Angeles v.

Uy
Facts:

Judge Angeles of the RTC of Caloocan City charged Atty. Thomas Uy with violation of
Canon 16 of the CPR. Complainant states that respondents acts also rendered him
administratively liable. In a different case, a certain Norma Trajano alleged that she paid 20k to
privatecomplainant and the balance of 16.5k was delivered to Atty. Uy, the lawyer of privatecomplainant in the
different case. Complainant Del Rosario manifested that she did not receive the 16.5k pesos paid toAtty. Uy. Uy
however argued that his client did not like to accept the money. But such an assertionwas belied when Del
Rosario manifested her willingness to accept the money. Uy alleged that the amount was safely in his office in
the same building. As such, the proceedings were suspended in order for Uy to get the money from his office.
Yet, Uynever returned hence the administrative case against him. In his comment, Uy contends that he kept the
money in his office because it was the wishof his client. He allegedly informed them of such money and tried to
give it to them butthey insisted that he retain it in order for them to not spend it. The Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended that Uy be suspended for one month. It
was decided that the complainants side of the story had more merit.
Issue: WON Uy is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the CPR
Held: The Court agreed with the Office of the Bar Confidant. The relationship between a lawyer and a client is
highly fiduciary. It requires a highdegree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed to remove all such temptation
and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for the protection of the client.
Canon 16 of the CPR provides that
a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Furthermore, Rule 16.01 states that
a lawyer shall account for al the money or propertycollected or received for or from the client.
Respondent failed to promptly report and account for the 16.5k he had received fromTrajano on behalf of his
client. If it were true that Del Rosario was informed about the payment and that she entrusted itto Uy, she would
have known his whereabouts. That she did not know it showed falsityof the claim. In Aya v. Bigornia, the Court
ruled that money collected by a lawyer in favor of hisclients must be immediately turned over to them.
In Daroy v. Legaspi, the Court held that lawyers are bound to promptly account for
money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether the
lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar.
In this light, the Court must stress that it has the duty to look into dealings betweenattorneys and their clients
and to guard the latter from any undue consequences resultingfrom a situation in which they may stand unequal.
In the present case, the records merely show that respondent did not promptly report thathe received money on
behalf of his client. There is no clear evidence of misappropriation.Under the circumstances, Atty. Uy should be
suspended for only one month
Nakpil vs Valdes [A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]
Ponente: PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street,
Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed
that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to
their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he used to purchase and renovate the
property. Title was then issued in respondents name.

The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Jose Nakpil died.
Respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the Moran property
from the inventory of Joses estate and transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval
Realty Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes and the complainant.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.
RATIO:
[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,
computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate
which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In
the estate proceedings, the duty of respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but
which claims were prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in
the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms
from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of
the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar, respondent
exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
EN BANC
[Adm. Case No. 275. April 29, 1960.]
GERVACIO L. LIWAG, Complainant, v. ATTY. GILBERTO NERI, Respondent.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeralda Umali and Solicitor Antonio M. Consing for the complainant.
Gilberto Neri in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CIVIL LIABILITY IN RAPE; NOT DETERMINABLE IN CRIMINAL
ACTION ONLY. Contrary to the provisions of Article 135 of the Civil Code of Spain, to the effect that in

cases of rape the provisions of the Penal Code regarding the acknowledgment of the issue is to be observed,
Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not make the civil liability of the offender in a case of
rape determinable in a criminal action only. Article 30 of the same code also implies the right of an offended
party to bring a separate civil action for the criminal act without instituting the criminal proceedings for the
prosecution of the offense.
2. ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION UNNECESSARY; RULE 107 OF THE RULES OF
COURT REPEALED. The provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court are no longer in force because a
civil action may now be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment without waiting the institution and
termination of a criminal action (Arts. 30 and 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines). These new provisions
are inconsistent with the provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court and the latter must give way thereto. In
consequence, it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and presented to final
judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman and recognition of the
offspring can be instituted and presented to final judgment. The provisions of Rule 107 of the present Rules
promulgated in 1940, are, therefore, considered repealed or modified pro tanto by Articles 30 and 283 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
The complainant, Gervacio L. Liwag, seeks to disbar the respondent, Atty. Gilberto Neri.
Prior to October 21, 1952, the spouses Enrique and Ursula Pineda requested the complainant to act as counterindemnitor with the Manila Surety & Fidelity Company in a bond posted for said spouses in favor of the
National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC). When the Pinedas had failed to liquidate their obligation, the
NARIC enforced the bond against the Manila Surety and Fidelity Company and the latter in turn collected from
the complainant the sum of P2,951.35. Having failed to recover extra-judicially said amount from the Pinedas,
the complainant engaged the services of the respondent who agreed to handle the matter on a contingent fee of
forty per cent.
As they were his neighbors, the respondent, acting slowly, tried to talk to the Pinedas, who admitted their
indebtedness and pleaded for time to pay the same. On or about July 17, 1956, when no payment had been
made, the respondent wrote a letter of demand, threatening to take judicial action if the Pinedas would still not
meet their obligation. On the same date, the complainant delivered to the respondent the amount of P30.00 as
the filing fee for the necessary complaint. The respondent did not actually file any complaint, for the alleged
reason that debtor spouses had given assurances to pay, although he informed the complainant that he had
already done so. It did not take long before the truth was discovered and before the complainant was provoked
into commencing this administrative case.
It is an established fact that the respondent had received from the complainant P30.00 as filing fee. The
respondent argues that his services were not engaged solely "for the purpose of filing the corresponding
collection complaint", but to collect from the Pinedas the amount owed; or, in other words, that the respondent
was given full discretion as to the means for accomplishing the assignment. Assuming that this was so, the
respondent has committed a breach of professional ethics when, contrary to the fact, he made the complainant
believe that the Pineda spouses had already been sued in court and did not return the amount intended for the
filing fee.
Considering however, that the respondent has not yet received anything for his services and that the

