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    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.: Nos. 17995 and 17996

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    This document summarizes a court case regarding a wrongful death suit and request for contribution between two shipping companies. The court found that while a collision occurred that resulted in the death of a seaman, one company was not entitled to contribution from the other. Specifically: 1) The seaman died in a collision between a launch transporting him between his ship and shore, and another vessel. Both the launch and vessel were found at fault. 2) The launch was operated by an independent contractor, not the seaman's employer shipping company. Therefore, contribution could only be sought from the launch operator, not the employer company. 3) The employer's obligations to the seaman under the Jones Act did

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    Public Domain
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    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.: Nos. 17995 and 17996

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    19 views4 pages
    This document summarizes a court case regarding a wrongful death suit and request for contribution between two shipping companies. The court found that while a collision occurred that resulted in the death of a seaman, one company was not entitled to contribution from the other. Specifically: 1) The seaman died in a collision between a launch transporting him between his ship and shore, and another vessel. Both the launch and vessel were found at fault. 2) The launch was operated by an independent contractor, not the seaman's employer shipping company. Therefore, contribution could only be sought from the launch operator, not the employer company. 3) The employer's obligations to the seaman under the Jones Act did

    Original Description:

    Filed: 1970-02-04 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 421 F.2d 851 Docket: 17996_1

    Original Title

    Arsenia C. Mendez, Administratrix of the Estate of Domingo Mendez, Deceased v. States Marine Lines, Inc. And Ocean Freighting and Brokerage Corporation,states Marine Lines, Inc., in No. 17,995, Ocean Freighting Andbrokerage Corporation, in No. 17,996, 421 F.2d 851, 3rd Cir. (1970)

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    This document summarizes a court case regarding a wrongful death suit and request for contribution between two shipping companies. The court found that while a collision occurred that resulted in the death of a seaman, one company was not entitled to contribution from the other. Specifically: 1) The seaman died in a collision between a launch transporting him between his ship and shore, and another vessel. Both the launch and vessel were found at fault. 2) The launch was operated by an independent contractor, not the seaman's employer shipping company. Therefore, contribution could only be sought from the launch operator, not the employer company. 3) The employer's obligations to the seaman under the Jones Act did

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    19 views4 pages

    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.: Nos. 17995 and 17996

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    This document summarizes a court case regarding a wrongful death suit and request for contribution between two shipping companies. The court found that while a collision occurred that resulted in the death of a seaman, one company was not entitled to contribution from the other. Specifically: 1) The seaman died in a collision between a launch transporting him between his ship and shore, and another vessel. Both the launch and vessel were found at fault. 2) The launch was operated by an independent contractor, not the seaman's employer shipping company. Therefore, contribution could only be sought from the launch operator, not the employer company. 3) The employer's obligations to the seaman under the Jones Act did

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    of 4

    421 F.

    2d 851

    Arsenia C. MENDEZ, Administratrix of the Estate of Domingo


    Mendez, Deceased,
    v.
    STATES MARINE LINES, INC. and Ocean Freighting and
    Brokerage
    Corporation,States Marine Lines, Inc., Appellant
    in No. 17,995, Ocean Freighting
    andBrokerage Corporation,
    Appellant in No. 17,996.
    Nos. 17995 and 17996.

    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.


    Argued Dec. 19, 1969.
    Decided Feb. 4, 1970.

    James F. Young, Krusen, Evans & Byrne, Philadelphia, Pa. (Raymond T.


    Letulle, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for States Marine Lines, Inc.
    John A. McMenamin, Clark, Ladner, Fortenbaugh & Young,
    Philadelphia, Pa. (Robert N. Ferrer, Benjamin F. Stahl, Jr., Philadelphia,
    Pa., on the brief), for Ocean Freighting & Brokerage Corp.
    Before McLAUGHLIN, FREEDMAN and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    GERALD McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge.

    This was originally a damage action brought by the administratrix of the estate
    of Domingo Mendez, a seaman drowned in a ship accident in Danang Harbor,
    Vietnam, while in the employ of appellee, States Marine Lines. Both States
    Marine and appellant, Ocean Freighting and Brokerage Corporation, were
    named defendants. However, prior to trial, Ocean Freighting entered into a
    settlement with the estate. Ocean Freighting is here appealing an order of the
    district court dismissing its contribution claim against States Marine.

    The factual framework in which the controlling issue arises can be briefly
    outlined. Mendez, while a crewman on a States Marine vessel, boarded a
    launch (not owned or operated by States Marine though engaged by it) for
    transport to the shore. In route, the launch collided with an Ocean Freighting
    vessel, and Mendez drowned. The court below found that both the Ocean
    Freighting vessel and the launch were negligent (264a). From that arises the
    Ocean Freighting contention that it should receive contribution on the basis of
    the 'admiralty divided damage-- collision rule.' States Marine not only opposes
    the application of this rule to the factual situation, but in its cross-appeal urges
    that the court below was 'clearly erroneous' in finding fault on the part of the
    launch in that the record does not support such a finding.-- Because we affirm
    the decision below agreeing that Ocean Freighting is not entitled to
    contribution, we need not consider the merits of appellee's protective crossappeal.

