William Bartholomew Prechtl, III v. Stanley R. Witkowski, Warden, Perry Correctional Institute Attorney General of North Carolina, 79 F.3d 1141, 4th Cir. (1996)
William Bartholomew Prechtl, III v. Stanley R. Witkowski, Warden, Perry Correctional Institute Attorney General of North Carolina, 79 F.3d 1141, 4th Cir. (1996)
William Bartholomew Prechtl, III v. Stanley R. Witkowski, Warden, Perry Correctional Institute Attorney General of North Carolina, 79 F.3d 1141, 4th Cir. (1996)
3d 1141
William B. Prechtl appeals from the district court's order granting summary
judgment for the Respondents on his 28 U.S.C. 2254 (1988) petition. Prechtl
raised fifty claims in his petition. We have reviewed the district court's opinion
adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation and find no error with its
determination that only the claims raised before the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Prechtl's direct appeal from his criminal conviction or in his petition to
appeal the denial of his post-conviction relief application may be addressed by
the federal courts. We therefore affirm the dismissal of all other claims on the
reasoning of the district court. Prechtl v. Witkowski, No. CA-95-150-2-17AJ
(D.S.C. Oct. 11, 1995).
Prechtl concedes that some of his claims may be barred by procedural default,
Prechtl concedes that some of his claims may be barred by procedural default,
but contends that they should be reviewed anyway for three reasons: (1) his
attorney's failure to present witnesses at his post-conviction relief hearing
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, thus resulting in both cause and
prejudice; (2) he is actually innocent; and (3) there was an intervening change
in the law regarding one claim. Our review reveals no error in the district
court's disposal of Prechtl's first two explanations. Therefore we dismiss these
two allegations as methods to attack procedurally defaulted claims on the
reasoning of the district court. Prechtl v. Witkowski, No. CA-95-150-2-17AJ
(D.S.C. Oct. 11, 1995).
Prechtl's third attempt to obtain federal review centers around a jury instruction
that "malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon." Prechtl
contends that an intervening change in the law rendered this instruction
constitutionally infirm. We find, however, that the rule upon which Prechtl
relies to demonstrate constitutional infirmity existed before the trial court
charged the jury. Accordingly, there was no intervening change in the law and
we dismiss this claim as meritless.