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Japan
IN

China

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

BOSTON CHICAGO DALLAS
ATLANTA SAN FRANCISCO

NEW YORK

MACMILLAN AND
LONDON

CO., LIMITED

BOMBAY CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE

MADRAS

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

OF CANADA,
TORONTO

HEILUNCrKIANG-

OUTER

><5MH*Wto)
5INKIANG

PACIFIC

OCEAN

INDIA
Calcu.ttaO

Map of
//VD/AN

OCEAN

Japan
IN

China
By T. A. BISSON

NEW YORK

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1938

Copyright, 1938,

BY THE M A C M I
All

rights

reserved

no

L LAN
part

of

COMPANY.
this

book may be

reproduced in any form without permission in writing

from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes

to quote brief passages

written for inclusion in

Set up and printed.

connection with a review

magazine or newspaper.

Published May, 1938.

FIRST PRINTING.

I-RINTED IK

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

TO
FAITH

PREFACE
THIS book

is

the outgrowth of travel

and

investiga-

tion in the Far East during 1937, made possible by a

fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation. Its content

and emphases were

Sino-Japanese

to presenting the
flict, I

necessarily affected by the outbreak of

during that period. In addition

hostilities

more immediate background of the conto deal briefly with what will probably

have sought

constitute merely its first stages.

I take this
opportunity to express

the

many

individuals, both in

my

appreciation to

China and Japan, who have

freely volunteered information, placed materials at

disposal, or otherwise assisted me in the preparation of

my

the manuscript. To the Foreign Policy Association, which

generously enabled me to devote a full year to this research project, my thanks are due in special measure.
is to my wife. Without her unand
encouragement, the task would never
failing optimism
have been completed. To her the book is dedicated.

My

greatest obligation

T. A. BISSON.
Port Washington, L. L,
April

12,

1938.

CONTENTS
PAGE

PREFACE

vii

3HAPTER
I.

II.

III.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

IX.

X.

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

INDEX

40

....

OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

78
110

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

154

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

192

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

....

236

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

275

THE STRUGGLE

290

JAPAN'S

XL THE
XII,

NORTH CHINA

AGGRESSION IN

THE REVIVAL

IV.

IN

THE NORTH

HOME FRONT

317

TEST OF STRENGTH

MANCHOUKUO:

PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

335
.

366

407

ILLUSTRATIONS

..........

MAP

OF CHINA

THE

PEIPING-TIENTSIN AREA, SHOWING LINE MARKED

Frontispiece
PAGE

BY THE TANGKU TRUCE

.........

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

CHINA'S COMMUNIST LEADERS:

MAO

TSE-TUNG,

facing

20

CHOU

...... facing
THE SHANGHAI-NANKING REGION .......
THE NORTH CHINA PROVINCES ........
EN-LAI,

Po Ku, CHU TEH

172

276
291

GENERAL CHU TEH, COMMANDER OF THE EIGHTH

ARMY, DONS A KUOMINTANG
(COMMUNIST)
UNIFORM
facing

296

GENERAL SUGIYAMA, JAPANESE WAR MINISTER, ADDRESSES HOUSE OF PEERS BEFORE VOTE ON WAR
APPROPRIATIONS IN SEPTEMBER 1937
f^ing

318

IMPERIAL COUNCIL MEETS IN JANUARY 1938 TO DECIDE

facing
JAPAN'S POLICY ON WAR WITH CHINA

336

GATE AND WALL OF A "PROTECTED VILLAGE" IN

MANCHOUKUO
facing

400

...........

..........

Japan
IN

China

CHAPTER ONE

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

THE

spring of 1937 was the quietest that China had

experienced for more than a decade. Internal peace seemed
assured; while external relations, save for disquieting
undercurrents in the north, were marked by a degree of
tranquillity unusual for some years past. The transfer of
Chang Hsueh-liang's Northeastern troops to Honan,

Anhwei and Kiangsu

provinces, and their reorganization

the
Central
Government, had been peacefully effected
by
the
end
of
by
May. Agreement on a similar reorganization
of the Szechuan provincial armies was reached during
June. Mr. Lin Sen, Chairman of the National Government, had visited Kwangsi province in April, conferred
with its erstwhile antagonistic chiefs, and passed in review

the soldiers of the Fifth Route Army. Government leaders

and the Communists were quietly working out the details

The officials of the HopeiCouncil were drawing closer to Nanking,

notably in arrangements concluded for the election of
northern delegates to the National People's Congress
scheduled for November. Economic indices were no less
of a political rapprochement.

Chahar

Political

favorable. Foreign trade

was growing

rapidly, the currency

reform was being extended, railway construction was

actively progressing, agreements to refund old foreign
loans were being made, and new foreign loans secured.

Encouraged by these concrete evidences of

political uni-

JAPAN IN CHINA

and economic advance, the whole nation was

buoyed up by a new feeling of self-confidence and self-

fication

respect.

There was perhaps too

apprehension that China's

domestic progress might be interrupted by outside intervention. Relations with Japan, it was true, had been characterized

by

little

a diplomatic detente since the

beginning of

the year, and overt Japanese aggression had been discontinued. On the whole the visit of the Kodama Economic

Mission to Shanghai in March, carrying the olive branch

of

"economic cooperation/' was viewed

skeptically, yet

Foreign Minister Sato's policy seemed to represent a new

attitude on the part of Japanese business and political

toward China. More attention should possibly have

been paid to the address delivered by General Sugiyama,
circles

Japanese Minister of War, to the conference of prefectural

governors at Tokyo on
for China, we find that

May
it is

19,

when he

declared: "As

concentrating on centralizaand other defensive

tion, replenishment of armaments,

undertakings based on anti-Japanese slogans. As a result,

it has come to overestimate its national strength, and this
in turn has served to encourage the anti- Japanese sentifear that China may ultimately
ments of its people.

We

sundry steps to obstruct Japan's peaceful advance

at its very foundation." I Under the conditions prevailing
at the time, however, such a statement was dismissed as
resort to

ordinary home propaganda by the War Ministry. With the

formation on June 3 of the Konoye Cabinet, generally
held to be liberal despite the predominance of reactionary
members, the prospects for continued peace were thought
to

have

still

further improved.

In North China disturbing political undercurrents partially belied the surface calm. Mutinies among the pro1

The Japan

Advertiser, Tokyo,

May

20, 1937.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Manchoukuo

irregulars controlling north Chahar, and

armed Chinese volunteers, were raising a

the activities of

barrier against further Japanese encroachment on the

Inner Mongolian provinces. Following a visit made to

Jehol and north Chahar early in

May by General Uyeda,

Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, reports of
Japanese plans for a renewed invasion of Suiyuan became
current.

During

Chahar

Political

this period, also, the leaders of the

HopeiCouncil were proving hesitant about

carrying through a series of economic projects involving

the exploitation of North China under Japanese auspices.
On May 1 1 General Sung Che-yuan went into a prolonged
retreat at Loling, his birthplace in northern Shantung;
it was rumored that his continued retirement was due to

a desire to avoid Japanese pressure. The growing authority

of the Central Government was evidently reacting on
events in the north. To the Japanese military, it seemed

Hopei-Chahar Political Council was becoming

something less than a pliant tool through which Japan's
purposes in North China could be accomplished. Japanese
newspapers at home and in China's port cities sounded
warnings against "over-confidence," "provocations," and
that the

'

the 'obstructions placed in Japan's path."

The members of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council,
some two dozen in number, were not all of one mind.

Nanking had

deliberately placed

many

of

them on the

Council by reason of their recognized pro-Japanese orientation. None of them, however, was wholly immune to
the national consciousness that was spreading over China;
affected by it. The important leaders
Council were commanding officers of the sgth
Route Army, and also held the chief government posts
in the two provinces. General Sung Che-yuan, Chairman

some were strongly

of the

of

the

Council, was Commander-in-Chief of the

2(}th

JAPAN IN CHINA

Army. General Chang Tzu-chung, commander of the 38th

Division, was Mayor of Tientsin. General Feng Chih-an,
the 37th Division, was the acting governor
of Hopei province. These two Divisions, which were stationed in the Peiping-Tientsin area, played the leading

commanding

role in the July events. Several other figures also deserve

mention: General Chin Te-chun, Mayor of Peiping; Gen-

Chao Teng-yu, commander of the 13 2nd Division,

located between Peiping and Paotingfu; and General Liu
Ju-ming, Governor of Chahar and commander of the
eral

i43rd Division, with headquarters at Kalgan. In the

spring of 1937 the four divisions of the sgth Army and
several other attached brigades probably exceeded 100,ooo troops, although less than half of these were in the
Peiping-Tientsin area. Several thousand Paoantui (feace
well armed but used mainly for
Preservation Corps)
were
also under the jurisdiction of the
policing purposes,
,

Hopei-Chahar Political Council. Eight Japanese civilian

advisers were attached to the Council, and three Japanese
military advisers to the stgth Army. These advisers exerted but nominal influence over the sgth Army and the
Paoantui units in Peiping and Tientsin; a few miles east
of Peiping at Tungchow, however, the East Hopei
Paoantui corps were puppet Chinese forces under direct
Japanese control.

During the spring the underlying uneasiness in the

north never took on tangible form. Through most of June
no hint of the approaching storm was let fall in Peiping.

sudden change of atmosphere occurred at the end of

Rumors of an impending upset began to fill
the air, and were multiplied during the first week of July.
They were discussed over luncheon and dinner tables,
and bandied about in hotels and clubs. The correspondents were alert to know when the Japanese were ''going to
the month.

JAPAN IN CHINA

6
strike."

The

state of

mind was

following Renter despatch shows that this

the product of something more than

unsubstantial fancy.

"Peiping, June 30. Precautionary measures have been

strengthened by the local defence authorities during the
last two days as the result of rumors that plain clothes
men have smuggled themselves into the city for the purpose of creating disturbances. Semi-martial law was enforced on

Monday and Tuesday

nights

when

pedestrians

were subject to search. It is reported that four suspicious

characters were arrested at the Chien Men Station on
Monday night and that they have confessed that they are

pay of a certain disgruntled politician. The continuance of field exercises by Japanese troops at Marco
Polo Bridge and vicinity has given rise to considerable
anxiety in Chinese circles. It is stated that at first the
Chinese authorities were given to understand that these
exercises would last only one day, but they have since
continued for three days." 2

in the

Two

possible sources of future trouble are noted in this

despatch: the activities of plain clothes men, and Japanese

troop maneuvers at Marco Polo Bridge. It is significant

that, despite the assurances reportedly given the Chinese
authorities, these maneuvers continued in the same lo-

another week and eventually gave rise to the

which precipitated Sino-Japanese hostilities.
Meanwhile, throughout the first week of July, the North
China officials were forced to deal with a continuous

cality for

incident

incursion of plain clothes agents. The following chrono3

logical summary of events, taken from the local press,
indicates that the Chinese authorities were thoroughly
aware of the danger which confronted them.
3
3

The Peiping
The Peiping

Chronicle, July
Chroiricle,

i,

1937.

The Peiping News, July

2-7, 1937.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Unscrupulous elements reported attempting

in Tientsin, Peiping, and Paodisturbances
up
tingfu. The Peiping police begin to enforce "summer
July

ist.

to stir

defence" regulations. General Chang Tzu-chung, Mayor

of Tientsin, arrives in Peiping to confer with his associates
on the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.
July 2nd. Two suspicious characters, loitering in vicinity of Hopei-Chahar Political Council's quarters, arrested
yesterday in Peiping; reported to have confessed that they
were in the pay of certain quarters to create disturbances

during the forthcoming election of local delegates to the

National People's Congress; admitted having confederates
in various parts of the

city,

and

also in Paotingfu

and

Kalgan.
Scores of plain clothes agents reported to have been
arrested in Peiping by detectives and police during last
few days. As precautionary measure, the local defence
force has been reinforced by troops
stationed in the suburbs.

from the sgth Army

July jrd. Defence measures discussed yesterday after-

noon in Peiping at a conference attended by General

Chang Tzu-chung, Mayor of Tientsin; General Chin Techun, Mayor of Peiping; General Feng Chih-an, Governor
of Hopei province; and General Liu Ju-ming, Governor of
Chahar province. These officials decided to cooperate in
the maintenance of peace and order in the two provinces
and two special municipalities under jurisdiction of the
Hopei-Chahar Political Council. General Chang Tzuchung returned to Tientsin shortly after the meeting.
High Chinese official in Peiping quoted as saying that
the authorities have the situation well in hand and that
no anxiety need be felt by the public.
July 4th. General Chang Tzu-chung, Mayor of Tienreappears in Peiping at 6:30 P.M.
July jth. Colonel Matsui, Chief of the Japanese Special
Service Mission in Peiping, leaves for Tientsin to contsin,

fer

with

JAPAN IN CHINA
Lieutenant-General Tashiro, Commander

of the

North China Garrison.

General Feng Chih-an, the Hopei governor, having returned to Paotingfu, declares that all is quiet in Peiping

and Tientsin.
July 6th. Two plain clothes men captured by police
gun chase in western suburbs of Peiping. More

after

than forty shots exchanged; one policeman and one plain

clothes man wounded. Latter admits to being a member

Hopei Paoantui (Peace Preservation Corps)

General Chang Tzu-chung inspects the 2Qth Route

of the East

troops in the Nanyuan barracks outside Peiping.

circulating in Peiping and Tientsin durthe
few
last
days reported to have gradually died
ing
down as a result of the precautionary measures taken by
the authorities.

Army

Wild rumors

If the plain clothes agents had planned to create disturbances that would serve as a pretext for Japanese
intervention, their object was evidently frustrated by the

determined actions of the North China officials. Escape

from this danger did not prevent the outbreak of conflict.
The exact details of the Lukouchiao, or Marco Polo
Bridge, incident will probably never be known. As at
Mukden, on September 18, 1931, the event which gave
rise to the armed clash took place under cover of darkness,

and contradictory versions

what actually happened

as to

were immediately put into circulation.

4
According to the Japanese version, Chinese soldiers
about 1,000 metres north of Lukouchiao fired several tens

some time before midnight 5 on July 7, at

Japanese troops holding maneuvers in that

of rifle shots,

a body of
*
The Peiping
and

Chronicle, July

9,

The Japan

1937;

Advertiser, July 9

10, 1937.

5
The time is given as "about ten o'clock" by the Japanese Military
Attach^ at Peiping (Chronicle, July 9)
and as "shortly after eleven
o'clock" in the Tokyo Foreign Office statement (Advertiser, July 10)
,

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

vicinity.

The maneuvers were immediately

halted and

the troops concentrated to watch developments. With

only one live cartridge for each soldier in his force, the

Japanese commander was obliged to hold fire and summon reinforcements from Fengtai. 6 Meanwhile, arrange-

ments were made for a joint Sino-Japanese investigation

committee to be despatched to the scene from Peiping.
This committee reached the spot between four and five
o'clock on the morning of July 8. The Japanese reinforcements reached Lukouchiao at five o'clock in the morning;
about half-past five, in consequence of renewed firing by
the Chinese troops, fighting was resumed and lasted until
half-past nine, when a temporary truce was effected.

The

official

Chinese version

claims that shortly after

midnight Colonel Matsui, Chief of the Japanese Special

Service Mission at Peiping, telephoned to the HopeiChahar Political Council, stating that while a company
of Japanese troops was engaged in field maneuvers near

Lukouchiao

rifle

shots

were suddenly heard. 8 The exer-

This point is stressed in the Foreign Office statement. It is contradicted

by the testimony of a Japanese private, who was wounded in the fighting
at Lukouchiao, given during the course of an interview with an Asahi
correspondent.

The

interview reads in part as follows:

"An

intense

sham

was carried out Wednesday night. Just as the bugle call concluded
the activities, rifle fire was heard. Bullets whistled over the heads of the
Japanese. The officers ordered the men to fall flat on the ground, but the
bullets began to fall fast. Orders were given to return the fire and the
men began shooting in the direction from which the bullets came. They
continued to fire until their live ammunition was all gone, 'before they
realized what they were doing.' At last the unseen enemy stopped firing
and fled. It was dawn when the battle was resumed." The Japan Adbattle

vertiser,
7

July

12, 1937.

The Peiping

Chronicle, July 9, 1937.

Chinese newspaper reports suggested that these shots might have been
fired by plain clothes men under Japanese direction. There are indications that certain "young officers" planned the whole affair in emulation
8

of the Mukden incident of September 18, 1931. The names usually mentioned include Major-General Torashiro Kawabe, Lieut.-Col. Wachi, and
Colonel Matsui. See China Weekly Review, July 31, 1937, p. 324.

JAPAN IN CHINA

10
cises

were then stopped, declared Colonel Matsui, the

of men checked, and one man found to be missHe concluded by saying that the Japanese had de-

number
ing.

manded

the right to enter Wanping to search for the

missing soldier, but that this demand had been rejected.
Later Colonel Matsui again telephoned the Council, say-

ing that the Japanese troops would enter Wanping by

force unless permission for entry was granted. Since the
missing soldier had now turned up, the Chinese claimed
that there was no further necessity for the Japanese to
enter the town. Colonel Matsui, however, replied that it
was difficult to check up on all the troops that were

mobilized, and pressed the need for sending representatives into Wanping for an investigation. At this time the
Hopei-Chahar Council authorities learned that the Jap-

anese troops were closing in on Wanping; hoping to

prevent the outbreak of hostilities, they agreed to have a
joint delegation sent to the scene.

The Japanese delegates were Captain Teradaira, vicechief of the Special Service Mission, and Colonel Sakurai,
adviser to the 2Qth Route Army. The Chinese delegation
comprised Mr.

Wang

Lei-chai, magistrate of the

Wanping

district; Mr. Lin Keng-yu, an expert of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council;
and Colonel Chow Yung-men, vice-chief of the communi-

Hopei-Chahar Pacification CommisThese delegates reached Wanping at four

o'clock on the morning of July 8. The Japanese officers
again insisted that their troops be permitted to enter and
cations staff of the

sioner's office.

search the town, but the Chinese officials declined to

entertain the

demand. The delegates entered the town,

however, and about

five o'clock, while negotiations for a

settlement were proceeding, the Japanese troops outside
the east gate opened fire. Soon afterwards heavy artillery

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

11

was heard coming from outside the west gate of the

town. Up to this point the Chinese troops had not replied
to the attack, but under the bombardment they were comfire

pelled to open

fire

in self-defence.

The

statement con-

cluded by declaring that the Chinese authorities hoped

to reach a peaceful settlement, but that if the Japanese
continued the attack on Wanping the Chinese troops
would not hesitate to resist to the best of their ability and
means.
The fighting at Wanping ended at half-past nine on
the morning of July 8, with several score Chinese soldiers
and about ten Chinese civilians killed or wounded; Japanese casualties were officially announced as ten, including two non-commissioned officers and one sub-lieutenant.
A one-hour armistice was declared at ten o'clock, later
extended to noon the first of several truces made only
to be broken on this and subsequent days.
Several aspects of the Lukouchiao incident deserve furfirst place, as noted in the

ther consideration. In the

Renter despatch quoted previously, the Japanese troop

maneuvers at Marco Polo Bridge had already been proceeding for three days as early as June 30. Yet field exercises were still continuing there on the night of July 7,

when

the incident occurred.

What made

necessary for
the Japanese maneuvers to be prolonged over a ten-day
period? In the second place, the Lukouchiao-Wanping
it

is of extreme strategic
importance. This region lies
athwart the Peiping-Hankow Railway which, in view of
the Japanese occupation of the Fengtai railway junction
in September 1936, afforded the last unobstructed access
to Peiping from the south for Chinese troops. Could the

area

Japanese army have been designedly aiming to secure

military control of Lukouchiao
pleting the isolation of Peiping?

and Wanping, thus com-

JAPAN IN CHINA

12

There

is,

finally, the

technical point that the Japanese

had no legal justification for conducting

maneuvers in the Lukouchiao area. Since the Japanese
authorities, on a number of occasions in recent years, have
referred rather loosely to the Boxer Protocol as justifying
the exercise of certain military rights in North China
which they have in fact arbitrarily assumed, it is necessary
to examine at some length the relevant sections of this
protocol and the later exchanges of notes between China
and the powers. Article IX of the Final Protocol, signed
on September 7, 1901 and commonly known as the Boxer
military forces

Protocol, reads as follows:

"The Chinese Government has conceded

the Powers in the protocol annexed to the

the right to
letter of the

i6th of January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be

determined by an agreement between them, for the maintenance of open communications between the capital and
the sea.
tsun,

The

points occupied

Langfang,

Yangtsun,

by the powers
Tientsin,

are:

Huang-

Chunliangcheng,

Tangku, Lutai, Tangshan, Lanchou, Changli, Chinwang9

tao, and Shanhaikuan."
Two points arise in connection with this article of the

The

right to station foreign troops at the places

specified rests on the declaration that they are located
"between the capital and the sea." Peiping ceased to be
protocol.

the capital of China in 1928; since then, it may be questioned whether any of the powers has a legal right to
continue the maintenance of its armed forces at these

An

adviser to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, in a recent brochure, notes that the powers enterplaces.

ing into formal treaty relations with the National Government since 1928 did so "with the knowledge that
8

John V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning

China,. 1894-1919,

Volume

I,

p. 382-283.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

13

Nanking had been chosen as the new capital and without

making reservation in favor o Peking." He therefore
maintains that Article IX of the main protocol, as well
as the provisions of the treaty

relating to

it,

"should

all

instruments of 1901-1902
be considered as obsolete and

subject to termination when and if the Chinese Government chooses to raise the question with the Protocol

Powers."

10

Aside from this general issue, it should be noted that

the Article under consideration permits the occupation
of only twelve specified points. In actual practice, up to
933^ a ll the powers including Japan had restricted their
troops to Peiping and Tientsin, except for small contin1

gents despatched in rotation to

summer camps

at Chin-

since 1933, had

exercised the right of stationing troops at most of the
twelve places specified in Article IX. In addition, from
fhe end of 1935 Japan arbitrarily assumed the right of

wangtao and Shanhaikuan. Only Japan,

Tungchow, and from September 1936 at Fengtai. The maintenance of Japanese

troops at these two towns was clearly contrary to the
provisions of the Boxer Protocol.
During the first week of July 1937, the issue at Lukouchiao was not one of military occupation but whether
Japan had treaty sanction for holding troop maneuvers
stationing a military force at

The

provisions relating to this question are

found in the identical notes addressed to China by five

in that area.
10

Shuhsi Hsu, "The Boxer Protocol and Japanese Aggression," Informa-

tion 'Bulletin, Council of International Affairs, Nanking, Volume IV, No.

8, August 18, 1937. In support of the same position, the editor of The.

Peiping Chronicle

cites

the precedent of Turkey.

He

states:

"When

the

Turkey was removed from Stambul (Constantinople) to Ankara

practically all the accumulated and accreted privileges that foreign Powers
had obtained in Constantinople under the old regime were swept away,
and there seems to be no reason why special privileges should persist
here." "The Documents in the Case," The Peiping Chronicle, July 27,
capital of

1937-

JAPAN IN CHINA

14

powers, including Japan, under date of July

and are supplementary

They read as
"By Article IX

to Article

IX

of the

15,

1902,

Boxer Proto-

follows:

col.

of the same Protocol

it is

provided that

the powers shall have the right of occupying certain points

between Peking and the sea, of which the whole town of
is one. Consequently, after the dissolution of the
Tientsin provisional government, foreign troops will continue as hitherto to be stationed there, in the places actu-

Tientsin

occupied by them, and their supplies of all sorts

continuing, as at present, to be exempt from all taxes or
dues whatsoever. They will have the right of carrying on

ally

field exercises

and

rifle practice, etc.,

without informing

the Chinese authorities, except in the case of feux de

guerre.
"It

is

desirable, however, to avoid as far as possible

the foreign troops and

that with this object
therefore,
propose,
the Chinese Government shall undertake not to station

occasions of collision between

those of China.

march any troops within 20 Chinese

or

li

(6% English

miles) of the city or of the troops stationed at Tientsin;

further ... it was agreed that the jurisdiction of the

commanders of the posts to be established along the line

of communications should extend to a distance of 2 miles
on either
to be

side of the railway, and this arrangement ought

as long as the line of posts specified in

maintained

of the protocol continues to be occupied/' u

These provisions confined the right to carry on "field

Article

IX

exercises

and

rifle practice, etc."

exclusively to the foreign

troops stationed in Tientsin. By no possible interpretation can they be stretched to cover troop maneuvers
farther than 6% miles from Tientsin or beyond the two-

mile zone on either side of the railway.

u

MacMurray,

cited,

Volume

I,

p. 317.

Nor does

the

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

15

main protocol which sanctioned the mainLegation Guards in Peiping make provision

article of the

tenance o
for their

deployment beyond the

Quarter. Article VII of the

point, reads as follows:

main

"The Chinese Government

limits of the Legation

protocol, relevant to this

has agreed that the quarter

occupied by the legations shall be considered as one

specially reserved for their use and placed under their
exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the
right to reside and which may be made defensible.
.

In the protocol annexed to the letter of the i6th of

January, 1901, China recognized the right of each Power
to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarter for
the defence of its legation." 12

By a later arrangement, the various Legation Guards

secured the privilege of using an international rifle range
which was laid out to the east of Peiping. 13 This privilege, however, did not carry with it the right to hold
troop maneuvers in the neighborhood of Peiping. Yet the
Japanese military forces, from 1935 to 1937, arbitrarily
assumed the right to conduct field exercises on an ex-

tended scale throughout the Peiping-Tientsin area. It

was by virtue of this assumed right, wholly unsanctioned
by treaty provision, that the Japanese troops were holding
maneuvers at Lukouchiao in July 1937- 14
Following the Lukouchiao incident, events in North
China with deceptive interludes of calm marched to the
appointed climax of July 28. In retrospect, these three
weeks call up a confused picture of sporadic clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops in the environs of
13
13

MacMurray,

cited,

Volume

I,

p. 282.

"The Documents

"Some

in the Case," cited.

authorities refer to a note of

November

15,

1913, sent to the

powers by the Chinese Foreign Minister, as conferring such a right.

exact degree of validity to be attached to this note is in doubt.

The

JAPAN IN CHINA

16

Peiping; reported settlements, alternately confirmed and

denied, the details of which were only verified much later;
the rapid breakdown of normal railway passenger schedinflux of Japanese troops and war
supplies. Less tangible was the unremitting tension created by a prolonged, severe political struggle, in the

and the steady

ules;

course of which resort to force

The

is continually threatened.
assumed
attitudes
in
the
by the opponents
disparity

was marked: irresolution, partial compromise, and differences of opinion on the part of the leading officials of
the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; on the side of the
Japanese military, unity, determination, and a grim certainty of objective.

Early on the morning of July 9, the War Office at

Tokyo sent urgent orders to the commanders of certain
divisions in

whose

Japan

service terms

postpone disbandment of privates

were expiring. Even more significant

to

measures were taken by the Japanese government on

15
Consular officials in China were ordered to
July n.
instruct Japanese nationals to prepare for evacuation "in
the event of serious developments." The Foreign Office
announced that the Cabinet had decided "to take all
necessary measures for despatching military forces to

North China," in pursuit of "its fixed and immovable

policy." At a specially summoned meeting of Japan's
political and financial notables, the Premier explained
the government's policy and elicited pledges of support.
On the same day 2,200 Japanese troops arrived in Tientsin from Manchuria. With these forces came large
quantities of supplies and military equipment,
including field
guns, armored cars, motor trucks, and airplanes.
On July 1 1 also, the first settlement of the Lukouchiao
incident was reached. General Chang Tzu-chung, Mayor
,

Japan Advertiserf July

12,

1937.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

17

of Tientsin, provisionally accepted the following terms:

apology by a representative of the sgth Army, and pun-

ishment of responsible Chinese

replacement of
troops in the Lukouchiao-Wanping area with

sgth Army
Paoantui units;

Communist
Chinese

and suppression of anti-Japanese and

North China. Denied at first by

activities in

officials

ment was

officers;

in Peiping, the validity of this agree-

later confirmed. Its terms

could not be upheld;

eventual breakdown was ensured by the forces at work

in both camps.

Throughout the period

of

crisis,

a sharp internal strug-

gle was taking place among the highest ranks of the North
China officials. The compromisers were mainly located in

Tientsin; at Peiping, a more militant mood prevailed.

Strongest of all was the feeling among the lower Chinese

and the private soldiers, who were especially deterLukouchiao-Wanping area should not be
turned over to occupation by Japanese troops, as had

officers

mined

that the

occurred at Fengtai in the previous September. On the

other hand, the Japanese forces in the Lukouchiao area
were at no time wholly withdrawn to Fengtai a factor

which led to continued skirmishing, since the sgth Army

troops were unwilling, under such circumstances, to retire
in favor of the Paoantui units.

The

position of the Chi-

who were at the same time responsible

was most unenviable. In line with
commanders,
military
official policy, sanctioned by Nanking, they sought to
avoid a frontal clash by complying so far as possible with
the Japanese demands. In contrast with previous years,
however, their yielding stopped short of an outright surrender of national rights, and thus failed to satisfy the
requirements of determined Japanese aggression. The corollary to this policy, which should have been definite,
planned resistance on the military side in case of a shownese

officials,

i8

down, was never

JAPAN IN CHINA
drawn. No straightforward

lead was

given to the milffcant spirit of the Chinese troops.

Despite the agreement of July 11, Japanese military

reinforcements continued to pour into North China.

Foreign military observers estimated that 10,000 Japanese troops had crossed the Great Wall by July 13 and
occupied positions between Shanhaikuan and Tientsin.

The

majority of these troops, which lacked the distinctive

badge of the Kwantung Army, had evidently been mobilized in Japan. During the succeeding week the bulk of

supplied with war equipment of all

was disposed at various points in the PeipingTientsin area, thus doubling the local Japanese garrison.
A new commander of the North China Garrison, Lieutenant-General Katsuki, had arrived in Tientsin and assumed
office by July i4. 16 On arrival, he had declared that his
"mission in North China was to lead the Japanese army
this force, liberally

kinds,

to justice and righteousness and to chastise the outrageous

Chinese, and simultaneously to protect Japanese residents
and Japanese rights and interests in North China on

the

basis

Cabinet."

of

the immutable decisions adopted

by the

17

General Sung Che-yuan had meanwhile broken off his

two months' retreat at Loling and reappeared in Tientsin. On July 18 he called upon Lieutenant-General Katsuki and accepted in principle the terms of the July 1 1
agreement. This action wasi reported to Nanking on July
1S

225 and approved by the central authorities on July 24.

General Chang Tzu-chung, Mayor of Tientsin, had meanwhile discussed further details of this accord with Jap18

His predecessor, Lieutenant-General

died a few weeks later.

Tashiro, was seriously

ill

and

w The
Peiping Chronicle, July 15, 1937.
Shuhsi Hsu, "The North China Crisis," The China Quarterly (ShangVol. 2, No. 4, Special Fall Number, 1937, p. 592.
hai)
18

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

19

anese representatives on July 19. Fulfilment of the terms

began on July 21, when a detachment of the Peace Preservation Corps arrived at Lukouchiao. During the next two
days both Chinese and Japanese troops began a gradual
withdrawal from this area, with the former being replaced

by Paoantui

units.

Three Chinese and three Japanese

representatives supervised the withdrawal. Simultaneously the Chinese garrison in Peiping, comprising a
section of the 37th Division, was retiring south to Cho-

Two

thousand men were estimated to have left

by
Peiping
July 23; they were replaced by contingents
from the igsnd Division under General Chao Teng-yu.
The tension in North China had considerably eased
by July 25. Sand-bag barricades had been removed from

chow.

the streets of Peiping; martial law, still nominally in

force, had been greatly relaxed. For the first time since

July 7 passenger trains were reaching Peiping from the

south along the Ping-Han line. Other aspects were less
reassuring. Relatively few Japanese troops had withdrawn
from the Lukouchiao area, and these for but a short
distance.

The

2Qth

Army

troops were also slowing

down

appears, had merely

the Paoantui. Most
their
uniforms
for
those
of
exchanged
an
stream
of Japanese
ominous of all,
uninterrupted
troops and equipment was still pouring into North China.
their retirement;

some

of them,

it

On July 25 the first of a fleet of Japanese ships began to

unload 100,000 tons of military supplies at Tangku. That
night another incident, occurring at Langfang, proved to
be the signal for the outbreak of general hostilities.
these weeks, the central authorities at Nanking
cautiously watched developments in the north. Routine
protests and reservations of rights were exchanged with

During

the Japanese government between July 9 and 12. The

Chinese government, from the beginning, was mainly
concerned over the influx of Japanese troops. As a counter

JAPAN IN CHINA

so

Chinese divisions were mobilized in

Honan and later sent into southern Hopei. Dr. Wang
Chung-hui, Chinese Foreign Minister, proposed on July
12 to Mr. Hidaka, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy,
that there should be mutual cessation of military movements and withdrawal of both sides to their original
positions, but Tokyo paid no attention to this proposal.
On July 16 a Chinese note outlining the circumstances of
the conflict was transmitted to the signatories of the Nine-

measure,

several

Power Treaty, Japan excepted, as well as to the U.S.S.R.

and Germany. A Japanese memorandum, presented at
Nanking on the following day, warned China to suspend
all hostile acts and not to obstruct a local settlement in
the north. These xvere the central points in the diplomatic
debate. In effect Japan was demanding,

first,

that the Chi-

nese government refrain from sending troops into Hopei

province, while offering no check on the despatch of its

own

forces; and, second, that the

Hopei-Chahar

Political

Council should be considered an independent government,

in no way amenable to Nanking's jurisdiction. In reply
to these demands the Chinese Foreign Office presented an
aide-memoire to the Japanese Embassy on July 19, containing the following counter-proposals:

(i)

joint fixing

on which both sides should simultaneall

cease
ously
military movements and withdraw their
armed
forces to the positions occupied prior
respective
to the incident; (2) settlement of the Lukouchiao inci-

of a definite date

dent through regular diplomatic channels; (3) questions

of a local nature susceptible of adjustment on the spot
should be subject to sanction of the National Government. 10

At
10

Killing,

on the same day, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-

For text of the aide-memoire, see The Piping Chronicle, July ai,

1937-

Times Wide

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

IV or Id

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

21

shek issued his ringing- proclamation to the nation, declaring that "China's sovereign rights cannot be sacrificed,
even at the expense of war, and once war has begun there
is no looking back." In this address the Generalissimo laid
down four points as the 'minimum conditions" for a basis
of negotiation: "first, any kind of settlement must not
'

infringe upon the territorial integrity and the sovereign

rights of our nation; second, as the status of the Hopei-

Chahar

Council is fixed by the Central Government, we will not allow any illegal alterations; third, we
will not agree to the removal by outside pressure of those
local officials appointed by the Central Government, such
Political

Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council;

fourth, we will not allow any restriction being placed

as the

now

held by the sgth Army." 20

Japan's diplomatic pressure at Nanking was immediately intensified. The Japanese Military Attache, MajorGeneral Seiichi Kita, in the course of a talk with General

upon

the positions

Ho

Ying-chin, Chinese War Minister, on the late afternoon of July 19, intimated that failure to remove the
troops from Hopei might aggravate the SinoJapanese crisis, which was "rapidly approaching the final
central

21

Other reports described this interview as the

22
On July 20,
Japanese army's "last warning" to China.
at an early morning session with the Chinese Foreign
Minister, Mr. Hidaka stressed the demands previously
stage."

raised by his government. Dr. Wang Chung-hui firmly

countered both demands. If the legality of central troop
movements in Hopei should be questioned, 23 he declared,
20

For

21

The Peiping

text, see

North-China Daily News, July

20, 1921.

Chronicle, July ai, 1937.

North-China Daily News, July 20, 1937.
33
An allusion to the Japanese claim that the terms of the Ho-Umetsu
agreement barred central government troops from Hopei province. For
discussion of this agreement, see Chapter II.
22

JAPAN IN CHINA

22

then

it

must be equally recognized

that the presence there

of a large Japanese army was an undoubted violation of

the territorial and sovereign rights of China. As to the
issue of local negotiations, he stated that in every country

the conduct of foreign relations was reserved exclusively

24
government. Since Mr. Hidaka refused to

to the central

consider the proposals of the Chinese aide-memoire, which

Dr. Wang renewed in this conversation, the deadlock

seemed complete.

To

the very end, however, the Central Government

kept open the possibility of a diplomatic settlement. The
presence of central troops in Hopei was played up in

Japan in order to rally popular support behind the militarists' aggressive plans. The Domei reports sent to Japan
greatly exaggerated the number of these troops, which
never exceeded two divisions during the month of July.
Neither in Hopei nor Honan, moreover, did the mobilized divisions consist of first-class troops; the crack diviwere all kept at Nanking. The sequel showed that

sions

there was

no intention even

Peiping-Tientsin area.

for these troops to enter the

the central authorities

Nor did

prejudice the attempts to reach a local settlement. Hsiung

Pin, Vice-Chief of Staff, went north and conferred with
the 2Qth Army commanders at Peiping on July 23-25, but
there is no evidence that he counselled military resistance.
The Nanking government, as already noted, had ratified
General Sung Che-yuan's acceptance of the July 1 1 agree-

ment with

the Japanese military; in so doing, it came

to violating the four-point minimum
perilously
enunciated by the Generalissimo. This, too, was of no
close

ava.il;

the blow

fell

Left mainly to

with unrelenting vigor.

its

own

resources, the leadership of the

to measure up to

2gth Route Army proved wholly unable

s*

The China

Press, July 21, 1937.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

its task.

ties

To

by a

the end,

it

compromise

23

hoped to stave off general hostilisettlement; against the day when

negotiations might collapse and fighting begin, it premonth earlier

pared no scheme of military defence.

Chu Teh,

then Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese

Com-

munist armies, 25 had given a prophetic forecast of the

events that were now about to take place in North China.
Asked to state the position and prospects of General Sung
Che-yuan and the sgth Army, he made the following
reply:

"The northern troops are under Japanese pressure and

are influenced by the national salvation movement. The
lower officers are very anti-Japanese, but they have no
plan of action for a crisis. Once war comes, they are likely
to be destroyed one after another. So it is necessary to
consolidate these forces under one command, and work

out a general plan for resisting Japan. We are trying

to have these troops coordinated with the central com-

mand."

2C

The key

to the

sudden collapse in the north

at the

end of July lies in the concluding sentences of this brief

commentary. The leaders of the sgth Route Army had
formulated no plan of action of their own; much less was
there a coordinated scheme of military operations between this army and the central forces. Japan's military
command was enabled to complete its preparations at
leisure, and then to choose the moment to strike a
paralyzing blow.
The interlude of comparative peace that had followed
the agreement of July 18-19 was rudely broken on the

morning of July 26 by a sanguinary clash

25
Now commander of the Eighth Route Army, under

at

Langfang.

authority of the
National Government.
^Interview by author at Yenan in north Shensi on June 23, 1937.

JAPAN IN CHINA

24

which precipitated hostilities occurred during the previous night, and the details as
27
published were presented in two contradictory versions.

As

usual, the incident

According to the spokesman of the Japanese Military

Headquarters at Tientsin, two unsuccessful attempts had
been made to repair the Japanese military telephone line
at Langfang, which he alleged had been cut by Chinese
an arrangetroops. On the night of July 25, he claimed,
with
General
reached
ment had been
Chang Tzu-chung,
senior commander of the Chinese troops stationed at
Langfang, to send a third repair corps accompanied, this
time, by a detachment of 300 Japanese troops. The party
arrived at Langfang this being a fact not mentioned in
the

Japanese statement at about half-past eleven

of July 25. As they approached the station
repairs, they were suddenly fired upon by Chi-

official

on the night
to effect

nese troops. The Japanese force immediately returned

the fire, occupied the station, and summoned reinforce-

ments. 28

According
the Japanese

to the

Chinese version,-

the

commander

force, after the repair corps

his troops be

had demanded that

fang,
establish

of

reached Lang-

permitted to

themselves at the railway station. The local

Chinese officer had refused the request, on the ground
that in the dead of night such an occupation might create
trouble with the Chinese troops, whose barracks were
located only a few hundred yards distant. Thereupon,

shortly after midnight, the Japanese force

had attacked

In the case o an incident that takes place late at night, it should be

observed that, aside from the difficulty of checking up on the facts, the
news does not reach the public until the second day after the event.
For text of the Japanese statement, see Peking & Tientsin Times,
527

328

July 27, 1937.

There was no official Chinese statement; these details are pieced together from various unofficial Chinese sources.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

25

the Chinese troops and occupied the station, using ma-

chine-guns, artillery, and an armored train.

Hostilities ceased for a brief period; they were resumed
at 3 a.m., when 1,300 Japanese reinforcements rushed

from Tientsin launched an attack on the Chinese

posi-

At dawn seventeen Japanese airplanes reached

Langfang and bombed the Chinese barracks severely,

tions.

forcing the Chinese troops to withdraw. The Japanese

forces completed their occupation of the town at eight

on July 26. During the morning the Chinese

continued their retreat towards Huangtsun, a few miles
south of Fengtai, with the Japanese forces in pursuit.
Japanese casualties were thirteen; the Chinese casualties,
including civilians, were much heavier one report placed
them at several hundred.
This incident, the "challenging attitude" of the Chio'clock

nese troops, and the delay in carrying out the terms of the
agreement accepted by the sgth Army were made the
grounds for an ultimatum addressed to General Sung

Che-yuan by the Japanese Garrison Headquarters on July

26. The ultimatum was delivered to General Sung in
Peiping at three o'clock in the afternoon and read to the
press correspondents in Tientsin at half-past three, only
a few hours after fighting had ceased at Langfang. Its

terms were embraced in the following sentence: "If your

army should have the intention not to make the situation

more

serious, the 37th Division stationed near Lukouchiao and Papaoshan should, first of all, be withdrawn as
soon as possible before the noon of the 27th inst. to
Changhsintien, and the 37th Division in Peiping, inclu-

same Division at Hsiyuan, should

be evacuated from the Peiping wall to the westward of
the Yungtingho, through the area north of the Pinghan

sive of the troops of the

JAPAN IN CHINA

26

Railway, before the noon of the 28th

inst.,

and the

trans-

portation of these troops to Paotingfu should be commenced immediately afterwards." In case of failure to
carry out these demands, the

ultimatum concluded, "the

Japanese Army must, to its greatest regret, take its own

decisive measures. Every responsibility incurred in this
30
case ought to be taken by your army."

The Japanese command

at

once proceeded to

effect

certain changes in the disposition of its forces, in order

to strengthen its military position in the Peiping-Tientsin

Japanese reinforcements were despatched

Tientsin during the morning of July
from
Langfang
The
26.
Japanese troops in the Lukouchiao area were
greatly increased. Special efforts were made to reinforce
area. Additional

to

the Japanese Embassy Guard, at Peiping. About 300 Japanese troops sought to enter the Chao Yang Men shortly
after noon, but finding the gate closed marched around
similar effort in the evening
the city toward FengtaL

led to a serious clash. Shortly before seven o'clock, about

500 Japanese troops arrived at the Kwang An Men from

Lukouchiao in motor lorries and demanded admittance

to the city. This force was accompanied by a Japanese
adviser of the sgth Army, who explained to the Chinese
guards that these Japanese soldiers belonged to the Embassy Guard. After a lengthy parley, about 120 of these
troops were allowed to enter, but as soon as they had
passed through the gate, the Japanese forces outside

with machine-guns and field artillery. The

guards immediately closed the gate, and soon a brisk
exchange of fire developed. The Chinese soldiers on the
wall rained hand grenades on the Japanese inside the

opened

city,

fire

who had meanwhile

alighted from their lorries

deployed for action* Firing

80

For

text, see

Peking

6*

continued until nearly

Tientsin Times, July 27, 1937.

and
micl-

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

27

night, when an agreement was effected which permitted

the Japanese troops inside the city to proceed to the
Embassy barracks.

The

precipitated by the clashes at Langfang and

Peiping, and by the Japanese ultimatum, found the leaders of the 2gth Route Army still unprepared for resolute
crisis

on which the first clause of the

ultimatum expired, saw General Sung Che-yuan attempting to arrange a compromise with the Japanese military
authorities. He apparently offered to withdraw the troops
of the 37th Division, as demanded, but sought to have these
replaced with the igsnd Division. This offer the Japanese
rejected, since the ultimatum clearly aimed at evacuation
action. July 27, the day

of all Chinese troops, i.e., demilitarization of the Peiping

area. When convinced that the Japanese would brook

nothing less, General Sung finally broke off negotiations.

In the evening he issued a circular telegram to the country expressing his determination to defend national territory against aggression. Fighting had already begun that
afternoon south of the Nanyuan barracks, where Japanese

troops had opened an attack on the Chinese positions at

could be no further doubt that a major

Tuan Ho. There

At this zero hour, the Chinese

themselves
contented
with bringing a few
commanders
of the Chinese troops at Nanyuan into the city. No offen-

struggle was impending.

operations were ordered by the higher command;

the bulk of the Chinese troops were not even deployed

sive

for action in the surrounding territory, but were left in

their barracks at Nanyuan, Peiyuan, and to a lesser extent
at Hsiyuan.

Large-scale operations began on the morning of July

proclamation issued by Lieutenant-General Katsuki,
commander of the North China Garrison, and distributed
28.

by military

aircraft

at

dawn, stated that the Japanese

JAPAN IN CHINA

*8.

Army had

decided "to launch a punitive expedition

against the Chinese troops, who have been taking acts

31
derogatory to the prestige of the Empire of Japan."

Bringing aircraft and heavy artillery into action, the

Japanese forces attacked the sgth Army troops at all
points in the Peiping sector, except the city itself. At
dawn fleets of airplanes bombed Hsiyuan, Peiyuan, and
Nanyuan; other places were also shelled and bombed in
the course of the day. Most of the Chinese troops had
evacuated the Hsiyuan barracks, where relatively small
casualties were reported. Concentrations of Chinese troops

were dispersed at Peiyuan. The most severe attack was

directed against Nanyuan, which contained the largest
concentration of Chinese troops in the neighborhood of
Peiping. Here the debacle was complete. Driven from
their barracks by a severe bombardment, the Chinese
troops withdrew down the nearby roads in mass formationstrafed by the Japanese airplanes. Press correspondents later found the bodies of the Chinese soldiers

heaped along the roads leading from the Nanyuan barwhere they had been slaughtered by machine-gun
fire from the air. Chinese casualties in this sector numbered several thousand, including the deaths of General

racks,

Chao Teng-yu, commander

of the 13 2nd Division,

and

his vice-commander, General Tung Lin-kuo. For days

afterward hundreds of wounded Chinese soldiers strag-

gled into Peiping.

That night Generals Sung Che-yuan, Chin Teh-chun,

and Feng Chih-an departed for Paotingfu, leaving the
reins of government in the hands of General Chang Tzuchung.
81

32

Peking

Following the departure of their leaders, the

6-

Tientsin Times, July 29, 1937.

The latter held his post for a week, and then escaped in disguise and
made his way south. In March 1938 he commanded a Chinese force fighting on the Hsuchow front.
88

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

29

troops of the 37th and 38th Divisions within Peiping also

evacuated. From midnight of July 28 until four o'clock
the next morning, a continuous stream of motor lorries

and trucks laden with Chinese

soldiers passed out of the

of these troops had been manning the

defences in various parts of the city throughout the precity gates.

Many

ceding day and night, and "when word was passed round
to them that they had been ordered to leave their defences
and evacuate the city, they cried bitterly." 33

Up to this point, the Japanese operations had proceeded entirely according to schedule. Two surprises were
in store, one at Tungchow and the other at Tientsin.
Reference to the background and origins 34 of the East
Hopei Paoantui throws considerable light on the macabre
features of the mutiny at Tungchow. In April and May
1933, the Japanese troops which invaded Hopei province
were assisted by semi-bandit Chinese renegades. The
,

Tangku Truce

of

May

31, 1933

had

specified that a Chi-

nese gendarmerie should police the demilitarized zone of

East Hopei. For some months the Japanese military prevented the organization or functioning of such a Chinese
police force. During this period the demilitarized zone
was overrun by the semi-bandit renegades, whose depreda-

On

tions kept the area in turmoil.

Japanese insistence,
these irregulars were incorporated in the Chinese gen-

darmerie eventually organized to police the demilitarized

zone. After formation of the East Hopei Autonomous
Government under Yin Ju-keng in November 1935, four
Paoantui corps, the basic stock of which was still the
former semi-bandit elements, were created. For more than
a year the resident Japanese Military Mission at Tungchow had devoted careful efforts to the training of the
38
*>

The Peiping Chronicle, July 30, 1937.

See Chapter II.

JAPAN IN CHINA

30

East Hopei Paoantui and apparently had implicit confidence in the loyalty of this Chinese force, despite its
questionable background. Of the four corps only the ist
and 2nd, numbering several thousand men, were at

Tungchow when

the mutiny occurred.

characteristic incident supplied the prelude to the

Tungchow was

revolt.

located

on the extreme southern

battalion of
edge of the East Hopei regime's territory.
the g8th Division of the sgth Army was stationed at the

south gate of the city. Despite its precarious position, this

battalion had received no orders to evacuate when the

Lukouchiao incident developed. It kept its post even

Hopei Paoantui were ordered to surround

after the East

hemming it in against the city wall.

of July 27, before the ultimatum expired, the Japanese troops opened fire on the battalion
from the gate and wall with trench mortars and machinein a semi-circle,

it

On

the

morning

guns. Facing complete annihilation, this Chinese force

escaped only because the Paoantui seem to -have let it

through; total casualties, so far as could be discovered,

were 18 killed and 18 wounded. The main body withdrew

but was later pursued by the bulk of the Japanese

safely,

garrison at

Tungchow,

and men were

left

of

behind.

which only

The

forty-three officers
resulting situation proved

too great a temptation for the Paoantui,

on the morning of July sg. 35

who mutinied

No extra precautions seem to have been taken by the

small Japanese force left at Tungchow. Awakened by the
sound of rifle fire at three o'clock, the garrison found that
the mutineers
of the
35

The

details of this

summarized
1937.

had completely surrounded the mud walls

This attack was never pushed home,

barracks.

paragraph are taken from an eye-witness account,

Peking c> Tientsin Times for August 14,

editorially in tlic

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

31

despite the overwhelming disparity of numbers. Japanese

planes bombed the city in the afternoon; the bombardment started a stream of Chinese refugees, numbering

nearly ten thousand, flowing into the mission compounds.

Seven more planes appeared over Tungchow on the fol-

lowing morning and engaged in a two hours' bombardment. At four o'clock that afternoon a relief detachment
of Japanese troops reached the scene; by dark this force
had mopped up most of the Paoantui still in the city and
gained control of the gates. Twenty of the Japanese garrison were killed and thirteen wounded. Five officers and
associates of the Japanese Military Mission escaped;
eleven were killed. Of some 385 Japanese and Korean
residents, there were only 135 survivors. Chinese casualties,

including civilians killed or

wounded during

the

bombardments, were estimated at approximately one

thousand. The remaining Paoantui groups were relentlessly hunted across the countryside in the neighborhood
of Peiping. Yin Ju-keng, who had been captured during
the revolt, was brought by one of these groups to the
gates of the city.

Peiping,

this

Unaware

of the change of regime in

was
group
apparently intending to sur-

render him to the ZQth

At the

Army

as a pledge of their loyalty.

rescued, set at liberty, and

gate Yin Ju-keng was

escorted to the Japanese Embassy.

The outbreak at
Tungchow mutiny

Tientsin, which exactly paralleled the

in point of time, was wholly different

in character. Again the Chinese forces consisted of a few

thousand Paoantui, but they fought against heavy odds

in equipment if not in numbers. They struck hard at a
vital Japanese military center and for some hours the
issue was in doubt. A similar attack, carried through with
equal spirit by a well equipped division of Chinese troops,
might well have resulted in a Japanese catastrophe.

JAPAN IN CHINA

32

Reports of Chinese military victories at Fengtai and

Langfang, which gave rise to enthusiastic celebrations at
Shanghai and Nanking, were current in North China during the afternoon of July 28. Although these reports seem
to have been greatly exaggerated, they were given full
credence in Tientsin, where there was no means of verifying the actual results of the hostilities in the Peiping
area, and may possibly have supplied the spark which set

by the

local Paoantui.

Leadership of this
Chinese military operation, the most effective conducted
in the north during these early days, is attributed to the
deputy commander of the Tientsin Paoantui, who inoff the attack

sisted

on

resistance

and

virtually forced his senior officer

to abdicate before he had his way. The Japanese forces

were taken unawares, and the initial successes owed much
to the factor of surprise.

At two o'clock on the morning of July 29, the Paoantui

opened vigorous attack on a series of carefully chosen
military objectives. They captured the Peitsang station
north of Tientsin; occupied the West and Central Stations in the city, overcoming small Japanese garrisons in

each case; and laid siege to the East Station. Here they

surrounded a fairly strong Japanese garrison, which was

forced to defend itself against Chinese troops in the railway sidings, snipers posted on the rooftops of buildings,
and a major concentration based on the nearby branch
headquarters of the Paoantui. Another Chinese detachment moved rapidly against one of the Japanese airfields,
where some forty planes were resting on the ground.

Warned

in time, the Japanese guards

made good

their

defences, while the planes took to the air and bombed and
machine-gunned the Chinese troops as they approached
the field. Success in this enterprise, despite the fact

that other Japanese planes

were within striking distance,

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

33

might have prolonged the struggle in Tientsin. Failure

sealed the fate of the attack.

During the morning, nevertheless, the Japanese position was extremely critical. The Paoantui commanded
the International Bridge and its approaches, concentrating a heavy

fire

on

all

Japanese military

traffic

attempting

Two

to proceed to the East Station.

of the three main
stations were occupied, and a struggle of serious propor-

was occurring at the third. The Japanese garrison

was cut off, and the Japanese Concession
was isolated. All ground connections between the airfield
under attack and the East Arsenal were broken. River
communications were severed by Chinese forces on the
south bank; the railway to Tangku was blocked by a
serious train wreck; and fighting was taking place at
Tangku and Taku. Many Japanese nationals were isolated in the industrial section down-river below the city;
tions

at East Station

the military forces could neither afford them protection

nor escort them in through the Concessions. The bulk of

the Japanese troops had gone inland toward Peiping,

where they were thoroughly occupied. Resort was had to
the air force.
planes, sent up in the early afternoon, loosed
destruction on the city. Japanese headquarters announced

Bombing

that certain carefully mapped areas had to be wiped out

to meet the military necessities of the situation. Circled in

red on the map of Tientsin landmarks, which allegedly

harbored "anti-Japanese elements", was Nankai Univer-

and unhurriedly, the heaviest bombers

of Japan's North China air force set about their task. "For
four hours/' in the words of the editor of the Peking &

sity.

Systematically

Tientsin Times, they "rained bombs upon the Municipal

Government building, the old Administration building
of the Peining Railway, the Central Station, Peining Park,

JAPAN IN CHINA

34

Paoantui Headquarters, the villages in the Palitai area,

and Nankai University. They went up in regular formation, and as soon as one squadron had dropped its bombs
and returned to the airfield three miles from the city another squadron went up, so that the bombing, with periodical bursts of machine-gun fire from the planes, was
The incendiary bombs soon
almost continuous.
started fires and the main hall of Nankai University, the
Peining Railway office at the Central Station, and the
various Government buildings were enveloped in columns of smoke and flames/' 36 By nightfall many of the
principal Chinese public buildings were smoldering ruins;
at Nankai University the concrete-and-steel Library and
.

Science Building withstood destruction but the Administration Building, with its wooden floors, windows
was burned to the ground. East Station, which

seats,

and
was

held by the Japanese garrison until relief arrived late on

the night of July 29, was carefully spared. Against the

bombing attack, the Paoantui were able to offer only

tered and ineffectual bursts of machine-gun and rifle

scatfire.

of July 29, the remaining Paoantui

their positions by rifle fire, machine-

Through the night

were blasted from

guns and trench mortars, operating in concerted offensive.
The hiding quarters of the snipers, as they were discovered, were subjected to a ceaseless fire, and gradually the
Japanese forces reestablished control. On the next morning there was a lull, broken only by an occasional shot.
period had already passed. The main forces
were evacuating the city, although scattered groups still remained near the East Station, in the
section of the Chinese Bund adjoining the Japanese Con-

The

critical

of the Paoantui

cession,

and in the Chinese

city.

At Tangku and Taku,

following withdrawal of the Chinese troops, the threat to

80
Peking & Tientsin Times, August i, 1937.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

35

the main line of Japanese military communications had

been removed. Japanese patrols began to move about
more freely in Tientsin. Thousands of Chinese refugees

thronged the entrances to the foreign Concessions. Shops

and residences in the Chinese city, especially near the
Courts and the Municipal Government quarters, were
badly damaged; the streets were littered with debris and
the bodies of dead and wounded, many of whom were
children.

Tension was renewed in the afternoon when another

operation, chiefly affecting Chinese
was carried out. Incendiary bombs, dropped
in the area of the Hui Wen Academy and the Nankai
Middle and Girls' Schools, started a fire which was fanned
intensive

bombing

institutions,

by a stiff breeze and spread rapidly. Fires of the previous

day were re-started at the Chinese Court and the Municipal Government buildings, and in the Palitai villages.
The destruction of Nankai University, including the
Science Building with its valuable equipment and the
irreplaceable Library, was completed. Parties of Japanese
troops, sent out in trucks carrying supplies of oil, "set
to the trees and brushwood all round the campus.

fire

The wind took the flames in the direction of the buildings. Then artillery opened up on the concrete buildings
which had escaped the fire from the incendiary bombs.
The campus was soon a mass of flames and the surrounding countryside, together with the adjoining premises,
were involved in the conflagration.'* 37
Clouds and occasional heavy rains on the morning of
July 31 promised an end to the anarchy and destruction

had ruled Tientsin for forty-eight hours. All signs

of Chinese opposition, save for infrequent sniping, had
virtually ceased. Japanese armored cars made patrols durthat

57

Peking

&

Tientsin Times, July 31, 1937.

JAPAN IN CHINA

g6

ing the morning, but the bombers did not take the

air.

The

severest measure of the punitive campaign was reserved for that afternoon.
heavy artillery bombardment

of several districts in the Chinese city began soon after

three o'clock, and lasted continuously until nightfall. The
shelling virtually wiped out the old Boxer villages near
the Central Station; until well into the night, the huts of

the Chinese villagers in this area blazed fiercely. By the

time the bombardment ended, an area of approximately
ablaze, and columns of smoke were
sections of the Chinese city.
other
from
various
rising
Panic-stricken residents made a wholesale exodus from
many areas, particularly the mud-hut villages, which were
almost completely destroyed. Since thirty thousand refugees were already crowded into the British Concession, it

one square mile was

proved necessary
British

Bund

to

direct

this

new stream along

into the First Special Area;

it

the

was estimated

that nearly forty thousand refugees passed along the British Bund on the afternoon and evening of this day.
Crowds of onlookers along the Bund were deeply moved

by the long line of refugees, which consisted largely of

careworn and exhausted women and children. The Japanese military spokesman later claimed that the bombardment was necessitated by the presence of anti-Japanese
elements in the Chinese districts, which could not be
driven out by other means. To many, however, it appeared that this measure could not be justified by any
military objective; its chief effect was to terrorize the
Chinese civilian population of Tientsin.
The events at Tientsin were rounded out by a final
act of vandalism. On the night of August i, shortly before
nine o'clock, a band of some twenty-six White Russians
surrounded the Soviet Consulate, threw hand grenades
into the grounds, scaled the walls,

and broke into the

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

37

residence. Mr. M. Smirnoff, acting Soviet ConsulGeneral and his staff, forewarned of the raid, had vacated
the premises an hour earlier. Besides notifying the Consu-

official

lar Corps of the expected raid, Mr. Smirnoff had approached the Japanese Consulate-General with a request
for protection. He was informed that efforts would be
made, but an hour before the attack no policemen were

in sight, although Japanese troops had taken over the

nearby police headquarters. The few Chinese guards at

the Consulate grounds scattered when the raiders appeared, and for six hours the White Russians had systematically looted the building. Soon after their arrival
a motor truck drove up and was loaded with valuables;
four more trucks, or possibly the same truck successively,
followed at intervals. The office safe, the archives and
other documents, personal belongings, the silver, and
much of the furniture was carried away. Every room in
the spacious house had been systematically pillaged, and
virtually nothing breakable left intact. Drawers had been
wrenched open and their contents strewn over the floors.

Heavy tables and chairs were smashed, the telephone line

and the instrument broken, paintings of Soviet leaders
were slashed, phonograph records and the electrola destroyed, and articles of clothing torn to ribbons. In the
dining room, where the men had feasted, bottles, ash
trays, glasses and cups were thrown at the walls, cabinets
and pictures. The names of several of the White Russians
cut

who

participated in this affair were

known

to the Soviet

Consul-General. According to Mr. Smirnoff's statement,

the ringleaders of the attack were in the employ of the

Japanese secret service. An official Soviet protest was later

presented at Tokyo, but the Japanese Foreign Office dis-

claimed

With

all responsibility.

the defeat of the Paoantui at Tientsin, the curtain

JAPAN IN CHINA

38

was drawn over the last act of hostilities in the PeipingTientsin area. For some days Japanese "mopping-up"
operations, disturbing chiefly to the Chinese citizenry,
continued in this vicinity. No reliable estimates of Chinese casualties, or of the property losses, were made.
Japanese casualties at Tientsin, up to eleven o'clock on
July 30, were officially listed at twenty-two, including
nine killed. In the short space of four days, the bulk of
the Chinese troops had been cleared out of the most
populous region of North China. Except for unexpected
reverses, notably at

Tungchow, the operation had been

carried out with relatively slight Japanese losses. The

fighting at Tientsin, however, had demonstrated what
might have been accomplished by the Chinese troops

under more determined leadership. At the end of July

there were some forty or forty-five thousand Chinese
soldiers in the Peiping-Tientsin area; the total

force

amounted

to approximately

thirty-two

Japanese
thousand

men. Given the superior mechanical equipment, especially the air

power, of the

latter,

the ultimate issue could

hardly be in doubt. Yet it is certain that coordinated

military action by the Chinese forces, especially in the
form of well-conceived offensive operations, would have

made

the whole enterprise vastly more costly for the Japanese. Even if the various units of the sgth Army had

merely been ordered to attack the nearest Japanese detachment at will, they would have given a very different
account of themselves, in the opinion of most informed
observers in North China. That order was never given.
In this fact lies the clearest evidence of Japanese aggres-

The mind

of the 2gth Army's high command was an

book
to
the
open
Japanese military. They knew well that
there was no real military threat to Japanese interests in
North China, save of their own making. They chose to
sion.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

39

create such a threat. The line thus thrown out from China
was immediately caught and held in Japan. The speed
with which the Toyko authorities expanded the Lukouchiao incident into a casus belli admits of but one inter-

Three days after the early morning hostilities

Wanping, the Cabinet had taken all necessary steps to

pretation.
at

secure mobilization of the army, evacuation of Japanese

nationals from China, and regimentation of public opinion at home. The scope of these measures, no less than
the rapidity with which they were put into effect, suggests the operation of a well-oiled machine which needed

only to be thrown into gear at a given signal.

By the beginning of August ominous clouds were already gathering over Shanghai, and a general exodus of
Japanese nationals was well under way. Two weeks later
the last dam had broken; with the opening clashes at
Shanghai, the second Sino- Japanese War had fairly begun.
This war, so far as its immediate origins are concerned,
had been maturing since the renewal of Japanese pressure

on North China in the spring and fall of 1935. The events

of that year reacted decisively on the internal political
evolution both of China and Japan. They form the natural starting-point for an analysis of the background of the
present conflict.

CHAPTER TWO

AGGRESSION IN NORTH CHINA

FROM
*933 to

^e

the signing of the Tangku Truce on May 31,

Lukouchiao incident of July 7-8, 1937, four

years elapsed.

The

full

extent of Japanese aggression in

North China during this period is little realized. Japan's

encroachments were carried out by gradual stages, and the
exact details of the successive agreements forced upon the
Chinese authorities were often not revealed until months

or years later.

The

attention of the outside world was

at times of crisis, as

caught only
during the hostilities in
the spring of 1933 or when the complete loss of the
northern provinces was threatened in 1935. Between

Japanese military-political pressure was

equally unremitting. A multitude of agents, official and
these

crises

was actively engaged at the task of filling in

the outlines of Japan's new imperium south of the Wall.
By the spring of 1937 this process had gone so far that
any effort by the local officials to safeguard China's few
unofficial,

remaining rights in the north was treated as a challenge

to Japan's "peaceful advance" and cause for military
intervention.

Japan's military

command inaugurated the first stage

North China when the League of

of the advance into

Nations was completing its consideration of the Manchurian question. The coincidence in time was so striking
that it could hardly be thought accidental; it was gen40

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

41

taken as a warning to Western nations against

"meddling" in Far Eastern affairs. On January i, 1933
fighting had broken out at Shanhaikuan, the main gateway to North China; on the third, Japanese troops took
erally

possession of the city. For nearly two months thereafter

the Kwantung Army continued preparations for a military thrust

into Jehol province, working up its case

such
incidents as the alleged kidnapping of Gonthrough
shiro Ishimoto, a Japanese captain. 1 An ultimatum, claim-

ing provocations from anti-Manchoukuo forces in Jehol,

was presented on February 23 to Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Chinese Foreign Minister. On February 25, the day after the

League Assembly had adopted

its

Manchurian

report, the

Japanese military invaded the province in full force.

Despite the difficult character of Jehol's mountainous
terrain, which afforded every advantage to defensive operations, the ill-captained northern troops speedily gave
way.

On March

4 the Japanese vanguard entered Cheng-

teh, capital of the province. Less than a week later all

efforts at organized Chinese resistance in Jehol had

collapsed.

At

Chinese government, concerned

should spread south of the Wall, made a
determined attempt to remove any pretext for further
Japanese aggression. On March 8 Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek arrived at Paotingfu, where he assumed personal
this juncture the

lest hostilities

charge of

affairs in the

north. Marshal

Chang Hsueh-

whom

the Japanese displayed an unrelentliang, against

dismissed
on March 13. His post as
was
ing animus,

northern commander was taken by General Ho Yingchin, the Chinese Minister of War, who was made chairx
For this and other details of the military campaign in Jehol and
Hopei, see Edgar Snow, Far Eastern Front, Smith & Haas, 1933, Chapter

16.

JAPAN IN CHINA

42

man

of the

Council.

newly established Peiping Branch Military

northern troops were reorganized, a trench

The

system was constructed south of Kupeikou pass, and several additional divisions were brought up from the south.

Orders were issued to the Chinese military commanders

the
strictly on the defensive; as a pacific gesture,
to
were
withdrawn
Shanhaikuan
stationed
before
troops
the Luan River. On March 25 the Generalissimo returned
to

keep

was the signal for a renewal

of Japan's advance into North China.
Early in April, on the ground of alleged provocative
to the south; his departure

Chinese counter-attacks, the Japanese military forces

launched a general invasion of Hopei province. Along
the coast they moved forward to the Luan River; inland
at the Great Wall passes, they were held up by a stubborn
Chinese defence. For some reason, possibly an inadequacy

commanders soon called a halt to

advance and withdrew their troops behind the
Great Wall. At Nanking the breathing spell was utilized
to make another gesture of pacific intention toward
of forces, the Japanese
this initial

On May 3 a "political readjustment council",

under the chairmanship of General Huang Fu, was created for North China. Most of the members of this organ,
later known as the Peiping Political Council, were if not
Japan.

sympathetic at least persona grata to Japan. Generals Ho

Ying-chin and Huang Fu, the respective military and
political heads of the new North China regime, were both

educated in Japan and had

many Japanese

connections.

The way was now

ment

cleared for a general diplomatic settleof Sino-Japanese issues in the north.

Such assurance, it was immediately made clear, was not

what Japan required. On May 8 a strong Japanese
expeditionary force opened a second and much more
determined assault on northern Hopei. Bitter fighting
at all

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

43

occurred at Kupeikou, Hsifengkou, and other passes along

the Great Wall, where the Chinese defenders made a
stand reminiscent of that at Shanghai early in 1932. At
the Luan River in the open plain, however, the Chinese
front collapsed, forcing a general retreat. By
May 20 the
forces
had
advanced
to
within
Japanese
thirty-five miles
of Tientsin and thirteen miles of Peiping, and the occu-

seemed imminent. The Chinese

troops which had withdrawn from the northern passes
were hurriedly reformed at the walls of Peiping, and
preparations were made for a last stand in defence of
pation of both

the

cities

city.

General Huang Fu had meanwhile hastened north to

assume his new post. On May 22 he secretly opened preliminary armistice negotiations with Mr. Shoichi Nakayama, Japanese Charge d'Affaires at Peiping. Fighting
had slackened in obvious anticipation of a settlement,

but any intimation that truce parleys were actually progressing was jealously withheld up to the last moment.
"The absurd expedients adopted to conceal the place and
time of the negotiations," states the New York Times
correspondent, "were inspired by the terror of the Chi-

who fear assassination by

countrymen." On May 30 he was able to
many days of evasions, mystifications and
nese delegates,

their enraged
assert:

"After

forthright de-

any plan was afoot for early signing of a specific

armistice, a group of China's negotiators were actually
housed tonight with Japanese delegates at Tangku." On
the morning of May 31 the town bristled with Chinese
troops and gendarmerie, standing at many points with
drawn weapons to ensure the delegates' safety, while the
guns of Japanese war vessels in the harbor pointed menacingly toward shore. All details had been settled beforehand; only the ceremonial signature was reserved for
nials that

JAPAN IN CHINA

44

Tangku. It was fittingly staged: ''The Japanese, evidently

grimly determined to impose humiliations upon the vanquished, sent a Major General to countersign with a
Chinese Lieutenant General and also arranged the venue
forcing -the Chinese delegates to leave their luxurious
special trains and proceed afoot across the narrow, dusty
to enter the Japanese barracks to sign the final
terms" of capitulation.'' 2 This famous truce, the charter
of Japan's later aggressions in North China, reads as

roadway

follows:

"Having accepted on the Twenty-fifth Day of May,

1933 the proposal for the termination of hostilities made
by Lieutenant-General Hsiung Pin, Chief of Staff to the
Peiping Branch Military Council, under authorization

General Ho Ying-chin, Chairman of the said

General Muto, Commander-in-Chief of the
Kwantung Army, has authorized Major-General Neiji
Okamura, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, to sign
as representative of the Kwantung Army, with Lieutenant-General Hsiung Pin, the representative of the Chinese
Army in North China duly authorized by General Ho

from

Council,

Ying-chin, the following truce agreement:

1.

The Chinese Army

the regions west

shall immediately withdraw to

and south of the line from Yenching to

Changping, Kaoliying, Sunyi, Tungchow, Hsiangho, Paoti, Lintingkow,

Ningho and Lutai and undertakes not
to advance beyond that line and to avoid any provocation
of hostilities.
2.

The Japanese Army may

or other
article.

tion
3.
2

to verify the carrying out of the above

Chinese authorities shall afford them protec-

facilities for

such a purpose.

The Japanese Army,

New

any time use aeroplanes

means

The

and

at

York Times,

May

31

after

and June

i,

ascertaining the

1933.

with-

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

45

drawal of the Chinese Army to the line stated in Article i,

undertakes not to cross the said line and not to continue
to attack the Chinese troops and shall voluntarily withdraw to the Great Wall.
4. In the regions to the south of the Great Wall and to
the north and east of the line as defined in Article i, the
maintenance of peace and order shall be undertaken by a
Chinese police force. The said police force shall not be
constituted by
its

armed

units hostile to Japanese feelings.

The

present agreement shall come into effect upon

signature. In faith whereof the two representatives

5.

have signed the present agreement and affixed thereto

their seals.

(Signed) Neiji Okamura, Representative of the Kwan-

tung Army.
(Signed) Hsiung Pin, Representative of the Chinese
Army in North China.

Declaration: In case there shall be in the Demilitarized

Zone armed units disturbing peace and order which the

police force shall be unable to cope with, the situation
will be dealt with by common accord between the two
parties.

(Signed) Neiji Okamura, Representative of the Kwan-

tung Army.
(Signed) Hsiung Pin, Representative of the Chinese
Army in North China.

May

gist, 1933."

Neither the preamble nor the accompanying declaration of this complete text was revealed at first publication;
3
The Chinese Year Book, 1936-3*], Shanghai, The Commercial Press,
P- 43i-

JAPAN IN CHINA

46

much more

important, the second sentence of Article 4

1937.* To the signifi-

was completely suppressed until

cance of this seemingly harmless sentence, which in fact

constituted the pivot of Japanese pressure in North China
up to 1935, it will be necessary to return later. Taken

merely

at their face value, the provisions of the Tangku

in a dominating position south of the

Truce placed Japan

The

by Article i started at Yenching, in

the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway
touched
Chahar province,
at Changping, passed through Tungchow within twelve
miles of Peiping, and ended at Lutai about thirty-five
miles north of Tientsin. Virtually all of Hopei province
north of the Peiping-Tientsin area was thus included in
the "demilitarized" zone. No Chinese troops could enter
this zone; the Japanese army, even after withdrawing to
the Great Wall, was by virtue of the Boxer Protocol
Wall.

line fixed

free to maintain garrisons at Shanhaikuan,

Chinwangtao,

Changli, Lanchou, Tangshan and Lutai, all of which were

located within the zone. No specific time limit was set for
the Japanese withdrawal. When evacuation was effected
would be "to the Great Wall'*, not to the Jehol boundary. Since the Great Wall dips well into northern Hopei,
it

an area of

several thousand square miles

to the territory of Manchoukuo.

aura of defensive necessity

An

was thus added

was imparted to the

truce by Japanese pleas that it was required in order to

put a stop to China's provocative activities against Man-

choukuo. Three months

earlier Japan's

armed

forces

had

occupied Jehol province on the same plea.

pragmatic
observer might be inclined to determine the real aggressor
*

by the new boundary

The Chinese Year Book,

lines successively established

by

1935-1936, p. 376,
gives only the "gist of
the armistice agreement", i.e., articles 1-5, omitting the preamble, the annexed declaration, and the second sentence of Article 4.
still

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

47

Japanese arms. In actual operation, the cordon sanitaire

of the "demilitarized" zone was far from reciprocal.
Under the terms of the Tangku Truce, Chinese armed

Manchoukuo was clearly prevented. There

was no similar guarantee that Japanese pressure would
not continue to operate against North China. The Great
opposition to

Wall

passes,

which constituted the natural defence

line

of the Peiping-Tientsin area, were wrested from China's

control. All Chinese troops were forced out of the inter-

vening region, while Japanese garrisons were left to command the sole line of railway communications through
the zone. The clearest evidence of aggressive intent, however, was supplied by the truce provisions relative to
policing the "demilitarized" zone, which were deliberately drawn so as to further Japan's general political aims
in North China.
When the Japanese army invaded northern Hopei, it
had utilized the services of certain Chinese renegade
forces which were not far removed from the status of
bandits. The terms of the Tangku Truce, as first published, apparently neglected to provide for the disposition
of these Chinese irregulars. "It is significant," wrote the

New

York Times correspondent on May 31, "that the

mention the future treatment of various
renegade Chinese forces now operating in the Luan River
truce fails to

triangle, flying the old five-barred

Chinese

flag."

The

complete text of the truce shows that the Japanese who

drafted it had understood and provided for the use to

which these

would be

put. After June 10 the Japanese troops gradually effected their withdrawal to the
Great Wall; the Chinese irregulars, however, were left
forces

behind in the "demilitarized" zone. In accordance with

the declaration annexed to the truce, the authorities of
B

New

York Times, June

i,

1933.

JAPAN IN CHINA

48

the Peiping Political Council were compelled to seek an

agreement with the Japanese for the removal of these
irregulars. In reply to this request, the
that a conference be held at Dairen.

Japanese suggested
July 3, when the
Chinese delegates reached Dairen, they were immediately
confronted with the following demands:

On

"

Employment

(a)

of part of the irregulars in police

service in the demilitarized zone;

Establishment in the evacuated area of agencies

handle matters relating to communications and economics along the Great Wall;
(b)

to

Permission to lease land and residences in the

(c)
evacuated area for the use of the Japanese troops still
stationed there;
(d)

service

Wall."

Restoration of trade, communications and postal

between the territory on either side of the Great
6

These proposals contained the essential items of what

were long surmised to be "secret protocols" attached to
the Tangku Truce. No such formal protocols, it now
appears, actually existed, although the Japanese demands
presented at Dairen owed their persuasive force directly

The Chinese delegates were

no position to object to the first of these demands,
since Article 4 had specified that the police force should
"not be constituted by armed units hostile to Japanese
feelings." This item was apparently accepted at the
Dairen conference. No agreement was reached on the
other three items, which raised wholly new issues of farreaching political and economic significance. As a result,
the Japanese military authorities continued to turn the
to the provisions of the truce.

in

Shuhsi Hsu,

1937, p. 11.
Affairs,

had

The

Kelly & Walsh,

author, an adviser to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign

The North China Problem, Shanghai,

access to official sources.

AGGRESSION IN
on the North China

screws

ind

autumn

of 1933.

NORTH CHINA
officials

The Japanese

49

during the summer

troops

had begun

to

withdraw on June

10, but not so their Chinese auxiliaries.

the
on
Traffic
Peiping-Mukden Railway was not restored
intil late July; even then Japanese control was retained
ap to Tangshan, subjecting passengers to the inconven-

of a

change at this point. Lawlessness reigned

in
the demilitarized area, which was preyed
jupreme
a
variety of Chinese irregular troops. Some of
apon by
ience

:hese

had been incorporated

in the Chinese force that was

supposed to police the zone, thus rendering its activities

ineffectual. The Chinese authorities made several at:empts to send in troops from Tientsin to put

down

the

marauding bands that were terrorizing districts in northern Hopei; in each case the Japanese military forces
disarmed the Chinese detachments and turned them
back. 7

In the

autumn

of 1933 the Japanese government initiated a general diplomatic offensive in China. Mr. Koki
Hirota, newly appointed Japanese Foreign Minister, de-

dared on September 29 that .he placed at the forefront of

his policy the gradual opening of regular negotiations
with China looking to "a practical solution" of SinoJapanese issues. His ultimate aim was "to establish an
Asiatic union comprising China, Japan and Manchoukuo,
pledging, through a definite protocol, close economic and
8
Throughout China a host of
political collaboration.'*
Japanese diplomatic, consular and military officials sought
with renewed energy to give effect to the Hirota program.

For some months a continuous round of official conversations was held at Shanghai, Nanking and Peiping. At
7
China Weekly Review, Shanghai, September 16, 1933,
vember 11, 1933, p. 428-429.
8
Osaka Mainichi, English-language edition, September

p. 82-85;
29,

1933.

No-

JAPAN IN CHINA

50

Nanking
still

this pressure

was directed toward a reduction of

and elimination of the boycott, which was

effective
on a voluntary basis despite the
proving

Chinese

tariffs

absence of organized support or

official

encouragement.

