United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

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857 F.

2d 1468
Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of


unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
Circuit.
Marie GILLIAM, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Cleveland SMITH, individually and in his capacity as a
police officer for the City of Woodruff, South
Carolina; City of Woodruff, South
Carolina, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 87-1741.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.


Argued: May 3, 1988.
Decided: Sept. 2, 1988.

James Cleveland Ferguson, for appellant.


Jack D. Griffith (Love, Thornton, Arnold & Thomason, on brief); William
U. Gunn (Holcombe, Bomar, Wynn & Gunn, on brief), for appellees.
Before DONALD RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, and
ROBERT R. MERHIGE, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:

Marie Gilliam appeals the summary judgments entered in favor of the


defendants on her claim brought pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and
1981. She also appeals from the district court's refusal to exercise pendant
jurisdiction over her state claims. We affirm.

Mrs. Gilliam alleges in her complaint that Cleveland Smith, a police officer in

Mrs. Gilliam alleges in her complaint that Cleveland Smith, a police officer in
the City of Woodruff, was using his official status to sexually assault her. Prior
to the incidents in question, Mrs. Gilliam and Smith had been involved on a
"romantic basis" for some twelve or thirteen years. Each blames the other for
the breakdown in the relationship. After the relationship ended, Mrs. Gilliam
alleges that Smith began to sexually assault her. She claims that Smith would
come to her home or stop her while he was in the police vehicle to initiate the
assaults.

Smith denies that the assaults occurred. He claims that after their relationship
ended, she would follow him or approach him during off-duty hours and
request that he accompany her to her home. Mrs. Gilliam, during the last
stormy years of the relationship, was charged with and pleaded guilty to
malicious injury to personal property of Smith's, his car.

Mrs. Gilliam contends that she complained of the alleged assaults to various
Woodruff officials. In her complaint, she claims that she is entitled to money
damages from Smith in his individual capacity and from the City of Woodruff
for condoning his conduct. She alleges that Woodruff has a de facto policy
known to police and city officials which allows the type of conduct she charges
to Smith. Further, the complaint states that the City has done nothing to
terminate the policy or discipline those acting in accordance therewith.

The district court correctly granted summary judgment for the defendants upon
its finding that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence to support
an essential element of her case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986). She failed to show that in any of the incidents of which she complains
Smith was acting in his official capacity or under color of state law. See Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, esp. p. 939, et seq (1981). Nor does
the record support the allegation: "... acts of officers in the ambit of their
personal pursuits are plainly excluded [from Sec. 1983 actions]." Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1944).

Further, there is no evidence in the record that the conduct complained of


represents an official policy or custom adopted by the City of Woodruff which
is required to be found in order to sue a municipality under Sec. 1983. Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, summary
judgment was proper in favor of the city.

The remainder of Mrs. Gilliam's claims were also properly disposed of by the
district court. Her Sec. 1981 claim was not supported by factual allegations of
discriminatory treatment on account of race, nor was it supported by the record.

As there was no longer a viable federal claim, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, the remaining state claims. United
Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
8

Based on the well-reasoned and thorough opinion of the district court, its
judgment is

AFFIRMED.

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