Not Precedential
Not Precedential
Not Precedential
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
Based on this information, the District Court determined that Santiagos guidelines
range was 97-121 months. At the sentencing hearing, Santiago challenged the gun
enhancement1 and sought a departure under USSG 4A1.3 on the ground that his
placement in the Criminal History Category II overstated the seriousness of his criminal
record.2 Moreover, he asked the District Court to consider [his] entire prior background
including his long[-]standing addiction to drugs, school history, work history, family
history, and his difficult childhood in Puerto Rico where his family lived in poverty.3
Because his criminal activity stemmed from his drug addiction, and there was no
evidence of violence or that anyone was harmed by his activity, Santiago asked the
District Court to impose a sentence below the guidelines range.4 The Government argued
for a within-guidelines range sentence, acknowledging that while Santiago had a
substance abuse problem, his offense included significant quantities of drugs, $23,000 in
cash, and multiple undercover purchases over an extended period of time, demonstrating
that Santiago was involved in large-scale drug trafficking.5
The District Court sustained this objection and thus reduced his offense level to 29,
resulting in the guidelines range of 97-121 months.
2
Santiago acknowledged that his criminal history category was correctly calculated, but
argued that assigning two criminal history points for juvenile adjudication regarding
possession of drug paraphernalia overstated the severity of this offense.
3
App. 42.
4
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court responded that this was not an objection
but rather an argument in support of a variance from the applicable range, to which
counsel agreed. App. 90. The District Court, however, addressed the argument as both a
variance and a request for a downward departure.
5
The Government also observed that Santiago had no verifiable income (but still owned
a car) and admitted that he gambled regularly with significant sums of money; that
Santiago was arrested in March 2011 by local authorities and was released on bailand
3
went right back to his drug trafficking activity selling crack to an informant in April
2011.
6
App. 126.
7
App. 127. The District Court also observed that even if it were to agree with Santiago
that the two criminal history points overstate his criminal history category, it would have
only reduced it by one point, still placing Santiago in a criminal history category II.
8
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3231, and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
9
United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851-52 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States
v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009)). In United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d
253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc), we held that when a party wishes to appeal based on a
4
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).10 We then review the substantive reasonableness
of the sentence imposed.11 Our substantive review examines whether the record as a
whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of those same 3553(a) factors.12
For a sentencing court to give meaningful consideration to the 3553(a) sentencing
factors, [it] must acknowledge and respond to any properly presented sentencing
argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual basis.13
Moreover, [t]he
sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
considered the parties arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority . . . . Nonetheless, when a judge decides simply to apply the
Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy
explanation.14 Assuming a defendant does, in fact, make a colorable argument under
3553(a) in support of a downward variance, it is sufficient for a district court to consider
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant as a whole.15
procedural error at sentencing, that party must object to the procedural error in order to
avoid plain error review on appeal. We also held that our prior ruling in United States v.
Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2008), would remain applicable to cases imposed before
Flores was announced.
10
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).
11
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.
12
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
13
United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 328-29 (3d Cir. 2007).
14
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (citation omitted).
15
18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1); see Rita, 551 U.S. at 356.
5