The

Japanese diplomatic campaign registered one major

achievement in the south. On October 29 Dr. T. V.
Soong, who had just returned from abroad after successfully enlisting American and European aid in China's
reconstruction activities, was forced to resign from the

Finance Ministry. 9

The main
Chinese

pressure was exerted in the north, where the

were again faced with the demands pre-

officials

sented earlier at Dairen. At a three-day conference, held

in Peiping
these issues

on November

7-9, negotiations concerning

reached a climax. Dealing directly with
Huang Fu at this time were Akira Ariyoshi, Japanese
Minister to China, and Major-General Neiji Okamura,
Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army, who had signed the
Tangku Truce as Japan's representative less than six

months previously. Successful efforts were made to conceal the decisive outcome of this conference. The foreign
press correspondents were led to believe that the Japanese
demands had been rejected, while the local press suggested that their acceptance had been forestalled by a
revolt of the

Kuomintang

political leaders in the Central

Executive Committee at Nanking. 10 In reality

9

see

For further

"The New

Huang

Fu,

details of Japan's pressure at Nanking during this period,

Status in the Pacific", Foreign Policy Reports, January 17,

1934, p. 261-262.
10
This revolt took

three forms: an interrogation of Premier Wang

Ching-wei in the Legislative Yuan concerning the Sino-Japanese negotiations at Peiping, a resolution passed by the Central Political Council
which vested in that body a more complete and effective control over the
conduct of foreign relations, and a proposal to the government executive
for reorganization of the Peiping Political Council. China
Weekly Review, November 25, 1933, p. 518.
Premier Wang Ching-wei, it might be noted, had declared at
Nanking

AGGRESSION IN
acting

for

the

NORTH CHINA

Nanking government,

secretly

51

accepted

the Japanese proposals originally presented at

Dairen. The agencies "referred to in (b) were to
in

toto

be established in Shanhaikuan, Kupeikou, Hsifengkou,

Lengkou, Panchiakou and Chiehlingkou, all being passes
along the Great Wall. The leasing of land and residences
referred to in (c) was to be restricted to Shanhaikuan,

Shihmengyen, Chienchangying, Taitouying, Hsifengkou,

Lengkou, Malanyu, and Kupeikou. It was also understood that in case resort was made to the use of the Luan
River for the transportation of military supplies protective measures could be adopted in addition. In the matter
of restoring trade, communications and postal service,
which formed Japanese condition (d) it was understood
that air service was to be included/' 1:L It is a significant
,

Japanese military officials constantly referred to

these political and economic concessions, the surcharges
imposed on the Tangku Truce, as part of the truce itself.

fact that

Some doubt may,

to

be permitted to exist as
were
not raised for considwhether these surcharges
perhaps,

still

some time during the preliminary conversations

which led up to the original military truce signed on
eration at

May

31, 1933.
Several years elapsed before

all of

these additional con-

cessions
fully operative, a factor which enhanced
the success attending efforts to maintain secrecy over

became

the outcome of the

November

conversations at Peiping.
Special Sino-Japanese agreements, effected for each of the
concessions, were gradually reached during the three-year
period from 1934 to 1936. In order to avoid de -facto

recognition of Manchoukuo, the Nanking government

31, 1933 tnat tne Tangku Truce was "purely military and does
not affect the nation's territorial rights or international position." New
York Timesf June i, 1933.
u Shuhsi Hsu, The North China Problem, cited,
p. 11-12.

on May

JAPAN IN CHINA

52

adopted the expedient of, authorizing the establishment

of joint Sino- Japanese organs, ostensibly private and unofficial

in character,

where the administration of

ness enterprises was concerned.

The

busi-

restoration of trade

between China and Manchoukuo occurred during the

spring and summer of 1934. On June 20 of that year the
Chinese government established a Customs Station at
Shanhaikuan, and on August 16 five sub-stations at Kupeikou, Hsifengkou, Lengkou, Chiehlingkou, and Yiyuankou. Thirty-six specified products were allowed to pass

through these stations from Manchoukuo without paying

duty, on the ground that Manchuria and Jehol were still
parts of China. This exemption was an expensive means
of asserting China's sovereignty; in fact, it first whetted
the appetites of Japan's merchants for that "special trade"
which later assumed such large proportions. Through
traffic was next restored on the Peiping-Mukden Railway

on July

i,

1934 by an agreement which established a

special joint railway administration.

Postal services be-

tween China and Manchoukuo were restored on January

12
10, 1935 by an agreement signed four days previously.

The Chinese government

took meticulous care in this

case to avoid de facto recognition of the

Manchoukuo

communication was restored "between

regime.
China Proper inside the Great Wall and the Northeastern
Provinces." Mail matter was handled by a joint SinoJapanese agency with transmitting offices at Shanhaikuan
and Kupeikou. Postal stamps and mail covers were not
allowed to bear the mark of Manchoukuo, and the Japanese side was required to use a special stamp. The
Western calendar was used, and charges collected in accordance with the existing postal regulations of the two
Postal

12

Ordinary mails were restored on January

on February i.

parcel post

10; postal

money

orders and

AGGRESSION IN NORTH CHINA

13

parties.

much

53

Air communication was not established until

later.

Sino-Japanese concern,

the

Hui Tung

Company, was organized in October 1936; service was

inaugurated on November 17 over four routes between
various cities in Manchuria and North China, the latter

comprising Peiping,
Shanhaikuan.

Tientsin,

Kalgan,

Changpei and

The

year 1934, during which the restoration of trade,

railway traffic and postal services across the Great Wall

was largely accomplished, witnessed a marked decline in

Japan's direct military encroachments on China. There
was good reason for this state of affairs. Foreign Minister
Hirota was achieving progress in

all phases of his China

in three points: establishment
of a Japan-China-Manchoukuo bloc, suppression of anti-

policy, later

summed up

Japanese activities in China, and organization of a joint

Sino-Japanese front against Communism. Reestablish-

ment

of

normal relations between China and

its

provinces

north of the Wall was obviously contributing to the

realization of the first point. The Japanese officers of the
Kwantung Army, enjoying these fruits of the Tangku
Truce, were content to rest on their laurels. Another
an Asiatic bloc was given in July 1934,
fillip to the idea of

when

Japan's long-continued pressure at Nanking finally

secured a revision of the Chinese tariff, which greatly

favored Japanese

importers.

The

injunctions

of

Mr.

Hirota's third point were also being fulfilled, especially

and teachers in the

in the north. Anti- Japanese students

Peiping-Tientsin area were jailed, anti-Japanese officials

out, and outspokenly nationalist Chinese news-

weeded

papers were suppressedall under the aegis of the Peiping

Political Council. 14 With regard to the third point, no
13
For the texts of these several agreements, see Shuhsi Hsu, The North
China Problem, cited, p. 12-15.
York Times, June 9, 1935.

54

formal

JAPAN IN CHINA
Sino- Japanese front against Communism had

been

months of

1934, however,
During
the
Chinese ComNanking's five-year campaign against
munist forces had culminated in a struggle of large proportions, marked in November by the withdrawal of the
Communist armies from Kiangsi and Fukien provinces. 15

the closing

established.

The

Japanese authorities were satisfied to watch this

fratricidal conflict

from the

sidelines.

By the spring of 1935, the Japanese military were ready

for a second forward move in the north. Various reasons
counselled this step.

one thing, had been

The

gains of the Tangku Truce, for

fully assimilated and the officers were

was necessary, again,

to strike a blow at the Japanese moderates, who were
threatening to reassert their political supremacy at
home. 16 The international auspices were also favorable.
Europe was preoccupied with the complications attend-

anxious for fresh

fields to

conquer.

It

ing Chancellor Hitler's reintroduction of military conscription, and Japan's relations with the Soviet Union

had been improved by the signing of the sale agreement

for the Chinese Eastern Railway on March 23 at Tokyo.
Once the decision to advance was taken, the Japanese
military rudely brushed aside the conciliatory policy long
followed by the Peiping Political Council. The crisis was
manipulated by the officers of the North China Garrison,

who brought forward

tions,

some

of

a long

list

of anti- Japanese provoca-

which went back

to

igga.

17

General

Ho

Ying-chin, War Minister in the Nanking government

and head of the Peiping Military Council, bore the brunt
16
This retreat initiated the "Long March" to Shensi and Kansu via
Szechuan. See Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, New York, Random
House, 1938, Part Five.
For a discussion of this factor, see below, Chapter VI.
1<J

17

For these alleged provocations, see

31, 1935.

Hugh

Byas,

New

York Times,

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

55

Preliminary Japanese agitation was supported by menacing troop movements and airplane flights
over Peiping. On June 9 Lieutenant-General Yoshijiro
Umetsu, commander of the garrison forces, transmitted
to General Ho Ying-chin a memorandum of nine items

of the attack.

accompanied by a "final warning'*. This memorandum,

which had been verbally accepted some days previously
by General Ho, reads as follows:
"The items which China has accepted and carried out
towards the Japanese
1.

Dismissal of

Army are as follows:

Yu Hsueh-chung, Chang

Ting-e and

their followers;
2.

Dismissal of Chiang Hsiao-hsien,

Kuang-ching,
3.

Ho

Ting Chang, Tseng

I-fei;

Withdrawal of the Third Regiment

of

Military

Police;

Dissolution of the Political Training Corps of the

Peiping Military Council and the Military Magazine
4.

Club of Peiping;
Restriction and suppression of the Blue Shirts, the
Fu-hsing Club, and other secret organizations inimical to
5.

Sino-Japanese relations;

Withdrawal of Kuomintang headquarters from the

province of Hopei and abolition of the Peiping branch of
the Officers' Moral Endeavor Association;
7. Withdrawal of the Fifty-first Army from the prov6.

ince of Hopei;

Withdrawal of the Second and Twenty-fifth Divisions from the province of Hopei and dissolution of the
Students' Training Corps of the Twenty-fifth Division;
9. Prohibition of anti-foreign and anti-Japanese agita8.

tion in general in China.

For your reference I have specially put the foregoing
in writing to be sent to you.

JAPAN IN CHINA

56

H.E.

Ho

Ying-ching,

Tenth Year

of Showa.
Umetsu,
(Signed) Yoshijiro
Commander of the North China Garrison."

June

This

6th, the

1S

memorandum

merely lists a set of Japanese demands; it does not contain General Ho Ying-chin's written acceptance. On and before June 9, however, General
Ho Ying-chin had discussed these demands with Colonel
Takashi Sakai and verbally accepted them. Later, on June
11, Major Takahashi submitted for Ho Ying-chin's signature a document which, in addition to the above nine
items, contained three others, reading as follows:
"Concerning the carrying out of the foregoing [China]
also accepts the following:

What

has been agreed upon with Japan shall be

carried out within the time specified. Any parties or
1.

organizations that have caused strain in Sino- Japanese

be permitted to re-enter [Hopei];
2. In the appointment of provincial and municipal

relations shall not

officials it is

hoped that Japan's wish that

selection be con-

fined to those who will not be likely to cause strain in

Sino-Japanese relations will be taken into consideration;

Concerning the carrying out of what has been agreed

upon Japan will adopt measures of supervision and
3.

examination."

19

General Ho Ying-chin refused to have anything to do

with this document for several reasons: the feeling "that

he had done enough to placate the Japanese"; unwillingness "to leave anything in writing in their hands"; and
displeasure "at seeing a set of three items which had
15
For texts, see The China Weekly Review, March 14, 1936, p. 38;
China Today, New York, May 1936, p. 150; Shuhsi Hsu, The North
China Problem, cited, p. 18-19.
19
Shuhsi Hsu, cited, p. 22; also p. 22-26 for general discussion of the
agreement.

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

57

never been brought up and discussed before."

On June
left
he
for
Ho
General
to
this
13
Nanking. Up
point,
had
written
no
kind
to
assurances
of
Ying-chin
given
any
the Japanese authorities, although he had verbally accepted the nine items first presented and had already
substantially executed them. On June 21, therefore, the
Japanese again approached General Ho with the request
that he should record his acceptance of the demands in
writing. This he did on July 6 in the following terms:
"Please be informed: [We] accept all items submitted
by Colonel Takashi Sakai on June gth and shall by our
20

free will see that they are carried out.

H.E.

Commander Umetsu,

(Signed)

Ho

Ying-ching.

July Gth, the Twenty-fourth Year of the Chinese Republic."

21

The

Japanese military authorities afterwards claimed

that this acceptance referred to all twelve items; on the
Chinese side, it was maintained that only the original
nine items were covered by General Ho's note. It is clear
that, in contrast to the extreme precision which marked
the arrangements connected with the Tangku Truce, the
circumstances surrounding the consummation of the "Ho-

Umetsu agreement" were highly irregular. Be that as it

may, the actual political effects of this later agreement
were hardly if any less momentous than those of the first.
Before the middle of June the first nine items had been
substantially carried into effect. At one stroke General

Yu Hsueh-chung,

governor of Hopei province, his FiftyArmy, and all central government divisions had been
driven from North China, and all Kuomintang and ancilfirst

20
21

Shuhsi Hsu,
Shuhsi Hsu,

cited, p. 24.
cited, p. 23.

JAPAN IN CHINA

58

lary political organs in the province suppressed. Finally,

in accordance with the last item of the agreement, the

Chinese government felt itself compelled to promulgate

on June 10, 1935 the following "Goodwill Mandate":
"The task before our country today, in its efforts to
maintain national independence, is, internally, to improve government administration and promote culture so
nation; and, exter-

as to consolidate the strength of the

nally, to preserve international

good

faith

and maintain

international peace.
"The cultivation of goodwill with our neighbors being
of prime importance, the Central Government has re-

peatedly ordered that all citizens should observe the

proper amenities towards friendly nations; and not indulge in discriminatory or provocative speeches or acts.

In this connection, especially, no organizations whatsoever

must be formed which might be detrimental to international relations.
is hereby again specially ordered that this
injuncbe
tion
fully observed. Persons violating this order will
be severely punished." 22

"It

The demand

for the suppression of anti-Japanese activ-

China had thus reached the point where the

Chinese government was forced to take official steps for
ities

in

the regulation of the speeches, acts

Chinese

citizens.

and organizations

of

The Goodwill Mandate, however, was

respect. Since it was expressed in general

not
be taken to refer clearly enough to
might
This
matter
was
cleared up on July 8 when, as
Japan.
the
the New Life Weekly incident,
of
settlement
of
part
the Central Publicity Council at Nanking was obliged

defective in
terms,

one

it

to issue the following instruction

to all provincial

municipal Kuomintang organs:

-2

The Chinese Year Book, 1936-^,

cited, p. 428.

and

AGGRESSION IN
'In one of

its

May

NORTH CHINA

issues, the

New

59

Life Weekly maga-

zine in Shanghai published an article containing some

remarks considered to be insulting to the Japanese Em-

peror which has aroused the displeasure of the Japanese

community. Be it remembered that the constitution of

the Japanese Empire is such that the Emperor of Japan
is held in higher esteem, respect, affection and reverence
by the Japanese people than the chief executive of any
other country in the world is by his respective citizens.
The slightest carelessness in editorial comment or news
reports concerning the Emperor of Japan would cause
ill-feeling between the people of the two countries.

"During the past year, this Central Publicity Council

has repeatedly warned against indiscreet comments on the
part of the press, and so far no case has been found for

New Life Weekly has made

an exception. The responsible officials of the Shanghai
Censorship Bureau and the publisher of the weekly in
question have been given due punishment, but in order
reproach. Unfortunately, the

to

avoid recurrence of similar incidents, this order

is

hereby issued, warning you against carelessness.

"With regard to the anti-Japanese movement, it is
hereby urged that the press circles in China conform to
the mandate as issued by the National Government on
June 10, calling for the promotion of friendly relations
with all neighboring countries." 23
The drastic terms of the Ho-Umetsu agreement, which
were restricted mainly to Hopei province, constituted
only one phase of the North China crisis of June 1935.

month

Japan's military agents exacted a similar set of concessions, almost equally far-reaching, with
regard to Chahar. The terms imposed in the case of

During

this

Chahar province, however, were related

28

The China Year Book,

1936-37, cited, p. 428-429.

to a

wholly

dif-

JAPAN IN CHINA

6o

ferent geographical

and

racial

setting.

This province,

along with Jehol, Suiyuan and Ninghsia, occupied the

same status in the Chinese administrative system as any

North China provinces. As sections of the

region commonly termed Inner Mongolia, on the other
hand, these four provinces have characteristics which set
them apart from Shansi, Hopei or Shantung. Japanese
penetration of this region has been studiously adapted to
its local peculiarities, and must therefore be treated in
of the other

relation to a special historical background.

The Mongolian people are chiefly located in three
territorial centers: western Manchuria, or "Eastern Inner

Mongolia"; western Inner Mongolia; and Outer Mongolia. Some four million Mongols are fairly equally
divided among these three regions. Following Japan's
occupation of Jehol in 1933, the three remaining western
Inner Mongolian provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and
Ninghsia were at once converted into a buffer area of
great strategic importance. One notable factor favored
the spread of Japanese influence into this area. Since
the Revolution of 1911, the relations of the Mongol

princes of both Manchuria and western Inner Mongolia

with the Chinese Republic had not disposed them toward

friendship with China. In the early years of the republic

they had tried vainly to win their independence, despite
24
preliminary successes in driving out the Chinese troops.
Far better able to obtain foreign arms, the Chinese military forces eventually established a decided superiority

over the Mongols. Railway construction, both in Manchuria and North China, led to an influx of Chinese
agricultural settlers which steadily dispossessed the Mongols of their best grazing lands. Political and economic
2

*Owen

March

Lattimore, "Mongolia Enters

1934, p. 17-18.

World

Affairs",

Pacific Affairs,

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

61

impacts coalesced in the persons of the local Chinese

officials, who were heavily interested in the land deals
25
Under pressure
attending the colonization movement.
from the Chinese officials, many of the princes had connived at alienation of their lands to the incoming settlers.

Since the early beginnings of Chinese colonization at the

end of the last century, the Mongols had lost about twothirds of their territory in Jehol, about a third in

Manchuria, and large portions of Chahar and Suiyuan

provinces. The crowning blow came in 1928, when Inner
Mongolia was divided into the four provinces of Jehol,
Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia. The new provincial

boundary lines cut ruthlessly across the Mongol tribal

and league frontiers, contributing still further to the
Mongols' disunity and facilitating their ultimate absorpby the Chinese. The ambitious schemes of Japan's
empire builders, playing against this background, had
long taken into account and assiduously prepared to utition

lize

the support of the Mongolian princes.

first stage of Japan's advance into Mongolian

The

tory took place early in 1932,

when

terri-

the western section of

Manchuria came under Japanese control. The next step

followed in March 1933, when Jehol was occupied by
Japanese military forces. Soon afterward western Manchuria and the northern portion of Jehol were reconstituted as the Mongolian province of Hsingan one of the
five provinces of Manchoukuo. Later, when the total

number
teen,

Manchoukuo

provinces was increased to fourwas

divided
into four sub-provinces. The
Hsingan
of

Japanese authorities sought to apply a liberal policy in

this province, including a guarantee against encroach-

ments on Mongol grazing lands by agricultural

25

settlers,

For an analysis of the Chinese official as entrepreneur in the colonization movement, see Owen Lattimore, Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict, Macmillan, 1935, rev. ed., Chapter VI.

JAPAN IN CHINA

6s

autonomy, and extension of suppriesthood. Thus constituted, Hsingan

was
clearly designed to win the support of the
province
Inner
Mongolian princes, as well as the
neighboring
remnant conservative elements in Outer Mongolia. The
same purpose was served by Pu Yi's enthronement as
Emperor of Manchoukuo on March i, 1934, which held

some measure
port to the

of local

Lama

out the possibility of national reunification of the Mongols on the traditional basis of allegiance to a Manchu

emperor. So long as the Chahar and Suiyuan princes still

retained freedom of action, they made no response to
these overtures from Manchoukuo. Their initial reserva-

were strengthened by the course of events in this

Japanese-sponsored kingdom. The promised autonomy in
Hsingan province was restricted by the rigid control exercised over the Mongols, the refusal to allow them to bear
arms unless actually enlisted in military service, and "the
fact that none of the Mongols holding office under Manchoukuo" was "considered a really capable potential
tions

26
Nor
by either conservatives or progressives."
were matters helped by the execution of several high
Mongol officials of Hsingan province, on the charge of
conspiring with Outer Mongolia, in the spring of 1936.

leader

In the
of

first

instance, then, the Inner

Mongolian princes
Chahar and Suiyuan turned a deaf ear to the blandish-

ments of Japan's agents. Instead they made capital of

Japanese pressure by seeking political concessions at Nanking. During 1933-1934 an autonomy movement, led by

Te Wang

(Prince Te) of Chahar, forced the

government to deal with the princes' demands.

Nanking

On

April

1934, after protracted negotiations, an Autonomous

Government of Inner Mongolia was established at Pai23,

28
Owen Lattimore, "On the Wickedness of Being Nomads", Asia, October 1935, p. 601; also "The Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism",
Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, London, June 1937.

AGGRESSION IN NORTH CHINA

63

27

lingmiao in Suiyuan province. The ruling organ was a

Mongolian Political Council of twenty-eight members,
assisted by two Chinese councillors. Prince Te, the moving spirit in this genuine autonomy movement, was made
secretary-general of the Council. The basic Mongol de-

mand

for unification of the Mongolian sections of Chahar

and Suiyuan provinces into a separate Chinese province,
however, was not realized. 28 In any case, the scope for
Mongol maneuvering was limited to the brief time during
which Japan stayed its advance. By 1934 Japan was already knocking insistently at the door; thereafter, until
the definitive occupation of 1937, Chahar and Suiyuan
provinces were subjected to progressive encroachment
from Manchoukuo, directed by officers of the Kwantung
Army.

Shortly after the occupation of Jehol province in March

1933, a body of Japanese troops crossed the border into
Chahar. This force took Dolonor early in May; turning

then occupied the strip of Chahar-Jehol border

territory, including Kuyuan, Paochang and Kangpao.
Meanwhile General Feng Yu-hsiang, with headquarters

south,

it

had organized an Anti-Japanese People's Army

with the object of rousing a popular campaign against
Japanese aggression and the compromise policy embodied
in the Tangku Truce. This force took the field in July,
under the command of Generals Chi Hung-chang and

at Kalgan,

Fang Chen-wu, and rapidly reconquered the Chahar territory occupied by the Japanese. With the reoccupation of
Dolonor in the middle of July, the whole of Chahar
province was restored to Chinese control. At this point
the Nanking government stepped in and ordered GenNew

York Times, May 27, June 17, and July 29, 1934.
See statement by Prince Te, Christian Science Monitor, June i, 1935;
also Edgar Snow, "War Brews in Mongolia", New York Herald Tribune,
27

28

October

28, 1934.

JAPAN IN CHINA

64

Feng to disband his army and leave the province.

enforce this order Nanking's troops in the north were
mobilized in preparation for operations against Feng

eral

To

Yu-hsiang's army; at the same time, additional Japanese

forces returned to the attack in Chahar. Faced with this

combined opposition, General Feng abandoned his campaign and left Kalgan in the middle of August. Generals
Chi and Fang continued the struggle for some weeks, but
were soon defeated and scattered by their combined
opponents. In the end, Japanese forces withdrew from the

Kuyuan area but continued

occupy Dolonor. During

to

the following year the Dolonor region, embracing a territory of some 5,600 square miles, was organized as a "special
district"

under the jurisdiction of Manchoukuo. 29 Resi-

dent Japanese

officials

a military mission of

consisted of the chief of police

Kwantung Army

officers.

The

and
area

was garrisoned by Manchurian forces, comprising one

infantry and one cavalry regiment, which drew high rates
of

pay supplied in part by the Manchoukuo government.

Police, currency,

and the

postal

and telegraph

services of

were also controlled by the Manchoukuo

regime. Throughout 1934 the Dolonor region was the
scene of active preparations for the next phase of the advance into the Chinese section of Chahar, while similar
preparations were being made further north at Peisiemiao
for an advance into the Mongol regions of the province.
Roads were built, airfields laid out, and a constant stream
this

district

of Japanese emissaries sent into Chahar and

court the support of the princes. 30 The latter

Suiyuan
still

to

refused

to accept these advances, and the Japanese were forced to

resort to overt military operations in order to renew their

drive into Chahar.

88
80

New York
New York

Times, February 6, 1935,

Times, March 28, April 4,

19, 1934.

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

65

In January 1935 an incident which developed on the

Jehol-Chahar border south of Dolonor rapidly precipitated hostilities. Charging that the troops under General
Sung Che-yuan, the Chahar governor, had invaded Jehol

province in this area, the

Kwantung Army headquarters

announced on January 18 that it was "forced to take mili31

An ultimatum addressed to General Sung
tary action."
on the same day apparently led to a preliminary settlement arranged by joint representatives in Peiping. These
negotiations proved unable to ward off the clash. At six
o'clock on the evening of January 22 a force of some two
thousand Japanese and Manchoukuo troops, using airplanes, armored cars and artillery, launched an attack
which speedily carried them into the southeastern corner
of Chahar province. Kuyuan, Tungchatze and Tushihkow,
all well within the Chahar boundaries, were bombed by
seven Japanese planes. Chinese troops, which offered some
resistance, were driven back from the Jehol border to the
Kuyuan-Tushihkow line. When fighting ended on the
night of January 23, the Japanese forces were

left

in

possession of an area in Chahar province totalling approximately seven hundred square miles, which lay between the

Great Wall's northernmost spur and the commonly accepted Jehol border line. The Japanese authorities claimed
that this region belonged to Jehol province, and that
their military action thus merely amounted to a "rectifica-

tion" of the boundary.

At Nanking on January 29 Premier Wang Ching-wei

and Mr. Ariyoshi, the Japanese Minister, agreed to settle
this issue locally. The Central Government instructed the
Chahar provincial authorities to give way, and the terms
were arranged in advance. On February 2 General Sung
Che-yuan's delegates signed the formal settlement with the
81

The

Trans-Pacific,

Tokyo, January

24, 1935, p. 8.

JAPAN IN CHINA

66

Kwantung Army's representatives in a fifteen-minute session at Tatan, a small town on the western edge of Jehol;
by this agreement, the territory in dispute was recognized
belonging to Jehol and so added to the Manchoukuo
One of the North China correspondents later
summed up this dispute in the following terms: "Actually,
as

realm. 32

the affair of last January amounted simply to an enforcement by the Japanese army of its arbitrary designation of
the Great Wall at this point as the southeastern boundary
of Jehol province. The effect of this action has been to
add to Manchoukuo a slice of territory which most maps
show as belonging to the Chinese province of Chahar." 33
Five months later the Japanese demands which led to
the Ho-Umetsu agreement were presented at Peiping. On

May

30, 1935, at the outset of this crisis, a

nese

officers,

group of Japawere members of the Special

Service Mission resident at Dolonor, set out on a trip
through Chahar province in the direction of Kalgan. This

some

of

whom

through carelessness or purposeful design,

passports. At Changpei on June 5 they were
detained overnight for questioning by the local Chinese
authorities. When word of this affair reached the Chinese
provincial officials at Kalgan, an order for their release
was immediately issued. They were detained for less than
party, either

carried

no

twenty-four hours, and apparently suffered no indignities.

On the basis of this "Changpei incident," the Kwantung
Army presented a series of far-reaching demands both

and at Nanking, backed by menacing troop movements on the Chahar border. 34 The Nanking government
on June 23 empowered General Chin Te-chun, at that
locally

^Shuhsi Hsu,

cited, p. 20;

also

New

York Herald Tribune, February

1935-

4>

**

H.

J,

*New
H'

1935-

Timperley, Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 1935.

York Times, June 13, 1935; New York Herald Tribune, June

AGGRESSION IN NORTH CHINA

67

time head of a bureau in the Chahar provincial governto arrange a settlement with Major-General Doiat Peiping. Four days later these men exchanged
notes embodying terms of settlement. The texts of these
notes have never been published, but the essential items
of what has since become known as the Chin-Doihara
36
agreement are fairly well established. Terms which might
actually be construed as connected with the incident called
for an apology, dismissal of the responsible Chinese officers,
a pledge that such incidents would not recur, and a guarantee of free and safe travel for all Japanese in Chahar.
Other terms, which by no stretch of the imagination could
be related to the incident, included dissolution of Kuomintang organs in Chahar, cessation of Chinese immigration
into the province, removal of the igsnd Division from
Changpei, and demilitarization of a broad area of eastern
Chahar. This area, much larger than originally suspected,
included all the territory "east of a line drawn from
Changping in Hopei to the Wall in East Chahar via Yenching and Talinpao, and south of another line drawn from
a point north of Tushihkou to a point south of Chang37
The forces of the 2gth Route Army were to be
pei.
withdrawn from this area, within which order was to be
maintained by a police force. In addition, though apparently not as part of the settlement, the Nanking government dismissed General Sung Che-yuan from his post as
Chahar governor. His place was taken by General Chin
Te-chun.

ment,
hara 35

7 '

During the course of this

Now Lieutenant-General. Doihara,

affair,

Japanese

military

36

then Chief of Kxvantung Army's

Special Service Section, had been active in every forward move in China
since September 18, 1931.
88

See

official

statement by Colonel Takahashi, Japanese assistant miliWeekly Review, July 6, 1935, p. 183; also

tary attach^ in Peiping, China

Shuhsi Hsu, cited, p.

S7
Shuhsi Hsu, cited,

si.

p. 21.

JAPAN IN CHINA
agents began to exert much stronger pressure on the
Chahar-Suiyuan Mongols. Prince Te stated in an inter68

view

Peiping on June i that Japanese military officers

periodically visited Inner Mongolia, suggesting the adat

38 He deunity.
clared that a Japanese airplane, bearing a Japanese military representative, had recently landed at Pangchiang,

of

visability

Manchurian and Mongol

headquarters in western Chahar situated on

the northerly route to Urga. This envoy informed Prince
Te that the Japanese desired to build an airdrome near

own

near his

Pangchiang, establish a branch of the Kwantung Army's

Special Service Mission there, and erect a wireless station;
he also submitted a request that the Mongolian Political

Council should transfer

its

capital

from Pailingmiao in

Suiyuan province to Peisiemiao, north of Dolonor. In his

statement Prince Te insisted that the Mongolian Council
did not intend to join Manchoukuo but aimed to estaba unified Mongolian province within China. Follow-

lish

ing settlement of the Changpei incident, direct Japanese

on the Chahar administration rapidly increased.

influence

Kalgan, the provincial capital, had for some time been

the seat of a Japanese military mission headed by

Colonel

more

Gennosuke

staff

officers

ing correspondent,
languages.

Matsui.

Most

of

the

dozen

or

of the mission, according to a visitspoke the Russian and Mongolian

39

On

July 5 a spokesman for the Japanese Embassy at

Shanghai revealed that Colonel Matsui had been appointed
military adviser to the Chahar government; on July 22 the
same source announced the appointment of a Japanese ad88

New

York Times, June

1935. Japanese agents were

Lama priesthood in Chahar

1935; Christian Science Monitor, June i,

also striving to win the confidence of the

2,

and Suiyuan provinces. See Hugh Byas,

York Times, April 19, 1935.

89
China Weekly Review, July

27, 1935, p. 282.

New

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

69

40

on civil affairs. Located at Kalgan, which dominates

the arteries of communication in Chahar and Suiyuan

viser

provinces, Japan's military agents could lay their plans for

completion of their conquest of Inner Mongolia.

During September and October of 1935, signs of the

approach of a new and more ominous crisis in North
China rapidly multiplied. The summer months had been
an important transitional period in Hopei province. Despite the enforced withdrawal of the central troops in June,
the local northern leaders had smoothly taken over pro-

and police functions. General Shang

Chen, commander of the gsnd Army, had successfully
handled the problems arising during the evacuation
period; on June 25 he was appointed governor of Hopei,

vincial administrative

in addition to his post as commander of the TientsinTangku Peace Preservation Headquarters. On June 28-29
some two thousand Chinese troops, led by one Pai

Chien-wu and stimulated by Japanese rom'n/ 1 had mutinied at Fengtai and engaged in an abortive attack on
Peiping. Following this affair, part of the 2gth Army was
transferred from Chahar to assist in policing the Peiping

On August 28 General Sung Che-yuan, former

Chahar governor, was appointed Garrison Commander of
the Peiping-Tientsin area, and additional units of the 29th
Army were brought in from Chahar. The seat of the Hopei
provincial government was removed from Peiping to
Paotingfu, which became Shang Chen's military headarea.

Appointments to the various posts were all made

by Nanking, and the new North China authorities quickly
demonstrated their ability to maintain an effective and
orderly government. If the Japanese military leaders had
40
New York Times, July 6, 23, 1935.
quarters.

41

Admitted by Colonel Takahashi, Japanese assistant military attache"

an interview with foreign correspondents on July 5. China
Weekly Review, July 13, 1935, p. 219.

at Peiping, in

JAPAN IN CHINA

70

thought

that,

under the changed

north, separatist tendencies

political status in the

would become dominant, they

were disappointed. By September

it

was evident that any

such result would require external stimulus.

Tentative feelers put out during the summer indicated
that Japan's military circles were already toying with the
idea of an "autonomous" North China. At the end of

July several Japanese officers sought to induce Yen Hsishan, the Shansi overlord, to take the lead in organizing
the government of a bloc of the five North China provinces. 42

A week later,

on August

5,

Colonel Takashi Sakai,

of the North China Garrison, suggested to

Keh-min, acting chairman of the Peiping Political

chief-of-staff

Wang

Council, the necessity for a complete reorganization of

China's five northern provinces. 48 The Central Government made two further concessions: on August 28 it or-

dered the abolition of the Peiping Political Council, and

on the next day the dissolution of the Kuomintang organs
in Suiyuan province. On September 24 a bombshell was
exploded in the form of a statement by Major-General
Hayao Tada, commander of the North China Garrison,
to Japanese correspondents at Tientsin, later distributed
as a pamphlet. Seldom has such a proclamation of aggressive

aims been

made by

a responsible military official sta-

country with which his government was

ostensibly on peaceful terms. Its irony was not lessened by
Japan's earnest efforts to place a curb on provocative
tioned in

speeches and acts of Chinese citizens. In unqualified language, Major-General Tada demanded the elimination
of

Western

interests in

China, and called for the overthrow

Nanking government, the Kuomintang, and Chiang

Kai-shek. His references to North China, nonetheless spe-

of the

*2

The Japan

43

China Weekly Review, August

Advertiser, July 28, 1935.

10, 1935, P- 3^3-

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

71

glowing phraseology, were expressed in the

terms:
following
"It has been stated previously that as long as Chiang
Kai-shek and his clique continue to dominate China, there

cific for their

can be no hope of the adoption of a friendly policy toward

Therefore the Japanese Empire should act inJapan.
dependently ... by starting to create a paradise for coexistence and mutual prosperity between the two countries out of a zone where the China policy will be adopted.
That paradise will be extended by degrees to such an
extent that China will have to change her attitude sincerely
or even they [Chiang and his clique] will not be permitted
.

to exist.

"North China at present is the district where the abovementioned policy can be most easily and quickly carried
out. ... So the

first

step to enforce the national policy

is

make North China a land of peace where the Chinese

and Japanese can live in peace and enlightenment, a
to

market where Chinese and Japanese commodities and

capital will not be subject to jeopardy but circulated freely
a paradise for co-existence and mutual prosperity of the
two nations. Such a step will help the healthy growth of
Manchoukuo in the north and demonstrate to that part
of China lying to the south that
cooperation among
with
the Empire as the
China
and
Manchoukuo
Japan,
center of gravity can warrant peace in Eastern Asia. Such
is the importance of the North China question, upon
which depends the success of the outward expansion of the
.

44

Japanese Empire."
The Tada statement was closely linked to the consultations then proceeding at Tokyo between the Ministries
of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs, which formulated a
4
*For complete text of this illuminating document, see China Weekly
Review, November 2, 1935, p. 306-312.

JAPAN IN CHINA

72

"new China policy" eventually adopted by the

Cabinet on October 8. During these two weeks the Tokyo
newspapers referred almost daily to the new policy which

so-called

was under consideration by the three Ministries. On September 24 the Asahi printed a declaration, attributed to a
War Office spokesman, which was similar in tenor to the
Tada statement but even more specific. It advocated a
three-point program for North China, comprising suppression of anti- Japanese elements, severance of financial con-

and military cooperation of the

northern provinces to prevent sovietization. As the
"first step" in this program, it concluded, "a guiding hand
has to be extended for organization of a united self-govern45
ing body among the five provinces in North China."
nections with Nanking,
five

These two simultaneous declarations from military quarters, one in Tientsin and the other in Tokyo, were calcudesigned to bring pressure on the
Foreign Office to accept the army's program. During the
first week of October, both Chiang
Tso-pin, the Chinese
lated indiscretions,

Ambassador, and the foreign correspondents made inquiry

as to whether the Foreign Office concurred in press statements to the effect that Japan intended to foster an inde-

pendence movement in North China. Foreign Minister

Hirota at first avoided a direct reply by declaring that his
only knowledge of the Tada pamphlet was derived from
newspaper reports; on October 7, however, he openly "dissociated" himself from the views of Major-General Tada
in a Foreign Office statement which was cabled abroad.
On the following day, the Cabinet formally approved
Japan's new policy toward China. At the same time, it was
decided to send to China special representatives of the

War, Navy and Foreign Ministries, who should inform

45

Quoted in China Weekly Review, October

12,

1935, p. 184.

AGGRESSION IN NORTH CHINA

Japanese

officials

in that country

on the

73

details of the

new

policy.

This

an extraordinary series of
among Japanese military, naval and consular
Dairen, Shanghai and Tientsin during the last

latter decision led to

conferences
officials at

two weeks of October. The

by

officers of

the

of these meetings, attended

Army and the North China

first

Kwantung

Garrison, convened at Dairen on October

Office

13.

The War

was represented by Major-General Yasuji Okamura,

Staff. Other participants included

of the Imperial General

Major-General Tada; Major-General Seishiro Itagaki, asKwantung Army; and MajorGeneral Rensuke Isogai, military attach^ at Shanghai. The
conference opened with a statement by Major-General
Okamura, who explained the Cabinet's new China policy
sistant chief-of -staff of the

and

stressed the bearing of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute on

the Far East. Sessions ended on the next day, according

to press reports, "in complete understanding and accord/'

Among the reported decisions was one that plans should
be pushed for the conversion of North China into "a Sino-

Japanese cooperation area." In addition, the conferees

felt that the Chinese government should be presented with
a demand that all causes of trouble in the north be uprooted. Failing satisfaction of this demand, the Japanese
Army should insist on the "divorce of North China from
46

Nanking/'
The most elaborate of these conferences occurred a week
Shanghai. Japanese diplomatic and consular offiassembled on October 19-20 to meet with the Foreign
Office representative, Mr. Goro Morishima, chief of the

later at
cials

Bureau of Oriental Affairs. The miliand naval parleys were held separately on October

First Section of the

tary
40

China Weekly Review, October

19, 1935, p. 221, 224.

JAPAN IN CHINA

74

20-21, with Major-General Okamura and Captain Tadao

Honda, chief of the China Section of the Naval General
Staff, as

the central figures.

ferences "were

ried out by Mr.

separate, these cona unity of mission car-

Though

bound together by
Goro Morishima, Major-General Okamura

and Captain Honda, representing the Japanese Foreign,

War and Naval Ministries. At the parleys, they had the
identic mission of conveying to the officials in the China
the ministries they respectively represent the new
China policy recently agreed upon by the three ministries
field of

at

Tokyo."

47

Toward the end of October these official conferences,

then continuing at Tientsin, were punctuated by serious
disturbances in North China. At Hsiangho, on the edge of
the demilitarized zone northeast of Peiping, Chinese
farmers seized control of the

city,

overthrew the

district

government, and set up an autonomous administration

under an official of their own choice. Legitimate tax grievances seem to have underlaid this affair; at the same time,
there was clear evidence of assistance from Japanese
sources. 48 Unsuccessful efforts were made to spread the
riots into the neighboring district of Sanho. When General Shang Chen sought to put down the disturbances with
Chinese troops, the Japanese military intervened against
such action on the ground that it would infringe the provisions of the Tangku Truce, though actually Hsiangho
was just outside the demilitarized zone. Efforts to settle
this affair were still proceeding on October 28, when it
was overshadowed by much more momentous issues raised

comprehensive Japanese demands addressed

North China authorities.
At this time General Chiang Tso-pin, Chinese Ambas-

by a

series of

to the

*7

China Weekly Review, October

48

See report of a group of

visited

26, 1935, p. 262.

American newspaper correspondents who

Hsiangho, China Weekly Review, November 16, 1935, p. 381-383.

AGGRESSION IN

NORTH CHINA

sador to Japan, was making his final round of

75
calls

on

Tokyo preparatory to leaving for China

to participate in the Kuomintang sessions scheduled for

Cabinet

officials at

On

November.

October 28 Foreign Minister Hirota

chose the occasion of his last interview with the Chinese
early

Ambassador

to offer a three-point proposal for Sino-Japanese rapprochement. The "three principles" of Hirota's
China policy were thus formally launched. As reported at

the time, they were expressed in the following terms: (t)

positive aid by the Nanking government to a scheme

Sino-Japanese relations on a firm,

a formula for cooperation between
friendly
(2)
and
Manchoukuo
in the development of
China, Japan
North China; (3) a program for a common front between
to

designed

place

basis;

China, Japan and Manchoukuo to prevent the spread

Communism. 40 General Kawashima, Japanese Minister

of
of

War, urged the Chinese Ambassador

to give "serious consideration" to the Hirota proposals. He stressed the necessity for a definite statement of attitude toward the plan

from the Nanking government, especially with regard to

the last two points, and asked the Ambassador to transmit his views to the officials at Nanking. 50 On the morning of October 29 General Chiang Tso-pin was received
in audience by Emperor Hirohito, and on the following
day he

left for

China.

Meanwhile the

first

steps to enforce Foreign Minister

Hirota's proposals for Sino-Japanese cooperation were being taken in North China. On October 29 Shigeru

Kawagoe, Japanese Consul-General at Tientsin, had presented a note to the North China authorities embracing a
set of five demands. These included abolition of the Peii9

"Hirota's

Three

Principles

Council of International

China", Information Bulletin,

Nanking, Volume I, Number 7, July

vis-a-vis

Affairs,

11, 1936, p. 5.
150

China Weekly Review, November

2,

1935, p. 299.

JAPAN IN CHINA

76

ping Branch Military Council within three days; dismissal

of Colonel Yuan Liang, Mayor of Peiping; formal apology
from General Shang Chen for the Luanchow incident, a
long-standing affair that had occurred during the summer
in the demilitarized zone; immediate arrest of active antiJapanese elements and Blue Shirts; and extension of the
demilitarized zone to five more hsien, or counties, namely,
Hsiangho, Changping, Wuching, Paoti and Ningho. The
note was delivered to the four leading Chinese officials in
the north: General Shang Chen, governor of Hopei; Gen51

Sung Che-yuan, garrison commander of the PeipingTientsin area; Cheng Ke, Mayor of Tientsin; and Colonel
Yuan Liang, Mayor of Peiping. In his accompanying repreeral

sentations, the Japanese Consul-General charged that the

Chinese authorities had not complied with the terms of

Ho-Umetsu agreement,

on the issue of
and
agents. The fact that
suppressing anti-Japanese groups
the Consul-General, and not the military officers, presented
these demands may be taken to indicate the measure of
the

especially

coordination achieved by the preliminary conferences of

Japanese civilian and military officials in China. Neverthe-

Major-General Tada saw

fit to
notify the same Chinese
that
the
simultaneously
Japanese army intended
to put an end to the North China complications, that deepseated intrigue and terrorism were being carried on in the

less,

officials

north,

and

that

Japan could not overlook China's

efforts

to "sovietize" the northern provinces. Additional evidence

of military-civilian correlation on the new China policy

was supplied by a statement issued at Shanghai on October

29 by Akira Ariyoshi, the Japanese Ambassador, which
deplored the "present unsettled conditions" in "the five
northern provinces" and called for the establishment in
51

China Weekly Review, November

*935> P- 338.

2,

1935, p. 291-292;

November

9,

AGGRESSION IN
North China "of

a stable

genuine permanency."

The
era in

NORTH CHINA
and

reliable

77

government o

52

presentation of these demands ushered in a new

North China, marked by a determined Japanese

northern provinces from Nanking's

Immediate
jurisdiction.
prosecution of this aim, however,
was halted by startling developments at the Kuomintang
sessions inaugurated on November i in Nanking. From
effort to sever the five

these events, despite further initial losses in the north,

emerged a nationalist movement which was destined to
forge a united China in the short space of eighteen months.
53

New York

Times, October

30, 1935.

CHAPTER THREE

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

AT

the beginning of

November

1935 a set of threat-

difficulties, which had slowly

ening political
gathered force over a period of several years, confronted
the Nanking government with a critical emergency. General Ho Ying-chin's surrender in North China during the

and economic

month

June had strengthened popular opposition to

Nanking's foreign policy, which had been nominally controlled since early 1932 by Premier Wang Ching-wei, with
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the background. This
question was now raised in even more burning form by
of

the open Japanese preparations to detach the five northern

provinces from the rest of China. Equally pressing economic and financial problems had been created by the

long-continued trade decline and the increasing outflow

of silver.

The storm broke on November

i,

when Wang

Ching-wei was shot and seriously wounded by an assassin

at the opening assembly of the Sixth Plenary Session of
the Kuomintang. Two days later the government suddenly announced a new monetary program, involvingsubstitution of a
silver standard.

managed currency

The

first

for China's traditional

of these events led to the

most

thoroughgoing shake-up in government and party offices

in nearly four years; the second gave an added stimulus to
Japan's activities in the north.
Since the reorganization of the National
78

Government

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

79

in January 1932, which brought Wang Ching-wei's group

into the ruling circle, Chiang Kai-shek had been continu-

ously occupied with two major political problems: the

Communist opposition and Japanese aggression. In November 1934 Nanking's anti-Communist operations finally
succeeded in ousting the main Red armies from their
Kiangsi and Fukien provincial strongholds, which had
been maintained for six years. Despite a vast concentration
of nearly half a million government troops, aided by the
new airplane bombers purchased abroad, Chiang Kai-shek
failed in his main objective of surrounding and annihilat-

ing the

Teh
ward

Communist

armies.

Under Mao Tse-tung and Chu

these forces escaped from the net, marched westacross sections of five provinces, and entered Szechuan

province in the early spring of 1935. In June they effected

a junction in western Szechuan with the second largest
Communist army. Several months later these combined
Red armies began a northward movement designed to
clear a path for their forces into China's northwest. In

November
cessful

a bitter military struggle to prevent the suc-

completion of

this

movement was

still

continuing

in the western provinces. 1

In dealing with the successive Japanese encroachments,
Chiang Kai-shek had consistently sought to achieve com-

promise settlements on the best terms possible. Nanking's

military forces had never been mobilized in full strength
against Japan, even in the crises which led to the Tangku
Truce and the Ho-Umetsu agreement. This policy was
defended on the ground that political unity had to be
established under the aegis of the Central Government before effective resistance could be offered Japan. In pursuit
of this policy, Chiang Kai-shek had suppressed all antiJapanese protest movements within China, whether of
1

For

details, see

Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China,

cited, Part Five.

8o

JAPAN IN CHINA

a military or civilian character.

The

treatment meted out

Feng Yu-hsiang's military operations against Japan in

Chahar province in the summer of 1933 has already been
noted. Toward the end of that year a second revolt, which
to

also represented a protest against the government's

resistance policy, broke out in Fukien province.

non-

The

Fukien rebellion was headed by the i gth Route Army, the

Cantonese force which had defended Shanghai against
Japan two years earlier. After a swift campaign, however,
it was crushed early in 1934. Since that period the government had pursued its temporizing foreign policy without
effective political opposition, despite an annoying verbal
from the Southwest Political Council, which com-

assault

Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces.

The threatening emergency in the north had now finally
aroused the Chinese public, and its voice was to be heard
in more and more powerful tones during the coming
prised the leaders of

months. The first direct expression of this spirit took an

unfortunate turn, which may be at least partially attributed to the rigidly enforced patience which the government had imposed on the Chinese people.
At nine o'clock on the morning of November i the
inaugural ceremony of the Sixth Plenary Session of the
Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

took place in the auditorium of the Central Party Headtotal of one hundred and twelve
quarters at Nanking.
members of the Central Executive and Central

Super-

Committees was in attendance, and the gallery was

filled with over a thousand representatives of various
party
and government organs and civic bodies. The ceremony
visory

was begun by the singing of the party anthem, followed

by three bows to the party and national flags and the portrait of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The last will of Dr. Sun was then
read, and a three-minute silence observed. Wang Ching-

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

81

wei, president of the Executive Yuan, delivered a brief

opening address. Immediately afterwards, as the delegates

the auditorium and gathered to pose for a group pic2

ture, Wang Ching-wei was shot by a Chinese reporter.

left

The

repercussions of this incident were of

first-rate politi-

Although dominated by Chiang Kai-shek,

the Nanking government had functioned through a number of titular leaders, of whom Wang Ching-wei was the
most prominent. As Premier and Foreign Minister, he had
for several years been forced to shoulder responsibility

cal significance.

for Nanking's policy of non-resistance to Japanese aggresThe attack on his life, particularly under the circum-

sion.

stances prevailing in the north, sharply raised the whole

Japanese issue before the Kuomintang sessions, and dramait before the country at large. In Japan the reaction
was one of ill-concealed dismay. Under military inspiration, the Japanese press generally asserted that no change
in China's foreign policy was conceivable, but an undercurrent of uneasiness was equally apparent. "The motive
for the attack/' declared a Japanese report from Nanking,
"is believed to be resentment at the Japan policy of Mr.

tized

Wang and

the incident

is

regarded here as likely to mark

a turning point in the Government's Japan policy." 3

The impression created among Japan's official circles

by the attempted assassination of Wang Ching-wei was as

nothing compared to the outcry which greeted the promulgation of Nanking's new monetary program on November 3. Without Tokyo's consent or foreknowledge, the
Chinese government had boldly plunged ahead on a major
stroke of policy. Some such effort as this might well have
2

The

assassin, Sun Feng-min, subsequently died of gun wounds inby the bodyguards. He had been a member of the igth Route
Army, and later commander of a company of machine-gunners in the
i2th Division of the Fukien Army.
8
The Japan Advertiser, November 2, 1935.
flicted

JAPAN IN CHINA

8s

been expected, had Japan not felt so certain of the strength

its influence at Nanking. It had long been realized that
drastic measures were required to support China's shaky
economic and financial structure, which had been seriously
undermined by the conditions prevailing since 1933. So
long as China maintained a silver standard, the nation's
trade and business status was intimately affected by the
price of that metal. During the first two years of the world
depression, when the price of silver fell to low levels,
China experienced an increasing degree of prosperity.
Business activity was well maintained, the price index was
of

and foreign trade reached new high totals. At the

end of 1931, with successive devaluations of the pound,
rupee and yen, this process was reversed. In 1933 the dollar
was also devalued, and in June 1934 the American government inaugurated the silver purchase policy. With the
consequent rapid rise in the world price of silver, China's
rising,

stocks of this metal

amounts.

normal

began

to leave the

From an importer

state of affairs,

country in large

silver, which was the

China turned into a large net ex-

of

was smuggled out of the country, especially

through North China, in alarming proportions. Travelers
in the demilitarized zone during the summer of 1935 witnessed numbers of Japanese nationals, who were wearing
special vests filled with silver coins, crossing the border
into Manchuria. Japan's exports of silver, which totalled
porter. Silver

14 million yen in 1934,

amounted

to 225 million yen in

million
in
1935,
36
1936.* Under these
conditions, silver stocks in Shanghai declined by at least

and then

fell to

one half in the two years prior to November 1935.

Exodus of silver led to a contraction of China's currency supply, which in turn brought on severe deflation.
*

Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade of Japan, Tokyo, Department

December 1936, p. 113.

of Finance,

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

83

prices fell, business stagnated, exports were

and overseas remittances dwindled. By 1935 the
country was in the throes of a serious depression, marked by
widespread bankruptcies and large unemployment in the
port cities. Although the Chinese economic crisis was not
originally caused by the American silver purchase policy,
the "rising price of silver was the principal factor responsible for China's grave economic troubles after early
5
1932." Repeated Chinese diplomatic approaches at Washington during 1934 failed to secure relief. In October of

Commodity

stifled,

that year the Chinese

government imposed a levy of 10

cent
on
silver
exports, plus an equalization fee that
per
varied with the price of silver. The salutary effects of this
measure on exchange stability were counteracted by the
excessive advance in silver quotations, which rose above
80 cents an ounce in May 1935 and markedly stimulated
smuggling operations. The collapse of several Chinese
native banks in Shanghai and the bankruptcy of the
American-owned Raven Trust Company, occurring during the spring and summer of 1935, warned of an imminent financial panic.
Foreign interests in China were seriously affected by
these developments. The continued decline in China's
foreign trade after 1933, when world trade in general was
on the upgrade, was a disturbing phenomenon. Total
Chinese foreign trade in 1935, as calculated by the

Monthly Bulletin

of the

League of Nations, was only 66

per cent of the 1931 figure.

The

resulting loss to Chinese

government revenues, which depended

largely on customs
duties, jeopardized the security of foreign loans. In this
respect, Great Britain, owing to its leading investment

position in China, stood to lose the most should a general

5

John Parke Young, "The United

Reports, July

i,

1936, p. 102-103.

States Silver Policy," Foreign Policy

JAPAN IN CHINA

84

economic debacle be precipitated. On the basis of a

Chinese appeal to London in March 1935 for a loan of
20 million pounds, Britain had attempted to arrange joint
consideration of China's finances with the United States,
Japan and France. This proposal, which might possibly
have led to a revival of the China international banking
consortium, was rejected outright by Japan and coolly
received in Washington. As the next step Sir Frederick
Leith-Ross, British treasury expert, was sent out to the
Far East. In September Sir Frederick had visited

Tokyo

in a final effort to secure Japanese assistance in stabilizing

China's financial situation, which had become a source of

acute anxiety to British investors and bondholders. Although a loan project to maintain Chinese exchange at a
fixed ratio to the pound was apparently broached at these
conferences, Leith-Ross left

Japan on September 18 with-

out having obtained Japanese cooperation. 6 He then went

on to China, where he had discussed questions related to
currency reform with Nanking government officials prior
to

November

g.

On

that evening, at one hour before midKung, the Chinese Finance Minister, an-

H. H.
nounced a series of drastic financial reforms.
As summarized in Dr. Kung's announcement, the Currency Mandate decreed, with effect from November 4,
night, Dr.

"

The banknotes issued by the three

Government banks, i.e.., The Central Bank of China, The
Bank of China, and The Bank of Communications, shall
1935, as follows:

(i)

and the banknote reserves of the three

banks shall be placed under a unified control. The notes
of all other issuing banks will continue in circulation, but
will gradually be withdrawn and replaced by notes of The
be

full legal tender,

Central Bank.

No new

New York Times September

7
8

notes are to be issued by these

18, 1935.

North -China Herald, November

13, 1935.

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

85

banks and all their unissued notes as well as their banknote reserves are to be deposited with the Central Bank.
(2) All debts expressed in terms of silver shall be discharged by the payment in legal tender notes of the nominal amount due. (3) All holders of silver are required to
exchange their silver for legal tender notes. (4) The exchange value of the Chinese dollar will be kept stable at
its present level, and for this purpose the Government
banks will buy and sell foreign exchange in unlimited
quantities." In addition, the "Government-owned Central
Bank is to be reorganized as the Central Reserve Bank
of China and will be owned principally by the banks and
the general public, thus becoming an independent institution, devoting itself chiefly to maintaining the stability
of the nation's currency. The Central Reserve Bank of

China

will hold the reserves of the

banking system and

act as depository of all public funds and will provide centralized re-discount facilities for the other banks. The Cen-

Reserve Bank of China will not undertake general

commercial business, and after a period of two years will
8
enjoy the sole right of note issue."
The impounding of China's silver stocks, provided for
tral

program, supplied the means by which the exchange stability of the new managed currency could be
maintained. By the sale of these silver stocks large foreign
reserves were acquired, particularly in London and New
York. Acquisition of the dollar reserve was made possible
through a special agreement with the United States,
reached in May 1936, by which the Treasury agreed to
make "substantial purchases" of silver from China. 9 The
extraordinary confidence in the reform displayed by the

under

this

China Weekly Review, November 9, 1935, p. 335-336.

York Times, May 19, 1935. On two previous occasions the United
States had helped China by purchasing considerable amounts of silver,
once of 19 million and again of 50 million ounces.
9

New

JAPAN IN CHINA

86

Chinese people, who immediately gave up their longstanding allegiance to silver coins, cleared away the second
major difficulty confronting the change to a managed currency. From the beginning it functioned smoothly, and led
rapidly to a general revival of business and trade. The last
difficulty the reaction from Japan proved more difficult
to handle.

Announcement

of

the

new monetary program was

greeted with a chorus of denunciation in Tokyo, center10

ing on the alleged role played by Leith-Ross. The latter
maintained, in later declarations, that the reform was an
independent move by Nanking, for which he "had no
n In
private conversation, Chinese officials
responsibility/'
with the launching of the new prowere
associated
who
gram asserted that its principles had been worked out
months before at Nanking. Certain Japanese circles
charged that a British loan had underwritten the currency
reform program, but these statements were categorically

denied by Leith-Ross. 12 There was no doubt, however,

that Nanking's action was thoroughly approved by Sir
Frederick. It was followed on November 4 by regulations

by the British Ambassador, under authority of an

Order in Council, which backed up the reform by prohibiting British persons and corporations from making
issued

on pain of fine or imprisonment. 1

The British colony of Hongkong, moreover, proceeded to
institute a managed currency along lines similar to those
taken by China. It might seem that in the efforts put
forth to assist China in solving its financial difficulties,
Great Britain was merely exercising a normal interpayments in

10

New York

11

"Statement

silver

'15

Times, New York Herald Tribune, November 5, 1935.

made by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross at Shanghai on Monday,

June 22, 1936," press release.

12
North-China Herald, November
**
North-China Herald, November

13, 1935.

13, 1935,

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

87

national right, especially in view of the attempts previously made to secure Japanese cooperation. The opposition raised by Japan was, in fact, a further application of
the Amau doctrine enunciated on April 17, 1934, advising
Western powers to keep their hands off China.

Statements emanating from official sources in Tokyo

during the second week in November left no room for
doubt in this regard. An informal declaration by the Foreign Office spokesman on November 8 deplored the suddenness of the reforms. In taking action on a matter of

such importance, he suggested, the Chinese government

should have consulted the Japanese authorities and secured
assurances of their cooperation, in view of the close relations existing between the two nations. The Japanese
government, he concluded, felt that any reforms of a general character in China had to be carried out through
China's independent efforts. 14 The views of the War
Office were expressed much more bluntly. "China's long

spokesman on November 8, "shows

that her economic rehabilitation must come of her own

history," declared the

Foreign attempts to establish control over the finanof the country through the
in
of
loans
our
will,
opinion, not only affect the welgrant
fare of China's four hundred million people, but will also
efforts.

cial

and economic structure

menace the peace of the Orient. Japan may be compelled

to take appropriate steps in this connection."

ing was speedily

fulfilled

15

This warn-

by measures adopted in North

China.

The

Nanking had effectually distracted attention

demands presented in the north by
Consul-General Shigeru Kawagoe. With the resignation
on November 3 of Colonel Yuan Liang, Mayor of Peiping,
stir at

from the

14
15

results of the

China Weekly Review, November

China Weekly Review, November

16, 1935, p. 377.

16, 1935, p. 377.

JAPAN IN CHINA

88

first demand was met. Three days later the National

Government formally appointed General Chin Te-chun
to this post. Hsiangho, Paoti, Changping and Ningho

the

four of the five hsien specified by the Consul-General

were arbitrarily added to the demilitarized zone. The other
demands were either left in abeyance or only partially
satisfied. General Shang Chen seems not to have apologized for the

Luanchow

incident,

and the Peiping Branch

Military Council was not dissolved.

the Military Council seems to have

On

the other hand,

made efforts to sup-

press so-called anti-Japanese elements. The Japanese authorities concentrated their main attention on this latter
issue.

When

the purge failed to proceed as fast as desired, the

Japanese military took matters into their own hands by
effecting arbitrary arrests of Chinese citizens and detain-

ing them for examination in the Japanese barracks at

Tientsin and Peiping. These arrests began on October 30

and continued for nearly two weeks. During this period

Japanese gendarmes arrested four Chinese officials: Li
Ming and Wang Chia-chi of the Tientsin Social Affairs
Bureau;

Wang

Yi-fan,

deputy director of the Tientsin

Press Censorship Bureau; and Colonel Hsuan Chieh-hsi,

staff officer of the sgth Army in Peiping. Four Chinese

educational leaders were arrested: Professor

Yang Yi-chow,

dean of the College of Commerce and Law in Tientsin,

and Professor Lo Yu-wen, chairman of the department of
commerce of the same institution; Liu Hai-hsun, physical
director of the elementary school attached to the Tientsin
Women's Normal College; and Yao Chin-shen, director
of the Tientsin

Municipal Library.

Among

Chinese busi-

Nien Kwang-yao, committee member of the

Tientsin Chamber of Commerce, and Fu Hung-chin, son
of the chairman of one of the merchant guilds, were
ness circles

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

The

89

and rehad compiled a list of

about one hundred well-known people in North China
who were to be arrested and accused of anti-Japanese acarrested.

latter

managed

to effect his escape,

ported that the Japanese military

tivities.

On November

11

the Chinese Foreign Ministry

charged, in a strong protest transmitted to Tokyo through

the Japanese Ambassador, that these arrests of Chinese
officials

and

citizens

on Chinese

territory

"constituted

grave violations of Chinese sovereignty as well as infringe-

ments of international law/' and demanded that

steps be
taken to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. The
arrests were then discontinued, but reportedly on condi-

tion that the North

China

officials

would

arrest all persons

whose names were submitted by the Japanese military

authorities. 16

Much more

important moves were already taking place

North China. Major-General Doihara, Chief of the
Kwantung Army's Special Service Section, had arrived at
Tientsin on November 6 and immediately plunged into a
series of conferences with Chinese and Japanese officials
both there and in Peiping. In these meetings Doihara was
in

dealing mainly with the leaders of the 2Qth Army, including Generals Sung Che-yuan and Chin Te-chun, and

Mr. Hsiao Chen-ying, newly appointed Chahar governor.

These men, with the gradual withdrawal of General Shang
Chen's 3 and Army units from Tientsin to Paotingfu, had
now come to occupy the key positions in Hopei and
Chahar provinces. In addition, Doihara was conferring
with the chairman of Shansi province, General Hsu Yungchang, and with representatives of the Shantung and
10

For the

November
spokesman
lesser

facts detailed in this

Chinese

vember

paragraph, see China Weekly Review,

1935, p. 369, 375. On November 18 the Foreign Office

said that Japanese gendarmes had arrested a total of 42

16,

officials in

19, 1935.

North China. North China

Star, Tientsin,

No-

JAPAN IN CHINA
provincial governments. The

go

Central GovernSuiyuan
ment was also in direct touch with the developing situation in the north. General Hsiung Pin, vice-chief of the
General Staff and signer of the Tangku Truce, who had
been sent north to investigate and report back to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, had several meetings with
General Sung Che-yuan at this time. The lines of political
pressure reaching into North China crossed on November
12, when Doihara talked with General Hsiung Pin. This

day also marked the convening at Nanking of the Fifth

National Kuomintang Congress, which had followed upon

Kuomintang plenum. The Kuomintang

was
Congress
greeted by a telegraphed appeal from General Sung Che-yuan, the terms of which created a mild
the sessions of the

"The period of tutelage has already ended,"

the telegram stated, "and the time has arrived to introduce
and enforce constitutional government. The Legislative
Yuan should submit the draft constitution to the Congress

sensation.

for discussion,

promulgating

it

immediately afterwards.

Simultaneously, the administrative authority should be

returned to the people, to secure their collaboration in
17

With its overtones of challenge

Nanking dictatorship, and its undertones of autonomy consciousness, the telegram seemed to mark Sung

national rehabilitation."
to the

Che-yuan as one of the logical choices of the Japanese to

work out their purposes in North China. This appeal was
echoed by General Han Fu-chu, governor of Shantung,
and by the Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin. 18 Yin Jukeng, administrative commissioner of the demilitarized
zone, registered his support of the appeals

by Generals
and
Han.
Sung
These declarations carried much greater weight than
17
18

China Weekly Review, November 16, 1935, p. 375.

The North China Problem, cited, p. 32.

Shuhsi Hsu,

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

91

the independence hand-bills spread broadcast in the north

at this time, or than the spurious autonomy organizations,
fostered by Japanese agents, that were now cropping up

in the Peiping-Tientsin area. Everything seemed prepared

for the coup de main that was to deliver the five northern

provinces into the hands of Japan. To ensure against any

last-minute wavering on the part of the North China
the threat of military force was invoked at this
point. On November 15 the Kwantuiig Army despatched
four divisions from Chinchow, in Manchuria, to Shanhaiofficials,

kuan, and that night the headquarters of the North

China Garrison demanded barrack accommodations for
15,000 troops from the Tientsin authorities. The general
public looked for an immediate Japanese occupation, but
the threat was not carried out. On November 18 MajorGeneral Doihara delivered a. verbal ultimatum to Mr.
Hsiao Chen-ying, chief negotiator on the Chinese side.
If a North China Autonomous Council was not announced
on or before November 20, Doihara stated, five divisions
would be moved into Hopei and four into Shantung.
Hsiao Chen-ying, in a two-hour interview with the foreign
correspondents that afternoon, declared that the autonomy
scheme laid down by Doihara had not yet been formally
accepted. He said, however, that "a meeting would take
place in Peiping

on or before November

chairmen of each of the

20,

when

the

provinces, or their representatives, would be present to pass final approval on the plan
and announce the formation of the new autonomous
five

regime." General Han Fu-chu, he continued, was expected

to arrive in Peiping before that date; General Hsu Yungchang, the Shansi chairman, had been in Peiping for the
past several weeks; General Shang Chen was expected on
the following day; Hsiao Chen-ying himself was governor

of Chahar;

and General Fu

Tso-yi,

chairman of Suiyuan,

JAPAN IN CHINA

gs

had a representative in Peiping. Hsiao Chen-ying stated,

further, that he and his colleagues "constantly informed
the Central Government of what was going on and asked
for instructions." Up to that afternoon, he complained,
"not a single concrete suggestion or plan of assistance had
been offered by Nanking. Marshal Chiang Kai-shek yesterday sent six telegrams to Mr. Hsiao and his colleagues, but
all were vague and indeterminate, such as insisting that
spiritual unity between Nanking and General Sung Che19
yuan must continue."
At Nanking, meanwhile, the last session of the old
Kuomintang plenum had ended on November 6 after
taking certain routine actions, such as referring the draft
Constitution to the forthcoming National Congress and

approving the monetary reforms.

The

Fifth

National

Kuomintang Congress, which convened on November 12,

was marked by the presence of Generals Feng Yu-hsiang
and Yen Hsi-shan. Although Generals Chen Chi-tang of
Kwangtung and Li Tsung-jen and Pai Tsung-hsi of
Kwangsi did not attend, the Southwest Political Council
sent a large and representative group to participate in the
sessions. Tsou Lu, Chancellor of the Chung Shan University of Canton and leader of the Southwest delegation,
addressing the Congress on November 18, declared:
"Kuomintang comrades, whether from the South or the
North, have gathered here with a firm belief in the necessity of internal cohesion. Such unity cannot be achieved

by means of

force,

but of a spontaneous

common

stand together and face the present crisis/'

18

For

this

significant interview, see

North China

20

Star,

desire to

On

the

November

fol19,

193520

China Weekly Review, November 23, 1935, p. 419; see also

"Special
Kuomintang Sessions Supplement", The China Press Weekly, December i,
1935, p. 46.

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

93

lowing day, General Chiang Kai-shek delivered an important address on China's foreign relations. After stressing
the need for "balanced progress", involving "the completion of the groundwork of nation building" as well as
the achievement of "equality and independence among
if international developnations", he concluded: ".
ments do not menace our national existence or block the
.

of our national regeneration, we should, in view of

the interest of the whole nation, practice forbearance in

way

facing issues not of a fundamental nature. At the same

time we should seek harmonious international relations
provided there is no violation of our sovereignty. We
should seek economic cooperation based upon the principle of equality and reciprocity. Otherwise, we should
abide by the decision of the Party and the Nation and
reach a resolute determination. As far as I am concerned,
I will not evade my responsibility. We shall not forsake

We

is no
shall not talk
hope for peace.
until
we
driven
sacrifice
are
to
the
of
last
extremity
lightly
which makes sacrifice inevitable. The sacrifice of an indi-

peace until there

vidual

is

insignificant,

but the

sacrifice of a

nation

is

mighty thing, for the life of an individual is finite while

the life of a nation is infinite. Granted a limit to condi-

and a determination to make the supreme

sacrifice, we should exert our best efforts to preserve
." 21 Despite its minor refrain, this declaration
peace.
left open the possibility of treating with Japan on the
basis of the Hirota three principles which were then being
tions for peace

pressed upon Nanking, not excluding the issues raised by

the North China situation. Nanking's temporizing policy
was still to continue. The task of reorganizing the Central

Government, necessitated by the attack on

21

The Chinese Year Book,

1936-37, cited, p. 433-434.

Wang

Ching-

JAPAN IN CHINA

94

first plenary session of the new

Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees,
scheduled to meet on December 2.

wei, was postponed for the

On November
China, the

first

a day charged with tension in North

phase of the autonomy movement reached
19,

climax. In the afternoon Major-General Doihara told

the Japanese pressmen in Peiping that the Chinese plans

its

an Autonomous Council had been completed and he

expected formal announcement shortly. The Chinese officials were non-committal,
stating that they were waiting
until noon of the soth, when, if no
plan was forthcoming
from Nanking, they would take responsibility and make
for

the decision.

Throughout the day Doihara was in constant

touch with Mr. Hsiao Chen-ying, urging
upon him the
22
That
necessity for a definite announcement on the soth.
evening the long-awaited instructions from Nanking arGeneral Chiang Kai-shek wired the North China

rived.

officials to drop the negotiations with Doihara, since the

whole problem of Sino-Japanese relations was being taken
up in Nanking. Mr. Hsiao Chen-ying at once notified
Major-General Doihara, adding that under the circumstances the North China officials would not be in a
position to act without express instructions from the Central
Government. As a further result of Chiang Kai-shek's telegram, General Han Fu-chu decided to remain in Shan-

Shang Chen cancelled his proposed

from
Peiping
Paotingfu. On the morning of November 20, Doihara quietly left Peiping for Tientsin,
tung, while General

visit to

Interviewed by Japanese pressmen, he indicated that

post-

ponement of the autonomy announcement would no

doubt be necessary owing to the non-arrival of Generals
Han Fu-chu and Shang Chen.
22

For this and other details of the

paragraph, see North China Star,

November

20-21, 1935.

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

95

The

causes leading to this temporary collapse of the

five-province autonomy movement resided in develop-

ments

at the capital.

Japanese Foreign

As the

Office,

from the
the Chinese government had
result of approaches

willingness to deal with the proposals advanced in Hirota's three-point program. On November 19,
after receipt of these assurances, Ambassador Ariyoshi had

indicated

its

entrained from Shanghai for Nanking to open formal

During these preliminary exchanges, the

Nanking government was apparently informed that MajorGeneral Doihara possessed no credentials empowering him
to negotiate with the North China officials. Japanese offinegotiations.

cials in

Nanking,

Government

that

it

was reported, informed the Central

Tokyo had no

desire to bring either

23
political or military pressure to bear in North China.
Acting on this information, instructions to discontinue

negotiations

had been wired north. 24 Doihara's anomalous

position was confirmed in statements made at this time

by Colonel Tan Takahashi, military attach^ of the Japanese Embassy in Peiping. 25 At eleven o'clock on the night
of

November

20,

Colonel Takahashi informed a United

Press correspondent that "Doihara was in North China in

a private capacity only, and not on any official mission."

On

the following afternoon, he categorically declared:

"Major-General Doihara has no authority to negotiate

with Chinese

officials."

There had never been any formal

negotiations in Peiping, he asserted, since such negotiations would have to take place either with him or the

appropriate secretary of the Japanese Embassy. As this did

not occur, he concluded, there were properly speakingno negotiations whatsoever. Ironically enough, this asNorth China Star, November 21, 1935.
These instructions were confirmed on the sist, the day
Chiang had held a three-hour interview with Ariyoshi.
25
North China Star, November 21-22, 1935.
23
24

after

General

JAPAN IN CHINA

96

tounding example of an outright clash between the civilian

and military branches of the Japanese government came
one month after the elaborate October conferences, designed to coordinate policy with respect to China questions.

Though his larger scheme was thus brought to a halt,

Doihara was as yet by no means defeated. He fell back on
an alternative plan, much less ambitious in scope, but
destined to have far-reaching political and economic consequences. Since the signing of the Tangku Truce on May
31, 1933, as already noted, the East Hopei demilitarized
zone had been a thorn in the flesh of China's body politic.

The

turbulent motley of Shih Yu-san, which had at first

"policed" the area, had effectively served Japan's purposes

during 1933. Gradually, however, the Peace Preservation

Corps (Paoantui) of the zone had increased to two divisions, and, while still containing large semi-bandit ele-

come more nearly to perform the functions

name indicated. In December 1933 the Chinese

ments, had

which

its

authorities

had been enabled

to establish

an administrative

system for the zone. For this purpose the whole area was
divided into two districts, each of which was placed under

an administrative commissioner.

The

eastern half of the

Luanchow-Shanhaikuan district, was controlled by Commissioner Yin Ju-keng, with headquarters

at Tungchow; the western half of the zone, the ChihsienMiyun district, was administered by Tao Shang-ming, with
headquarters at Tangshan. Both men spoke the Japanese
language, and both knew Japan well; Yin Ju-keng had the
additional advantage of a Japanese wife. Tao Shang-ming
proved difficult for Japan to handle. His troubles came to
a head in the summer of 1935, when he was lured into
the Japanese Embassy in Peiping by a telephone call from
Colonel Takahashi, the military attach^, and illegally dezone, called the

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

97

tained there for nearly two weeks, from August 5 to 17.

Chinese press censors forbade publication of this inci-

The

and the news only leaked out gradually. 26 Tao Shangming's usefulness thus came to an end. By order of the
Peiping Branch Military Council, Yin Ju-keng was appointed to act concurrently in Tao's place, and so assumed
dent,

administrative control of the entire demilitarized zone. 27

Following

this

appointment, Japan's influence in the East

Hopei area had

steadily increased.

Japanese military authorities

On November

announced

that

8 the

Yin Ju-keng

had concluded an agreement with Lieutenant-Colonel

Yoshiharu Takeshita, member of the Kwantung Army's
Special Service Section, for the appointment of Japanese
advisers to twelve of the hsien, or counties, in the zone.

The

advisers

had been appointed,

it

was

said, for the

purpose of "strengthening the projected Japanese collaboration in North China/* 28

In the demilitarized zone, at least, Doihara was able to

move toward the realization of his plans. On November
24 Yin Ju-keng issued a proclamation of autonomy for
Hopei area. Simultaneously, he sent a circular

the East

telegram to the leaders of the five northern provinces,

urging them to join with him in setting up an autonomous
government for North China. On November 25 the "East

Hopei Autonomous Council" was unceremoniously

augurated in a small building which formed part

in-

of

The Ta Kung Pao, a leading Chinese vernacular newspaper, published the following editorial paragraph anent this incident: "The news
of the detention of Tao Sharng-ming at the Japanese Embassy was not
00

published until ten days after it reached our office. We feel most regretful over this. However, there was nothing else we could do as we were
carrying out the orders of the Government. We sincerely hope that our
readers will understand this and show us consideration accordingly."
Quoted in China Weekly Review, October 19, 1935, p. 216.
27
Shuhsi Hsu, cited, p. 31.
28
China Weekly Review, November 16, 1935, p. 369.

JAPAN IN CHINA

98

Tungchow's ancient Confucian temple. "No flag was

hoisted/' wrote Renter's correspondent, "no salute of guns
was fired for the simple reason that the new regime has
no flag, while its heaviest armament is a Peace Preservation
Corps

rifle.

No

cheering crowds

or crowds of any sort-

gathered outside the temple where 'history' was being

made. In a long, narrow room with paper windows, and

heated by a small, primitive coal stove, nine men sat down

without fuss or ado to take office as the 'East Hopei
Autonomous Council*, while outside stood six members of
the Peace Preservation Corps on guard and a handful of
Chinese and foreign press correspondents from Peiping.
Complete quiet reigned throughout the ramshackle old

town, formerly Peking's port at the end of the Grand

Canal which housed the vast Imperial rice granaries. The
Council of Nine, which controls the whole of the demilitarized zone together with four nearby hsien (districts)

Hsiangho, Paoti, Changping and Ningho

Ju-keng (Chairman)

consists of

Chih Tsung-mo (vice-Chairman)

Wang Hsia-tsai, Chang Ching-yu, Chang Yen-tien,

tien, Chow Lei, Li Yuan-cheng and Yin Ti-hsin.
them

are

commanders

Yin
,

Li HaiFive of

of units of the Peace Preservation

2d

Corps."
The Executive Yuan, meeting at Nanking on the morning of November 26, ordered abolition of the special ad-

and issued
Yin Ju-keng. Neither
Shang Chen nor Sung Che-yuan dared enforce the Central
Government's ukase, especially after the North China
Garrison had despatched two hundred Japanese troops to
Tungchow and served notice that any move against Yin
Ju-keng would be regarded as an infringement of the
ministrators' offices in the demilitarized zone

mandate

calling for the arrest of

^"Special Kuomintang Sessions Supplement", cited, p. 61; also China

Weekly Review, November

30, 1935, p. 477.

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

Tangku Truce.
several

hundred

spurious

rioters

99

autonomy demonstration by

kept Tientsin in turmoil through-

out the day of November 25. Popular opinion in North

China, however, was beginning to express its real attitude
toward the autonomy movement. The leading Chinese
educators of Peiping met on November 24 and unani-

mously adopted the following resolution: "Since there

have appeared statements in the press purporting to represent public opinion in this region as favoring the so-called
autonomy movement, we, members of universities and

other cultural institutions in Peiping, do solemnly declare

that we are utterly opposed to any movement tending to
detach any region of China from the jurisdiction of the
Central Government, or to set up special political organs
for such region. We urge the Central Government to use

the energies of the entire nation to maintain the territorial

30
After the meetintegrity of China."

and administrative

ing, this resolution signed by Chiang

cellor of Peiping National University;

known

philosopher and

educator;

the

Mon-lin, Chan-

Hu

Shih, wellof

Chancellors

Yenching and Tsinghua Universities; and other cultural

leaders of the north was issued to the country in the form
of a circular telegram. The student organizations in the
Peiping-Tientsin area published a similar manifesto on
November 26. Another interesting reflection of public

sentiment was the resignation, and withdrawal from the

East

Hopei demilitarized zone, of a number

of the hsien

magistrates.

General Chiang Kai-shek had meanwhile formally initiated negotiations with Japan at Nanking on November
20, in the course of a three-hour interview with the Japanese Ambassador. Reports as to what transpired during
30

North China

Star,

November

Sessions Supplement", cited, p. 61.

25,

1935;

also

"Special

Kuomintang

JAPAN IN CHINA

ioo

this conversation differed widely.

Chiang apparently

told

Mr. Ariyoshi that China desired to maintain friendly

Japan but refrained from any commitment
on Hirota's three-point program, aside from agreeing to
continue discussion of the proposals. Regarding the situation in the north, he seems to have said that the Central
Government had already decided on appropriate steps
which would soon be put into effect. The interview was

relations with

attended by three of the local Japanese officials, and also

by General Chang Chun, chairman of the Hupeh provincial

government, and

Tang

Yu-jen, vice-minister of

who

Foreign Affairs,
interpreted. These two Chinese
officials continued negotiations at Shanghai after November 26 with Mr. Ariyoshi and Major-General Rensuke
Isogai,

senior

Japanese

military

attache.

