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    - Willie Davis, an inmate with asthma, suffered asthma attacks after pepper spray was used on another inmate in his housing unit. He sued prison officials Brown and Bledsoe alleging they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to place a sign on his cell door instructing staff to remove him before using pepper spray. - The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding they were not deliberately indifferent because they reasonably deferred to the judgment of medical staff who treated Davis. Discovery was not necessary because the defendants did not directly provide medical care and were entitled to rely on medical staff. - The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that non-medical prison officials cannot be found deliberately indifferent when an inmate is already receiving medical treatment,

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    - Willie Davis, an inmate with asthma, suffered asthma attacks after pepper spray was used on another inmate in his housing unit. He sued prison officials Brown and Bledsoe alleging they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to place a sign on his cell door instructing staff to remove him before using pepper spray. - The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding they were not deliberately indifferent because they reasonably deferred to the judgment of medical staff who treated Davis. Discovery was not necessary because the defendants did not directly provide medical care and were entitled to rely on medical staff. - The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that non-medical prison officials cannot be found deliberately indifferent when an inmate is already receiving medical treatment,

    Original Description:

    Filed: 2014-02-25 Precedential Status: Non-Precedential Docket: 13-2575

    Original Title

    Willie Davis v. S. Brown, 3rd Cir. (2014)

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    - Willie Davis, an inmate with asthma, suffered asthma attacks after pepper spray was used on another inmate in his housing unit. He sued prison officials Brown and Bledsoe alleging they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to place a sign on his cell door instructing staff to remove him before using pepper spray. - The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding they were not deliberately indifferent because they reasonably deferred to the judgment of medical staff who treated Davis. Discovery was not necessary because the defendants did not directly provide medical care and were entitled to rely on medical staff. - The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that non-medical prison officials cannot be found deliberately indifferent when an inmate is already receiving medical treatment,

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    42 views8 pages

    Not Precedential

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    Scribd Government Docs
    - Willie Davis, an inmate with asthma, suffered asthma attacks after pepper spray was used on another inmate in his housing unit. He sued prison officials Brown and Bledsoe alleging they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to place a sign on his cell door instructing staff to remove him before using pepper spray. - The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding they were not deliberately indifferent because they reasonably deferred to the judgment of medical staff who treated Davis. Discovery was not necessary because the defendants did not directly provide medical care and were entitled to rely on medical staff. - The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that non-medical prison officials cannot be found deliberately indifferent when an inmate is already receiving medical treatment,

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    of 8

    NOT PRECEDENTIAL

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 13-2575
    ____________
    WILLIE L. DAVIS,
    Appellant
    v.
    S. BROWN; WARDEN B.A. BLEDSOE
    __________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 3-12-cv-01294)
    District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
    __________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 24, 2014
    Before: SMITH, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: February 25, 2014)
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________

    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Willie Davis appeals from an order of the District Court granting
    summary judgment to the defendants. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

    Davis, who is housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU) at the United
    States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, suffers from asthma. On January 12,
    2012, pepper spray (Oleoresin Capsicum) was used to subdue another inmate in the
    SMU. Davis was affected and he suffered a severe asthma attack. He was taken to the
    prison Health Services and treated successfully. Following this episode, Davis submitted
    an informal request to staff asking that a sign be placed on his cell door instructing staff
    to remove him from the area before pepper spray is used in the SMU. According to
    Davis, Health Services Administrator S. Brown ignored his request.
    Dissatisfied with Browns lack of a response, in February, 2012, Davis submitted
    a grievance to Warden Bledsoe. Warden Bledsoe denied his request that a sign be placed
    on his cell door which instructed staff to remove him from the area prior to using pepper
    spray in the SMU, noting that Davis had been treated by the health services staff
    following the January, 2012 incident, and advising Davis to take any future medical
    concerns to the medical personnel who were treating him. Several months later, on June
    8, 2012, Davis suffered another asthma attack when pepper spray was used in the SMU.
    He was taken to Health Services and treated.
    Davis filed a Bivens1 action in the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of Pennsylvania against Administrator Brown and Warden Bledsoe, alleging that
    they violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment because they refused his request
    that in the future he be removed from his cell prior to the use of pepper spray in the SMU.

    Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
    (1971).
    2

    Brown and Warden Bledsoe moved to dismiss Davis amended complaint, or, in the
    alternative, for summary judgment. The defendants noted that Warden Bledsoe had
    retired prior to the second incident, and that neither Warden Bledsoe nor Administrator
    Brown directly provided health care to inmates, and, accordingly, neither could be held
    personally liable to Davis for money damages in a civil rights actions. In the alternative,
    Davis failed to show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a serious
    medical need. The defendants further argued in the alternative that they were qualifiedly
    immunized from a suit for damages. The defendants successfully moved to stay
    discovery pending the outcome of their motion.
    Davis submitted opposition to the defendants motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
    56, in which he claimed that he needed to conduct discovery in order to effectively
    oppose the defendants motion. The discovery sought included information about the use
    of pepper spray in the SMU and information about inmates who had suffered injury as a
    result of the use of pepper spray. Davis argued that the defendants had the required
    culpable state of mind because inmates in the SMU were getting pepper-sprayed every
    other day, and he argued that Warden Bledsoe and Administrator Brown were indeed the
    proper defendants in this civil action.
    The Magistrate Judge recommended that summary judgment be awarded to the
    defendants. Noting first that Davis was not challenging the adequacy of the medical care
    he received for his two asthma attacks, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Davis failed
    to show that the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety.
    Citing Durmer v. OCarroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993), the Magistrate Judge
    3

