United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
2d 1468
Unpublished Disposition
Mrs. Gilliam alleges in her complaint that Cleveland Smith, a police officer in
Mrs. Gilliam alleges in her complaint that Cleveland Smith, a police officer in
the City of Woodruff, was using his official status to sexually assault her. Prior
to the incidents in question, Mrs. Gilliam and Smith had been involved on a
"romantic basis" for some twelve or thirteen years. Each blames the other for
the breakdown in the relationship. After the relationship ended, Mrs. Gilliam
alleges that Smith began to sexually assault her. She claims that Smith would
come to her home or stop her while he was in the police vehicle to initiate the
assaults.
Smith denies that the assaults occurred. He claims that after their relationship
ended, she would follow him or approach him during off-duty hours and
request that he accompany her to her home. Mrs. Gilliam, during the last
stormy years of the relationship, was charged with and pleaded guilty to
malicious injury to personal property of Smith's, his car.
Mrs. Gilliam contends that she complained of the alleged assaults to various
Woodruff officials. In her complaint, she claims that she is entitled to money
damages from Smith in his individual capacity and from the City of Woodruff
for condoning his conduct. She alleges that Woodruff has a de facto policy
known to police and city officials which allows the type of conduct she charges
to Smith. Further, the complaint states that the City has done nothing to
terminate the policy or discipline those acting in accordance therewith.
The district court correctly granted summary judgment for the defendants upon
its finding that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence to support
an essential element of her case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986). She failed to show that in any of the incidents of which she complains
Smith was acting in his official capacity or under color of state law. See Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, esp. p. 939, et seq (1981). Nor does
the record support the allegation: "... acts of officers in the ambit of their
personal pursuits are plainly excluded [from Sec. 1983 actions]." Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1944).
The remainder of Mrs. Gilliam's claims were also properly disposed of by the
district court. Her Sec. 1981 claim was not supported by factual allegations of
discriminatory treatment on account of race, nor was it supported by the record.
As there was no longer a viable federal claim, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, the remaining state claims. United
Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
8
Based on the well-reasoned and thorough opinion of the district court, its
judgment is
AFFIRMED.