During

this

period reports from Chinese

sources, bearing an authentic

stamp, claimed that the central authorities were approach-

ing the discussions of Sino-Japanese issues in the light of

three principles: integration of all Chinese territory, non-

impairment of China's sovereignty, and negotiations on a

basis of equality. Recognizing that special problems obtained in North China, the Central Government was "conthe

sidering

eventual

establishment

of

some

sort

of

political council in this area comparable to the Southwest

Political

Council at Canton/'

31

The

Executive Yuan, at

meeting of November 26, took the first steps in this

direction, three in number: abolition of the Peiping
Branch Military Council and the transfer of its functions
its

to the Military Affairs Commission, of which Chiang Kaishek was chairman: appointment of General Ho Yingchin, the War Minister, as resident representative of the

Executive
81

Yuan

North China

at Peiping;

Star,

November

and appointment of General

24, 1935.

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

Sung Che-yuan,

garrison

commander

101

Peiping and

of

new office of Pacification Commissioner

and
Chahar
Hopei
provinces.
By the end of November tension in North China had

Tientsin, to the
for

again reached the breaking point. Continuing his efforts

to force the northern leaders into line, Doihara had

General Han Fu-chu of Shantung and General Fu

Tso-yi, chairman of Suiyuan. Japanese forces effected a

visited

temporary occupation of the Fengtai railway junction

27, ostensibly to prevent removal of rolling
stock to the south. On the following day the Chinese

on November

Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a strong protest at

Tokyo

against the occupation of Fengtai

of the

autonomy movement by Japanese

and promotion
officers,

while

identic notes were sent to the foreign powers. Extensive

Japanese troop movements in the Peiping-Tientsin area,

and the threat

that a full division

Manchuria, contributed

would be

sent in

from

the general uneasiness. Frequent Japanese airplane flights were made over North
to

China cities, and Japanese troops with full war equipment

marched provocatively through the streets. Construction
work on a large Japanese airdrome near the International
Race Course at Tientsin, which later came to be occupied
permanently, was feverishly pushed forward. On the afternoon of November 30 General Sung Che-yuan telegraphed

Nanking

mand

that he could

no longer control the growing

"de-

of the people" for autonomy.

That night General Ho Ying-chin, the War Minister,

and Mr. Chen Yi, chairman of the Fukien government,
with several other leaders, entrained for the north from
Nanking. The visit of these delegates from the Central
Government, bringing plans for a solution of the crisis
worked out at the capital, was greeted with ill-concealed

JAPAN IN CHINA

102

32
by the Japanese military authorities. At Tsinan,
in Shantung, General Ho Ying-chin talked with Han
Fu-chu; he then crossed over to the Peiping-Hankow Railway and traveled up to Paotingfu, reaching there on the
evening of December 2. Interviewed at Tsinan on December i, General Han Fu-chu declared: "No matter how
hard other persons may press, I will remain steadfast to
The autonomy movement does not exmy own policy.
will
the
the
of
people. A few persons in Shantung
press
approve of the movement, but they are bad characters who
seek to disturb the situation for their own interest and
cannot make serious trouble/' 33 While General Ho Yingchin delayed at Tsinan and Paotingfu, Chen Yi went on
up to Tientsin, where he immediately entered into conferences with Chinese and Japanese officials, including
Major-General Doihara. If the plan broached by Chen Yi
proved acceptable, then General Ho, as the representative
of the Executive Yuan in North China, was prepared to
come up and stamp it with his official approval.

hostility

Yi's negotiations in Tientsin apparently went off

smoothly, as General
Ying-chin arrived at Peiping on

Chen

Ho

the evening of December 3 from Paotingfu.

round of
conferences with Sung Che-yuan and the other leaders of

the 2gth Army, as well as with Japanese officials, followed.

By the 7th it was known that a Political Affairs Council

Hopei and Chahar provinces, with General Sung Cheyuan as chairman, was to be set up in Peiping. At this

for

88
Major-General Tada, commander of the North China Garrison, according to a Rengo despatch, upbraided the Nanking authorities for
sending General Ho northward and declared that "the situation would
not be cleared up" by the latter's presence. Had General Ho come "to
apologize for his past misdeeds," the commandant said, "his presence
could have been tolerated. But his return to North China to engage in

new

subversive activities is inconceivable."

in "The Bogus East Hopei Regime", Information Bulletin,
Council of International Affairs, Nanking, March 21, 1937, p. 163-164.
88

Quoted

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

103

point, the center of the stage was taken by the students of

Peiping. During the autumn o 1935 a skeleton union had

been organized, and this body now brought the students

into the streets in mammoth protests against an "auton-

omous" North China. In midwinter, and

facing brutal
students
rallied
to
mass parades
Peiping
and demonstrations which surpassed those of 1919 and
1925 in numbers and determination. The first demonstration, directed as much against Ho Ying-chin as against the

police assaults, the

Japanese, took place on December 9. In the face of this

elemental protest, the formal launching of the Political

Council was measurably retarded. All appointments necessary to bring the new North China regime into
being, however, were quietly gazetted. On December 1 1
the National Government appointed General Sung Cheyuan to the posts of chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, and chairman of the Hopei provincial
government. General Shang Chen, the retiring Hopei
governor, was transferred, along with his 3 2nd Army, to
Honan. The sgth Route Army was left as the sole military
force in Hopei and Chahar provinces, except for a few
thousand Peace Preservation Corps militiamen. General

Affairs

Sung Che-yuan, commander

of this army, also held, in

offices, the post of garrison comfor the Peiping-Tientsin area. His military sub-

addition to his two

mandant

new

ordinates or civilian associates monopolized the other chief

positions in the two provinces. For some months General

Chin Te-chun had been Mayor of Peiping; Hsiao Chenying was now appointed Mayor of Tientsin; while in
Chahar, the acting governor was General Chang Tzuchung. A new dynasty, revolving around the sgth Route
Army, had been installed in the north. General Ho Yingchin had carried out his assignment; on the isth he left
quietly for the south. It was announced that he had de-

JAPAN IN CHINA

104

cided not to take

the Executive

up his post as
Yuan in Peiping.

resident representative of

importance had been simultaneously

taking place in party and government offices at Nanking.
The Fifth Kuomintang Congress had come and gone in
November; the first plenum of the Fifth Central Executive and Supervisory Committees was held on December

Changes of no

2-7.

On

new

party

less

the last day of the sessions, the personnel of the

and government organs was elected. For many

years Chiang Kai-shek's all-pervading influence on the
National Government had been exerted indirectly, from
the vantage point of his party offices and his position as
Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. Now, on
December 7, he was chosen President of the Executive
Yuan, or Premier, in succession to Wang Ching-wei. Of
the high party offices, Chiang Kai-shek was made vicechairman of the standing committee of the Central Executive Committee and also of the Central Political Council,
the two governing organs between sessions of the Kuomin-

He retained his post of Chairman of the

Military Affairs Commission. Feng Yu-hsiang, new vicechairman of the Military Affairs Commission, reappeared
after five years' retirement as an active adherent of the
tang plenum.

Central Government.

Two

of Feng's old

commanders,

Generals Sung Che-yuan and Han Fu-chu, now controlled

three of the northern provinces: Hopei, Chahar, and

Shantung. Yen Hsi-shan, who exerted controlling influence

in Shansi and Suiyuan provinces, was made a member of
the Central Political Council. No similar progress in
knitting the country together could be noted with regard
to the Southwest. Tsou Lu, leader of the delegation from
the Southwest Political Council to the Kuomintang sessions, was elected member of the standing committee of
the Central Executive Committee. The military leaders

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

105

SouthwestGenerals Chen Chi-tang of Kwangtung,

and Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Tsung-hsi of Kwangsi
occupied none of the leading positions, either in party
of the

or government organs.

Anticipating reorganization of the Executive Yuan, con-

sequent upon Chiang Kai-shek's assumption of the presidency, Wang Ching-wei's cabinet resigned en bloc on

December

9.

The new

cabinet, appointed

on December

12, virtually eliminated Wang's following. Ku Meng-yu,

chosen Minister of Communications, shortly resigned;

there was left only

Both

Tang

Yu-jen, one of the vice-ministers.

withdrew into the

Ku Meng-yu and Chen Kung-po

background

as

members

of the Central Political Council,

important political organ, of which Wang Ching-wei was

made chairman. The new Foreign Minister, succeeding
Wang Ching-wei, was General Chang Chun, former chair-

man

Wu

of the

Hupeh provincial government.

Tingchang, Tientsin banker who had just headed a Chinese
Economic Mission to Japan, became Minister of Industry.

The Shanghai

banker,

Chang Kia-ngau, became Minister

of Railways. Chiang -Tso-pin, for three years Chinese Ambassador at Tokyo, assumed charge of the Ministry of Interior.

Each of the four new Ministers was educated wholly

or partly in Japan. In the country at large, these cabinet

choices, as well as the newly established Hopei-Chahar

were greeted as evidences of truckling

Shanghai Mainichi admitted on December
14 that the composition of the new cabinet left "no room
for fear that Nanking will continue its double-faced policy
towards Japan." 34 Tang Yu-jen, newly appointed viceminister of Communications, was assassinated in the
French Concession at Shanghai on December 25; the
event was regarded as a witness to Chinese popular dis-

Political Council,

to Japan.

14

Quoted

The

in

China Weekly Review, December

21, 1935, p. 82.

JAPAN IN CHINA

io6
trust o

been

had

previously
policy. Tang Yu-jen
the
in
assistant
Foreign Ministry,
Ching-wei's

government

Wang

serving as chief go-between in the negotiations with Japan.

At the time of his death he was conferring with MajorGeneral Rensuke Isogai, Japanese military attache, in

Shanghai. Chiang Kai-shek had meanwhile summoned his

cabinet to an informal conference at the Executive Yuan
16, immediately after they had been sworn
In
office.
concluding an address to his new associates
on this occasion, he had declared: "In respect of problems
detrimental to the freedom and equality of the state, the

on December
into

government

make no compromise. For

will

the consolida-

tion of international peace, we shall make a supreme

effort. For the maintenance of the life of the nation, we
are not afraid to

my
that

make

the final sacrifice.

hope that all

viewpoint, and
I

colleagues will fully understand this

we shall perform our duties to the

best of

our

35

ability."

Formal inauguration of the Hopei-Chahar Political

Council at Peiping had been arranged, after some delay,
for December 16. The ceremony did not take place as
scheduled.

That day Peiping was the scene of a monster

student demonstration, which dwarfed the

week

earlier.

From

dawn

first protest of
until long after dark

early
nearly ten thousand students paraded the streets in disciplined order, save when the marching lines were broken

up by police assaults, and assembled at various points in

huge protest meetings. Their movement, despite rigorous
press censorship, had already reached nation-wide proportions. Chinese students were marching in all the
great port
along the coast, as well as in the interior centers.
Wherever they marched, they broke the government's
cities

restrictions
85

on

anti-Japanese activities,

China Weekly Review, December

si, 1935, p. 82.

and

stirred

up

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

107

new and powerful

national consciousness. Despite its

the
did not prevent formal instudent
movement
strength,
the
of
auguration
Hopei-Chahar Political Council, which

was quietly effected on December i8. 36 The nucleus of the

Council's seventeen members consisted of the leaders of
the zgth Army, including Sung Che-yuan, Chin Te-chun
and Chang Tzu-chung. Several members of the former
pro- Japanese Anfu clique, which the Chinese students had
driven from office in 1919, were appointed members of
the Council, notably Wang Yi-tang and Liu Chieh. The

Japanese authorities ventured the claim that the new

Council would be completely autonomous. While the
abolition of the Peiping Branch Military Council, and the
elimination of all direct representatives of the National
Government in the north, supported this view, there were
not a few indications to the contrary. The term "autonomy'* or "autonomous" did not appear in the title of the
Hopei-Chahar Political Council, which was strictly analogous to that used in the case of the Southwest. All appointments to the Council had been made by the central
authorities, and continued so to be made. The conduct of
foreign

and military

affairs, finance,

and the judiciary con-

tinued to be formally vested in the Central Government.

Actually, the full validity of these jurisdictional rights
depended on the extent to which General Sung Che-yuan
accepted the orders of the central authorities rather than
the dictates of Japanese officials in North China. There
was still another noteworthy aspect to this affair. Unlike

Tangku Truce and

arrangements made with
the

the

Ho-Umetsu agreement,

the

the Japanese authorities in connection with the establishment of the Hopei-Chahar Politi80

The new

governing body for the north was "launched in semi -secrecy.

announcement of the hour of the ceremony was given in advance and the inauguration started at the unexpectedly early hour of
eight o'clock in the morning." The New York Sun, Dec. 18, 1935.

No

official

JAPAN IN CHINA

io8

Council were purely verbal. There was no agreement

and no document was signed. Paradoxically
it
may be fairly asserted that the strength
enough,
mustered by the student demonstrations contributed

cal

in writing

materially to the successful launching of the new Council,

despite evident Japanese reservations as to the extent to

which

it

might serve their purposes. From December 9

Doihara's five-province

autonomy scheme, in

so

far as

by the northern military leaders

voluntary adherence to it
was concerned, was definitely set at rest. Henceforth it
could be achieved only by outright military conquest.
This period, nevertheless, was utilized by the Japanese
military to extend and consolidate the positions they had
already won in North China. On December 9 a force of

Manchoukuo irregulars, commanded by Li Shou-hsin, a

former colonel in the Jehol provincial army, launched an
attack from Dolonor on districts of north-central Chahar.
The invaders were assisted by a squadron of airplanes, as
well as tanks. Part of the area under attack was included
in the extension of the demilitarized zone effected in June
1935 by the Chin-Doihara agreement. Few of the units of
the sgth Army were in this region, which was defended
mainly by several thousand Peace Preservation Corps
militiamen. Meeting with relatively slight resistance, Li
Shou-hsin's forces marched rapidly across the six hsien of

North Chahar, comprising Kuyuan, Paochang, Kangpao,

Huateh, Shangtu and Changpei. By December 24 they had
reached Changpei, not far north of Kalgan, and established
their control over the whole of the occupied
territory.

From

this

enlarged base, these forces began preparations

for the invasion of Suiyuan, which occurred a year later.

Yin Ju-keng also made efforts at this time to extend the

On December

territory of the demilitarized zone.

force of the East Hopei Paoantui, taking

15 a
advantage of the

"AUTONOMY" FOR NORTH CHINA

moment when

109

replacing General
Shang Chen's troops in the Tientsin area, occupied the
port of Tangku. The withdrawal of the East Hopei
the

sgth

Army was

North China port was not

effected until two months later. General Sung Che-yuan
had meanwhile instituted negotiations with MajorGeneral Doihara and other Japanese military officials for
militiamen from

this strategic

Hopei regime with the HopeiChahar Political Council and for restoration of the six
North Chahar hsien. General Sung's energies, however,
were distracted by a succession of Sino-Japanese incidents,
and the East Hopei and North Chahar territories gradually assumed the status of permanent puppet regimes. On
December 25 the "East Hopei Autonomous Council" gave
way to the "East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous
Government." The revenues of the twenty-two hsien
under Yin Ju-keng's control were appropriated by the
the merging of the East

new government, circulation of

Bank of China in the area was

the notes of the Central

prohibited, and exportaThese were merely the first steps

in a program which culminated some months later, when
the East Hopei area became the source of entrance for a
tion of silver banned.

vast illicit trade in Japanese goods that seriously affected

the revenues of the Central Government.

The

closing months of 1935 marked an historical turning point in the balance of political forces within China.
From that time forward a nationalist resurgence, born of

the Peiping student demonstrations in December, rapidly

knit the country together on the basis of resistance to

Japan's encroachments. Less than a year later the National

Government was already taking a stand on foreign policy
which brought it measurably closer to the demands of

an aroused Chinese nationalism.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

THE* year 1935 had witnessed a long succession of
encroachments on China's northern provinces. It had
opened in January with the Kwantung Army's attack on
southeastern Chahar, which had added a strip of that
province to the domains of Manchoukuo. Six months later
had come the enforced signature of the Ho-Umetsu and
Chin-Doihara agreements, which had ousted all central
troops and political organizations from Hopei and Chahar provinces. The climax had been reached in November
and December, with the threatened alienation of the five
northern provinces. Although this threat had been staved
off, the actual results of the Japanese drive were by no
means inconsiderable. An independent regime sponsored
by Japan had been set up in the strategic region of East

Hopei; a base of operations for conquest of the sections

Mongolia still under Chinese control had been
established in North Chahar; while the newly appointed
of Inner

Hopei-Chahar
of General

Political Council,

under the chairmanship

Sung Che-yuan, occupied

a status little short

of semi-autonomous. Against these losses could be set only

one outstanding gain: the revival of the Chinese student
movement. This was a not inconsiderable factor. The
forces unleashed by the student movement were destined
to exert a unifying influence which speedily overcame
political cleavages that

had existed for ten years and

still

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM in

at the end of 1935. No observer of
the Chinese political scene, especially after noting the
course of events since the seizure of Manchuria, would

seemed unbridgeable

have dared predict that China's military leaders would

shortly sink their private differences

common

effort

to

and

defend the country.

interests in a

The

following
description of conditions as they existed in the early
months of 1933 throws light on the obstacles which confronted political unification:

"Observe for a moment the strategy of the military

chieftains everywhere in China. General Chiang Kai-shek
was not alone in the policy of feint and withdrawal, of
perennial shadow-boxing. Various provinces had their
each regionally supreme, each jealously eyeing
armaments, squeezing his peasants to buy
more foreign guns, increasing his investments in foreign
concessions, each uttering verbiage about 'national resistance' against Japan, each hoping that the other might
militarists,

his neighbor's

take it seriously, wreck his

rivals for supremacy.

"Thus

power, narrow the circle of

General Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen in

the southwest, waiting for the missteps of General Chen
Chi-tang in Canton; thus sat General Chen, waiting for
an opportunity to strike at Nanking, with a sidelong
glance at General Tsai Ting-kai whose power increased
in Fukien; thus in western China squatted the pair of
Lius and Yang Sen, urging Nanking to resist, increasing
the.ir

sat

own

rabble armies for incessant

the northwest crouched Generals

civil wars;

thus in

Yen Hsi-shan and Feng

Yu-hsiang, ready to pounce on a careless neighbor. And

thus, from Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek urged the Young

Marshal on toward

more

disaster,

and thereby eliminated one

rival in his struggle for effective military

China.

mastery in

JAPAN IN CHINA

112

"Each regional militarist thought in his regional way,

concerned himself with augmenting his wealth and power
mis-

troops, regarded Manchuria as the personal

fortune of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. None made the

and

gesture of sacrifice of personal power for the national

good. None conceived of the national good except in

terms of his personal power. To none, apparently, was

the loss of Chinese territory to Japan so grave a matter

The concept

as the possible loss of his regional control.

nationhood and unity was not in them/'

of

In its first phase, the student movement seemed to dig

a deep gulf between the Chinese people and the Central

Government. The demonstrations constituted an open

of war against the prohibitions on antiJapanese speeches and acts contained in the government's
"good- will mandate" of June 10, 1935. They were equally
declaration

to the

government's coolly calculated, temporizin

relation
to Japan's aggressions. Both issues
ing policy
were sharply drawn in the December 9 and 16 demonstra-

opposed

tions, despite the

absence of overt anti-government slofirst of these demonstrations was

largely spontaneous, with many schools as yet unorganized throwing themselves rapidly into action, signs of a
gans.

Although the

developing movement had been apparent for at least two

months. There were at this time in Peiping 19 universities and 77 middle schools, with
respective enrollments
of 13,517 and 24,537 students. Some of the institutions,
in Tientsin as well as in Peiping, had Students' SelfGovernment Associations. Contacts formed between several of these organizations during October had resulted
in the submission of an outspoken petition,
signed by

eleven universities and middle schools in

Peiping and
Tientsin under date of November i, to the
Kuomintang
1

Edgar Snow, Far Eastern Front,

cited, p. 302-303.

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

113

plenary session. Decrying Kuomintang absolutism, this

petition demanded freedom of press, speech, organization

and public assembly,

as well as

guarantees against arrest

of students without due process of law. These demands

were supported by an impressive indictment: university
discussion groups closed down, and their members arrested; student dormitories raided

cations suppressed

by the police; publi-

and burned. The appeal concluded:

"... we submit our petition

because our country is
and all citizens must bear the responsibility of
saving our country. The sooner these restrictions are done
2
away with, the sooner can we fulfill our responsibilities."
By early December a Peiping Students' Union, still
embracing only a minority of the local schools and universities, had been formed. This skeleton organization
.

in danger

planned the details of the first demonstration marking

out the line of march, preparing handbills, and seeking
to mobilize the student bodies of the various institutions.

On December

7 the students in the universities six miles

outside the Peiping walls failed to gain entrance into the

"Over one thousand students from Yenching and

Tsinghua Universities outside the city/' writes an ob3
server, "broke through side-gates and left their campuses
city.

at seven o'clock to join the

demonstration in the town.

With banners flying and slogans shouted in high spirits,

they marched cross-country, as the main road was effectively cordoned by the police. Nevertheless, they had

Armed police tried to beat

the leaders back with their leather belts at various times,

several skirmishes en route.

tore the standards into pieces,

generally, but to

no

avail."

and threatened the students

Arrived at the west gate, the

Christian Science Monitor, December 24, 1935; also China Today, New
York, January 1936, p. 77.
8
All quotations from eye-witness accounts in the China Weekly Review,
2

December

28, 1935, p. 127-133.

JAPAN IN CHINA

ii 4

students found

it

closed against them; late in the afterin formation to their schools, making

noon they returned

speeches in the market-places along the way. Meanwhile

"their colleagues in the city were gathering. In some
schools, especially the municipal middle schools, the students climbed over the walls to escape the police guards,
and in others student masses rushed the gates." The first
serious clash with the police occurred in the West City,
where "twenty-seven students were arrested and many in-

in
jured, two of them severely. Dispersed, they proceeded
small groups to join the demonstration which was scheduled for eleven o'clock in front of General Ho Ying-chin's

headquarters." Here the students asked to send a delegation of twelve to wait on General Ho, but were informed
that he was out of town. After long parleys they finally

drew up a petition, which was left for the General's consideration, containing the following points: (i) that the
students are unanimously opposed to any form of so-

"autonomous organizations" in North China; (2)

that the students are opposed to the policy of secret
diplomacy in Sino-Japanese relations, and demand that
called

the government make known publicly its foreign policy

and publish all previous negotiations; (3) that the people
be granted real freedom of speech, press, right of organization and assembly;, (4) that all civil war be stopped

immediately to fight the common enemy; (5) that all

illegal arrests be stopped; (6) that all students arrested
during the demonstration be released immediately.
A decision was now reached to march to the west gate,
in an effort to secure entrance for the students outside
the city. "Half-frozen by the long wait in the bitter wind,
warmed up as they marched along shouting

the students

their slogans. At Hsi Tan Pailou some eighty or ninety

police and a squad of big-swords tried to block the way,

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

waving

their

guns and swords menacingly in the

air

115

and

striking the students. Several arrests were made and the

line was partly split, but the students poured over the

and quickly reformed. The leadnever hesitated and took the blows without flinching,
arguing peaceably with the police and filling their pockets
with propaganda." Deciding that efforts to open the west
intersection at the sides

ers

gate
line

would be futile, the student leaders next turned the

of march toward Tien An Men, the historic meeting-

for Chinese student demonstrations. The

police
gave determined opposition as the parade approached the
Legation Quarter. In this sector the "fire department had
been called out with a hose
good strategy in zero
weather upon children who had been waiting or march-

place

ing since six o'clock in the morning, it being then four

The leaders ran right into the spray and were
mercilessly beaten by the police with leather belts, revolver ends and fists.
The retreat was quite orderly,
o'clock.

with the victims being dragged away and petted by their

comrades."
The demonstration was carried through with admirable
self-control,

and

effectively struck

home

to

the general

were made to win the sympathies

of the police. The students "first handed them small handbills that could be read at a
glance, addressed 'To the
Police and Gendarmes, to our Dear
Countrymen Bearing
"
Arms/ As they approached street intersections, the leaders raised their arms and
"began begging the police not
to interfere: 'We are all Chinese
together. Do not strike
public. Special efforts

your countrymen. Help us to save the country. Don't fight

us, fight the Japanese/ The leaders, however, did not
stop
the marching rhythm for a second, which would have
spread confusion in the line. Those who were struck
down were marched over, and picked up later in the line.

n6
The

JAPAN IN CHINA
girls

attention,

engaged the police in debate

to deflect their

and by various means no small number of the

"

It was evident that "many o

police were 'disarmed.'
the rank and file police did not seem to enjoy their role
in silencing the only anti-Japanese sentiment that has

been publicly expressed throughout the many months of

the present crisis here.
Coming suddenly during the
silence and tenseness which has prevailed in the city, the
movement has aroused tremendous popular enthusiasm
already. Groups of shopkeepers sometimes applauded as
the students went past, and everyone ran out and grabbed
for handbills which were eagerly read by little knots of
.

rickshamen, apprentices and people in the streets generally. Tens of thousands of handbills were distributed
all over the
city." There were at least seven different kinds
of handbills, the essence of

which was summed up

in

or twenty slogans, 'printed on small

slips of paper
to coordinate group action. There were no anti-Kuominfifteen

tang nor anti-Chiang Kai-shek slogans shouted. The most

popular slogans shouted were 'Down with Japanese Imperialism*, and
fense of North

'The Whole Nation in Arms for the De"

China/
The week which intervened between the first and second demonstrations was a period of feverish organizational activity. In virtually
every school mass meetings
were held or else small committees were formed, and
delegates sent to join the Peiping Students' Union.
Within a few days "the strike to enforce the
granting of
the demands made on the gth was
city-wide. In every
important school, the newly organized Students' SelfGovernment Associations took over control and defied
of any variety of
authority to compel them to
resume class schedules. Schools were surrounded on the
efforts

outside by police

and gendarmes and patrolled on the

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

117

inside by the Students' Self-Protection Corps, unarmed

but stern of countenance. Study groups were organized to
replace academic class work with research into the serious
social, economic and political questions of the day. Girls
took up first-aid, wartime dietetics, and athletics in preparation for demonstrations.
Information and courier
services were installed, wall-newspapers posted throughout the campuses, translators kept busy supplying the
school papers and magazines with the world's news
delegates were sent to other cities to help organize a
nation-wide movement. 'Foreign' and 'Domestic* Publicity Committees sent news to correspondents and Chinese publications abroad, as well as to whatever local
press would receive it. A complete administration under
severe discipline was installed" in the schools of Peiping.
'By Monday, the i6th, the interschool organization was
so well formed that the vast demonstration which took
place one of the largest and most impressive ever held in
Peiping seemed to have outwitted the police all along
.

the line."

This time the Yenching and Tsinghua students, aided

by the efforts of about one hundred of their number who
had spent the previous night in the city, battered their
way under a barrage of bricks thrown by the policethrough one of the more decrepit gates. The whole city
was aroused, as various "contingents paraded the streets,
struggling through police cordons on every important corner, previous to converging together for a big mass meeting at Tien Chiao, the poor workers' district outside the
city, and distributed their handbills over all their

main

appointed territory." The police were enraged early in

the day by the complete rout of their fire-hose technique
at the hands of the students, who wrested away the nozzle,
cut the hose with their pocketknives, turned off the hy-

JAPAN IN CHINA

n8
drant,

fire engine. This episode was soon

a furious melee, in which the 'leaders were

and smashed the

followed by
as they
singled out by the police and beaten furiously
off under arrest.
lay on the ground, several being dragged
The Peking National University leader, who was espe.

cially intelligent

and courageous in marshaling

his forces,

Seventeen Peking National

received a terrific mauling.
were
arrested, according to their reUniversity students
taken from any school; and of
port, the largest number
.

the twenty-two treated at the Peking Union Medical ColNational University,

lege nearly all were from the Peking

Northeastern, and the

The mass meeting

Normal University.'*
Tien Chiao was successfully

car-

at

ried through, and aroused the "attention of thousands

of people gathered nearby." At the conclusion of the

meeting, the leaders decided to hold a "demonstration

before the Waichiaopu, where the inauguration of the

Hopei-Chahar
later

Political

postponed)

for

Council had been set (but was

nine o'clock. Formed into neat

cordon of student bicycle police on either

and under the most extraordinary discipline, the long
line of about five thousand students began the march
from Tien Chiao to the big Chien Men gate." As the
parade reached the gate and the leaders went forward to
confer with the police, the latter "crouched into position
with their rifles and fired three volleys of blank shots
ranks, with a

side

mass of students, not over their heads,

been reported. If shots were fired overhead they
were from the gendarmes' revolvers." After a momentary
directly into the

as has

scattering the students surged back, and then "waited in

formation for about an hour and a half, while the leaders

At least half a dozen

were
in
the
blatantly present
Japanese
foreground.
talked with the Chief of Police. ...

They

took notes on the names of the schools represented

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

119

on the banners, and seemed very interested in the proceeding, especially when a contingent bearing the banner
of a Mongol and Tibetan School appeared on the scene,
and I observed them scanning the faces of these students
very closely."
After a long parley, the students were promised entrance if they went round to another gate. Reaching this
gate, they were still refused admittance. Here Lo Tsei,
the famous girl leader from Tsinghua, crawled under the
gate, only to be roughly handled by the police and then
carried off as a hostage. After

and the
enter

if

to

police promised
the Tsinghua and

some hours she was

released,

permit the city contingents to

Yenching students would re-

turn to their campuses without reentering the city. The

then "began the long, weary march through the
dark countryside to their campuses, where they arrived
at eleven-thirty." Meanwhile, the police had again refused
entry to the city students. Some two or three thousand of
latter

them at first
and chanted
they

sat

managed

down back

their

to back

on the cold ground

Finally deciding to return,

to enter the city in small contingents. One
slogans.

of these was trapped in a blind alley and brutally set upon

in the darkness by policemen and big-swords; the results
of this affray accounted for most of the serious casualties
of the day. According to figures tabulated by the SelfGovernment Associations of some 25 universities and

middle
this

schools, approximately 6,500 students took part in

demonstration. Forty-six students were arrested or

missing by the end of the day. There were 275 casualties,

of

which 75 represented serious

injuries.

Overnight this movement was projected on a nationwide scale. The same scenes were repeated in all the larger
cities of the country during the last two weeks of December. Besides the port cities of Tientsin, Shanghai,

JAPAN IN CHINA

120

Canton, student protest meetings and

held at Taiyuan, Chengchow, Kaifeng,

Hankow and
parades were

interior
Nanchang, Chengtu, Hsuchow and many other
towns. At Taiyuan, while the students were demonstratof various public organiing in the streets, a mass meeting
zations mapped out plans for a publicity campaign to
to the seriousness of the North China
arouse the

public

University, following the demonstrations in Tientsin, two hundred students, who had

situation.

From Nankai

accommodation to Nanking,
vainly sought free railway
reach the capital but were
to
effort
an
in
foot
on
set out

marched
eventually turned back. Five thousand students
at Nanking on December 18 and over eight thousand on
the following day; at the national capital the student
petitions were
dent of which

tabled with the Executive Yuan, the presiwas Chiang Kai-shek. In the Wuhan cities

the provincial authorities suspended ferry services for

three days but were finally forced to rescind the order,

and a

by well over ten thousand stu21. A mass

the
on
igth eventually
Shanghai

vast demonstration

dents held the streets of

Hankow on December

protest which began at

tied up all railway traffic, as thousands of students took

North Station and demanded transportation

One group of Shanghai students commandeered a train and proceeded nearly to Changchow, about
seventy-five miles short of Nanking; at meetings held in
the towns and villages along the railway, they urged the
people to resist Japanese aggression and force suppression
of the autonomy movements in North China. The sympathetic response evoked by the students alarmed Nanking, and the military authorities destroyed a bridge in
possession of
to Nanking.

order to block the students' approach to the capital.

assassination of

Tang

Yu-jen,

coming

at

The

this juncture,

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

added

to the uneasiness of the authorities. In

an

121

effort to

bring the student agitation under control, the National

Government ordered enforcement of martial law on De-

cember 25 in Nanking, Shanghai and Hankow.

Despite all prohibitions, the student movement continued into the new year. In most of the larger cities of
the country the students efforts to arouse mass resistance
to Japanese aggression proceeded with unabated vigor.
5

On

January 8 the students mauled a gendarme caught

down anti-Japanese posters at the University of

Nanking. The character of the movement, however, was
now changing, and the number of such incidents grew
tearing

more infrequent.

Serious efforts of a fundamental kind

were being undertaken in many centers to undermine

Japan's advance and win the ear of the people. At Canton
and elsewhere the students encouraged a revival of the
boycott of Japanese goods, which official circles had
frowned upon for some years. In Peiping, at the heart
of the movement, student brigades were sent out into
the North China villages during the New Year vacation
on lecture tours, carrying with them thousands of pounds
of leaflets, cartoons and posters loaded on wooden carts.
Early in the new year the government organized a
conference with students and educators, at which it

sought to

convened

make
at

clear

its

The assembly
when Chiang Kai-

foreign policy.

Nanking on January

15,

shek met with 89 university presidents and 78 high school

principals in a lengthy discussion, while the secretarygeneral of the Executive Yuan received some 130 students'
representatives. On the afternoon of the next day Chiang
Kai-shek delivered an address to a combined gathering of
the delegates. At this meeting he took an oath that he
"
would never sign any treaty deleterious to Chinese territorial

and administrative

integrity,

nor any secret agree-

JAPAN IN CHINA

122

ment."

The

student

movement

at this elaborate performance,

in general looked askance

of the

and boycotted many

student representatives who attended. Several such delewere expelled from their
gates, on returning to Peiping,
respective student associations.

By the middle of February fifty-two universities and

middle schools, represented by duly elected Students'
Self-Government Association officers, were members of
the Peiping Students' Union; while twelve other schools
were represented by the chairmen of special National
Salvation Committees. With all the important schools of
Peiping enrolled, the Union had become the general

staff

for nearly 40,000 students in the city. Twenty-eight Tientsin schools were also included in the federated Peiping-

Tientsin

Students'

Union. Every

member

school

was

pledged to support the seven Principles of the Union:

the Japanese-fostered Autonomy Move(1) we are against
ment, which

is

intended to

split

the territory of China;

are against the surrendering and yielding of secret

(2)
diplomacy; (3) we struggle for the absolute freedom of

we

speech, press, assembly and organization in order to start

a movement to save the country; (4) we are against
domestic strife and favor mobilizing the sea, air and land
forces

of the whole

imperialism;

(5)

of

we want

China

to fight
to mobilize and

with Japanese
the people

arm

North China and drive the enemy

to form an organization of
(6)
armed people to lead the Chinese national movement;
we want to confiscate the goods of our enemy and
(7)
the property of traitors for the use of our anti- Japanese
5
campaign. Virtually the same program was supported by
of all

China

to protect

out of China;

the
4

we want

overwhelming majority of students throughout China,

China Weekly Review, January 25, 1936,

China Weekly Review, February 22, 1936,

p. 272.

p. 403-404.

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

123

despite efforts by the school and other authorities to guide

the movement into safer channels.

Police suppression, both in Peiping and other cities,

was rigorously at work. Some ten thousand Peiping police
were mobilized day and night to deal with the activities
of the local students' organization. From the end of January all students caught propagandizing in the parks,
theaters or public places of Peiping were arrested. Strong
Japanese pressure on the Hopei-Chahar Political Council

Communist proclivities
their leaders. Secret night raids

stimulated a continual search for

among ^the students

and

on the dormitories, usually upon information supplied by

the Japanese military, were accompanied by searches of
the premises for incriminating documents. Arrested leaders were normally subjected to gruelling examination for
a week or ten days, in an effort to force them to implicate
their classmates in

As a

leased.

rule,

Communist

activities,

and then

this period, there

re-

were about

during
twenty students being held for investigation at the headquarters prison of the Peiping Bureau of Public Safety.
Special precautions were taken to quarantine the units
of the ZQth Army against the student approaches, but
"fraternization" between the troops and students could
not be prevented, especially as the latter took advantage
of every Sino- Japanese incident in the north to impress
the troops with their mission of defending the country.
Unable to stem the general growth of the protest move-

ment, the National Government issued an emergency law

on February 20, 1936, authorizing Chinese troops and
police to use "force or other effective means" in suppress-

ing meetings, parades and propaganda activities "which

aim to violate peace and order." 6 This law placed the
6

For

March

text,
i,

see

News

1936, p. 1-2.

Bulletin, Society of Friends of China, Shanghai,

JAPAN IN CHINA

124

central authorities in direct opposition to a widespread

deep
popular demand for firmer action against Japan.

chasm had opened up between the government and the

people on this issue.
During these months a series of inconclusive diplomatic
exchanges was taking place between Nanking and Tokyo.
Mr. Ariyoshi, the Japanese Ambassador, who was soon to
retire under fire from the military, had a second interview with General Chiang Kai-shek on December 19, but
without any reported advance in the negotiations on

On December 27 General
Chinese
new
Foreign Minister, submitted a
Chang Chun,
a
"fundamental
readjustment" of
proposal to Tokyo for
Hirota's three-point program.

Sino-Japanese relations, suggesting that negotiations to

that end be conducted through regular diplomatic channels.

Foreign Minister Hirota, in the annual address to

on January sti, 1936, defined his three principles

the Diet

exactly and referred to the

the following terms:

more

new Chinese proposal

in

"The first point is concerned with the basic readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, by which we aim to
bring about the cessation by China of all unfriendly acts
and measures, such as have been hitherto adopted. ... It
would be most regrettable should China resort to unfriendly actions or to her habitual policy of playing off a
third Power against this country, thus undermining the
stability of East Asia ... it is plain that no stability can

ever be attained without the adjustment of relations between Japan, Manchoukuo and China. In the fulfilment
of this purpose lies the second point of our programme.
are convinced that as the first step to a complete and

We

final

adjustment of the relations between Japan, Man-

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

125

choukuo and China, the Chinese Government should

recognize Manchoukuo, and the two countries should
open diplomatic intercourse and harmonize their interThe greatest o all difficulties confronting China
ests.
.

today

is, I

believe,

Communism.

Herein

lies

the third

the desire of the Japanese Government to

with
China in various ways for the eradication
cooperate
of Communism. These, then, are the three points of our
The Chinese Government not only has
programme.
indicated its concurrence with our views, but has pro-

point. It

is

posed recently to open negotiations on Sino-Japanese

rapprochement along these lines stated above. Although,
much to our regret, there are at this moment student
agitations in China which contravene the very spirit of
our programme, it is expected that the present situation
will soon be rectified by the Chinese authorities and an
auspicious atmosphere for the opening of the said negotiations will prevail. The Japanese Government have
communicated their acceptance of the Chinese proposal,
and are awaiting the notice from the Chinese Government of the completion of its preparations. With the

progress of these negotiations we shall be able, I am

confident, to lay the foundation for a thorough readjust-

ment
its

of Sino-Japanese relations."

This explanation of the Hirota program, especially in

explicit demand for recognition of Manchoukuo, went

beyond any definition of the three points thus far

published. As one Chinese writer expressed it, "Summed
up, the three Hirota principles meant practically this:
that China shall recognize the fait accompli in Manchuria, Jehol, Hopei and Chahar, forsake the world, and
far

For complete

636-642.

text, see

Contemporary Japan, Tokyo, March 1936,

p.

JAPAN IN CHINA

ia6

8
cause with Japan against Soviet Russia/'
Hirota's address was also notable for its assertion that the

make common

Chinese government had agreed to enter into negotiations

with Japan for the readjustment of Sino- Japanese relations along the lines of the three principles as he defined
them before the Diet. This assertion resulted in an immediate disclaimer by a Foreign Office statement issued

on January 22

Nanking. After recapitulating the course

of previous negotiations, the statement noted that the
three principles originally presented by Mr. Hirota were
"
defined as follows:
(i) China must abandon her policy
of playing off one foreign country against another; (2)
China must respect the fact of the existence of Manchoukuo; (3) China and Japan must jointly devise effective
measures for preventing the spread of Communism in
regions in the northern part of China." The statement
at

then continued:

"However, these three points were considered by the

Chinese Government as being too vague in their phraseology to serve as a subject for useful discussion. So the
Japanese Government was requested to state the concrete
terms embodied in these points. But up to the present the
Japanese Government have not yet done so. Mr. Hirota's
statement to the effect that China had indicated her
concurrence to these points is therefore entirely without
foundation. On the other hand, General Chang Chun,
shortly after assuming his duties as Minister of Foreign
Affairs, proposed that Sino-Japanese negotiations should
be conducted according to regular procedure and

through

diplomatic channels with a view to the fundamental readjustment of the relations between the two countries.
Now in his speech on Tuesday, Mr. Hirota not only expressed concurrence with General Chang Chun's proposal
'Shuhsi Hsu, The North China Problem,

cited, p. 82.

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

127

but also reiterated Japan's fundamental policy of non-

menace and non-aggression against neighboring countries

in the hope of restoring the relations of the two countries
to normalcy as well as to adjusting their mutual interests.
From this standpoint there seems to be no divergence of
views between the two sides. With this as a starting point
in the negotiations between China and Japan there can
be no doubt that the relations between the two countries
will

be greatly improved/'

In certain Japanese

circles, especially

among

the mili-

this contradiction of Hirota's address to the

tary,

was considered to have

Diet

gloom over the future of SinoAs

relations.
Japanese
apparent reassurance, a semi-official
statement emanating from Nanking on January 26 said
that "concerning Mr. Hirota's three points for the settlecast

ment

of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic situation, it is indicated in Chinese diplomatic circles today that while the
Chinese Government has not accepted them, it has not
10

At the end of January

completely rejected them either/'
Mr. Ariyoshi and Major-General Rensuke Isogai, senior
Japanese military attache, made separate visits to Nanking. They interviewed many officials of the National
Government, including President Lin Sen, General Chiang
Kai-shek and Foreign

Minister

Chang Chun, but no

concrete results emerged from their talks. There seemed

to be considerable divergence of opinion between the two

Japanese

officials as to

the status of affairs at Nanking,

shortly thereafter Mr. Ariyoshi retired from his Ambassadorial post. The military uprising at Tokyo on

and

February 26 put a temporary stop to the Sino-Japanese

These were resumed in the middle of March,

negotiations.
9

For complete

ruary

text, see

Kuo Min

despatch, China Weekly Review, Feb-

i,

1936, p. 297.
^Quoted in "Hirota's

Three Principles

vis-a-vis

China," cited, p.

12.

JAPAN IN CHINA

i8

new Japanese Ambassador, had

Chang Chun. The
be
talks
these
may
judged from the
progress achieved by
following joint communique issued on March 19:

when Mr. Hachiro

Arita,

a series of discussions with General

"With reference
Japanese relations

to the question of readjusting SinoGeneral Chang Chun, Minister for

Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Hachiro Arita, Japanese Ambassador to China, had a series of four talks at the Foreign
Office between March 16 and 19. Each conversation lasted

from two and a half to three hours, nobody else being

present besides the two diplomats. The conversations were
in the nature of an informal exchange of opinions, both
expressing their frank views in a free and sincere manner.
As the object of the parleys was to facilitate satisfactory progress of future negotiation for readjusting Sino-

Japanese relations, no definite procedure had been

arranged nor was the scope of discussion limited to any
particular subjects. All questions concerning the relations

between the two countries were discussed, and no attempt

was made to reach any conclusions. The talks were conducted in a most friendly atmosphere throughout the
four days and ended at four o'clock this afternoon as
previously arranged. Although a complete agreement on
all points has not yet been achieved, the
parleys may be

considered to be very helpful towards producing a better

n
appreciation of each other's viewpoints."

further delay in the negotiations ensued

Arita, after a final interview with

when Mr.

General Chiang Kai-

shek on March 20, left for Tokyo to take up the post of

Foreign Minister in the newly formed Hirota Cabinet. If
Japan's diplomats were finding their path strewn with
certain difficulties, not so the Japanese military in the
north.
11

The

center of the stage, in the spring of 1936,

"Hirota 's Three Principles vis-a-vis China," cited, p.

14.

had

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

129

been taken by a specially fashioned technique o Japanese

penetration smuggling operations organized on a mass
scale., Its advantages were manifold, since it was profitable,
robbed Nanking of much-needed revenue, and struck a
blow at the Western powers. From the beginning, the
demilitarized zone had been the seat of smuggling enterprises of various kinds. Through this area had flowed the
precious stocks of silver coin and bullion in a stream that
was at flood in the middle of 1935. An extensive traffic in
narcotic drugs fostered

by Japanese nationals, especially

had
Koreans,
developed since 1933 in the railway towns
of the zone. Opium and other more deadly narcotic drugs
from Manchoukuo, entering via East Hopei territory, had
spread widely through all the North China provinces.

The

Japanese Concession in Tientsin, particularly after

the establishment of Yin Ju-keng's regime, became perhaps the largest manufacturing and distribution center
for

opium and

its

derivatives in the Far East. 12 Traffic

in narcotic drugs had traditionally enjoyed the benevolent

protection of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, where
it had early sprung up in the Kwantung Leased Territory
and the railway towns within the South Manchuria Rail-

way

zone.

The

transition to protection of a smuggling

which embraced Japanese commodities in general,

especially with the facilities afforded by East Hopei and
out-of-work silver smugglers, was relatively easy.
traffic

To

clear the road for wholesale entrance of

smuggled

goods, it was first necessary to destroy the effectiveness of

the Chinese Customs Preventive Service. 13 The Japanese
military achieved this

end

as the result of a series of steps,

"For details, see "Japanese Concession in Tientsin and the Narcotic

Drug Trade", Information Bulletin, Council of International Affairs,
Nanking, February 11, 1937.
18
For the complete picture, see The Chinese Year Book, 15^6-57,
p. 891-945.

cited,

JAPAN IN CHINA

130

the

which was taken in June 1935 when the Cusalong the Great Wall were disarmed. Some
smugglers had suffered injuries in jumping from a

first

toms
silver

of

officers

city wall to escape arrest, so the

Japanese army authorities

took the logical step of disarming the

Customs men;

this

prohibition was soon enforced throughout the demilitarized zone. On September 9, 1935 the Japanese Garrison
at Chinwangtao informed the local CommisCustoms that machine-guns should be removed
from Customs Preventive Vessels; some days later the
same Japanese Commander demanded that all vessels,
irrespective of armament, should cease to operate within

Commander

sioner of

the three-mile zone along the East Hopei coast. Still later
the Customs vessels sought to apply the right of

when

search within the twelve-mile limit, though outside the

three-mile zone, the Japanese military advised the Cus-

continuance of such action would be

an
act of piracy and treated accordingly. With
considered
Customs officers disarmed on land and sea, in virtually
the whole area between Tientsin and the Wall, the smuggling operations could go on unchallenged. The capstone
to the arch was laid in the spring of 1936, when the East

toms

officers that

Hopei regime began levying dues on the smuggled goods

approximately one-fourth the Chinese national
By this stroke, the illicit goods acquired a
spurious legality, and new revenues flowed into Yin Juat rates

tariff duties.

Tungchow. The measured words of the

annual Customs Report, 14 covering the year 1936, thus
describe the resulting smuggling situation:
"In the report for 1935 reference was made to the
keng's coffers at

The Trade of China, 1936, Introductory Survey, Shanghai, The Maritime Customs, 1937, p. 7-8. For figures from actual Customs returns for
1936 illustrating the decline over 1935 in imports at northern ports of
cotton piece goods, artificial silk floss and yarn, sugar and kerosene, the
principal articles favored by the smugglers, see p. 9-11.

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

151

licence afforded smugglers and the impetus given to smuggling in the eastern part of Hopei, owing to the Customs

having been compelled to comply with demands from

the Japanese military authorities that Customs officers
functioning within the 'demilitarized zone' should not be
permitted to carry fire-arms and that Customs armed vessels should cease to operate within three miles of the coast
included in the 'zone'. These unprecedented restrictions
on normal preventive activities having continued throughout the year under review, it is not surprising that the

smuggling situation in that area has shown no signs of

improvement. Nanlichuang, some two miles from Chinwangtao, and other places on the coast not open to foreign
trade but near to the railway stations of Nantasze, Peitaiho,
Liushowying, and Changli became veritable hives of
smuggling activities, vessels of all kinds, mostly from
Dairen, arriving daily and discharging their illicit cargoes under the guard of numerous Koreans armed with
sticks, stones, etc., and ready to attack any
Customs officers who appeared in the vicinity. The position was aggravated during the early part of the year by
the action of the so-called 'autonomous regime in Eastern
Hopei' which claims jurisdiction over the whole so-called
demilitarized zone in enforcing their own taxation on

iron bars,

goods landed at rates representing only a small

percentage of those of the National Tariff, thus creating
a false impression that the importations were regular, an
argument which those concerned were not slow to use in
the

illicit

defense of their illegal activities. During the earlier stages

smuggling was confined to articles paying high duty rates,

such as artificial silk yarn and sugar, but with the accumulation of stocks of these commodities attention was turned
to other varieties until finally every conceivable kind of
sundry, irrespective of the duty rates, was finding its way

JAPAN IN CHINA

13*

to Tientsin through the open door created in East Hopei;

moreover, arras and ammunition in comparatively small
lots were not excluded from the list. The volume of illicit
goods arriving at Tientsin from the east attained its peak
towards the middle of the year, when it is estimated that
some $2,000,000 per week were escaping the duty account.
"In May there was inaugurated a Customs Chief Inspection Bureau for the Prevention of Smuggling by Rail,
and while the situation in the North did not permit of

the

Customs

functioning

effectively

on

the

Peiping-

Liaoning Railway and thus checking the transport of

illicit goods from East Hopei to the neighborhoods of
Tientsin and Peiping, the establishment of some 17 customs inspection posts on the Tientsin-Pukow, Peiping-

Hankow, Nanking-Shanghai, and Shanghai-Hangchow

had the almost immediate effect of stopping all

lines

shipments of smuggled goods by

rail freight

southwards

from Tientsin. Certain quantities of sugar, artificial silk

yarn, and cigarette paper were, however, transported to
Tsinanfu as passengers' baggage by Korean ronin, who
not only ejected members of tjie travelling public from
passenger coaches in order to provide the necessary space
for their goods but also caused considerable damage to
the coaches themselves

when loading

at Tientsin

and

dis-

charging at Tsinanfu. Attempts by Customs officers to

interfere with these desperadoes resulted in a series of
incidents in which

many of the former suffered severe

was
not until late in July, when overinjuries,
forces
of
armed
Chinese military and railway
whelming
the
boarded
one
of
trains
at the Tientsin Central
police
Station and ejected the Koreans by force and seized their
and

it

goods, that the transport of

illicit

cargo as passengers'

baggage finally ceased. With the closing of railway channels for the distribution of smuggled goods southwards

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

133

and the consequent accumulation of stocks in Tientsin,

the volume of smuggling in East Hopei diminished, and
for a brief spell the situation showed marked signs of
improvement. Towards the end of August, however, further attempts were made to break through the cordon
created by the various preventive measures instituted,

time by road. Motor-trucks loaded with sugar, artificial silk yarn, etc., and escorted by Japanese and numerous Koreans armed with revolvers and less dangerous
weapons, began to make their way from Tientsin southwards towards Shantung. Customs land barriers at points
outside Tientsin were thereupon established with a view
this

to check this

new menace, but

in the face of

armed threats
and adequate

these barriers, lacking the necessary force

protection, were unable to function effectively, with the
result that smugglers availed themselves of this means of

more and more, and illicit goods continued

Shantung in increasing quantities.
"Approximate statistics of illicit goods arriving at
Tientsin by rail from East Hopei during the year are
transportation

to reach

as

follows:

artificial

silk

yarn,

3,994,200 kilogrammes;

897,070 quintals; cigarette paper, 378,600 kilogrammes; kerosene oil, 2,166,600 gallons; piece goods,
78,400 cases (particulars of contents unknown) sundries,
sugar,

220,800 cases (contents unknown) The estimated duty

evaded on the artificial silk yarn, sugar, cigarette paper,
and kerosene oil is in the neighborhood of $30,500,000,
.

and, although particulars of the other goods are unknown

and the duty is therefore difficult to calculate, a figure of

$20,000,000 is conservative, so that the total duty evaded

during the year on goods brought in illicitly through East

Hopei under conditions

of force majeure reached the

of
over
$50,000,000. It is true, of course,
staggering figure
Service been permitted
the
Customs
Preventive
had
that,

JAPAN IN CHINA

134

normal functions and the vast majority

been compelled to follow legitimate channels
paying National Tariff duty rates, the demand for such
goods would not have reached the proportions indicated
by the above figures, and it does not follow, therefore,
that normally the total amount of duty evaded on the
illicit
cargo brought in would have accrued to the
to execute their

of goods

national revenue.

were
from

Be

that as

it

may, the

losses sustained

sufficiently serious to call forth a public statement

Sir Frederick Maze, the Inspector General of Cus-

toms, during the middle part of the year, to the effect

that the orgy of organized smuggling in North China
must necessarily affect the indemnity and loan services

secured on the Customs, and, as Shanghai and the Northern Ports are responsible for 88 per cent of the total
Customs revenue, the question was no longer a purely

domestic one but an international issue. Representations

were made in Tokyo by both the British and American

Ambassadors,

and General Chang Chun, Minister of

Foreign Affairs,

filed several protests

with the Japanese

Government

against Japanese interference with the preventive powers of the Customs in Hopei and connivance
at the

smuggling

activities

of their nationals

enjoying

extraterritorial protection. Other than a decrease in the

volume of goods entering the smuggling area, brought

about by the palliative measures instituted by the Customs to check distribution and by an accumulation of
however, the general smuggling situation in the
North remained unchanged at the close of the year/'
The watchword of Sino-Japanese "economic cooperation" in North China, which came to the front in the
stocks,

summer

of 1936, expressed the positive side of Japan's

economic penetration of the northern provinces. A comprehensive Japanese program designed to secure a monop-

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

North China's economic

oly of

resources,

which

135

will

be

considered later in another connection, 15 underlay this

slogan. Immediate efforts were devoted to strengthening
Japan's political influence over the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, as a prelude to the full execution of the eco-

nomic program. In many respects these efforts appeared

to be meeting with marked success. On the surface, at
measure of the Council's "autonomy" was
steadily increasing. General Sung Che-yuan's appointees,
one after another, took over the major revenue-producing
least,

the

offices,

affecting such items as the consolidated taxes,

salt,

and the Peiping-Mukden Railway. 16 Appointments to the

Council itself added more members of the Anfu clique,
such as Tsao Ju-lin, Li Ssu-hao and Lu Chung-yu, or tools
of the Japanese military, such as Generals Chi Hsiehyuan and Shih Yu-san. Beginning from May 15, 1936,

with the gradual arrival of at

least 5,000 additional troops,

the political leverage exerted by Japan in the PeipingTientsin area was still further increased. These reinforce-

ments brought the North China Garrison up to brigade

strength, or four times larger than the normal effectives
maintained by any foreign power in this region for over
Kanichiro Tashiro, the new garrison
held
the
rank of Lieutenant-General instead
commander,
twenty-five years.

of Major-General, as had been customary. The step was

carried through in the face of a strong protest from the

Chinese government.

Its

nation-wide. In the north

repercussions in China were

it brought the students once

more

into the streets in large

tions,

while in the Southwest

it

and

effective

was taken

demonstra-

as the signal for

a virtual declaration of war on the Central Government.

The
15
16

government's emergency law of February 20, de-

See Chapter V.
See North China Star, February

2,

1936.

JAPAN IN CHINA

136

creed in an effort to bring an end to student agitation,

had given risen to a state of guerrilla warfare between the
various local authorities and the students, especially in

North China. Large-scale police raids on the Peiping university dormitories had resulted in the arrest of numerous
students, some of whom had been detained for months at
a time. 17 Despite a partial crippling of its leadership and
activities, the movement had continued its struggle. In
April a preparatory committee for the organization of an
All-China Students' Union, comprising delegates representing approximately 200,000 students from schools and
universities throughout the country, had met in ShangDuring these months the movement had steadily

hai.

broadened

its

scope,

drawing people of

all

ranks and occu-

pationsteachers, workers, women, journalists, and even

business-meninto National Salvation Associations established in

many

different cities.

This continuous organi-

work culminated in two notable conferences at

Shanghai. On May 29-30 student delegates from twentyone districts, representing organizations from Peiping to
zational

Canton, formally inaugurated the Students' National

Salvation Union. On May 31 sixty delegates, representing

more than fifty national salvation groups, launched the

All-China Federation of National Salvation Unions. The
manifesto issued by this second conference asserted a
belief in "the possibility of consolidating the country/'
even while deploring the continued
hegemony." To break the deadlock it
"

proposals:

put an end

"strife for political

made

the following

(i) that all parties and groups immediately

to civil war; (2) that all parties and groups

17
The student-police warfare in Peiping during the early months of
1936 forms a lengthy story in itself. For details, see the series of articles
appearing under the title "On the Peiping Student Front" in China

Weekly Review, March

215-216;

May

7,

23, p. 440-441;

p.

35-36;

June

March

13, p. 72-73.

21, p.

107-108; April

11, p.

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

137

political prisoners in their custody;

that
all
and
(3)
parties
groups immediately send formal
delegates, through the national salvation front of the peo-

immediately free the

begin joint negotiations, so as to formulate the

joint anti-enemy program and to build a united antienemy political power; (4) that the National Salvation
Front of the People will guarantee with all the force at
its disposal, the faithful fulfilment of the anti-enemy
ple, to

program by any and

all parties

and groups;

(5)

that the

National Salvation Front of the People will with all the

forces at its disposal, use sanctions against any party and
group that violates the joint anti-enemy program, and acts
to weaken the united strength against the enemy." 1S
Even while these meetings were being held, a new crisis

had developed in the north. The Japanese troops added to

the North China Garrison had moved steadily into Tientsin and Peiping during the last two weeks of May. A
crop of incidents, including an explosion at a railway
bridge outside Tientsin, had occurred. The stage was evidently being set for a new series of Japanese demands. On
May 28 several thousand Tientsin students had paraded
the streets, overcome police resistance, presented demands
the Mayor's office, distributed handbills, addressed

at

crowds of people, and held a mass meeting, in protest

against the increase of Japanese troops in North China,

on the Nankai University campus. Spurred by strong Japanese representations, the local Chinese authorities had
clamped down martial law and occupied school and university campuses.

The

Tientsin students then declared a

which spread to Peiping. In this latter city,

the students had taken advantage of a Japanese

five-day strike,

on June
demand
18

2,

for occupation of the

Nanyuan

barracks to send

For complete text of the manifesto, see The Voice of China, Shanghai,
June 15, 1936, p. 7-8, 21-22.

JAPAN IN CHINA

138

delegates to the sgth

Army

units stationed there. Staff

sympathetically received a petition from the students, reminding the officers and men of the sgth Army
of their heroic defense of Hsifengkou pass in 1933 and

officers

urging them to protect China to the last. In reply, the

expressed their approval of the patriotic activities
of the students, and pledged themselves not to disappoint
the masses when the time came. At Shanghai, on May 30,
the delegates who had inaugurated the All-China National Salvation Union proceeded directly to a vast mass
meeting at which the new program was publicly anofficers

nounced. After the meeting, an orderly procession passed

through the International Settlement into battle-scarred
Chapei, where thousands of workers, as well as a number
of policemen, joined the demonstration before the graves
of the martyrs of May 30, 1925. This public demonstration was the first of its kind held legally on May 30 in

Shanghai since 1927.

Early in June, striking into the midst of these events,
that the Southwest was organizing an anti-

came word

Japanese expedition, under command of General Pai

Chung-hsi, and demanding free passage into the north to
fight against Japan. This move was supported by the

powerful military leaders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi

provinces. It had been preceded by a circular telegram
from the Southwest Political Council, issued on May 28,
urging the nation "to oppose to the death the increase of
19
Since the action proJapanese troops in North China."
posed could not possibly receive the sanction of the
National Government, unless the latter were prepared to
declare war on Japan, its immediate effect was to produce
a sharp political crisis involving the threat of serious civil
strife. Announcing their adherence to the national salva14

For

text, see

The

Voice of China,

June

15, 1936, p. 10.

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

139

tion front, the Southwestern authorities sponsored large

anti-Japanese demonstrations, both at Canton and in the

and towns

Kwangsi province; while the northern

expeditionary force was given the title of Anti-Japanese
National Salvation Army. The sudden emergence of this
crisis faced the patriotic movement, organized under the
cities

of

auspices of the National Salvation Unions, with a difficult

problem. It was realized from the first that political animosities

and

differences

between the leaders

at

Nanking

in the Southwest played a part in the situation. On

the other hand, the Southrwest was apparently taking the

and

lead in carrying out the program which the National

Salvation Unions were strenuously advocating. The first
reaction was one of enthusiastic acceptance of this new

In a mass demonstration at Peiping on June 13, for

example, the students put forward a demand that the
ally.

National Government accept the Southwest's anti-Japanese program. 20

During the month which followed, there were times

when

a disastrous civil

war seemed inescapable. General

Chiang Kai-shek rapidly concentrated a large force of

government troops in southern Hunan province, within
striking distance both of Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Meantime the Kuomintang was summoned in plenary session
at Nanking. At its second meeting, held on July 13, the

plenum ordered

abolition of the Southwest Political

ordered
the dismissal of General Chen
Council.
Chi-tang of Kwangtung, and appointed General Yu Hanmou in his place; but Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai
Chung-hsi were confirmed in their Kwangsi posts. The
latter decisions were highly significant, arguing an effort
It also

20
For an account of this highly emotional demonstration, marked by
extreme expressions of support from the public and also from members
and officers of the police, see "On the Student Front in Peiping", China
Weekly Review, June 27, 1936, p. 150-152.

JAPAN IN CHINA

140

Chen Chi-tang from the political scene, while

the
services of Generals Li and PaL This disretaining
tinction was shrewdly calculated to gain popular support.
to eliminate

General Chen Chi-tang was an old-type militarist, mainly

bent on conserving his own interests and political power;
during the spring, he had vigorously attempted to crush
the student movement in Kwangtung province. On the
other hand, Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi
were generally recognized to be capable administrators

and military commanders. They had never enforced the

National Government's emergency law of February 20,
but had allowed the student and national salvation movements virtually free play in Kwangsi province.
At the Kuomintang plenum, twenty-eight members of
the Southwest Political Council had submitted a motion
calling for the immediate launching of an anti-Japanese
expedition. Speaking to this motion, which was rejected
by the plenum on July 13, General Chiang Kai-shek
further clarified the National Government's foreign
Recalling the previous declaration

on

foreign
he sought to define
policy
the point at which the maintenance of peace became
policy.

made

at the Fifth Congress,

hopeless and the necessity for sacrifice inevitable: "What

the Central Government considers to be the absolute

minimum

in foreign relations

is

the maintenance of our

territorial sovereignty intact. If any nation should seek

to violate our territorial sovereignty, it would be abso-

We

shall definitely
lutely impossible for us to endure.
refuse to sign any agreement that violates our territorial
sovereignty, and shall definitely refuse to endure any

actual violation thereof.

To

put

it

more

plainly, if others

should seek to force us to sign an agreement violating our

territorial sovereignty such as that for recognition of the
puppet state, it would be impossible for us to endure any

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

141

longer, it would be time for us to make sacrifices. This is

one point. Next, beginning with the National Congress
in November last year, if our territorial sovereignty is
found violated by others, in the event that all political
and diplomatic means are exhausted and the violation is
still not repelled, it will mean that the fundamental existence of our nation is threatened, it will mean that it is
impossible for us to endure any longer. When that time
comes, we shall not hesitate to make sacrifices. This is
what we mean by the absolute minimum." 21
This statement, no less than the vote on the motion
proposed by the Southwestern members, clearly indicated
that the National Government was still committed to the
maintenance of peace with Japan. Yet its firmer tone suggested that the government did not remain unaffected by

the strong nationalist feelings aroused in the Chinese

public since December 1935. During the month of July
the attitude of the national salvation movement also

changed, and the weight of its attack shifted. With the

Southwestern drive taking on the aspect of an antiNanking expedition, the National Salvation leaders con-

demned

it as a disguised civil war. At the same time, they

directed an equally heavy fire against any attempt by the
Central Government to make the revolt a pretext for dis-

patching a punitive expedition against Kwangtung and

Kwangsi provinces. Though the full aims and proposals of
the national salvation movement as yet mustered only

minority support in the country at large, its attitude on

this question undoubtedly harmonized with general Chinese public opinion. This fact registered an important
advance. From the period of the February emergency law,
which had banned the student movement and ordered its
forcible suppression, the progress of events
21

Quoted

in Shuhsi Hsu,

The North China Problem,

had carried

cited, p. 90-91.

JAPAN IN CHINA

142

to a position of neutrality in an issue vitally affecting

the national government. In this position, moreover, particularly in the condemnation of resort to civil war, it
stood side by side with the overwhelming majority of the
it

public.

The

breach between government and people was

closing.

The

General Chen Chi-tang's power in

Kwangtung province was foreshadowed before the meeting of the Kuomintang plenum at Nanking. General Yu
collapse

of

Han-mou, appointed by the plenum to Chen Chi-tang's

posts, had placed the First Kwangtung Army, of which he
was commander, under control of the Central Government on July 9, when he suddenly arrived at Nanking by
airplane from the Kwangtung border. His example was
soon followed by other Kwangtung military commanders,

number of the Cantonese aviators flew their planes

Nanking on July 10. Accepting the inevitable, Chen
Chi-tang fled from Canton to Hongkong on July 18. The

while a
to

reestablishment of the National Government's authority

in

Kwangtung province, which had been

automatically followed.

lost since 1931,

The

event was a notable step

effects were reinforced, on the

toward political unity. Its

material plane, by the newly completed Canton-Hankow
Railway; and it enabled the application of the government's monetary reforms to Kwangtung province, thus
strengthening China's economic foundations.
The problem of the Kwangsi armies, which still held
the field, remained to be settled. In early September, after
a prolonged crisis, the issues between the Kwangsi leaders
and the Central Government were peaceably adjusted. By
government mandate of September 5, Li Tsung-jen was
appointed Pacification Commissioner for Kwangsi prov-

Chung-hsi was named a member of the

committee
of the Military Affairs Commission,
standing
ince, while Pai

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

143

of which Chiang Kai-shek was chairman. Reconstituted as

the Fifth National Army, the Kwangsi forces were enrolled as national troops under nominal jurisdiction of

the Central Government. The terms of this settlement,

which brought the Kwangsi armies and commanders
closer to Nanking than they had been since 1929, repre-

another considerable advance toward national

unity. The gains thus achieved, both in Kwangsi and
Kwangtung, w^ere noteworthy in one further respect: they
had been won without resort to armed hostilities. This
result could be largely attributed to the gathering strength
of a nationalist public opinion, which henceforth forbade
recourse to civil war in the settlement of internal political
sented

still

differences.

The

student movement, and the patriotic

its outgrowth, had speedily leavened the thought of the Chinese people, had brought into
being a real public opinion, and endowed this public
opinion with a specific political leverage which had made

associations

it

which were

a vital force in national

affairs.

The Kwangtung-Kwangsi

crisis

had

lasted

for

three

months, from June to September. Throughout this period

there had been a marked relaxation of Japanese pressure,
symptomatic of a deferred expectation of Chinese civil
strife which, however, never materialized. Shigeru Kawagoe, the Consul-General at Tientsin w ho had presented
the demands of October 29, 1935 to the North China
authorities, had meanwhile been appointed Japanese Ambassador to China. In elevating this junior official to such
a responsible post, the Foreign Office had deferred to the
insistence of the military at Tokyo, who wished the forthcoming negotiations to be placed in strong hands. After a
brief visit to Nanking early in July, during which he
called on General Chiang Kai-shek, the new Ambassador
had gone to North China to deal with problems relating
r

JAPAN IN CHINA

44

"economic cooperation" in that area.

In mid-September, following the Kwangsi settlement, he
had begun discussions with General Chang Chun, Chito Sino- Japanese

nese Foreign Minister, taking as his point of departure

two incidents in which Japanese nationals had lost their
lives. The Chengtu incident of August 24 had been precipitated by Japan's insistence on opening a consulate at
the Szechuan capital. This move was opposed both locally
and at Nanking on the ground that Chengtu was not a
treaty port; when the attempt was persisted in, two Japanese were killed during the riot which ensued. The
second incident took place at Pakhoi, in southern Kwangtung, where on September 3, a Japanese was the victim in

murder

case. Seizing

upon
demands

these incidents,

Mr. Kawagoe

at Nanking which, in effect,

presented a set of
translated the three principles of Hirota into specific
terms. The demands were carefully formulated by the

Japanese Cabinet and were

solemnly ratified by

the

Emperor.

Ambassador Kawagoe's

discussions with General

Chun began on September

cember 3, when the last of

15

and continued

Chang

until De-

eight successive conferences

was held. During the first two conferences Mr. Kawagoe
seems to have held the floor, while "the Chinese Foreign
Minister listened patiently." 22 The Ambassador's two

major demands called for recognition of Japan's special

position in North China, accompanied by appropriate
measures to give it effect, and organization of a joint SinoJapanese front against Communism. Five so-called minor
demands involved establishment of a Shanghai-Fukuoka
airline, reduction of China's tariffs, control of subversive
activities of

Koreans, employment of Japanese advisers,

and suppression of
22

Shuhsi Hsu,

anti- Japanese activities.

cited, p. 93.

Of

these de-

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

145

mands only the last had any direct relation to the Chengtu
and Pakhoi incidents. At the third conference, held September

23, the Chinese Foreign Minister presented a set

of counter-demands, including suppression of smuggling,

abolition of the East

of

Korean

its

Hopei regime, and control by Japan

Following this meeting, Mr.

nationals.

Kawagoe threatened

to

leave

Nanking

if

the Chinese

authorities "unnecessarily delayed" the readjustment of

Sino- Japanese relations. On the same day unidentified

and killed a Japanese seaman at Shanghai.

naval
vessels thereupon moved to Nanking and
Japanese
Hankow, and fleet reinforcements were sent to Chinese
assailants shot

waters.

On

September 28 Foreign Minister Arita declared

to the foreign press at

large

that

Tokyo

if

the negotiations

and property of the

in
China
could not be left
Japanese population

terminated without result "the

exposed to any further danger.

sary to consider the steps

to

lives

It will therefore be necesbe taken in case of that

China is now at the momentous crosseventuality.

roads, to decide whether or not to shake hands with
.

I very earnestly hope that China will

grasp our
in friendly response, whatever difficulties she may
have to surmount/' 23 Despite these gestures of disap-

Japan.

hand

proval from Tokyo, the negotiations at Nanking were

temporarily suspended. On October 8 Ambassador Ka-

wagoe, in an evident effort to go over the head of the

Foreign Minister, obtained an interview with General

Chiang Kai-shek, but the latter referred him to Chang

Chun for negotiations on concrete issues. Three more
conferences between Mr. Kawagoe and the Chinese Foreign Minister followed on October 19, 21 and 26, but the
deadlock remained unbroken.
During this period the National Government went to
**New York Times, September

28, 1936.

JAPAN IN CHINA

146

great lengths to curb untoward popular manifestations of

in midanti-Japanese sentiment. At the first conferences

September General Chang Chun, in response to Ambassador Kawagoe's expressed apprehension over possible
anti-Japanese disturbances on September 18, anniversary

Mukden, replied that all provincial authorihad been ordered to take stringent precautions. 24
These orders were fulfilled to the letter, even to the
of the fall of
ties

extent of not allowing Chinese flags to be flown at halfmast. Rifle butts of the Chinese police broke up a demonstration at Shanghai; at least thirty persons were injured
and several score arrested. In Peiping and Tientsin police

guards, posted at schools and colleges both before and

after the anniversary, prevented any large-scale demonstrations.

The

government's

stiffer

tone toward Japan, however,

clearly expressed the growing nationalist spirit of the peo-

On

October 12 sixty-six leading Peiping intellectuals

an outspoken manifesto, to which the Foreign
Ministry replied that the principles advocated were in
complete harmony with the fixed policy of the Central
Government. The national salvation movement, especially at Shanghai, was enrolling figures of national prominence under its banner. In his speeches General Chiang
Kai-shek, taking over the slogan of the movement, was
ple.

issued

now
tion.

referring to his task of accomplishing national salvaHis prestige in the country at large was steadily

increasing.

At

this

time he was engaged in a series of

conferences with national and provincial military com-

manders, apparently with an eye to threatening developments in the north, where the Japanese military were
^North-China Daily News, September 17, 1936. On August 29, following the Chengtu incident, the government had issued a second mandate prohibiting "hostile utterances and deeds" tending to stir up international ill-feeling.

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

growing

restive

147

under the continued stalemate in the

Nanking. Beginning with Hangchow, on

were held
at Sian and Loyang. The latter, held on October 31, was
the scene of a celebration in honor of Chiang Kai-shek's
fiftieth birthday. This occasion was also greeted with large

negotiations at

October

16-18, successive military conferences

many centers throughout the country, marked

the
by
presentation to the government of gift airplanes
purchased by funds popularly subscribed. Fifty-five planes
meetings at

were actually presented on this day; an estimated total

of over one hundred planes wr as eventually realized by the
fund-raising campaign. In the course of an address to the
nation from Loyang, General Chiang Kai-shek declared:

"So long

as

we have not recovered our

rights and restored

be free as a people

lost sovereign

our territorial integrity, we will never

nor independent as a nation." 25

The

seventh Chang Chun-Kawagoe conversation took

on
November 10. At its conclusion, the respective
place
views were said to have come closer on several of the issues
under discussion, although no full agreement had been

The negotiations at Nanking were already overshadowed by a renewal of Japan's military pressure in
North China. Several warning signals had been issued in
the north since the middle of September. On September
18 an incident had occurred at Fengtai, strategic railway
junction near Peiping. As reported, the details of this
incident seemed trivial. A Chinese soldier, at the end of
a column which had just passed a Japanese contingent in
a narrow street, slapped the hindquarters of a Japanese
officer's horse. The steps taken were
important. Japan's
forces surrounded the Chinese barracks, exacted an apology, and forced all Chinese units to evacuate Fengtai.
reached.

Japanese troops then moved into the Chinese barracks;

25

China Weekly Review, November

7, 1936, p.

336,

JAPAN IN CHINA

148

henceforth Japan retained military control of the Fengtai

junction. Five weeks later a second premonitory sign appeared. Japanese troop maneuvers, which began on October 25, were of an unprecedented size, ending with a
large-scale

sham

battle

aimed

at the capture of Peiping.

The maneuvers concluded without

incident but not be-

fore the Chinese Foreign Ministry, on October 30, had

lodged a strong protest with the Japanese authorities.
These events occurred in Hopei province; the scene of

now

shifted to Suiyuan.
Following the occupation of

action

North Chahar by JapDecember 1935, me-

anese-sponsored irregular forces in

thodical preparations had been

made

for

further

advance into Suiyuan province. During

period several changes in the political line-up within the two Inner
Mongolian provinces had occurred. By decree of January
25, 1936 the Nanking government had set up a new
Mongolian Political Council, limited mainly to the Suiyuan banners. This move had thrown Te Wang, outthis

standing leader of the Mongolian nationalist movement,

into the hands of Japan, and some of the Chahar Mongols

had been organized as a military unit under Japanese

This force, together with pro-Manchoukuo irLi Shou-hsin, had made a tentative thrust
under
regulars
into eastern Suiyuan in early August, but had been
direction.

repulsed by General Fu Tso-yi's provincial troops. After

this setback, additional Chahar forces had been mobilized

and supplied with arms and equipment from Japanese

sources. In mid-November they returned to the attack.

Though aided by Japanese

planes, the initial assaults in

eastern Suiyuan were again thrown back. General Fu
Tso-yi's troops then took the offensive; Pailingmiao, a

base of operations for the invaders in north Suiyuan, was

captured on November 24. Prior to this counter-attack,

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

149

mutinies among the Mongolian-Manchurian irregulars

near Pailingmiao had cost the lives of several Japanese

Although the military phases of this struggle in

Suiyuan were relatively insignificant, the effects upon
China were profound. The defense of Suiyuan became a
rallying cry which stirred the patriotism of the whole
officers.

country. In this issue China's newly developed nationalism found its first complete expression, and received a

One further point was

Japan's Mongolian and Manchurian allies,

powerful additional stimulus.

made

clear:

even though staffed by Japanese officers and equipped

with Japanese supplies, were neither reliable nor strong
enough to complete the conquest of Inner Mongolia. To
accomplish this task, an invasion in force by Japanese
troops would be required.
The Sino-Japanese negotiations were concluded on
December 3, when a final conference took place at Nanking. At this meeting the Chinese Foreign Minister "first
lodged a protest with Mr. Kawagoe against the landing of
Japanese blue-jackets at Tsingtao and their subsequent
raiding of the Kuomintang offices" events that had followed disturbances in connection with a strike of the

workers in Japanese-owned mills. General Chang Chun

then "reported on the facts gathered by investigation of
the Suiyuan situation" and requested that "the Japanese
government should promptly suppress the participation
of Japanese military

and

civilians in the

Suiyuan

affair." 26

The Japanese Ambassador, in an effort to commit Chang

Chun on the issues under negotiation, next read a memorandum purporting

latter,

on which
however, drew

attention to certain inaccuracies in the

memorandum;

to

detail

the

agreement had been reached. The

28

From

official

points

statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, quoted

in Shuhsi Hsu, cited, p. 95-99.

JAPAN IN CHINA

150

when

document was later sent to the Chinese Foreign

was formally rejected in a note addressed to the
Japanese Embassy. At the end of December the Chengtu
and Pakhoi incidents were settled by the normal methods
the

Office, it

of apology

and reparation.

Further details as to the course of these momentous

negotiations were supplied in a semi-official Chinese
statement issued on December 8 by the Central News
7

Agency? Taking note of Japanese reports that agreement in principle had been reached on five questions
under discussion, this statement claimed that the true
attitude of the Chinese government on these issues was as
follows:
"
(i)

The

discussions of direct China- Japan air traffic

were confined

to the question of the linking of

Shanghai

and Fukuoka by a civil air line. This question was first

brought up by Japan even before September 18, 1931.
Last year, the ministries of Communications of Japan and
China, after several discussions, reached a draft agreement, based on the principles of equality and reciprocity.
Unfortunately, since last winter, Japanese airplanes have
been freely flying over North China without going

through the legitimate procedure of obtaining the consent of the Chinese Government. Such illegal flights are
a violation of China's sovereignty.
ment maintains that before a stop

The

Chinese Govern-

is put to these illegal

be extremely difficult to proceed with further discussions to link Shanghai and Fukuoka by a civil
air line. The Chinese Government has not modified this

flights, it will

attitude.
(2)

Revision of China's import tariff is China's domesThe tariff may be readjusted at any time as

tic affair.

required by national financial and commercial conditions.

^Shuhsi Hsu,

cited,

Appendix B,

p. 110-112.

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

151

But when tariff readjustment is being studied the Chinese

Government regards the suppression of smuggling and
freedom of the Chinese Customs Preventive Service as
questions to be first considered.
In connection with the question of suppressing
(3)
unlawful activities of Koreans, it is pointed out that the
Chinese Government naturally does not like to see illegal

committed on Chinese soil by nationals of whatever

should
foreign country. But the Japanese Government
also suppress unlawful activities, committed under its protection by Koreans, Formosans and other subjects of

acts

Japan.

On

the question of employing Japanese advisers,

pointed out that the employment of foreign advisers
the Chinese Government depends upon the require-

(4)
it is

by

ment

of the

Government and

those to be employed.

The

the technical ability of

question of nationality does

not enter. Should Sino-Japanese relations have taken a

turn for the better, it would not be impossible for China,
on her own initiative, to employ Japanese technicians as
the
experts. But this is not a matter which can be made
subject of a

demand by

a foreign government.

so-called
(5) Referring to the question of suppressing
in
the
GovernChinese
China,
anti-Japanese activities

ment has repeatedly

issued orders to the people stressing

the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with foreign nations. These orders have been strictly carried out

by the

local authorities.

