Carolino V Senga
Carolino V Senga
Carolino V Senga
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., as Chief
of Staff of the AFP, Brigadier General Fernando Zabat, as the Commanding Officer of the AFP
Finance Center, Commodore Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the AFP-GFIQ Management and Fiscal
Office, and Captain Theresa M. Nicdao, as Pension and Gratuity Officer of the Pension and
Gratuity Management Center, or any of their respective successors and those taking instructions
from them as agents or subordinates, to:
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a.
immediately reinstate the name of petitioner in the list of retired AFP Officers, and to
resume payment of his retirement benefits under RA 340; and
b.
release to [petitioner] all retirement benefits due him under RA 340 which accrued to
him from March 2005 continuously up to the time his name is reinstated in the list of
AFP retired officers.11
The RTC found that the issue for resolution is the applicability of RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638
upon Jeremias' retirement benefits. It found that he retired as a commissioned officer of the AFP
in 1976; thus, RANo. 340 is the law applicable in determining his entitlement to his retirement
benefits and not PD No. 1638 which was issued only in 1979. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides
that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." PD No. 1638 does
not provide for such retroactive application. Also, it could not have been the intendment of PD
No. 1638 to deprive its loyal soldiers of a monthly pension during their old age especially where,
as here, the right had been vested to them through time. RA No. 340 does not provide that the
loss of Filipino citizenship would terminate one's retirement benefits; and that PD No. 1638 does
not reduce whatever benefits that any person has already been receiving under existing law.
Respondents sought reconsideration,12 but the RTC denied the same in an Order13 dated May
25, 2007, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is herebyDENIED,
considering that the questioned decision has not yet attained.its finality. The Motion for
Execution in the meantime is hereby DENIED.14
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA. After the submission of the parties'
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for decision.
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Jeremias died on September 30, 200715 and was substituted by his wife, herein petitioner.
On May 25, 2009, the CA granted respondents' appeal. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The appealed decision
is REVOKED and SET ASIDE.16
In so ruling, the CA found that while it is true that Jeremias retired in 1976 under the provisions
of RA No. 340, as amended, which does not contain any provision anent cessation or loss of
retirement benefits upon acquiring another citizenship, PD No. 1638, which was signed in 1979,
effectively repealed RA No. 340, as amended. Section 27 of PD No. 1638, which provides that
the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and
his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss, was correctly made applicable to Jeremias'
retirement benefits. Logic dictates that since Jeremias had already renounced his allegiance to
the Philippines, he cannot now be compelled by the State to render active service and to render
compulsory military service when the need arises. The CA found that for the writ of mandamus
to lie, it is essential that Jeremias should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of respondents to perform the act required which petitioner failed
to show; thus, mandamus will not lie.
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Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 10, 2009.
Hence, this petition raising the following:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE
ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH SET ASIDE AND REVERSED THE 26 FEBRUARY
2007 DECISION OF THE QC RTC BECAUSE:
PD 1638 should not have been applied and cannot be used against petitioner as her husband's
retirement and pension were granted to him by the AFP under RA 340 which was not
superseded by PD 1638, a later statute.
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Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of mandamus to compel the reinstatement of his
pension and benefits from the AFP under RA 340 as PD 1638 was not applicable to him.
Petitioner contends that her husband's retirement from the active service in 1976 was pursuant
to the provisions of RA No. No. 340 as PD No. 1638 was not yet in existence then, and there
was nothing in RA No. 340 that disqualifies a retired military personnel from receiving
retirement benefits after acquiring foreign citizenship. The concept of retirement benefits is such
that one is entitled to them for services already rendered and not for those to be made at a
future time. Retirement benefits due petitioner's husband under RA No. 340, is an acquired right
which cannot be taken away by a subsequent law. PD No. 1638 does not expressly provide for
its retroactive application. Respondents, being officers of the AFP tasked to implement the
provisions of RA No. 340 have neglected their function thereunder by delisting petitioner's
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Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979.
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive
effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions; 17 that
all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and
intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved
against retrospective effect.18 These principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive application, nor the same
may be implied from its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the
decree shall take effect upon its approval. As held in Parreno v. COA,19 there is no question that
PD No. 1638, as amended, applies prospectively. Since PD No. 1638, as amended, is about the
new system of retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to
those who were in the service at the time of its approval. 20 Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not
applicable to those who retired before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act
is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued
prior to such amendment.21
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for the retirees to whom the law shall
be applied, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried
in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his
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Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon such loss, (emphasis supplied)
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those above-enumerated Sections of PD No.
1638 as he retired under RA No. 340.
Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an
employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of
employment, age, and length of service.22 Undeniably, petitioner's husband had complied with
the conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits as he was then receiving his retirement
benefits on a monthly basis until it was terminated. Where the employee retires and meets the
eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due
process clause.23 It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits.24 Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right
to immediate payment under pre-existing law.25
In Ayog v. Cusi,26 we expounded the nature of a vested right, thus:
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular
person or persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property
legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing
law" (12 C.J.S. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has become
fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170
Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
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The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may not impair
vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the concept of present
fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive
to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5,
citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).27
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his retirement benefits which must
be respected and cannot be affected by the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which
provides that loss of Filipino citizenship terminates retirement benefits. Vested rights include not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations after the right has vested. 28
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In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No. 1638 recognize such vested right, to wit:
Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any manner to reduce whatever
retirement and separation pay or gratuity or other monetary benefits which any person is
heretofore receiving or is entitled to receive under the provisions of existing law.
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xxxx
Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Decree and to
preserve the rights granted to retired or separated military personnel, all laws, rules and
regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has no intention to reduce or to revoke whatever
retirement benefits being enjoyed by a retiree at the time of its passage. Hence, Section 35
provides for an exception to what the decree repealed or modified, i.e., except those necessary
to preserve the rights granted to retired or separated military personnel.
We also find that the CA erred in finding that mandamus will not lie.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances petition for
mandamus may be filed, to wit:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
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the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioner's legal right to the performance of a
particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right
which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.29 A doctrine wellembedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear
legal right to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an
imperative duty to perform the same.30 The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty.31 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.32 If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial.33
The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the RTC was for the payment of his
terminated retirement benefits, which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on the
part of the respondents to pay such claim, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such
payment.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.34 However, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely
legal.35 This is because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative
officer.36 Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility.37 Here, the
question raised is purely legal,i.e., what law should be applied in the payment of retirement
benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no need to exhaust all administrative remedies
before a judicial relief can be sought.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 25, 2009 and the Resolution
dated September 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated February 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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