    The controlling issue is simply whether or not the maritime collisioncontribution rule is relevent to the facts of this case. Of course, it is well-settled
    that in non-collision maritime torts, there is no contribution between joint tortfeasors. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96
    L.Ed. 318 (1952).

    Turning to the facts, it is undisputed that the death of Mendez resulted from the
    collision of the launch and the Ocean Freighting vessel. To repeat, the court
    below found both the vessel and launch at fault. Since the launch was,
    admittedly, not owned by States Marine and since we are in accord with the
    ruling of the trial court that it was operated by its owner as an independent
    contractor,1 it seems clear to us that the launch owner and not the owner of the
    vessel it was servicing would be the proper party from whom Ocean Freighting
    might seek contribution.

    Appellant in its contention that the particular launch service was an agent of
    States Marine and thus, the launch's negligence is attributable to States Marine
    further argues that States Marine's Jones Act (48 U.S.C. 688) obligations to
    Mendez (or his estate) imposes liability upon States Marine for its contribution
    claim. With respect to the liability stemming out of agency principles theory,
    the court below in determining that the launch was an independent contractor,
    held that 'There was no right of direct control over the operation of the motor
    launch by * * * (States Marine).' (265a) We see no reason to disturb these
    conclusions.

    The court also decided that with respect to Mendez, the launch's negligence
    would be attributed to States Marine. Certainly this is correct for it is elemental

    that Mendez' employer was obligated to insure Mendez safe means of ingress
    and egress from his ship. But it does not follow that the liability imposed upon
    employer States Marine by the Jones Act vis a vis seaman Mendez can be so
    twisted as to support Ocean Freighting's contribution claim. The Jones Act was
    enacted for the benefit of seamen. Mr. Justice Stone stated this clearly in The
    Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123, 56 S.Ct. 707, 711-712, 80 L.Ed. 1075
    (1936):
    7

    '* * * With respect to the modified and in some respects enlarged liability
    imported into the maritime law by the Jones Act * * * the legislation was
    remedial, for the benefit and protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards
    of admiralty. Its purpose was to enlarge that protection * * *. Its provisions * *
    * are to be liberally construed to attain that end, * * *.'

    The Jones Act was not designed to extend ship owner's liability regarding other
    ship owners. Appellant's argument that States Marine's Jones Act obligations to
    Mendez creates contribution liability in States Marine to Ocean Freighting is
    completely without merit. We are satisfied the district court was entirely correct
    in its determination that under the circumstances of this appeal '* * * there is no
    basis for applying the collision exception to the contribution rule in admiralty.'
    (266a). State Marine's vessel on which Mendez was a crew member was not
    involved in a collision with appellant's vessel. In Halcyon Lines, supra, the
    Supreme Court made it clear that any enlargement of the collision contribution
    rule in admiralty must come from the Congress. A recent comment by Judge
    Friendly of the Second Circuit in McLaughlin v. Trelleborgs Angfartygs A/B,
    408 F.2d 1334, 1338, cert. den. 395 U.S. 946, 89 S.Ct. 2020, 23 L.Ed.2d 464
    (1969) is sound in stating that unless Congress acts,

    'So long as Halcyon v. Haenn, * * * 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, * * * remains
    on the books, inferior federal courts will do better to abstain from further
    adventures in this wonderland and leave doctrinal development to the Supreme
    Court * * *.'

    10

    The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

    11

    FREEDMAN, Circuit Judge (concurring).

    12

    It is ironic that admiralty, normally so hospitable to equitable principles, should


    deny contribution except in a strictly limited category of 'collision' cases. But
    this is the doctrine of Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72
    S.Ct. 277 (1952).

    13

    Halcyon might be interpreted not to bar relief here, since a collision did in fact
    occur, albeit States Marine Lines had delegated to an independent contractor its
    duty of transporting its seamen to shore. But the construction the case has
    received warns against our expansion of its doctrine (see McLaughlin v.
    Trelleborgs Angfartygs A/B, 408 F.2d 1334, 1338 (2 Cir.), cert. denied 395
    U.S. 946, 89 S.Ct. 2020, 23 L.Ed.2d 464 1969)) and leads me to the conclusion
    that we should not permit contribution in a case which seems to go beyond the
    factual circumstances marked out in Halcyon.

    14

    Therefore, while joining in the conclusion of the court, I express the hope that
    there may be review and with it a reexamination of the existing limitation on
    contribution in admiralty.

    The launch service in question, probably the only such service in Danang
    Harbor, evidently served all of the harbor's vessels. (213a)

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