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    Anthony Pritchett v. Shawn Warrender, 3rd Cir. (2013)

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    The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, Detective Shawn Warrender, in a §1983 malicious prosecution claim brought by Anthony Pritchett. The district court concluded that Pritchett failed to present legally sufficient evidence that Warrender acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Pritchett. Specifically, Pritchett conceded that his only evidence of malice was a false statement in Warrender's affidavit, which the district court found was not enough to reach the jury on the issue of malice. The Third Circuit agreed that Pritchett was required to prove both lack of probable cause and malice, and that he failed

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    Anthony Pritchett v. Shawn Warrender, 3rd Cir. (2013)

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    The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, Detective Shawn Warrender, in a §1983 malicious prosecution claim brought by Anthony Pritchett. The district court concluded that Pritchett failed to present legally sufficient evidence that Warrender acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Pritchett. Specifically, Pritchett conceded that his only evidence of malice was a false statement in Warrender's affidavit, which the district court found was not enough to reach the jury on the issue of malice. The Third Circuit agreed that Pritchett was required to prove both lack of probable cause and malice, and that he failed

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    Filed: 2013-11-04 Precedential Status: Non-Precedential Docket: 12-3906

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    The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, Detective Shawn Warrender, in a §1983 malicious prosecution claim brought by Anthony Pritchett. The district court concluded that Pritchett failed to present legally sufficient evidence that Warrender acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Pritchett. Specifically, Pritchett conceded that his only evidence of malice was a false statement in Warrender's affidavit, which the district court found was not enough to reach the jury on the issue of malice. The Third Circuit agreed that Pritchett was required to prove both lack of probable cause and malice, and that he failed

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    55 views5 pages

    Anthony Pritchett v. Shawn Warrender, 3rd Cir. (2013)

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    The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, Detective Shawn Warrender, in a §1983 malicious prosecution claim brought by Anthony Pritchett. The district court concluded that Pritchett failed to present legally sufficient evidence that Warrender acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Pritchett. Specifically, Pritchett conceded that his only evidence of malice was a false statement in Warrender's affidavit, which the district court found was not enough to reach the jury on the issue of malice. The Third Circuit agreed that Pritchett was required to prove both lack of probable cause and malice, and that he failed

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    of 5

    NOT PRECEDENTIAL

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 12-3906
    _____________
    ANTHONY PRITCHETT,
    Appellant
    v.
    SHAWN WARRENDER, INDIVIDUALLY & IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A
    DETECTIVE IN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF
    PHILADELPHIA; JOHN DOES 1-10
    ____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (Case No. 11-cv-4682)
    Magistrate Judge: Honorable Timothy R. Rice
    ____________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    Argued: October 8, 2013
    Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
    (Opinion Filed: November 4, 2013)
    Matthew B. Weisberg [Argued]
    Weisberg Law, P.C.
    7 South Morton Avenue
    Morton, PA 19070
    Attorney for Appellant
    Elise M. Bruhl [Argued]
    Deputy Solicitor, Appeals
    City of Philadelphia Law Department
    1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor

    Philadelphia, PA 19102-1595
    Attorney for Appellees

    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________

    FUENTES, Circuit Judge:


    Anthony Pritchett appeals from the District Courts judgment in favor of Shawn
    Warrender. Pritchett had sought to recover from Warrender, a police detective, for
    maliciously prosecuting him in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. After the parties presented
    their evidence at a jury trial, the District Court concluded that Pritchett had not come
    forward with legally sufficient evidence of malice. The District Court entered judgment
    as a matter of law for Warrender. We affirm.
    I. Background
    Pritchetts claim of malicious prosecution stems from Pennsylvanias efforts to
    hold him criminally liable for the theft of a laptop computer. Based largely on the
    suspicions of Pritchetts work supervisor, who reported the disappearance of her laptop to
    the police, Warrender arrested Pritchett on July 28, 2010 for three theft-related offenses.
    But the prosecution stalled. After holding Pritchett in pre-trial custody for months, the
    government withdrew its charges on January 13, 2011 and he was released.
    Following his release, Pritchett sued Warrender and the City of Philadelphia for
    maliciously prosecuting him in violation Pennsylvania state law and 42 U.S.C. 1983.
    Before trial, the District Court granted summary judgment in the Citys favor, but the
    Court found that disputes of fact precluded summary judgment in Warrenders favor.
    Pritchett presented his case against Warrender to a jury. At the close of the
    evidence, but before the jury received the case, the District Court heard argument on
    2

