11 Fair empl.prac.cas. 672, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,443 Emmett J. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company or Companies, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 528 F.2d 934, 4th Cir. (1976)
11 Fair empl.prac.cas. 672, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,443 Emmett J. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company or Companies, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 528 F.2d 934, 4th Cir. (1976)
11 Fair empl.prac.cas. 672, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,443 Emmett J. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company or Companies, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 528 F.2d 934, 4th Cir. (1976)
2d 934
On July 25, 1968 Stebbins received a 'suit letter' from the EEOC for his May
13 complaint. He waited, however, until October 31, 1969 to file suit in the
Eastern District of Virginia. Civil Action No. 373--69--A (E.D.Va. Sept. 9,
1971). His complaint there alleged retaliation because of the Schmidt letter and
continuous discrimination from 1966 when Mr. Sorrell allegedly made his
discriminatory remark. Judge Lewis granted summary judgment for Stebbins on
the retaliation claim and awarded nominal damages of $1.00. He nevertheless
dismissed the continuing discrimination claim, holding that Stebbins was
collaterally estopped to relitigate the question of his qualifications. The earlier
litigation upon which Judge Lewis relied was Stebbins v. INA, Civil Action
No. 2848--69 (D.C.D.C. June 14, 1970). There Judge Pratt found Stebbins was
The EEOC issued Stebbins a new suit letter for his claim against Nationwide's
Annapolis and Falls Church offices on March 13, 1973. With this letter in hand,
Stebbins filed the present action in the District Court for Maryland on March
22, 1973. The district court held that this was the same claim litigated in the
Eastern District of Virginia (Civil Action No. 373--69--A) and involved in our
earlier appeal and, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata barred the present suit.
The court reasoned that the doctrine of res judicata bars not only matters that
were actually litigated but also those which could have been litigated.
Moreover, it concluded that even if this court had erred in the earlier case, that
error does not dispel the res judicata effect of the judgment.
The doctrine of res judicata traditionally applies only to those cases which have
been fully litigated on their merits. 'The doctrine prevents an encore and
'reflects the refusal of law to tolerate needless litigation." 1B Moore, Federal
Practice P0.405(1) at p. 628, quoting Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192-93, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947). The district court held, and Nationwide
argues, that the litigation in the Eastern District of Virginia is res judicata, and
thus determinative of the instant action, because that litigation reached a final
judgment on the merits of the same claim asserted here. Because of the peculiar
posture of the case, we cannot say that the earlier judgment was 'on the merits,'
but we do agree that this litigation must be deemed to be concluded.
bringing of his action, we cannot now say that the matter was adjudicated
against him on the merits.
8
10
11
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the district court is affirmed.
12
Affirmed.
This action is one of nearly a dozen that Stebbins has been juggling since 1966.
Several years ago he launched a new career--suing insurance companies that
declined to hire him as a claims adjuster. He has brought actions against no less
than six companies in this and the District of Columbia Circuits and has
testified that he plans to obtain conflicts between various courts, ultimately to
have the pleasure of arguing in the Supreme Court of the United States. See
Stebbins v. Keystone Insurance Co., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 481 F.2d 501 at n.
4 (1973)
This same effect was given to Judge Pratt's finding by Judge Gesell in Stebbins
v. Keystone Insurance Co., No. 3588--69 (D.D.C. July 8, 1970) and Stebbins v.
INA (II), No. 2036--70 (D.D.C. Nov. 1970). The District of Columbia Circuit
subsequently held this to be an improper application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel because Judge Pratt's finding of unemployability was an alternate
holding to the stronger rationale that Stebbins had not applied to INA. Stebbins
v. Keystone Insurance Co., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 481 F.2d 501 (1973)
Our earlier opinion noted that, in related litigation, Stebbins had demonstrated
an "intentional, wilful and contemptuous' disregard of both Court and statutory
rules and requirements.' Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
469 F.2d 268, 270 (4th Cir. 1970) quoting from Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 193, 413 F.2d 1100 (1969)
See, e.g. 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2373 at
240 (1971): 'A good argument can be made that after a full trial and decision on
the merits of the case a plaintiff should not be allowed to start over by
removing an obstacle to suit that it was within its power to remove at any time.'
Professors Wright and Miller take the position that the Weissinger decision
may be justified for precisely the same reasons that dictate the result in this
case. 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2373 at 240-242 (1970). See note 6 supra