While the Chinese Government

will continue to suppress illegal acts according to law,

cognizance must also be taken of the fact that there must

be a cause which excites the sentiments of the masses. If

Japan can change her policy toward China and really
cooperate with her with sincerity, then all the so-called
anti- Japanese activities will completely disappear

and a

JAPAN IN CHINA

152

sincere

friendship will

always

exist

between the two

peoples."
This statement omits consideration of the two

main
demands relating to Japan's special position in North
China and a joint front against Communism. Even in

was generally admitted that General

these demands. Mr. Kato have strengthened
seems
however,
wagoe's pressure,
to suppress antidetermination
the Central Government's
Japanese activities and the Chinese Communists by its
Japanese

circles, it

Chang Chun had turned down

own

efforts.

On November

23, for

example, seven

officers

of the All-China National Salvation Association, all of

whom

were prominent national figures, were arrested at

Shanghai under charges of violating the February 20
emergency law. Those arrested included Shen Chung-ju,
dean of the Shanghai Law College; Chang Nai-chi, noted
economist and former vice-president of the Chekiang
Industrial Bank; Li Kung-po, a school president; Sa

Chien-li, lawyer; Wang Tsao-shih, professor of political

science in Kwang Hua University; Sze Liang, a woman
lawyer; and Tsou Tao-fen, well-known writer and editor.

This cause celebre dragged on for many months, attracting both national and international attention and casting
doubt on the sincerity of the National Government's
patriotic

and

nationalist pronouncements.

No

less signifi-

cant was a speech delivered by General Chiang Kai-shek

at Loyang on November i, 1936 in which he declared
that all traitors should be eliminated, "especially the
Communists." 28 This declaration presaged a determined
attempt to renew the anti-Communist campaign. It was
clear that, in the

demand
88

for

mind

an end to

of the Generalissimo, the popular

civil strife

China Weekly Review, November

7,

was not taken to include

1936, p. 336.

THE REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

153

surcease to warfare with the Communists, on which Nanking had squandered enormous resources since 1930 with-

out achieving final success. Chiang's adherence to this

fixed idea was to usher in the most crucial phase of
China's recent political evolution.

CHAPTER FIVE

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

THE

drama enacted at Sian during the fortnight

before Christmas 1936 seemed, for the moment, to shatter
the prospects for national consolidation. Strands from ten
years of China's political history were woven into the
crisis precipitated by the arrest of Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek on

December

12,

1Q36.

It

climaxed the

five

years of exile suffered by General Chang Hsueh-liang,

the Young Marshal of Manchuria, and his Northeastern

The

protracted struggle between the Nanking

government and the Chinese Communists, which began
with the split between the right and left wings of the
troops.

Kuomintang

in 1927, was central to the story. Finally, the

for unity in the face of Japanese aggres-

popular demand

an end

between rival Chinese

brought the whole issue into direct relation with
the burning problems of contemporary political development. Unpromising though the Sian coup appeared at the
sion, for

to the civil strife

factions,

eventual results placed the finishing touches on

China's newly reared structure of political unity.
time,

its

During the year which preceded the Sian events, the

Chinese Communist forces had completed their "Long
March" from Kiangsi province
1

via

Szechuan into the

For a notable first-hand account of the events of the Sian coup and
the issues at stake, see James M. Bertram, First Act in China, New York,
The Viking Press, 1938; see also Red Star Over China, cited, Part Twelve,
chapters

1-5.

"54

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

autumn of 1936 the
armies had entered Shensi. For the

northwest. In the

Red

155

last of
first

the

of the outstanding Communist leaders

joined forces in one contiguous belt of territory.
history,

all

main

time in their

had

The

remarkable fighting ability, tactics and generalship, which

had accomplished the march through sections of eight
provinces against bitter opposition from central and
provincial troops, had again testified to the disciplined
morale of the Communist armies and added new prestige
the almost legendary names of their commanders.
These men had established a new Soviet area in the northwest, embracing northern Shensi and parts of Kansu and
to

Ninghsia provinces. Though sparsely populated, it was

far larger than the former central Kiangsi-Fukien base
and even better adapted for defensive warfare. Much
in the minds of the Communist leaders,
was within striking distance of the advancing Japanese
forces in North China. The center of gravity of their
policy had shifted from immediate prosecution of social
revolution to the achievement of a united national front

more important,
it

against the invader. In its manifesto of August 31, 1935,

the Chinese Communist Party laid chief stress on the

organization of a united anti-Japanese army and a national defense government. As the general platform for

such a government, it proposed the following points: (i)

resistance to Japanese invasion and the recovery of lost
territories; (2) confiscation of all properties of Japanese
imperialists in China to finance the war against Japanese
invasion; (3) confiscation of all properties, stored food

and land owned by Chinese traitors and agents of Japan,

to be used by the poor countrymen and anti- Japanese
fighters; (4) abolition of onerous taxes and fees, reorganization of finance and currency, and development of industry, agriculture and commerce; (5) increase of sal-

JAPAN IN CHINA

156

soldiers' pay, and improvement of the

of workers, peasants, soldiers, students
conditions
living
and teachers; (6) exercise of full democratic rights, and

wages and

aries,

release of all political prisoners; (7) free education and

provision of jobs for the unemployed youth; (8) equality
for all nationalities in Chinese territory, and protection
life, property and freedom of residence and busi-

of the

Chinese emigrants; (9) union with all antiimperialist elements the toiling people of Japan, Korea,
Formosa and other oppressed nations as China's allies;
union with all nations which are sympathetic to the liberation movement of the Chinese nation, and establishment of friendly relations with those nations which
maintain good-will and a neutral attitude toward this
ness

of

movement. 2 Many features of this declaration, far removed though it was from a challenge to the conservatives, were by no means acceptable to the dominant
groups at Nanking. Indeed, the Nanking government was
not even mentioned as one of the constituent elements of
the proposed national defense organ.
By the spring of 1936, however, Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Communist party's Central Executive Committee, no longer excluded the possibility of an
with the Nanking authorities, provided only that
evidence of determination to struggle against
aggression. At this time Mao declared: "The

armistice

they gave

Japanese

war

still

raging in the interior of China is what is called the 'war

of extermination' against Communism conducted by

Chiang Kai-shek with all the military forces at his disposal.

The Red Army, at the command of our people, is the
only resolute and courageous body of troops struggling
against Japanese imperialism. It goes without saying that
we shall never allow Chiang Kai-shek to lay a finger on
2

For

full text, see

China Today, December 1935, p. 58-59.

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

157

it. ... I
solemnly declare here, in the name of the Chinese
Soviet Government, that if Chiang Kai-shek's army or any
other army ceases hostilities against the Red Army, then
the Chinese Soviet Government will immediately order

the

Red Army

to stop military action against them. .

really means to take up the struggle
.

Chiang Kai-shek

If

against Japan, then obviously the Soviet government will

field of battle

extend to him the hand of friendship on the

3

In August 1936 this evolution was caragainst Japan."

ried one step further by a manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party which
offered to conclude a united front agreement with the
Nanking government based on the premise of resistance
to Japan.

The

was implemented by proposals to

offer

moderate the internal program of the Communist Party

along lines which would call a halt to the seizure of the
property of landlords and merchants and enable them,
on giving evidence of allegiance to the anti-Japanese
front, to play a full part in the

economic and

political

of the Soviet regions.

None of these proposals was accorded serious consideration by the Nanking authorities, who continued to
life

adhere to the policy of "extermination of the Communist

bandits'*

which had been rigorously pursued since 1927.

Prosecution of the anti-Communist campaign rested at

this time in the hands of General
Chang Hsueh-liang,

Commander-in-Chief of the Northwestern Bandit-Sup3a

pression Forces. The bulk of the Tungpei
troops was
concentrated under his command at Sian; another Manchurian force, the sist Army under General Yu Hsueh3

Interviews by Mao Tse-tung

London, March 14, 1936.

et

al.,

International Press Correspondence,

3a

Tungpei, i.e., Northeastern, from the Northeastern provinces or

Manchuria, is the name by which Chang Hsueh-liang's troops are known
all

over China.

The word

is

pronounced "doong-bay."

JAPAN IN CHINA

158
4

was stationed further west at Lanchow, capital

Kansu province. The Northeastern, or Tungpei, troops
in the neighborhood of Sian and Lanchow numbered
approximately 130,000 men; they were further assisted
by some 40,000 local troops under command of General
Yang Hu-cheng, Pacification Commissioner of Shensi
province. These forces were located mainly in the central
and southern areas of Shensi and Kansu provinces, with
the Communist armies holding sections in the north.
General Chang Hsueh-liang had originally been transferred to his post at Sian in October 1935. Even before
his transfer, he had begun to entertain doubts as to the
wisdom of the Central Government's temporizing policy
toward Japan. These doubts were much more sharply
formulated by the rank and file of the Tungpei troops,
who had grown weary of the round of internecine warfare, during which they had fought against the Communists in several provinces, and asked only to be led
chung,
of

against the Japanese aggressors so that they could "fight

back to their homeland" in Manchuria. Nevertheless, on
arrival in Sian, General

Chang had immediately

initiated

against the Communist forces in

northern Shensi. Two of his crack divisions, won over by
offensive

operations

and anti- Japanese propaganda, had deserted

en masse to the Communists. The campaign continued,
but with ever diminishing momentum. Gradually a truce
nationalist

was established. By the autumn of 1936 the Tungpei

armies and the Communists were virtually cooperating
on a common program, in which each recognized the
other as a component element of an anti-Japanese front.
This result had come about so gradually and naturally
that it was not recognized in the country at
large, nor
*

The same which had been

of the

Ho-Umetsu agreement

in

driven from Hopei province under terms

June 1935. See Chapter II.

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

159

even fully appreciated at military headquarters in Nanking. Contact with the Communist armies had convinced
the Northeastern troops and leaders that they were dealing with a force as anti-Japanese as themselves. Tungpei
officers and men, captured by the Communists, had been
released and permitted to return to Sian, where they had
given glowing accounts of the discipline, morale and anti-

spirit animating the Soviet organization.

of
group
young Northeastern officers, revolving around a
newly established Military Academy near Sian, had in-

Japanese

creasingly

won

the ear of General

These "Tungpei

Chang Hsueh-liang.

were determined to call a halt

to civil warfare, so that all Chinese guns, as the slogan
ran, could be turned outward against the common enemy.
Chang Hsueh-liang himself met and talked with Chou
En-lai, one of the Communist leaders, in June 1936 at
Sian. 5 Throughout this year he pleaded with Chiang Kaishek for active resistance to Japan. To urge his case, he
made two special trips to Nanking, where he canvassed
the views of all groups, some of which were sympathetic
to his proposals. The Generalissimo turned a deaf ear
radicals'*

to these pleas, insisting that the time for action against

Japan had not yet arrived and that meanwhile the Com-

munists had to be exterminated.

One

Marshal's transfer, the nationalist forces that had been germinating at Sian came

year after the

Young

out into the open. On September 18, 1936, despite the

ban placed on such actions by the central authorities, an
enthusiastic demonstration followed by a mass meeting of
some 12,000 people was held in the Shensi capital. In
answer to a petition demanding immediate mobilization
of the Northeastern troops against Japan, General Chang
Hsueh-liang delivered a passionate speech to the assembly.
6

See Bertram, First Act in China, cited, p. 106.

JAPAN IN CHINA

160

After that day the city was covered with slogans. Some of
these, such as "only by resisting Japan can the real unification of China be manifested," ran directly counter to
the Central Government's slogan of "unification before

On

October 4 a Northeastern Peoples' Nawas formally inaugurated at

charter membership of two hundred included

resistance."

tional Salvation Association

Sian. Its

Tungpei

officers

and

soldiers, as well as local officials, stu-

dents and representatives of the professions. 6 Undergirding this organization was a coalition of students and the

young officers. Part of the old Northeastern University at

Mukden, which had been transferred to Peiping in 1931,
was now moved to Sian. In addition, several hundred
picked students from Peiping had formed a special political training school under command of Colonel Sun Mingchiu,

one of the leading "Tungpei radicals."

The

senti-

ment
was

of these groups, as well as of the Tungpei soldiers,

fanned to white heat by the invasion of Suiyuan. Six

large patriotic demonstrations were held at Sian between

September 18 and December 9, the period during which
the show-down that led to the coup was maturing.

No effort was made to hide from the central authorities

what was taking place in Sian. Long before these crucial
months, General Chang Hsueh-liang had gone straight to
Nanking with his proposals as to policy and program.
in late October, he despatched urgent telegrams to
General Chiang Kai-shek and General Chen Cheng, a

Now,

leading central commander, asking not only for military

Japan but also for a united front to include

resistance to

the

Red

armies. General Chiang Kai-shek was already

engaged in the series of military conferences summoned

to deal with the emergency in Suiyuan. In the conferences
at Sian
e

and Loyang, held during the

For these

details, see

last

days of October,

China Weekly Review, October

24, 1936, p. 272.

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

161

General Chiang delivered a categorical refusal to the

requests of the
at
"

both

cities

Young Marshal. Chiang's public addresses

still listed the Communists among the

that had to be exterminated. His attitude

toward Chang Hsueh-liang was somewhat like that of a
father toward a wayward son. The latter continued to
traitors"

obey the orders of the Generalissimo, despite Chiang Kaishek's declaration before the Military Academy at Sian
to the effect that the Communists, and not the Japanese,

were the nearest and most dangerous enemy. This speech

precipitated a near revolt of the young Tungpei officers,
which Chang Hsueh-liang managed to control only with
considerable difficulty.
General Chiang Kai-shek had sent no airplanes and few
central troops to Suiyuan; the latter did not participate
in the actual fighting. Instead, three divisions of the crack
First Army under General
Tsung-nan, the Generalis-

Hu

simo's trusted subordinate, were moved into Kansu to

initiate the anti-Communist campaign. This action repre-

sented a sharp rebuff to Chang Hsueh-liang, who, however, accepted it calmly and merely advised General Hu
of the dangers attending an offensive against the Com-

munist armies. The First Army advanced warily into

Kansu for three weeks until November 18, covering some
twenty-five miles without encountering the enemy. On
this day, and again on November 21, the Red forces swept
down on the Nanking troops. Two brigades of Hu's army,
with all their equipment, were captured and disarmed;
some of the captives, after receiving a lecture about fighting Chinese during a national emergency, were sent back
to tell their fellow-soldiers what they had learned. The
First Army had meanwhile beat a hasty retreat to its
starting-point,

days.

this

time covering the distance in three

JAPAN IN CHINA

i6s>

The outcome of this affair offered Chang Hsueh-liang

new opportunity to press his views upon the central

On November

27 he sent a letter to the Generalissimo at Loyang, which presented his case in these
terms: "Nearly one month has elapsed since I last saw

authorities.

Your Excellency. Knowing that Your Excellency had personally gone to Shansi and Shantung to give instructions
at these respective places, I was deeply moved by Your
Excellency's undaunted spirit of devotion to the affairs
of the country. The situation in Eastern Suiyuan becomes
For the period of nearly half
more and more critical.
a year, I have continuously laid before Your Excellency
my principle and program of struggle against Japanese
Now the war
imperialism for national salvation.
.

against Japanese imperialism is beginning. ... I have

therefore waited patiently for Your Excellency's order of
mobilization. To my greatest disappointment, I have so
far received no such order at all. ... Pressed by the zeal-

ous sentiments of

my

and urged on by

my personal
ventured to present my recent appeal, but
Your Excellency instructed me to wait for an opportunity.
Since then I have ordered my troops to wait patiently,
convictions,

troops

although their desire to fight against Japanese imperialism was already flaming. ... In order to control our
troops, we should keep our promise to them that whenever the chance comes they should be allowed to carry
out their desire of fighting against the enemy. Otherwise,
they will regard not only myself but also Your Excellency
as impostors,

and

will

no longer obey

us.

Now

is

exactly
the right time. Please give us the order to mobilize at
least a part, if not the whole, of the Tungpei Army to

march immediately

who

to

Suiyuan

as

reinforcements to those

are fulfilling their sacred mission of fighting Japanese

imperialism. If so, I as well as my troops numbering more

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

163

than a hundred thousand will follow Your Excellency's

7
In reply to this virtual ultileadership to the end/'
matum, General Chiang Kai-shek asked the Young Marshal to meet him at Loyang. At this conference the
Generalissimo again waved aside Chang Hsueh-liang's
to visit Sian to talk with the
proposals, but agreed

Tungpei commanders.
Affairs had now reached the breaking point. Within
Shensi an open rift had developed between the military
commanders and the officials representing the central
authorities. Of these latter, the civil governor, Shao Lihe
tzu, was the most important, but for military support
The
force.
could count only upon a small police
Tungpei
Yu
General
under
the
of
Hsueh-chung
Army
gist
troops
in Kansu province were of one mind with those under
HuHsueh-liang in Shensi. When General Yang

Chang

the 40,000 local Shensi troops, openly

the Tungpei program, the civil
with
affiliated himself
authorities were powerless. They possessed only one well-

cheng,

commanding

the special gendarmerie controlled by the

Blue Shirts, a secret terrorist organization which had
been active throughout China in suppressing movements
tried

weapon

deemed

hostile to the Central

Government. In the

cir-

cumstances prevailing at Sian, the activities of this organ,

while annoying, could not affect the balance of power

and merely added

fuel to the

fire.

Blue Shirt

efforts to

movement in Shensi had

disrupt the national salvation
led to a series of incidents. In one case, word was brought
to Chang Hsueh-liang that three student delegates from
North China had been kidnaped and were being held
at the local

Kuomintang headquarters

in Sian. In answer

at the

to telephoned inquiries, the people

headquarters
of such students. That
knew
that
nothing
they
replied
.

From

text released at Sian

on January

2,

after the revolt.

JAPAN IN CHINA

164

Chang posted troops around the building;

were
refused admittance, they broke through
they
the doors and found the students imprisoned inside. The
Blue Shirts in the place were arrested and deported from

night General

when

Sian.

Following his conference with the Young Marshal at

Loyang, General Chiang Kai-shek prepared to deal with
the Shensi problem in his usual decisive fashion. For

and military equipment had

accumulated in great quantities along the Lunghai Railway in the neighborhood of Loyang. Ostensibly these supplies were for use on the Suiyuan front; in reality, they
were ear-marked for a renewal of the anti-Communist
campaign on a grand scale. On December 4 the Generalissimo and his staff arrived at Sian. With him came eighty
some time

stores of supplies

bombing planes, presented to Nanking only a month before on the occasion of Chiang Kai-shek's birthday. None
of these planes had been sent to Suiyuan, but their presence at the Sian airfield was symbolic. Obviously the
Generalissimo had come to give orders to the Tungpei

commanders, and not to listen to their proposals. Though

prepared to meet with some difficulty, he had underestimated the explosive possibilities of the situation at Sian.
He has himself written: ''My opinion was that the foundation for national unity had already been laid; that the
Northeastern troops under conditions created by our national crisis, might have [been] given occasion for the
expression of unorthodox views, but that if they were
given sound and earnest advice they would realize the
importance of our national interests and all as one man
would submit to authority." 8 With his bodyguard, someStan: A Coup D'Etat, by Mayling Soong Chiang; A
Fortnight in Sian:
Extracts from a Diary, by Chiang Kai-shek, Shanghai, The China Pub9

lishing

Company,

1937, p. 54.

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

what enlarged but

all

told less than a

165

hundred men, and

a few of his close associates, Chiang Kai-shek was accommodated at temple quarters near Lintung, twelve miles

from Sian. The greater part of his staff, accompanied by

one or two other important military commanders, stayed
within the city at the Sian Guest House, a newly constructed

modern

hotel.

The meetings which began

December 4
diary: "There I

after

are thus

described in Chiang Kai-shek's

sent for
the Commanders of the bandit suppression troops in
Shensi and Kansu and received them one by one on a

number

of successive days. I inquired about the condiand gave them my orders. I told them

tions at the front

campaign had been proseit would require only the

that the bandit suppression

cuted to such a stage that

minutes' to achieve the final success.

perform their duty with courage and
What the Tungpei commanders them-

efforts of 'the last five

urged them

to

determination." 9
selves said the diary does not

state. It is known, however,

all
and
that they one
protested that they wanted to fight
back to Manchuria, that they could not go on killing

their

own

'

people.

10

On

this

clear issue

of policy,

the

Generalissimo found that the

Young Marshal and Generals Yu Hsueh-chung and Yang Hu-cheng were as inflexible as any of the subordinate commanders. They wanted
orders to fight Japan; General Chiang Kai-shek insisted
that their duty was to suppress the Communists.

The

feeling in Sian, which already ran high, was not

improved by an incident that occurred on December 9,

anniversary of the

first

big student demonstration in

Peiping. Thousands of students, some from the university

but tnany more from middle schools, paraded the streets
9

Sian:

10

A Coup

D'Etat,

etc., cited, p.

54-55.

Bertram, First Act in China, cited, p.

114.

JAPAN IN CHINA

166

and demanded

that reinforcements be sent to the

Suiyuan
them
received
Shao
Li-tzu,
governor,
with smooth words; meanwhile, he had given orders to
front.

The

civil

the police to suppress the students by force,

if it

proved
demonstration at this moment, with the city
and environs filled with central government officers, was
as awkward to the Northeastern commanders as to Shao
Li-tzu. The students sought to have their petition received by the local military commandants, but Chang
Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng were both out. Chafing
at these failures, they decided to march out to see General
necessary.

Chiang Kai-shek at Lintung. The police authorities became alarmed, and a police unit fired on the marching
line while it was still inside the city; two middle school
students, twelve and thirteen years of age, were seriously
wounded. Several thousand students, their determination
strengthened by this attack, broke through the gate and
started the march to Lintung. Only the personal interven,

tion of Marshal
faction to their

Chang Hsueh-liang, who pledged satisdemands within a week, turned them

back.

The
hand.

Generalissimo chose this

On December

10, for the

moment
first

to

show

his

time, there was a

combined meeting of the leading military officers on both

sides. The old arguments were repeated, with no better
than before. General Chiang Kai-shek thereupon
presented his ultimatum. He was determined to proceed
with the anti-Communist campaign. Since Chang Hsuehliang would not prosecute these operations, he would have
to be replaced by General Chiang Ting-wen, Pacification
results

Commissioner

for -Fukien.

The

latter officer

had accom-

panied the Generalissimo's party to Sian; an official order

installing him in the post of Commander-in-Chief of the

Northwestern Bandit Suppression Forces had, in

fact,

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

167

This order was now shown to GenChang Hsueh-liang. The Tungpei troops, he was
told, were to be transferred to the south, even further
away from the anti-Japanese front in Suiyuan; the Central Government, moreover, was issuing orders on December 1 2 for general resumption of the anti-Communist

been already

issued.

11

eral

operations. At Nanking the Executive Yuan actually did

issue orders to this effect on December 12 to twelve
12
Not until some hours later did
provincial governments.
the Nanking authorities learn that the Generalissimo was

a prisoner at Sian.

Chiang's ultimatum, in

effect,

gave the Northeastern

commanders and General Yang Hu-cheng two days

come to terms. Their decision was taken on December

to
1 1

night conference attended by the leading commanders and several of the younger Tungpei officers,
a

at

The coup was carried into effect early

the
on
following morning. Colonel Sun Ming-chiu, with
part of a special regiment which included a number of
thirteen in

all.

13

the Peiping students, was entrusted with the task of capturing the Generalissimo alive. The bodyguard at the

Lintung temple was taken by surprise and quickly overwhelmed. Chiang Hsiao-hsien, a nephew of Chiang Kaishek and well-known Blue Shirt leader, was shot down
out of hand when discovered. The Generalissimo could
not at first be found, but was shortly discovered on the
mountain-side behind the temple and brought back to
Sian. In the city Yang Hu-cheng's men had occupied the
Guest House and captured all of Chiang's retinue, as well
as Shao Li-tzu, the Shensi governor. They had additionally

taken over the police stations, the Blue Shirt head-

11

See Sian:

13

New

13

A Coup

D'Etat,

etc., cited, p. 117.

York Times, December 14, 1936.

Bertram, First Act in China, cited, p. 115-116.

JAPAN IN CHINA

i68

cells, and the bombing planes at the

In
Yu Hsueh-chung's troops simiGeneral
Kansu
airport.
of
took
control
Lanchow, disarming a brigade of
larly

quarters and secret

Hu

in the process.
Responsibility for these acts rested squarely on the
shoulders of the ranking commanders in the northwest.

Tsung-nan's First

Army

Their actions were motivated by an effort to effect a

change in national policy which, they believed, was supported by majority opinion. Under the conditions in
China, the difference of views that reached its climax in
Sian on December 12 could be settled through no pacific
democratic medium. After months of rebuff, capped by
dismissal from their posts, Chang Hsueh-liang and his
associates had, in their

own

phrase, offered the Generalis-

simo "advice by military force/* Their objectives were

expressed in the following eight points: (i) reorganization of the Nanking government in such a way that all

might share the joint responsibility of saving the

nation; (2) cessation of all civil war; (3) immediate reparties

lease

of the

patriotic,

i.e.,

National Salvation, leaders

arrested at Shanghai; (4) release of all political prisoners

throughout the country; (5) removal of all restrictions
patriotic movement of the people; (6) safeguardof
the
people's freedom to organize and call meetings;
ing
(7) effectual realization of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's last testa-

on the

ment; (8) immediate convocation of a National Salvation

Conference. This program was smothered by the Nanking
press censorship, and never appeared before the country
at large in complete form. The eight points, as generally
reported, were vulgarized into demands for an immediate

on Japan and an alliance with the

Communists. Even more unfairly, Chang Hsueh-liang was

declaration of war

alternately painted as a villain seeking greater political

power, huge monetary bribes, or better treatment for his

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

169

background of misrepresentation, the

facing accomplishment of the ends
practical
the
envisaged by
coup were greatly increased. The Gentroops. Against this

difficulties

not unnaturally, refused to treat with the

rebels. At Nanking the military machine, in the hands of
General Ho Ying-chin, insisted on a punitive expedition
against the northwest irrespective of the possible danger
eralissimo,

14
Chiang Kai-shek. The message despatched to Wang
Ching-wei inviting him to return at once from Europe
to Nanking smacked suspiciously of an effort to reorganize
the government on the basis of an anti-Chiang coalition.
Throughout the two weeks of General Chiang's captivity,
it seemed not unlikely that the conservatives at Nanking
might precipitate a disastrous civil war the very thing
which the coup had aimed to prevent.

to

The

position of the Communist leaders during this

was
of crucial importance. They had taken no
period
in
the
planning or execution of the coup, which was
part
the
work
of Chang Hsueh-liang and his associates.
solely
On the other hand, once the step had been taken, alluring
possibilities opened up before the Red commanders. They
had already established a basis of working cooperation
with the forces in Shensi and Kansu under Generals

Hsueh-liang, Yu Hsueh-chung, and Yang Hucheng. Under conditions created by the coup, this cooperation might be cemented into a firm alliance which

Chang

would muster 300,000 troops and dominate the northwest.

Other

Kwangsi, could possibly be mobilized

in support of the eight-point platform; with the Generalissimo held captive, the conservatives at Nanking
forces, say in

might be isolated and the Central Government remodeled

on the basis of the liberal program. Inviting though these
14

See

Madame Chiang

cited, p. 5-9.

Kai-shek's comments, Sian:

A Coup

D'Etat>

etc.,

JAPAN IN CHINA

170

the Communist leadership firmly set itself

such
action. Along that path the threat of largeagainst
scale civil war was too great.
vistas were,

The

alternative involved a frank

approach

Taking the Tungpei platform on

basis of "advice" to the Generalissimo, the
Kai-shek.

its

to

Chiang

professed

Communist

leaders could reenforce the appeals of Chang Hsueh-liang

for a change of policy. Further, by using their influence
to

secure

Chiang Kai-shek's

release,

the

Communists

could demonstrate beyond peradventure of doubt the

sincerity of their united front offers. Success of this policy
would conserve the strength and prestige of the Generalis-

simo for establishment of a national united front behind

which all forces in China, both conservative and radical,
could rally. Its dangers were patent. No pledges could
be exacted from General Chiang at Sian which he might
not easily repudiate once he had returned to Nanking.
Release of the Generalissimo would almost surely lead to
the break-up of the local united front in the northwest.

The younger "Tungpei radicals" would bitterly oppose

such a step without sure guarantees; some of them were
not averse to placing Chiang on trial at Sian for his
"crimes" to the state. They would feel that their main
had disappeared with Chiang's return to Nanking,
and would naturally resent Communist pressure toward
this end. The results of this line of policy were thus
highly problematical; in the end, both the local and the
national united fronts might well be lost. This alternative, nevertheless, seems to have been chosen with virtu15
ally no hesitation.
surety

The
15

choice was not rendered any easier by the successes

Actually, the policy was enforced by the ranking Communist leaders

against fairly serious opposition from some of the secondary Red com-

manders.

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

171

attained almost without effort by the united front in

Shensi and Kansu at the end of December and early in

January. During these weeks a revolutionary base of mass

proportions appeared virtually overnight in the northwest.

Sponsored by the authorities, instead of being

subjected to official repression, the national salvation

movement achieved its first completely untrammeled expression in China. Enthusiastic mass demonstrations on
a vast scale, addressed by Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-

cheng and other leaders, were successively held in Sian.

These activities, contrary to reports disseminated outside,
were carried through under disciplined control. Martial
law, imposed in Sian on December 12, was lifted on the
following day; only a few scattered incidents occurred
in the city during the course of the coup d'etat. Organization work went on among the peasants in the villages,
who came by the thousands to participate in meetings

held throughout the country-side. Newspapers devoted to

the cause of the national salvation movement sprang up
in Sian and won a wide circulation in the northwestern
provinces. Political prisoners, including many Communist youths in the local jails, were released. Although no

troops entered Sian, Red army men fraterwith

nized
the provincial troops in the north. A United
Northwestern Military Council was set up, with head-

Communist

quarters at Sian.
possibly

The

more by

Communists, was

the

at stake in the negotiations

to decide the fate of

From

the

first

future of this movement, cherished

young Tungpei officers than the

Chiang

these

which were

Kai-shek.

negotiations were

impeded by
Nanking to give a
hearing to the Young Marshal. Madame Chiang Kai-shek's
efforts to get in touch with General Chiang's captors had
refusal of the forces in control at

to break

through a wall of resistance at Nanking.

The

172

JAPAN IN CHINA

proposals of the rebels reached the capital on the day after

the revolt, but the eight-point platform was disregarded
and its contents suppressed. On December 14 a telegram
from Sian sent by Mr. Donald, the Generalissimo's adviser, informed the central authorities that Chiang Kai-

shek was well and indicated that Chang Hsueh-liang

wished Dr. H. H. Kung, acting head of the Executive
Yuan, and Madame Chiang to go to Shensi. Doubts were
cast on this telegram by the Nanking officials, who resolutely opposed Madame Chiang's efforts to leave for Sian
and pressed ahead with preparations for a punitive expedition against the rebels.

The

state of affairs at the capital

was soon realized by the Generalissimo, who could also

hear the Nanking bombers droning over Sian. Initial
including the bombing of Weinan, northeast
occurred three days after Chiang's detention.
The outbreak of large-scale warfare was prevented only
when General Chiang Ting-wen, one of the Sian captives,
was released and sent to Nanking with an autographed
letter from the Generalissimo ordering the Minister of
War to cease bombing and fighting for three days. Dr.
T. V. Soong had meanwhile gone to Sian; on December
2 1 after conferring with Chang Hsueh-liang, both he and
Mr. Donald returned to Nanking. Only then was Madame
Chiang Kai-shek, in the face of continued objections from
the authorities, able to return with these men to Sian
hostilities,

of Sian,

during a prolongation of the truce arranged at Nanking

with the greatest difficulty.
During these two weeks the leaders in the northwest
were finding it impossible to shake the Generalissimo's
determination to refuse political commitments. After
some hesitancy, overcome partly by the state of affairs in
Nanking, he entered for the first time into a serious discussion with Chang Hsueh-liang of the political issues at

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

stake.

Chou

En-lai,

173

one of the chief Communist leaders,

16
He made it clear to
participated in these conversations.
that
the
Communists
were
unwilling to exploit
Chiang
the situation on the narrow plane of partisan advantage;

they desired the Generalissimo to return to Nanking,

establish nation-wide political unity embracing the Red

and make preparations to resist Japan. 17 The

efforts of Chou En-lai and other Communist representatives at Sian to prevent the hot-headed Tungpei officers
from staging a mass trial of the Generalissimo, which
would almost certainly have resulted in a death sentence,

armies,

18
convincingly underlined the sincerity of these proposals.
Chang Hsueh-liang finally agreed to the release of Chiang

Kai-shek; he succeeded, moreover, in winning the assent

of his fellow-commanders.

The young Tungpei

officers,

however, were apparently not thoroughly reconciled to

this procedure an element which lent a clandestine

atmosphere to the flight from the Sian airport. General

Chang Hsueh-liang accompanied his erstwhile captive to
Nanking. The act was perfectly understandable. Only
thus could he clear his name of the aspersions cast by the
rebellion, and demonstrate the sincerity and patriotism
of the motives which inspired the coup.
To the end Chiang Kai-shek seems to have refrained

from committing himself

to specific political pledges. In

the later speeches of General

Yang Hu-cheng and

others,

No mention

of Chiang's talks with Chou appear in the former's published diary of his sojourn in Sian. The omission is natural, as such a
revelation would have intensified the suspicions of the conservatives at
10

Nanking and of Japan.

17

Interview by the author at Yenan in north Shensi, June 1937.

Note Madame Chiang's statement: "We heard nothing of menaces
from the Reds during all this time. Quite contrary to outside beliefs, we
were told, they were not interested in detaining the Generalissimo. In18

stead, they preferred his quick release/' Sian:

P- 39-

A Coup

D'Etat,

etc., cited,

JAPAN IN CHINA

174

there are references to verbal assurances by Chiang Kaishek that there would be no further civil war in China.
If this evidence can be accepted, it marks the limit of the
concessions made by the Generalissimo. Chou En-lai may
that bore Chang
possibly have watched the airplane

Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek away toward Nanking,

where the latter would again come under the influence
and pressure of China's conservative elements. He could
not be certain of the outcome. He and his Communist
associates in northern Shensi had one assurance. Their
analysis of conditions in China, and of the tempo of
Japanese pressure, had convinced them that Chiang Kaishek, whatever reservations he might have, would eventually be forced to assume the leadership of a national
united front.

The immediate results were far from reassuring. In

the northwest the spirit and enthusiasm of the mass movement persisted well into January; outwardly, few changes
were noticeable in Sian after Chiang's departure on
Christmas afternoon. As the weeks passed, however, ominous signs began to appear. The Nanking troops, which
had at first been withdrawn from Shensi's eastern borders,
reappeared and a strict blockade closed down against the
northwest.

Chang Hsueh-liang's sentence

of

ten years'

imprisonment was commuted, after a plea for clemency

from Chiang Kai-shek, but he was kept under surveillance and not permitted to return to Shensi. The Generalissimo had gone into self-imposed retirement at Fenghua, and affairs at Nanking were evidently dominated by
the conservatives; once more the possibility of a punitive

expedition against the northwest emerged. In Shensi and

Kansu the political liaison between the various military
units gradually weakened.

hand was

Chang

Hsueh-liang's guiding

sorely missed; neither the other

Tungpei com-

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

175

manders or Yang Hu-cheng were able to take his place.

Collapse of the northwestern front was signalized by a
second coup on February 2, carried out by the young
"Tungpei radicals," in which General Wang I-che and
two other officers were killed. This mutiny was directed
against the settlement, accepted by the high Tungpei
commanders, whereby the central authorities were to

take over control in the northwest; in the end,

hastened the process. On February 9 General

it

merely

Ku Chu-

tung, Director of the Generalissimo's Provisional Headquarters in Sian, entered the Shensi capital to assume

control of military readjustments in Shensi and Kansu.

organizations that had centered in Sian were

The mass

dissolved and their leaders went into hiding. Full reorganization of the troop dispositions in the two provinces
was still to be effected, but the last stage of the revolt

had ended. One favorable sign might be noted: General

Ku Chu-tung's title was no longer that of ''banditsuppression" commander.
The Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, which
met at Nanking on February 15-22, was devoted mainly
to winding up the last phases of the Sian affair. For the
third time Chiang Kai-shek's offer to resign his posts, in
token of responsibility for the mutiny, was rejected. He

presented a report on the Sian events which included,

possibly as a result of prior agreement with Chang Hsuehliang, the eight-point program of the northwestern rebels.

The Kuomintang

plenary session, in voting to accept this

report, noted that since Chang Hsueh-liang's proposals

had been "submitted through rebellious action" they
could not be accorded consideration. On the other hand,

the session restored the

Young

Marshal's civil rights, of

which he had been deprived for five years. This action

removed his last substantive penalties, although he was

JAPAN IN CHINA

176

not allowed to resume his military command nor permitted to stray far from the capital.
telegram from the Central Executive Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party was brought before the

plenary session. This message, after congratulating the

nation on the peaceful settlement of the Sian affair and
expressing hopes for political unification of the country,
outlined five proposals which it hoped would be adopted
as basic national policies. These were: (i) cessation of
all civil wars and concentration of national strength to
(2) freedom of speech and
all
and
of
release
assembly,
political prisoners; (3) sumSalvation
Conference to be ata
National
of
moning
tended by delegates from all parties, factions, public
bodies, and armies; (4) acceleration of preparations for
positive armed resistance against Japan; (5) improvement of the people's living conditions. The Communist
Party was prepared, in case these proposals were adopted,

cope with external aggression;

demonstrate

to

its

desire for national unity

by pledging

to take the following steps: (i) suspend all armed activities throughout the country aiming at overthrow of the

National Government;

Government"

(2)

change the

title

of "Soviet

"The

Special Area Government of the

of
China''
and
re-name the "Red Army" as
Republic
to

"The Chinese National Revolutionary Army"

this latter

be placed under direction of the Military Affairs Commission of the National Government; (3) realize democracy in the area under jurisdiction of the Special Area
to

Government through introduction

of popular suffrage;
enforcement
of
the
land
confiscation policy,
(4) suspend
and resolutely carry out the national program of resist-

ance to Japanese aggression. 19

The Kuomintang
19

session also received a lengthy peti-

China Weekly Review, February

20, 1937, p. 408.

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

177

tion from the All-China National Salvation Association,

which advocated the adoption o eight proposals similar
in tenor to the Tungpei platform. Even more notable was

a joint proposal submitted by fourteen of the liberal

party and government

members, including Feng YuSun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen, which openly
advised a return to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's policies of cooperation with the Communists and alliance with the Soviet
Union. 20 At its sixth general meeting, held on February

hsiang,

21, the plenary session adopted a resolution outlining its

stand on the issue of rapprochement with the Communists.

The

resolution listed four conditions

onciliation could be effected:

Army and

rec-

Red

incorporation into the nation's armed forces

unification of political
unified command;
(2)

under

power

(i)

on which

abolition of the

its

in the hands of the Central

Government and disGovernment and

solution of the so-called Chinese Soviet

other organizations detrimental to governmental unity;

(3) absolute cessation of Communist propaganda, which
is diametrically opposed to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Peo-

which
and invites mutual
destruction. 21 The historical account which accompanied
this resolution bitterly excoriated the Communists, while
ples' Principles;

(4)

termination of

class struggle,

splits society into antagonistic classes

the session's concluding manifesto endorsed the government's pacific policy toward Japan and reiterated the
necessity of exterminating the "Communist scourge"
throughout China.

Adjournment of the Kuomintang plenary session ushered in a trying period of four months' apparent indecision on all vital political issues. The morale of the
country at large was high. For this a combination of
20

For

21

The Peiptng

text, see

February

China Weekly Review, February 27, p. 445.

Chronicle, February 23, 1937; also China Weekly Review,

27, 1937, p. 442-443.

JAPAN IN CHINA

178

was responsible: peaceful settlement of the Sian

the successful defense of Suiyuan; Chang Chun's
stand against Ambassador Kawagoe's demands; and the

factors
crisis;

obvious relaxation of Japanese pressure. The prestige of

General Chiang Kai-shek was undimmed, as witnessed

by the popular expressions of relief and rejoicing on his

return from Sian. If the leaders in the northwest had
expected the Generalissimo to press immediately toward
reorganization of the Nanking government and realization of the national salvation program, they must have

experienced a keen sense of disappointment. At Nanking

seemed to go on as before. In this respect, the outcome
of the February plenum was but one example. The trial
of the seven National Salvation leaders, to whose number
three more had been added, was scheduled to open at
all

Soochow on April

28; despite all protests in behalf of the

defendants, the case dragged on from one postponement
to another through May, June and into early July.

During these months the national salvation movement

seemed to mark time, devoting itself chiefly to strengthening mass organizations through activities which constituted no direct challenge to the National Government.

Nanking agents succeeded in splitting the Peiping student

movement, and on May 4, during a meeting commemorating the eighteenth anniversary of the 1919 student

movement,

an open wrangle

student factions in the

made no open

city.

between

occurred

The

rival

National Government

to retrieve the lost positions in

East Hopei at a time which many

efforts

North Chahar and

thought to be opportune.

In

March

it

received

the

Kodama Economic

Mission, sent by Japan to strengthen

"economic cooperation" between the two countries, with
fine formality, though the Chinese business-men suggested
to their Japanese colleagues that revision of the status of

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

179

East Hopei was required to place Sino-Japanese relations

on a sounder basis of cooperation. The relations between
Nanking and the Communists seemed to have reached a
stalemate. Rumors persisted that negotiations were proceeding, but there was no concrete evidence to this effect.

The

military authorities were

still engaged in operations

in provinces outside
bands
against
partisan
in
and
Shensi
the northwest;
Kansu, however, there were
no hostilities between the Communists and the local or

Communist

central troops.

This pattern of events presented no clear picture as to

the basic policies and attitude of the National Government. Against an indecisive political background, important advances toward military centralization were nevertheless being made. The Tungpei armies, which had at

remained in the northwest, were transferred to

Honan, Anhwei and Kiangsu provinces during the month
of April. The bulk of these troops was placed under the
control of a Military Affairs Rehabilitation Committee,
which included Tungpei commanders but was headed by
General Liu Chih, Pacification Commissioner for Honan
and Anhwei. General Yu Hsueh-chung, whose 5ist Army
had carried out the revolt in Kansu, was transferred with
his troops to Kiangsu province, where he became Pacification Commissioner. General Yang Hu-cheng, last of the
first

triumvirate

who

led the mutiny, resigned his

command

and left China for a trip abroad to study military affairs.

These various steps marked the final liquidation of the
Sian revolt, and brought the Northeastern troops under
direct control of the National Government. By the end of
June the five Tungpei armies had been reorganized as
national units and formally incorporated into the regular
forces under the Ministry of War, with maintenance provided by the central treasury.

JAPAN IN CHINA

i8o

Immediately following this settlement, a serious issue

arose in Szechuan province over the Central Government's
efforts to reorganize the motley array of more than 300,000
This attempt was the culmination of a process
in the southwest which had begun at the end of 1934,
local troops.

central troops had entered Kweichow and Yunnan

provinces to cut off the Communist armies on their long

when

latter objective was not achieved, the cenhad

established firm control both in Kweitral authorities
chow and Yunnan, hitherto quasi-independent. In May
1937 a similar effort in Szechuan raised complications

trek.

While the

which, for a short time, threatened to result in civil war.

The Central Government had by this time become virtually unassailable, the situation was handled tactfully,
and the outcome was a success for Nanking. In July a

Szechuan-Hsikang Military Affairs Readjustment ComWar Minister as chairman and General

Ku Chu-tung as vice-chairman, reached an agreement

mittee, with the

which provided

for reorganization of the local military

forces according to the central system by the middle of
August. With this agreement, another major stride toward

army had been taken.

These achievements during the late spring of 1937 left
no further room for doubt that the country was being
knit together, both politically and militarily, at a faster
a consolidated national

rate than at any time since the

founding of the Republic.

big question-mark was the extent to which the
National Government would be willing to bring the Com-

The one

munists within the scope of the developing union. Early

in June a group of four foreigners 22 set out from Peiping
for Yenan, in north Shensi, to seek information from the

Communist

leaders as to the status of their relations with

Nanking. Statements
^Including the author.

made

at this capital of the

Chinese

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

181

Soviet Republic on June 21-24 by Mao Tse-tung, Chu

En-lai breathed a certainty that the split
between the Kuomintang and the Communists, which

Teh and Chou

had existed for ten years, was in the process of being

healed. In reply to reservations expressed by the interviewers with respect to the contradictory features of
Nanking's domestic and foreign policies, and the continued evidences of reactionary tendencies, Mao Tse-tung,
chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party, made the following statement:
"As to a Kuomintang military dictatorship, it is very
clear that from September 18, 1931 to now Nanking has
always been a military dictatorship. In the first period, up
to July 1936, there was dictatorship plus a pro-Japanese

Now

that it has changed its foreign policy, it must

policy.
also change its internal policy. It is impossible for the

one and the same time to suppress the

fight against Japan. It may be true that
Nanking is not deeply and permanently committed to an
anti-Japanese policy. There is not yet the anti-Japanese
war, not yet democracy. This can only be a temporary

Kuomintang

at

people and

situation.
acter; it is

The

present period bears a transitional charare now

passing from one stage to another.

We

in the midst of this transitional period. The same holds

true in the world at large. So it is possible to observe

many unhealthy phenomena. In China we

and

see the arrest

of the National Salvation leaders, the suppression

of the mass movement, the remnants of the old policy not
trial

yet fully given up.

On

the other side

is

the struggle of the

healthy trend against evil remnants. It is not necessary

to be overanxious, because we can see the other side.

Look

the struggle that is going on objectively; this

the specific character of this period. If some
struggle
Kuomintang members maintain the old policy and don't
at

is

JAPAN IN CHINA

82

to change, they are free to adopt this attitude. But

anti- Japanese, democratic forces are growing up,
will call a halt to the activities of these people. Even

want
the

and

new

Hughes must change

Justice

From

conversations with

Chief of the

Communist

Red Army,

it

little,

or be carried away."

Chu Teh, Commander-inwas learned that the main

the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia areas,

centralized
command through radio connecunder direct
forces

in

tion, numbered about 90,000 troops. These regulars were,

on the whole, well armed; their equipment as to clothes,
food and supplies was still inadequate, although steadily
improving. Fairly large partisan forces, engaged mainly in
police duties, provided reserves which, however, were not

undergoing actual military training. Outside the central

Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia district, Red partisan areas existed
in southern Shensi, the Fukien-Kiangsi border, the Honan-

Hupeh-Anhwei border, northeastern Kiangsi, the HunanHupeh-Kiangsi border, the Kwangtung-Hunan border,
the Kiangsi-Hunan border, and the Shensi-Szechuan
border. Each of these groups numbered from one to three
thousand men, but it was impossible to give an exact estimate of their total figure. The central command maintained irregular and uncertain connections with only a
few of these scattered partisan areas. In several cases, the
Kuomintang forces were carrying on expeditions against
such partisan groups; their ultimate disposition depended
on the outcome of the negotiations being conducted with
Nanking. After considerable difficulty, the Communists

had succeeded in establishing friendly relations with certain Moslem communities in the west and Mongols to the
north.

The

People's Anti- Japanese Military Academy at

students, who were
instruction
over
a
wide
obtaining
range of military, political, and cultural subjects.

Yenan enrolled over two thousand

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

Chou

183

En-lai indicated that the negotiations toward a

Kuomintang-Communist rapprochement were progressing

favorably. After Sian, he had conferred with General
Chiang Kai-shek both at Hangchow and Killing; delegates
from Nanking had also visited the Soviet region. The
negotiations were proceeding within the frame-work of
the respective proposals made public during the Kuomintang plenary session in February. For their part, the Com-

munists were implementing the pledges contained in the

telegram to the Kuomintang plenum. Confiscation of
landlord property and attempts to overthrow the Kuomintang had already ceased; the Red Army was resting on its
arms within the northwestern districts then occupied. In

and propaganda efforts had been

some months to prepare the people for the
transition to a democratic form of government. Before the
end of July it was expected that the existing Soviet
organization would give way to a representative system
of elections to local and higher offices, with all classes of
this region, educational

under way

for

During July, also, the Red

would
be
coordinated
with
the central military comArmy
mand at Nanking. Its name would probably be changed
to the "National Revolutionary Army/' and its various
divisions would be appropriately numbered in relation
to other units of the national armed forces. No commanders would be sent in from Nanking. The army would
be officered by its own leaders, who would operate under
the population enfranchised.

direction of the Military Affairs Commission, the chairman of which was General Chiang Kai-shek.

On

the

Kuomintang

side, certain conditions stipulated

by the Communists were also in process of fulfillment.

Internal peace had been realized with the cessation of
Nanking's anti-Red campaigns. Nationalization of the

Communist

military forces,

when

complete, would in-

JAPAN IN CHINA

84

volve maintenance and pay from the central treasury. This

condition had already been partially met by the lifting of
the economic blockade, and the shipment of food, trucks

and equipment

to the

Red

armies.

The

general

Com-

munist demand for democratization of the Kuomintang

political system had been specifically applied to the issue
of the forthcoming Peoples' National Congress, scheduled
to inaugurate the

Communist

new Constitution

leaders,

in

November. The

during the negotiations with Nanking,

insisted that this Congress should be democratically elected

on a basis that would include all parties and groups, so

that

it

might be transformed into a comprehensive repreorgan capable of dealing with all problems

sentative

affecting salvation of the country.

the

new

Constitution,

They

also insisted that

which had been formulated by the

Kuomintang, should be so modified that it might serve as

the organic law for a genuinely democratic republic. On
these questions, the

Communist point

of view

had been

The

basis of representation of the

only partially accepted.
Congress had been somewhat broadened, and Communist
delegates were to be included, but on the whole it would
still be dominated
third Comby the Kuomintang.

munist proposal, to the effect that a National Defense

Conference representative of all military groups be summoned, was under consideration, but the appropriate time
for such a conference was thought to have not yet arrived.
The Communist leaders were also discussing with Nanking
concrete measures for preparation of the defensive war
against Japan, stimulation of the national defense economy, and improvement of the people's livelihood. Their
last

condition, involving full guarantee of civil rights and

liberties, stipulated that all political prisoners

democratic

should be released and the

position.

Communist Party given

a legal

These points had not yet been conceded; in the

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

185

had been freed, but in the rest of

Communists estimated that roughly ten
thousand were still imprisoned, if the war prisoners were
northwest

all politicals

the country the

included.

Chou

summarized the progress

achieved," he said. "There
have the opportunity
is now no fighting between us.
in
the
actual preparations for the defensive
to participate
In vivid metaphor,

En-lai

that was taking place. "Peace

is

We

war against Japan. As to the problem of achieving democracy, this aim has only begun to be realized. This is more
difficult than the development of the anti-Japanese movement, but it has begun to grow both among the masses
and within the Nanking government, although the pace
is still slow. One must consider the anti- Japanese war
preparations and democracy like two wheels of a bicycle,
one before the other, and not like the two wheels of a
'rickshaw, for example.

That

is

to say, the preparation

for the anti-Japanese war comes first, and following it the

movement for democracy which can push the former

move together, but the anti-Japanese

the
front position/' These comments
occupies
were suggestive of the determination manifest in Yenan
forward. Both wheels

movement

between the two parties, irrespective

of the difficulties to be surmounted. On the other side,
it was clear that Nanking, in view of the concessions already made, was equally convinced of the desirability and
necessity of cooperation. Public announcement of the
Kuomintang-Communist agreement was scheduled to take
place on or about July 15. Such a declaration would have
had an electric effect on China, galvanizing the centripetal
forces at work in the country and hastening the advent
of national unification. The announcement was forestalled
by the hostilities at Lukouchiao.
Japan's military onslaught was timed no less carefully
to close the breach

i86

than

its

previous

JAPAN IN CHINA
retreat. The full results

of the Sian

mutiny were not apparent in the early months of 1937.

During this period, with Mr. Naotake Sato in the Foreign
Ministry at Tokyo, Japanese military-political pressure
on China noticeably relaxed. The result was not as anticipated; centrifugal tendencies failed to reassert themselves
in Chinese political life. On the contrary, as the spring
wore on it became clear beyond the shadow of doubt that

China was rapidly pulling itself together. This process

could not be permitted to go past a certain point; above
all, it could not be allowed a period of years in which to
demonstrate its full potentialities. The blow fell in July
1937 for another equally valid reason. Japanese aggression

which had progressed steadily since 1931, had

been brought to a halt all along the line. The Chang
Chun-Kawagoe negotiations at Nanking brought the diplomatic offensive to a full stop, while the Suiyuan hostilities
marked the limit to advances in the north which could be
achieved by reliance on the "irregular" allies. Uprisings in
Chahar in the spring of 1937, in fact, suggested that the
Japanese positions already won in North Chahar and East
Hopei were none too stable. There was still the program
of "economic cooperation to fall back upon in this time
of need. In the hands of Foreign Minister Sato, with the
in China,

7 '

backing of strong groups of Japanese

gram was capable

of extensive

or less pacific auspices.

The

capitalists, the pro-

development under more

testing-ground for this policy,

however, was North China, and here military considerations impinged directly on the nature and objectives of
Japanese economic penetration.
The cleavage within Japan between the heavy industries, which supported the War Ministry's aggressive
policy,

and the

light industries,

which hesitated

to disrupt

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

trading relations with China,

North China

23

found

187

direct expression in

at this period.
to a certain point, the
interests of these two groups in the economic invasion of

Up

China's northern provinces could be harmonized.

The

by the Japanese military for reasons of their own, consisted mainly of the products of light
industry, especially cotton and rayon textiles. In another
vast illicit trade, assisted

by contributing directly to the bankruptcy of the

Chinese cotton mills in Tientsin, this trade played into
the hands of Japan's liberal industrialists. After 1935 these
mills were one after another forced to shut down, and
then to sell out to Japanese textile firms. By the spring
of 1937 the cotton textile industry in Tientsin had become
predominantly Japanese. The Osaka firms were also

respect,

directly interested in the efforts being

made, through Japanese pressure on the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, to

induce the Chinese authorities to improve and extend
cotton cultivation in North China.

On

the other hand, the Japanese army was seeking to

force the Chinese officials to carry through a number of

economic projects which were much more closely related

to military objectives. Pressure toward this end reached
its height during the closing months of 1936. In August
Ambassador Kawagoe had participated in a series of conferences with the Japanese consular and military officials
at Tientsin and Peiping, through which efforts were made
to hammer out a concerted economic program. He also
conferred with the Chinese authorities, and urged General Sung Che-yuan "to seek Japanese technical and financial assistance in the exploitation of North China's natural
resources." 24 The subject was followed up by the army
28

For more detailed treatment of

this

political struggle, see Chapter VII.

24
North China Star, August 21, 1936.

key factor in Japan's internal

JAPAN IN CHINA

i88

In late September and early October LieutenantGeneral Tashiro, commander of the North China Garrison, assisted by his chief-of-staff, held several meetings
chiefs.

with General Sung. The result was the so-called SungTashiro agreement, by which General Sung was reported
to have agreed in principle to Sino-Japanese "cooperation"
on various economic projects in North China. These included construction of a railway from Shihchiachuang to
Tsangchow, which, aside from its strategic potentialities,

would

afford a direct outlet for Shansi's coal through

Tientsin; construction of a harbor at Taku; exploitation

of the Lungyen iron mines; improvement of air communi-

development of radio and telegraph

communications; expansion of cotton and wool production in North China; and preference to Japanese capital.
The items of this program served the needs both of Japan's
light and heavy industries, but were weighted strongly in
favor of the latter and of military aims.
Impressive efforts were made to inaugurate this largescale "exploitation of North China's economic resources."
The Hsing Chung Corporation, a subsidiary of the South
Manchuria Railway Company, was established with head
cations in the north;

Tientsin to direct the program of Sino-Japanese

economic cooperation. Months passed, however, and the
results achieved hardly measured up to expectations. The
offices at

scarcity of available

Japanese investment capital repre-

on the scope of the Hsing Chung

the middle of 1937 the progCorporation's
ress actually made could be summed up in a relatively
modest list of achievements. 25 The growing Japanese
monopoly of the textile industry in Tientsin undoubtedly
sented a basic limitation
activities.

25

By

For details, see "Sino-Japanese Economic Cooperation in North

China", Information Bulletin, Council of International Affairs, Nanking,
April i, 1937.

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

189

constituted the most significant item. Through direct military pressure the salt output of the Changlu fields, situated

in the East Hopei area, had been largely diverted to Japan

at prices ruinous to the producers. 26 Chinese shipping
interests, operating a line between Tientsin and Dairen,
were forced into bankruptcy through Japanese competition and restrictions imposed by the Manchoukuo authorities; in September 1936 the company was reorganized
under Japanese ownership and management. The Hui
Tung Aviation Corporation, with airlines between Manchuria and North China cities, inaugurated traffic early in

The Tientsin Electric Company, designed to supply

and
light
power and operate the municipal tramways, was
organized under Japanese control and ownership in the
1937.

fall

of 1936. Lesser enterprises, affecting the rayon, woollen,

match, cement, glass and paper industries, had been projected but had only partially materialized.
It was noteworthy that this list included none of the

more important

projects

which

specially

engaged the atten-

tion of the Japanese military. By the spring of 1937 the

growing authority of the National Government was exert-

ing a larger measure of influence over the attitude and

policies of the

North China

officials.

This influence was

definitely slowing up the rate of progress of Sino- Japanese

economic "cooperation" in the north. In March General

Sung Che-yuan declared that such cooperation could only

be carried out on the basis of reciprocity and equality. He
admitted to having exchanged views with the Japanese
authorities regarding exploitation of the Lungyen iron
mines and construction of the Shihchiachuang Railway,
but asserted that no specific plans had been worked out
28

Export of this salt, which possessed qualities specially adapted to manufacture o explosives and chemical gases, had hitherto been prohibited
by the Chinese government.

igo

JAPAN IN CHINA

positively denied that building of the railway would

shortly be started. As to political issues, he stated that it

and

was beyond his power to "discuss such problems, as they

should be handled by the diplomatic authorities of the
Central Government." 27 Some weeks later General Sung
went into retirement at his native town in northern Shantung, from which he did not emerge until the middle of
July a week after the opening hostilities at Lukouchiao.

During the period of Sung's retirement, Japan's army

circles were forced to take stock of the new situation which
confronted them in China. The National Government
was stronger than at any time since the Kwantung Army
launched the Manchurian invasion in September 1931.
Prospects of civil strife in China had definitely receded

into the background.

period of peace would offer the
chance to round out the structure of national unity on the

foundations already laid. Political unity was undergirded

by a strong national consciousness that was gradually

The rapid cencommand at Nanking indicated what these

developments would mean to China's military strength.
permeating the whole Chinese people.
tralization of

Industrial conditions, foreign trade, and central revenues

were rapidly recovering from the low levels of 1934. An
ambitious program of railway and highway construction,
correlated with the extension of telephone, telegraph and
radio communications, was strengthening the material
basis of political unification; nowhere was this factor so
visible as in China's large and growing network of commercial airlines. To the Japanese military, it was obvious

growth of a strong and unified China, capable of

its legitimate interests, could not be
allowed to continue. It was no less clear that Japan's policy
of piecemeal encroachment in the north,
pursued by
that the

a real defense of

37

Qhina Weekly Review, March

go, 1937, p. 91.

CHINA ACHIEVES UNITY

191

threat and cajolery with a minimum use of military force

since the middle of 1933, had reached the limit of its
possibilities.

They could stand on

six years

their existing positions,

of steady aggression, or they

gained through
could advance toward a large-scale military operation
aimed to annihilate China's central military forces. If a
halt were called, the positions already won might soon
become untenable and force a retreat. They chose to
advance.

CHAPTER

SIX

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

THE

dramatic military uprising at

Tokyo on Febru-

ary 26, 1936, turned, a corner in Japan's political evolution

which has proved to be no less decisive than the changes

occurring at that period in China. For up to that time a

relatively small clique of army extremists had been the
propelling force behind the military-fascist program; and
although its members had exerted a determining influence

on the course of Japan's foreign policy since September

18, 1931, they had remained on the fringes of control over
the machinery of government and the direction of policy
at home. The failure of the February coup resulted in the
virtual elimination of the direct influence of this

army
and the relegation of its leaders to obscurity. Retirement of these army extremists, however, did not mean
that their program of regimentation in the political and
clique

economic spheres was discarded. On the contrary, the

drive toward an authoritarian regime was taken up by a

more conservative army leadership working, not through

the methods of assassination and coup d'etat, but through
the increased measure of control at the centers of governinto its hand as a result of the Febru-

ment power thrown

The new army

leadership was placed in a far

more advantageous position to realize its internal program.
Its control over budgetary
appropriations for the armed
ary events.

forces

became much stronger and more

192

direct

a factor

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

193

which cemented an alliance with the large and growing industrial interests engaged in the production of war supenabled it to draw closer
plies. Its more cautious tactics
even to the conservative elements of Japanese business and
finance, which had been repelled by the uncontrolled
demagogy and direct action of the former clique of army

When

appeared on the political scene, the

new army group was faced with only one serious handicap:
the Japanese people's disillusionment with the results of
extremists.

the expansionist

it

program in China,

general anti-militarist
ary coup.

The

struggle that

its

fear of war,

and a

sentiment intensified by the Febru-

scenery had shifted,

had begun

but the

five years earlier in

political

Japan went on

unabated.

This struggle has been carried on within the framework

of one of the most complicated governing systems of any
modern nation. Perhaps the closest parallel to the Japathe pre-war Tsarist autocracy. Japan's
pseudo-democratic government apparatus is intertwined
with a set of monarchical institutions which still flourish

nese state regime

is

in full vigor. The backbone of the system is provided by

the highly developed police organization and the extensive
monarchist bureaucracy, which performs the day-to-day
tasks of routine administration.

This pattern

is

further

complicated by the feudalistic survival of a semi-independent military and naval command.

At the apex
demi-god, and

of the state

pyramid stands the Emperor

such knitting the whole people together

the
veneration
he commands; constitutional
by
religious
ruler; and wealthy landlord and capitalist. Under normal
as

conditions, the Emperor himself has the greatest stake

in the preservation of the constitutional regime, which
enables him to exert a considerable measure of direct
political influence.

There

is

little

room

for

doubt that

JAPAN IN CHINA

194

military-fascist control would curtail the Emperor's powers

and relegate him to a position analogous to that under the

Shogunate. For this reason,

to

throw

if

his support to the

for

no

other,

he has tended

moderates during the

crises

of the internal political struggle in recent years. In evaluating the Emperor's political role, consideration must also

be taken of the fact that he is the largest landowner and

one of the wealthiest capitalists of Japan. The possessions
of the Japanese royal family are even more extensive than
those of the British crown. In 1927 the royal domain of
Japan consisted of 1,397,656 cho } or about 3,800,000 acres
of landed property, including tenements, agricultural
lands, and forests, the whole being valued at 637,234,000
1
yen. The Japanese throne also owned buildings, furniture, cattle, and farm implements to the value of nearly
83,000,000 yen in that year. In addition, the Imperial
family holds a considerable block of shares of the Bank
of Japan, the South Manchuria Railway, the Yokohama
Specie Bank, the Formosan Bank, the Nippon Yusen
Kaisha, and the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, amounting to
about 300,000,000 yen. Finally, the Emperor enjoys an

annual

civil list of

4,500,000 yen.
The democratic front of the Japanese state apparatus
consists of the Diet and the Cabinet, but equally effective
centers of political power lie behind this facade. Many
factors combine to reduce the lower house of the Diet to
a subordinate position. Among these may be noted the
equal powers exercised by the House of Peers, the ordinance power of the Cabinet, and regulations which even
affect its control over the budget. In the Cabinet, the
authority of the Prime Minister is impaired by the embry1
Since 1927 over 200,000 cho of the Imperial estates have been sold or
transferred to public or private ownership.
a
For these figures, see Kenneth W. Colegrove, "The Japanese Emperor",
American Political Science Review, October 1932, p. 837-838.

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

onic development of the parliamentary

195

commons and

challenged by the virtually independent position of the

military and naval branches. The Army and Navy Ministers, by imperial ordinance, cannot be
be ranking military or naval officers.

civilians

On

but must

occasion, the

army officers to serve in a cabinet has led to its

downfall or prevented its formation. The latent threat of
such action always exerts a certain degree of pressure on
refusal of

the composition and policies of a cabinet, the strength

depending on political circumstances.

of this influence

The War and Navy Ministers, furthermore, have the right

of direct access to the Emperor, without reference to the
Prime Minister. This right is also shared by the military
and by members of the Supreme
War Council, a body which is in no way subordinate to
the War and Navy Ministers. Finally, since the general
staffs exercise supreme command over the armed forces,

and naval

chiefs of staff

they can initiate or conclude military action without

authorization of the government, although such .action is

normally the result of imperial sanction given to a decision of the cabinet. 3 In addition to the military-naval
organs, the position of which conduces to "dual govern-

ment" and "dual diplomacy", the threads of actual political power in Japan lead to a number of other institutions.
Prince Saionji, last of the Genro or Elder Statesmen, has
wielded virtually dictatorial power over the choice for
Prime Minister when a government is overthrown. The
Privy Council, a collection of aged conservatives, must be
consulted on legislative measures and on the ratification
8

For a detailed

analysis, see Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government

York, Century Co., 1932, Chapters 6-11; also Colegrove,
"Powers and Functions of the Japanese Diet", American Political Science

and

Politics,

New

Review, December 1933 and February 1934; "The Japanese Cabinet",

ibid., October 1936; "The Japanese Privy Council", ibid., August and

November

1931.

JAPAN IN CHINA

196

of treaties

powers which amount to extensive restrictions

of Cabinet and Diet. Less visible, but no

on the authority
less

important,

is

the influence exerted

by the

officials

of

the Imperial Household Ministry through their control

over access to the Emperor. In times of crisis, the latter
himself has a determining voice.

The

intense political struggle that has developed in

since
1930 has mainly involved four groups: the
Japan
capitalists, the landowners, the monarchist-bureaucratic

elements,

and the military

cliques.

Of

these, the first

and

have been the central protagonists. The conflict between these two leading members of Japan's ruling bloc
does not at all represent war a I' entrance. The basic neceslast

preserving their ruling position, particularly against

the threat of social revolution, constitutes a strong bond

sity of

of union. Before the military-fascist movement had acquired momentum, the bourgeois moderates had already
proceeded to stamp out revolutionary groups and drive

Communism underground. The

no

than
the military, are interested in external aggression and have
not been slow to take advantage of its results in China; at
the same time they tend to be more cautious than the
military, and are unwilling to plunge into a big war for
which adequate diplomatic and financial preparation has
not been made. On the internal front, they have struggled
capitalists,

less

demand for a monopoly of

and
the
political power
scrapping of the parliamentary
With
the
regime.
emergence of a decisive crisis, however,
as of war or revolutionary upheaval, all the ruling
groupsincluding the capitalists tend to close ranks around the
bitterly against the army's

program.
Following the world war, which enriched and strengthened the Japanese capitalists, they increasingly pressed
military-fascist

their

way into the

traditional ruling corporation of the

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

197

clan bureaucrats, who had dominated the state since the

Constitution of 1889 from their entrenched positions in

Navy, Cabinet, Privy Council, House of

Peers, Genro, and the Imperial Household Ministry.
Japan's industrial and financial barons had established
close connections with the political parties even in the
the

Army and

pre-war years. After 1925 the extension of the electorate,

which forced Diet members to spend vast electioneering
sums, firmly cemented the capitalists' control over the

Minseito and Seiyukai parties. The close relation between

the Mitsubishi interests and the Minseito is commonly
acknowledged; while the Seiyukai, though it continues to
represent the landowners, is closely allied with the house
of Mitsui.

By

this time,

moreover, the bourgeois interests

had penetrated into the House of Peers, the Privy Council,

and the Imperial Household Ministry. Above all, the passing of Prince Yamagata, long the dominant Genro who
worked in the interest of the army, and Prince Matsukata
had left Prince Saionji himself connected with the Sumitomo banking house the sole surviving Elder Statesman.
Through his influence, in the period from 1925 to 1931,
six consecutive Cabinets were formed by party Premiers
who headed either a Minseito or Seiyukai majority in the
lower house of the Diet. It was noteworthy that General
Tanaka, who headed a strong militarist Cabinet from
1927 to 1929, achieved the Premiership by virtue of his
presidency of the Seiyukai party. The Tanaka interregnum
was significant in another sense: it indicated the persistence of the military bid for control of government even
during an adverse period. This nearest approach to democracy in Japan at the end of the 'twenties was reached in a
time of relative stability, and corresponded to the actual
position which the capitalists had achieved in Japanese
society.

JAPAN IN CHINA

198

Various factors combined to narrow the term during

which even an approximation of orthodox parliamentary
democracy could successfully function in Japan, The concentration of financial, industrial and commercial control in the hands of the leading Japanese capitalists had
already reached an advanced stage. Although the landowners still maintained an important position, 4 with an
independent role as collectors of tribute from the counthe
tryside, the capital squeezed from the peasantry in
form of rent was largely invested in industry and the
banks. Japanese industry and trade had not only grown
in relative size and importance but had increasingly fused

with monopolies of finance capital. A half-dozen of Japan's

huge family combines had come to constitute one of the
most powerful financial oligarchies of the world. Five
years ago the banking houses of Mitsui, Mitsubishi and
Sumitomo comprising the Big Three already held onefourth of Japanese finance capital, while the Big Eight
held one-half. 5 In the decade of the twenties, Japan's
national economy reached the stage of an advanced
monopoly capitalism, which, however, was rendered peculiarly unstable by a set of unique drawbacks. The economic structure was top-heavy, and prevented from attaint

ing all-round development by the relative importance of

an agriculture with a low level of technique and a chroni6
cally impoverished peasantry. Restrictions thus imposed
on the size of the domestic market also obstructed the

complete growth of a modern large-scale industry. Over

wide areas, except for textiles and a few other notable
*In 1925 over 50 per cent of the population still depended on agriculture for a livelihood. See John E. Orchard, Japan's Economic Position,

New York, McGraw

5

See

Hill, 1930, p. 182.

"The Control

of Industry in Japan", Problems of the Pacific, 1933,

University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 255.
6
For detailed analysis, see Freda Utley, Japan's Feet of Clay, London,
Faber and Faber, 1936, Chapters IV and V.

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

199

exceptions, Japanese industry was characterized by insufficient concentration and inadequate technical modernization. 7

With
national

the onset of the world depression in 1929, Japan's

economy suffered the same catastrophic reverses

that were experienced by all of the highly developed capitalist nations. In the two years 1929-1931 Japan's total

foreign trade declined by nearly one-half, while the income from rice and silkthe agricultural staples declined

in the same proportion between 1929 and 1933. The condition of the farming population, already serious in the

period before the crisis, deteriorated until a virtual state

of famine prevailed in certain districts. Industrial unemployment, which the rural areas could no longer absorb,
rose to nearly three millions. Small-scale industrial establishments were squeezed by the large monopolies, as well

by the gradual closing of the smaller banks, and the

middle-class intelligentsia either suffered wage cuts or
joined the ranks of the unemployed. Widespread social
as

among the lower and middle classes.

Tenant-farmer and industrial-labor conflicts multiplied,
while the middle classes inveighed against monopoly and
demanded lower taxes, cheaper credit, and employment.
Under conditions such as these, the basic defects and weaknesses of Japan's national economy stood out in bold relief.
The domestic market, half of which was constituted by a
unrest developed

poverty-stricken peasantry, afforded no possibility of recovery, unless the possessing classes became willing to

undertake drastic

social

reforms that would trench on their

own

privileged position. Neither the landowners nor the

great banking houses could be expected to engage in such

task.
7

They would not

take, in point of fact,

Orchard, Japan's Economic Position, cited, Chapter

Chapters III, VII.

cited,

11;

even the
also

Utley,

JAPAN IN CHINA

200

new deal. At the same time,

retrieve the economic situato
done
had
to
be
something
tion from disaster and divert the existing discontent into
safe channels. The solution fascism at home and aggresmildest of steps toward a

sion abroad was hit upon by the military. Its advantages

were soon realized by the capitalists, despite certain reservations as to the nature of the internal

was

to control

program and who

it.

The growing

crisis had found the Minseito government

an economic platform that was quite out of line
with the needs of the moment. A return to the gold
standard, retrenchment, and deflation conservative meas-

wedded

to

ures adopted at the height of the boom in 1929 enormously aggravated the difficulties of the depression period
in 1931. They had been carried through by a government

which, more clearly than any that had gone before, expressed the newly

won

political

hegemony

of the capi-

A single-party cabinet,

with a large majority in the

was
Diet,
guided by distinguished leaders: Shidehara,
Hamaguchi, Inouye, Wakatsuki. Baron Shidehara's policy
talists.

cooperation, which had reversed the

enforced
"positive" policy
by the previous Seiyukai government under General Tanaka, stood squarely in the
path of the military-fascist program. It was grounded on
a different premise: that friendly relations with China
provided the soundest basis for an expansion of Japan's
of Sino- Japanese

trade and the solution of its economic difficulties. Even

more anathema to the military was the Minseito government's policy of disarmament and reduction of defence

expenditures. The effort to achieve the latter by small

cuts in the budget led to a minor skirmish with the military-naval leaders; while issues involved in the former,
revolving around the London Naval Treaty of 1930, gave
rise to a first-class struggle of
major proportions. In protest

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

201

against the signature of this treaty, Admiral Kato, Chief

of the Naval Staff, memorialized the Emperor on April

Public opinion and

in support
unanimous
the press, however, were practically
of the government's position, and the Privy Council, which
had delayed action on the treaty for several months,
2

and ultimately resigned on June

1 1

eventually yielded to this pressure by recommending unconditional ratification on October i, 1930.

More than

the question of cruiser ratios was involved

in this struggle. It brought to the fore the basic issue of

the Emperor's constitutional prerogatives with regard to

the seat of control over the naval and military establish-

ments. 8 Did this reside in the Cabinet, by reason of the

Emperor's prerogative over affairs of state, or did it rest

with the military-naval leaders, by virtue of the Emperor's

prerogative over the supreme command? The issue concerned a fine point of constitutional interpretation. Liberal
jurists such as Professor Minobe lined up in favor of the

Cabinet, and their opinions were supported on the editorial pages of such progressive newspapers as the Tokyo
Asahi. If this view were to prevail and become established
constitutional practice, the Cabinet's supremacy over the
military-naval organs would be unchallenged and "dual
government" abolished. The progress being made toward

parliamentary government would have reached its

triumphant conclusion. Obviously, the significance of the
full

Minseito government's success in achieving ratification

of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 could hardly be
overestimated. As it turned out, this victory was the swan

song of parliamentary government in Japan. In November

Premier Hamaguchi was shot by an assassin; eight months
later he died from the wounds. His death was a portent.
8
See Kenneth W. Colegrove, "Militarism in Japan,"
Peace Foundation, 1936, p. 16-27.

New

York, World

JAPAN IN CHINA

202

Economic conditions and

social unrest

provided an ad-

the military; defeat on the

vantageous
naval treaty issue supplied the incentive. Leadership for a
field of action for

military-fascist movement was already at hand. The decade

of the twenties, when capitalist elements were establishing

themselves more firmly in the organs of government, had

witnessed profound changes in the army. With the declining influence of the Choshu clan, formerly dominant in
the supreme military command, the social composition

had undergone a marked change. From

1920 to 1927, thirty per cent of the new officers came from
families of small landowners, rich farmers, and lower middle classes in urban areas; in later years, this percentage
of the officer ranks

9
steadily increased.
crushing effects of

These young officers had observed the

monopoly capitalism on the rural and
urban middle classes, and had developed a bitter hatred
of the parliamentary regime and its capitalist supporters.
Their personal interests led them to challenge the positions held in the
erals, aside

made

army by the older conservative clan genfrom the fact that many of these had long since

their peace with

the capitalists.

The

older clan

however, were already being pushed out by

middle-rank officers coming from the poorer and less influgenerals,

whose social-economic background was not

from that of the discontented young officers.
By 1930 this middle group of officers, including Generals
Muto, Araki and Mazaki, began to take over control of
ential clans,

very different

the

Supreme War Council. The authority and influence

incoming generals was reinforced by the prestige

they bore in the eyes of the young officers, whom they
were enabled to utilize as a revolutionary threat to the
of these

established order.

The "young

colonels" Itagaki, Doihara,

See Tanin and Yohan, Militarism and Fascism in Japan,

International Publishers, 1934, p. 180.

New

York,

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

203

Okamura, Nagata and Ishihara, 10 who all exercised great

sway over the young officers, were the underpinning of
the Muto-Araki-Mazaki triumvirate.

On

the surface, at

least, these generals had not been compromised by connections with the big concerns, the bureaucrats or the

party leaders. Assuming the position of the disinterested

they were enabled to come forward as a force
the
nation, and so to take the lead in a "nationaluniting
socialist" reformation. By deflecting the suppressed grievsoldier,

the young officers and the general discontent of

the lower middle classes into this movement, they sought

ances o

to strengthen the position of all of Japan's ruling groups,

including the capitalists.

To this end, they developed an extensive chauvinist,
anti-capitalist

and national

socialist

demagogy.

11

In the

political sphere, they excoriated the alliance between the

capitalists and the parties, which was corrupting Japan's

institutions of government,

the parliamentary system.

and

called for abolition of

They demanded

that the

army

should be given political leadership, since it was the sole

disinterested force that could be trusted to uphold the
dynasty and subordinate conflicting interests to the welfare of the nation as a whole. In the realm of foreign
affairs, they asserted that the "weak-kneed" policy of
Foreign Minister Shidehara was threatening Japan with
disaster; that his conciliatory policy toward China, by
encouraging Chinese aggression, was destructive of Japanese prestige in the Far East; and that the ratification of
the London Naval Treaty had dangerously weakened
Japan's national defense. To correct this situation, national
policy required the creation of a powerful colonial empire

on the
10

Asiatic mainland, the crushing of the Soviet

Union,

These have since advanced to the rank of Lieutenant-General.

^Tanin and Yohan, cited, p. 184-203; also for the economic program,
New York Herald Tribune, April 28, 1932.

JAPAN IN CHINA

204

of the "kingly way" Kodo or Wang

the economic side, they deother countries.

and thus the spread

Taoto

On

clared that capitalism had to be replaced by state socialism;

that is, the government the army leaders under the Em-

perorshould assume control of industry and finance, and

end the agricultural crisis. Finally, they demanded the
merciless eradication of the

"Red menace."

For the dissemination of

this

propaganda, the army

soon controlled an

extremists possessed at the outset or

12
extraordinary set of facilities. The Ex-Servicemen's Association, with a membership of three million, came under

the control of the Muto-Araki-Mazaki triumvirate in 1932.

This association, with its allied patriotic societies, had tens
of thousands of local posts and branches scattered throughout the country, embracing an active membership estimated at half a million. Through this agency tons of

were distributed; in recent years, some of the

army pamphlets have gone into editions of several hundred thousand copies. In addition, there existed a host of
reactionary societies of all shades, with possibly a quarter
million of active members, which were all connected in
one way or another with the army chiefs. These societies
literature

varied greatly in social composition; they also performed

many different functions. Some specialized in espionage

work abroad under the War Ministry, some were devoted

to breaking up strikes or combatting Socialism and Communism, while others were out-and-out terrorist groups.
Several of the more conservative and dignified patriotic
societies enrolled members from the highest ranks of Japanese society. Only one, the Great Japan Production Party,
ever held out the possibility of bridging the gap between
12
For detailed analysis of the various societies, see Colegrove, Militarism
in Japan, cited, p. 27-39.