    Warrenders motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court focused the parties on
    element of malice. In particular, the Court questioned how the jury could lawfully
    conclude that Warrender, for example, had been motivated by spite, did not actually
    suspect Pritchett of wrongdoing, or intended to prosecute Pritchett for some improper
    purpose. In response, Pritchett noted that he had offered evidence that Warrender had
    made a false statement in an affidavit of probable cause. The District Court ruled that
    Pritchett need[ed] more than a false statement in order to reach the jury on the question
    of malice. (J.A. 174.) The Court then entered judgment in Warrenders favor.
    Pritchett now appeals the District Courts judgment on the 1983 claim.
    II. Analysis 1
    According to Pritchett, the District Court committed three errors: (1) requiring him
    to prove the element of malice as distinct from the absence of probable cause; (2)
    refusing to permit the jury to infer malice from the absence of probable cause; and (3)
    disregarding the law of the case as established at summary judgment.
    None of these arguments persuades us to vacate the judgment of the District Court.
    First, the trial judge did not err by insisting that Pritchett come forward with evidence of
    both the absence of probable cause and the presence of malice. In this circuit, a plaintiff
    seeking to recover for malicious prosecution pursuant to 1983 must show that a
    defendant initiated criminal proceedings against him without probable cause. See, e.g.,
    1

    The District Court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. This Court has
    jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. The Third Circuit exercises plenary
    review of a district courts decision to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law. ZF
    Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, this Court applies
    the same standard as a district court: A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be
    granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it
    the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a
    jury reasonably could find liability. Id. (quotation marks omitted).

    Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). A plaintiff must also
    show that the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the
    plaintiff to justice. Id. The District Court properly separated these two elements.
    Pritchett rests his contrary view on Sykes v. Anderson, where the U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Sixth Circuit held that malice was not an element of a 1983 malicious
    prosecution claim. See 625 F.3d 294, 309-10 (6th Cir. 2010). Sykes v. Anderson,
    however, is not the law in the Third Circuit, so the District Court did not err by requiring
    the element of malice.
    Second, Pritchett cannot obtain a new trial on the grounds that the District Court
    neglected to invoke the common law doctrine that a fact-finder may infer malice from the
    absence of probable cause. [I]t is well established that failure to raise an issue in the
    district court constitutes a waiver of the argument. Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d
    632, 645 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Pritchett failed to
    invoke the inference of malice before the District Court and therefore did not preserve the
    issue for review.
    Third, the District Courts denial of summary judgment did not create law of the
    case that ensured Pritchetts claim would reach the jury. [T]he law of the case doctrine
    limits relitigation of an issue once it has been decided in an earlier stage of the same
    litigation. Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 786 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks
    omitted). When the record contains new material evidence, however, a court may revisit
    an earlier ruling. Id. at 787. That is the circumstance here, where the District Court
    entered judgment as a matter of law on a different and more complete record than the one
    on which it denied summary judgment. Indeed, the trial judge properly considered

    Warrenders motion for judgment as a matter of law only after Pritchett had been fully
    heard on [the] issue during a jury trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
    III. Conclusion
    We affirm the District Courts judgment. Pritchett had the burden to introduce
    evidence from which the jury could conclude that Warrender acted with malice. He did
    not meet it. Pritchett conceded to the trial judge that his proof of malice hinged on a false
    statement in Warrenders affidavit of probable cause. The District Court correctly
    determined that a malicious prosecution claim required more than a false statement to
    prevail. Pritchett cannot fault the District Court for failing to infer malice from his
    evidence regarding the absence of probable cause, because Pritchett never raised that
    theory to the trial judge. Nor can Pritchett avoid judgment as a matter of law by pointing
    to a favorable summary judgment ruling. The District Court properly considered whether
    or not Pritchett had introduced evidence at trial from which the jury could find in his
    favor.

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