    reasoned that deliberate indifference is not shown where supervisory correctional staff do
    not respond to the medical complaints of a prisoner who is already being treated by
    prison medical staff. In short, because defendants were entitled to defer to the judgment
    of prison medical staff on questions of medical necessity, Davis did not state a
    constitutional tort. In the alternative, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the defendants
    were qualifiedly immunized from a suit for money damages. Davis submitted objections
    to the Report and Recommendation, complaining that he had been denied the right to
    conduct discovery.
    In an order entered on May 20, 2013, the District Court overruled the objections,
    adopted the Report and Recommendation, and granted summary judgment to the
    defendants. The court further concluded that discovery was unnecessary.
    Davis appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We review a
    District Courts grant of summary judgment de novo. Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509
    F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007). Davis contends in his Informal Brief that summary
    judgment for the defendants was not proper because they had actual knowledge of his
    asthma and actual knowledge that pepper spray was used in the SMU under
    circumstances that might cause him to suffer an asthma attack. He also contends that he
    was denied the discovery he needed in order to defeat the defendants motion for
    summary judgment, and that summary judgment was not proper because he did not
    receive adequate notice that summary judgment would be considered.2

    Davis also requests that we indict and investigate the District Court and Magistrate
    Judge for committing treason against their allegiance and oath, Appellants Informal
    4

    Summary judgment is proper where the moving party shows that there is no
    genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the
    absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
    Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.10 (1986). If the moving party has carried its
    burden, the nonmovant must then come forward with evidence showing that there is a
    triable issue. See id. at 587. A triable, or genuine, issue of material fact is one that could
    change the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247
    (1986).
    We will affirm. As a threshold matter, Davis plainly was on notice that the
    District Court would consider summary judgment because the defendants moved in the
    alternative for summary judgment. In addition, he invoked Rule 56 to the extent that it
    provides that, when facts are unavailable to the nonmovant, and [i]f a nonmovant shows
    by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
    justify its opposition, the court may: . . . (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations
    or to take discovery; in opposing summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(d)(2).
    Accordingly, the notice required in Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 341-42 (3d Cir. 1989)
    (1989) (court must give notice that it intends to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion
    for summary judgment and permit nonmoving party to submit materials opposing

    Brief, at 4, citing among other federal statutes 28 U.S.C. 455. Davis allegations are
    baseless; we see nothing in the record that would give us a reason to question the District
    Courts or Magistrate Judges impartiality, 28 U.S.C. 455(a).
    5

    summary judgment prior to doing so), was not required here. We also agree with the
    District Court that discovery would not have changed the summary judgment result here.
    With respect to Davis primary contention, correctional officials who are
    deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of an inmate violate the Eighth
    Amendments prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
    U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But to establish deliberate indifference, a prison official must both
    know of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmates health or safety. Farmer v.
    Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To state a constitutional claim, the official must both
    be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
    serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. See id.
    The facts are undisputed here. Davis Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
    indifference rested on an allegation that Warden Bledsoe and Administrator Brown failed
    to protect him from the June, 2012 asthma attack by failing to take any protective action
    after being notified of the January, 2012 asthma attack. Summary judgment for the
    defendants was proper here because the summary judgment record establishes that the
    defendants did not act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, that is, with deliberate
    indifference to Davis serious medical needs. We said in Durmer that correctional
    defendant-administrators who were not themselves physicians cannot be considered
    deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical
    complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor. 991 F.2d
    at 69. See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.2d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (If a prisoner is under
    the care of medical experts . . ., a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in
    6

    believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.). In Spruill, we held that absent a
    reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are
    mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be
    chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.
    Id.
    Spruill applies here because Davis did not show that the defendants involvement
    in the matter consisted of anything more than reviewing his grievance and deferring to
    the judgment of medical personnel. Davis did not allege or establish that either
    Administrator Brown or Warden Bledsoe had actual knowledge that prison heath staff
    were mistreating his condition by failing to address his repeated exposure to pepper
    spray. In addition, Davis did not show through competent medical evidence that his
    asthma condition was so serious that he could never be near the use of pepper spray, or
    that he risked serious damage to his future health. We note that Davis filed a petition of
    writ of mandamus in the District Court, in which he sought injunctive relief, explaining
    that he had suffered a third asthma attack on July 30, 2012. Although the Magistrate
    Judge issued an order deeming this mandamus petition withdrawn under the local rules
    (because Davis failed to submit a supporting brief), Davis attached his medical records to
    it. They are plainly pertinent to the summary judgment issue and show that, after Davis
    second asthma attack was treated, he was sent to the recreation yard until the spray in the
    SMU dispersed. Medical staff did not recommend any modifications to his assignment in
    the SMU. Following treatment for this third attack, Davis was released back to his
    housing unit with no restrictions.
    7

    Accordingly, summary judgment for Warden Bledsoe and Administrator Brown


    was proper here. We emphasize the limited nature of our holding. Davis chose to file the
    instant Bivens action against two officials who were not treating him for his asthma and
    who were not medically responsible for determining whether his asthma is so serious that
    he could never be near the use of pepper spray. He exhausted his administrative remedies
    only with respect to the first asthma attack and the defendants response to it, see 42
    U.S.C. 1997e(a) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to bringing
    suit), and those defendants cannot be considered deliberately indifferent to his serious
    medical needs in violation of the Eight Amendment for their limited actions. Moreover,
    the sum total of the allegations in his complaint do not support any actionable claims that
    have merit.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting
    summary judgment to the defendants.

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