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

205

the people and the upper classes,

and establishing a
Fascist party of mass proportions along more or less orthodox lines. The great numbers of these societies, their
heterogeneous composition and aims, and the jealous
efforts of the military to preserve a

monopoly

of political

control militated against the rise of a single united mass

movement. As an unrivalled propaganda vehicle, and as
participants in terrorist outbreaks, the societies exercised
their most important role. The position of the Ex-Serv-

icemen's Association as a channel for propaganda was

buttressed by the Japanese Youth Association with over

two million members, and the Young Women's Association with more than a million members. The Imperial
League of Young Officers was significant for its part in
directing the attention of the younger officers to a study
of the social and economic conditions of the country and
to an attack on parliamentary government. Finally the
Kokuhonsha, or Society of the Foundations of the State,
with nearly one hundred thousand members, was the
most notable representative of the conservative type of
Fascist society. Its membership was drawn from the highest
social strata, including

ernment
naval

landed proprietors,

capitalists, gov-

bourgeois intelligentsia, and military and

During the 1932-1935 period the Kaku-

officials,

officers. 13

honsha groomed

its

leader Baron Hiranuma, then vice-

president of the Privy Council, for a Fascist Premier. In

1930-1931 the society conducted a vigorous agitation
against the London Naval Treaty, and became closely
associated with the Muto-Araki-Mazaki group. This con13
On its directorate were such men as Seihin Ikeda, manager of the
Mitsui interests; Fumio Goto and Keinosuke Ushio, one-time finance and
home ministers respectively; Dr. Kisaburo Suzuki, president of the Seiyukai party from 1932 to 1937; Generals Araki and Ugaki; and Admirals
Mineo Osumi and Kanji Kato.

JAPAN IN CHINA

206

nection, given the social composition of the Kokuhonsha,

was indicative of the real aims o the army extremists despite their anti-capitalist demagogy.
In the summer of 1931 the campaign of the army leaders definitely entered the sphere of political action. Seizing

on provocative developments in Manchuria, not unconnected with the activities of the army itself, 14 the general staff openly pressed the Foreign Office to take "positive" action. At this period General Minami, Minister of
War, headed an aggressive military clique which was competing with the ultra-aggressive Muto-Araki-Mazaki group

The loss of public confidence in the political parties, hastened by the economic
depression and army propaganda, was meanwhile sapping
the foundations of the Minseito government. Allegiance
for the leading role in the army.

wavered among influential sections of the

some of whom began to advocate a reversal

to the cabinet
capitalists,

of the Minseito's deflationary policy, while others felt the

need of a stronger hand to control the developing crisis.

These conditions enabled General Minami, acting more

less secretly within the Minseito Cabinet, to
prepare
for a military coup in Manchuria. Plans were carefully

or

and on September 18, 1931 the military took independent action at Mukden, Changchun and other points
in Manchuria. Never was there a clearer example of "dual
government" and "dual diplomacy" in Japan. The efforts
of Baron Shidehara to limit the scope of military operations proved unavailing, and the Foreign Office was forced
into the position of apologist to the world for events in
Manchuria which it had not initiated and was powerless to
laid,

control.

Under cover
14

For

June

of the excitement

details, see "J a P an

22, 1932, p. 89-90.

engendered by war con-

and Manchoukuo," Foreign Policy Reports,

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

207

ditions, the military chiefs were able to press forward all

along the line with their political program. Extreme

propaganda, fostered by direct and indirect censorship and the rigorous suppression of pacifist views, took
the center of the stage. Broad sections of the lower middle
classes, the peasantry and the workers, who, only a year
Fascist

previous,

had supported the Minseito's

fight to ratify the

London Naval Treaty, succumbed to the nationalizing

process. With popular support rallied behind them, the
army cliques intensified their assault on the correspondingly

weakened Minseito government. Military conspiraaimed at the seizure of political power oc-

cies directly

curred in rapid succession.

coup d'etat, planned by the
group surrounding General Minami, was prematurely
revealed on October 17, 1931, and failed to materialize;
although Colonels Hashimoto and Shigeto were directly
implicated, neither suffered more than minor penalty,
and the whole affair was hushed up. An even more ambitious effort, in which General Araki's clique took a direct

was planned for November

3. It involved the KokuEx-Servicemen's Association, the Imperial

League of Young Officers, and Ryohei Uchida's reactionary societies, as well as the Fascist section of the Social

part,

honsha,

the

Democratic Party led by Katsumaru Akamatsu. The police

again discovered the plot; gendarmes were detailed to
guard the residences of Premier Wakatsuki, Foreign Minister Shidehara and Count Makino, Lord Keeper of the
Privy Seal; and the conspiracy was forestalled. Financial
groups, now strongly committed to abandonment of the
gold standard, powerfully seconded the attacks of the milisuspension of gold payments on September
by accentuating the difficulties facing Japanese trade
and shipping, and intensifying a specie drain that was
tary. Britain's

20,

already severe, had dealt the Minseito government's eco-

JAPAN IN CHINA

so8

nomic program a crippling blow.

tion of the gold ban arose.

clamor for reimposi-

The Seiyukai, the opposition party, was in a strong position to capitalize these Minseito difficulties. Not only was
it the more nationalistic of the two parties and, to this
extent at least, more acceptable to the military. It was also
traditionally inflationist,
deflationary policy since

and had

criticized the Minseito's

The

unsavory circumstances attending the resignation of the Minseito government on December 1 1, and the formation of a Seiyukai
Ministry on December 13, played into the hands of the
its

inception.

by arousing renewed public antipathy

to party
the
Minseito's
cause
of
resignapolitics.
tion was an intrigue led by its reactionary Home Minister,
Kenzo Adachi, ostensibly directed at setting up a coalition

military

The immediate

ministry

composed of the

nationalistic

wings of

the

Seiyukai and Minseito parties. It was widely believed,

however, that Adachi had received a liberal fortune to

accomplish the downfall of the Minseito and thus facilifrom the gold standard. 15 In any case,
the chief benefit derived from the precipitate reimposition
of the gold embargo by the Inukai Ministry, announced
tate a departure

appointment, was reaped by Japawhich had been faced with heavy

losses on dollar-buying speculations so long as Finance
Minister Inouye maintained gold payments. It was charged
that departure from the gold standard netted the Mitsui,

immediately after

its

nese financial interests

Mitsubishi and
thirty to sixty

Sumitomo interests sums ranging from

million dollars. 16 Popular condemnation

York Herald Tribune,

4, 1932, p. 14.
16
It was estimated

May

22, 1932;

The

Trans-Pacific,

August

that some 200 million dollars was held specula tively,

the principal holders being the Mitsui house with 50 millions, Sumitomo
with 20 millions, and Mitsubishi with 10 millions. In these dollar-buying
operations, Mitsui was recouping losses suffered by depreciation of some
50 million yen of sterling holdings in London. New York Times, Decem-

ber

14, 1931.

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

209

was intensified when it was revealed that the private

financiers' gain was the government's loss, since the hurried restoration of the gold ban left the Yokohama Specie
Bank with foreign obligations amounting to some 170
million gold yen, which had to be covered by a much

sum

of depreciated yen. 17
In the War Ministry of the Seiyukai Cabinet,

larger

formed
General
Sadao
was
Araki, outby Tsuyoshi Inukai,
placed
standing leader of the army extremists. Unhampered by
any save minor Cabinet restrictions, the military-naval
leaders completed the conquest of Manchuria, organized
the Manchoukuo government, and carried through the

attack

on Shanghai. Despite these gains, the army exstill far from satisfied. Prince Saionji had

tremists were

followed parliamentary procedure in advising the choice

of Inukai, who was president of the opposition party, for
the post of Prime Minister. In the general election of
February 20 the Seiyukai won a sweeping victory. Having
just overthrown the Minseito government, the military
were again confronted with a single-party cabinet, drawing
its chief strength from an unchallenged majority in the
lower house of the Diet. The political struggle therefore
continued with unabated intensity. Junnosuke Inouye,
the ex-Finance Minister, was assassinated on February 9

and Baron Takuma Dan, head of the Mitsui interests,

was shot on March 5. These assassinations were carried
out by the Blood Brotherhood League, dedicated to the
use of terrorism against the "corrupt political parties,
slaves of the capitalists."

18

Late in March the Japanese police discovered that the

Japan Weekly Chronicle, December 31, 1931, p. 840; New York Times,

17

December

21, 1931-

Colegrove, Militarism in Japan, cited, p. 38. The Ketsumeidan had

been founded in 1930 by Lieutenant-Commander Hitoshi Fujii and one
Nissho Inouye, a Buddhist priest of the Nichiren sect who had had a
varied career as spy for the South Manchuria Railway and agent of
18

Chinese generals.

JAPAN IN CHINA

210

Blood Brotherhood League had planned the assassination

of a score of prominent political leaders, financiers and
industrialists. Even this plot was dwarfed by the affair of
May 15, 1932, in which Premier Inukai was assassinated,
bombs were hurled at the residence of Count Makino, at
the Tokyo police headquarters, the Mitsubishi bank and
the offices of the Seiyukai party, and an attempt was made
to blow up the metropolitan power stations. These acts
were carried out by several terrorist societies, composed
mainly of young naval officers, military cadets and peasant
youths, including the Blood Brotherhood League, the
and the Aikyojuku. 20 They were part of a
Jimmukai
wider conspiracy, involving high army commanders, which
aimed to take control of the capital by a military coup
d'etat. 21 Partially forewarned, the government had mobilized the police and placed the defense of the capital and
19

The Jimmukaij

or Society of

Emperor Jimmu, was a

secret terrorist

organization of young military and naval officers, founded by Shumei

Okawa in 1931. Prominent army figures were connected with it, including Lieutenant-General Kikuchi, a leader of the Kokuhonsha. Lieutenant-Colonel Hashimoto acted as head of the Jimmukai's military de-

partment. See Tanin and Yohan, Militaris?n and Fascism in Japan., cited,
p. 225.
20

The Aikyojuku,

or School of Love for the Native Soil, was founded

in 1930 by Nissho Inouye of the Blood Brotherhood League and Kozaburo Tachibana, head of an agricultural settlement at Mito. Peasant
youths studying in Tachibana's school were imbued with the belief that
the rural crisis resulted from the actions of the politicians and plutocrats,

and

that by

these men they

of the Emperor who

killing

could "reestablish in

its

original

would depend upon only the army

and people." This society was connected with the higher commanders
through Lieu tenant-General Kikuchi of the Kokuhonsha. Tanin and
purity the

Yohan,

power

cited, p. 220-222; see also Colegrove, Militarism in

Japan, cited,

p. 36-38.
21

The police report of the trial stated that the officers were trying "to
create a condition for the proclamation of martial law, to open a way for
other forces to make a move for the acceleration of a national reform."
The

November

16, 1933. Colegrove brings out the fact that

by the Jimmukai and Aikyojuku, which passed
through Shumei Okawa's hands, came from the South Manchuria Railway directorate. See also Tanin and Yohan, cited, p. 28.

Trans-Pacific,

funds used in this

affair

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

211

the Emperor's residence in the hands of the chief of police

commander. The May 15th affair,

known, sounded the death-knell of party

instead of the garrison

as it

came

to be

government.
Before advising on the choice of a new Premier, Prince
Saionji devoted a full week to thorough canvass of the
views of the Army, Navy, Diet, Privy Council and Imperial

Household

officials.

The army

chiefs

refused to

support a party Cabinet and demanded the establishment

of a "national" government headed by Baron Hiranuma,
leader of the Kokuhonsha. Dr. Kisaburo Suzuki, who was

hurriedly chosen president of the Seiyukai on May 16, was

the logical choice for the head of a party government.
Prince Saionji elected neither of these alternatives, but

secured agreement of the army and parties to the appointof a compromise candidate Admiral Saito, former
Governor-General of Korea.
super-party coalition Cabi-

ment

net emerged, with three posts allocated to the Seiyukai,

two to the Minseito, two to the military, and six to nonparty men. The outstanding figures were General Sadao
Araki, who kept the War Ministry, and the new Finance
Minister, Korekiyo Takahashi. In the general compromise
the political parties suffered the most decisive loss. The

theory of government responsibility to the Diet, which

had been reinforced by six successive party administra-

experienced a grave set-back. On the other hand,

although the basic demand of the militarists that the
government must stand above party allegiance was satisfied, the army extremists failed to set up a Cabinet exclusively dominated by the military. To this extent the
compromise represented a victory for the capitalist eletions,

ments, despite the loss of authority by the parties, especially

since the key post of Finance Minister was placed in the

capable hands of Takahashi.

JAPAN IN CHINA

sis

The passing of this crisis ushered in a three-year period

of comparatively peaceful political evolution. Trials of
the various persons implicated in the terrorist affairs
much

22

and

stirred political passions.

The comparatively light sentences meted out to the defendants encouraged further plots, of which the most

attracted

attention,

by the Shimpeitai, or Soldiers of God, in

and
others, however, were successfully foreJuly
stalled by the police. Toward the end of this year General
Araki's prestige gradually waned; although his views prevailed in connection with the advance into North China,
he had relatively little success in affecting the course of
domestic policy. The Manchoukuo regime, at first headed
serious was that

1933; this

by General Muto, Araki's close collaborator, and after

the former's death by men sympathetic with extremist
aims, carried the state socialist ideology to

its

clearest prac-

expression, and wrung capital from Japan for an

economic program devoted to military-strategic aims.
Thorough-going supporters of the military-fascist program
were to be found only among a small minority of the big
concerns. In January 1934 Araki resigned from the War
Ministry, and was replaced by General Senjuro Hayashi.
Six months later the Saito Cabinet was forced out of
office by the Teikoku Rayon scandal, in which its Minister of Communications was involved. The succeeding
Cabinet, under Admiral Okada, was formed on the basis
tical

of a super-party coalition similar to that of its predegradual reassertion of

cessor. Its stability testified to the

new group of moderate statesmen a phenomenon which had become clearly marked by the end of
authority by a

At no point were the army extremists enabled to

break through the wall that was again rising up before
1935.

22

For course of the

p. 323-324-

trials, see

Foreign Policy Reports, February

13, 1935,

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

them. Despite

all efforts

by the

213

military, the inner

group

of Imperial advisers continued to be dominated by the

moderates. Of these, Prince Saionji was still the most influential; in the Imperial Household Ministry, also, Count
Makino, as Lord Privy Seal, and Admiral Suzuki, the

Lord Chamberlain, were both moderates. A difficult situation had arisen when the presidency of the Privy Council
fell

vacant in the

summer

of 1934.

The

vice-president,

who, according to precedent, should have been appointed

to the post, was Baron Hiranuma, head of the Kokuhonsha.
Hiranuma was passed over, and the post was given to
Baron Kitokuro Ikki, a moderate. Despite the furore over
the "Minobe affair", 23 which was an oblique attack on
Baron Ikki, who held the same liberal views as to the
Emperor's constitutional status, the latter had maintained
his position as president of the Privy Council throughout
1935.

Count Makino

finally resigned as

Lord Privy

Seal,

but his successor Viscount Saito, the former Premierwas hardly less objectionable to the extremists. Despite
the steady attacks to which Admiral Suzuki was subjected,
he too retained his office as Lord Chamberlain. Every post
in the circle of inner advisers surrounding the Emperor
was sealed tight against encroachment from the military.
The same struggle went on in the Cabinet, with not dissimilar results. Budgetary expenditures on Japan's armed
forces
23

mounted

Professor

rapidly during these years.

Minobe has already been noted

as a

From

champion of the

442.8
liberal

interpretation of the Emperor's prerogative in connection with the struggle over ratification of the London Naval Treaty in 1930. He was one of
the foremost constitutional jurists of Japan, his text-books were required
study material in the great universities, and he had been appointed to
the House of Peers. In 1933-1935 the extremists bitterly attacked the basic
theory underlying his writings that the Emperor was an organ of the
state, and not the state itself. Attempts were made on his life; his text-

books were eventually withdrawn; and Premier Okada was forced to issue
a statement clarifying Japan's "national polity" in the sense required by
the extremists.

214

JAPAN IN CHINA

million yen, or 28 per cent of the total, in the fiscal year

1930-1931, appropriations for the military and naval establishments advanced to 937.3 millions, or 43.7 per cent of
the total, in the 1934-1935 year. Each autumn, however,
Finance Minister Takahashi pared down the lavish army-

navy estimates; the increases actually allotted were sufficient to cover the necessities arising- out of the conquest of
Manchuria, which Japanese capitalists unreservedly supported, but not sufficient to unduly hasten preparations
for a large-scale conflict, say, with, the U.S.S.R.

Foreign

Minister Hirota finally succeeded in arranging an agreement on March 23, 1935 for purchase of the Chinese
Eastern Railway from the Soviet Union, although at one
time the military seemed bent on taking it over by force.

General Araki's demands for greater arms expenditures

demagogic pleas for vast subsidies to
relieve the farmers. In this matter, as well as the issue of
higher taxes on the big concerns, Finance Minister Takaconflicted with his

hashi had listened to Araki's extravagant proposals but

quietly shelved their practical application. In the summer
of 1935 General Hayashi, after more than a year in the
Ministry, undertook a general transfer of extremist

War

army officers from key posts. The purge started at the top
with General Mazaki, Inspector-General of Military Education and, since General Muto's death, the closest asso-

The assassination on August 12, 1935 of

Lieutenant-General Nagata, the official directly charged
with the task of carrying out shifts in army personnel,
constituted a vigorous return thrust by the army extremists. General Hayashi
resigned from the War Office; he
ciate of Araki.

was replaced by General Kawashima, who put a stop to

the purge. The struggle was then transferred to North
China where Major-General Doihara, one of the original

"young colonels" of the extremist movement, staged the

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

five-province

autonomy movement

in

215

November-December

1935. Foreign Minister Hirota, during the preliminary

conferences with the War and Navy Offices, 24 had been

forced into grudging assent to the scheme. He had adroitly

managed to bring it to a halt, as soon as the moderates be-

came worried by the growing opposition from China and

the Western powers.
While the capitalist interests had kept their grip on the
advisory posts to the Emperor and had largely reasserted
their dominance in the Cabinet, one difficulty still remained. The Seiyukai, the more extremist of the two
major

parties, controlled a majority in the

the Diet.
1934, the

had been

When
first

the

steps

taken.

lower house of

Okada Cabinet was formed on July

toward a change in

As in the previous

7,

this state of affairs

Saito Cabinet^ three

and two to the

Admiral Okada
had chosen Mr. Takejiro Tokonami and two of his followers, all of whom were members of a clique opposed to
Dr. Suzuki, president of the party. This action tended to
discredit Dr. Suzuki, who was one of the founders of the
Kokuhonsha and supposedly had pro-army leanings. It
also contributed to the disruption of the Seiyukai, which
proceeded to expel all members who supported Mr. Tokonami. Finally, since Home Minister Fumio Goto, one of
the bureaucrats appointed to the Cabinet, had Minseito
leanings, the Okada government was obviously establishministries were allotted to the Seiyukai
Minseito. From the Seiyukai, however,

ing

its

parliamentary support on a Minseito

followers of Mr.

Tokonami.

basis,

plus the

was apparently
an
in
to
with
election
order to wipe
go through
prepared
out the Seiyukai majority. This became even clearer when
Mr. Tokonami and his adherents organized a new third
party, called the Showakai. Since the Seiyukai had proved
24

See Chapters II and

III.

If necessary, it

JAPAN IN CHINA

216

Okada government had permitted the Diet,

elected in February 1932, to live out its
been
had
which
full four-year term. An election, therefore, fell due in
tractable, the

February 1936, in accordance with statutory requirement.

Following reassembly on January 21, after the usual
winter recess, the Diet was dissolved as soon as the
Premier and Finance Minister had finished reading their
declarations on administrative policy. The step was forced
by the Seiyukai, which sought a vote of non-confidence in
order to use the Diet as a sounding-board for announceof its campaign stand. An interesting reflection of
the actual political status, prior to the election, is supplied
by editorial comment of a leading bourgeois journal to

ment

the effect that "Japan today is in a peculiar condition

with respect of business and industry being immune from

any high degree of political unsettlement. This is entirely

due to the general assumption that, no matter who is
entrusted with the steering of the ship of state, he will
have to follow the policy of Finance Minister Korekiyo
Takahashi, insofar as that concerns economic and financial affairs/' 25 In the election which followed the Seiyukai
was roundly defeated, as shown in the table.
Results of the General Election, February 20, 1936

At Dissolution

Parties

Minseito

Showakai
Seiyukai

Kokumin Domei
Shakai Taishuto
Local Proletarians

Elected

Change

127
25

205
20

+78

242
20

174

68

15
18

+15

5
5

Independents

10

31

Vacancies

39

4~ 21
39

466

466

Total
The Oriental

215

Economist, Tokyo, February 1936, p. 70.

-j-

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

217

Virtually every feature of these returns witnessed to the

running of a strong anti-Fascist tide in the electorate. The
affected several of its party
leaders, including Dr. Suzuki, who failed of reelection.
seats

lost

by the Seiyukai

The Kokumin Domei,

or Nationalist League, a rightwing party organized by the Kenzo Adachi who had
wrecked the last Minseito government, lost five seats. An

number of right-wing candidates stood

most of them suffered disastrous defeats. On

unusually large
for election;

the other hand, aside from the Minseito successes, the

Shakai Taishuto> or Social Mass Party, gained fifteen new
seats, while three additional proletarian candidates were

Tokyo. Labor representatives polled nearly

700,000 votes, as against 268,000 in February 1932. Most
of the independents were liberals rather than reactionaries, including the veteran liberal Yukio Ozaki; while in
the great majority of cases the heaviest votes cast were
elected in

polled by the Shakai Taishuto, the Tokyo proletarians,

and the independents. The Minseito, combined with the
Showakai, the labor members, and the liberal independents, commanded an absolute majority in the lower
house of the new Diet. The policies of the Okada Cabinet
were thus vindicated; if a new Cabinet were to be formed,
it would probably witness an increase of party influence.

To

their strongholds at court and their growing control

in the Cabinet, the moderates had now added the Diet,
thus closing the last parliamentary door to the army extremists. Unless the military were willing to admit defeat,
they were forced to take direct steps either through inde-

pendent action in the field or a frontal attack at home.

The latter course was chosen. Its results are detailed in the
following

official

version of the February

2 6th

incident,

on March 4 by the martial law headquarters:

"Early on the morning of February 26, officers and men

issued

JAPAN IN CHINA

218

Regiment of the Imperial Guards

and grd Infantry Regiments and the
7th Field Artillery Regiment, numbering about 1,400,
left their barracks without authorization and in violation

of the 3rd Infantry

Division and the ist

of military discipline. In the insurrection that followed

they attacked the official residence of Premier Keisuke

Okada; the private residence of Viscount Makoto Saito,

Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal; the private residence of
General Jotaro Watanabe, Inspector-General of Military
Education; the quarters of Count Nobuaki Makino, the
Itoya at Yugiwara; the official residence of General Kantaro Suzuki, Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty; and the
private residence of Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi. They killed Viscount Saito and General Watanabe
and seriously wounded Chief Aid-de-Camp Suzuki and
Finance Minister Takahashi. They then took up positions
in the neighborhood of Nagata-cho, Kojimachi Ward,
Tokyo, and cut off all traffic, within and without. Their

aim, according to their declaration, was to exterminate at

this moment of great crisis at home and abroad the archtraitors who were destroying the national polity, such as
the Genro, statesmen close to the Throne, financial mag-

nates,

military

cliques,

bureaucrats,

and members of

political parties.

the outbreak of the incident, the garrison comdirected the units in the city to maintain order.

"Upon

mander
At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, wartime garrisoning under
the jurisdiction of the ist Division was ordered. Units
from Kofu, Sakura, Mi to, Takasaki and Utsonomiya were
meanwhile called to Tokyo, and on their arrival the same
night they placed themselves under the direction of the
garrison commander. The next day, on February 27, it
was decided to apply part of the martial law ordinance to
the City of Tokyo. Martial law headquarters were set

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

219

up. Lieutenant-General Kohei Kashii, commander of the

Tokyo Garrison, was appointed commandant of the martial law area and ordered to have his forces restore peace

and order in the

capital. It

was feared that the taking of

forcible measures to suppress the insurgents would result

in bloodshed. Had an unfortunate situation arisen in

which an exchange of shots would have been unavoidable,

unfathomable damage would have been caused and evil
effects produced on the public mind, for the locality involved was in the neighborhood of the Imperial Palace,
the mansions of Imperial Princes, various Government
offices, foreign diplomatic establishments and many private residences. To avoid this, the insurgents were surrounded and placed under heavy guard.
'Tor three days, their superior officers and colleagues
endeavored to the best of their ability to persuade the
insurgents to return to their barracks quietly, but they
refused to listen. At last, on February 28, in view of their
disobedience to the Imperial commands, the martial law
headquarters were compelled to decide on forcible means
to liquidate the situation.

That

night, re-enforcements

were summoned from Utsunomiya, Matsumoto, Mito,

Sendai and Wakamatsu. Upon arrival in Tokyo, they
were placed under the direction of the martial law commandant. On the morning of February 29, residents in the
neighborhood of Nagatacho, Kojimachi Ward, were ordered to refuge. All traffic in the city was suspended, and
other preparations were made for forcible settlement of
the issue. At the same time, airplanes and tanks were sent
out to distribute handbills among the insurgents in order
to give them a last chance to surrender. As a result, noncommissioned officers and men gradually laid down their
arms in groups, and by afternoon almost all had given
themselves up. They were disarmed and sent back to their

JAPAN IN CHINA

220

Of the ringleaders of the insurNonaka

Shiro
disposed of himself, and the ma-

barracks for confinement.

rection,

were confined in military prisons.

Thus, without any exchange of fire, the insurgents were

jority of the others

26

quelled."
What in this statement

is

described as the

aim of the

insurgents constituted, in reality, their method. Their

dicobjective was nothing short of a full-fledged military

which they hoped to establish after physical

extermination of the moderate leaders of the government
and court. During the first day or two of the rebellion,
it seemed not unlikely that the ruling groups would be
tatorship,

constrained to accept this result. Many high officers of

the army, including War Minister Kawashima, tacitly

supported the revolt; army extremists, such as Generals

Araki and Mazaki, openly came forward as mediators
between the rebels and the court. Prince Chichibu, hurriedly summoned to Tokyo from his division at Hirosaki
in the north, was thought to be persona grata with the
extremists. The moderate leaders were either dead, scattered or in hiding. On the other hand, the rebellion failed
awaken a popular response, hardly surprising in view
of the clear expression of public opinion in the election
to

of six days before. The army extremists, moreover, hesitated to take the dangerous step of calling out other
military units to assist the rebels; in the face of this hesitation,

many

officers

who sympathized with

the aims of

the uprising were impelled to protest against its methods.

Thus the army was disunited, while the navy was definitely hostile. After a period of confusion and perplexity,
the court circles realized these facts; they then mobilized

the navy, called in safe detachments of the army,

forced the rebels to surrender.
28

The Oriental Economist, March

1936, p. 136.

and

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

221

passed momentarily to the modhad been severe, particularly in respect

of Takahashi, who succumbed to his wounds on February
26, and of Viscount Saito. For a time Premier Okada was
also thought to have been killed; not until February 29
was it disclosed that his brother-in-law, Colonel Denzo
Matsuo, who resembled him, had been mistakenly killed
in his stead. Following Admiral Okada's reappearance,
Prince Saionji and Count Makino were called into consultation by the Emperor. The opportunity to form a new
Cabinet was offered on March 4 to Prince Konoye, who
declined on the plea of ill-health and lack of ability to
cope with the crisis. Koki Hirota, former Foreign Minister, then assumed the task. His first choices, announced
on March 6, included a set of liberal Ministers, who, if
they had been confirmed, would have constituted a Cabinet not dissimilar to that under Admiral Okada. This
result was immediately forestalled by army pressure.
After their initial set-back, the army leaders had quickly
reorganized their lines and rallied for a counter-attack.
On March 7 the seven ranking generals on the Supreme
War Council resigned en bloc. Four of these generals,
comprising Araki, Mazaki, Hayashi and Abe, withdrew
from active service. The remaining three were appointed
to executive posts: Terauchi to the War Ministry, Uyeda
to the proconsulship in Manchoukuo, and Nishi to the

The

erates.

initiative

Their

now

losses

Inspectorate-General of Military Education. Having carried through this voluntary purge, the army command

held a vantage point from which it could exert renewed

pressure on the moderates. General Terauchi's refusal to

assume the

War

Ministry wrecked the Cabinet line-up

Hirota.
In particular, the army opposed
by
proposed
of
appointment
Shigeru Yoshida, son-in-law of Count
as
Makino,
Foreign Minister; of Naoshi Ohara, who in
first

JAPAN IN CHINA

222

the previous Cabinet had insisted on prosecuting the

assassins of Premier Inukai, as Minister of Justice; and of
Dr. Hiroshi Shimomura, editor of the then liberal Tokyo
Asahi, as Overseas Minister. After three days of negotiation with the army leaders, Hirota dropped all three of
these appointees. General Terauchi also refused to allow

Mr. Kawasaki, a Minseito party man,

Ministry, which was finally awarded

to
to

occupy the Home

Keinosuke Ushio,

a non-party bureaucrat and member of the

Instead of five party members as before, the

Kokuhonsha.
new Cabinet
and these in

two from each party,

the
posts. Important changes also occurred among
inner circle of the Emperor's advisers. Baron Ikki resigned
as president of the Privy Council; he was succeeded by
Baron Hiranuma, founder of the Kokuhonsha -a decided advance by the extremists. In the Imperial Household Ministry, however, the moderates retained control
through the appointment of Kurahei Yuasa as Lord Privy
contained only four

minor

Seal,

in place of the

Tsuneo Matsudaira

as

murdered Viscount
Minister of

and of
the Imperial HouseSaito,

hold.

This counter-offensive by the military was carried out

in the midst of a
currents.

number

of contradictory political cross-

The

movement

revolt led to a temporary eclipse of the

that had been led by the army extremists, as

typified by Generals Araki and Mazaki. The latter was

kept under unofficial detention for more than a year after
the February events; not until October
1937 was Mazaki
cleared
of
in
the
rebellion.
The minor
officially
complicity
officers who openly led the
revolting soldiers, however,

were executeda sharp contrast to the leniency

displayed
toward offenders in the earlier terrorist outbreaks.
Popular reaction was no less
pronounced. Whereas, in previous
cases, there was general sympathy for the
"patriotic" mo-

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

223

tives of the terrorists, in this case public condemnation

was virtually unanimous. An outgrowth of this sentiment
was the marked alienation between the army and the
people which soon developed. On the other hand, the
revamping of the Hirota Cabinet was passively accepted,
both by the public and the ruling elements. The leaders

of the political parties, forgetting their election pledges,

played for peace at any price and offered no resistance to

General Terauchi's demands. Even the Social Mass Party

avoided an appeal to the people; instead, through its
general secretary, Hisashi Aso,

it

declared that

from "hasty commentary." The court

circles

it

abstained

and the

capi-

content with suppression of the rebellion, sought

to defend their own narrow interests and shunned a headon collision with the army, chief pillar of the regime.
talists,

Under

these circumstances, and despite popular antipthe

athy,
part played by the military in the Cabinet
became far more influential than at any time in the

previous

five years.

Under

the cautious

and conservative

leadership of General Terauchi, with far greater unified

support from the army as a whole, the military-fascist

movement now proceeded

the

top.

Terrorism was

to

work

for

its

eschewed and

objectives
its

from

exponents

curbed, except as a latent threat held over the heads of

the moderates to force acceptance of demands presented
in the Cabinet. Aside from revising the ministerial personGeneral Terauchi had exacted a number of pledges
from Hirota in the course of the negotiations leading

nel,

to formation of the

new government. These

along four major

vastly larger appropriations for

establishments, to be financed by

the

military-naval

pledges were

lines:

heavier taxation; definite steps toward a controlled economy, beginning with nationalization of certain selected
enterprises; a revision of the parliamentary structure;

and

JAPAN IN CHINA

2*4

The

a "positive" foreign policy.

full outlines of this pro-

gram did not become apparent until toward the close of

Hirota's term of office. Nevertheless, its implications were
immediately grasped by the capitalists, as indicated by
the mingled note of hope and dread in the following
editorial comment: "While it is true that Mr. Hirota
made a certain revision of his Cabinet program on the
advice of General Terauchi, to brand the General's action
as military meddling shows lack of a correct conception
of the circumstances. It would be rash to conclude that
this conceded fact presages the Hirota government's taking orders from the Army so as to become its puppet
and adopt fascistic economic measures. To be sure, some
entertain varied ideas, and it
a few are sympathetic with
would not be surprising
views akin to the fascist ideal. But this is not true of the

among

the

army

officers

if

larger section

of

the

Army. Even those who advocate

have no concrete plans prepared in such

a form to suit the practical needs of this country, for
ready application. Viewed from the angle of Japan's social
structure, entirely dissimilar from Italy's, whether better
fascist principles

or worse, conditions are lacking to make a similar evolution possible. Even granted that the Army lorded it over
the Cabinet, it is entirely unthinkable that social and
economic changes of any magnitude might occur. Moreover, neither is the Army equal to such a task, nor has
it the intention to undertake it." 27

The
ment
office,

reaction in Japanese business circles to the stateon March 9, the day the government assumed

issued

by the new Finance Minister, Eiichi Baba, belied

these optimistic views.

read as follows: "Our
state that
27

The

first

sentence of this statement

Government finances are in such a

not only are curtailments probably impossible,

The Oriental Economist, April

1936, p. 213.

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

225

but one must be prepared for increased expenditure, as

the country stands in need of pushing its Manchurian
policy, amplifying the national defense, effecting the economic regeneration of agrarian and fishing communities,
and enforcing other important State policies so as to build
strength and reserve resources." From this
starting-point, the Finance Minister went on to advocate

up national

the need for continued heavy borrowings, fundamental

reforms in the system of taxation so as to increase reve-

nues and distribute burdens more

fairly,

and cheap money

to facilitate industrial prosperity and bond financing. 28

Here, at last, was a Finance Minister who understood the

army's requirements.
Its effect

on business proved

unsettling.

The

journal

quoted above observed that "the Baba announcement was

received as though it were a bombshell in the financial
community. After an extended closure, from February 26
to March 9, stock exchanges reopened throughout the
country on March 10, the day after the formation of the
new Cabinet, and a stampede developed. The Baba statement was held directly responsible. There were some
rallies during the next two days, but on the igth shares
again slumped violently, conditions for a time verging
on panic. This unsettlement lasted only a short while, and

towards the end of the month a seeming composure returned to the market, although below the surface there
still lurked some feeling of nervousness and uncertainty,
stock prices being held down at low levels.
Share
.

vulnerability, however, was not by any

to the Finance Minister's statement.

and agitated
ment had made up
stirred

28

For

p. 212.

also
its

means solely due

The market was

by a rumor that the new govern-

mind

full text of the statement, see

to exert control of a fascist

The

Oriental Economist, April 1936,

JAPAN IN CHINA

226

industries. In particular, rumor said, eleccoal

mining, sugar and fertilizer industries
power,
One prominent feature of the
be
nationalized.
might

type over

many

tric

Baba statement which proved a particularly discouraging

financial

factor

was the reference to the forthcoming

And what aggravated the situation
rumor that the Finance Depart-

boosting of taxation.
was the circulation of the

ment had up its sleeve a program of drastic tax increase,

so as to make good its chiefs announcement." 29 These,
however, were merely the first difficulties which the financial

community was

to

have with the

Cabinet's

new

outlook; the later issues came to a head with the Baba

budget and the proposal to nationalize the electric power
industry.

During the early months of the Hirota government,

General Terauchi made extraordinary efforts to counteract the hostile popular sentiment toward the army. In his
speech to the prefectural governors at Tokyo on March
26, he had specifically deplored the loss of "social support" suffered by the army as an aftermath of the February uprising. Serious steps were taken to rectify this

The young

involved in the revolt were

Four ranking generals on the
Supreme War Council were retired, and three shifted to
new posts. These personnel shifts, ordered immediately
after suppression of the uprising, were the first of many
situation.

court-martialled

and

officers

shot.

that took place throughout the spring. Generals Minami,

Kawashima, and Honjo were also retired, as well as four

Lieutenant-Generals and

five

Major-Generals, bringing

the total retirements in the top ranks to sixteen. In March

wholesale shifts and a number of retirements were en-

forced
this
IJO

among

the lower-rank

officers.

Terauchi

purge to concentrate control in his

The Oriental

Economist,, April 1936, p. 212-213.

own

utilized

hands, as

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

227

well as to strengthen army unity. He removed not only

those who supported the rebels, but officers who had
connections with the court circle. He also succeeded in

revoking the ordinance which had permitted generals on

the reserve list to become Minister of War, and this at a
time when the number of generals in active service had

become very

limited.

The army was

thus regrouped and

to a certain extent consolidated.

These measures somewhat relieved the apprehension of

the bourgeois moderates but they awoke no popular response, despite the wide publicity which attended the

purge and the "restoration of discipline" in the army.

Mainly for this reason, martial law was prolonged for
nearly six months until the middle of July. Under its
provisions, the press was rigidly controlled and opposition
voices silenced. Government authorities, both local and

national, strenuously attempted to change the humor of

the masses. Labor demonstrations on May i were banned.

These

efforts

were aided in some

cases

by leaders of the

Further steps in this direction were taken

the
during
extraordinary Diet session which convened on
political parties.

May 4, 1936. Departing from his customary formally prescribed speech, the Emperor included in the opening
address the following words: "We regret the outbreak of
the recent incident in Tokyo. It

is

expected of

Our

faith-

ful subjects that they will unite as one, government and

people, civilians and military, to promote the develop-

ment

of national prosperity."

This unprecedented Im-

perial intervention was a rebuke to the army, but it served

at the same time to soften the popular resentment against

the military. General Terauchi reinforced this effect by

roundly declaring that soldiers should place limits on

their interest in politics.

JAPAN IN CHINA

2*8

Nevertheless, several reactionary bills were introduced

law was
this session of the Diet.

under army pressure in

passed for the protection and surveillance

of

persons
their
after
release
with
"dangerous thoughts"
charged
from prison; this measure strengthened the notorious

Peace Preservation

Law

of 1925,

which had made

it

crime to organize associations designed to alter Japan's

national polity or repudiate "the system of private ownership of property." The army then sought to pass a Mobilization Secrets Bill and a Seditious Literature Bill, both of
which could have been utilized to stifle freedom of speech
and the press. These bills met with intense opposition.
The first was eventually abandoned while the second was
passed, with amendments which weakened its force and

made

it

apply solely to emergency situations, only after

the Diet session had been prolonged for two days.

opposition to these bills, both within the Diet and

The
from

the general public, reflected a dissatisfaction with the

Hirota government which steadily increased. It also wit-

nessed to General Terauchi's failure to moderate popular

suspicion of the army's motives and activities.

Although the government came under severe fire at

notably in a fiery speech by Mr. Takao Saito,

this session,

member of the Diet, excoriating army activand defending parliamentarism, 30 it did not give way
hand. The session had been summoned mainly to pass

a Minseito
ities
its

working budget, but since the government limited itself

minor revisions of the last budget framed by Mr. Taka-

to

hashi, the new principles of Finance Minister Baba were

not yet applied. On the other major issues of
parliamentary "reform" and foreign policy, the Cabinet restricted
80

For summary of

p. 10-11.

this speech, see

The

Trans-Pacific,

May

14,

1936,

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

itself

to

safe

generalities.

229

All these questions assumed

great prominence during the

Premier Hirota's speeches

autumn months.

had from the beginning

stressed the need for "renovations" and "reforms" in the
administrative structure. These euphemisms were understood on all sides to stand for modifications of parliamentary government in the direction of suppression of
party influence and increase of army control. At the
special May session of the Diet, attacks were already made
on certain rumored proposals of this nature. The army,
it was said, would
push for the establishment of a Minister without Portfolio, in whose hands would be concentrated problems of state reorganization and wartime
economics. Then it was declared that the army would

demand

the fusion of certain Ministries, especially those

control, with a view to reducing the total

under party

number

to five or six, 31 It

Ministry of Aviation
posals,

rumor
sions,

was

also believed that a

new

would be

however, remained

established. All these proin the field of conjecture and

until the autumn. Meanwhile two policy commisaside from a previously organized Parliamentary

System Investigation Commission which contained Diet

members, had been set up within the Cabinet. Toward
the end of October the press reported a set of reform
proposals which was said to be receiving strong backing
from the army authorities. This scheme, as reported, provided for the organization of an inner Cabinet to be
composed of only a few Ministers; separation of the
legislative and executive powers in such a way as to deny
a political party the right to organize a government;
annulment of the Diet's right to impeach a government
by vote of non-confidence; abolition of universal suffrage

by enfranchising only the head

31

The Japan

Advertiser,

September

of a family or a person

30, 1936.

JAPAN IN CHINA

230

who had

served in the army; and functional instead of

territorial representation.

32

Publication of these proposals raised a storm of protest.

General Terauchi, on November 6, and Premier Hirota,
on November 16, both made statements tending to allay
unrest.
suspicion, but only succeeded in intensifying the

The

System

Parliamentary

Investigation Commission
the War Minister.

demanded an explanation from

finally

General Terauchi at first rejected the demand but eventuto

ally, following Premier Hirota's intervention, agreed
attend an informal meeting of the Commission. At this
meeting, on December 2, General Terauchi denied the
authenticity of the news reports and indicated that an
individual in the military affairs bureau of the War Department, from whom the reports had emanated, had
his imprudent conduct. He
some are engaged in spreading the

been properly punished for

then stated:

rumor

".

that the

Army

bent upon a revision of the

is

Constitution or the abolition of the Diet, which

course, absolutely without foundation. The Army

is,

is

of

op-

posed to the operation of the parliamentary institution

along democratic ideas of the Western type. It is hoped
that the Diet and the Election Laws will be so amended
that fair popular opinion

and national

intellectual facul-

be given full opportunity for their demonstration. It is keenly desired that a constitutional
government
based on a Constitution which is all our own be allowed
to develop/' 33 The Hirota Cabinet's efforts to secure
parliamentary reform ended at this point, with an aroused
ties shall

public opposition in full cry and the

covering his retreat.
32
The Japan Advertiser, October 30, 1936; also The

War

Minister

Oriental Economist,

December
38

also

For

1936, p. 750.
full text, see

The

Trans-Pacific,

The

Oriental Economist,

Decembers,

1936, p. 25-26.

December

1936, p. 751;

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

231

Premier Hirota's "positive" foreign policy had also

reached an impasse by the middle of December. The
prolonged Sino-Japanese negotiations, initiated at Nanking by Ambassador Kawagoe three months earlier, had
34 Failure
of the China
produced no tangible results.
negotiations coincided with equally serious diplomatic
complications which had arisen over the German-Japanese
anti-Communist pact, concluded on November 25, 1936.
Abroad, especially in Great Britain and the United States,
the pact met with an exceedingly unfavorable reaction.
Apprehension over its possible effects was also felt by the
Japanese public. These feelings became even more pro-

nounced when the U.S.S.R. refused to ratify the SovietJapanese fisheries agreement, which had just been
brought to final form after lengthy negotiations. The
of the Foreign Minister's diplomacy was
under
review by the Privy Council on December
brought
10, when Mr. Arita was quizzed by members of this body.
As to China, he told the Privy Councillors that the negotiations had reached a deadlock but had not actually
broken down; by mentioning the Suiyuan invasion, he
indirectly suggested that the army was responsible for the

''clumsiness"

lack of diplomatic results at Nanking. He admitted that

efforts to explain Japan's position on the anti-Communist

pact to Great Britain were "being made under unfavorable conditions." In the matter of the Soviet Union, he

promised to consult further with the Privy Council if it

proved impossible to sign the fisheries agreement before
the year was out. 35 The results finally attained by Mr.
Arita on these questions were meager enough. On December 29 the Soviet Union agreed to extend the old
<*
85

See Chapters III and IV.

For a summary of this examination of the Foreign Minister, see

Trans-Pacific,

December

17, 1936, p. 14.

The

232
fisheries

JAPAN IN CHINA
agreement, which was much less

favorable than

one year; while at Nanking the

the new
best that could be secured was the settlement, effected
on December 30, of the Chengtu and Pakhoi incidents,
instrument, for

with no political concessions attached.

Minister Baba's
The
application of Finance
practical

new program had meanwhile

created equally burning

issues in the economic sphere. In July Premier Hirota
had decided that budgetary considerations should rank

second to the formulation of important national policies,

Takahashi

vs.

Baba Budgets

(in millions

of

Takahashi

yen)

Baba

May 1936

193 5 -3 6

x 93 6 ~ 37

I 93 (>~37

* 937 -3 s

Gains

Per
Cent

1,443

38.9

Ordinary revenue
Loans
Total revenue

1,598

1,608

2,234

626

772

680

704

806

102

14.5

2,215

2,312

3,041

1,1 55

1,252

1,632

Navy
(Army and Navy

493
530

508
552

508
552

728
681

729
380
220

31.5

Administrative expenses.

2,278
1,218

1,023

1,060

1,060

1,409

Total expenses

2,215

2,278

2,312

3,041

Army

130
349
729

30.4
43.3
23.6
32.9)

31.5

which should be threshed out in the Cabinet. The various Ministries immediately drew up a long list of expensive projects, all of which were professed to be supremely
advantageous to the national welfare. Of these, the armynavy replenishment programs and the proposal to nationalize the electric

attention.

The

latter

power industry attracted the most

scheme, which had been drafted

under army influence, was vigorously attacked by the

and after months of acrimonious
was
controversy
temporarily shelved. Hostilities on the
economic front became more general when the full terms
of the Baba budget, approved by the Cabinet on Novemprivate interests affected

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

233

her 27, were announced. The accompanying table shows

the comparative figures of the last two Takahashi budgets,
the working budget adopted in May 1936 which slightly
increased Takahashi's estimates for 1936-1937, and the

Baba budget.

The

last

budget prepared by Mr. Takahashi, that for

1936-37, levied no additional taxes. Allowing merely for

the natural increase in revenue, it covered a 63 million
yen net increase in expenditures by a 154 million net

increase of revenues, thus permitting a reduction of 91

millions in borrowings. The increases in the army and

navy expenditures were held down to 15 million and 22

million yen respectively, or a total of only 37 millions.
This conservative policy contrasted sharply with the Baba
budget, which was unprecedented both in total and in
respect to the army-navy estimates. The fact that armynavy expenditures swallowed most of the total increase is

masked by the apparent large increase in general administrative expenditure. This sum, however, was swelled by
a 220 million yen subsidy which the national treasury, as
an element in Baba's tax reform plan, was to extend to
the local and prefectural governments in order to permit
of a corresponding reduction in their tax burden. Omitting this amount, the actual increase in general admin-

expenditure was only 160 million yen, or 12.8

per cent, while the increase in national defense expenditure was 349 millions, or 32.9 per cent.
Along with this budget went a fundamental revision

istrative

of the Japanese taxation system, the details of

made public on September

22. 36

which were

The main

object of the
change was to effect a large total increase in the annual
revenue derived from taxation, thus reversing one of

Takahashi's cardinal policies. Other purposes were also

88

For

details, see

The Oriental Economist, November

1936, p. 690-692.

234
served, of

JAPAN IN CHINA
which one long advocated by the army was

to

relieve the agrarian community. To this end the land

taxes were not increased, while prefectural and local taxes

were to be reduced by some 220 million yen the first

year and 289 millions thereafter. The resulting deficit
in local government finances was to be made
good by
Treasury disbursements. This amount, as well as the
higher army-navy expenditure, had therefore to be met
by a wholesale boosting of nearly all tax rates. These
increases bore directly on the industrial and financial
communities in a number of ways. The rates on
corporation and individual income, on inheritance, on stock and
produce exchanges, and on business profits were raised;
while new levies were imposed on movable
property, on
the transfer of stocks and bonds, on
gasoline, and on
corporation capital and reserves. In view of the prosperity
for the monopoly concerns which attended the current
munitions and trade boom, as well as the
large profits
derived from underwriting the
government loans, these
measures did not appear objectionable. On the other
hand, the heavy additional burdens, both direct and indirect, imposed by the Baba tax reforms on the mass of
the people hardly bore out the Hirota Cabinet's
professed
policy of the "stabilization of the national livelihood."
The already low exemption limit of 1,200
yen for income
tax was reduced to 1,000
yen. In addition, a national sales
tax was introduced, while the excise duties
on sugar,
wheat-gluten, textiles, silk and woollen hosiery, felt manufactures and liquor were increased, tobacco sales
prices
were marked up by the government
monopoly, and postal
stamps and charges were raised.
This large advance in the direct and indirect levies
on

mass consumption was

additionally increased by an extensive tariff
readjustment, in which 964 out of a total

POLITICAL CRISIS IN JAPAN

of 1,610 items were affected. Rates were raised

235

on 692

items; 62 duty-free items were placed on the dutiable

and 210 were revised downward. 37 In view of the fact

list;

that

the benefits of the much-touted reduction of 220 million

were mainly derived by the middle and

upper agrarian strata, it would seem that the masses of
the Japanese people were paying far more than their

yen in

local taxes

proportionate share of the increased army-navy expenditure. Especially was this true since the economic position

and farmers, unlike that of the merchantindustrial-banking monopolies, had deteriorated during
of workers

the years of territorial expansion in China. 38 Finally, it

should be noted that the Baba budget, despite the tax

had still to be balanced by loans considerably

in excess of those called for by Takahashi's last budget.
Taken as a whole, the Baba budget met with no
increases,

insuperable objections from the capitalist groups, which

concentrated their attention on the elimination of certain

new

of the

tax proposals distasteful to them. In the coun-

try at large, however, this

disfavor,

and added

Cabinet created by

"war budget*' was viewed with

unpopularity of the Hirota

essays in parliamentary reform and

to the

its

When

a serious financial-economic crisis

foreign policy.
developed at the turn of the year, the position of the

Hirota Cabinet,
1937,
87
38

as it

appeared before the Diet in January

had become exceedingly vulnerable.

The
The

Oriental Economist, January 1937, p.

6,

agrarian crisis was but slightly mitigated in 1935 and 1936; as

for the workers, unemployment had declined but so had wage rates, while
the cost of living mounted slowly but steadily from 1931 to 1936. See the
wage-rate and cost-of-living tables in The Oriental Economist, 1931-1936,
passim.

CHAPTER SEVEN
JAPAN'S DRIVE

JAPANESE

TOWARD

FASCISM

first six
politics, for the

months of 1937,

was dominated by a parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggle of serious proportions, which turned almost
solely

on

Fascist issues.

The

lines of battle,

which were

gradually forming during the Hirota administration, became clear-cut under the Hayashi Cabinet. -Behind the
Fascist drive, giving it "propelling force",

was thrown the

determined political weight of the military.- The army

leadership, both in personnel and methods, had accomplished its divorce from the strong-armed gangsterism of
the previous epoch. Generals Terauchi, Sugiyama, and
others of their group had "disciplined" the army extremists. In the process, the latter's aims had come to dominate
the greater part of the army command, including the
former moderate and conservative generals. This leadership had adjusted its policies not only to changed conditions in Japan but to new problems raised by the gradual
metamorphosis in world politics since 1931. In the early
years of the Manchurian invasion, Japan had virtually a
clear field in the Far East. The economic depression, and
the low level of European and American armaments,

prevented effective interference from that quarter; the

U.S.S.R. was militarily and economically weak and unprepared; China was disorganized and helpless. Five years
later the outlines of this picture
236

had changed in impor-

TOWARD

JAPAN'S DRIVE
tant respects.

gradual

The army

shift against

leaders

Japan

FASCISM

237

were conscious of a

in the Far Eastern balance of

power, resulting mainly from the arms programs of the

Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. They
felt that this shift was strengthening Chinese resistance
and undermining their drive toward hegemony in China.
Retreat or a settlement negotiated on the basis of the
status quo could not be tolerated. They chose, instead, to
enter

on the task
would

a level that

of bringing Japan's armaments

restore the pre-igsG balance of

up

to

power

in East Asia.

The goal set by the army necessarily demanded serious

innovations in Japan's national economy; above all, it
required an immense expansion of Japanese heavy industry. To accomplish this task, the mobilization of
Japan's entire financial resources had to be effected. Five
years earlier, the resistance of the financial community
would have negatived any such attempt at the outset. In

the interim, the business prosperity attendant on the

trade boom had enlarged the scope of possible internal
financing.

The moderate

inflationary policy of Finance

Minister Takahashi, combined with the refusal to in-

had apparently provided resources which

could now be tapped to expand heavy industry. Even
more important, the enlarged armaments budgets since
1932 had given the army a strong ally in the group of
industrialists whose products supplied the ever-growing
requirements of the War and Navy Ministries. The munitions manufacturers, ship-building firms and various
heavy industries, including mining, chemicals and metallurgy, were all directly concerned in war preparations.
Old industrial combines, such as Furukawa, Fujiwara and
Okura, tended more and more to acquiesce in the army's
program. New and vigorous industrialists, speculating on
crease

taxes,

JAPAN IN CHINA

238

the possibilities of the inflation and armaments boom,

to challenge the positions of the bigger houses,

had arisen
such

Mitsui and Mitsubishi. Of these the Aikawa

as

were outstanding. Nippon Sangyo Kabushiki

interests

(Japan Industrial Company, Ltd.) the Aikawa

holding company, was capitalized at 225 million yen. Its
associated enterprises included Nippon Mining Company,
with i60 million yen capital; Hitachi Works, manufacturing tools and machinery, at 118 million yen; and

Kaisha

Nissan Chemical Industrial Company, at 62 millions.

Through the Nippon Marine Products Company, capitalized at 91

million yen,

Aikawa had bought up the

Mitsui and Mitsubishi fishery interests and established

virtually a complete monopoly over the fishing industry,
1
including manufacture, refrigeration and catch. In his
business methods, Aikawa had brought a new technical
efficiency into industrial

management, and a vigor and

dash which contrasted with the safer and more conservaof the older houses. Somewhat similar,
on
a
smaller scale, were the activities of the
though
Noguchi interests, specializing in mining and heavy industry, and the Mori interests, with large investments in
tive

policies

the chemical industry.

Even these aggressive industrial promoters, it should
be noted, had hesitated to link themselves too closely to
the army extremists headed by General Araki. The new

army leadership, however, with its solid program of arms

and industrial expansion, found in them ardent supporters.

This evolution was not confined to industrial

upstarts; it

combines.
to a
1

much

had

also affected the older financial-industrial

The heavy

industries of Mitsui

and Mitsubishi,

greater extent than their parent financial cen-

For complete figures on the Aikawa enterprises, see The Japan Times,

December

15, 1937.

JAPAN'S DRIVE
ters,

TOWARD

gravitated toward support of the

FASCISM

239

army program. In

cases their representatives moved into controlling

positions in the older houses, as when Mr. Chichi, former

some

manager of the Mitsui Mining Company, was appointed

managing director of the Mitsui Bank. Younger men,
who rapidly pushed out the older leaders after 1932, were
coming to the fore in the traditional strongholds of orthodox finance. Their aggressiveness and ambitious designs
increasingly outweighed the counsels of caution advanced
new factor of basic significance
by the conservatives.

political struggle. The

solid wall of capitalist opposition to the army's internal

was thus introduced into Japan's

program, which had existed during Takahashi's reign

over the Finance Ministry, was crumbling. By 1937 important sectors of the business community were prepared
to join hands with the more conservative leaders who
had established their control over the army. This reactionary grouping, in order to defend and enlarge the
gains won by six years of aggression in the Far East, was
prepared to discount the strain that would be imposed
on Japan by an arms race with the first-class Powers.

Gathering up the reins of political power, it moved

steadily toward a series of fixed objectives. These included vastly larger armament expenditures, the expan-

meet the enlarged military-naval

of a semi-wartime controlled
establishment
requirements,
tax
and bigger deficit loans,
increases
economy, large
elimination of parliamentary influence in government,
sion of heavy industry to

and the complete suppression of all opposition voices.

The forces of the right were a compact and closely
knit minority. Linked firmly to the reactionary magnates
of finance and heavy industry, the army possessed the
advantages of initiative, position and driving political
power. The constituents of the liberal opposition were

JAPAN IN CHINA
the moderate business and financial groups,
the parties, and public opinion. At first glance it might
seem that such a combination was amply sufficient to
throw back the Fascist attack. In reality this opposition,
three-fold:

save for certain adherents in the inner circle of the Emperor's advisers, lacked any clearly articulated channels

through which its influence could be effectively brought

to bear on government policy. Political trends, both at
home and abroad, were undermining the strength which
the business conservatives had mustered during the earlier
onslaught of the army extremists. Their platform, no less
than that of the reactionary industrialists, was rooted in
economic necessity. The industrial and trading interests
of the Osaka area, specializing primarily in the products of
light industry, constituted the stable, cautious elements
of Japanese monopoly capital. Enriched by the export
boom and dependent on an uninterrupted flow of international trade, they looked askance at any influence that
threatened to upset the status quo. Like the conservative
centers of finance with which they were merged, they battened on the accomplished fact of territorial aggression
but fought shy of too risky or too costly military adventures. Budgetary disequilibrium, an abnormal commodity
price rise, runaway inflation, weakness of the yensuch
dangers could be curbed when it was a matter of local
military operations restricted to China, especially in the
weak and disorganized state. But these
difficulties attained formidable proportions when it be-

latter's previously

came

a question of inaugurating a vastly enlarged arma-

ments program, particularly one that attempted to keep

pace with the expanding preparations of the first-class
Powers, which now included Great Britain and the
United States as well as the U.S.S.R. At the end of
such a race, aside from its immediate strain on Japanese

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

241

economy, the conservative business circles foresaw the

likelihood of war with one or more of these Powers, or
a large-scale clash with China, and had no confidence in
the ultimate result.

These apprehensions were generally shared by the

Japanese public, which clearly sensed the dangers inherent in the army platform. If conservative capitalists struggled against a government-sponsored controlled economy,
the people were opposed to rising prices, increased taxes,

and the

offensive against their few remaining democratic

rights. If conservative business distrusted military

turism and swollen budgets and scented financial

advencrisis,

the people reacted against military conscription, service

in Manchuria, and the danger of war. But this coalition,

strong in numbers and outwardly powerful, was politically ineffective because the main levers of control rested
the hands of its opponents. The natural political
instrument to effect its policies was the parties, more
especially when the moderate business elements began
to lose their grip on the Finance Ministry. Since the
middle of 1932, however, the parties had been relegated
to a few of the minor Ministries and excluded from any

in

on policy. The promise of a new lease on

held
life
out to the parties by the election of February
30, 1936 had been withdrawn by the military uprising less
than a week later. In any case, the Minseito and Seiyukai
were far from homogeneous political entities; both contained elements that properly belonged in the reactionary

real influence

camp, and the same was true of the Social Mass Party.
These parties, even in combination, were an unstable
defense against the Fascist drive; only the strong antiFascist public opinion current at this period served to
force them to hew to the line of a fairly vigorous opposition.

Despite

its

inherent weaknesses and strategic

JAPAN IN CHINA

242

the
handicaps, the liberal opposition managed to obstruct
at
least
the
o
partially
military-fascist program
progress
until

June 1937.

When

the Diet

members reassembled

in January 1937,

after the customary holiday recess, they were provided

with a full store of ammunition for an attack on the
Hirota Cabinet. The lack of results attending the China
the German- Japanese
negotiations, the unpopularity of
the
over
Soviet-Japanese fisheries
pact, and the difficulties

agreement laid the government's foreign policy open to

General Terauchi's efforts to
emasculate parliamentary government by way of Diet
wholesale condemnation.

reform were generally resented by the public. Finally, the

prospect of the Baba budget, with its tax increases and
increased deficit financing, and the indications of a sizeable excess in the year's imports had led to an incipient
financial panic over the year-end.
sharp rise in prices
had set in. The Bank of Japan's index of wholesale com-

modity prices for January 1937, taking October 1899 as

100, stood at 233.3, the highest on record. This figure
represented an advance of 8.6 per cent over December
2
1936 and 21.6 per cent over January 193&. In December
1936 the Bank of Japan's retail price index was 2.26 per
cent higher than the previous month. When the yen
showed signs of weakness in December, a flight of capital

accompanied by speculative imports developed. The demand for imports was intensified by efforts to place orders
for shipment before the new tariffs went into effect. To
cope with this situation, the Finance Ministry subjected
import exchange on January 8 to a rigid licensing system.

The

resulting difficulty in obtaining import exchange

placed a
tiles
2

and

premium on import commodities,

textile

materials,

The Japan Times, February

especially tex-

and exaggerated the

6, 1937.

rise in

TOWARD

JAPAN'S DRIVE

FASCISM

243

prices. Underlying these untoward manifeswas the fear of a serious inflation, indicated by
difficulties in marketing government bonds and a decline

commodity
tations

in

bond

quotations.

The

vigorous attack launched on the Cabinet by party

members when the Diet reconvened in January immediately created a governmental crisis. None of the ranking
party leaders had sought this result, which was mainly the
of young progressive members in the two
major

work

In November the younger Minseito deputies had

in conference to devise means of overcoming
the party leaders' hesitancy in taking up General Terauchi's challenge on the Diet reform issue.
Representatives
parties.

twice

met

of this group, including Seiyukai

deputies, had been the
chief interlocutors of Terauchi before the
Parliamentary
System Investigation Commission. On the eve of the Diet

and Seiyukai deputies held a conference at which they decided to take a

strong stand
3
the
The
against
government.
interpellation of one of
session fifteen Minseito

these deputies, Kunimatsu Hamada of the

Seiyukai, was
the outstanding feature of the turbulent session in the

lower house of the Diet on January 21. In the course of

this speech,

Mr. Hamada declared: "Of

late the

army has

taken upon itself the role of 'the propelling force of the

nation/ and in all the recent major incidents it has made
this force felt. It

is true of the
May 1 5 incident, the February 26 incident, the dictatorial views broadcast by some
sections of the army from time to time, the
political views

expressed by the

War

Minister at the meeting of the Diet

System Inquiry Commission.

cal ideology

is

within the army, and there

stroying the
8

Thus

dictatorial politi-

at all times the

dam

that

is

set

is

undercurrent of thought
danger of this current de-

between the

Japan Weekly Chronicle, January

si, 1937, p. 66.

civil

and military

JAPAN IN CHINA
in accordance with the Imperial will. The people realize
this and are afraid. If the Hirota Cabinet is really to
enforce renovation of general administration, it must first
of all undertake the disciplining of the army, and at the
same time it must lift the heavy pressure brought to bear
the army. The present Cabinet, however,
weakness and indecision, is seeking its propel-

on the people by
through

its

ling force in a section of the army. Under a vague totalitarian banner, the Cabinet is feverishly trying to establish
administrative Fascism. ... In disregard of the capacity

has compiled an
enormous and abnormal budget and planned heavy tax
increases that are exceptionally crude and lacking in balof the people to bear the burden,

it

ance. Thus a general economic panic is threatening. By

rash economic control measures, it is brewing industrial
confusion. The general impasse in international relations

armed diplomacy

also a

product of the
When General Terauchi stated that
Fascist ideology."
words in this talk seemed "like an insult to some military
men," Mr. Hamada made a vigorous rebuttal and then
challenged examination of the stenographic record. If the
War Minister's charge were borne out, he was ready to
apologize by committing harakiri; if not, the former
should assume full responsibility. After the session, the
Cabinet obtained Imperial sanction to prorogue the Diet
for two days, January 22 and 23.
characterized by

is

Active political maneuvering featured the period of

prorogation. The ranking leaders of the Minseito and
Seiyukai denounced the step as unconstitutional. Within
the Cabinet, a sharp struggle was caused by the War
Minister's

demand

that the Diet be dissolved.

by reporters immediately
Terauchi refused
4

The Japan

all

Approached

after the Diet session,

comment except

Advertiser, January 22, 1937.

to say that

General
he had

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

245

taken "a firm resolve." On January 22, after conferring

with other army officers, he privately submitted his resignation, apparently in an effort to force the Premier to
dissolve the Diet. Navy leaders sought to arrange a compromise, and this attempt was seconded by the Emperor's
advisers.

The Cabinet was

divided,

and

at first it

seemed

War

Minister might have his way. Eventually, on

the
Cabinet submitted its resignation. In this
January 23,
first round the victory belonged to the parties, which had
that the

avoided dissolution by the army and thrown out the government. Despite his inglorious downfall, Hirota had won
and held new positions for the military-fascist drive: the

and surveillance

import exchange control, and the German-Japanese pact. More important, he

passed on the Baba budget to his successors. The Cabinet
had outlived its usefulness, even to the reactionaries. Its
support of the Fascist program had compromised it in

sedition

laws,

the eyes of the public, and the

army

let it fall.

General Kazushige Ugaki received the Imperial comto form the next Cabinet at one o'clock on the
morning of January 25. His choice came as a severe
shock to the army leadership. General Ugaki had recently
concluded a five-year term as Governor- General of Korea;
earlier, he had been War Minister in three Minseito cabinets. In 1925 he had forced through a reduction of the
standing army by two divisions. An emergency conference
of the army leaders, meeting as soon as Ugaki 's nomination became known, decided to oppose his efforts to form
a Cabinet. The reasons given for this stand were that

mand

Ugaki's views on the situation confronting the nation

fundamentally differed from those of the army, and that

under

his leadership they

could not succeed in strengthen-

ing military discipline. These two points were made explicit in later statements. For the first, he had "too many

JAPAN IN CHINA

246
ties

with the

status

quo camp, composed

of the parties,

he was
under suspicion of "having plotted a dictatorship/' 5 This
latter charge was understood to refer to Ugaki's implication in one of the abortive military coups during the
financial interests, et cetera*';

autumn of 1931From the determination

as

first

to the second,

taken, the

army

chiefs

never wavered through five days of intense political crisis.

The success with which this opposition was maintained
showed conclusively the extent to which General Teraujudicious personnel changes had riveted a stranglehold of his own on the army. Japan's military affairs have
"
traditionally been controlled by the occupants of the Big-

chi's

Three" positionsChief of the General Staff, Minister of

War, and Inspector-General of Military Education. 6 At
this time these offices were respectively held by Prince
Kanin, General Terauchi, and General Gen Sugiyama.
Prince Kanin had been a fixture at the Staff Office since
1932; by virtue of his rank, he was immune to political
changes. The latter two generals, since the eclipse of
Araki and Mazaki, had come to dominate the "upper
strata" of the army. They had been purging or disciplining the "middle strata", i.e., chiefly the former "young
colonels" of the extremist wing who had moved up to
the rank of major-general. The changes had been carried
out in such a way as to place adherents of the TerauchlSugiyama clique in key posts, until its influence had become paramount. In this process Terauchi's following had

become increasingly affected by extremist views; their

methods of a gradual advance toward Fascism through
government reform, though eschewing violence, equally
5

The Japan

Advertiser, January 23, 1937,

In the heyday of the extremists' power, General Araki was at the War
Office and General Mazaki in the Inspectorate-General of
Military Education.

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

247

involved them in efforts to gain control of the Cabinet.

All their actions were rationalized by the claim that they
contributed to renovation of the army.

Terauchi now held his stand despite the recognized

ability of Ugaki, and in face of the latter's overwhelming
support by the press, public, the parties and the business
world, as well as the Emperor's advisers. The full force of
the liberal opposition was mobilized against the militaryfascists, and was calmly waved aside. The army's "Big
Three" suggested the names of three men for War Min-

each of them declined the post. No others dared

come forward. Never before in Japan's constitutional history had the inability to appoint a civilian to the War
ister;

Ministry

testified so clearly to

the formation of a Cabinet. 7

the army's power to wreck

At times

it was thought that

General Ugaki would resort to Imperial intervention on
his behalf, but this critical step was not taken. On January
29, after announcing his determination to resign his rank

of full general on the retired list in protest against conditions in the army, 8 he finally abandoned his efforts to

form a Cabinet.

A statement by Ugaki, in the form of a note transmitted on the previous day to one of his old army assowas made public in the morning editions of the
papers but was immediately banned. Its essential portions
ciates,

Between 1912 and 1936 it was constitutionally possible to appoint a

general or a lieutenant-general on the retired list to the War Ministry.
Through General Terauchi's pressure, the ordinance which made this
possible had been repealed by the Hirota Cabinet a factor which
strengthened his position in this political crisis.
8
In submitting his resignation, he stated: "A general in the army,
whether on the first or second reserve list, must as long as he retains his
rank go to the front and command an army in the event of war. By
observing the attitude of the army since I received the Imperial command
to form a Cabinet, I have realized that I could not possibly discharge my
duty as a commander in the field. Thus I think I should hand in my
resignation."

The Japan

Advertiser, January 30, 1937.

JAPAN IN CHINA

248

"The

read:

present conditions in the

opinion are as you see. What I see

in authoritative positions in the

is

army and public

that only a few

men

army have formed a

group and are forcing their views on the authorities,

propagandizing as

if

their action represents the general

will of the army. The army belongs to the Emperor.

Whether their action during the last few days represents
the general will of the army of the Emperor or not is not

The

War

Minister by the Big

Three of the army was too formal and lacked sincerity.
Some of the officers in active service are willing to come
forward and cope with the present difficult situation but
too clear.

selection of a

What I can do in these circumstances

an abnormal measure. I have not thought
of requesting an Imperial message. I am very anxious
regarding the future of Japan and the future of the army
their

is

way

is

blocked.

to resort to

should

decline the Imperial

command.

believe that

Japan stands today at the crossroads between Fascism and

parliamentary politics. I am partly responsible for the
present condition in the army, which has become a political organization. I feel sorry for the Emperor because of
this state of affairs. Moreover, I greatly regret that the

army which
a pass.

have loved so long has been brought to such

." 9

period the party leaders showed themselves to be mainly interested in smoothing over the
difficulties with the army, instead of continuing the out-

Throughout

this

right struggle which they had begun on the floor of the

Diet. On January 27 Yukio Ozaki, the veteran liberal

deputy, proposed that the parties should assemble the

Diet, which was still formally in session, to pass a resolution expressing "the will of the people". This offer was

summarily rejected by the Minseito and Seiyukai leaders,

9
New York Herald Tribune, January 29, 1937.

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

249

preferred to watch developments passively. Mr.

Ozaki then proposed that the lower house should adopt
a resolution inquiring after the health of the Emperor.
With considerable qualms, the party leaders finally agreed
to allow the Speaker of the House to perform the errand
in his own capacity, but refrained from meeting in ple-

who

nary session to pass a resolution to this effect. On January

27 the Social Mass Party issued an innocuous statement
calling on both Premier-designate Ugaki and the army to
clarify their intentions with regard to national policy.
After the crisis was over, the Minseito put forth a declaration expressing sympathy with General Ugaki over his
difficulties

and asking the army

to clarify the reasons for

opposition. In conclusion, the declaration stated that

"the Minseito, together with the people, is keenly observing the situation." Surprised by the vigor of General
Terauchi's counter-attack, the parties had never resumed
its

the offensive after January 21.

The

strongly against them.

The new choice for Premier was

next moves turned

announced

late

on the

night of January 29. Prince Saionji's first nominee was

Baron Hiranuma, president of the Privy Council. The
latter 's

tremist
to the

army connections had been with the former exclique; knowing that he would be unacceptable
Terauchi group, he declined the

offer.

In evident

expectation of this refusal, Prince Saionji had suggested

an alternate choice. Shortly before midnight, General

Senjuro Hayashi was vested with the command to form a

Cabinet. The suggestions made by Saionji were indicative
of the new political current. Though Hayashi was not one
of the officers close to General Terauchi, he was far more
extreme in his views than Ugaki and to that extent more
acceptable. Nevertheless, difficulties at once arose over his
attempt to secure Lieu tenant-General Seishiro Itagaki,

JAPAN IN CHINA

250

chief of staff of the

sugu

as

Kwantung Army, and Admiral

War and Navy

Ministers.

The

''Big

Three"

Suetof the

army and the naval authorities strongly objected to these

men, who were both extremists of the first water, and
eventually induced Hayashi to accept Lieutenant-General
Kotaro Nakamura and Vice-Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai.

Considerable surprise was occasioned by the extremist

nominees at first advanced by the Premier-designate for
portfolios. The explanation offered
was that Shinji Sogo, chief of Hayashi's cabinet organization headquarters, had been planted in this strategic

the

War and Navy

position by the extremists in order to put over a vigorous

reform Cabinet. When the Premier-designate finally accepted the nominees of the Terauchi-Sugiyama clique,
Sogo withdrew from his post at Hayashi's headquarters.
This incident, however, shed further light on the new

Premier's

political

views,

hitherto

none

too

clearly

marked. Equally revealing was his ready acceptance of

the army's demand that the Cabinet should include no
party members. Three political leaders were approached
with an offer of Ministerial portfolios, but only on condition that they severed connections with their parties.
These men were Mr. Chikuhei Nakajima, a director of
the Seiyukai; Mr. Ryutaro Nagai, chief secretary of the
Minseito; and Mr. Tatsunosuke Yamazaki of the Showakai, a small third-party group. Of these, the latter
as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry,

office

signed from

his party; the other

accepted

and retwo refused the proffered

Ministries.

In

this

time of

trial the parties

received

little

support

from the capitalists. The latter centered attention on

reaching an agreement with the army over a Finance Minister who would be able to remove some of the
"iniquitous" features of the Baba budget. Mr. Toyotaro Yuki,

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

251

the compromise choice finally selected, summed up in his

person the basic political evolution that was taking place
in Japan's ruling circles. He was at the time president of
the Industrial Bank of Japan, and concurrently president
of the Japan

Chamber

of

Commerce and

Industry; in

earlier years, his connections were with such moderate

financial leaders as Inouye and Takahashi. His past ties

and undoubted

practical abilities reassured the conservative business-men, who trusted him to bridge over the

immediate
faction.

and revise the budget to their satishand Mr. Yuki had in recent years
the army, and was known to favor arms
expansion factors which won him the

difficulties

On

the other

drawn close to
and industrial

allegiance of heavy industry.

He

was thus uniquely fitted

interests and marshal them

to harmonize all capitalist

behind an economic program adapted to army requirements. Ten days later he appointed Mr. Seihin Ikeda,
former Mitsui managing director, as Governor of the

of Japan, a move equally symptomatic of the inroads of the reactionary platform in financial circles.

Bank

Ikeda himself had become an outspoken expansionist,

set about his task of channeling large

and vigorously

credits into the

development of heavy industry.

February 15 Yuki was already advancing proposals
a
revision of the Bank of Japan Act to enable the bank
for
to lend money directly to industrial enterprises and to

On

receive debentures

ment bonds and

and stock

shares, in addition to govern-

notes, as security for such loans. 10 Pend-

ing this revision, Ikeda had begun open market operations, featuring the purchase of government bonds by the
Bank of Japan, in order to augment funds at the disposal
of private banks for investment in industrial enterprises.
Still another figure in the new Cabinet was worthy of
10

The Japan

Advertiserf February 17, 1937.

JAPAN IN CHINA

252

Takuo Godo, president of the Showa

Works in Manchoukuo, was appointed Minister of
Commerce and Industry, with the object of pushing forward the campaign to make Japan self-sufficient in the
11
heavy metals. These appointments were made with one

note. Vice-Admiral
Steel

industrial producobject in view: to bring the nation's

tion up to a level that would match the large additions
to the armaments budget. Having won this major point,
was content to make certain concessions to the
the

army

big concerns on the new tax scheme, and to lessen

immediate pressure toward a controlled economy.
After two additional prorogations, made necessary by

Finance Minister Yuki's revision of the Baba budget, the

Diet reassembled on February 15. Lieutenant-Genera]
the War Minand General Gen Sugiyama
General Terauchi assumed the

Nakamura had meanwhile resigned from

istry

due

to serious illness,

had replaced him.

When

Inspectorate-General of Military Education, vacated by

Sugiyama, these key men had merely exchanged places in

two of the "Big Three" posts and thus retained dominance in the army. Their success in ousting party men
from the Cabinet constituted a bold advance toward exclusion of the parties from governmental authority, and
left the latter no option except to continue the
struggle.

Many

factors

combined

at the outset of this

to

weaken the

new period

parties' position

of conflict.

The Hayashi

Cabinet, as was customary, had issued a colorless declaration of policies, which offered small grounds for direct
attack. Taken aback by the army offensive, the leaders of
the major parties were inclined to hesitancy and com-

promise. This tendency was reinforced by the feeling that

11

Godo's first essay in unifying sales of Manchurian and

home-produced
pig-iron, however, seemed to have been drawn mainly with an eye to the
interests of the home producers and had to be
after

from the Kwantung Army.

dropppd

objections

'

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

253

Yuki's revision of the budget would conduce to the interests of their capitalist supporters; the generally passive
attitude of the Minseito and Seiyukai leaders was not
materially affected by pressure from the younger progresand from the left-wing parties. Throughout

sive deputies

the Diet session, the

army continued

to

hold the threat

of dissolution over the heads of the party leaders. Its force

was strengthened by efforts to disrupt the two major
parties

and organize a new

internal

Fascist party out of dissident

Seiyukai was in the throes of a serious
with a strong "reformist" faction under

The

elements.

crisis,

army influence disputing for leadership. When Dr. Kisaburo Suzuki resigned as president, the guidance of the
party had to be placed in the hands of a committee representing the several factions. Under these conditions, the
opposition during the Diet session was confined mainly to
occasional courageous criticism from individual deputies.
Finance Minister Yuki's handling of the budget in-

herited from Baba was admirably adapted toward restoring business confidence, while at the same time maintain-

ing untouched the enlarged armaments program. The

revised budget figures laid before the Diet for the 19371938 fiscal year aggregated 2,814 million yen, a reduction
of 224 millions over the Baba total. Army-navy expenditure stood unchanged at 1,409 million yen, although 46
millions of this total was to be postponed to the next
fiscal year.

The

reduction of 224 million yen was accom-

plished entirely on the civilian side of the budget, comprising 150 millions lopped off the projected grants to
local governments and 74 millions cut from the budgets
of the civilian Ministries. This latter sum, the sole actual

reduction

of

expenditure

in

the

new budget,

affected certain social welfare measures

projected in the Baba budget.

The

chiefly

which had been

proportion of the

JAPAN IN CHINA

254

budget taken by the defense

services

had thus increased

to slightly over half of the total. Bond emissions for general account aggregated 771 million yen, a reduction of

35 millions.

The Yuki budget was

still

slightly

more than 500

mil-

lion yen in excess of that for the preceding fiscal year, so

that ordinary revenue had to be increased by 441 millions.

In accomplishing this end, important changes were

made

in the taxation scheme which Baba had fostered. The two

new levies on property and on combined income instead
of on income at the source, which financial quarters had
particularly opposed, were eliminated. Propertied interests, however, were still affected by increases in income
tax,

emergency earnings

poration tax.
additional
prices,

tax,

The people

and the newly imposed corwere forced to assume

at large

burdens with respect to advanced tobacco

higher postal stamp charges, the

tariff increases,

new gasoline

tax,

and

increases in the liquor tax

and sugar

excise.

With Minseito and Seiyukai

support, and some slight

the
from
Social
Mass Party, the
opposition mainly
amended budget was adopted by the lower house on
March 8. Confidence inspired by Yuki, rather than the
nominal budgetary revision, exerted a marked psychological effect which speedily overcame the unsettlement
which had gripped Japan's business and financial circles
in December and January. The basic economic outlook
remained none too favorable. Commodity prices continued to soar and the increased excess of imports, already

much larger proportions during

months of 1937. On February 18 the Finance
Minister announced that recourse to shipments of gold
to balance Japan's international accounts, which had virnotable in 1936, achieved
the early

tually ceased for five years,

might have

to

be resumed.

