United States v. Victor Engle, 4th Cir. (1999)
United States v. Victor Engle, 4th Cir. (1999)
United States v. Victor Engle, 4th Cir. (1999)
No. 98-4454
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Victor Tyrone Engle was indicted by a federal grand jury and
charged with two counts of an eighteen count superseding indictment.
Count one charged Engle with conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
846 (West Supp. 1999). Count eighteen charged Engle with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1) (1994). Engle pled guilty to count eighteen in accordance
with a written plea agreement. At sentencing, the court increased
Engle's offense level by two levels because police officers found
three weapons at his residence at the time of his arrest. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2D1.1(b)(1) (1997). The court also sentenced Engle as a career offender. See USSG 4B1.1. Engle now
appeals his sentence of 200 months' imprisonment.
Engle's attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), addressing whether Engle should
have been classified as a career offender. Engle contends that the
prior convictions forming the basis for his career offender classification should not have been counted against him because if he had pled
guilty to the conspiracy charge in count one of the indictment, the
prior convictions would have been counted as relevant conduct and
Engle would not have been sentenced as a career offender. This argument is without merit. Engle did not plead guilty to count one, but to
count eighteen. Based upon that plea, Engle met the criteria identified
by USSG 4B1.1 for sentencing as a career offender. Furthermore,
Engle's contention is irrelevant and speculative. Therefore, the district
court did not err in sentencing Engle as a career offender.
Engle's pro se supplemental brief argues that his offense level
should not have been increased for possession of firearms. Engle
states that the increase was improper because the firearms at issue
were not found at his residence, as stated in the presentence report
(PSR), but were discovered by police in a field, separate and apart
from where the cocaine was located. Engle did not raise this point at
the plea proceeding or sentencing and did not object to the facts stated
in the PSR. We find that Engle did not demonstrate plain error by the
district court on this sentencing issue. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52.
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