United States v. Larry R. Gunnell, JR, 4th Cir. (2000)
United States v. Larry R. Gunnell, JR, 4th Cir. (2000)
United States v. Larry R. Gunnell, JR, 4th Cir. (2000)
No. 99-4513
made this statement the officers had already found a twenty-dollar bill
in the right vent and black mesh concealing a plastic bag apparently
filled with money in the central vent. Additionally, the officers had
also discovered, by this time, marijuana residue in the glove box, and
evidence that someone had possibly tampered with the vehicle's ventilation system to secure a hidden compartment. Therefore, we hold
that the district court correctly denied Gunnell's suppression motion.
Next, Gunnell argues that insufficient evidence supports his conviction because the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt
that he knew drugs or money were hidden in the vehicle. Gunnell
essentially argues that flight alone does not constitute knowledge. We
find Gunnell's argument unpersuasive.
On direct appeal, we must sustain the district court's judgment "if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to support it." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942). When challenging the evidentiary sufficiency, this Court will
consider both direct and circumstantial evidence. See United States v.
Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). Moreover, knowledge
can be shown by circumstantial evidence. See United States v.
Grubbs, 773 F.2d 599, 601 (4th Cir. 1985).
It is not the flight alone, but the timing of it, that suggested Gunnell's knowledge of the presence of drugs in this case. Only after the
officers' initial discovery of the twenty-dollar bill and concealing
black mesh did Gunnell ask to leave. Then, only after the officer
began removing the vent blades that concealed the drugs did Gunnell
flee. Furthermore, Gunnell's claim that he had no dominion or control
over the drugs is refuted by his knowledge of the drugs and his
dominion and control over the vehicle hiding them. When viewing all
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we hold that
the district court properly found the evidence sufficient to convict.
Finally, Gunnell argues that a comment the district judge made
during the trial indicates that the judge was biased against him by
determining his guilt before the trial started. Because Gunnell failed
to preserve this error at his trial we review his claim under the plain
error rule. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Brewer, 1 F.3d
1430, 1434 (4th Cir. 1993). Under the plain error rule, we will only
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