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

255

Soon afterward the government forwarded 50 million yen

in gold to the United States, the first of successive shipments during later months as the import excess steadily
mounted. At the same time, business promotion in Japan
assumed proportions that had not been experienced in
many years. The Bank of Japan placed the volume of new
capitalizations for March at 489 million yen, an increase
of 327 millions over the preceding month and 442 mil-

lions

over March

1936.

Munitions industries led the

advance, with 89 millions for mining, 72 millions for

12
chemicals, and 39 millions for metals.
Speaking before
a committee of the lower house on March 26, Finance

Minister Yuki stressed the importance of extending indusproductive capacity; clearly, this policy was already
being effected. On the other hand, no important economic
control measures were passed. The Hirota Cabinet's plan
trial

power industry was allowed to

As
the "repletion of national
Yuki,
envisaged by
lapse.
defense" was to be obtained by private rather than governmental enterprise. The latter might be called upon
where costs loomed larger than profits. A bill to set up an
Imperial Fuel Industry Promotion Corporation, to conduct enterprises for the manufacture of artificial petroleum, was introduced in the Diet; although passed by the
lowr house, it had not yet been approved by the House
to nationalize the electric

of Peers

when

the session ended.

Several projects for administrative reform, which the

army was still intent on achieving, continued to attract
attention during this period.
number of Ministerial

were held concurrently

it was thought that this
fact signified -an intention to reduce the number of Ministries. In particular, it was feared that the Overseas

portfolios in the Hayashi Cabinet

for longer or shorter periods, and

**

The

Oriental Economist, April 1937, p. 201.

JAPAN IN CHINA

256

Ministry would be abolished, while the merging of Agriculture and Forestry with Commerce and Industry, and

Railways with Communications, was also rumored. The

army was further seeking to establish a General Affairs
Board within the Cabinet, professedly to coordinate Min-

and functions. This idea was borrowed

from Manchoukuo, where the General Affairs Board was
utilized by the Kwantung Army to dominate the government from behind the scenes. Finally, the long delay

isterial policies

in appointment of the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers or

Counsellors, one of which is usually attached to each
Ministry, was also viewed with suspicion by the parties.

These Counsellors were chosen from the Diet to help

maintain liaison between the executive and legislative
branches; they are to be distinguished from the ViceMinisters, who are administrative officials. In the end,
none of these various threats materialized, but they served
to maintain an undercurrent of hostility between the
deputies and the army throughout the Diet session.
A highlight of this guerrilla warfare was the publication on March i of a ten-point questionnaire, addressed
by Yukio Ozaki to the Cabinet, which flayed the army's
interference in politics. The ten questions, each of which
was accompanied by lengthy commentary, were as follows:

(i)

Why

are the true facts that caused the Hirota

Cabinet's resignation being kept a secret? (2) What were

the reasons that reputedly prompted the former War Minister to

demand

the Diet's dissolution?

(3)

What were

the facts that prevented General Kazushige Ugaki from

has the Cabinet failed to
forming a cabinet? (4)

Why

curb political opinion

among

the army?

(5)

Is

that fulfilment of the Imperial wish by General

it

true

Ugaki
was prevented entirely by the army? (6) Why has the
nation not known the authors of political opinion within

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

257

the army? (7) What are the actual circumstances which

enabled General Hayashi to form the present Cabinet?
Does the Cabinet intend to recommend to the
(8)
Throne an amendment of the system of appointing a
Premier? (9) Is the Cabinet in favor of direct exercise
of the Imperial prerogative for selection of a Premier?
(10) Is the Cabinet willing to consider a change in the

procedure of Imperial recommendation

as a substitution

13

Genro system?
more indirect, but hardly less forceful, attack on the
army was the resolution adopted by the Diet on March
14, the seventieth anniversary of Emperor Meiji's Charter
for the

Oath, which explicitly sanctioned democratic government.

This resolution, which was submitted to the Throne, was
worded as follows: "Emperor Meiji, on March 14 of the
fourth year of the Keio Era, promulgated the Charter

Oath containing

five

articles

and inaugurating the

na-

tional principle that all affairs of the State be referred to

public opinion before final decision. Subsequently the

Imperial Constitution was granted to the nation, leading

development of the national will and to the pros-

to the

perity of the country's destiny. This day is the yoth anniversary of the promulgation of the Oath. On this auspicious occasion, it is proper and desirable that the members

of the

House look back upon the

past

and

fully recall to
the Oath, so that

mind the Imperial wishes underlying

in the future they may even more appropriately express
their faith in the Constitution, and exert all efforts in
harmony and cooperation, and, by

their

conduct and

achievements, help to illustrate the beauty of the Constitution throughout generations. 14 Article I of the Char1

13

For

full

text of

this

'

questionnaire, including the commentary, see

The Japan Advertiser, March i, 1937.

14
The Oriental Economist, March 1937,

p. 135.

258
ter

JAPAN IN CHINA

Oath, to which the resolution particularly referred,

reads:

"An assembly widely convoked

shall

be established

and all affairs of the State shall be referred to public

opinion before final decision."
These diversions could not serve to conceal the position
which the parties and parliamentary politics had been
reduced under the Hayashi Cabinet. The basic trend was
indicated by the smooth functioning of the Yuki-Ikeda
combination, which was intent on forcing Japan's industrial development into the straight and narrow path of
preparation for war. It was indicated by the huge armynavy appropriations, to which the business interests had
easily accommodated themselves. The parties had logically followed suit, swallowing the insult of exclusion from
Cabinet posts in their approval of the budget. Their defense was conceived solely in terms of an effort to maintain their parliamentary rights, and not of an attack on
the fundamental aims of the military-fascist program.
In one field the more moderate financial groups may
be said to have had a representative of their opinions in
the Hayashi Cabinet. The new Foreign Minister, Mr.
Naotake Sato, introduced a marked change of emphasis
into the truculent policies of Hirota and Arita, especially
to

in reference to China. In response to interpellations in

the lower house on March 11, the Foreign Minister de-

war at any time if it so

he would negotiate with China on a basis of
equality, and that formation of economic blocs, such as
that between Japan and Manchoukuo, was premature.
These remarks were highly indiscreet, and were bitterly
clared that Japan could avert

chose, that

army circles. The first, in particular, could

be
reconciled
with Premier Hayashi's interpretahardly
resented in

tion of the international situation in terms of

"explosion
at a touch/'

On

the following

morning the Premier and

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

the defense Ministers conferred with

FASCISM
Mr.

Sato,

259

who

con-

siderably modified his statements that afternoon in an

explanation before the budget committee of the House of
Peers. 15 His concept of ''economic diplomacy" awoke distinct echoes of Baron Shidehara, who also sought peace
and an uninterrupted flow of international trade in the
interests of Japan's export industries. In pursuit of this

Foreign Minister Sato despatched the Kodama

Economic Mission to China and sent a similar mission to

policy,

the United States and England.

At the moment even the military circles could see no
real

harm

in this shadow-play. So far as

China was con-

cerned, there was every advantage in waiting to see the

ultimate outcome of the Sian crisis. With an internal
struggle of major proportions on its hands, a truce to foreign adventures by the army was nothing more than an

elementary precaution. Foreign Minister Sato's policy

meanwhile provided an admirable stop-gap which tended
to mitigate the international suspicion aroused by the

Suiyuan hostilities, Ambassador Kawagoe's demands at

Nanking, and the German- Japanese pact. The groundwork for a liberal foreign policy of any permanence was
cut away by the actualities of the military-fascist program
being carried through at home.
Premier Hayashi's sudden dissolution of the Diet on

March 31 came as a general surprise. Despite a steady

drum-fire of criticism, the parties had given the Cabinet
little real difficulty. On one relatively minor point, the
addition of 30 million yen to the grant for local governments, the party leaders had wrung a concession from the
Cabinet. Yuki had reduced the original Baba grant of 220
million yen to local governments to 70 millions; the additional amount raised the total grant to 100 millions.

Japan Advertiser, March

12-13, 1937.

JAPAN IN CHINA

*6o

supplementary budget of 58 million yen, including the

added 30 millions, was passed by the Diet during the
session. On another point of considerable interest to the
The six
parties, the government had remained obdurate.
the text of an
parties in the lower house had agreed on
election reform bill, designed to forestall possible essays
in this direction

mitted

it

by the army, and

to the Cabinet.

When

late in the session sub-

the latter's approval was

the lower house appreciably

slowed down. On March 25 an Imperial edict extending
the Diet for six days, from March 26 to 31, was issued.
At the end of this period a number of bills still awaited
consideration, and some were deadlocked. The Premier
seemed to have been waiting for some such opportunity.
On March 31 he obtained Imperial sanction for dissolu-

withheld, proceedings in

tion of the lower house, charging that it had unduly

obstructed the passage of legislation.
general election

was

set for

The

April 30.

arbitrary nature of Hayashi's action betrayed the

army's impatience with parliamentary politics and its

determination to crush the opposition in the Diet. In
choosing the tactic of dissolution and general election,
however, the Premier committed a first-class political
blunder. The party leaders, who had been engaged in

damping down the

fires of political struggle, were

obliged
assume an intransigeant opposition. The hands of the
progressive forces within the two big parties, as well as
of all left-wing elements, were immensely strengthened.
A head-on clash between the army and public opinion, on
a much more serious scale than during the election of
February 1936, was precipitated. In 1936 the public was

to

generally opposed to reactionary tendencies, but not specifically anti-army. Since then the February coup, the
policies of the Hirota Cabinet, General Terauchi's role

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

in opposing Ugaki, the exclusion of party

men from

261

the

Hayashi Cabinet, and the latter's abrupt dissolution of

the Diet had opened the eyes of the people to the source
of danger. They now saw, much more clearly than before,
that the army leaders were the bearers of war and Fascism.

The general election of April 30 was fought on this cleancut issue, and mobilized much stronger forces of popular
opposition to the army.
At the

outset of the election campaign, Premier Hayashi was confronted with the basic difficulty that his
government had no organized party to represent it at the
polls.

The

threat that a

new

party, essentially

dominated

by the army, would be organized by the government persisted until nearly the end of the campaign. In his state-

ment when

the Diet was dissolved, the Premier declared:

would be nothing wrong

should the Government decide to cooperate with a new
party that might come into existence that would support
it. The Government has not yet considered whether it
should take positive action in the direction of forming a
new party. It would be good if a party ready to support
"I think, however, that there

Government came into being of its own accord. There

no intention on my part to take the initiative in forming such a party. I am afraid I have yet to make up my
the

is

mind regarding

the matter."

ie

The

rather lame conclusion to this statement was suggestive of the difficulties facing such a project. In the
existing state of public opinion, the reformist elements in
the major parties were compelled to think twice before
openly allying themselves with the military-fascist pro-

The possible leaders for a new party, as suggested

in the press, were nevertheless highly significant. Outstanding was the name of Prince Konoye, president of the
gram.

10

The Japan

Advertiser, April

i,

1937.

JAPAN IN CHINA

262

whose leadership was considered essential

of
success. Of the other suggestions, one
any degree
was Chikuhei Nakajima, a Seiyukai leader, and the other
was Ryutaro Nagai, chief secretary of the Minseito. None

House

of Peers,

for

of these

men

considered the time opportune for announc-

ing their adherence to the

army platform. On April

Mr. Nagai had already given favorable reception to a

the
proposal by Mr. Seijun Ando, chief secretary of
the
in
should
cooperate
Seiyukai, that the two parties
election. This proposal was later implemented in a number of constituencies, where the weaker candidates of the
two parties withdrew in favor of the stronger.
The Hayashi Cabinet encountered almost as much difficulty in formulating a set of policies as in finding a party.
On April 10 it published an eight-point platform consisting mainly of vague generalities. Kinship with the Hirota
as perfection of armathe
control
of the electric power
reform
of
Diet,
ments,
a
and
establishment
of
Cabinet
Planning Board.
industry,

program was evident in such items

Statements by individual
its

associates, left

members

no doubt

of the Cabinet,,

and by

as to its real purposes.

On

April 8 the War Minister, General Sugiyama, defined the

objective in a classic sentence: "The myriad affairs of the
State must be made to harmonize with the keynote of full
armament." 17 Seihin Ikeda, Governor of the Bank of
Japan, in an interview given on April 17, called for

"perfection of national defense" by operating "Japan's

and monetary policies on a semi-wartime sys-

financial

tem."

1S

Finance Minister Yuki, after addressing a roun'd-

17
Commenting on this speech, the Domei news agency noted that its
statements were regarded "as a manifestation by the army that its highest
aim is construction of a national -defense State and that its determination
is to be the
pilot in leading the nation toward that goal." The

Japan

Advertiser, April 9, 1937.

18

Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, April

20, 1937.

JAPAN'S DRIVE
Osaka

table conference of

TOWARD

FASCISM

industrialists

on April

263
6,

was

The business-men pointed out that

capacity may expand in the munitions indus-

criticized.

sharply

"production
alone as a result of the arms program, and warned
the Minister that the Government should be ready to
turn munitions plants to more productive purposes when
tries

the military program is completed." 19 The actual issues

of the campaign were also revealed by the Cabinet's orders
to

prefectural chiefs of police to prohibit "utterances

people from the army" during the

liable to alienate the

These were defined as utterances "charging the

with
military
trying to provoke a war, alleging that the
mean to reject the parliamentary system,
services
fighting
arousing suspicion about obedience to orders in the services, or affecting the attitude of the people toward the
election.

20

conscription system."
During the months preceding the election campaign,
there had been a general leftward swing among the
people, based on the rise in the cost of living and the
fear of Fascism and war. Economic struggles of the factory

workers had increased throughout the country. Actual

labor shortage in some lines of business had greatly
strengthened the workers' bargaining power. For the first

quarter of 1937 labor disputes totalled 609, as compared

with 353 in the first quarter of 1936, while the number
of workers involved in strikes had risen from 13.8 per
thousand to 384 per thousand in this period. 21 These
strikes revolved

increases,

almost solely around demands for wage

and nearly

for the workers. In

offered
19
80

21

wage

all

resulted in successful settlements

many

cases the employers voluntarily

increases, in order to avoid labor difficulties.

The Japan Advertiser, April 8, 1937.

The Japan Advertiser, April 8, 1937.
The Oriental Economist, May 1937, p.

263.

264

JAPAN IN CHINA

This situation contrasted notably with the 1931-1936

in spite of
period, when wage rates steadily declined
increased employment.
It was partly affected by a movement for unity and
consolidation of the trade unions, begun by the Osaka
metal workers in 1935. Their demand for fusion of the
two labor federations was at first resisted by the leaders
of these organizations, but pressure from below led to a
formal decision for unity in January 1936, which was

and in some prefectures.

union membership
arsenal workOsaka
the
case
of
In
the
increased.
rapidly
from 5,000
rose
the
soon
for
ers,
membership
example,
to 7,000. At this point the military authorities stepped in
and forced the arsenal workers to dissolve their union,
on the ground that they were "working members'* of the
army and "in an entirely different category from the
workmen of civilian factories and companies, which operate on a profit basis, in respect of their social standing,
responsibility and their mission."
partially effected at the center

Where

The

unity was achieved,

trade

majority of the trade unions were associated with

the Social Mass Party, including 270,000 members of the

united labor federation, 70,000 members of two farmers'

unions,

and some 5,000 members of lower middle

class

organizations. In addition to these "supporting organizations", the Social Mass Party recruited an individual

membership, much on the order of the British Labor

Party. Taken together, these trade unions included only
a small fraction, considerably less than ten
per cent, of
the Japanese working class; the organizational base
among
the farmers was even less important. The cohesion of the

Mass Party depended mainly on the prestige of the

social-democratic
leader, Dr. Abe; within its Diet
aged
representation, social democrats some of whom were outSocial

JAPAN'S DRIVE
spoken

anti-Fascists

TOWARD

FASCISM

265

were forced to rub elbows with po-

tentially Fascist elements. This factor accounted for the

continued inability to establish unity with the "legal

headed by Kanju Kato, who controlled a more

militant minority following of some 40,000 trade unionists. The overtures of the "legal leftists" for a formal

leftists",

united front were turned

down by

the Social Mass Party,

although the trade union and peasant organizations of

Kato's group had forged certain links with the latter's
trade union following. In 1936, after the setting up of
formal trade union and political party organs by the
the split between the two groups deepened. This picture of disunity was further accentuated by
"legal

leftists'*,

the existence of a considerable fraction of "patriotic", or

Fascist, unions. During the election campaign of April
1937, however, the voting strength of the left wing was
materially increased by the general leftward movement of
public opinion. The leaders of the Social Mass Party,

much more
able to take

than those of the Minseito and Seiyukai, were

up a fairly vigorous anti-Fascist position and

count upon popular support.

Threats from both sides enlivened the final days of the
campaign. Minseito and Seiyukai leaders, it was said,
were prepared to introduce a vote of non-confidence at
the special session of the Diet to be called after the
election. The Cabinet countered by letting it be known
that it was ready to dissolve the Diet a second time, if
the results of the poll did not prove satisfactory. In this
case press reports suggested that Premier Hayashi would
seek through Imperial ordinance to reduce the number
of Diet members by half or more, with the expectation
that the enlarged constituencies would enable a new party
to crush the influence of the old-line parties. In spite of
all

efforts,

the Hayashi Cabinet found itself unable to

JAPAN IN CHINA

266

new party by April 30 that would stand any

chance of success in the election. It was thus forced to
rely on the election of reactionaries under the banners
of the two major parties or of the Showakai and Kokumin
Domei, which favored the government. Early in the camorganize a

paign the Nichi Nichi had noted:

aspect of the 2oth general election

"The outstanding

that it is not a
between
opposed parties but
struggle for political power
status
a struggle for supremacy between the
quo and renois

Results of the General Election, April 30, 1937

Total

466

466

vation forces to be found side by side within

What

10,204
all

the

not how many seats

important
the Minseito or Seiyukai will win, but how
many seats
the reformist elements in all the
parties gain in comparison with the status quo elements. If the election results
parties.

will be

is

in a majority of reformist members of the lower house

who will coalesce in a new party, the Government will
22

The votes cast on April 30

crushed
such
decisively
any
hope.
Although the Seiyukai gained appreciably in relative
standing as against the Minseito, the two major parties
consider

Quoted

itself

in

fortunate."

The Japan

Advertiser, April

3,

1937.

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

267

represented a combined opposition controlling 354

seats, or well over an absolute majority. The Showakai,
main government supporter, lost six seats, while the
still

Kokumin Domei

barely retained

its

11 seats.

Among

the

newly elected deputies of all parties, the Cabinet could

muster hardly fifty adherents. The outstanding result of
the election was the doubling of its representation by the
Social Mass Party, which polled nearly one million votes
and took rank as the third largest group in the lower
house.

Under normal constitutional procedure, the

would seem to have called for immediate

election

result

resignasort occurred. Despite

the emphatic popular repudiation of his reformist platform, Premier Hayashi elected to remain in office. His

tion of the Cabinet.

Nothing of the

statement issued on May 3 had the effrontery to instruct

the new Diet members to fulfill their duties in "the spirit
of self-abnegation and service to the country, hold high
the ideals on xvhich the nation was founded in accordance

with the cardinal principles of our national

polity, pro-

mote the development of a constitutional government

which is entirely our own, and have a correct perspective
of the existing situation." 23
Although the Cabinet made preparations to face a special session of the Diet, it postponed the date for this
session until August, or five months after dissolution
the final limit permitted by law. During May the Cabinet

inaugurated three
boards.

One

new policy-making commissions

of these

or

was a Price Policy Commission,

charged with the task of devising remedies for the untoward rise of commodity prices, while another was the
Education and Culture Commission, formed to "inquire
23

May

The
4,

Oriental Economist,
1937.

May

1937, p. 259; also

The Japan

Advertiser,

JAPAN IN CHINA

268

and study all important matters relating to thorough permeation of the concept of the national polity and promotion of the national spirit."

24

Cabinet Planning Board,

headed by Finance Minister Yuki, was formally inaugurated on May 14. Established by Imperial ordinance, this
board was a continuing organ of government with significant potentialities as the economic general staff of an
army dictatorship. Its immediate tasks, aside from preparing bills for submission to the special Diet session,
were to solve the iron and fuel supply questions, to
consider a five-year industrial program being studied by
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, revise the Election Law, and deal with the problem of creating an
aviation department. 25 This board later framed the National Mobilization Bill passed in March 1938.
The most serious problem of the Cabinet was

how

to

cope with the parties, as a spate of statements issued by

the Premier testified. Organization of a new party out of
the material thrown up by the election was patently impossible, and had to be abandoned. For a few days the
Premier toyed with the hope of seducing the party leaders

some of the three Ministerial portfoliosand Education which were still held
the parties becoming daily more inWith
concurrently.
such
transigeant, any
step was soon out of the question.
On May 19 a meeting of Minseito and Seiyukai repreby the

offer of

Overseas, Railways,

sentatives decided to establish a joint headquarters "for

the overthrow of the Hayashi Cabinet." This movement,

which centered its efforts on achieving "a real national

union Cabinet," was carried further by a joint rally of
the two parties in Tokyo on May 28. The conservative
party leaders, however, were careful to see that they did
34
25

The Japan Advertiser, May u, 25,

The Japan Advertiser May 14-15,
f

1937.
1937-

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

269

not arouse a genuine mass movement against the militaryfascist program. In this connection, the comments of
"the parties are really
Kokumin were instructive:
.

expected to proceed carefully to keep the military from

thinking that the anti-Cabinet combination is taking on
the nature of a popular-front movement against Fascism.
To guard against such consequences, the parties, at every
available opportunity, will seek the understanding of the
military and the upper strata in political circles on their
26

Sentiment in the House of Peers, exin

pressed
meetings of several of its groups, turned against
the Cabinet. The Showakai, considered the Ministry's
only organized support in the Lower House, voluntarily
contentions/'

dissolved

on May

21 as

an example

to the other parties.

president was said to have suggested to Premier

he should resign in the interests of national
that
Hayashi
The
unity.
position of the Hayashi Cabinet had become

Later

its

on May

31 it suddenly resigned.
short
term in office, the Hayashi Ministry
During
had carried forward under the onus of difficulties be-

hopeless;

its

queathed by its predecessor. It had passed the 1937-1938

budget and won acceptance of the arms expansion program by business circles, after modifications of the tax
reforms. Three new consultative agencies, of which the
Planning Board was outstanding, had been established. A
truce to military aggression was enforced in foreign
policy,

marked

especially in

May by

a serious effort to

reach agreement with Great Britain on China questions.

The Premier's efforts at complete suppression of the
remnants of parliamentarism had led to an outright clash
with the parties, in which the former had been worsted.

Before his resignation, Hayashi's tactic in this respect was

accepted on all sides as a serious blunder. It had widened
**

Quoted

in

The Japan

Advertiser,

May

16, 1937.

270

JAPAN IN CHINA

the gap between the army and the people, and strengthened the left wing in each of the parties, reflecting the
anti-Fascist, anti-government, and anti-war sentiment of
the country at large. This result was not at all to the
army's liking, and had seriously compromised its domestic standing. The two major parties were not alone in
demanding a government of "national union." Views of
the army leaders, canvassed at an emergency meeting after
Hayashi's resignation, were reported as follows: "The
feeling prevailing in the army is that the new Premier
should be capable of embracing the fighting services, the
bureaucracy and the parties in order to form a strong
Cabinet with unanimous national support. He must be
able to put through renovation policies in spite of obstacles. The new Cabinet must not, therefore, be partial
to any party or faction. Instead, it should embrace the

army, navy, bureaucrats, people, parties and financiers,

with its personnel strongly coordinated. As long as they
27
cooperate, the parties will not necessarily be ostracized."
This program was faithfully carried out in the formation of the next Cabinet. At its head was placed Prince
Konoye, favored no less by the army than by the parties

and business

quarters. There were valid grounds for bethat

Prince
lieving
Konoye's liberal front masked basically
views.
The
comment of a bourgeois journal
reactionary

complex individual, who seemed to be all things

to all men, is noteworthy: "A keen student of politics,
Prince Konoye is much a reformist in his views but never
an extremist, people say/' 2S Obviously he was an ideal
choice to reestablish a semblance of cooperation between
all of
Japan's ruling groups, including the two big parties,
in realizing the military-fascist aims. For the main
posts

on

27
28

this

The Japan Advertiser, June i,

The Oriental Ecotiomist, June

1937.

1937, p. 326.

JAPAN'S DRIVE

TOWARD

FASCISM

271

new

Cabinet, Prince Konoye chose the leading

reactionary figures of the two previous governments. General Sugiyama and Admiral Yonai were carried over as
in the

War and Navy

Ministers, affording the clearest evidence

change in policy was contemplated. The

Suehiko Shiono a close intimate of the
Minister,
Justice
that

no

real

Fascist-minded Baron Hiranuma, president of the Privy

Council was also taken over from the previous Ministry.
The bureaucrats were represented by Okinobu Kaya, as

Finance Minister, and Shinji Yoshino, Minister of Commerce and Industry. These men were advanced from the
posts of Vice-Minister; they were typical of the "new
bureaucrats", who had decisively swung over to support
of the army since the February coup and had been instrumental in framing many of the economic control measures
put forward by the Hirota and Hayashi Cabinets. Equally
notable were the appointments of Koki Hirota, as Foreign Minister, and Eiichi Baba as Home Minister. The
former had launched the army's excursion into Fascist
reforms at home, and seen to the signing of the German-

Japanese pact; the latter had drafted the

budget, which included the army's proposals

1937-1938
as to mili-

tary-naval appropriations and tax reforms.

The roll of these Ministers Sugiyama, Yonai, Shiono,

Kaya, Yoshino, Hirota, and Baba showed a compact reactionary team, holding all of the important portfolios.

To

party members were delegated two of the lesser portthe Communications Ministry, given to Ryutaro
Nagai, and the Railways Ministry, assumed by Chikuhei
folios:

Nakajima. These choices were the most reactionary figures

two major parties; both had been prominently
mentioned as possible leaders of a new party. Mr. Nagai
had been chief secretary of the Minseito; Mr. Nakajima,
an airplane manufacturer, had been a leader and large
of the

JAPAN IN CHINA

27*

financial supporter of the Seiyukai. Their willingness to

enter a Cabinet of the complexion outlined also reflected

the eagerness of the two parties to come to terms with

the army. Thus the result of their struggle with the

Hayashi Cabinet had left the parties with two minor portunder Konoye, as against four under Hirota and
five under Okada. Before entering the Konoye Cabinet,
moreover, both Nagai and Nakajima agreed that, though
they would not resign from their parties, they were not
folios

representing their parties in the

this

Jesuitical

new

Ministry.

However

compromise might be interpreted, there

was no question that

concession to the

it

constituted at least a technical

army viewpoint

that party

members

should be excluded from the government.

The

Agriculture and Forestry, and the Overseas, Minwere both taken by members of the House of Peers;
Konoye, Hirota and Baba were also members of the
Upper House. Two of the auxiliary Cabinet posts were
given to deputies in the Lower House. Mr. Akira Kazami,
a member of the Kokumin Domei, was made Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; and Mr. Masao Taki, an independent
deputy personally connected with the Premier, was apistries

pointed Councillor of the Bureau of Legislation. Including these two men, the Cabinet contained nine members

The

following comment on this phenomenon

"In
significant:
spite of this sprinkling of Diet members
the Konoye Cabinet is by no means a party government.
of the Diet.

is

While Communications Minister Nagai and Railways

Minister Nakajima are leaders respectively of the Minseito and Seiyukai, they are not representing their
parties
in the present Cabinet. In this respect the administration
is even less
closely linked to the House of Representa-

than the two cabinets preceding General Hayashi's,

namely those under General Keisuke Okada and Mr.
tives

JAPAN'S DRIVE
Koki Hirota."

up

its

hope

29

of

TOWARD

FASCISM

273

The

army, in other words, had not given

securing control of the lower house,

although it had reversed the tactic of frontal assault.

Nagai and Nakajima, it was hoped, would turn the parties
toward collaboration with the military or possibly even

emergence of a new party through which the

a firm parliamentary support for
establish
could
army
facilitate the

its

policies.

The

sharp internal strife which had existed under the Hayashi Ministry could not be eliminated
merely by a change of government. Echoes of that conflict
effects of the

would not die out at once, and popular suspicion of the

army would continue to exist. At all costs the army's
rear, or public confidence and support at home, had to
be consolidated. With a strong national Cabinet such as
Konoye's in office, there was little danger to be apprehended from a renewal of military aggression in China.
Such military operations, in view of the greater unity and
new nationalism of China, might have to be conducted
on an extensive scale. The risk was worth taking, especially since the international auspices were favorable, thus

reducing the possibility of outside intervention to a

minimum. Under cover of a serious external emergency,
nationalist sentiments at home could be re-kindled,
opposition voices silenced, the prestige of the army reestablished in the public mind, and the military-fascist
program for a "controlled economy" pushed ahead at

an accelerated rate. The Konoye Cabinet was inducted

into office on June 3; less than five weeks later, the first
shot of a war with China had been fired at Lukouchiao.
Within this brief period, the army had retrieved victory
from apparent disaster. The downfall of the Hayashi
Cabinet had been in the nature of a rout. Under the
20

The

Oriental Economist, June 1937, p. 326.

274

JAPAN IN CHINA

Konoye Cabinet, the army had skillfully re-formed its

With the beginning of war in China, the liberal
opposition, composed mainly of elements which never
dared to repudiate the military entirely, was swept away
and its cause was lost.
lines.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

THE
the

month

preliminary fighting in North China during

of July, 1 though comparatively restricted, had

already carried the Japanese troops well beyond the territorial limits of the hostilities in 1933. At that time
Japan's armed forces had stopped short of the northern
metropolitan district; by the end of July 1937, they had
effectively occupied the Peiping-Tientsin area. After with-

drawal of the 29th Route Army from Peiping, the full

extent of the next phase of hostilities was not apparent
for some weeks. The steady stream of Japanese reinforce-

ments flowing into North China, as well as the large

amounts of munitions and supplies being concentrated
there, indicated that Japan was preparing for an extensive campaign in the northern provinces. Factors on both
sides militated against the possibility of a swift local campaign and a compromise settlement in the north at this

The

Nanking could no longer

with
hope
compromise
Japanese aggression and retain
a
For
political power.
year General Chiang Kai-shek had
been declaring that the government was determined not
to permit further encroachments on China's territorial
sovereignty. Neither the nation's armed forces nor the
general public, which were equally aroused, would admit
of retreat without resistance. On the other hand, Japan's
time.

central authorities at

to

*See Chapter

I.

275

JAPAN IN CHINA

276

ruling groups, notably the military and the dominant

elements of big business, had become convinced that war

was necessary both to consolidate their home front and

break China's growing unity and strength. A campaign
restricted to the north might have been prolonged indefinitely without seriously affecting the military strength or

THE SHANGHAI-NANKING REGION.

economic resources of the Chinese government.

the latter at

its

To

vital point, operations in the

would have to be undertaken.

Before the end of July a typical incident
reminiscent of earlier affairs, had plunged a

attack

Shanghai

area

in

Hongkew,

large part of

Shanghai's northern district into a fever of excitement.

On the evening of July 24 a Japanese civilian reported
that three Japanese bluejackets had been involved in a

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

fight

277

with a group of Chinese. At the end of the

fracas,

the informant claimed, the Chinese party had bundled a

first-class seaman, Sadao Miyazaki, into a car and carried

him

off.

This

civilian

informant gave a

false

name and

address; despite thorough search, he could never be located for further questioning. His information had been

relayed to the Naval Landing Headquarters, which immediately went into action. Japanese marines in full war
kit, with steel helmets and with rifles at fixed bayonet,
were speedily stationed along the roads where the incident
had occurred. Trucks crammed with fully equipped Land-

ing Party contingents tore through the streets, depositing

men at various points in Hongkew. Patrols were sent

through the area, cars were stopped, people were interrogated and searched. As the seaman was indisputably missthese precautions continued for several days. The
Chinese population, fearing that hostilities were about
to begin, was greatly alarmed and a general exodus of
Chinese citizens from the adjoining Chapei areas began.
Local Japanese officials called on the Chinese authorities in connection with the affair. Mr. O. K. Yui, Mayor
of Greater Shanghai, pointed out to the Japanese ConsulGeneral that the Naval Landing Party had despatched
ing,

fully-equipped patrols to the territory outside the Settleinvestigating the facts regarding the incident.
The alleged kidnaping was brought up on the floor of
the Diet at Tokyo, contributing to stir nationalist pas-

ment before

sions in Japan.

On

July 29 the true facts of the incident

came to light. There had been no fight between Chinese

and Japanese, nor had Miyazaki been abducted. He had
deserted, changed into Chinese clothes, hidden for two
nights on the Bund, and then stowed away on a Chinese
river steamer.

At Chinkiang he had been taken into cuswho sent him to the Nanking

tody by Chinese police,

JAPAN IN CHINA

276

and the dominant

ruling groups, notably the military
that war
convinced
become
had
elements of big business,
and
front
home
was necessary both to consolidate their
break China's growing unity and strength. A campaign
restricted to the north might have been prolonged indefithe military strength or
nitely without seriously affecting

THE SHANGHAI-NANKING REGION.

economic resources of the Chinese government.

the latter at

its

To

vital point, operations in the

attack

Shanghai

would have to be undertaken.

Before the end of July a typical incident in Hongkew,
reminiscent of earlier affairs, had plunged a large part of
area

Shanghai's northern district into a fever of excitement.

On the evening of July 24 a Japanese civilian reported
that three Japanese bluejackets

had been involved in a

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

fight

277

with a group of Chinese. At the end of the

fracas,

the informant claimed, the Chinese party had bundled a

first-class seaman, Sadao Miyazaki, into a car and carried

him

off.

This

civilian

informant gave a

false

name and

address; despite thorough search, he could never be located for further questioning. His information had been

relayed to the Naval Landing Headquarters, which im-

mediately went into action. Japanese marines in full war

kit, with steel helmets and with rifles at fixed bayonet,
were speedily stationed along the roads where the incident
had occurred. Trucks crammed with fully equipped Landing Party contingents tore through the streets, depositing
men at various points in Hongkew. Patrols were sent

through the area, cars were stopped, people were interrogated and searched. As the seaman was indisputably missing, these precautions continued for several days. The
Chinese population, fearing that hostilities were about
to begin, was greatly alarmed and a general exodus of
Chinese citizens from the adjoining Chapei areas began.
Local Japanese officials called on the Chinese authorities in connection with the affair. Mr. O. K. Yui, Mayor
of Greater Shanghai, pointed out to the Japanese ConsulGeneral that the Naval Landing Party had despatched
fully-equipped patrols to the territory outside the Settlement before investigating the facts regarding the incident.

The

alleged kidnaping was brought up on the floor of

the Diet at Tokyo, contributing to stir nationalist passions in Japan. On July 29 the true facts of the incident

came to light. There had been no fight between Chinese

and Japanese, nor had Miyazaki been abducted. He had
deserted, changed into Chinese clothes, hidden for two
nights on the Bund, and then stowed away on a Chinese

At Chinkiang he had been taken into custody by Chinese police, who sent him to the Nanking

river steamer.

JAPAN IN CHINA

278

under suspicion
Foreign Office for questioning on July 28,
followwas
established,
of being a spy. There his identity
him
over
to the
turned
ing which the Chinese authorities
2
this affair was reminisJapanese Embassy. In its details,
cent o the missing Japanese consular officer two years
had mobilized war vessels at
previously, who, after Japan
and threatened dire action, was found un-

Nanking

harmed, although he had run away and attempted suicide

in despondency over failure to be promoted. The hanNaval Landing
dling of the Miyazaki incident by the
its high-handed methods at
of
fair
a
was
sample
Party
Shanghai, where for several years the Chinese and foreign
mapopulace had been continually alarmed by Japanese
in
heart
the
the
all
hours
of
at
neuvers carried out
night
of the Settlement. Aside from provocative use of the
Japanese marines, the higher officers showed no intention
of expanding the Miyazaki case into cause for war. It
served nonetheless to increase the apprehension at Shanghai, where feeling was already running high over events
in the north.

In the two weeks' grace which followed, China's political unification

was carried several steps further. Under

imminent war, the leaders both at Nanking and

in the provinces seemed impelled to overcome the last
threat of

remnants of separatism. On July 31 the National Salvation leaders were released from their prison at Soochow,
where they had been detained for eight months. They
proceeded to Shanghai and thence to Nanking, where one
of their number interviewed General Chiang Kai-shek
and assured him of their determination to assist in repelling Japanese aggression. The ban on songs of the
national salvation movement, which had been imposed
in deference to Japanese susceptibilities, was lifted;
3

North-China Daily

New>

Shanghai, July 25, 29, 1937.

and

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

279

these stirring tunes, created out of the nationalist revival,

were allowed to be broadcast. General Han Fu-chu arrived at Nanking on the morning of August i consulted
with Generals Feng Yu-hsiang and Chiang Kai-shek, and
left by return train to Shantung the same afternoon.
Before large mass meetings on August 2 at Canton and
Kweilin, the ranking military leaders of Kwangtung and
Kwangsi pledged their support of the National Government. On August 4 General Pai Chung-hsi, one of the
two Kwangsi leaders, landed at the capital in a plane
,

despatched by the Generalissimo. The subsequent meeting of these two men, who had been bitter enemies since
March 1929, was the first in eight years. One after another, during the early days of August, the leading procommanders appeared at Nanking to consult with

vincial

the central authorities. General

reached Nanking on August

of

Hunan and Yu Han-mou

2,

of

Yen Hsi-shan

while Generals

Kwangtung

of Shansi

Ho

arrived

Chien
on the

following day. General Liu Hsiang of Szechuan, arriving

on August 7, announced that the troop readjustments in

were being rapidly completed, after which

Szechuan would be able to contribute its man-power to
the state. On August 9 General Lung Yun, chairman of
Yunnan, appeared at Nanking for the first time in his
career, and declared that his province was ready to offer
its full support to the Central Government. One of the
last schisms was healed when General Tsai Ting-kai,
his province

leader of the igth Route Army during the Shanghai hostilities of 1932, visited the capital and offered his services
to the Generalissimo;

by

associate

he was

commanders

Generals Li Chi-shen,

whom had

later followed to

Nanking

of the same army, including

Chen Ming-shu and Chiang Kwang-

participated in the Fukien rebellion

of 1933-1934. This period also witnessed the successful
nai, all

of

JAPAN IN CHINA

2 8o

completion of the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations.

The Communist forces were reorganized as the Eighth
Route Army, commanded by General Chu Teh; the vice-

commander was General Peng Te-huai. These appointments were formally gazetted on August 22 by General
Chiang Kai-shek, in his capacity as chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. By the end of August, every
military leader in China was directly responsible to the
central command of the National Government at Nanking.

This new-won military unity was

at

once put to the

steady evacuation of Japan's nationals

supreme
from the Yangtze valley was capped on August 6 by official
test.

orders for

all

remaining Japanese to leave Hankow.

The

subsequent concentration of Japanese vessels from the

upper Yangtze in and around Shanghai fostered Chinese
apprehension that a renewed invasion of the city was
being planned. On August 9, as the result of a shooting
affray near the Hungjao Airdrome, two members of the
Japanese Naval Landing Party and a Chinese member of
the Air Force Auxiliary were killed. The Japanese authorclaimed that a sub-lieutenant, with a seaman as
chauffeur, had been driving along an outside road, when
Chinese with rifles and machine-guns surrounded the car
ities

and suddenly opened

fire. According to the Chinese verhad attempted to drive into

marines
Japanese
the military airdrome; challenged by a Chinese sentry,
they shot him down with a revolver. Attracted by the
firing, Chinese members of the Peace Preservation Corps
rushed to the scene, exchanged shots with the Japanese

sion, the

bluejackets, and killed them. Mr. O. K. Yui, the Shanghai

Mayor, called attention to the fact that previous disputes
had occurred in that vicinity, and that repeated protests

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

had been lodged with the Japanese

281

authorities over at-

3
tempts of their marines to enter the Hungjao Airdrome.
The efforts of a joint Sino-Japanese investigation committee to fix responsibility for the incident were nullified

by the rapid progress of events. On August 1 1 a Japanese

Naval Squadron of four cruisers and seven destroyers
arrived in Shanghai with marine reinforcements. A stream
of arms, ammunition and supplies poured from the Japanese cruisers and destroyers onto the Yangtzepoo Wharf
of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, where they were loaded into
lorries and taken to the barracks of the Naval Landing
Party's headquarters on Kiangwan Road. A large detachment of bluejackets, in full marching kit, was landed; it
was reported that the Landing Party's force of about 5,000
men was to be increased to 9,000. At the same time the
Japanese authorities requested the Shanghai Mayor and
General Yang Hu, the local Chinese garrison commander,
to withdraw the Peace Preservation Corps and dismantle
all Chinese military defense works in and around the
Shanghai area. The same demands were presented to the
Chinese Foreign Office at Nanking on the following day.
August 12 marked the eve of the outbreak at Shanghai.
Five additional Japanese naval vessels, and a transport
for the Landing Party,
was estimated that 28 Japanese war
vessels of all types were concentrated in the Whangpoo
River. Late that afternoon the Chinese authorities threw
a boom across the Whangpoo River from the Nantao
Bund to Pootung, with the object of protecting the
Kiangwan arsenal and naval dockyards, which were located some distance above the barricade. Vanguards of

carrying

1,000

reached the

reinforcements

city. It

the 88th division, part of Nanking's crack Fifth

"North-China Daily News, August

10,

1937.

Army,

JAPAN IN CHINA

28s

entered Chapei, where sand-bag barricades were erected.

The Chinese population of Hongkew and Chapei was
thrown into panic, and evacuation reached a peak never

equalled even in 1932. The Shanghai Volunteer Corps

was mobilized to protect the foreign-controlled areas of
the Settlement, exclusive of Hongkew. At a special meeting of the Joint Commission, a representative body of the
major Powers organized to supervise execution of the

Shanghai Armistice of May 5, 1932, the Japanese and

Chinese delegates mutually accused the other of violating
the truce agreement. This was the last diplomatic gesture;
hostilities

The
23,

began on the following morning.

first

stage of the warfare in Shanghai, up to August

to Chapei and Hongkew, where

was confined mainly

the Japanese naval landing forces were compelled to stand

on the defensive against incessant Chinese attacks. At
times during this period, the Chinese troops pushed well
into the Japanese lines, but were unable to consolidate
their advances owing to the heavy shelling from the Japanese naval vessels. The Chinese air force continuously

sought to sink the Idzumo,, flagship of the Japanese fleet

Whangpoo, but never succeeded. On August 14,

in the

during the course of one of these raids, Chinese planes

dropped bombs in two thickly settled quarters of the
Settlement, resulting in 3,609 casualties, of whom 1,741
killed. 4 Official sources at Nanking claimed that shell

were

had wounded the airmen and damaged the bombracks, releasing the bombs accidentally. On August 20 a
shell struck the Augusta, flagship of the United States
naval forces at Shanghai, resulting in the death of one
seaman and the wounding of eighteen members of the
fire

Official figures published October 26 by the Fire Brigade. On August

23 a large projectile, from an unidentified source, also took ^a heavy toll
of 773 casualties, with 215 deaths, in the Settlement.
*

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

283

crew; investigation failed to establish the source of the

projectile. Japanese air-raids on cities in widely separated
areas of the Yangtze valley carried the war well into the
interior of China. In dog-fights over these cities, especially
Nanking, the Chinese aviators proved their mettle by

downing some two score Japanese planes.

During the week beginning August 23, Japanese army
contingents, aided by heavy naval concentrations, effected
costly landings at several points on the lower Whangpoo

and Yangtze

severe struggle for possession of the

rivers.
of
Lotien and Liuho was thus inPaoshan,
key points

augurated, with additional Japanese troops gradually concentrating in this region. For some weeks the warfare

continued indecisively at two separated areas, the one

immediately around Shanghai and the other on the banks
of the Yangtze River near Woosung. On August 26 two
Japanese planes machine-gunned and bombed motor-cars
containing a party of British officials traveling from Nanking to Shanghai. The British Ambassador to China, Sir
Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, was seriously wounded. A
lengthy diplomatic controversy ensued, at the conclusion
of which Britain's demands for satisfaction, including im-

munity
the

for non-combatants,

were only

partially

met by

Japanese government. Japanese disregard for the

of non-combatants was strikingly illustrated on

safety

September

8,

when

train standing at the

the

bombing

Sungkiang

of a

station,

crowded refugee
on the Shanghai-

Railway, resulted in the deaths of at least 300

blockade of the Chinese coast from
Chinese civilians.

Hangchow

Swatow, proclaimed by the Japanese naval

authorities on August 25, was extended to the whole of
the coast from Chinwangtao to Pakhoi on September 5.
This blockade was applied only to Chinese shipping, al-

Shanghai

to

though the Japanese authorities reserved the right

to hail

JAPAN IN CHINA

284

foreign merchantmen to ascertain their identity. After

three weeks o dogged defense, the Chinese troops were
forced to withdraw from their advanced coastline posi-

Lotien was surrendered on

loss of Paoshan. In the
September 15, following
had been effected on
area
a
withdrawal
Shanghai
slight
tions along the lower Yangtze.

the

September 13. A new line, running from the North Station through Tachang and Liuhong to Liuho, was firmly
consolidated.

The

fighting in the lower Yangtze region was of the

highest strategic importance, since a sufficient advance in
this sector would enable the Japanese army to turn the

Chapei-Kiangwan front and force a Chinese

from Shanghai. During the next six weeks, Japanese assaults in this area were bitterly contested and

flank of the
retreat

advances

won

only at heavy

cost.

Chafing at the stubborn

opposition, the Japanese military authorities decided to

extend and intensify their bombardments of Chinese

behind the lines. On September 20 Vice-Admiral

Hasegawa, in communications to the foreign consuls at
Shanghai, served notice that Nanking would be severely
bombed after noon on September 21 and warned all forcities

eign nationals to evacuate the

local foreign authorities

echoed in capitals

city.

To

this

demand

the

made

strong protests, which were

abroad. On September 22 some
thirty

or forty Japanese planes subjected

Nanking to a drastic
bombardment. The bombs landed on more than
thirty
places, including a refugee camp where approximately
100 civilian refugees were killed. A series of
Japanese
raids on Canton, also carried out at this
time, had even
more disastrous effects, resulting in an estimated total of
roughly 2,000 casualties. Widespread destruction was also
caused on September 24 by a raid on Hankow, with

approximately 700 casualties, of which the major propor-

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

285

tion consisted of refugees and children. In the face of

mounting sentiment in Europe and the United States

against these exhibitions of Japanese "frightfulness", and

the adoption by the League Assembly on September 28
of a resolution

condemning the bombing

of

open towns,

the Japanese naval authorities saw fit partially to curtail

the air-raids and restrict them to more specifically military

Large Japanese reinforcements were thrown

into the fighting in the Liuho-Tachang sector during
October. Sanguinary engagements, featured by continuous Chinese counter-attacks to regain ground temporarily
lost, continued until nearly the end of the month. The
capture of Tachang, key position of the Chinese center,
was finally effected on October 26. Japanese forces at once
objectives.

pressed into the rear of the Chapei-Kiangwan front, from

which the Chinese troops withdrew in good order across
Soochow Creek on October 27.
The new Chinese line, running from Soochow Creek
to Liuho, promised to afford an equally stern defense
against a frontal attack. Initial Japanese efforts to break
the Soochow Creek front were turned back. Additional

troops were brought in from Japan, and early in November landings were effected as several points on Hangchow
Bay, some fifty miles southwest of Shanghai. This flank

movement was pushed

front; within a

rapidly north toward the Shanghai

forces involved had

week the Japanese

The Chinese troops

withdrew
on
November
Pootung
7 through the narrowing gap left by the Japanese advance from the south.
On the following day the bulk of the Chinese forces
evacuated the Soochow Creek area, with rearguards covering the retreat. A force of several thousand Chinese troops
was cut off in Nantao; after severe Japanese shelling, it
was compelled to hand over its arms on November 12.
covered more than half the distance.
in

JAPAN IN CHINA

286

The

had taken exactly

occupation of the Shanghai area

three months, during which Japan's military forces had

suffered their heaviest losses since the Russo-Japanese War.
During the last three weeks of November, the Japanese

armies rapidly cleared the triangle formed by Shanghai,

Hangchow Bay and the Tai Lake, and began an advance
on Nanking in several parallel columns. From the southern

Tai Lake, one column pushed inland toward Wuhu, in an effort to flank the capital's defenders, while another moved overland toward Nanking.
The more vital offensive was made from north of the Tai
Lake, where Japanese forces pressed up the ShanghaiNanking Railway and along the banks of the Yangtze
River. In this sector the Kiangyin-Wusih defense line was
the immediate objective of the Japanese drive. Wusih

and inner

fell first,

sides of the

followed by reduction of the Kiangyin forts at

the beginning of December. The last major obstacle to a

direct assault on the capital was thus removed. By Decem-

ber 7 the outer defenses of Nanking were under attack;

one week

later, the

Japanese military forces had

won com-

plete control of the city.

Japanese bombing planes, with what seemed to be

intent, had meanwhile engaged in several
on British and American ships in the Yangtze

deliberate
attacks

River.

On December

5 several Japanese planes bombed

the British

Tuckwo and Tatung, as well as

gunboat Ladybird, at Wuhu. All three vessels
the steamers

plainly disthe
British
colors.
Both
steamers
were
filled with
played
Chinese civilian refugees; one of them burned, while the

other was beached. Scores were killed, while the American

Mission Hospital at Wuhu treated more than a hundred

burned and mangled Chinese. Japan's apologies for the

attack on the steamers were delivered on December 8.
Four days later the American gunboat Panay and three

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

287

tankers, anchored 28 miles up-river from Nanking,

were bombed by Japanese planes. The gunboat was sunk,
and the tankers were either destroyed or beached. Although the Panay was clearly marked with American flags
and other insignia, and was resting in an open stretch of
the river, it was subjected to four successive bombing
oil

attacks. Parties of the gunboat's survivors,

making

their

way toward shore in small boats, were machine-gunned

by the planes. A Japanese military launch machinegunned, boarded and searched the Panay before it sank.
Three Americans and one Italian were killed, or subsequently died of their wounds, and nearly two score were
wounded. Stern protests from the United States, including a request that they be brought to the attention of the
Emperor, eventually elicited replies from the Japanese authorities which were accepted as satisfactory by Washington.

For several days after Japan's victorious entrance into

Nanking, no word as to what was transpiring at the capital, or as to the fate of the foreigners who had remained
to supervise a safety zone for Chinese civilians, could be

When

obtained.

the news finally leaked out,

apparent that a complete

occurred

among

terrorism,

breakdown

it

became
had

of discipline

the Japanese troops. Wholesale looting,

of women's security had taken

and violation

city. The feeling of relief at

of
Nanking's residents, who
experienced by many
an
to
minor
and looting by evacend
disturbances
expected

place in

all

quarters of the

first

uating Chinese troops, was engulfed in a

much

greater

These excesses at Nanking, which duplicated

scenes in Paotingfu and other captured cities and towns
in North China, were clearly connived at by the Japanese
officers, some of whom were seen directing the looting
horror.

of street shops.

The rounding up

of former Chinese sol-

JAPAN IN CHINA

2 88

who were

by ropes and executed in

directed by Japanese
also
was
fifty,
officers. Looting of American residences both at Nanking
and Hangchow, the latter of which fell to Japanese forces
on December 24, formed the subject of protests later presented at Tokyo by the United States government.
Dispatches from Tokyo, prior to the fall of Nanking,
indicated that the Japanese Cabinet expected to be able
diers,

tied together

batches of forty or

conclude a peace treaty immediately after the fall of

the capital. The stubbornness of the Chinese resistance at
to

Shanghai had confounded Japan's military leaders. With

the relatively easy and rapid advance on Nanking, a considerable degree of confidence had been restored. On
December 8 Hugh Byas wirelessed from Tokyo: "Chinese
leaders are conferring, and it is known a peace party exists,
so the Japanese hope a new government, sufficiently representative to be recognized by the world and disposed to
conclude a peace treaty, will replace Chiang Kai-shek's
The prospect of a victorious termina-

administration.
tion of

what has been

short,

arouses great exuberance here.'*

easy, inexpensive war

At the time Japan was

already sending peace feelers to the Chinese authorities.

For a while Tokyo was apparently led to believe that

Wang

Ching-wei, chairman of the Kuomintang Central

and General Chang Chun, former Chi-

Political Council,

nese Foreign Minister, would take over the government

and seek to obtain the best peace terms possible. The

Chinese armies had been defeated; obviously, they would

now have to sue for peace.

The danger of a split among

whom

China's leaders, some of

undoubtedly voted for compromise, was probably

very real during the first two weeks of December. Japan's
brutal excesses at Nanking did not help to uphold the
New York Times, December 8, 1937.
5

THE DEFENSE OF SHANGHAI

hands of the compromisers.

The

289

crucial period passed with

signs of capitulation. The peace was not concluded. An answer to Japan's overtures may be read in

no overt

General Chiang Kai-shek's statement of December 17,

broadcast to the nation from his military headquarters:
"To capitulate is to court sure national disaster. No matter how the international situation turns, we must do our
utmost and not depend on others. The time must come
when Japan's military strength will be exhausted, thus
giving China the ultimate victory. Appraising the probable outcome of hostilities, we are convinced that the

present situation is favorable to China. The basis of

China's future success in prolonged resistance is not found
in

Nanking or big

cities

but in

villages all over

China and

in the fixed determination of the people. Since the beginning of hostilities Chinese army casualties on all fronts

have exceeded 300,000. The loss of civilian life and property is beyond computation. Such huge sacrifices in resisting foreign aggression are unprecedented in the history
of China. My position and responsibility do not admit of
evasion of duty. As long as I live I shall pursue to the
my ability China's determination to resist the

utmost of

and secure the ultimate victory for China." e

political unity forged in China during the early
months of 1937, Japan was to learn, had substance to it.
Various departments of the Chinese government had withdrawn from Nanking some weeks previously. The active
Ministries, such as Foreign Affairs and Finance, were
established in Hankow, while other offices were removed
to Chungking, on the upper Yangtze. New armed forces
were recruited and placed in training, and measures to
continue resistance to the Japanese armies of invasion were
aggressors

The

vigorously pushed.
9

New

York Herald Tribune, December

17, 1937.

CHAPTER NINE

THE STRUGGLE
IN North China,

at the

IN
end

THE NORTH
of July 1937, the Chinese

military forces in the Peiping-Tientsin area

had retreated

along three railway lines: the Tientsin-Pukow, the PeipingHankow, and the Peiping-Suiyuan. The Japanese com-

mand had two

alternatives. It could

continue

its

efforts

Hopei province by pushing along the two trunk

railways which ran south from Tientsin and Peiping, or
it could advance north and west
through the Nankow Pass
to clear

into

Inner

Mongolian provinces of Chahar and

Obvious strategic considerations dictated the
course, since the mountains west and northwest of

the

Suiyuan.
latter

Peiping flanked the Hopei plain and exposed it to the

threat of raiding attacks. Relatively small forces were
therefore detailed to keep the Chinese units south of
Tientsin and Peiping at bay, while the bulk of the available Japanese troops sought to force the Nankow Pass.
Strong Chinese resistance in this quarter held up the Japanese drive until nearly the end of August. One
Japanese

made the frontal attack; another flanking detachment pushed up parallel with and some ten miles
south of the pass. Nearly a month
elapsed before this
latter force had debouched on the
high plain behind the
pass; on August 27 it entered Huailai, a town on the
Peiping-Suiyuan line between Nankow and Kalgan. On
the same day units of the
Kwantung Army, which had
contingent

290

JAPAN IN CHINA

292

marched

across

Faced with

Chahar from Manchuria, occupied Kalgan.

this threat to their rear, the

Chinese forces

defending the pass had already effected a retreat toward

the southwest. Before withdrawing they had blown up

Nankow

tunnels, but
within ten days,
the Japanese military had cleared the railway and established communication between Peiping and Kalgan. The
Japanese expeditionary forces had continued along the
railway to Tatung; here they divided, with one group
pushing westward into Suiyuan and another southward

several locomotives in

one of the

failed to destroy the tunnels themselves;

into Shansi.

During the course of these operations, the Japanese

command had made extensive preparations for a drive in
Hopei province. Early in September, Japanese munitions
and food trains were still being unloaded at intermediate
stations between Tientsin and Peiping, and their stocks
added to the mountainous piles of crates, boxes, bags and
baskets of all kinds stacked along the platforms. Pontoon
bridges were brought in for river crossings. A force of
Japanese troops estimated at 300,000 was disposed in
readiness for the offensive.

On

September 10

a concerted

attack was launched along a seventy-mile front stretching

between the railways leading south from Peiping and

Tientsin.

The

Japanese forces had an overwhelming suequipped with about

periority of armament. They were

30 tanks, more than 100 airplanes,

and all types of modfrom

artillery, ranging
one-pounders to five-inch
howitzers and heavier guns. Against the weight of such an
offensive, backed by methodical preparation for every
eventuality, even the best Chinese force would have been
at a hopeless disadvantage. As it was, the Chinese commanders on this front made no effort to overcome their
mechanical inferiority by resort to mobile warfare or
ern

THE STRUGGLE

IN

THE NORTH

293

on the Japanese lines of communication. The intrenched armies, lacking adequate artillery and without
anti-aircraft guns or a single war plane, waited almost
fatalistically for the attack. When it came, the center of

attacks

the Chinese front collapsed and both wings were rolled

up. Blasted from their first-line positions and mercilessly

bombed and machine-gunned from

the air during their

retreat, the withdrawing troops were never able to consolidate their secondary defense lines. The Japanese forces

rapidly pushed their way down both railways. Paotingfu,

capital of Hopei province, was occupied September 24;

on the same day Tsangchow, a

Pukow

Railway,

also

fell

large
to the

town on the Tientsinadvancing Japanese

armies.

The

actions of the Japanese troops in Paotingfu beg-

gared description. For more than a week some 30,000 soldiers indulged in an unrestrained orgy of looting and
massacre. Virtually every shop and home in this city of
70,000 people, most of whom had already fled, was systematically broken into, looted, and wrecked. Chinese
refugees were shot and bayoneted on the streets.

correspondent,

foreign

who reached Paotingfu

several days after

of destruction. On his way back

watched the work

to Peiping he was placed under arrest by the Japanese
military authorities and detained for seventeen days before
he was allowed to return. One of the foreigners in the city
had his watch lifted by a Japanese officer. Sporadic firing
went on day and night, although the battle front was
miles south of the city. No Chinese woman was safe, either
in the city or in the surrounding villages. Cases of Chinese
civilians, all with tales of one tenor, filled the hospitals.
A young farmer was shot in the leg; his wife and sister
had been killed by Japanese soldiers. A middle-aged barber
was stabbed in the abdomen by a bayonet; two other Chiits fall,

JAPAN IN CHINA

294

nese were killed outright in his shop. Usually there xvas

not the vestige of an excuse for this wanton killing. Chinese refugees quartered at different places in the cfty were

hounded by Japanese soldiers, threatened with drawn

bayonets, and stripped of their few remaining belongings.
Other phases of Japanese action at Paotingfu betrayed
systematic design. For days the city was lighted with

more

bonfires,

fed by tens of thousands of text-books

from

schools where 15,000 students had formerly pursued their

education. The destruction did not stop with text-books.

Laboratory equipment and part of the library of the

Hopei Medical College were fed to the flames; so also were
the Agricultural Institute, which
represented the results of a decade of careful study and
investigation designed to help the Chinese farmer.
the

crop-statistics

The

of

Japanese military advance had meanwhile con-

tinued steadily down the two railway lines. On October 3

Techow, in northern Shantung, was occupied, while
Chengtingfu, junction of a railway line running west into
Shansi province, was taken on October 13. The
occupation of this strategic junction-point proved of inestimable
value to the hard-pressed Japanese divisions in northern
Shansi.
large force, estimated by correspondents at well
over 100,000 troops, was detached from the main armies

operating in

Hopei province; this army immediately

an advance along the branch railway from Chengtingfu to Taiyuan, capital of Shansi province. The end

started

of

march belongs

to the story of the Shansi

campaign,
and will be told in that connection. Events at
Chengtingfu
were a repetition on a smaller scale of those in
its

Paotingfu.

News

of the deaths of eight Catholic missionaries

other foreigner,

group

at

and one

who were bayoneted and cremated

in a

Chengtingfu, was withheld by the Japanese au-

THE STRUGGLE

IN

THE NORTH

295

thorities for nearly six weeks; investigations conducted by

foreigners at the end of November tended to incriminate

Japanese troops, despite strenuous denials of responsibility

by garrison headquarters

officials at

Tientsin.

With

the

capture of Chengtingfu, the spectacular phase of the campaign in Hopei was concluded. During October and

November

the Japanese troops left in this province gradually fought their way down the Peiping-Hankow Railway
into northern Honan; to the east, along the Tientsin-

Pukow

line, they worked their way to the north bank of

the Yellow River in Shantung, where the large bridge near

Tsinan was blown up by retreating Chinese troops. On

both railway lines the sgth Route Army, which had been
driven from Peiping in July, doggedly held its ground
against the more powerful Japanese forces in a series of
sustained, courageous actions; months later, this army was
fighting off the Japanese attacks in southern Shantung
and north of the Yellow River near Chengchow in Honan
province. At the end of November the Japanese command

still

postponed general operations south of the Yellow River

in Shantung, either through a desire to protect Japan's
investments or in the hope that General Han Fu-chu,
local Chinese governor, would yield the province without
a struggle.

In Shansi province the scheduled plan of Japanese

operations had meanwhile been rudely upset by the desperate resistance of the Eighth Route Army, assisted by
the Shansi provincial troops. The details of this campaign,

which was covered by none of the foreign correspondents,

were virtually unreported during the month of October,
when some of the severest engagements were fought along
the passes through the mountain barrier. Not until De-

cember did the correspondents

in Peiping begin to piece

296

JAPAN IN CHINA

from reports of missionaries and information

gathered by the foreign military attaches, the full story
together,

of these operations.

The

preliminary stages of the Shansi invasion, including the capture of Tatung, were successfully handled. By
the middle of September, the Japanese divisions mainly
from the Kwantung Army had left the railway and taken
Huaijen, some fifty miles south of Tatung. The mountain
passes along the Great Wall in northern Shansi were be-

Here the Japanese troops were split into three

four columns which attempted to force their way
southward through the passes, of which Pinghsiangkuan,
fore them.

or

Juyuehkou, and Yenmenkuan were the most important.

Sections of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by General Chu Teh, had taken up positions along the mountain
barrier. In late

September the Communist forces

-isolated

a full division of Japanese troops in a narrow defile at

Pinghsiangkuan, the easternmost pass, and cut them to

General Chu Teh later stated that 2,000 Japanese

troops were killed in this single engagement. At about the
same time, however, another invading column broke
pieces.

through at Juyuehkou, and debouched into more open

country at Fanchih and Taichow. Large Japanese reinforcements also increased the pressure at Pinghsiangkuan
and finally forced the pass, whereupon a considerable
portion of the Eighth Army fell back to Wutai and the

Hsinkou range, covering the approaches to Taiyuan.

During these operations the Eighth Army leaders refused to be drawn into a positional battle in which they
might have been destroyed by the bombing planes and
superior artillery of the Japanese. Marching often at night,
and guided by information supplied by the local population, they swiftly attacked carefully

then withdrew.

The

chosen objectives and

Japanese forces which

first

broke

>

-. :*^^v
"
'., -,
-

GENERAL

^,
,^
*
'

^r

'j,

COMMANDER OF THE EIGHTH (COMMUNIST)

ARMY, DONS A KUOM1NTANG UNIFORM.

C1IU TKH,

THE STRUGGLE

IN

THE NORTH

297

through at Juyuehkou, as well as the neighboring pass of

Hsiaoshihkou, totaled about 50,000 troops. They were
soon surrounded south of Taichow by overwhelming Chinese armies, including provincial troops and units of the
Eighth Army, and for a time were in desperate straits.
Even with supporting reinforcements, which brought the

combined Japanese

more than 100,000 troops, it

break
the
Chinese resistance which
proved
developed along the Hsinkou range. From the middle of
October to the end of the first week in November, the
Japanese divisions which had penetrated the northern
passes were held up north of Taiyuan. Sections of the
Eighth Route Army, still operating in the passes, comforce to

impossible to

pletely disrupted the supply lines of the invaders. Ping-

hsiangkuan and Yenmenkuan were twice recaptured and

held for a time by Eighth Army detachments, and a continuous series of engagements occurred in the rear of the
Japanese columns. These swift attacks, often in considerable force, made it impossible for all except large and
heavily mechanized Japanese contingents to move south

from Tatung

to the aid of their fellow armies south of

passes. The Kwantung Army commanders' whole

offensive bogged down. They were bailed out by the army

the

which had started into Shansi from the east, at Chengtingfu, three weeks earlier.
This force was also operating in difficult country. The
Chengtai Railway, which runs from Chengtingfu to
Taiyuan, climbs steadily from the Hopei plain toward the
high plateau on which Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi, is
situated. It passes through a series of mountain ranges,
cut by deep river valleys. The Niangtsekuan passes, along
this route, are virtually as impregnable as the Great Wall
barrier in northern Shansi.

nese troops defending

this

As

happened, the few Chiquarter were unequal to their

it

JAPAN IN CHINA

2 98

task; the bulk of the local troops and the Eighth Army
were all in the north. The Japanese army from the east
smashed its way steadily through the Niangtsekuan passes;
by the end of the first week of November, it had reached
the outskirts of Taiyuan. Its appearance was decisive, in
so far as the defense of the capital was concerned. Taken
from the rear, the Chinese defense along the Hsinkou
range was compelled to give way, and the Japanese advance guards entered Taiyuan on November 9.

Weighing the results of the Shansi campaign, the Japaarmy command could find little cause for self-con-

nese

gratulation.

The

task of

conquering north Shansi, at

first

entrusted to several relatively small Japanese columns, had

eventually required an army of between 200,000 and 300,ooo men. After the fall of Taiyuan a good portion of this

needed

to hold the ground already won. Until

the
city of Fenchow, distant only about
February
from
miles
Taiyuan on a good motor highway, was
eighty

force was
late

still

held by Chinese troops.

The Eighth Route Army

ranged across the Japanese line of communications from

Tatung to Taiyuan, rendering it useless as a source of
military supplies.
On the basis of these
chine, General

first

clashes with Japan's war macertain preliminary

Chu Teh had formed

judgments which reveal his coolly calculating temper.

The Japanese, he remarked in an interview with a news1
paper correspondent, had superior arms and used them
well;

they could act according to their plans and keep

their plans secret; they did not surrender their

guns but
fought until killed, mainly because they feared death if

taken captive; they could retreat and bring in reinforce1

China Weekly Review, November 13, 1937, p. 239; for other details,
Domei dispatch, Peking 6- Tientsin Times, September 29, 1937;
and editorial, September 30, 1937.
see also

THE STRUGGLE

IN

THE NORTH

299

ments more quickly than the Chinese. On the other hand,

the war spirit among the rank and file was low; the Japanese soldiers did not like to build defense works; their
intelligence service worked slowly; andthis he thought a

fundamental weakness they feared hand-to-hand battles.

He pointed out that most of the Japanese killed had
fallen in hand-to-hand combat; hand grenades accounted
for the second largest number. Not a man of the Eighth
Army had been captured; without exception, the Japanese
had put to death every soldier captured from other Chinese forces in Shansi. At Yenmenkuan on October 18
units of the Eighth Route Army had attacked the Japanese
airfield; using hand grenades it had destroyed twentyone Japanese planes, leaving only three on the field before
In

engagements following that at Pingstated, the Eighth Army had killed

hsiangkuan,
between three and four thousand Japanese troops, suffered less than one thousand killed, and had virtually reequipped its troops with captured Japanese arms and
retreated.

it

Chu Teh

munitions.

The
this

on the Japanese army during

protracted character and inconclusive

severe losses inflicted

campaign,

its

and the number of troops required for the capture

of Taiyuan demonstrated the efficacy of the mobile warfare employed with such skill by the Chinese Communist
leaders. Formal conclusion of the campaign left the Japanese command with a military problem scarcely less seri-

results,

ous than the one

it

faced at the outset of

its

operations.

opponent in Shansi, the Eighth Route Army, by

avoiding positional battles, had emerged virtually intact
to continue the struggle. The Eighth Army's war base in
the mountains of northern Shansi is the most strategic
area in the whole of North China. As long as the Chinese
forces led by Chu Teh and his associates can operate in
Its

chief

JAPAN IN CHINA

300

and pacification of Japan's

in
the
northern
provinces will be a long-drawnconquests
out and inconclusive affair, engaging the efforts of large
this region, the consolidation

and expensive armies of occupation. From north Shansi,

during the early months of 1938, the Eighth Route Army
sent raiding detachments into Suiyuan, Chahar and Hopei
which harried all the main Japanese lines of communication in these provinces.
Of basic importance

is

the fact that the population of

whole area has been opened to the organizational

efforts of the Eighth Army, which for the past ten years
has been demonstrating the extraordinary military potenthis

tialities

of the Chinese masses

the Japanese

doxically,

when properly

invasion,

led. Para-

which claims

to

be

saving China from bolshevism, has enabled the Communist leaders to exercise their talents for making effective

workers and peasants in a larger area than

dreamed of. It was the pressure of Japanese
had
ever
they
aggression, in the first place, which forced the Nanking
authorities into a position where they became willing to
soldiers of

bury the hatchet with their erstwhile

felt that

foes.

Many

observers

the

Kuomintang-Communist agreement of last

which
restricted the Red forces to the comparaspring,
tively poor Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia districts, would eventually bring about the decline and disintegration of the
Chinese Communist movement. Japan's invasion of North
China has completely altered this perspective. The Eighth
Army has now a large and important sector of the national
defense front to hold against the invaders, in which it
can apply the lessons of
experience of a decade.

The Communist

its

rich guerrilla

campaigning

leaders are already devoting a

major

portion of their energies to the speedy organization of

partisan forces, which can immediately take the field to

THE STRUGGLE

IN

THE NORTH

harry the enemy outposts and supply

lines.

301

Japanese ex-

North China countryside, reported in Peiping

a
succession
of eye-witnesses, may be counted on to
by

cesses in the

induce the peasants to lend a willing ear to the appeal for

enlistment in military service. Thousands of the peasants,
townspeople, have been torn from their sur-

as well as the

roundings or embittered by wanton murders of their

closest relatives. A correspondent who traveled through
rural districts swept over during the Hopei campaign
found that an almost unparalleled reign of terror existed.
Forced requisitions, reckless killings, and worse had been
the universal experience of the villagers. Some had been
shot down while they ran in terror, others had suffered
the same fate because they had not obeyed a command
barked at them in the Japanese language. Many villages
had lost as many as two score killed in this way, others had
lost ten or a dozen. In many cases, the survivors were
herded together by bayonet and forced to carry out tasks
2
imposed by the Japanese military. Chinese peasants, shot
or bayoneted in the villages around Paotingfu, were coming into the hospitals two months after the fall of the city.
In Mentoukou, a small town not far from Peiping, shops
and homes were stripped bare by the Japanese forces of
occupation: villages in the region around Mentoukou had
lost every young Chinese woman. A first-hand observer
reported similar conditions at Tatung, in north Shansi.
Such circumstances tended to produce sympathy and support when the Eighth Army organizers entered a village
or town and began the task of winning the people to active
resistance against the invader.

The

extent to which these efforts have been rewarded

indicated by the testimony of missionaries and other

is
a

The author

September

1937.

witnessed an example of this in Kalgan, in the middle of

JAPAN IN CHINA

302

observers from the interior of Hopei province. North

Shansi, by virtue of its geographical position, dominates
the greater part of the Hopei plain from the Peiping

The mountain

ranges extending from

Shansi into western Hopei offer excellent cover for military forces entering this region, especially if they possess
the confidence of the Chinese peasants. During the fall

environs south.

months

and

locally recruited guerrilla

in
the mountains a fexv miles
position
the outset of the war the Eighth Army

of 1937, a small

force maintained
west of Peiping. At

its

of 10,000 regulars into western Hopei.

up into numerous smaller bands

leaders sent

upward

This force

later split

which, accompanied by experienced political organizers,

and began to establish

with the villagers. These units have been

scattered across the interior areas

friendly contacts

reorganizing remnants of defeated Chinese troops, collecting all available arms

new worker and

and ammunition, and organizing

peasant guerrilla forces. Similar activities

were being carried on in much of Shansi province, and in

areas of Suiyuan and Chahar. It is safe to say that tens of
thousands of new guerrilla forces have been put into the
field in North China as the result of these efforts. At first
these detachments may be poorly armed, but past experience suggests that the Eighth Army leaders may rapidly
overcome this deficiency with captured enemy equipment.

Chu Teh
only
rifles,

declared that in

many

of the

new

partisan units

twenty out of a hundred men possessed

the rest being armed with hand grenades. With the

fifteen or

support of

this type of

tary authorities,

which

campaigning by the central miliis

now

assured, supplies of small

arms and ammunition can be procured from the government arsenals. Early in February nearly 100,000 silver
dollars, raised by public subscription in Hankow, was
expended for uniforms and other supplies to equip newly

THE STRUGGLE

THE NORTH

IN

303

organized Shansi guerrilla forces. Dr. H. H. Kung, the

chairman of the Executive Yuan and himself a native of
3

Shansi, contributed 10,000 dollars to this fund.

On

the

leadership and morale of guerrilla troops depends much

of their effectiveness. In its simplest terms, the strategy
applied by the Eighth Army consists in keeping out of

way of superior forces and attacking when the enemy

weak or unprepared. Hundreds of leaders trained in

the
is

this strategy in the People's Anti-Japanese Military Acadat Yenan are available for the present emergency,

emy

and can be placed

in

command

of

newly formed partisan

units.

Eighth

Army

detachments in Hopei province were

In Peiping during the last

fighting as well as organizing.

two weeks of November the correspondents had reports

o from sixteen to twenty attacks on Japanese detachments
along the Peiping-Hankow Railway. A Japanese airfield
at Hantan, near the southern border of Hopei province,
had been attacked with hand grenades and a number of
airplanes destroyed; the Japanese aviators had returned

by rail through Peiping. Only heavily armed Japanese

detachments, usually escorted by airplanes, dared venture
into the interior of Hopei. Actual Japanese military control

embraced but a narrow

strip of

approximately

five

miles on either side of the railway, with somewhat larger

areas around the more important cities, such as Paotingfu.
East of the Peiping-Hankow Railway the countryside was
controlled by remnants of the Chinese divisions which

still

had been swept

aside in the big

area at the beginning of

September push. In

December

the Japanese

this

command

motor highway from Tientsin to Paotingfu as a regular supply line. In Suiyuan and
Chahar units of the Eighth Army were also operating. The

was

still

unable to

utilize the

York Times, February

5,

1938,

304

JAPAN IN CHINA

continuous reports of raids, captured towns, and torn-up

railway tracks during the early months of 1938 suggested
that the guerrilla campaign was acquiring increased mo-

mentum

in North China.
In addition to the operations in Hopei and Shansi, the
Japanese armies had fought a third major campaign in
Inner Mongolia during the autumn of 1937. Following
the capture of Kalgan and Tatung, the fighting was immediately carried into Suiyuan during mid-September.
Here the provincial troops under General Fu Tso-yi

proved no match for the crushing thrusts of the Kwantung

Army divisions, assisted by Mongol forces. Three
parallel columns participated in the early phases of the
invasion. Pingtichuan, main strategic defense of the province, fell to the combined onslaught of the two southerly

columns before the end of September. The Mongol force

operating in the north took Pailingmiao during the first
week of October and then pressed on to Wuchuan, twenty
miles north of the capital. Kweihua, capital of the province, was occupied on October 14; three days later Paotou,
western terminus of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, fell
to a Japanese force. Japanese domination of the Inner
Mongolian provinces, save for the western reaches of
Ninghsia, had finally been achieved. Years of scheming
by the Kwantung Army had gone into the accomplishment.

On

October 29 a so-called National Assembly of the

Mongol princes, meeting under Kwantung Army auspices
at Kweihua, formally established the Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia. Prince Yun was chosen
Chairman, and Te Wang Vice-Chairman of the new government. The territories embraced by the new regime

Chahar and Suiyuan banners; the

Hsingan in Manchoukuo was not
included. Future expansion of this Mongolian kingdom
consisted mainly of the
Mongolian province of

THE STRUGGLE

IN

THE NORTH

305

was envisaged by the wording of Article 2 of the organic

law, which stated that the government "shall rule over the
territory originally possessed by Mongolia, but for the
time being it will function" over the Chahar-Suiyuan
banners. Echoes of the Manchoukuo state builders rang
through many portions of this document. The new regime,
according to Article 3, was "founded on the policy of anti-

Communism and racial unity." 4

The Kwantung Army's state-building

activities

did not

stop with the Mongols; there were still the southern areas
of Chahar and Suiyuan, populated mainly by Chinese, to
be considered. For these regions an Autonomous Govern-

ment of Chahar was set up at Kalgan, while at Kweihua

an Autonomous Government of Suiyuan was formed. A
committee to coordinate the work of the three new Inner
Mongolian regimes was organized at Kalgan toward the
end of November. The Kwantung Army's future relationship with the province of Shansi has not yet been made
clear.

The problem

involves a certain

amount

of rivalry

with the Japanese armies in North China under the command of General Terauchi. Both groups participated in
the invasion of Shansi, but the title of the Kwantung
Army, whose divisions entered the province from the
north, does not seem entirely clear. Its entrance into

Taiyuan was made possible only by the assistance rendered

by the Japanese forces from Hopei, without which it
might have pounded vainly at the Hsinkou range for some
time longer. There can be no doubt that the Kwantung

Army

will surrender

its

tutelage of the three

new Inner

Mongolian regimes, or allow them to be merged with the

provisional government established at Peiping, only with
the greatest reluctance. Inner Mongolia is considered as
4

For text of the organic

1937-

act, see

The Peiping

Chronicle, October 30,

306

JAPAN IN CHINA
Kwantung Army's exclusive
in Manchoukuo.
autumn of 1937, conditions seemed

a natural extension of the

sphere of jurisdiction
At Peiping, in the

outwardly normal, and the general routine of life went on

much as usual. External signs of Japanese occupation,
though quite apparent, were limited to a few sights which
soon became customary and accepted. Columns of marching Japanese troops or long lines of supply carts might
be encountered at any point in the city, instead of the
Legation Quarter or its environs. Khaki-colored motor
trucks, carrying Japanese troops or military supplies,

drove

recklessly through the streets, causing many accidents and

not a few casualties among Chinese pedestrians, 'rickshaw

and their passengers, bicyclers and cartmen. To

the
large influx of Japanese residents, new Japasupply
pullers

nese shops were being continually opened on

Hatamen

subtly changing its appearance and giving it a

pronounced flavor of Japan. Most spectacular were the
Street,

balloon streamers floating over Peiping a wholly

sight, and typically Japanese. In late September

new
and

October, the lines of Chinese characters on these streamers

usually reported the new cities captured by the Japanese
armies. Later, possibly in deference to the susceptibilities
of the local Chinese population, the sentiments expressed

by the streamers changed to more general themes. Of

most favored read: "The Japanese Army prethe
serves
peace of East Asia." Some Japanese doctor had
evidently examined the water supply, and probably been
horrified at the number of bacilli; the result was an overdose of chlorine, which confounded the digestion and
rendered even tea undrinkable.
Economic life, as the result of many factors, had dropped
to a low ebb, and a serious business depression prevailed.
these, the

THE STRUGGLE
The virtual closing
Tangku to all but

IN

THE NORTH

307

of the port cities of Tientsin and

military supplies had throttled the

foreign trade of North China. Collapse of the former

Chinese government, and the withdrawal of the sgth

Route Army,

registered severe

economic

effects.

