In Re: Donnell Ponton V., 3rd Cir. (2011)
In Re: Donnell Ponton V., 3rd Cir. (2011)
In Re: Donnell Ponton V., 3rd Cir. (2011)
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-3028
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In re: DONNELL PONTON, and
PERTANIAL PONTON,
Debtors
Donnell Ponton,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-04384)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
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Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P.
10.6
September 20, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 29, 2011)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
In late November of 2009, Donnell and Pertanial Ponton filed for protection under
Chapter 13 (11 U.S.C. 130130) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 Their
voluntary petition noted that the sole piece of real property owned by the couple, the
parcel located at 3714 N. 18th Street in Philadelphia, was in foreclosure proceedings.
Vericrest Financial, Inc. (Vericrest) was listed as the relevant secured creditor.
Eventually, the Pontons and Vericrest reached an agreement that allowed, in part,
for a small grace period and a shifting of arrears owed on the property to the end of the
repayment period. The Pontons would be responsible for paying the monthly mortgage
payment after the expiration of the grace period. In the event of a default on these
payments not cured within a fifteen-day window, Vericrest reserved the right to certify
the default to [the] Court, after which an Order shall be entered granting Vericrest . . .
relief from the automatic stay without further notice and hearing. The Bankruptcy Court
approved the arrangement on January 10, 2011.
Dtente was to be short-lived. In April, Vericrest (through counsel) sent the
Pontons a notice of default; in May, it filed a Certification of Default with the Bankruptcy
Court, alleging a failure by the Pontons to pay any of the monies owed under the
agreement and requesting a termination of the automatic stay. Donnell Ponton objected
to the Certification of Default, filing a confusing document that accused Vericrest of,
inter alia, Perjury in the Judicial Context and sundry violations of the 14th
Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the trustee moved to dismiss the case due to a fail[ure]
See Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 2011).
We have held that an order lifting an automatic stay is appealable. See In re Connors,
497 F.3d 314, 318 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Pelullo, 178 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir.
1999).
4
Invs. v. Howard Sav. Bank, 972 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1992) (Once the bankruptcy
proceeding is dismissed, neither the goal of a successful reorganization nor the debtors
right to the automatic stay continues to exist. Accordingly, it no longer serves any
purpose to determine whether the bankruptcy court properly lifted the automatic stay; the
appeal has become moot.); In re Income Property Builders, Inc., 699 F.2d 963, 964 (9th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (Once the bankruptcy was dismissed, a bankruptcy court no
longer had power to order the stay or to award damages allegedly attributable to its
vacation. A remand by us to the bankruptcy court would therefore be useless.).
[W]hether a case or controversy remains after the dismissal of a bankruptcy case
depends on whether the issue being litigated directly involves the reorganization of the
debtors estate. In re Universal Farming Indus., 873 F.2d 1332, 1333 (9th Cir. 1989).
Here, as in Olive Street Investments, it would serve no purpose for us to determine
whether the [B]ankruptcy [C]ourt properly lifted the automatic stay now that there is no
bankruptcy proceeding whatsoever in which to ground a stay. 972 F.2d at 216. Simply
put, even if the Bankruptcy Courts lifting of the stay was somehow erroneous, we could
not redress it now that an order of dismissal, which Ponton did not challenge, has been
entered.
For the reasons given, we will dismiss Pontons appeal as moot. His remaining
motions are denied.