complainant has subsequently been paid, disbarment or even suspension of the respondent from the practice of
his profession would be too harsh and unkind. We only hereby reprimand him for the offense, with the warning
that a repetition of similar misconduct or, for that matter, any violation of his oath will be dealt with more
drastically.
So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcin, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ.,
concur.
Diaz v. Kapunan
Facts:
Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona formed a business partnership. The business failed to prosper and
suffered losses. They formulated a document of sale and mortgage in which Mendezona recognized a debt in
favor of Diaz in the sum of 90k laid upon Mendezonas hacienda.
Later on, Mendezona was nowhere to be found and his family was unable to meet the payment. Thus, the
hacienda was offered for sale at public auction.
Diazs lawyer, Atty. Kapunan told the deputy sheriff of Leyte that he was ready to bid on the property up to
16k in order to assist the Mendezona family.
Later, Diaz and Kapunan entered into an agreement wherein Kapunan should withdraw his bid and refrain
from bidding in consideration of 1,000 pesos from Diaz.
Following the termination of the sheriffs sale, Diaz pressed charges against Kapunan for alleged
unprofessional conduct.
It was found that Kapunan was also the lawyer of the Mendezona family and was given extensive authority.
When Kapunan took part in the sale, it must be assumed that he was bidding in representation of his clients and
not for the benefit of his clients.
Three charges were considered against Kapunan. The first two were related to Kapunans attempt to
represent both the parties in the case and to molest and disturb Diaz by frviolous motions. The third charge has
to do with Kapunan having intervened in the manner in which he did in the sale of the property of his client
Mendezona.
The Atty-General is of the opinion that the facts constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions of article 1459
of the Civil Code and article 542 of the Penal Code.
Issue: WON Kapunan is guilty of such violations.
Held:
Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the following persons, naming them, annot take by purchase,
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another.The provision
contained in the last paragraph of said article is made to include lawyers.
The Court does not believe this article has been infringed by the respondent because he has not purchased
property at a public or judicial auction and because his participation was in representation of his client.
In article 542 of the Penal Code, it punishes ny person who shall solicit any gift or promise as a
consideration for agreeing to refrain from taking party in any public auction.
The agreement of both parties wherein Diaz pays Kapunan the sum of 1,000 pesos to withdraw from the sale
is exactly the situation covered by article 542 of the Penal Code.
Execution sales should be open to free and full competition in order to secure the maximum benefit of the
debtor.
The Court concluded that Atty. Kapunan has been guilty of a technical violation of art. 542 of the Penal Code.
However, since the complainant is equally guilty with the responded Kapunan and the latter was found to be
acting in good faith, Kapunan shall only be reprimanded.

Canlas vs. CA
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA,respondents.
G.R. No. L-77691
August 8, 1988
SARMIENTO,J .:
Facts:
The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon City for which he is the registered owner.
He secured loans from L and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of land for the
security of the same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the
properties in question after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The private respondent filed a
complaint for injunction over the said foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of land. Two years after the
filing of the petition, private respondent and L and R corporation entered into a compromise agreement that
renders the former to be insured another year for the said properties. Included in the stipulations were the
attorneys fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private respondent however, remained to be in turmoil
when it came to finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the attorneys fees, more so the
redemption liability. Relief was discussed by petitioner and private respondent executed a document to redeem
the parcels of land and to register the same to his name.
Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the parcels of land to his name but without prior
notice, the properties were already registered under the petitioners name. The private respondent calls for a
review and for the court to act on the said adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties
consolidated by the redemption price he paid for said properties. The private respondent filed a suit for the
annulment of judgment in the Court of appeals which ruled over the same.
Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the said properties.
Ruling:
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was
willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and
petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," a development that should have
tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his
client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." The
Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The
petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do
not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money."
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas
monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his liability for payment of
the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his
lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other.

Emilio Capulong vs Manuel Alio

In 1957, the spouses Emilio and Cirila Capulong lost a civil case. They were represented by Atty. Manuel Alio.
The spouses then gave P298.00 (then a significant amount of money) in order for the lawyer to use the money
in paying for fees in appealing the case. However, the appeal was dismissed because Atty. Alio failed to pay
the docket fees and other required fees.
The spouses then filed an administrative case against Atty. Alio. In his defense, Atty. Alio claimed that he was
given the option to either use the money for appeal if in his judgment an appeal is proper or to appropriate the
same for his legal services. The investigating fiscal recommended disciplinary action against Atty. Alio. The
Solicitor General agreed with the fiscal. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Atty. Alio manifested his
intent to produce additional evidence. The SC granted his request but, after four postponements which Atty.
Alio asked for, he still failed to adduce additional evidence within the prescribe period. The SC still gave him a
chance and scheduled an oral argument but again, Atty. Alio asked for postponement. In lieu of the oral
argument, the SC required Alio to submit his memorandum which he again failed to comply with.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alio should be subjected to disciplinary action.
HELD: Yes. Alio was already negligent when he failed to pay the docket fees. In the first place, he already
filed the appeal, hence, he should have applied the money given to him to pay for the docket fees. It is clear
that Alio misappropriated the funds when he applied the same as payment for his fees.
But his later actions in this case shows his high degree of irresponsibility. He was given all chances by the SC
but he continually failed to comply with the orders of the court. Such display of irresponsibility indicates his
unworthiness as a member of the legal profession. Alio was disbarred by the Supreme Court.