An

in-

vestigation covering but part of the city disclosed that

20,000 white-collar workers, including clerks, lower government officials, staff employees in factories and hotels,

and those connected with the Chinese military, had been

thrown out of employment. Among the lower classes the
conditions were even more serious; more than 200,000
were being fed at twenty-three local gruel
kitchens, mostly conducted by charitable organizations
under Chinese or foreign auspices. Normal agricultural
life in the surrounding countryside was disrupted. In
November there were still more than forty refugee centers
at Peiping, housing upwards of 10,000 refugees from
neighboring towns and villages. Retail business was seriously affected by the fear of looting; in many Chinese
shops, all valuable articles had been taken off display and
hidden for safe-keeping. Large losses were suffered from
destitute

who would put down a tithe of the

an object, offer a small sum in Japanese currency,
or else walk out without paying anything. Early in September this situation became so serious, and was attracting

Japanese soldiers
price for

so much comment, that the Japanese military authorities

were forced to take cognizance of it and issue special regulations to hold it in check. 5 The tourist traffic of the
summer and fall, an important item in the economic income of Peiping, had been frightened off in large part by
the hostilities. This untoward situation is to be set right
in 1938. Japanese tourist and other government agencies
c

The Peiping

Chronicle, September 5, 1937.

JAPAN IN CHINA

308

have prepared an extensive advertising campaign, which

will feature the attractions of Peiping for European and

American
Behind

tourists.

these surface

phenomena, much more funda-

mental changes were occurring in Peiping's political

life

period the city was

Peace
Maintenance
a
so-called
nominally governed by
been
set
had
which
Commission,
up early in August.
strenuous
For months, despite
efforts, the Japanese had

and

social organization.

been unable

During

this

to secure the services of

any Chinese puppets

who would command

the respect of the people. Chiang

Peace Maintenance Commission,
the
head
of
Chao-tsung,
was a conservative Confucian scholar who had held office
in former Peking governments. Pan Yu-kwei, chief of
police in this nondescript regime, had spent a term in

jail for

Pei-fu,

Wu

nefarious practices some years earlier. Marshal

aged leader of the former Chihli Party, although

resident in Peiping, had steadily refused Japanese overtures and spurned Japanese threats designed to make him

head of North China. As in Manchoukuo,

Peiping regime was controlled by a set of Japanese
advisers which directed every phase of the administration.
These advisers enforced the application of a series of
measures which were rapidly molding North China into

become

titular

this

Manchoukuo.
Within a few months the Chinese population was deriving its information of events in the rest of China and
the outside world from sources controlled or directed by
the likeness of

the Japanese civilian or military authorities. Any possible

misuse of the forest of radio antennae over Peiping, which

had

Japanese some concern, was speedily

Agents disseminating propaganda material were
in
the local broadcasting stations. The programs
placed
soon failed to supply any news, even from Japanese
at first caused the

set right.

agencies.

THE STRUGGLE IN THE NORTH

309
A shriek, set up on the wave-length of Nanking's

powerful

station, effectively

prevented successful reception

of short-wave radio sets was

from that quarter. Possession

prohibited. The few short-wave radios owned by foreigners

were heavily patronized.

number

of startling transformations occurred in the

field. Following the Japanese

newspaper and news agency

occupation, the many Chinese newspapers that had appeared in Peiping and Tientsin were forced to suspend
publication. In Peiping the Chinese

staff

of the Central

News, a government agency, was imprisoned and kept

under detention for several weeks. The important newspapers, each with its set of Chinese figure-heads, were
reorganized and placed under Japanese direction. Filled
with news items and dispatches of Domei and Kokutsu,
these newspapers were hardly distinguishable from those
published in Japan or Manchoukuo. The editors were
held strictly responsible for what appeared in their papers.
They were instructed to emphasize the number of Chinese casualties and the number of Chinese planes shot
down or destroyed. They were forbidden to use the term
"Chinese National Government'*, forced to

vilify

Chiang

Kai-shek and the central authorities, and compelled to

play up and praise Japan's "holy war" to deliver China
from the clutches of its corrupt rulers. In Peiping such
papers were forced on the Chinese shopkeepers by
tions

from the

visita-

police.

The

evolution of the two English-language newspapers

in Peiping took a characteristic course. At the end of
July the editors of The Peiping News, a paper owned

and managed by Chinese

editor-in-chief, Dr. Wilson

were arrested; the

Wei, was held in jail for

interests,
S.

months. After a temporary suspension, the paper reappeared on August 14 with a new set of Chinese editors;

JAPAN IN CHINA

3io

its editorials and news items were thoroughly

colored with a Japanese viewpoint. Pressure from the
authorities forced The Peiping Chronicle, which was

thereafter

suspend publication on
August 22. After considerable negotiation, the paper was
allowed to resume on August 31, but difficulties still continued. Its delivery boys were shanghaied, and two of its
foreign

owned and

edited,

to

Chinese sub-editors were attacked by thugs. At the beginning of November new interests, with Chinese names to
the fore, bought up the Chronicle. In accordance with the

change in the
the

On

city's

name decreed by

the authorities,

of the paper was altered to The Peking Chronicle.

December i the News suspended publication, leaving

title

the

only English-language paper in

nominal editors are Chinese, but it

Chronicle as the

Peiping.

The

latter's

understood that the actual editorial work is carried on

by a Mr. Gorman, who has long worked with the Japa-

is

nese.

The

character of the paper

is

indicated by a scare

published on November 20, which read as

"Mutiny and Coup D'Etat Led by Feng at Nanking has Communism as Centre/' This was based on a
Domei dispatch, itself taken from the Asahi, which "indihead-line,
follows:

cated" that "mutiny has reportedly occurred at Nanking";

a second Asahi message quoted by Domei said that General

coup

Feng Yu-hsiang was "reportedly planning

d'etat."

Under

to stage a
these conditions, exaggerated reports

of Chinese victories spread

tion,

which

is

compelled

among

to choose

the Chinese populabetween such rumors

or distorted materials from Japanese sources.

Peiping has always been the foremost educational center of China; in this sphere, wholesale
changes were

wrought by the Japanese occupation. The normal enrolment of approximately 80,000 elementary and middle
school students, who came from all parts of North China,

THE STRUGGLE
was cut nearly in

half.

IN

With

THE NORTH

311

the loss of a substantial edu-

cational subsidy from the Nanking government, public

school finances were seriously crippled. During the first

two months of the school term, the teachers received only

30 per cent of their regular salaries.

Japanese-language
teacher was attached to each of the 190 primary and
middle schools, and the study of Japanese made compulsory.

Text-books in history and

civics

were revised. All

reference to the three principles of Sun Yat-sen or other

ideas involving Chinese nationalism was eliminated, and
the history of Sino- Japanese relations recast to illustrate

Japan's benevolent intentions toward China. Use of the

documents of the League of Nations was banned. Study of

with particular reference to their

to authority, was
the
Yi Ching} which
tomes
such
as
Abstruse
emphasized.
no scholar pretends to understand, were offered as intellectual fare for pupils in the lower schools. Ultimately the
whole set of Chinese text-books used in the primary and
middle schools is to be revised. At one meeting of the
local school principals, a Chinese teacher had the temerity
to suggest that it would hardly be necessary to change all
the Confucian

classics,

encomiums on humility and obedience

text-books, especially those in the natural sciences. He

argued that the expense of purchasing a complete set of

new

text-books

would impose a heavy burden on poor

Chinese families.

immediately
which Japan
unfortunate

Japanese sitting in at the meeting

stated that, considering the large expenditure

was incurring for the benefit of China, it was

if the Chinese people should not be willing

to contribute their small share. Early in September the
authorities had attempted to organize a Student Union in

Peiping. At the inaugural meeting, not more than half a

second meeting fared no
dozen students appeared.
better and the effort was given up, although the organiza-

312
tion continued to

JAPAN IN CHINA
exist on paper. The teachers, who were

dependent on their positions for a livelihood, did not

escape so easily; they were formed into clubs to promote
Sino-Japanese friendship.

When

Paotingfu and Taiyuan

fell

to

the

Japanese

armies, brightly colored pailou symbolic of the victories

were erected across the main streets of Peiping, and cele-

brations were organized. Each shop was compelled to send

at least one representative to the street parades and demonstrations, or else contribute

one dollar in

local

currency

to help cover expenses. The primary and middle school

principals were called together in advance, and notified

that their pupils must take part in the street parades. Each
school had to prepare flags and banners, inscribed with

slogans furnished by the Japanese authorities. Thousands

of students, many of whom had participated in the earlier

anti-Japanese demonstrations in
streets on these occasions. They

Peiping,

paraded the

marched with lowered

No slogans were shouted;

heads, in almost complete silence.

in many cases the flags were not even unfurled. Missionary
schools, including Truth Hall and Bridgman Academy,
to send their pupils to these demonstrations.

were forced

On

the occasion of the fall of Paotingfu, the turn-out

of the students was not complete. The school principals,

on the eve of the capture of Taiyuan, were therefore called

on the carpet and told that they must see that every student appeared or there would be reprisal. This time the
students were all out; again they were herded through the
streets by Chinese police and an occasional Japanese soldier. At one point two thousand students were lined up
before a military headquarters; officers inspected

them

from behind sand-bag barricades, and Japanese sentries

pointed bayonets at them. They were ordered to cheer for
the Japanese army. After the first feeble response the com-

THE STRUGGLE
mand

was barked out more

IN

THE NORTH

gruffly,

313

and the cheers were

louder. Nevertheless, when the demonstration was over,

many of the students threw their flags into the moat

around Central Park, where they were later seen floating on the water. The effects of these parades, which embitter the local population, would hardly seem to be
worth the effort expended on them. A possible explanation

offered by the fact that many photographs of the

demonstrations are taken; these are apparently sent home
is

to illustrate the enthusiastic support

people are giving to their deliverers

which the Chinese

from mis-rule and

oppression.

University students were not compelled to join the

demonstrations, mainly because the former flourishing
college life of Peiping has been almost entirely swept

away. Of some 13,000 former Chinese university students,

only 1,700 were

1937.

left in

Where formerly

Peiping during the autumn of

there

had been 2,200

professors
college teachers, there were less than five hundred.
Sixteen of the twenty-six colleges and universities were
shut down. Of those left, only three could be termed bona

and

Peking Union MediChinese Studies, and a business

fide universities; the others included

cal College, the College of

were either under foreign auspices or

of foreigners on their faculty
staffs. Peking National University, the Oxford of China,
had become a barracks for Japanese troops. The same was
true of three other Chinese national universities at Peiping, including Tsinghua, the institution founded by
American Boxer Indemnity funds. Part of the National
Normal University was used as a stable for Japanese
school. All of these

had a considerable number

cavalry horses.

The

three real universities

still functioning
Protestant
with
American
backing;
comprised Yenching,
Fu Jen, the Catholic University; and the Sino-French

JAPAN IN CHINA

314

University. Their enrolments were considerably reduced,

but on giving pledges that no political activities would be

permitted by the student body they were enabled to continue under watchful supervision.

From

late

November Japanese

representatives

of a
desperate efforts to enlist the political services
the
north.
in
Chinese
set
of
figure-heads
imposing

made
more
The

patch-work regime formed by amalgamating the Peace

Maintenance Commissions of Peiping and Tientsin had
outlived its usefulness. Despite the approaching fall of
Nanking, none of China's national leaders had swung over
to cooperation with Japan. The real capital of China was
already at Hankow, and the Japanese could substitute no

would not be dwarfed by

the galaxy of Chinese leaders up the river. Something had
to be done toward setting up a more respectable alternative in the north. On December 14 a "provisional government of all China" was proclaimed in Peiping. No leader
of sufficient stature to become president or chief executive

rival authority at

Nanking

that

of this provisional regime could be found. Wang Kehmin, twice Finance Minister in the old Peking govern-

ments dominated by the pro-Japanese Anfu clique, headed

the executive council.

Tang

Erh-ho, veteran North China

Tokyo Imperial University, was

of Education in the abbreviated cabinet.

politician educated at

made Minister
Another

of the council

members was Wang

Yi-tang, also

educated in Japan; once an adviser of Yuan Shih-kai, he

had helped to organize the Anfu clique, which" had contracted the notorious "Nishihara" loans in 1918. General
Chi Hsieh-yuan, an old-style warlord who had fled to
Japan after defeat in the civil wars of 1924, headed the
Ministry of Public Safety. Every man on this list had longbefore been thoroughly discredited in the eyes of progressive

Chinese public opinion. Premier Konoye welcomed

THE STRUGGLE

IN

THE NORTH

315

the regime as heralding "the birth of a new China", but

he did not see fit to extend Japan's immediate recognition.
The provisional government's title to authority rested on
Japanese bayonets. Its figure-heads were fairly safe on the
main railways; off the trunk lines they might encounter
responsible Chinese citizens. The first visit of Wang Kehmin, Tang Erh-ho, Wang Yi-tang et al. was to Tientsin,
where they were herded in to pay their respects to General Terauchi, commander-in-chief of the Japanese military forces in North China. This was symbolic. For their
continuance in office depends on Japan's ability to win
the war. Against this a question-mark was being set by the
rising tide of guerrilla opposition in the northern provinces. The new government was hardly ensconced in office
when raiding activities were carried to the outskirts of
Peiping and Tientsin. This, too, was an omen.
While the facts with regard to Chinese guerrilla campaigning in the north are of primary significance, they
should not be exaggerated. They do not suggest that the
Japanese military position in North China is untenable,
or that new areas may not be overrun by heavily mech-

They do mean that the Japanese command

faced with a military problem of large dimensions, which
will continue to require a costly army of occupation for
many years to come. The "pacification" of North China,
anized armies.

is

certainly of any considerable section of the interior, will

not be accomplished unless the Eighth Route

Army

is

completely annihilated. Failing this, from fifteen to

twenty divisions of Japanese troops will be required to
maintain control of the lines of railway communication in
the northern provinces. And the problem may become
steadily more serious if the Eighth Army is able to com6
This was the reported objective of a Japanese drive across Shansi
into Shensi in late February of 1938, which had petered out by April.

and

JAPAN IN CHINA

316

mobilization of the peasants in areas off the railway lines. In March 1938 a Chinese administration, embracing an estimated total of seven million people, was
functioning in the interior of Hopei province.
Guerrilla operations in the north were being carried
on at an increasing tempo during the winter months of
1937-1938, when the grain had been cut and cover was
meagera season when the armed Manchurian volunteers
are normally driven into the most inaccessible areas of the
Northeastern provinces. The campaign, in other words,
plete

its

had got

an early and auspicious

start. Consisting of
seasoned
an initial force of 100,000 troops
by a decade
difficult
the
most
under
warfare
circumstances,
of mobile

off to

and led by experienced commanders, the Eighth Army

will carry on a wasting conflict that will try Japanese
nerves to the utmost and place an increasing strain on
Japan's economy and finances. The Communist leaders
are convinced that China, because of
status

its

semi-colonial

and backward technique, cannot defeat Japan by

engaging solely in positional warfare. Chu Teh made

this point, during an interview last June, 7 in these succinct
sentences: "China must depend on its peasant and worker
strength

if it is

war must be a

to fight Japan victoriously. For China this

totalitarian war. Even all of our four hun-

dred millions are not quite enough/'

7

Interview by author at Yenan in north Shensi, June 23, 1937.

CHAPTER TEN
JAPAN'S

HOME FRONT

AUTHORITARIAN

trends in Japan's political and

which had rapidly become predominant
the February uprising in 1936, received new impetus

economic
after

life,

with the outbreak of

hostilities in

China.

The

three weeks*

delay between the Lukouchiao incident of July 7 and the

launching of the Japanese attack in the Peiping-Tientsin
area was utilized to cement public opinion behind the
Konoye Cabinet and overcome the damaging effects of
the political strife that had divided Japan under the
Hayashi Ministry. For this purpose, nothing could have

served so well as the long series of sporadic clashes in the

neighborhood of Peiping from July 7 to 28. The relatively
small Japanese forces on the ground in North China were

depicted as under danger of imminent attack from overwhelming Chinese armies. During these three weeks the
Domei news agency carried almost daily reports of the
vast numbers of Chinese central troops that were being
mobilized in southern Hopei for an advance on Peiping.
All the newspapers in Japan, including such formerly
progressive papers as the Asahi, joined in denunciations
of China's "provocative" actions. The responsibility for
the continued local clashes near Lukouchiao was unhesitatingly assigned to the Chinese troops.

Although the regimented

press did

yeoman work,

Japanese people refused to be swept off their feet.

317

the

The

JAPAN IN CHINA

gi8

public displayed marked suspicion of the army's motives,

according to well-informed observers, throughout the

month of July. Not until after the Japanese troops began

to move on July 28, when the barrage of propaganda was
did the war shibboleths win any measure of
general acceptance. By dint of sheer repetition, the claims
that Japan was 'preserving peace in East Asia ', ''saving
China from Communism", and "serving the welfare of the
Chinese masses" gradually affected Japanese public opinion. Official circles were not wholly satisfied. As insurance
intensified,

'

against any flagging of patriotic sentiment, the government organized a national "spiritual mobilization" cam-

paign.

The movement was inaugurated

at

Tokyo on

Sep-

tember 11 by a patriotic rally addressed by the Premier

and other Cabinet Ministers, and broadcast by radio
throughout the country. Despite all official efforts, the
spontaneous popular enthusiasm generated during the
earlier phases of the invasion of Manchuria was not apparent. The mobilization of approximately one million troops

countrya marked contrast to

Manchurian campaign and later advances, which had
been handled by the regular army. This conflict with
China was taken much more in the spirit of grim necessity.
The Cabinet organized by Premier Konoye, with its
affected all sections of the

the

"national union" basis, was well fitted to take advantage

of the change effected in public opinion. In the political
parties, progressive tendencies were submerged by the

flood of nationalist propaganda. The political leaders vied

with each other in demonstrating their firm support of the
Cabinet in its prosecution of the war. At the conclusion
of the extraordinary session of the Diet on September 8,
the lower house adopted the following resolution: "Let
it be resolved that the House of
Representatives shall, in
accordance with the wish expressed in the gracious rnes-

HOME FRONT

JAPAN'S

319

sage granted to it by the Emperor and with the principles

of justice and equity, seek to realize national unanimity,

cope with the situation with perseverance and tenacity,

urge the lawless Republic of China to reflect on its attitude
and establish peace in the Far East/' * Many of the party
leaders went abroad as unofficial ambassadors to explain
the aims and purposes of Japan in relation to the China
hostilities. Among others, these included Bunji Suzuki,
of the Social Mass Party, who visited the United States in
an effort to influence the American labor movement
against taking hostile action toward Japan. The Social
Mass Party openly supported the war. Fascist elements
within the party, headed by such leaders as Hisashi Aso,
Kanichiro Kamei and Manabu Hirano, were enabled to

come

to the fore

under

stress of the national

emergency.

One

of the planks in the party platform adopted at its

annual meeting, held in Tokyo on November 15, reads

"To strive for the progress and development

of Japan in accordance with the fundamental principles
of national policy for the advancement of mankind's civi-

as follows:

lization

and

culture."

unanimity should have

strengthen
position, Premier
fit to add to it in October an advisory council
saw
Konoye
of ten impressive personages. Meeting regularly once a
week, this set of virtual unofficial Ministers was empowered
to advise jointly or severally with members of the Cabinet.
The personnel of the Board of Cabinet Councillors included General Kazushige Ugaki, General Sadao Araki,
Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, Admiral Kiyotane Abo, all
retired from active service; Mr. Chuji Machida, president
of the Minseito; Mr. Yonezo Maeda, representing the

Although the apparent

served

The Japan
The Japan

political

the

to

Cabinet's

Advertiser, September
Advertiser.,

November

9,

1937.

16, 1937.

JAPAN IN CHINA
Seiyukai; Mr. Kiyoshi Akita, former speaker of the lower
house; Baron Seinosuke Goh, of the business community;

Mr. Seihin Ikeda, former governor of

and Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, president

the

Bank

of the

of Japan;
South Man-

churia Railway Company. This group was organized as a

temporary organ "in order to participate in the Cabinet's
discussion and planning of important State affairs con-

cerning the China Incident." The Councillors were "to be

accorded the Court treatment due to State Ministers in
view of their Cabinet duties," but they were "not to be-

come regular members

of the Cabinet Council."

The

examining the draft ordinance establishing the Board, was somewhat concerned lest the Councillors might represent a set of Ministers without portfolio,
Privy Council, in

but was assured that they constituted merely an advisory

4
group whose recommendations need not be accepted. One
unexpressed function of the Board was to smooth over any
that might develop in Japan's ruling circles over the
handling of the war. Its personnel was representative of
rifts

the army, navy, the business community, and the political

in
parties. The military and naval members of the Board,

were obviously chosen with an eye to reconciling opposing points of view. General Araki and Admiral
Suetsugu, two outstanding extremists, were balanced by
the more moderate views of General Ugaki and Admiral
Abo. In this connection, the editor-in-chief of the Asahi
writes: "The Sino- Japanese conflict having been aggraparticular,

vated to an unexpectedly serious extent, failure to settle

the situation properly may possibly involve internal strife
in this country.

The new

system of Cabinet Counsellors

*Taketora Ogata, "Behind Japan's Greater Cabinet,"

Japan, Tokyo, December 1937, p. 380.
*
The Japan Advertiser, October 12, 1937.

Contemporary

JAPAN'S

HOME FRONT

represents a precaution taken by the

1

against this

For the

321

Government

to

guard

grave possibility.'
months of the war, the additional exappropriated by the Japanese government

first six

penditures
reached the impressive total of nearly 2,600 million yen.
The aggregate cost of the Russo-Japanese war to Japan
was approximately 1,700 million yen; of this sum more
than half, or roughly 900 millions, was borrowed abroad.
Expenditures for the China war began with a sum allotted

from the reserves of the 1937-1938 fiscal term.

special Diet session, which convened for three
weeks on July 25, two supplementary budgets were passed;
a third supplementary budget was passed by the special
session in September. These appropriations and their
destination are shown in the following tables.
early in July

At the

first

Authorized Expenditures

Destination

Yen

From

1937-1938 reserve

Passed by 71 st Diet:
First estimate
Second estimate ....
Passed by 72nd Diet:

10,198,223

Yen

Army

1,736,019,270

Navy
96,809,496

419,635,200

Debt

.
(

service

Reserve

Other ministries

454,058,381
10,220,499
350,000,000

41,623,175

Emergency military .2,022,671,158

General account
Total

42,607,248
2,591,921,325

These appropriations

all

Total

2,591,921,325

came within the 1937-1938

ending March 31, 1938. They were in addition

to the regular budget of 2,814 million yen, plus the first
supplementary budget of 58 millions voted by the Diet in
March, bringing the total estimated expenditures for the
1937-1938 fiscal term to 5,464 million yen. The 7ist Diet
approved a set of China war taxes in July which, with
special reserve transfers, were estimated to produce an additional revenue of 106 million yen. Total bond emissions
fiscal year,

Taketora Ogata, "Behind Japan's Greater Cabinet,"

cited, p. 379.

322

JAPAN IN CHINA

to cover the anticipated deficit for the 1937-1938 fiscal year

were estimated at over 3 billion yen. The leading Japanese

economic journal comments editorially on the fiscal problem thus created as follows: "As it is out of the question
that bonds in such vast amounts can be successfully placed
in the market for assimilation within a few months, the
Government appears to have decided on the policy of first
selling the bonds in several blocks to the Bank of Japan,
receiving in exchange a line of credit with which to meet
fiscal expenditure. When the money market begins to

show increasing signs of slackness as a result, the central

bank is expected to sell bonds out of the above holdings
and thereby contract the expanded credit supply. It is
hardly necessary to say that this method involves the
danger of provoking inflation. Much the same method has
been used since 1932 whenever the Government issued
bonds, and as this system served the purpose of the reflation policy for which there was a widespread demand in
the Japanese financial community, no evil result was

The present situation, however, is entirely

The industrial mechanism is now being given
almost full employment and a large number of able-bodied
experienced.

different.

have been called to the colors. To adopt such a fiscal

policy at such a juncture is essentially to tread the path
which the European belligerent nations followed during
the world war. The probable duration of the fightingshould dictate what sort of fiscal method is to be followed.
We are, however, of the contention that the most sensible
policy that can be adopted by this country is a taxation
increase to be effected without delay, and we are convinced
that both the Government and people will presently recognize the soundness of this contention." 6

men

Japan's inability to borrow in foreign capital markets

The Oriental Economist, September 1937, p. 501.

JAPAN'S

HOME FRONT

323

during recent years has enhanced the difficulty of its fiscal

problem. All loans since the Manchurian invasion of 1931
have been floated in the home market. By the end of the
current fiscal year Japan's national debt will amount to
nearly 13 billion yen. Though relatively small in comparison with other major powers, this sum is equal to
Japan's entire national income for 1936. In the near future
it will continue to increase at a rapid rate. The fiscal
problem is rendered even more acute by the large adverse
balance of Japan's merchandise trade. For the first eleven

months of
amounted

1937, the excess of imports for the

Empire

647 million yen, as compared with 130

million yen in the full year of 1936 and 15 million yen for
1935. The increase may be partially accounted for by
to

raw materials accumulated by light indusbut more largely by the rise in world prices and the
demand for war supplies. These latter factors will doubtexcess stocks of
try,

continue to operate in 1938. The invisible items of

Japan's balance of payments were also adversely affected
by the decline in shipping income, attributable mainly to
less

the requisitioning of ships for transport service.

To balance Japan's international accounts and maintain
stability of the yen, the
forced to resort to large

Japanese government has been

shipments of gold for the first

time since 1931. During the

five

months from March

to

July 1937, the total shipments of gold reached the sum of

7
380 million yen. Japan's gold reserves, however, are ex-

tremely limited. Specie reserves of the central banks and

new exchange equalization fund aggregated possibly

two billion yen in August 1937. The production of gold in
Japan and Korea, which has greatly increased in recent
years, was still only slightly in excess of 100 million yen in
the

Contemporary Opinions, Tokyo Information Bureau, November

1937, p.

i.

11,

JAPAN IN CHINA

324
1

936.

Finally, Japan's nationals

owned

foreign securities

and held deposits and loans in foreign currency at the end

of April 1937 valued at approximately two billion yen.
Japan's war cHest was thus one of the smallest possessed by
any first-class power. Combined gold reserves and foreign
assets were worth about four billion yen; calculated at the
present exchange rate, this sum was equivalent to hardly
one and one-quarter billion dollars. To this may be added
the annual gold production of the Empire, which should
reach 200 million yen in 1938, and the amount which
could be obtained by collecting the ornaments and gold
hoarded by private individuals.
The difficulties consequent on war financing have
sharply accelerated the trend toward controlled economy
in Japan. On January 8, 1937 the Finance Ministry had
already decreed that foreign exchange contracts for financing imports valued at 30,000 yen or over, later reduced to
9
1,000 yen, would be subjected to license. Government
permission also became mandatory for export shipments
made without negotiation of an exchange draft, unless

payment had been received in Japan. Even export

ship-

ments used to cover imports, if made without negotiation

of a draft, were subjected to license. Japanese nationals
were further required to secure government permission
to dispose or hypothecate foreign assets held abroad in
payment for imports. Bank to bank payments under telegraphic instructions from abroad required a permit, as
well as similar payments of 10,000 yen or

more under

In August 1937 the yist Diet passed a Gold Production Law, which
to concentrate the country's gold supplies and augment the gold
output. Plans were then laid down to increase the gold production of the
Empire to 450 million yen by 1942; Manchoukuo, which produced gold
worth 10 million yen in 1936, is scheduled to produce 200 million yen in
1942. It may be doubted whether these ambitious plans can be successfully

aimed

fuiailed.
9

For

details, see

The

Oriental Economist, October 1937, p. 574-576.

JAPAN'S

HOME FRONT

325

Thus

the movement of funds between

bank or corporation in Japan and
branch establishment abroad was placed under strict

mail instructions.

the headquarters of a
its

government supervision. The Finance Ministry stated

that permits for foreign exchange contracts involving purchase of pig iron, steel products, petroleum, machinery
and metals, all relating to the needs of war industries,
would be unreservedly granted. As to other imports,
licenses would be given within limits calculated on the
past volume of shipments. The effort was directed, in
other words, toward speeding up the import of materials
for war purposes by giving them the right of way.
With the outbreak of war, which placed even greater
pressure on the yen, three additional measures were
speedily adopted. The 7ist Diet, meeting from July 23
to August 8, enacted the Gold Fund Special Account Law,
which authorized revaluation of gold on the basis of 290
milligrams per yen, or about ten per cent below the world
price. The former statutory rate, unchanged since the
gold ban was reimposed in December 1931, had been 750
milligrams, equivalent to the old par value of the yen.

Gold reserves of the central banks of Japan, Formosa and

Korea were revalued on the new basis and the resulting
book profit was credited to the government. With these
funds, the gold reserve of the Bank of Japan was increased
about 800 million yen, outstanding government debts
Bank of 248 million yen were cleared, and a Gold
Fund Special Account totalling 747 million yen was inaugurated. With these funds, the Special Account was to
buy about 200 million yen of government bonds from the
to

to the

Bank of Japan, take up 250 million yen

Bank debentures, and use the remainder

of Industrial
to adjust the

balance of international payments.

This foreign exchange

stabilization

fund

is

not called

JAPAN IN CHINA

326

upon

to control migratory short

term transactions, which

are virtually unknown in Japan. Even when restricted to

adjustment of exchange fluctuations due to seasonal trade

movements, its resources were exceedingly small. Another

step was therefore taken in preparation for future emergencies. The Foreign Exchange Control Law was revised
to enable the

government

to acquire control

over and

dispose of all foreign assets held abroad by Japanese

nationals. Through data already supplied by applications

had been ascertained that Japanese naabroad at the end of April 1937 assets valued
at 1,476 million yen. 10 These included 761 millions in
Japanese government and corporate securities, actually
foreign currency obligations of Japan; 390 millions in
foreign securities; 166 millions in foreign currency deposits; and 159 millions in foreign currency loans. Of
these only the last three, amounting to 715 million yen,
could be mobilized to support the Japanese currency.
This sum was expressed in terms of the former gold
parity; on the revalued basis, it placed approximately two
under

this act, it

tionals held

billion yen at the government's disposal in case of need.

third measure, designed to regularize the buying and

selling rates for the yen,

was

also

adopted at

this time.

Although foreign exchange transactions had been conducted on the basis of is zd on London, uncertainty had
existed as to whether this represented the buying or selling rate, leading to competition among the various banks
in Japan. On August 20, through the offices of the Finance
Ministry and the Bank of Japan, the various Japanese
banks came to the following agreement: "Telegraphic

on London to be sold at or above is sd. Buying

rates on London 3 months credit bills to be is 2% 6 d or
above. Forward contracts to be no further forward than
transfers

10

Contemporary Opinions,

cited,

November

11, 1937, p. 4.

JAPAN'S

HOME FRONT

327

three months, quotations to be flat for all months. Interbank change-over transactions for providing funds, how-

be regarded as exceptions to this rule and can

be dealt in at differences to suit the occasion." n This

ever, will

bankers' agreement clarified the basis of yen quotations

and established the government's intention to maintain

the is 2d rate. Foreign banks in Japan subscribed to the
agreement, which went into effect on August 23.
In September 1937 the 72nd Diet had enacted two further important economic control measures: the Foreign
Trade Control Law and the Capital Control Law. The
first of these empowered the government, whenever necessary, to restrict or prohibit the import or export of any
article or articles, or to place their manufacture, distribu-

tion

and consumption under

control.

This

act,

which

reinforced the foreign exchange control law, was also designed to cut down the import balance to a minimum on
all

commodities not directly required for war purposes or

the export trade. Three classes of commodities were made

subject to the law. Restrictions applied to the first two
classes, for

which import permits had

to be secured

from

the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, sought to reduce

the value of imports by nearly 200 million yen annually. 12

Under

was placed certain major import items,

comprising raw cotton, wool and lumber. The estimated
saving of 157 million yen on these commodities was calClass

culated on the basis of a reduction of 1936 imports by 10

per cent for raw cotton, 30 per cent for wool, and 20 per
cent for lumber. Purchases of American cotton on this

would be reduced by 37 million yen. Under Class

B was grouped some 260 import items, but as most of

basis

these were unimportant, a saving of only 39 million yen

11
12

The
The

Oriental Economist, October 1937, p. 576.

Oriental Economist, October 1937, p- 577-580.

328

was anticipated.
classes

came

JAPAN IN CHINA
The total estimated saving

in these two

to 196 million yen, or only seven

per cent of

the import value for 1936. Class C included a list of commodities, such as naphthalene, nitric acid, cotton waste,
rabbit furs, antimony and sulphate of antimony, mainly

required for war purposes, which could not be exported

without permit from the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry.

This general measure received specific application to

the cotton trade by a regulatory program introduced on
October 23, 1937, by the Ministry of Commerce and In13
Raw cotton imports were restricted to 1,050,000
dustry.
a
while the production of cotton yarns was
month,
piculs
limited to about 300,000 bales a month, as against the past
average of from 340,000 to 350,000 bales. To maintain
yarn and piece-goods exports at their existing level,
domestic consumption was to be curtailed to the above
extent. The ramifications of a control program of this
sort

were illustrated by the additional

set of

measures

deemed necessary. It was feared that restricted imports of

raw cotton might boost domestic yarn prices above world
levels, and so hinder the export trade. To counteract this
result, maximum prices were fixed for yarns and raw
cotton to check appreciation, and a control duty of 10 per
cent ad valorem was imposed on raw cotton to check its
consumption. Since this latter impost would increase the
production cost of cotton goods and hinder their export,
refunds from the raw cotton control duty were granted to
the cotton manufacturers.

The home consumers were

obviously expected to buy less cotton goods at higher

prices in order to enable the cotton manufacturers to hold
their export markets. Official

yarns
18

The

and raw

cotton, based

Oriental Economist,

maximum

prices for cotton

on quotations of the

November

1937, p. 643.

New

JAPAN'S

HOME FRONT

329

York Cotton Exchange, are set by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry once a week. The first official maximum price for cotton yarns was set on October 23 at 230
yen per bale, allowing an estimated profit of 30 yen to
the Japanese manufacturer and a differential advantage
of 66 yen over the British manufacturer.

The

Capital Control Law, also enacted by the 72nd

Diet, subjected all enterprises with a minimum limit of

capital, as well as new financing of fixed capital, to gov-

ernment

license.

Regulations which became effective on

September 27 gave absolute priority in capital increases

or calls on shareholder capital to a list of "urgent" industries having relation to military necessities. The law also
sought to make additional funds available for such wartime financing. It empowered the Japan Industrial Bank
to issue government guaranteed debentures to a maximum limit of 500 million yen, intended to supply the
capital needs of industries supplying emergency requirements. It also authorized the Japan Hypothec Bank to
savings certificates to the limit of 200
million yen, in order to absorb the savings of Japan's

issue its

premium

laboring

classes.

tal increases to

Capital Control Law permitted capiurgent concerns even before their author-

The

had been fully paid up, a procedure normally

prohibited by the commercial code. Expansion of capital
equipment in Japanese industry went on at a rapid rate
14
throughout 1Q37- Total capital increase during the first
six months of the year amounted to 846 million yen, as
ized capital

compared with 828 million yen in the full year of 1936

and 577 million yen in 1935. For the third quarter of
1937, the Bank of Japan estimated that capital investment
for new incorporations, capital increases and debenture
14

The

Oriental Economist, August 1937, p. 454-455; also October 1937,

p. 564-565-

JAPAN IN CHINA

330

would total 984 million yen. In absolute amounts

and in rate of expansion, such industries as machinery
and shipbuilding, mining, metals, and chemicals stood in

sales

the forefront of this expansion. Japan's "national defense"

state was being speedily rushed to completion. In the
process, the bloc of the Japanese

the military was consolidating

of the national life.

its

heavy industrialists and

control over all phases

While the details of establishing a wartime economy

were thus being arranged, the army and navy authorities
were entrenching their position as sole arbiter of the
conduct of war operations through the establishment of
an Imperial Headquarters. Sanction for this step was
obtained by the War and Navy Ministers on November
11, 1937, and the ordinance authorizing the new organ
was promulgated on the following day. The Imperial
Headquarters was formally organized on November 20.
This institution

is peculiar to Japan. It clearly establishes

the sole responsibility of the Supreme Command to the
Emperor in directing military operations, side-tracking
7

the Cabinet, and so emphasizing the "dual government'

of Japan. Article i of the new Imperial Headquarters

Ordinance

states

in

Supreme Command,

part:
to be

"The
called

highest body of the

the Imperial Head-

quarters, shall be established under the supervision of the

Emperor"; while Article 2 states: "The Chief of' the

Army
Staff

General
shall

as

Staff and the Chief of the Naval General

heads of their respective staffs assist the

Emperor in the exercise of His Majesty's Supreme Command, formulating strategic plans for achievement of the
final objective and coordinating the operations of the
army
and navy." 15 Under this system, even the War and Navy
Ministers occupy a subordinate
15

The Japan

Advertiser,

November

position,

18, 1937.

becoming in

JAPAN'S

HOME FRONT

331

between the Cabinet and the ImAt

the first joint conference between
perial Headquarters.
the Cabinet and the Imperial Headquarters, held on
November 24, the Premier and the chief secretary of the
effect liaison officers

Cabinet were the only civilian representatives. The statement issued by the army and navy press sections of the
Headquarters on November 20 declared that the Imperial
Headquarters was "purely an agency of the Supreme
Command based on the Supreme Command prerogatives

Emperor in order to unify the command systems

army and navy. Its establishment in no way signifies
that the boundary between the functions and responsibilities of high command and those of the Government
has been affected in the slightest, and any rumor that
the Imperial Headquarters is intended to combine the
Supreme Command and the Government is entirely without foundation. That is not in the least the purpose of
of the
of the

the headquarters.'* ie Despite this disclaimer, it was obvious that by the establishment of the Imperial Head-

quarters the army and navy had firmly taken, in hand

complete control of the military operations in China,
which was the paramount political concern of the country. In respect of this enterprise, the Cabinet was relegated
to a subsidiary role.
Political trends in Japan under the stress of war condi-

tions

were

marked by the re-emergence of the army

whose influence had gone into partial eclipse

also

extremists,

after the February 1936 assassinations in Tokyo. The

mobilization of an army of one million soldiers had forced
the recall to active service of many extremist officers who

had been placed on the retired list in 1936. Among the

high commanders of the three main centers of military
operations in China, the extremist wing of the army was
16

The Japan

Advertiser,

November

21, 1937.

JAPAN IN CHINA

33*

prominently represented. General Terauchi, in control of

the North China front, had brought the influence of the
new and ambitious, but somewhat more conservative,

army clique to bear on developments in this region. In

the Inner Mongolian provinces, however, the Kwantung

Army pursued

its

own

special political objectives, as indi-

cated by the puppet regimes established under

its

exclu-

Chahar, Suiyuan and north Shansi.

the Shanghai front, General Iwane Matsui represented

sive jurisdiction in

On

the viewpoint of the extremists; his successor, General

Shunroku Hata, and the latter 's chief-of-staff, Major-

General Torashiro Kawabe, were of the same persuasion.

No less significant was the return of the extremists to high
government posts at home. General Sadao Araki, as previ-

emerged from retirement in October to beof the Board of Cabinet Councillors. His
closest exemplar in the navy, Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, was also appointed to this Board. Two months later,
on December 14, Admiral Suetsugu succeeded Eiichi
Baba in the Home Ministry. This appointment was an
omen for the future. It was widely believed that Adously noted,

come

member

miral Suetsugu was being groomed to succeed Konoye as

Premier.

The new Home

Minister's

first

act

was to order a

general round-up of all persons suspected of harboring

"dangerous though ts", that is, those with liberal or radical
leanings. The arrests took place during the last two weeks
of December. All mention of these arrests by the press was

stringently prohibited. This press ban was faithfully observed until nearly the end of January, when the police

news of the scope and details of the raids. The

statement issued at the time declared that not only
Communist ideas, but liberal and democratic thoughts
which might become "hotbeds for Communist ideas" had
released
official

JAPAN'S

HOME FRONT

333

to be "drastically suppressed/' In the course of the police

which took place simultaneously throughout the

country, 371 persons were arrested. In Tokyo alone 108
were detained. Kanju Kato, left-wing labor leader who
visited the United States in 1936, was the most prominent
raids,

figure taken in the police drag-net.

The Japan

Proletarian.

Labor and Farmer

the
radical
most
of
Unions,
legal political and labor
in
organizations
Japan, both headed by Kanju Kato, were
summarily dissolved, Mr. Kato was a member o the
lower house of the Diet, having twice been elected from
Party and the All-Japan Council

of

a working-class constituency in Tokyo with the largest

majorities polled by any candidate. Four former univer-

two from Waseda, one from Tokyo Imperial and one from Kyushu Imperial University, were
taken into custody. Baroness Ishimoto, prominent femisity professors,

nist

known

Two

for her liberal-minded autobiography "Facing

Ways' ', was also arrested. These persons, under

Japan's legal system,

may be

detained indefinitely for

examination without being brought to trial. Although

the arrests were labeled "precautionary'*, they would seem
to indicate that the authorities are not wholly at ease.
The increased privations imposed on the Japanese people
by the war demand a more rigid and drastic suppression
of even potentially oppositionist elements.
Apprehension of the authorities is not without founda-

The existence of opposition to the war is testified

additional
facts which occasionally come to light.
by
Students of Tokyo Imperial University are known to have
absented themselves from war ceremonies at the Imperial
tion.

Liberal educational leaders are being weeded

out of the universities. Dr. Hachiro Yuasa, president of
Doshisha, one of the oldest mission colleges in Japan, was

shrines.

recently compelled to retire. Professor

Tadao Yanaihara,

JAPAN IN CHINA

334

economist and expert on Japanese colonial administration, has also been forced to resign his chair at Tokyo
Imperial University. In September the Metropolitan Police

Bureau of Tokyo, during a series of raids, seized large

quantities of anti-war publications. Popular sentiment is
further illustrated by the reaction to the Social Mass
Party's adoption of a pro-war platform and relegation of
its former socialist aims to the background. In the Tokyo

municipal elections, held at the end of November 1937,

the party elected only ten of its forty-two candidates; in

had elected two-thirds of its candidates. As the

and its effects on the living standards of the
people become more pronounced, an even more thoroughgoing campaign of repression will be required to dam up
the forces of opposition and unrest.
1936,

war

it

drags on,

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

THE

initial phases o the war, despite the unexpectstubborn

resistance encountered at Shanghai and in
edly
the north, had resulted in the occupation of considerable
areas of China, important both politically and economi-

by Japanese armies. With the conclusion of these

operations, there were many signs that the Japanese Cabinet was prepared to make peace. The objectives set for
Japan's military forces at the outset of hostilities had been
triumphantly attained. Nanking, the enemy capital, had
been captured; the North China provinces had been overrun. All that remained was to dictate the terms of peace.
These terms, imposed by the victor on the vanquished,
would more than repay the costs of the campaign. At this
point, when success was within Japan's grasp, the scheduled program met with a disconcerting set-back. Japan's
military and political circles had confidently expected
that the first powerful blows of their war machine would
cally,

shatter the morale of the Chinese leaders.

The

influence

compromisers in the Nanking regime, it was

thought, would suffice to clear the road to an acceptance

of

the

of the fait accompli. Failing this, the more conservative

elements in the Chinese government would at least split

and offer themselves

dominated
establishment
by Japan.
puppet
Neither of these anticipated results occurred. China's

away from

the determined resisters,

as tools in a

335

JAPAN IN CHINA

336

newly

won

reverses,

political unity stood the test of severe military

the Chinese authorities continued to main-

and

tain a solid opposition front to the invaders.

Japan's official leaders were loath to accept

dences o

this fact.

prior to the
persisted.

At

Their

first

peace overtures,

the evi-

made

just
of Nanking, were rejected. Still they
the end of the year, a more detailed outline
fall

of Japan's peace terms was submitted to General Chiang

Kai-shek at Hankow through Dr. Oskar P. Trautmann,

German Ambassador

to China.

cluded Japanese participation

The
in

reported terms

the

in-

development of

China's resources, aviation, transport and communications; increased Japanese control over the Maritime Customs; China's adherence to the anti-Comintern pact;
establishment of permanent Japanese garrisons in China;
specification

of

certain

demilitarized

zones by Japan;

of an

independent government for Inner

and
Mongolia;
payment of war indemnities by China.
in
Early
January it became clear that these terms had
also been rejected. The gravity of Japan's failure to
obtain a peace settlement was recognized by the summoning of an Imperial Council, an action which had been
recognition

taken only once before during this century. On January

11, in the presence of Emperor Hirohito, the Imperial
Council formally considered the steps which it deemed
necessary to pursue. The decisions of this meeting were
not revealed for several days. In the end, the only new
step adopted, aside from a determination to prosecute the

war vigorously, was the withdrawal of recognition from

the Chinese government. This action, in view of the wide
publicity attracted by the Imperial Council's session, came
as something of an anti-climax.

A general Japanese advance into Shantung province

was already well under way. If the previous hesitation to

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

337

take this step had been due to anxiety over the fate of
Japan's extensive investments in Shantung, there was noth-

ing gained by the delay. Soon after the middle of December, Chinese troops had dynamited and fired the valuable
Japanese cotton mills in Tsingtao, and had wrecked the

Japanese-owned coal mines along the Tsingtao-Tsinan

Railway. On December 23 several Japanese columns
crossed the Yellow River and quickly invested Tsinan,
capital of the province. Tsingtao was occupied without
fighting on January 11, when -a dozen vessels unloaded a
Japanese force which took over the undefended city. The
provincial troops under General Han Fu-chu had meanwhile offered

little

resistance in the interior of Shantung,

and the Japanese troops had driven rapidly down the

Tientsin-Pukow Railway. By the middle of January this
offensive was seriously threatening Hsuchow,
strategic
junction point of the east- west Lunghai Railway and the
Tientsin-Pukow line. On January 14 General Chiang Kaishek took personal command of the operations on this
front. His first act was to order the arrest of General Han
Fu-chu, the Shantung governor, who was later executed
for failing to resist the invaders. New Chinese forces were

thrown into the struggle at Tsining, in southern Shantung, and the Japanese drive in this sector was brought
to a full stop.

With

the rapid massing of some 300,000 Chinese

troops
the
along
Lunghai Railway, the struggle for this strategic
line soon developed large
proportions. Halted in their
drive through Shantung, the Japanese commanders

began

new

offensive against Hsuchow from the south.

By early
February, this force had covered approximately half the
distance between Nanking and Hsuchow in its northward

advance along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, At

Pengpu

and Hwaiyuan,

in

the valley of the

Hwai

River,

the

JAPAN IN CHINA

338

Chinese defense stiffened and little further advances were

made during February. An even more serious Japanese
thrust down the Peiping-Hankow Railway toward Chengchow had meanwhile developed. This drive, which was

aimed

to cut the center of the

Lunghai Railway

in

Honan

the Chinese forces deprovince, threatened to pinch off

southern
in
Hsuchow
Shantung. Late in Februfending
central and south Shansi
into
thrust
ary a strong Japanese
lines of Japanese communication
increasingly harassed by guerrilla forces. In Hopei
units of the Eighth Route Army occupied sev-

began.

were

The extended

province,

towns near Paotingfu in mid-February and tore up

the tracks of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, the line of

eral

communication of the Japanese forces advancing on

Chengchow. Serious fighting was also taking place at
Wuhu, where the Japanese troops were hard pressed, and
at other centers in the

Shanghai-Hangchow-Nanking

In March 1938 the Japanese

command threw

area.

additional

forces into the offensive against the

Lunghai Railway.
in Shancolumns
southward
pushed
Separate Japanese
In
each
and
Shansi
Honan
province, as
tung,
provinces.
the invading forces approached the Lunghai Railway, the
Chinese defense stiffened and held. Chinese operations in
these areas displayed unsuspected potentialities of effective
organization and staff work. New forces, speedily trained
and reorganized by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek after
the retreat from Nanking, were sent to the Lunghai fronts.
Under General Li Tsung-jen, the Chinese armies deliv-

ered strong flank attacks against the Japanese line of communications in central Shantung. Early in April a Chinese
counter-offensive at Taierhchuang routed the front-line
Japanese divisions in southern Shantung and temporarily

As the war proceeded, the

were
Chinese forces
demonstrating the possibility of meet-

relieved pressure in this sector.

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

339

ing the Japanese invaders successfully in the open field

and holding their own in a combined warfare of position
and maneuver. The stubborn defense of the Lunghai
Railway front opened up new perspectives. As the Chinese
soldiers and officers gained experience, it seemed possible
that they might steadily reduce Japan's original margin of
technical superiority in orthodox positional fighting. Even
a partial lessening of Japan's ability to strike through to
specified objectives

with heavy concentrations of mecha-

nized troops would redouble the effectiveness of the grow-

ing numbers of Chinese guerrilla troops. These latter, instead of assuming a dominant military role, would then
take their proper place as an adjunct of an increasingly
effective army of Chinese regulars.

In any

case,

Japan's difficulties in covering such large

problem of achieving conclusive

distances, as well as the

results,

were becoming more apparent. There was no indi-

cation

that the

of the

Lunghai Railway, serious

might be, would bring Chinese military resistance to an end or establish Japan's effective domination of China. Under the conditions imposed by a long
and wearing contest, there was no assurance that Japan's
though

loss

this

military technique would eventually prevail.

test of strength lay in the home fronts of the two

superior

The

belligerents, and in the relative ability to procure the

sinews of war necessary to meet the vastly different requirements of the invader and the defender in the course

of a prolonged struggle.
During the early months of 1938, Japan's governing
authorities were compelled to deal with the fiscal prob-

lems consequent upon the continuance and enlargement

of the military operations in China. The general account
budget for the 1938-1939 term authorized expenditures
of s,868 million yen, or 54 millions in excess of the record

JAPAN IN CHINA

340

budget for the previous

year.

Added

to

this

were the

'China incident" expenses, aggregating 4,850 million

the 1938-1939 fiscal year
yen. Total appropriations for
thus amounted to 7,718 million yen. O this sum, 694
million yen from the general account budget, 166 milk

from the special accounts, and the bulk of the 4,850

millions of direct war expenditure had to be derived from

lions

bond

flotations.

Bond

issues in this

amount would

swiftly

bring on a catastrophic inflation.

government bond

issues during the 1937that the situation is not

shows
however,
1938
so serious as these figures might be thought to indicate.
The budgets of the 1937-1938 term called for bond issues
of 965 million yen for both general and special accounts,

Analysis of

fiscal year,

and

of 2,428 millions for the

Total bond flotations

tures.

"China incident" expendiup to the end of 1937

to 1,300 million yen, i.e., 900 millions of

"China incident" obligations and 400 millions for the
1
regular budgets. Additional bonds were floated before the
end of the fiscal term on March 31, 1938; even so, it was
clear that actual expenditures were running well under
total appropriations. Most of the bond flotations were
taken up by the Bank of Japan. Some difficulty was apparently experienced in passing on these bonds, since at the
end of the year the central bank's holdings had increased

amounted

by 539 million yen. The net increase in the bank's note

issue was 301 million yen, indicating some degree of

though hardly of serious proportions.

As expressed in prices, even if not in currency emission, there was rather more evidence of inflation. The
level of wholesale and retail prices, as well as the cost of
living index, has risen steadily since 1931 and notably
inflation

during the past year. Tokyo's wholesale price index, based

1

The Oriental Economist, January

1938, p. 3.

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

341

from 116.0 In November 1931 to

1936; in December 1937 the index
This index includes certain imported ma-

on 1913

as

209.8 in

December

100, rose

stood at 232.

and possibly shows a disproportionate increase.

Nevertheless, the same trend is evident in retail prices
and the cost of living. The retail price index, based on
1914 as 100, which stood at 135 in November 1931, had
risen to 163 in December 1936; in December 1937 it had
terials,

reached 182.

The

rise in the cost of living

index, based

on 1914

as 100, has been almost equally pronounced.

159 in November 1931, it rose to 186 in December
2
1936; in December 1937 it stood at ig8. The war was
being brought home to the Japanese population in

From

increased living costs.

There are several other aspects of Japan's internal
financing which cannot be lightly dismissed. A bond emission of 1,300 million yen, even though it happens to be
well under total appropriations, constitutes almost exactly
10 per cent of Japan's national debt. Bond flotations

during 1938, moreover, will certainly exceed 1,300 million yen by a wide margin. The burden of servicing this
debt is growing steadily heavier. In this connection, there
is the matter of taxation to be considered. During the
spring of 1937 the Hayashi Ministry obtained the Diet's
approval for tax increases designed to raise 361 million
yen over a full year. The Konoye Cabinet increased taxes
by another 100 million yen, and this enactment has now

about 300 million yen. Over

the course of a single year, taxes have thus been boosted
by some 631 million yen. Calculated on the basis of the
tax revenue for the 1936-1937 fiscal year, which was 965
millions, the Japanese taxpayer has been forced to shoul-

been revised

*For these
January 1938,

so as to yield

figures,

p. 44.

see

The

Oriental Economist, January 1936, p. 37;

JAPAN IN CHINA

342

der an increase of 68 per cent over his burden of a year

ago. These tax increases weigh heavily on the mass of the
people, and their effects are not so easily shuffled off as
an increase in the Bank of Japan's bond portfolio.
The Achilles heel of Japan's fiscal situation, however,
resides not so

much

in internal financing as in the prob-

lem of the import surplus, yen stability, and the gold

reserve. Complete trade figures for 1937 show an excess
of imports of 608 million yen for Japan proper and 636
millions for the Empire, including Korea, Formosa and
the South Seas. 3 An import surplus of this staggering
amount has been registered only once before in Japan's
4
history in 1924. As already noted, this deficit in merchandise trade forced resort to large gold shipments for
the first time since 1931. During the first seven months

from March through July, gold shipments aggregated 380 million yen. 5 After July 1937, the
Department of Finance at Tokyo ceased to publish figures
on gold exports. As these shipments have been made
exclusively to the United States, it is possible to gauge
of 1937, Actually

fairly accurately the

last July.

By

amounts reaching
December

the middle of

the United States since

March

this

country since

total

shipments to

8 aggregated $245,300,000,

according to figures issued by the Federal Reserve Bank

of New York. 6 Up to July, calculated on the basis of $0.29
to the yen, Japan had shipped gold worth $110,200,000
to the United States. Shipments since then have therefore
totaled $135,100,000, or well above the original amount.

During 1937, on this basis, Japan had shipped gold valued

at nearly 850 million yen to the United States. Since July
3
Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade
ment of Finance, December 1937, p. 3.

*See Chapter X.
The Oriental Economist, January 1938,
Q
New York Times, December 18, 1937,

of Japan,

p. 44.

Tokyo, The Depart-

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

343

it had dug into its gold reserves to the extent of 465

million yen. Nearly one-eighth of its total reserves in gold
and foreign securities, estimated previously at four billion
7
yen in July, had been consumed in less than five months

of war. Specie reserves

had been

virtually exhausted.

not surprising that the Japanese authorities had

made drastic efforts to curtail imports during this period.
These attempts were continued and intensified in the
It is

new year. On January 13, for example, the Ministry

Commerce and Industry decreed that cotton yarn used

of

in

the manufacture of textiles for domestic consumption had

to be mixed with 30 per cent staple fiber, a synthetic

material

made from wood pulp with which Japanese

in-

had been experimenting for some years. The

trend toward rigid economic control was made even more

dustrialists

explicit in the provisions of the National Mobilization

Bill, drafted by the government Planning Board in col-

laboration with the army, which the Konoye Cabinet

fought to push through the Diet in February. This bill,

by method of ordinance, would vest additional sweeping

powers in the ha#ds of the authorities to complete the

The provisions of
the bill are so detailed as to encompass all phases of economic life. State officials would be vested with virtually
establishment of a totalitarian

state. 8

unrestricted powers of industrial control, affecting such

matters as contracts, prices, insurance, and transportation

charges. They could order industrialists to install machin-

and producers and merchants to hold in stock fixed

quantities of goods. They would control capital investery,

ment, issuing orders with respect to company promotion

and amalgamation and increases of capital share and debenture issues. Trade control would be placed in official
7
8

See Chapter X.
York Times, February

New

16, 1938.

344

JAPAN IN CHINA

hands, permitting

tariffs

exports regulated by
bill

are

no

less

be altered and imports and

to

decree.

typical of

The

labor provisions of the

regimentation. State

Fascist

might regulate wages, prohibit strikes, and enforce compulsory labor service. The provision whereby
people might be examined and registered according to
vocation suggests that compulsory allocation of workers
officials

to various types of labor service

is

speech, press and assembly, already

Japan, are explicitly voided by this

contemplated. Free
drastically limited in

bill,

which empowers

the authorities to exert complete control

meetings, the press, and organizations.

over public

no less than the economic cononce again brought the parties into opposition to the Cabinet. This opposition was intensified by
efforts of the Home Minister, Admiral Suetsugu, to curb
These

latter provisions,

trol features,

the parties through police action. Following police raids

on both the Seiyukai and Minseito headquarters in February, the parties carried the issue to the floor of the Diet,
where they demanded guarantees from the Home Min-

recurrence of such incidents. 9 This controversy underlined the change that had come over Japan
since the days when control of the Home Ministry was
ister against

an accepted prerogative of the parties. Behind the parties

in this struggle stood the group of industrialists whose
interests are being seriously injured by the government's
pressure to give the right of

The

'

to 'necessary'* industries.
textile manufacturers have particularly suffered from

the application of the

whose future

is

way

new program.

contingent on

All export industries,

their competitive ability

to sell abroad, are necessarily concerned over the

prospects of unlimited state regimentation and control. Their
experience has already indicated that such measures as
*

New

York Times, February

22, 1938.

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

345

allocation of capital investment and control of

imports are all applied in favor of the heavy industries
official

supplying war requirements.

The point of view of the opposition is expressed in the
following statement: "At the same time, it is essential
that the Government shall exercise the utmost care to
restrict its interference with national economic life to the
absolute

minimum. The Government's

however,

is

course just now,

diametrically opposed to this desirable policy.

Not only are imports of such important raw materials as
cotton, wool, etc., placed under restriction, but the for-

exchange license system is being enforced with

growing rigidity, and under the two forms of control
industrialists and traders are required to
go through complicated formalities at the hands of Government officials
who are complete novices in commercial affairs. The
result has been to undermine alarmingly the
competitive
powers in the world markets of Japan's harassed business
eign

men, and the

effect of the faulty

wartime policy on the

commodity price movement has already become apparent.

... As measured by The Oriental Economist's index for
which May 1936 is the base period, wholesale prices
last December moved
up to 129.8 as contrasted
110.6 in Great Britain and 96.1 in the United States

Japan

in
to

of

America. ... It is a noteworthy fact that imported articles alone were as high as 141.8 in December, while home
trade factory manufactures remained at 117.7, farm
products at 108.9 and exported articles at 117.2. It is obvious
that the recent commodity upswing has
chiefly been due
to the obstruction of imports of articles of trade."

10

This

quotation clearly illustrates Japan's economic dilemma.

Even at the risk of losing vital foreign markets, it is compelled to place restrictions on export industries in order
10

Editorial in

The Oriental Economist, January

1938, p. 5-6.

JAPAN IN CHINA

346

to secure the necessary sinews of war. While the opposition may delay full application of industrial control for

which has already been

industries and the
military is marching toward an unrestricted domination
of the state. Before the Seventy-third Diet adjourned on
March 26, it had passed the National Mobilization Bill
and the long postponed measure for nationalization of
time,

,a

it

is

fighting a cause

virtually lost. The mesalliance oi the war

the electric power industry.

Recent economic developments in Manchoukuo, notably the incursion of the Aikawa interests into the field
of Manchurian industrial development, have special reference to the problem of Japan's current economic and

The

position occupied by Yoshisuke

Aikawa, president of Japan Industrial Company, Ltd.,
in the Japanese scene has already been briefly considered. 11 It must now be taken up in more detail. In January
1938 it was revealed that the Aikawa interests had appolitical evolution.

proached Thomas J. Watson, president of the International Business Machines Corporation and also of the
International

Chamber

million dollars.

The

of

Commerce,
was

for a loan of fifty

be applied to the
of
Manchurian
industries
development
heavy
through the
of
American
purchase
machinery. Recognizing the difficulties likely to be encountered, the Japanese interests
formulated their offer in the most attractive terms. They
not only secured an undertaking from the Japanese govcredit

to

ernment that payments on the loan would be exempt from

operation of the Exchange Control Act, but apparently
suggested that American experts might be retained to
install the equipment and
operate it during the period
12
required for training the necessary staff and workers.
11
12

See Chapter VII.

New York Times, January 16, 1938.

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

347

On the face of it, the execution of such a contract by

an American business man at this time, when China is
being ruthlessly overrun by Japan's war machine, would
seem to merit condemnation. It places the executor in
the category of those

American operators who are now

profits by selling scrap iron to Japan. A credit

of this amount for Manchuria's industrial development,
moreover, would seem to be a gratuitous slap at the

making

American government's

policy of refusing to extend recognition to the Japanese conquest of Manchuria.

While normal American economic relations with Manofficial

choukuo have not been suspended

as a

consequence of

the non-recognition policy, a financial transaction of the

size contemplated in this arrangement would have the
effect of

reducing the policy to an absurdity.

It is there-

fore not surprising that official circles in Washington

frowned on the carrying through of such a deal, when
the details were made public. 13 In view of Mr. Watson's
disclaimer of any formal approaches from the Aikawa
concern, it may be hoped that the project is dead.
These reflections are incidental. Much more interesting
details are concealed in the ramifications of the Japanese

background. As the commentary in the New York Times

brings out, the offer was made to sound more palatable

by an effort to show that private industrial enterprise in

Japan was staging a revolt against pressure of the military
for a controlled economy, and particularly against the
brand of state socialism enforced by the Kwantung
Army in Manchoukuo. The obvious implication is that
an American credit, given at this time for Manchurian
industrial development, would tend to work against militarist domination in Japan and Manchoukuo. This interesting implication, which involves the crucial issue of
York Times, January

18, 1938.

JAPAN IN CHINA

348

the direction of Japan's internal development,

demands

closer examination.

The facts already considered hardly justify the conclusion that laissez-faire is on the up-grade in Japan. If
the Japanese military can enforce their control over the
opposing vested interests at home, they might reasonably
be expected to do so even more effectively in Manchoukuo, which is the creature of the Kwantung Army. Nevertheless,

it

is

asserted that the

army advocates

of state

socialism in this colonial protectorate have admitted the

error of their ways, and have appealed to the home capitalists for aid. 14

The

evidence, so

it is said,

can be seen

Manchurian Heavy Industrial

Development Company, Ltd., organized in December
1937 to take over the exploitation of iron, gold and silver
mines, to produce pig iron and steel, to manufacture
automobiles and aircraft, and to refine Manchuria's light
in the formation of the

metals. The president of this company is Yoshisuke

Aikawa. His new Manchurian enterprise shunts aside
the South Manchuria Railway Company, which had

previously carried on
cooperation with the

many of these enterprises in

Kwantung Army. The total

close

capi-

Manchurian heavy industry holding

will
be
corporation
450 million yen. Of this amount,
however, only half is supplied by the Aikawa interests;
the Manchoukuo government will provide the other half.
The new company is thus not very different from the
long string of Manchoukuo government monopolies, affecting coal, oil, telegraph, telephone and radio, electric
light and power, munitions, and others, most of which
were formed by absorbing a home Japanese interest. In
this case, it is argued, the situation is
different; under
Mr. Aikawa the private interests will dominate. This
talization

of

the

u New York
Times, January

16, 1938.

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

349

argument, in view of the personality and undoubted

managerial ability of Mr. Aikawa, has a certain amount
of weight. The real issue thus becomes clear. What sort
of man is this Aikawa? What are his connections, past
and present? What tendency in Japan's business circles
Is he an acceptable champion of
or
laissez-faire.,
possibly of liberalism?
The details of his past history furnished by the New

does he

represent?

York Times are not entirely reassuring. It is said that

"Yoshisuke Aikawa sprang into prominence as the chief
aide of Fusanosuke Kuhara, his brother-in-law. Mr. Kuhara's fortunes were closely entwined in his early days
with those of the late General Baron Giichi Tanaka.
When Mr. Kuhara became Minister of Communications
in the Tanaka Cabinet [1927-1929], Mr. Aikawa became
.

chief executive of their joint enterprises." 15 This is quite

illuminating. Aikawa is the brother-in-law of Kuhara,

who was

closely

connected with General Tanaka mili-

expansionist, exponent of a "positive" policy in

China, famed for the Tanaka Memorial, the man who
ordered the Shantung intervention of 1927-1929, and
tarist,

whose Cabinet

fell

mainly because of the unexplained

circumstances attending the implication of certain Japanese officers in the murder of Chang Tso-lin at the
railway trestle outside Mukden in June 1928. But what
of Kuhara' s more recent history? About this nothing is
said. Nevertheless, it is germane to the subject, and should

be introduced at this point. Kuhara was a Seiyukai member of the Diet in 1935, when he covered himself with
a transparent effort to drag the Emperor into
the political arena against the Okada Cabinet. Needless
to say, he was working hand in glove with the military.

ignominy in

This was not the climax of

15

New

York Times, January

his career. After the assassi-

16, 1938.

JAPAN IN CHINA

350

nations of February 26, 1936, Kuhara was detained on

charges of being an accomplice to General Mazaki, chief
instigator of the attempted

coup

d'etat.

Both Kuhara and

Mazaki were later officially cleared of complicity in the

affair, chiefly because of their influence and high position.
evidence produced during the investigation tended
show that funds expended in behalf of the military
inuprising had passed through Mr. Kuhara's hands, if,
him.
furnished
not
were
deed, they
by
Clearly, this brother-in-law of Mr. Aikawa is a very
interesting person. But to continue with the narrative:
"Taking advantage of the inflation boom which followed
Japan's departure from the gold standard at the end of
1931, Mr. Aikawa started a career of rapid company promotion. On the foundation of the old Kuhara-Aikawa

The
to

he erected the edifice of the Nippon Sangyo

Kabushiki Kaisha (Japan Industrial Company, Ltd.) and
commenced the formation of subsidiaries and the acquisiinterests

tion of control in going companies. The Nippon Sangyo

'empire', in which the paid capitalizations aggregate more

than 500,000,000 yen and the 'going concern value' is

probably triple that, includes such diversified interests as
iron manufacturing, machinery manufacturing, glycerine,
whaling, accident insurance, nitrogen fertilizers, gold

mining, coal mining, shipping, industrial chemicals, fishing and automobile manufacturing. Through the Kyodo

Company, which now operates off the coasts of

Mexico and Australia as well as in the North Pacific,
Mr. Aikawa now dominates the marketing of the Japanese catch of crab and salmon. All in all, the Nippon
Fishery

Sangyo interests make it second only to Mitsui in the

16
Japanese industrial scheme."
These facts are also of extreme value in gauging the
York Times, January

16, 1938.

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

351

position occupied by Mr. Aikawa. He is, first and foremost, a promoter of heavy industriesmining, iron manufacturing, industrial chemicals, machinery, and automobiles. His meteoric rise is said to rest on the inflation

boom

after 1931. It rests equally

on the stimulus

to

heavy

industry given by the expanding military budgets. He is

par excellence the representative of the group of heavy
industrialists which profit from the army program and

which are the staunchest supporters of continental expansion, including the war in China. He is in the opposite
camp from those light industrialists whose interests are
really opposed to a controlled economy, twisted and
warped to the purpose of building a war machine. One
other fact, of considerable interest, might be added to
this man's biography. In October 1936 Aikawa visited
Manchoukuo on an inspection trip made at the invitation and under the auspices of the Kwantung Army. This
is the man, then, whose advent on the scene of Manchurian heavy industrial development is to be taken as
the signal for a revival of laissez-faire in Manchoukuo,
the precursor of the "open door" for private Japanese
and mayhap American interests who may wish to invest
in Manchuria. With a few more "enemies" like Aikawa,
the leaders of the Kwantung Army would have nothing
left to fear. Any classification of Mr. Aikawa as an exponent of laissez-faire, liberalism, or anti-militarism must

be decisively rejected.

He

is

compound

of the opposites

of all these terms.

Sound

reasons led the

Kwantung Army leaders to go out

way to interest Mr. Aikawa in the development
of Manchurian heavy industries. They needed capital, it
is true, but they wanted this capital to come from an
industrialist who stood shoulder to shoulder with them
of their

in their

program

of aggressive continental expansion. In

JAPAN IN CHINA

35*

this entente cordiale, they were cementing

the bloc with Japanese heavy industry and undermining
the position of the liberal business groups in Japan which

consummating

and opposed the army program. Since Nippon

Sangyo was already engaged in most of the lines of enterprise allocated to the new Manchurian holding company,
it was obviously in a most advantageous position to coordinate the development of the resources of Manchoukuo. In the second place, they needed the technical and

distrusted

managerial equipment of Japan Industry, Ltd. Under

Mr. Aikawa's direction, this firm has become one of the

premier exhibits of advanced technical efficiency in Japanese industry. It disposes of a staff of hundreds of engi-

who thoroughly explore

every project and close every avenue of possible failure
before actual work is undertaken. When the signal to
neering and economic experts,

go ahead

is given, nothing is allowed to stand in the

of
results.
The ruthless aggressiveness of Nippon
way
Sangyo is well illustrated by its purse-seine salmon opera-

tions off the Alaskan coast,

which have been prosecuted

in complete disregard of the protests of American salmon

operators, who point out that the methods pursued by

the
in a

Aikawa
few

fishery

concern will destroy the salmon

fields

years* time.

One

further reason was the most compelling of all.

Staggering under the financial burdens of the war, Japan
desperately needs the assistance of foreign capital to deits new
conquests. What a coup it would be, both
from the economic and political angles, if American
capital could be induced to invest in Manchoukuo. The
difficulties in the way of securing American
cooperation
in such a project were obvious. Special preparation and
inducements would be necessary to assure success in the
delicate task of approaching American interests. The

velop

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

S53

Mr. Aikawa into the Manchurian scene

be the proper answer. His reputation and
the technical standing of Nippon Sangyo would be reassuring to any foreign investor. And lest the fear of
government control might result in hesitation to rise to
the bait, why not present Mr. Aikawa in the guise of a
introduction o

seemed

to

crusader for the revival of private enterprise in Manchoukuo? This was the crowning, the most subtle touch
of the

whole scheme.

reconstruction seems too Machiavellian, it is

only necessary to refer to an editorial in The Oriental
Economist, the most authoritative economic journal of
If this

Japan. As this editorial appeared in the

November 1937

must have been composed at

some time toward the end of October. Its concluding
issue of the magazine,

it

as follows: "An interesting fact about

Manchoukuo holding concern is its reputed aim of
obtaining as much foreign capital as possible, more espe-

paragraph reads
the

American capital, for the operation of its variegated

activities. As referred to elsewhere in this issue, while
cially

Manchoukuo

has access

personnel of executive

to, by the present arrangement,

and technical ability of an unusu-

high order which Japan Industry, Ltd. has taken several

decades to build up, it has been recognized that assistance

ally

of foreign capital was needed to develop the vast resources

of the country. Plans considered for the introduction of

foreign capital include obtaining a line of credit on the

security of heavy industrial assets in Manchoukuo for the

purchase in the country where such credit is established

of machinery and other producers' goods. It is also suggested that American capitalists be induced to take up
the shares of various industrial concerns."
these will be shares in the
17

The

Oriental Economist,

new

November

17

Presumably

concerns which will spring

1937, p. 636.

JAPAN IN CHINA

354

up

as

soon as Mr. Aikawa has accomplished the revival of

private industrial enterprise in Manchoukuo.

As the strain imposed by the war on Japan's financial

position becomes greater, the search for foreign loans will

be pursued with redoubled intensity. The weakest link
is the large merchandise trade deficit,
which demands unprecedented amounts of foreign exchange. There is a definite limit to the restrictions which
the Japanese authorities can apply to imports. Those

in Japan's armor

already applied have begun to hamper export trade; they

can be carried further only at the risk of adding to the

by reducing the volume of exports. The

boycott of Japanese products by consumers in the outside world, which is growing in extent and intensity,
strikes directly at this most vulnerable point. Even a
trade deficit

small decline in Japan's total export trade,

occurring under present circumstances, would add greatly

relatively

to its difficulty of securing

exchange.

The

adequate quantities of foreign

purchases abroad must be continued.

Japan's import requirements for war purposes, owing to

its paucity of natural resources and deficiencies in certain

machine techniques, are greater than those of any other

power. It must purchase abroad the bulk of its
raw cotton, rubber, antimony, nickel, mercury, lead,
first-class

petroleum, scrap iron, manganese, tungsten, molybdenite,

chrome and iron ore. It produces less than half of its

needs with respect to aluminum,

phosphorus and

asbestos. It

tin, zinc, cadmium,

must import machinery, air-

craft and military trucks in large amounts, as well as such

raw materials as wool, timber and hides. This excessive
dependence on the outside world for the sinews of war
means that for Japan the problem of foreign exchange is
crucial. To wage a successful war, it must sooner or later

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

seek external financial assistance.

355

Germany and

Italy, its

partners in the anti-Comintern pact, have no surpluses

of foreign exchange to place at the disposal of their East-

ern

ally.

Their deficiencies in this respect are as serious

The best they can do is to establish barter

as Japan's.

arrangements, as in the triangular German- Japan-Man-

choukuo trade agreement, by which Japan exchanges

Manchuria's soya bean products for German machinery
and munitions. Only in the United States or Great
Britain, which possess large capital reserves, can Japan
hope to obtain sufficient loans or credits
on its finances. Mr. Aikawa's essay in
likely to

to ease the strain

this

direction

is

prove but the precursor of similar attempts in

future months.
strength between China and Japan, the
latter has the advantages of a superior professional army,

In the

test of

and more adequate munitions, and a higher industechnique. These are of great importance. They
explain the relative ease with which Japan's armies have
better
trial

to smash their way to military objectives

the
by
high command. Under the conditions of a protracted war, however, it may prove that China's economic

been enabled
set

the stronger, possessing certain advantages which

Japan lacks. The more advanced financial-economic structure of Japan is also more delicately geared, and its

front

is

equilibrium can be more easily upset. Dislocation or stress

at any point immediately transfers its effects to the structure as a whole. There is a much more general dependence on the outside world, with more serious results if
any of the connections are impaired or broken. Within
Japan itself there is an imperfect fusion of a developed

monopoly capitalism, which reigns over some but by no

means all phases of industry, and a backward agriculture,

JAPAN IN CHINA

356

system, share-cropping, and

18
predominance of hand labor. In certain respects Japanese agriculture is closely linked up with the world
market, and seriously dependent on these connections.

characterized by the

strip

true notably of silk; a sharp decline in the prices

paid for raw silk by the United States, or in the amounts
taken, has immediate repercussions on the whole Japanese

This

is

countryside.
These considerations do not apply in nearly the same
degree to China. While the loss of Shanghai is a serious

blow, it does not have the crippling effects which the

destruction of Osaka or New York would produce on
the economies of Japan or the United States. As one careful student of Chinese economic conditions has noted:

"In China, the loss or destruction of a city like Shanghai

would not seriously affect the economy in the interior.

There would be a dearth of imported articles and glut

of commodities destined for export, but neither of these
categories constitutes a significant proportion of the total
products of the nation.

Not only

will the destruction of

and stoppage of foreign trade not be of

major port
decisive importance, but the economy of China is so
localized and the various localities are so self-sufficient
cities

that even a disruption of internal trade through the loss

of certain regions in the process of the war will not be
fatal to China's power of resistance." 19
blockade will

impose hardships on the interior population, especially as

regards clothing and certain other necessities, but it cannot lead to a general economic collapse. The predominantly agricultural
18

life

of China's inland provinces will

See Chapter VI.

Ch'ao-ting Chi, "China's Economic Strength and the Sino-Japanese
War", amerasia, October 1937, p. 345.
10

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

357

continue, with various necessary readjustments to compensate for the scarcities of imported articles.

As regards finance the Chinese government faces rather

more serious handicaps, but even in this sphere there is
no certainty that the difficulties cannot be surmounted.
The loss of Shanghai, Tientsin and Tsingtao has already
cut off the bulk of China's customs receipts, which supplied over 40 per cent of government revenue in 1935
and 1936.
considerable proportion of China's banking,

industrial,

and commercial

interests

have either suffered

grave losses or been placed beyond the effective jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities. The financial contributions of this group to China's war chest must henceforth

become much more

lien.

of a voluntary offering than a taxable

an increasing extent, China's government reve-

To

nues must be derived from a narrowing section of the

interior. These disadvantages are partially offset by the
patriotic enthusiasm of the Chinese people, which, for
example, facilitates the sale of government bonds. The
war loan of 500 million silver dollars, sold in issues as low
as one dollar, met with a surprising response and has
been largely, if not entirely, subscribed. Other sources of
revenue have also been made available by the existence
of a war situation. In view of Japan's savagery, it would
not seem unreasonable for the Chinese authorities to
confiscate

the

considerable

Japanese properties in the

war use. The same action

be
might
legitimately applied to properties of Chinese
found to be assisting the invader. Measures such as land
tax reform, involving larger assessments on the landlords,
and a graduated property tax are already under considinterior

and convert them

to

eration for the inland provinces.

On the expenditure side, the Chinese government will
find

it

possible to effect large savings.

moratorium on

JAPAN IN CHINA

358

the loan and indemnity services, which averaged 300

million dollars in 1935 and 1936 or nearly one-third of
total expenditure, is contemplated. Important reductions
of administrative expenditure, including

official salaries,

have already been made. These savings will release considerable sums for direct military expenses, which must
necessarily increase. China's problem in this regard, however, has certain differences from that of Japan which
must be taken into account. The Chinese armies are
fighting on their own soil, in the midst of a sympathetic
and friendly population. Japan must transport huge
armies, now aggregating possibly 800 thousand men, to the
war fronts and supply them with food and other supplies, which must largely be sent from home by means
of an expensive commissariat system. Its expenditure of
munitions, notably with regard to bombs and shells, is
on a prodigal scale compared with China. A burst of
machine-gun fire from Pootung, for example, has been
answered by a two-hour bombardment from Japanese

war

vessels in the

Whangpoo

of military expenditure

is

River.

The

relative extent

vastly different

in the

two

cases.

These are some of the underlying

factors

which have

to be taken into account with respect to China's financial

ability to continue the military struggle. Extensive yearend surveys by American and European financial experts

have contributed

specific

information on certain elements

of this problem. 20 Chinese foreign loan and indemnity

bonds, as well as internal issues, have been regularly
serviced throughout 1937; it is expected that during the

1938 amortization payments on foreign obligations will probably cease, but interest payments will be
met in full.
moratorium will be declared at the same

year

30

New

York Times, February 20, 1938.

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

359

time on Chinese domestic bonds; interest payments will

continue, though at 3 or 4 per cent instead of the prevailing 6 per cent. To maintain service on its foreign and

domestic loan obligations, the Chinese government paid

out nearly 100 million U.S. dollars during 1937. Somewhat over 100 million U.S. dollars had been expended
for munitions between July and January; on January i,
1938 an additional 25 million dollars* worth of munitions
and other war supplies had been ordered but not yet
delivered.

