John Allen Starks v. United States, 264 F.2d 797, 4th Cir. (1959)

264 F.
2d 797
John Allen STARKS, Appellant,

v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 7779.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 9, 1959.
Decided March 17, 1959.
Charles W. Laughlin, Richmond, Va. (Court appointed counsel) for

appellant, John Allen Starks, pro se, on brief.
Jackson L. Kiser, Asst. U. S. Atty., Roanoke, Va. (John Strickler, U. S.
Atty., and H. Clyde Pearson, Asst. U. S. Atty., Roanoke, Va., on brief),
for appellee.
Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and SOPER and HAYNSWORTH,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
On June 4, 1956, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of procuring

the interstate transportation of a falsely made bank check in violation of 18 U.S.
C.A. 2314. He received a sentence of 8 years and is now confined in the
United States penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. On August 8, 1958,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 2255, he filed a motion to vacate the sentence on the
ground that, while in the custody of officials of the State of South Carolina, but
after the issuance of the federal warrant in Virginia, he was questioned by an
FBI agent who took his statement. The petitioner also complains that there was
a delay of some days in his arraignment after he had been released into federal
custody, although it was not claimed that any statement was taken from him
during that period. Finally, the petitioner alleges that he was not handed a copy
of the indictment at the time of arraignment.
The District Court, upon consideration of the petition, dismissed it without a

hearing.
It appears from the petition that the defendant was arrested in South Carolina
for a state offense. The petition alleges that, while he was held in the custody of
the state officials under the state court charges, he was interviewed by an FBI
agent in connection with a wholly unrelated federal offense, for which a warrant
had been issued in Virginia. The defendant claims that he confessed to the
federal offense after the FBI agent, in his presence, had inquired of state
officials as to the existence of a recidivist statute in South Carolina and after
state officials had responded that there was such a statute, and that, if the
defendant was first tried and convicted of the federal offense, a subsequent trial
and conviction of the state offense, in the light of his prior criminal record,
might result in life imprisonment. In light of these considerations, the petitioner
alleges that he was induced to confess to the federal offense with the
understanding that the federal warrant was to remain unexecuted until after the
state charges had been fully tried and disposed of.
It does appear that he was tried and convicted for the state offense and that the
previously issued federal warrant was not executed until completion of his
service of the state court sentence.
Whether the petition alleges that a written statement was actually taken from
him is not clear. The record of the proceedings in the court below contains no
reference to the existence of any such statement, nor was there any reference to
any oral statement by the defendant prior to his arraignment. Since no use was
ever made of the statement the defendant claims to have made, and more
particularly because, at the time he claims to have made the statement, he was
clearly not in federal custody, the rule of Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479, which the defendant seeks to invoke, is
inapplicable.
After the execution of the federal warrant, the defendant claims he was not
carried before a United States Commissioner on the date indicated by the
record, but was held for some days in Columbia, South Carolina, awaiting the
return of the resident United States Commissioner, who was then out of the
city. He does not claim, however, that any statement was made by him to any
one during this period of detention and, of course, the Mallory rule is
inapplicable.
The stenographic transcript of the proceedings at the time the defendant's plea
was taken clearly shows that he was handed a copy of the indictment, and the
charge was explained to him. The District Judge was entirely justified in
disposing of this contention without a hearing, for the defendant's claim that he
was not handed a copy of the indictment is not only contradicted by the record,
but the circumstances were within the knowledge of the District Judge.
8
Upon appeal to this Court, the defendant's court-appointed counsel for the first
time advances the contention that the defendant's constitutional right to counsel
was insufficiently explained to him before his guilty plea was accepted. The
commitment order and the order of the District Judge dismissing the present
petition recite that his constitutional rights were fully explained to him, but the
stenographic transcript of the presentence proceedings shows only that the
defendant was asked if he had counsel, and, after his response that he did not,
he was asked if he wished to have counsel. The defendant again responded that
he did not and, thereupon, his plea was requested, and he entered a plea of
guilty.
So long as the inquiry suggested by the decisions in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, and Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68
S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309, is not meticulously made by the District Court, or, if
made, is not made a part of the record in the case, such contentions as that now
made, however groundless, will continue to demand the time and energies of
the courts. The fact that the inquiry of the defendant as to his understanding of
his constitutional rights prior to his plea is not so searching as is desirable,
however, does not always invalidate the proceeding. The defendant who seeks
relief under 2255 must still bear the burden of showing that he did not
understand his constitutional rights. The fact that the written record, itself, does
not contain an emphatic and direct answer to a claim that the court's
explanation was insufficient opens the door to subsequent collateral attack, but
it does not necessarily mean that such collateral attack must be successful. We
are entitled to look at the entire record, the nature of the charge, the defendant's
circumstances, his experience in court proceedings, and other relevant matters,
and, if it then clearly appears, even without a hearing, that the defendant did not
lack understanding of his constitutional rights, the petition should be denied.
10
Here the offense charged was not a complicated one. The indictment is short
and direct. It was explained to the defendant, and his reference to the matter in
his present petition suggests no possibility of any misunderstanding on his part
of the crime of which he was charged and the nature of the offense. The charge
does not involve a complicated legal question upon which a defendant would be
expected to be in need of legal advice. The only issue was one of simple fact,
and the assistance of an attorney was not necessary to enable the defendant to
conclude whether or not he had committed the crime with which he was
charged.
11
The defendant's criminal record is not before us, but the record contains
references to a number of prior convictions, dating back as far as 1933, and to

other charges still pending against him. It is apparent that he is no novice in the
criminal courts. Indeed, the defendant, himself, in his petition makes no claim
that he did not understand his constitutional rights, for, as indicated, his petition
is entirely concerned with other matters.
12
The defendant was asked if he had counsel and, having none, was asked
whether he wished counsel. The second question fairly implies the availability
of the assistance of the court in obtaining counsel if he wished it, but the
defendant's answer was quick and unequivocal. In the light of all of the
foregoing circumstances, we can only conclude that the defendant did
understand his constitutional rights and that he was not denied the effective
assistance of counsel at the time his plea was taken. Miller v. United States, 4
Cir., 261 F.2d 546; Cundiff v. Nicholson, 4 Cir., 107 F.2d 162; Pinfold v.
Hunter, 10 Cir., 140 F.2d 564.
13
Affirmed.

John Allen Starks v. United States, 264 F.2d 797, 4th Cir. (1959)

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264 F.

John Allen STARKS, Appellant,

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Charles W. Laughlin, Richmond, Va. (Court appointed counsel) for

On June 4, 1956, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of procuring

The District Court, upon consideration of the petition, dismissed it without a

references to a number of prior convictions, dating back as far as 1933, and to

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