This document summarizes a court case between Noel Buenaventura and Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura regarding the nullification of their marriage. Noel filed for nullification on the grounds of Isabel's alleged psychological incapacity. The trial court declared the marriage null and void due to Noel's psychological incapacity. It ordered monetary awards for Isabel, including moral damages. However, the Supreme Court overturned this, finding that the same acts cannot be considered the product of incapacity but also willful for awarding damages. It remanded the case for liquidation and equal distribution of property acquired during the marriage.
This document summarizes a court case between Noel Buenaventura and Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura regarding the nullification of their marriage. Noel filed for nullification on the grounds of Isabel's alleged psychological incapacity. The trial court declared the marriage null and void due to Noel's psychological incapacity. It ordered monetary awards for Isabel, including moral damages. However, the Supreme Court overturned this, finding that the same acts cannot be considered the product of incapacity but also willful for awarding damages. It remanded the case for liquidation and equal distribution of property acquired during the marriage.
This document summarizes a court case between Noel Buenaventura and Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura regarding the nullification of their marriage. Noel filed for nullification on the grounds of Isabel's alleged psychological incapacity. The trial court declared the marriage null and void due to Noel's psychological incapacity. It ordered monetary awards for Isabel, including moral damages. However, the Supreme Court overturned this, finding that the same acts cannot be considered the product of incapacity but also willful for awarding damages. It remanded the case for liquidation and equal distribution of property acquired during the marriage.
This document summarizes a court case between Noel Buenaventura and Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura regarding the nullification of their marriage. Noel filed for nullification on the grounds of Isabel's alleged psychological incapacity. The trial court declared the marriage null and void due to Noel's psychological incapacity. It ordered monetary awards for Isabel, including moral damages. However, the Supreme Court overturned this, finding that the same acts cannot be considered the product of incapacity but also willful for awarding damages. It remanded the case for liquidation and equal distribution of property acquired during the marriage.
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CIVREV-PERSONS
NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. CA and ISABEL LUCIA
SINGH BUENAVENTURA AZCUNA, J.: 1. Petitioner, Noel Buenaventura worked as Branch Manager and as VP of Far East Bank & Trust Co. He married Isable Lucia Singh on July 4, 1979. 2. He filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. 3. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. 4. July 31, 1995, the RTC: 1) marriage is null and void ab initio; 2) plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos, 3) liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property particularly the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3.6M; 4) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly; 5) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and 6) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh. 5. Petitioner appealed to CA. While the case was pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. CA issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000. ISSUE: WON the marriage between Noel and Lucia is null and void based on Art. 36 of NCC. YES HELD: On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code.
CA & TC considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact. The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis. SC has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings. The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code).
CIVREV-PERSONS
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of
a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared voidab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides: ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and (b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.