United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
2d 91
During the period in which the parties negotiated and the bankruptcy court
entered these orders, the debtor stopped paying Equitable Gas. Equitable
promptly petitioned for permission to terminate service. In April 1984, the
bankruptcy court approved a payment timetable, but denied Equitable's right to
terminate service, app. at 20-21. The court also denied Equitable permission to
terminate service automatically upon noncompliance with the payment
schedule. Although the debtor subsequently breached the payment agreement,
Equitable Gas continued to provide natural gas pursuant to the bankruptcy
court's order. On May 31, 1984, Equitable notified the bankruptcy court that
debtor had not made the first required payment, and that it desired a prompt
hearing on its motion to terminate service. A hearing was held June 20, 1984.
At that time another payment schedule was arranged, and Equitable was again
denied permission to terminate without leave of court in the event of
noncompliance. The court made it clear that it was seeking to protect the
lienholders by assuring that the business could be sold as a going concern on
July 10, 1984. The court did grant Equitable a superpriority for the period from
the hearing until July 9. App. at 25-33. Because of misunderstandings, the sale
was not held on July 10, but was continued until July 26, 1984, at which time
McKeesport was sold as a going concern for $500,000. At that time it was
stipulated that the debtor was $57,261.16 in arrears for post-petition gas
service. The distribution to creditors, however, was subject to future claims
approved by the court. App. at 85.
In December 1984, Equitable moved for payment for post-petition gas service,
and the bankruptcy court granted payment in May 1985. Equibank then
appealed this order to the district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court.
Equitable Gas now appeals the order of the district court.
II.
6
Equitable Gas contends that the bankruptcy court's order granting payment was
justified on a number of bases. Equitable argues that we may sustain the
payment under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 506(c), as a necessary cost or expense of
preserving or disposing of the debtor's property, or pursuant to Sec. 366(b),
which provides that a utility may discontinue service if it is not furnished
adequate assurance of payment for that service. Additionally, Equitable
maintains that pursuant to paragraph 4 of the third cash collateral order, app. at
141, it has a superpriority claim mandating payment for gas service it provided.
Finally, Equitable alleges that failure to affirm the bankruptcy court's order will
result in a violation of the fifth amendment--the taking of private property for a
public use, without just compensation.
8 an appellate court twice removed from the primary tribunal, we review both the
As
factual and the legal determinations of the district court for error. The district court
does not sit as a finder of facts in evaluating them as a court of review, and therefore
its evaluation of the evidence is not shielded by the "clearly erroneous" standard of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), which applies only to a trial court sitting as a fact finder. We are
in as good a position as the district court to review the findings of the bankruptcy
court, so we review the bankruptcy court's findings by the standards the district
court should employ, to determine whether the district court erred in its review. To
the extent the parties challenge the choice, interpretation, or application of legal
precepts, we always employ the fullest scope of review: we examine the decision of
the court from which the appeal is taken for error, and the legal determinations of
the district court as a reviewing tribunal are not shielded by any presumption of
correctness.
9
III.
10
Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that: "The trustee may recover
10
11
A number of courts have held that parties other than the trustee have standing
to recover under provisions stipulating that only the trustee may act. In In re
Philadelphia Light Supply Co., 39 B.R. 51 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1984), the court
permitted the creditors committee to bring a section 547 preference action
where the trustee/debtor in possession refused to act and the creditors had a
colorable claim. Accord In re Monsour Medical Center, 5 B.R. 715
(Bankr.W.D.Pa.1980). A landlord recovered his expenses, pursuant to Sec.
506(c), in In re Isaac Cohen Clothing Corp., 39 B.R. 199
(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1984). Finally, in In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 B.R. 278
(N.D. Ohio 1985), the court permitted the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to bring a section 506(c) suit because it found that the EPA had assumed
the trustee's duty to remove hazardous waste. But see In re Fabian, 46 B.R. 139
(Bankr.E.D.Pa.1985) (reliance on In re Codesco ); In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R.
225 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (strict interpretation of Sec. 506(c) permitting only
trustee to recover).
12
Based on the above cases, we hold that Equitable Gas has standing to recover.
The rule that individual creditors cannot act in lieu of the trustee is often
breached when sufficient reason exists to permit the breach. In this case, neither
the debtor in possession nor a creditors committee had reason to make a claim
on behalf of Equitable, when the debtor thereby would be required to pay for
utilities it had received without charge following the date that its petition was
filed. Thus, because Equitable Gas had a colorable claim for expenses and was
the only creditor that would zealously pursue that claim, it has standing to bring
a Sec. 506(c) action. See In re Isaac Cohen Clothing Corp., 39 B.R. 199
(landlord was only creditor with reason to bring Sec. 506(c) action).
13
Appellee Equibank argues that even if Equitable Gas had standing, the fact that
Equitable supplied gas did not benefit the secured creditors. Appellee relies on
In re Flagstaff Food Service Corp., 762 F.2d 10 (2d Cir.1985), in which the
court denied recovery for payment of payroll taxes. In that case, the court
rejected the general assertion that payment of the taxes contributed to
reorganization and increased the going concern value of the assets. Rather, the
court required the debtor to "show that its funds were expended primarily for
the benefit of the creditor and that the creditor directly benefitted from the
expenditure." Id. at 12. In accepting appellee's argument, the district court relied
on Miners Savings Bank v. Joyce, 97 F.2d 973 (3d Cir.1938), which held that
expenses necessary to preserve the property, but not operating expenses of a
business, are recoverable.
14
15
16
Thus, even under the stricter test of Flagstaff, by providing natural gas to the
debtor, Equitable benefited the secured creditors. Because distribution was
made only to secured creditors, the increased price realized when McKeesport
was sold as a going concern directly benefited those creditors.2
IV.
17
Thus, we hold that the bankruptcy court correctly ordered payment to be made
to Equitable Gas for providing post-petition gas service as an administrative
expense necessary to preserve the going concern value of the debtor's estate.
Because we uphold the action of the bankruptcy court based on Sec. 506(c), we
need not consider the parties' other statutory and constitutional arguments. The
order of the district court will be reversed, and the order of the bankruptcy
court will be affirmed.
We address only one other minor point raised by Equibank. At bottom, all of
Equibank's arguments, which were accepted by the district court, rest on a
fundamental mischaracterization of the situation. Equibank attempts to equate
the secured creditors with the debtor, thus arguing that the bankruptcy court
abused its discretion because it ordered the secured creditors to pay the debtor's
utility bills. Equitable Gas was paid out of the property of the debtor's estate;
distribution of the assets was subject to future claims approved by the
bankruptcy court. To the extent that approval of claims diminished the
distribution, the secured creditors received less money than they might have.
But the money they receive is only "theirs" once all the valid administrative
claims are paid out of the debtor's estate