On

the same date, cash reserves of the Chinese

government held abroad, principally in New York and

London, were estimated at roughly 300 million dollars.
The reported summary of the experts' observations then
stated: "Were it not for the necessity of keeping intact
a large slice of this fund to act as a reserve back of Chinese
national currency, China's financial position would indeed be bright, despite nearly
war on her own soil/'
For the immediate future, at

six

months of devastating

the Chinese government apparently has sufficient funds with which to cover
its minimum requirements for munitions. Another
aspect
least,

problem involves the maintenance of lines of access

China through which such supplies can continue to

of this
to

The

great bulk of China's military

supplies have thus far entered the country through Canton, from which they have been carried north to Hankow

reach the interior.

by rail. This supply line was still functioning in the early

months of the new year. At the beginning of 1938, it was
obvious that a considerable additional supply of airplanes
had been acquired by the Chinese military authorities

and put into action at the front. Japan might adopt either
of two methods to block this line of entrance. By a declaration of war, Japan would be enabled to attempt to
block shipments via Hongkong.

The

risk of complications

360

JAPAN IN CHINA

with foreign powers has thus far prevented such action.

The alternative would be a direct military attack on
Canton. Such a campaign would entail large-scale miliconsiderable forces;
tary-naval operations, involving very
the exigencies of the war in the north have not permitted
such a diversion.
It is not unlikely, however, that one or the other of
these steps may ultimately be taken, thus eliminating

Canton as a source of entrance for military supplies.

Under such circumstances, it is also probable that the
line of access through French Indo-China might be closed
through blockade or threat of reprisal. Even so, there
would still be several interior routes through which supChina. Access from the Soviet Union,
plies might reach
either through Outer Mongolia or Sinkiang, could be
blocked only by a general Japanese occupation of China's
northwestern provinces. Under these conditions, there
would still be access to Szechuan province via the southerly routes through Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan.
Finally, an overland highway from Burma into Yunnan
was being rushed to completion and was expected to
be ready for use in the spring of 1938. All these overland
routes would be subject to inconvenience and considerable delays, but would at least offer means dl entrance

for a certain

amount

of military supplies. Airplanes, in

particular, can be flown into China from a number of different points on the borders of the peripheral provinces.
There is still another factor, which may well prove to
be decisive, in China's ability to wage a successful war
of defense. The positional warfare carried on in the
Shanghai-Nanking area, and later on both sides of the

Lunghai Railway, is of great military and strategic value.

China's stand at Shanghai dealt a considerable blow to the
prestige of the Japanese army. For nearly three months,

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

361

Chinese armies with inferior military equipment withstood the shock of Japan's heaviest blows and inflicted
serious losses

on the invaders. During the operations early

Shantung and Anhwei provinces, both

in the year in

north and south of the Lunghai Railway, the Japanese

were held up for many weeks by a determined
Chinese defense. Such campaigns exact a heavy toll from
offensives

the Japanese side, in military supplies, in casualties, and

At the same time, they involve a serious drain

in funds.

on the more scanty munitions stocks at China's disposal.

As the Japanese armies penetrate further into the interior,
positional warfare combined with the broad application of
guerrilla tactics becomes both more feasible and more
damaging to the morale and fighting ability of the invading forces.

The

effectiveness of the

mobile warfare carried

Route Army in several of the

northern provinces has already been noted. 21 These tacon by units

of the Eighth

have also been successfully applied in the ShanghaiNanking area by former Communist partisan forces from
the southern provinces, which have been reorganized and
placed under the Chinese central command.
Statements made on February 2 1 by General Chen Chien,
tics

commander

of

the

Peiping-Hankow Railway

indicate that preparations have been

guerrilla fighting on a large scale.

defenses,

made to inaugurate
The Chinese forces

operating north of the Yellow River, he declared, were

under orders to adopt mobile tactics in that area, and
establish liaison with the Eighth Route Army. Within

Honan province, Chen Chien was recruiting soldiers for

the regular armed forces; in addition, at least two million
men of military age in 85 districts of the province were
undergoing two hours of daily training. A mass mobilization of this sort, if thoroughly organized, can place
21

See Chapter IX.

JAPAN IN CHINA

362

hundreds of thousands of additional guerrilla forces in

the field. Large numbers of regular troops can also be
diverted to mobile operations. The problem of supplying
such units with munitions is relatively simple. Rifles,
machine-guns, and small arms ammunition are the main
requirements. Even in the interior provinces, China pos-

number

of arsenals capable of producing these

of such centers
types of military equipment. The output

sesses

can be expanded at slight expense.

Military resistance of this character,

be able

to

win smashing

it is

true, will

victories. Its effects, in the

not

long

nonetheless devastating. By their control of

the interior, the guerrilla units can force
areas
of
wide
Japan to maintain large armies of occupation in China

run,

may be

indefinitely.

These occupationary

forces

will

be

con-

stantly harassed by swift attacks at various points of their

extended lines. The support of the local population will

not only afford the mobile detachments a continuous

source of food supplies and other necessities; the people

an incomparable intelligence service,

the
warning
guerrilla fighters of the approach of large
and supplying information as to the numforces
Japanese
will also constitute

and disposition of isolated Japanese units. Such a

guerrilla army will attest the truth of the statement of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that "the basis of China's
future success in prolonged resistance is not found in
Nanking or big cities but in villages all over China and
bers

in the fixed determination of the people." The successes

Manchurian volunteers, under even more difficult
circumstances, is a pledge of what can be accomplished in
of the

the wider regions of China's inland provinces. At best

the Japanese armies will be restricted to a defense of the

main

lines of railway

and highway communication. The

effective garrisoning of interior areas presents a

problem

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

363

of such vast proportions that it can be ruled out as a

practical procedure. With the countryside in arms against

the invader, there can be no question of economic revival

or of a generally successful exploitation under Japanese
auspices of the occupied provinces. The essential eco-

nomic

be the staggering burden of expenditure

Japanese armies of occupation, only a small
which could be recouped by taxes or forced
of
portion
for

fact will

the

requisitions.

The most

serious danger for China has resided in a

possible collapse of morale, particularly among certain
elements in the ruling government circles. The critical

period in this respect, however, seems to have passed with

the fall of Nanking and the withdrawal of the government

There is every indication at present that

the political unity established last spring has stood the
test, and that a firm struggle in defense of China's

to the interior.

national existence will be maintained. It

on

that China's

is

recognized

hope lies in prolonged

resistance over a period of years, which may be ultimately
counted upon to bring about Japan's financial and military collapse. Plans have been laid, and are being put
all

sides

sole

into execution, to transfer the vital elements of China's

life to the provinces of the Southwest. Uniformerly located in the occupied areas have
transferred students and faculties to Szechuan and the

national
versities

reconstruction

program for
improvement of communication facilities, is being planned and put into effect
in the midst of war. These developments do not mean
that the rest of China is being abandoned to Japanese
rule. Even if the core of the central armies was eventuneighboring provinces.

these regions, especially affecting

forced back into the Southwest, the real struggle

would still be carried on by guerrilla forces behind the
ally

JAPAN IN CHINA

364

Japanese lines in occupied territories, as the example of

Hopei province clearly indicates. Off the main lines of
communication, in any section of the country, the Japanese will be able to operate only in overwhelming force.
Democratization of China's political system, which is
making steady progress, may be expected to contribute
further to the unity and strength of Chinese resistance. Measures adopted by the Kuomintang plenary sesstill

sion,

held March 29 to April 2, 1938 in Hankow, witnessed

most notable democratic trend in Chinese political

to the

life during the past decade. The session's outstanding

achievement was the creation of a People's Political Council. As the representative of all party groups, and not

merely the Kuomintang, this organ constitutes an embryonic legislature. This step toward democratic government
was supported by the decree granting full freedom of
press,

speech and association. Since the beginning of 1938

newspapers of many political shades, including the Communist Hsin Hua Jih Pao or New China Daily, had been
published in Hankow. The possibility of achieving these
democratic reforms was originally considered during the
negotiations which established the Kuomintang-CommuUnder a more liberal political regime, the
Chinese people as a whole will play a fuller and more

nist entente.

responsible part in China's broad anti- Japanese front.

The test of strength, as between China and Japan, pits

two

qualitatively different techniques and objectives

against each other. For Japan the supreme objective must

continue to be a smashing victory, and collapse of the

opponent's morale and will to resist. Only a swift tri-

umph, thorough enough

excessively

large

economic margin
additional

month

forces

to

of

permit the withdrawal of

occupation, will leave an

sufficient to

balance

books. Every
diminishes the

its

of large-scale warfare

THE TEST OF STRENGTH

365

prospects of a successful outcome to the military adventure. The gambler's hands already betray their nervousness as the wheel spins, but shows no sign of settling on
the lucky number. For China there is the necessity of

maintaining a stubborn refusal to admit defeat in the

overwhelming devastation and apparent disaster.
The sources of such a spirit are reinforced by the objectives of the struggle. The Chinese soldier, long the plaything of internal struggle for wealth and power, now at
last takes his legitimate place as the defender of an

face of

independent national existence.

He

is

fighting in self-

defense against a ruthless aggressor, and with a united

country behind him. Among both the leaders and the

rank and file, genuine patriotism rules more supreme than

at any time in this century. In the opposing trenches, the
motivating force is the zeal for conquest, domination,
even for loot. The advantage in this regard clearly rests
with China. It may well turn the scales. History shows
other examples of a colonial country defeating a better
equipped ruling power, whose troops had no stomach
for the business. It was true of the American war for

independence.

CHAPTER TWELVE

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

THE

founding of the Manchoukuo regime was marked by appropriate ceremonies

in March 1938. This occasion, coming at a time when
Japanese armies were operating in half the provinces of
China south of the Great Wall, affords a not unfitting
sixth anniversary of the

opportunity

to

review the record of Japan's administra-

Manchurian provinces. Attention might be

legitimately directed, in particular, toward an examination of the effects of Japanese rule on the life of the
thirty million Chinese in Manchuria. At the moment
tion in the

is engaged in the task of establishing new

puppet
regimes which, if successfully consolidated, will control
the destinies of scores of millions of the Chinese people
south of the Wall. These new governments, it is claimed,

Japan

sweep away old abuses and confer the benefits of an

honest and enlightened administration on the people
which they are to govern. Fortunately, there exists the
prototype of such an administration in Manchoukuo. The
experiences and results of the past six years in Manchuria
supply a mass of material which may be used to check the
validity of the claims now advanced. For the methods and
policies already enforced in Manchoukuo will be applied
to the additional territories and populations which the
will

Japanese are attempting to bring under their sway, as is

1
clear from the evidence of developments in
Peiping.

^ee Chapter

IX.

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

What have been

the

distinguishing

methods and

features

of

367

the

to the govern-

policies applied by Japan

the Northeastern provinces? How have they
affected the livelihood, physical well-being, and mental

ment

of

outlook of the Chinese in this region?

initiative

and self-determination

nese in this

state,

is

What

degree of

exercised by the Chi-

the creation of which was claimed to

represent the spontaneous will of

its

inhabitants?

The highest government offices of Manchoukuo, notably the various Ministries under the State Council, are
held almost exclusively by Chinese and Mongols. Actual
administrative control, however, is vested in the powerful

General Affairs Board, which functions within the State

Council and is dominated by Japanese officials. Foreign
visitors to Hsinking, capital of the new state, at once find
themselves in the hands of Japanese officials, who will
accompany and assist them if they wish to interview the
de jure Ministers or the Emperor. No less revealing is the
data on the composition of Manchoukuo's Civil Service,
as supplied by the Official Register. In 1933 there were
2

and 1,259 Japanese civil servants;

2,048 "Manchurian"
the
middle
of
May 1936 the proportion was 5,514
by
"Manchurians" and 5,811 Japanese. The change was

particularly striking in the lowest of the four grades of the

Civil Service. In this category of civil servants, known as

wei-jen, the figures show 1,547 "Manchurians" and 740

Japanese in 1933, while in May 1936 there were 4,540

"Manchurians" and 4,473 Japanese. Thus, even on the

lowest level, the work of day-to-day administration was
being carried on increasingly by Japanese under-officials.
Six months later, significantly enough, the Official
2

Japanese

of the

new

officials

state.

In

make

every effort to stress the

reality, the

"Manchu"

character

population is overwhelmingly Chinese;

such few Manchus as remain have been almost entirely assimilated in
customs and language.

JAPAN IN CHINA

368

Register for November 30, 1936 failed to include statistics

for this lowest grade of civil servants. Nearly 500 "Man-

churian"

officials

had meanwhile been added

to the

De-

partment of Justice, bringing the figures for the three

upper grades in this department to 527 "Manchurians"
and 122 Japanese. Since most of the cases handled by the
courts involve Chinese litigants exclusively, the change
thus introduced was not of material importance. More

noteworthy was the

racial

composition of the

civil serv-

where the three upper grades

and 189 Japanese. In the
"Manchurians"
43
comprised
the
of
Industry
corresponding figures were
Department
in
and
the
to
124,
38
Department of Communications 33
to 68. Taking the administrative branches of the governants in the State Council,

ment

as a whole, including the provincial offices, the

tendency was to approximate a ratio of 40 per cent "Manchurians" to 60 per cent Japanese in the three upper

grades of the Civil Service. These figures show that the

Manchoukuo regime is not only directed at the top by

Japanese officials ensconced in the General Affairs Board,

but that routine administration is predominantly carried

on by Japanese

Whatever else may be true

not governed by the Chinese who
constitute the overwhelming majority of its population.
Recognizing the inherent difficulties of this situation,
the Japanese authorities have devoted special attention to
of this

new

civil servants.

state, it is

the problem of controlling the intellectual life of the

Chinese people in Manchuria. Every avenue of indoctrinationeducation, press and radio is employed in the
task of reconciling the local

population to

its

inferior

The more

positive aspects of this effort are reflected

in the activities of the Manchoukuo Concordia
Society,
which has the special function of inculcating a peculiar
status.

brand of Manchurian patriotism, and in the emphases of

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

the school curriculum.

At

circumscribing

same time, Japanese policy

Manchurian Chinese by delib-

the

seeks to de-nationalize the

erately

569

their

educational

opportunities

and by carefully filtering all information that enters Manchoukuo from the outside world. This negative side of
Japanese policy is probably more subtly effective and in
the long run more damaging than the rather obvious
propaganda for the "harmony of the five races/ Both
7

aspects,

aim

however, are correlated to achieve the supreme

of destroying the national consciousness of thirty

million people.
Even the most cursory survey of Japan's educational
program in Manchuria brings to light a series of startling

not surprising that Japanese apologists for the

achievements of Manchoukuo carefully sidestep any mention of what is taking place in the sphere of education.
The budgetary appropriations for the Department of
Education are not only unusually small, amounting to
roughly one-half of that expended for educational purposes by the former Chinese governments of the four
Northeastern provinces in 1929. They have declined, durfacts. It is

ing the past four years, both in absolute

relation to total government expenditure.

amount and

The

in

figures are

3
in 1934-1935;
6,114,268 Manchoukuo yuan
in
the
last
half
of
year
1935, when the
3,055,814 yuan
term of the fiscal year was changed; and 5,090,043 yuan

as follows:

in the calendar year 1936. 4 In percentages of the total

budget, these sums work out respectively at 3.24 per cent,

3 per cent, and 2.3 per cent. The estimate for educational
expenditure in 1937 was 5,697,925 yuan 3 or 2.2 per cent
of total budgetary appropriations.
8
A Manchoukuo yuan is equal to the Japanese

yen, or rather less than

thirty cents in United States currency.

*
Fifth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1936, Dairen,

Manchuria Railway Company, July

1936, p. 153.

The South

JAPAN IN CHINA

370

The

logical conclusion from these figures would seem

be that educational enterprise in Manchoukuo is declining, or at least is making no advance. Attempts to
check such an assumption by reference to the educational
to

statistics

Manchoukuo government

of the

are unavailing,

since the data issued are contradictory and incomplete.

One source, for example, places the number of elementary

Manchoukuo at 12,896, with 830,960 pupils, at

the end of 1934- 5 Another gives corresponding figures for

schools in

with 825,468 pupils. 6 Statistics

recently issued, showing 13,100 schools with 960,600 puto 1936, i.e., a sudden jump during
pils, presumably refer
a period when the appropriations had declined by about
one million yuan, or one-sixth of the total. Yet these dis1

935 as

345 1

schools,

crepancies are as nothing to figures by the Department

of Education for the three-year period 1933-1935, which
show the number of elementary schools fluctuating by
well over 2,000 but give the constant figure of 596,688
pupils for each of the three years. These misleading data
are possibly intended to conceal the actual status of Manchoukuo education.
conservative estimate would be

no more pupils are in school than under the pre-ig3i

Chinese regime; the highest figures cited above exceed
that

but

slightly those for

era. It is

in school

more

1929 during

Chang Hsueh-liang's

fewer children are

borne out by the testi-

likely that considerably

a conclusion

which

is

of foreign residents in Manchoukuo.

It will be noted that so far mention has been

mony

made

only of elementary schools. The Japanese freely admit

that they are not interested in providing secondary or
advanced education. Statistics with respect to secondary
*

Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1936, cited, p. 170.

Department of Civil Affairs Bulletin, September 15, 1935.
T
General Survey of Conditions in Manchoukuo, Department of
Foreign
Fifth

Affairs,

Hsinking,

November

1936, p. 13.

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

371

education also exhibit puzzling discrepancies. One source

gives 202 middle schools with 28,866 pupils for the end
of 1Q34, 8 while another shows 178 middle schools with
9
32,900 students for ig36. Both sets of figures appear to
be well padded. The use of former middle school text-

books is prohibited, and new ones have been provided in

but few subjects. There is not one bona fide university in

Manchoukuo. 10 The half-dozen

the whole of

universities which flourished in

Chang

colleges

and

Hsueh-liang's day

University at

The famous Northeastern (Tungpei)

Mukden has suffered the same fate recently

meted out

Peking National University;

have been closed.

to

barracks for Japanese troops.

much above

secondary grade,

is

it is

used as a

Indifferent training, not

provided in a few special

normal and vocational schools, the latter specializing in

business, agriculture, and mechanics. Vocational educahighly prized, evidently because it is less likely to
provoke "dangerous thoughts" or stir up political unrest.
tion

is

Students

who

return

to

Manchoukuo from advanced

China or Western countries undergo police

inquiries and supervision; while they are abroad, their
few
parents are visited and questioned by the police.
students are given the opportunity to pursue a university
schools in

This favored handful of "Manchurians" is

They must have a permit
issued by the Manchoukuo Embassy in Tokyo, which
supervises their activities and may send them back to
Manchuria if they prove "unsatisfactory." The expectation seems to be that, after such a period of training in
Japan, these students will be smoothly assimilated into
education

in

Japan.

carefully selected.

the ruling caste of

8
*

Fifth Report

Manchoukuo. Private

on Progress

in

Manchuria

schools are not

to 1936, cited, p. 170.

General Survey of Conditions in Manchoukuo, cited, p. 13.

10
Two medical colleges, one under missionary auspices and the other
under the South Manchuria Railway Company, are located in Mukden.

JAPAN IN CHINA

372

encouraged; those under missionary auspices, in particular, are viewed with suspicion and subjected to strict
regulation.
Since the

Manchoukuo

authorities direct their educa-

tional efforts primarily toward the elementary schools, it

is instructive to examine the content of this education.

have their best opporminds of Manchurian youth who

have not been previously affected by the virus of Chinese

Here the Japanese

feel that they

tunity to influence the

The curriculum

nationalism.

of these lower schools has

several obvious emphases. Study of the Japanese language

is compulsory. Manual training for boys and domestic

science for girls are characteristic features. Most prominent of all are the courses in ethics, the central theme

which is Manchoukuo's guiding principle of "Wang

Tao." This concept of the "Kingly Way" has been consciously borrowed from the Confucian classics. It represents the Confucian ideal of the upright sage, who rules
not by force but by the persuasive effect of his gracious
benevolence on all within his realm. It is the "Way of
Right" as contrasted with "Pa Tao", the "Way of Might."
of

There is a certain grim irony in the connotations of

such a symbol for the state of Manchoukuo. Yet the
emphasis on Confucian ideology, perfected through the
centuries to buttress the ruling position of a privileged
bureaucracy, has a deliberate and not inappropriate appli-

The

taught to revere Kang Te, the

as the virtuous ruler who govEmperor
erns in accordance with the "will of Heaven." His mind is
cation.

of

pupil

is

Manchoukuo,

impressed with the Confucian ethical concepts of te, i, li

and jen, or virtue, right conduct, propriety and benevolenceall of which tend toward submission and minimize
self-assertion.

There

is

no mention of

that other strain in

Confucian philosophy, represented notably by Mencius,

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

373

and duty of the people to revolt

an
and
tyrannous ruler.
against
unjust
Within this Confucian setting, attention is devoted
toward creating and popularizing a set of patriotic shibboleths, especially in the history text-books. Manchuria is
pictured as distinct from the China south of the Wall. It
is a separate geographical entity, with an historically

which

stressed the right

unique

culture. It possesses the treasured precedent of the

Manchu conquests. More recently Manchuria has been

delivered from the corrupt Chinese warlords, mainly by
the spontaneous will of its thirty million people, though
benevolently aided by Japan.

The

pupil also learns that

Manchoukuo

derives great benefit from its intimate connections with Japan, that China is ground down by the
militarists,

and that

his

duty

is

to reverence the

Emperor

and

act his part in achieving the "harmony of the five

races." This latter concept seems to be a purely Man-

choukuo

creation. It has already

evolution.

During the

Han

first

undergone a degree of

year or two, the classification

Manchu, Japanese, Korean and

(Chinese)
but
it
has
since
been revised to read Manchu,
Mongol,
Korean,
Mongol and Russian. The Chinese
Japanese,
was

become "Manchurians." These various school

which
seek to fashion a patriotic undergirding
precepts,
of the new state, are given free rein in demonstrations on
the national holidays of Manchoukuo and Japan, when
the pupils must parade, wave flags, cheer and listen to
have

all

speeches.
The strands

woven

Manchoukuo's educational
policy form one consistent pattern. There is the decline
in government expenditure and probably in the number
into

who receive schooling, the absence of higher

the
education,
prominence of elementary and vocational
the
schools,
emphasis on Confucianism and unquestionof children

JAPAN IN CHINA

374

ing obedience to authority, and the importance attached

to the inculcation of patriotism. What effect this sort of
education may have on those of the younger generation
are subjected to it is somewhat problematic. Most of
the children are affected by home influences which must

who

act as a healthy counter irritant to the indoctrination they

receive in school. Very soon they doubtless come to realize

"Manchurians" means the acceptThey probably recognize that the

burden of maintaining the "harmony of the five races"
rests chiefly upon them. For the objective of Manchoukuo's educational system is clear. It aims to prepare the
that patriotism for the
ance of an alien rule.

for a well defined

great bulk of the Chinese population
in their new national life, with
subservience
of
position

the ruling places reserved to the Japanese and those few

Chinese who emerge acceptably from a university education in Japan.

This educational policy

is
supplemented by rigid prothe press and distribution of
control
of
visions affecting
news in Manchoukuo. The press system now in vogue

contrasts sharply with conditions in

the Japanese occupation. Under the

Manchuria

prior to

former Chinese ad-

ministration censorship was exercised only during stress

and newspapers and periodicals were freely

from
the outside. As in China south of the
in
brought
literate
the
Wall,
population was growing and the numof emergency,

ber of newspapers increasing. By 1931 there were thirteen

Chinese dailies in Manchuria, of which six were published in

Mukden and

three in Harbin. Following the

occupation, these Chinese-owned papers

were reorganized

under Japanese control, with military censors directing

their news and editorial policies. This ad hoc policy was
regularized by an order of the Department of Education

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

in

October 1932,

later

enacted into law.

11

Under

375

the

provisions of this law, the publication of a wide range of

material was prohibited. The limitations set up were so
vaguely defined as to confer virtually unrestricted discretion

on the

censor.

They covered news

materials disturb-

ing to peace and order, seeking unlawful alteration of the

state, affecting foreign relations, liable to cause

form of the

public or financial panic, and revealing closed court proceedings or other subjects forbidden by the police. In
addition,

the

Foreign, War and Finance Departments

to forbid discussion of matters deemed

were empowered

and order or

to jeopardize peace

to interfere

with their

spheres of administration. Censorship of local and imported publications, enforced by the power of total suppression, was sanctioned by this law. Imprisonment up
to

one year could be visited upon violators of the law's

provisions.

Some two weeks later, on December i, 1935, the Manchoukuo News Agency, or "Kokutsu", took over the telegraphic and news facilities of existing Japanese agencies
in Manchuria.

action, this agency

given a

distribution in

By official
monopoly of news

was soon

Manchoukuo,

including all despatches entering and leaving the country.

Kokutsu obtains its Chinese news from its own branches
in China, while

its

Japanese and foreign news

through "Domei", Japan's

out or brought into Manchuria

is

secured

agency. All news sent

thus originates with and

official

approved by
authorities were
is

Japanese organs. The Hsinking

not wholly satisfied. Regulations is-

official
still

sued on August 17, 1935 by the Japanese Ambassador to

Manchoukuo forbade the import of publications into the
111
Department of Education, Order No.
Ordinance No. 11, March 1934.

130,

October

13, 1932;

Imperial

JAPAN IN CHINA

376

Kwantung Leased Territory and

the South

Manchuria

Railway zone except by permission granted after copies

submitted for examination had been approved by the
appropriate censorship organs of these jurisdictions. Similar

arrangements were already effective with respect to

Manchoukuo, under the provisions of its publications

law, so that foreign newspapers and periodicals must run

a double gauntlet before they can enter Manchuria.

further step toward effective press control was taken on
April 9, 1936, when an ordinance was issued establish-

12
ing the Manchuria News Publishing Association, Ltd.
Ostensibly formed to develop the local press along "sound
lines'', this organ was actually intended to coordinate the

press

Offices

censorship.

established by the association,

which was composed of Japanese

officials

and publishers,

took over the onerous burdens of censorship, introducing

greater efficiency

and uniformity and relieving police and

judicial authorities.

The
come

older vernacular newspapers had long since benothing more than a reflection of Japanese editorial

opinion of the most orthodox stamp. Staffs of the former

Chinese-owned papers had gradually been changed, usually with Japanese editors and business managers added
by the Kwantung Army. So colorless were these papers
that the Chinese reading public tended to shift allegiance
to Chinese-language dailies published and edited by Japanese interests in the Kwantung Leased Territory, which

were

slightly less circumscribed in their treatment of the

news. At

best,

the Chinese population of

Manchoukuo

restricted to a reading fare totally alien to its viewpoint

and interests. In their press, no less than in their educais

tion, the Chinese in

from the

rest

of

Manchuria are

intellectually isolated

China, and taught to look through

"Imperial Ordinance No.

51.

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

377

Japanese eyes at the world around them and the world

outside.

In ways not so formal, though equally pervasive and

compelling, the mental outlook of the Chinese people in

Manchuria

is

by the

affected

activities of the

Manchoukuo

Concordia Society. Here the Kwantung Army, central

and directing force behind the whole Manchurian adventure, is revealed in true perspective as the semi-secret yet
dominant power in the new state. In the words of its
official

handbook, 13 the Manchoukuo Concordia

origins

and

Society's
early activities are described as follows: "The
predecessor of the Concordia Society was the Bureau for
Directing Self-Government, which for some years prior to

the Incident was an organization of groups of Japanese

and Manchurian volunteers united to solve Manchurian

and Far Eastern questions. Under the influence of the

Kwantung Army, this Bureau before the Incident worked
strenuously to hasten the day of Manchurian independence. At the time of the Incident, when Manchoukuo was
being established, this organization, in concert with the
Army's military measures, took upon itself the burden of
After the nation was established,
political measures.
it split into two parts, one composing the Manchoukuo
Government and the other forming the Concordia So.

ciety, a people's organization.

From

the historical view-

point, therefore, while the Society has

nature

its

developed

is

the same as before;

as a

it

changed its form,

was born and has

nation creator."

These are notable admissions. Before the Mukden

dent of September

18,

1931, the

inci-

Kwantung Army was

sponsoring a movement to detach the Manchurian provinces from China. After the success of "the Army's
13

"Concerning the Manchoukuo Concordia Society", Central Affairs

Manchoukuo Concordia Society, May 9, 1935.

Office,

JAPAN IN CHINA

378

military measures", the members of this movement were

responsible for the political steps which led to the forma-

them entered the government thus established, while the rest became members of
the Concordia Society. The role which this Society was
tion of

Manchoukuo. Some

of

henceforth to play is clarified by another statement: "The

government is the direct and the Society the oblique
organization of Manchoukuo. In a primitive society a
direct organization may be sufficient, but in a complex
society such as that of Manchoukuo ... if one does not

bind the

social

mass by an oblique as well as a direct

organization, the state will not develop unity and strength

to resist external conflict and internal dissension. As for
functions, the

the

Wang Tao

principle.

government administers the operation of

principle, while Concordia preaches this

Thus

the rule of

Wang Tao

is

perfected

by two coordinated but separate organs, the government

taking the higher will to the people, the Society taking
the people's will to the higher. ... If we compare Man-

choukuo to a kimono, the government is the outer cloth

and the Society the lining, two pieces but nevertheless
one garment." More specifically, the Society "will give
substance to the spirit of national construction founded

upon Wang Tao principles", and "bind officials with

people and inferiors with superiors." It will "ease the
execution of the government's plans by smoothing rela-

among and
and "must complete the structure of
nation and mould the minds of the people."

tions

among

the several races." It "works

close to the people"

the

The Concordia

Society is evidently an unofficial arm of

the government, striving to reconcile the Chinese population to the new dispensation in Manchuria. Though not
a statutory organ, its relations to the government are of

the closest.

Not only

are the

Emperor and Prime Minister

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

379

Governor and President respectively, but its

mainly supplied by annual grants in aid from
the government. These have been steadily increasing. In
1934-1935, the grant was 800,000 yuan; in 1935 (last half)

its

ex

officio

revenue

is

500,000 yuan; in 1936 (calendar year) 1,500,000 yuan;

while in 1937 ^ was 1*800,000 yuan. Obviously, the task
of developing patriotism, a feeling of nationality, and a

harmonious relationship to the new regime among the

Chinese in Manchuria is considered of the highest importance by the Manchoukuo government.
On the surface, the Concordia Society appears to be a
democratic, self-governing organization. At its base are

may be formed by two or more

by occupation or locality. The vari-

the local chapters, which

members, organized

ous chapters annually elect local congresses, which in

turn elect the national congress. The national congress
elects a Board of Directors, which chooses the Chief
Director. The latter appoints the Central Affairs Office
Committee, which is the actual executive organ of the
Society. Despite this democratic facade, the Society is in
fact a firmly controlled tool of Japanese policy intimately

linked with the

ers-in-Chief

acted as

its

of

Kwantung Army. The various Commandthe Kwantung Army have successively

honorary advisers.

Central Affairs Office on

May

pamphlet issued by the

"These
7, 1936 states:

have been made by the Society pari passu with the

progress of Manchoukuo, but the spur to them has been
the Kwantung Army, which is the Society's inner supreme
strides

14

guiding force/'
In 1936 the Board of Directors was composed of 23
honorary directors (11 Japanese and 12 Chinese) includ,

ing the highest officials of Manchoukuo, the Kwantung

u "Concordia's New
Leadership Plans", Central Affairs Office, Manchoukuo Concordia

Society.

JAPAN IN CHINA

380

Army, and the South Manchuria Railway Company. It

also consisted of 85 acting directors (69 Chinese and
Mongols and 16 Japanese) including the state Ministers
and chief administrative officials. This Board, however,
met only twice a year, while the majority of its 108 direc,

tors were high Chinese officials who were preoccupied

with other business. Actual executive authority was concentrated in the hands of the nineteen commissioners (11

of the Central Affairs Office.

Japanese and 8 Chinese)

This body consisted of one chairman, four full-time commissioners, and 14 part-time commissioners. The chairman was the Minister of Civil Affairs, a Chinese and a
three fullfigure-head. The vice-chairman and the other
Of
the
time commissioners were Japanese.
remaining
with
Chinese
other
seven
were
commissioners,
part-time
the
Control
of
were
and
seven
Society's
Japanese.
positions
affairs thus rested in the hands of the four full-time Japanese commissioners, and the Commander-in-Chief of the

Kwantung Army normally

participated in their business

meetings.

Although the Concordia Society was organized as early

July 25, 1932, by an informal edict of Chief Executive
Pu Yi, and was clearly backed by the highest sources of
political power in Manchoukuo, it seems to have met with
as

little

success in recruiting

members

or promoting

its vari-

ous aims. Early in 1936 the vice-chairman of the Central

Committee, i.e., the real director, publicly

the
that after nearly four years membership
fact
deplored
consisted almost solely of employees of the Society, Man-

Affairs Office

choukuo

officials,

and Japanese 'Volunteers". He urged

the necessity of greater efforts and activity, in order to

expand and popularize the Society. Following this public

board of twenty Japanese members,

functioning under a larger advisory commission, actively
airing,

special

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

381

program. The grant

raised
was
to 1,500,000 yuan.
government
Additional regional field offices were set up, bringing
their total to 10; while local field offices were increased
to 76. A membership drive was energetically fostered. The
Concordia Society absorbed the entire 43,000 members of
another Japanese-sponsored organization, the "Manchuria
Justice Party/' New chapters were formed, until in June
1936 their total number was 1,377, with a membership
set to

work

to revitalize the Society's

in aid from the

to aggregate 300,000. Eighteen months later the

claimed membership was 7oo,ooo. 15

said

During the past two years the Society has vigorously

pushed its campaign to develop synthetic Manchoukuo
patriotism and national unity. All channels of publicity
are at

its

broadcast

disposal.

from

half-hour Concordia

Hsinking

every

evening;

program
a

is

Chinese

language daily is published for its members; pamphlets,

handbills and posters are widely distributed. Movie films
prepared by the Central Affairs Office or Japanese agencies are continuously shown in local towns and villages by
a special corps of screen operators with several dozen
screen projectors. Junior members are enrolled in the
Concordia Young Men's Association. The Society spon-

and calligraphy among primary

and secondary school pupils, and offers prizes for essays
on Wang Tao and other Manchoukuo themes. In June
1936 it conducted a nation-wide competition, with monesors contests in oratory

tary prizes as an inducement, for the best slogans in

Chinese, Japanese, Korean or Russian to enliven the

"national foundation spirit" and encourage the "fight

against Communism." The Society organizes patriotic
celebrations on national holidays and on the newly pre15

William Henry Chamberlin, Christian Science Monitor, January

1938.

19,

JAPAN IN CHINA

382

scribed

days. Airplanes scattering leaflets

handbills constitute a feature of these celebrations.
festival

and

The

independent status of Manchoukuo, emphasized in this

patriotic propaganda, is not allowed to stand in the way
of efforts, similar to those in Korea, to Japanize the population. Concordia has established schools giving free instruction in the Japanese language; it arranges free trips
to Japan to promising individuals, and gives constant lectures on Japan and its relation to Manchoukuo. Society
officials

find

Japanese,

it

make special efforts to enroll

to manifest little enthusiasm over

necessary to

who seem

becoming "Manchurians". Mongols and White Russians

exhibit the same apathy. Concordia's chief aim, of course,
is to reach the Chinese. The Society has even sought to
amalgamate the Japanese and Chinese Chambers of Commerce in the larger cities a bold attempt to break down
an age-long stronghold of Chinese exclusiveness. Members
of Concordia are encouraged to wear the society's olivedrab uniform, which is now generally affected by Japanese
employees of Manchoukuo.
This quasi-Fascist society presents certain novel features. Its original founders,

who

constituted

little

more

than a conspiratorial sect, obviously could not build up

a mass movement among the Chinese to overthrow their

own government. The Kwantung Army captured

political

power by dint of military conquest, imposing its will by

force on those whom it now seeks to woo into the Concordia Society. It has since continued to dominate the state
which it created. After the conquest, however, the leaders
of the Kwantung Army felt the need of winning the
support of the conquered population. The Concordia
Society was organized to meet this need. It is a vehicle of
high-pressure propaganda, designed to conciliate the Chi-

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

383

nese people, create a distinctive national consciousness

among them, and present Japan's role in an attractive
light.

The work

of Concordia

is

clearly synchronized with

the objectives of Japanese policy in relation to education

and the press in Manchoukuo. In each sphere, the aim is

between the Chinese in Manchuria and

choke off any spirit of
nationalism
genuine
among them, and mold them to a
to

break the

ties

their kindred south of the Wall,

passive acceptance of their lot as Japan's colonial wards.

The phases of life in Manchoukuo thus far considered

the intellectual environment of the Chinese

all relate to

not extreme to say that the facts point

population.
toward a deliberate effort to stupefy the mental processes
It is

Chinese living in Manchuria. On the physical

these
Chinese are also being drugged as a conseplane,
quence of the growing sale of opium and its derivatives.
of the

In this

case,

too, the facts are too

dispute. In 1936 the

choukuo
opium;

obvious to admit of

Opium Monopoly Bureau

of

Man-

specified that 133,333 acres might be sown to

in 1937 this legally permitted sown area was

increased to 156,061 acres. The Manchoukuo budget for

1937 anticipated a gross revenue of 47,850,000 yuan from

compared with 37,318,925 yuan in 1936.

These figures, moreover, do not show the whole picture.
Considerable areas of Manchuria are sown to opium by
illegal cultivators, and there is a widespread sale of opium
and its derivatives by illicit retailers, mostly Japanese
and Koreans. In addition, a vast opium enterprise has
existed in the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South
Manchuria Railway zone, where the extraterritorial privileges of the Japanese producers and dealers placed them
beyond reach of the regulations of Manchoukuo's Opium

opium

sales, as

Monopoly Bureau.

It

remains to be seen whether, with

JAPAN IN CHINA

384

the abolition of extraterritoriality, the Manchoukuo authorities will limit the traffic in the railway zone and the
leased territory.
In theory, the laws of

Manchoukuo and the regulations

are designed to control and
Bureau
Opium Monopoly
limit the production and sale of dangerous drugs. Only
a specified total area can be sown to opium, retailers are
licensed, and opium smokers must obtain permits. These
restrictions are more honored in the breach than in the
observance. In recent years the Kwantung Army, by tacit
consent if not actively, has encouraged an extensive and
of

its

opium traffic across the Great Wall. A flood of

opium and opium derivatives swept into the former
"demilitarized zone" of northern Hopei province, and
16
The opium grown in
thence throughout North China.
Manchuria had to cover this large external demand. Even
lucrative

more, the

fierce three-cornered

Manchoukuo Opium Bureau,

competition between the

the

illegal

Manchurian

dealers, and the Japanese producers and retailers in the

extraterritorial zones broke down any pretenses at limitation. In the effort to popularize legal consumption, the

Monopoly Bureau was forced

tions all along the line.

to relax

its

official restric-

The

area legally sown to poppies

of licensed shops in the larger

was increased; the number

was nearly doubled; and the retailer's guarantee
money was reduced by four-fifths in the smaller towns
cities

and

Permit requirements became virtually a dead

smoking permit was first reduced
to
0.20
yuan, and then disregarded almost
yuan

villages.

The

letter.

from

entirely.

Mukden,

fee for a

Hardly three per cent of the opium smokers in

it is estimated, have permits. The
hard-pressed

18
This opium traffic in North China has latterly been supplied to an
increasing extent by the output of huge manufacturing establishments
which hax'e been set up in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin.

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

385

licensed retailers, in addition to winking at the permit

requirements, have been forced to duplicate their competitors' practices in such matters as purchase of illegal
opium, secret employment of female attendants, adultera-

opium with ash in preparation of the paste, and

manipulation of standard weights and measures.
An increasing proportion of sales consists of the more
dangerous opium derivatives, such as heroin and morphia.
tion of

These derivatives, produced mainly in the leased terriand the railway zone, are distributed from Dairen
and Mukden along the railway lines. Sold in many forms,
tory

designed to satisfy varying tastes or to suit differing incomes, they include heroin or morphia for injection,
materials for a pinch of snuff, cigarettes, and certain types
which may be eaten.
dose sells for o.io yuan, as con-

for an opium pellet in a licensed

Heroin
cigarettes are the cheapest of all, and are
shop.
therefore most popular among the poorer classes.

trasted with 0.20

The weight

of evidence indicates that

both opium and

increasing

would be

in

yuan

derivatives,

its

Manchoukuo.

consumption of

mainly heroin,

conservative

is

rapidly
estimate

that at least one-fourth of the adult population

smokes opium more or less regularly. Confirmed addicts

must total at least half a million, and their number is

steadily growing.
question put to a Chinese as to the
number of opium smokers in Mukden elicited the reply
17
eight out of ten, or 80 per cent.
doubt that every year thousands of

"shih fen yu pa", that

is,

There can be no
Chinese throughout Manchuria die from the effects of
narcotic drugs. Bodies of narcotic addicts may be discovered almost daily on ash heaps and other such places in
the larger

cities.

was quite

it
17

On

late

a morning in March 1937, although

and the bodies are usually removed

Evidence by author while in Mukden.

JAPAN IN CHINA
Red Swastika Society, the

386

corpses of two
quickly by the
such addicts were seen on an ash heap near the Mukden
wall. 18 The immediate area was surrounded by filthy
dens, housing the lowest type of prostitutes who
openly dispense narcotic drugs. Whether the policy is
deliberate or not, the existence of this situation, and the

opium

fact that it

a black

is

mark

growing worse instead of

against

better, constitutes

Manchoukuo. The

record' in this

respect adds little justification to Japan's efforts to extend

its rule over the Chinese provinces south of the Wall.

The

disabilities suffered

by the Chinese in Manchou-

kuo, at least in the fields already touched upon, will

hardly be disputed. In some quarters, however, the claim

put forth that the industrialization and economic progress achieved by Manchoukuo tend to counter-balance
these negative aspects of the new regime. What do the
is

facts indicate

on

this point?

Has the

livelihood of the

mass of the Chinese people in Manchuria been improved

under the aegis of Japan?

On

this issue, the foreign trade figures of

Manchoukuo

some valuable suggestions. Prior to the Japanese

occupation, Manchuria enjoyed a steadily favorable balance of trade, ranging from well over 100 million silver
offer

400 million this latter in 1931. Beginwith

ning
1933, the balance has been continuously adverse, reaching nearly 200 million Manchoukuo yuan in
1935. This development is even more striking when the
change in the position of Japan vis-a-vis other countries
in Manchoukuo's trade is taken into account. In 1932
dollars to nearly

Japan bought from Manchuria goods valued at 26 million

yuan more than it sold to Manchuria; while in 1936
Japan sold to Manchuria goods worth 270 million yuan
more than it bought. During this period the rest of the
18

Evidence by the author.

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

387

buy more from Manchuria than it

amount
fell from 277 million yuan in
although
to
180
in
million
1932
1936. Manchoukuo's excess
yuan

world continued

to

this

sold,

of exports to third countries thus goes to cover increased

purchases from Japan. In other words, Manchoukuo's role

has

become

that of helping to rectify the adverse balance

of Japan's total foreign trade.

These figures also serve to pose the issue of Manchuria's
industrialization in concrete terms. In 1936 Manchoukuo
showed a favorable balance of 180 million yuan in its

trade with third countries, and an adverse balance of 270

million yuan in its trade with Japan. The difference, or

90 million yuan,, can be taken to represent at least part

of Japan's investment in Manchoukuo for that year. Such
investment in Manchuria's industrial development, it is
argued, necessarily contributes to the welfare of the local
population. But this does not follow automatically. It is
necessary to ask several questions. What sort of invest-

ment? For what industries? In whose benefit? These questions can be answered only by breaking down the trade
figures into the various categories of export

commodities, and tracing the resulting

different classes of the population. 19

and import
on the

effects

With

respect to exports, the statistics show no signs of

increasing industrialization. Contrary to the 'trend from

1928 to 1931, under the former Chinese administration,

the value of industrial exports from Manchuria declined

from 1932 to 1934 a loss which was only slightly

redressed in 1935. This occurred during a period when
the value of Manchuria's agricultural exports was reduced
steadily

by approximately one-third. The net

10

result

is

measured

been competently performed by A. J. Grajdanzev, and the results of his analysis have been summarized in what follows.
See "The External Trade of Manchuria, 1928-1935," Nankai Social and
Economic Quarterly, Tientsin, January 1936, p. 853-894.
This exacting

task has

JAPAN IN CHINA

388

in the
cereals

Manchurian population's reduced consumption o

and beans, amounting to a decline o from 445

in 1934,
kilograms per capita in 1931 to 378 kilograms
20
and to an estimated 340 kilograms in 1Q35- That is, the
the Manchurian people
living standards of. the mass of
had seriously deteriorated since 1931. It may be granted
that this result was

due

to a

combination of

factors,

not

all of which were within Japan's control. Nevertheless,

there was no sign that the situation was being remedied
need
by greater industrial development. The immediate

was for a revival of Manchuria's export trade. In this

had cut Manchoukuo off from

China
market, while Japan itself was
its formerly large
buying even less than before from Manchuria.

respect, Japanese policy

In the case of import commodities, it is necessary to

examine both goods for production and goods for consumption. Manchoukuo's import of production goods
showed an absolute and relative increase. While such
total
goods already constituted from 29 to 33 per cent of
to
rose
40 per cent
imports in the 1928-1931 period, they
in 1934 and 1935. The significant fact, however, is that
from 70 to 80 per cent of these production goods went
as
solely to railway and allied construction. In so far
is concerned, many of these new railway
earning power
lines may be considered doubtful ventures. The Kwantung Army built them primarily with an eye to strategic
considerations, and not to industrial development. After
this item for railway construction is eliminated, little remains for 'industrialization" purposes. And this conclusion is borne out by the fact that virtually no general
industrial development has occurred in Manchoukuo.
Such an attempt would, in any case, meet with the de'

cided opposition of Japan's vested interests at home.

20

A. J, Grajdanzev, cited, p. 866.

The

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

389

only exception to this rule is a few heavy industries serving military needs, and such industries in Manchoukuo
have been preempted by the government, latterly assisted

by Yoshisuke Aikawa one of Japan's leading industrial

capitalists. As for the Chinese population, it will have the
privilege of contributing its labor powerat low wages
to these few industries. No all-round industrial development of Manchuria will take place under Japan's auspices.

With regard

to

imports of consumption goods, the

analysis also contributes certain interesting results. The

value of these imports, surprisingly enough, remained on

a stable level of roughly 280 million yuan from 1931 to

1934, after which it slightly increased.
is further divided into luxury goods

When

this category

and goods for genbecomes

evident
who consumes the
consumption,
bulk of these commodities. Especially after 1933, and in

eral

it

contrast to 1928-1929, the value of imported goods for

general consumption exhibits a marked decline. The pri-

vation of the mass of the people is rendered even more

obvious when it is noted that the population of Man-

churia increased by some

five millions,

or approximately

between 1928 and 1935. Even within this

classification, moreover, most of the so-called goods for
general consumption were quite beyond reach of the
purchasing power of the bulk of the population. They
were consumed mainly by the middle class and the well15 per cent,

to-do, including the large influx of Japanese since 1931.

In the case of luxury goods, the picture is even clearer.

As compared with 1928 and 1929, the index of luxury

imports rose from 100 and 101 to 142 in 1933, 200 in
1934, and 268 in the first seven months of 1935. There
can be no question as to what class of the population buys
musical instruments, jewelry, radios, laces, perfume and
cosmetics, and toilet equipment all of which show large

JAPAN IN CHINA

390

In this connection, the growth in imports of

tatami (Japanese mats) , rice, trunks, and sporting requisites calls attention to another significant factor. Japanese
residents in Manchuria, most of whom are of the middle

increases.

or above, now total more than half a million, having

doubled their numbers since 1931. The consumption of
this group has an important effect on the composition of
Manchoukuo's imports, but does little to ameliorate the
living conditions of the local Chinese population.

class

mass of direct evidence substantiates the conclusions

reached by this analysis of Manchoukuo's foreign trade.
All classes of Chinese society in Manchuria, upper as well
as lower, have suffered from the Japanese -irruption. The

added 250,000 or more Japanese in Manchoukuo have to

a large extent supplanted an equivalent number of middle and upper class Chinese, thousands of whom fled from
Manchuria in 1931-1932. In official life, from the lowest
ranks up, and in business and professional life, these
Japanese now supply the characteristic upper class atmosphere of Manchoukuo. A trip on the afternoon express
to Mukden is a revealing experience.
dozens
of
Among
Japanese there is only an occasional
and
have obviously made their peace with
these
Chinese,
the new regime; the fact that the train conductor speaks
Japanese supplies an added note of finality to the general

from Hsinking

impression. This change is equally evident in social life.

resorts are patronized almost exclusively by
to
such an extent is this true, indeed, that the
Japanese;
life
of
Manchoukuo is more typical of Japan than
night

Amusement

of China.

Luxury and fashionable

ously absent

among

the Chinese,

display are conspicuare no longer the

who

patrons of high-class trade.

Similar direct evidence may be adduced with respect to
the deterioration of living standards among the Chinese

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

lower

391

Manchoukuo. It is these elements, constithe

tuting
great majority of the population, which have
suffered most severely. In Eastern countries generally, the
classes in

condition of rural credit represents one of the surest ineconomic status of the farmer. The bulk of

dices of the

credit supplied to the farmer in Manchoukuo is advanced

through an extensive system of pawnshops. On the security of his tools, clothing and personal possessions, the

farmer obtains seeds and fertilizer; after the harvest,

he redeems the pledged articles. Approximately threequarters of such business is handled by the Ta Hsing

Company,

Manchoukuo government

enterprise. Statis-

showed a large increase of forfeitures

in 1936, as well as a marked decline in the value and
quality of mortgaged articles. The countryside of Manchuria, in other words, has been denuded of ready cash,
even after the harvest has been gathered. Outside of the
Ta Hsing Company, some thirty per cent or so of the
credit supplied to the Manchurian farmer is advanced by
tics

of this concern

private usurers. It may be taken for granted that the

credit terms exacted by these private usurers are even

worse than those of the government concern. Apprehension over the existing situation was expressed in the
enactment of new chattel loan regulations by the Man-

choukuo

authorities in

November

1936.

Among

other

measures to protect the borrower, this law sought to

prohibit rates of interest which exceeded 4 per cent a
monthin itself a reflection of prevailing conditions with
respect to rural credit.
Beginning in 1936,

when

new and more

drastic

approach toward "pacification" of disturbed areas was

adopted, the Manchurian peasantry was forced to shoulder much more onerous burdens. The rapid building of
additional military highways, mostly dirt roads surfaced

JAPAN IN CHINA

392

by crushed rock, was encouraged by wholesale resort

to

forced peasant labor. Nearly 15,000 kilometers of such

roads were constructed in Fengtien province alone during
1936. This road-building campaign,
old highways, was inaugurated at
of
including also repair
the time of the fall harvest, but was nonetheless rigorously
In some regions, only one member of a family

the closing

months of

pursued.

was impressed for road service, but in others virtually all

men and women between the ages of fifteen and sixty

were forced to work on the roads. Young girls and old

in this work. Not only was no remunerathose
tion given;
prevented from undertaking road work
were forced to supply a monetary contribution calculated
on a daily rate which exceeded the average wages of a
Manchurian laborer. On the whole, the new roads were
designed for military use in disaffected areas, but in some
cases, where bus routes were instituted, they were speedily
adapted to profitable commercial use. Yet it is difficult to

women engaged

see

how, on balance,

this type of

"economic development"

was of any benefit to the Manchurian farmer.

Forced labor on roads constituted one of the minor
disabilities of the peasantry, incurred as a result of the

program of the Japanese military authorities in

dealing with so-called "banditry." Other concomitants of
this program were far more burdensome. Five years of
campaigning against the armed Manchurian volunteers
had convinced the Kwantung Army that much more thoroughgoing measures had to be applied if the "bandit"
menace was to be eradicated. The heart of the problem
was seen to be the support accorded the armed volunteers
by millions of the Manchurian farmers. In 1936 the army
authorities tackled this aspect of the pacification camrevised

paign in characteristically ruthless fashion.

The popu-

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

of whole

393

was concentrated in "protected

villages'*; outlying farm houses were burned to the
ground, and in some districts the standing grain was
fired. Around each of these villages the farmers were comlation

areas

pelled to build high mud walls. The villagers themselves

were registered, in order to control the entrance of out-

and the headman was made responsible, on pain

no "bandit" received asylum in his village.
.Periodic check-ups were made. Those villagers unable to
produce their residence certificates were summarily executed; at times such executions occurred in some districts
siders;

of death, that

at the rate of ten a day. By the middle of 1937 well over

2,000 of these "protected villages" had been established;

the total population in areas affected by this program was

estimated to range between five and six million. The
results of this combination of measures, in regions where

they were most rigorously applied, were devastating. Tens

of thousands of Chinese farmers in Manchuria's eastern

marches, under the spur of impoverishment and the reign

of terror, were migrating to north Manchuria and moving

south of the Wall in the winter of 1936-1Q37. 21 This pacification program throws additional light on the general

economic developof conquered Chinese territories.

Another characteristic aspect of Japanese policy should
also be carefully noted in this connection. Japan has
issue of Japan's ability to foster the

ment

always lacked adequate capital resources; to compensate

for this scarcity, it has been compelled to levy excessive
colonial populations. The fiscal problem
even more acute when serious armed resistance

burdens on

becomes

its

21
At three different times in March 1937, the author witnessed hundreds
of these refugees, carrying their few belongings on their backs, crowded
into the Mukden railway station.

JAPAN IN CHINA

394

and general
the case of

disaffection exist in

an occupied

territory.

In

Manchoukuo, the corvee duties exacted from

the peasantry constitute but one example of the pennysqueezing policy to which the Japanese authorities are

forced to resort.

who

conversation with a Chinese farmer,

lived in one of the "protected villages" of

Manchou-

22
kuo, illustrated this point even more circumstantially.
His village lay some miles off the macadamized motor

highway, at the foot of a range of mountains which offered

excellent cover for the operations of the armed volunteers. It was reached by a dirt road hastily built by the
local villagers during the previous autumn. The Chinese
farmer pointed to the piles of crushed rock scattered at
intervals along the road. Although the time for planting

was nearly at hand, he and his fellow villagers would

soon have to start surfacing the road with this material
which they had obtained from the near-by hills. Several

burned farmhouses, lying some distance off the road,

were clearly discernible in the early afternoon sunlight.
One of these, partially hidden by the bluff of a hill,
invited closer observation.

but two

The

roof had disappeared, and

mud

walls were left standing; these latter were

half torn down, with a few broken reed laths projecting

from their tops. In what had been the court-yard, there

was a stone mortar that had once been used for grinding
grain; inside the walls, occupying the space of the former
ground floor, were the remains of a mud-brick oven. The
Chinese farmer said that of approximately 150 families in
his village, some 30 or 40 had been forcibly moved in

from the outlying districts, after their homes had been

thus fired and gutted. They had built temporary huts
inside the village, for which no monetary assistance had
been provided by the authorities. In answer to a question
-'^Evidence by author during visit to a "protected village."

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

as to

how

395

the cost had been met, he said simply: "pang

mutual self-help among the villagers. 23

mang",,
In further conversation, this Chinese farmer supplied a
brief outline of the actual conditions of life in these "protected villages". The details are illustrative of the multii.e.,

form types of petty tribute exacted from the Manchoukuo

peasantry. Taxes ranged from three to five dollars in local
currency for every 10 mou, that is, for somewhat less than
one and one-half acres. Prior to 1931, the equivalent tax
had been only one dollar and a half. Each household
contributed from four to eight dollars a year to the village
headman, making up a sum used for purposes of "military
protection." About once a week, a detachment of 40 or
50 Japanese troops visited the village. These had to be
welcomed by a reception committee, and quartered and
fed for the night at the expense of the villagers. Each
household had to join the local branch of the Concordia
Society; membership dues per household were collected
semi-annuallyone dollar in the spring, and one dollar
and a half in the fall. In addition, the Society levied
occasional contributions to meet emergency needs, such
as flood, drought, et cetera.

During the

fall of

1936,

when

Japanese-sponsored Chinese and Mongol troops invaded

Suiyuan, the Concordia Society exacted a contribution of
fifty cents from each household in his village for the
"Inner Mongolian independence" campaign. Meetings of
the Society's local branch were held about twice a month,

when

a representative would lecture the villagers on the

principle of Wang Tao, racial harmony, and other allied

This phase of his life was summed up in one

ff
comprehensive phrase: szu hsiang shih tsui", that is, "to
subjects.

think
23

is

a crime".

In some regions where the "protected village" campaign has been

enforced, the new huts were not finished for months, leaving whole
families exposed to the wintry weather.

JAPAN IN CHINA

396

of this "protected village," when it was

a
Manchoukuo
reached,
flag was flying bravely in
finally
the stiff breeze. The front gate was a new heavy cross-

Over the center

wood. A mud wall some eight feet high

completely surrounded the village, with a deep ditch
below it. From the top of the mud wall projected a series
of newly cut stakes, along which six strands of barbed
wire were strung about a foot apart. It was now made

beamed

clear

affair of

where some

of the

money

collected for "military

protection" went. This fund had been drawn upon to pay

for the barbed wire supplied by the Japanese authorities.

freshly

dug trench ran up one

side of the hill.

At

its

top corner was a little mud block-house, with a galvanized

iron roof; gun-holes commanded the trench and its approaches. In all, there were five such block-houses on the

permit an enfilading fire. All the

work had been done by the villagers without pay. Despite
the impressive show made by the walls, trenches, barbed
wire and block-houses, the Chinese farmer said that the
village was not really protected. None of the villagers had
any guns; they were given cudgels, but nothing more. He
pointed to the new telephone line, strung on thin light
poles, which crossed the line of hills into the village. In
case of attack, the villagers had to telephone to the nearest
Japanese detachment, which could not arrive before some
time had elapsed. A near-by village, he said, had been
recently attacked; food and other supplies had been taken
before the troops arrived on the scene.
Before leaving the village and its friendly Chinese representative, a last determined effort was made to shake
the testimony which he had so freely volunteered. Is it
not true, he was asked, that the currency of Manchoukuo
has been stabilized, thus removing the blight of the old
depreciated feng-p'iao. Grudgingly he admitted that this
wall, so placed as to

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

397

and

that it represented an improvement. More

he
important,
thought, was the fact that prices of agricultural products were higher in 1937 than they had been
for some time past. He stoutly maintained, however, that
conditions in general were much worse than "shih pien
i ch'ien"; i.e., than "before the
change in circumstances**,

was

so,

or before the incident of September 18, 1931. The increase in taxes bulked largest in his mind. It was no use
to ask

him whether
*

development'

the Japanese program of "economic

had not contributed to the welfare of the

Manchurian people.
In official and unofficial statements, the Manchoukuo
authorities make every effort to minimize the extent of
"banditry" in the

new

The

usually treated
in smooth generalities.
typical example of this approach
may be seen in the following quotation: "As a result of
state.

subject

is

a series of intensive campaigns against the bandits, the

major outlaw groups have been completely wiped

out.

Moreover, with the establishment of the peace preservation organizations among the civilians throughout the
country, and closer co-operation between the military and
the police, the normal state of peace and order has been
24 In
other cases, it is apparently
practically restored."
more
somewhat
concrete evidence should
that
recognized
be offered to substantiate such general claims. The result
usually a

is

statement in good round figures of the

reduced numbers of "bandits" operating in Manchoukuo,

illustrated by the following: "As a result of strenuous
efforts exerted by the national army and police forces and
the number of outlaws
assisted by the Japanese troops,
.

became exceedingly small. It is reported that, as against

some 200,000 bandit hordes in 1932, there are to-day
about 20,000. This number continues
24

General Survey of Conditions in Manchoukuo,

to decrease

cited, p. 5.

with

JAPAN IN CHINA

398

the progress of campaigns/* 25 In reply to a Diet interpellator, the Japanese Vice-Minister of War, Lieutenant-

General Yoshijiro Umezu, was not quite so categorical:

"There has been a marked restoration of peace and order
in Manchoukuo, but we cannot tell just yet when ban2Q
ditry will be completely eliminated/
7

There are

several

of these statements.

means of checking up on the validity

The newly applied pacification pro-

gram, which seeks to concentrate millions of the Manchurian farmers into "protected villages", does not seem
to bear out the contention that the campaign against the
insurgents

is

progressing favorably. It is, in fact, a measure

on the part of the Kwantung Army. No

of desperation

such wholesale suppression and terrorism would be required if the insurgents had been reduced to a negligible
factor.
ters

The

"protected village" campaign further embit-

the mass of the

Manchurian population,

militates

seriously against the assiduous efforts of the Concordia

Society to win the allegiance of the people to the new

regime, and adversely affects agricultural productivity

over wide areas of the interior. These grave liabilities
would not be incurred without good and sufficient reason.
Incidentally,

the

nature

of

this

pacification

program

throws considerable light on the term "bandits" universally applied by the Japanese authorities to their military

The so-called "bandits" are clearly supported

the
by
great majority of the Manchurian population.
are
the spear-head of the general disaffection which
They
exists in Manchoukuo, the armed section of the
people
opponents.

which

resists alien

domination.

They may be more

appro-

priately termed insurgents or, in the phrase most commonly used by the Chinese, "armed volunteers".
25
26

Fifth

Report on Progress

The Japan

in

Manchuria

to 1936, cited, p. 12.

Advertiser, February 27, 1937.

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

399

The

stringent precautions adopted to protect lines of

far more extensive than was necessary in
the pre-i93i era, afford additional evidence as to the

communication,

The trunk lines of the

South Manchuria Railway have been forced to institute
an elaborate system of protective devices. Except in the
actual progress of pacification.

larger cities, such as

Mukden, every railway

been turned into a miniature

fortress.

station has

pill-box of steel

and concrete guards every bridge-head, and stands at the

entrance to every tunnel. At night the smaller stations
are blacked out; lights are turned on only to mark the
arrival or passage of trains. In some districts armored
cars pilot passenger trains at night; crack express trains
are sometimes darkened in regions thought to be unsafe.
Many stations have been abandoned, and steel shutters

placed over doors and windows. High brick walls surisolated Japanese communities in railway shops or
round-house centers. Into the corner of these walls are

round

which are strung barbed

wire partially electrified, as indicated by a porcelain insulator. Gangs of railway laborers work under the protection of detachments of Japanese troops in many areas.
These precautions all apply to the South Manchuria
Railway lines, which run through the more populous
built pill-boxes, along the top of

centers of the country. In the case of the state railways,

which traverse less settled sections of the interior, even

more

stringent protective measures are enforced. In addition to the usual railway guards, many of the trains on

these lines are

manned by machine-gun

units.

Fiscal expenditures supply another avenue of approach

toward gauging the extent of insurgency in Manchoukuo.
The state budget for 1937 appropriated 80,170,141 yuan
for the Department of Defense, or 40 per cent of total

budgetary expenditure. Of

this

amount

at least one-half

JAPAN IN CHINA

4 oo

or 40 million yuan, including a sum of 19,500,000 yuan

listed as a "contribution to share of national defense/'

may be

set

down

as the

sum

directly applied to anti-

insurgent operations and protective measures. To this

share of the sums
figure must be added an appropriate
the
allotted
by
Japanese budget to "Manchuria
annually
Incident Expenditures", which jumped from 198 to 268
million yen in 1937. Half this latter amount may be safely
charged to the various items of expense incurred by the
Kwantung Array's pacification operations in Manchou-

On the most conservative basis, therefore, nearly 175

million yuan was spent in campaigning against the Mankuo.

churian insurgents during 1937. This would seem to be

an excessive bill for the curbing of 20,000 "bandits."
The evidence thus far adduced is corroborated by all

unbiased reports of the real state of affairs in the Manchurian countryside. Persons with extensive knowledge of
interior

conditions assert that disorder

and insecurity

were never so widespread in the Northeastern provinces

as during recent years. It is true that banditry existed in
Manchuria prior to the Japanese occupation; quite posthe outlaws of that period outnumbered the present
insurgent forces. Many factors serve to indicate, however,
sibly,

that the banditry formerly existing never constituted the

problem that the insurgents now present. Before 1931 the

settlement and reclamation of extensive areas were rapidly

taking place. There were no such elaborate means of pro-

and defense as have recently been developed.

villages were not as a rule protected by walls.
families
lived on the land in many districts. One
Isolated
notable difference is that the former settlers often had
their own weapons, which they could use in self-defense.
tection

Towns and

The

possession of such weapons to-day involves the danger

that they might be turned against the Japanese.

o
p

J
>

I
i

O
(J

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

The

activities of the

armed

volunteers, moreover, are

not limited to outlying regions,

the

401

as in the

summer and

former period.

when

the standing
early fall,
grain affords excellent cover, the insurgents carry their
operations right up to the outskirts of the larger cities.
Raids and kidnapings have occurred on the fringes of

During

Mukden and in the neighborhood of Fushun, as well as

not far from Harbin and Hsinking. In the summer of
1935 the authorities found it necessary to move a group
of Korean rice farmers, who were located near Fushun,
and re-settle them within sight of Mukden. This is the
season

when

the

Manchurian volunteers

take the offen-

sive, choosing at will their points of attack. Never certain

where the insurgents will strike, the government forces

are placed on the defensive, with little chance to coordinate their superior numerical and mechanical strength.
At such a time much of the Kwantung Army, which

numbered approximately 125,000

before the start of the

China war, is forced to take the field. In addition, it has

to call on the assistance of the Kwantung Bureau police,
the consular police, and the Manchoukuo gendarmerie.

The

so-called

officered

Manchoukuo Army,

mainly by Japanese,

off the guerrilla attacks.

rendered by

The

is

of about 130,000 troops

also called

actual

amount

out to ward
of assistance

this force is problematic. Defections are re-

ported from time to time; in the fall of 1937 a serious

mutiny cost the lives of several score Japanese officers. In
the autumn, the whole aspect of the campaign changes.

With

the grain cut, the volunteers are forced to merge

with" the local population or retire into the most inaccessible regions of the

mountains. Japanese punitive expedi-

tions take the offensive, seeking to discover the insurgent

hide-outs and raze their bases. Some of the fiercest strug-

402

JAPAN IN CHINA

gles of the year's

campaigning take place during these

punitive expeditions in the winter months.

The prolonged struggle with the Japanese

troops,

equipped with every weapon of modern military science,

has exerted a marked effect on the evolution of the
insurgent forces. In the early years of the Japanese occupation, the Manchurian armed opposition consisted
mainly of former Chinese troops and professional bandits.

Their numbers dwindled as the pressure increased; their

character also changed, until finally the present insurgent
forces emerged. Hardened by an incessant guerrilla warfare,

the Manchurian volunteers are

now

in

many

respects

analogous to the Chinese Communist armies south of the

Wall. The names of the various insurgent units, such as
the "National Salvation Army/' the "People's Revolutionary Army," and the "Korean National Army," are
indicative of their nationalist outlook and aims. At first

more or

less

independent of each other, the bands of

volunteers have lately tended to coalesce into larger units,

with effective military organization and staff work. The

movements

of widely separated detachments, for example,

coordinated by means of portable radio transmitters. Their original stock of munitions was derived
from the Chinese armies which were broken up during

are

now

Manchuria in 1931-1932. To this have

been added the supplies gained from successful

the conquest of
since

engagements with their Japanese or Manchoukuo oppofrom raids on Manchoukuo arms depots. Munitions are also smuggled in from China. Virtually no
military supplies seem to come in from the Soviet Union,
nents, or

Japanese military authorities readily admit in

private conversation. Finally, the insurgents themselves
operate arsenals for small arms ammunition in their hidas

the

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

403

den bases. Careful estimates placed their total number

at somewhere between 50,000 and 75,000 in 1937. Their
forces appeared to be increasing during 1937, and probably approximated the latter figure at the end of the year.
Like the Red armies south of the Wall, the Manchurian
volunteers draw their main strength and sustenance from
close and friendly relations with the local population. In
certain districts they have maintained stable organized
governments, embracing considerable numbers of people,
for long periods of time. Uniforms, clothing and other

equipment are produced for them by the local peasantry,

and food supplies are gathered and stored at their headquarters. In the summer, when the volunteers range over
wide areas, a fixed policy enforced by strict disciplinecarefully maintained. The poorer elements of the population are protected from despoliation, receiving adequate
is

pay for food supplies or other requisitions. Wealthy individuals are occasionally kidnapped and held for ransom,
but even in these cases the ransom has been known to
be

set as

low

as 10

yuan. Special anti-Japanese

prepared, and such propaganda

leaflets

are

spread throughout the

This
does
not stop with the
countryside.
propaganda
the
local
with
or
Chinese population
Koreans; efforts,

reported successful in some

is

cases, are

made

to

win over
them

the rank-and-file of the Japanese troops, and induce

their officers. In rapid marches covering

long distances, the volunteers are materially aided by the
generally sympathetic attitude of the peasantry and townsto

mutiny against

people. They are apprised by the people of the approach

of Japanese forces long before these latter appear, and
conversely, are enabled to strike at the enemy with full

the

Kwantung Army

knowledge

officers

of his disposition

have been amazed to discover

and numbers. In some cases,

JAPAN IN CHINA

404

that the volunteers were in possession of the Japanese

code ciphers, and were making effective use of the infor-

mation thus derived.

These are some of the

factors

great difficulty experienced

eradicating "banditry" in

which give

rise to the

by the Kwantung

Army

in

Manchoukuo. Despite the

added handicaps imposed on the volunteers by institution of the "protected village' system, there is no sign
'

that their military effectiveness has

paired.
winter.

The

struggle

is

been seriously im-

virtually continuous,

summer and

Over a period of three months, a total of 250

engagements by a single Japanese garrison headquarters
is not unusual. The serious nature of some of these engagements is suggested by the reported description of an
attack on one of the insurgent bases in the winter of
1936-1937. A Japanese punitive expedition had engaged
a volunteer force which had taken its stand on a steep
deep in the mountains. The volunteers operated in
alternate lines of rifle-men and machine-gunners, one line
retiring through the other to reload after its ammunition
was fired. Against this steady, murderous fire, the Japanese unit was forced to charge the hill. The cost of such
an operation is obvious.
Evidence from many sources indicates that Japanese
hill

casualties over the course

figures.

An

official

of a year

mount

into large

announcement by the Tokyo

War

one of the last made in recent years, listed 138

killed and 330 wounded in the September-November
Office,

quarter of 1935. Hundreds of casualties, invalided home

as unfit for further service, may be counted in the reports

robed heroes" traveling on special trains

to Dairen. Most of these have been
Manchuria
through
serious
wounds; some are either tubercuincapacitated by
lar or affected by other diseases. In 1936, during the
of the "white

MANCHOUKUO-A PROTOTYPE FOR CHINA?

405

month

of September, 515 of these permanently disabled

soldiers were transported to Japan. Similar evidence is

supplied by the item of 11,610 yuan for "cremation" in

the 1937 Manchoukuo budget, allotted to the Department
of Defense. Since cremation

may

be supposed that

this

is

not a Chinese custom,

sum applied

it

chiefly to the

and subalterns serving in the ManchouJapanese

kuo Army. Unless special ceremony is involved, the cost
of an individual cremation does not exceed five yuan; it
should not be more in the case of an army man. Calculated at the normal rate, this budgetary item evidently
anticipated the deaths of some 2,300 Japanese in the
officers

Manchoukuo Army alone for

Manchoukuo takes

fication of

the year 1937. The pacia heavy toll of Japanese

lives.

The
teers

military struggle

waged by the Manchurian volun-

no longer an

isolated affair. It constitutes the

is

northernmost front of a united war of liberation by the

Chinese people. Behind the lines in Manchoukuo, the
engaged in the task of conposition against a determined armed

Japanese military are

solidating

their

resistance.

They now

still

seek to enforce their rule over a

great portion of China south of the Wall. If they would,

they might read an omen in the stubborn resistance of

the Manchurian population to the Japanese yoke. Such

resistance will be multiplied ten-fold in the wide reaches

China to the south. In the end it will turn the tide, and
win for China the unchallenged right to a free and
of

unfettered national development. It will also gain freedom for the Japanese people, who are to-day equally at
the mercy of their militarist masters.

INDEX
matum,
Abe, Dr., 264
Abe, General, 221
Abo, Kiyotane, 319, 320
Adachi, Kenzo, 208, 217

124, 127
Asahi, 201, 222, 310, 317, 320
Aso, Hisashi, 223, 319
Augusta, 282

Kawagoe negotiations, Autonomy

movement in North China
352, 353

74'

Nan91;
policy, 92,
93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, ioij 102,
103-104; Peiping educators' manifesto, 99; preliminary Japanese
moves, 69-70; riots at Hsiangho,

statement by Tokyo War Ofspokesman, 72; Sung Cheyuan's telegram, 90; Tada statement, 70-71; temporary occupa74;

fice

332
Arrest of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian,
154; attitude of officials at Nan-

Hsueh-

tion
of Fengtai,
101;
Ministries formulate "new

toward the ComChiang's

>

divisions
mobilized,
king's attitude and

135, 314
207, 209, 211, 212,
214, 220, 221, 222, 238, 319, 320,

158-159;

in
China, 72-74; deat Tientsin by Kawagoe,
87-88, 143; Doihara
75'7 6

with North China officials, 101; Doihara disavowed, 9596; Doihara-Hsiao Chen-ying negotiations, 91-92; Kwantung Array

Sadao,

munists,

by Japanese miliand collapse

by Japan's

confers

doctrine, 87

Chang

arrests

North

officials

Ando, Seijun, 262

Anfu clique, 107,

168-169;

76-77;

in

mands

ers, 278
All-China Students' Union, 136
All -Japan Council of Labor and
Farmer Unions, 333

king,

109;

tary, 88-89; climax

conferences
of, 94;

152, 177; arrest and trial of leaders, 152, 178, 181; release of lead-

liang's attitude

China,

Ariyoshi deplores
"unsettled conditions" in north,

Aikyojuku, 210
Akamatsu, Katsumaro, 207
Akita, Kiyoshi, 320
All-China Federation of National
Salvation Unions, 136, 138, 139,

Araki,

movement

Autonomy

Aikawa, Yoshisuke, 238, 346, 348,

Amau

of

northwest, 170-171; role of Communists, 169-170, 173, 174

Arita, Hachiro, 128, 231
Ariyoshi, Akira, 50, 65, 76, 100,

kouchiao incident, Chang Chun-

35> 35 *>

collapse

tionalist movement at Sian, 159160; negotiations for Chiang's release, 171-173; other leaders arrested, 167; preliminaries to, 160161; revolutionary movement in

Aggression, Japanese, 2, 63, 79, 191;

diplomatic pressure at Nanking,
49-50; in North China, 40; reasons for 1937 onslaught, 185191; secures revision of Chinese
tariff, 53; see also Jehol invasion,
Tangku Truce, Ho-Umetsu agreement, Chin-Doihara agreement,
New Life Weekly incident. Lu-

349>

166-167;

northwestern front, 175; commitments by Chiang, 173-174; eightpoint program of rebels, 168; na-

ulti-

policy," 71-72, 74, 215

407

Tokyo
China

INDEX

408

Chen

Chi-tang, 92,

Baba, Eiichi, 224, 225, 228, 271, 332

Blood Brotherhood League (Ketsumeidan) 209, 210

Blue Shirts, 55, 76, 163-164, 167
Boxer Protocol, 12; quoted, 12, 14,
,

Burma, 360

Canton-Hankow Railway, 142

Chahar province, 3; Autonomous
Government of, 305; conquest of
north-central districts, 108; defeat of Generals Chi and Fang,
64; Dolonor and Peisiemiao used
as base of operations, 64; Dolonor occupied, 63; Dolonor or-

ganized as "special district," 64;

People's
Feng's
Anti-Japanese

Army,

63; hostilities to "rectify"

Jehol-Chahar border, 65; Japanese influence at Kalgan, 68-69;

mutinies among pro-Manchou-

kuo irregulars in, 2-3; recapture

of Dolonor by Generals Chi and
Fang, 63; Tatan agreement, 6566
Chang Ching-yu, 98

Chang Chun,

100,

128, 134,

127,

105,

145,

124,

126,

149, 152,

146,

288

Chang Chun-Kawagoe

negotiations,
143, 144-146, 147, 149, 186; Arita's statement on, 145; attitude
of Chinese government denned,
150-152; Chengtu and Pakhoi incidents
settled
normally, 150;

Chinese counter-demands, 145;

concluding session, 149-150; Japanese demands, 144-145
Chang Hsueh-liang, i, 41, 112, 154,
167

Chang Kia-ngau, 105

Chang Nai-chi, 152
Chang Tso-lin, 349
Chang Tzu-chung, 4,
28,

7,

8,

107
Yen-tien, 98
Changpei incident, 66, 68
Chao Teng-yu, 4, 19, 28
Chen Cheng, 160
103,

18,

24,

105,

111,

139,

142

140,

Chen Kung-po, 105

Chen Ming-shu, 279
Chen Yi, 101, 102
Cheng Ke, 76
Chengtu incident, 144, 145, 232
Chi Hsieh-yuan, 135, 314
Chi Hung-chang, 63
Chiang Chao-tsung, 308
Chiang Hsiao-hsien, 55, 167
Chiang Kai-shek, 20, 41, 70, 71, 78,
79, 81, 90, 92, 94, 99, 100,
106, 111, 116, 120, 121, 124,
128, 139, 140, 143, 145, 146,

104,
127,
154,

183, 275, 278, 279, 280, 309, 337

Chiang
Chiang
Chiang
Chiang
Chiang

Kai-shek,

Madame,

172

Kwang-nai, 279
Mon-lin, 99

Ting-wen, 165-166, 172

Tso-pin, 72, 74, 75, 105

Chichibu, Prince, 220
Chihli Party, 308
Chih Tsung-mo, 98
Chin-Doihara agreement, 67, 108,
no; demilitarizes eastern Chahar,
originates in Changpei incident, 66; strengthens pressure on
Chahar-Suiyuan Mongols, 67-68;

67;

terms

of,

67

Chin Te-chun,
89,

103,

China,

i;

4, 7, 28, 66, 67, 88,

107
anti-Japanese, 53, 55, 58,

72, 76, 79, 88, 89, 144, 151,

182; banks, 84-85; Central

ernment,

1,

158,

Gov-

3, 22, 65, 70,

81, 83, 88, 90,

100, 101, 103,
126, 127, 135,
142, 143, 145,

78, 79,
92, 93, 95, 98, 99,
104, 107, 109, 125,
138, 139, 140, 141,
150, 152, 279, 280;

Chinese government, see Central

Government; Communism, i, 53,
75, 123, 125, 126, 144, 151, 152;
see Kuomintang-Communist relations; currency reform, i, 78,
81-87; deflation, 82-83; disunity,
111-112; efficacy of guerrilla warfare, 359-363; emergency law, 123124,
135-136, 140, 141; foreign
loans, i, 83, 86, 358, 359; foreign

Chang

trade,

Chen Chien, 361

ernment, see Central Government; National Government, see

Central Government;
National

i, 83; military centralization, 179, 180, 190; Nanking gov-

INDEX

409

na-

People's Congress, 7, 184;

tional salvation movement, 141142, 146,
178, 278; nationalist
movement, 77, 109; nationalist

public opinion, 80, 99, 143, 146;

political unification, i, 190, 278280; political unity, see political
unification; railway construction,
i, 60; reconstruction during war,
363; revolt by Southwest, 138143; routes for munitions, 359360; student movement, 103, 106-

110-111,

108,

107,
137,

139,

112-124, 136165-166, 178; type

356-357; war fi-

143,

of economy,
nances, 357-359

Chinese Eastern Railway,

Chou

54, 214
En-lai, 173, 174, 181, 183, 185

Chow Lei, 98
Chow Yung-nien, 10
Chung Shan University, 92
Chu Teh, 23, 79, 181, 182, 280,
298,

302,

299,

296,

316

Communism,
Communists,
nism;

see
see

China,
-

280, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300,

303> 3\5> 316, 338; organization
of partisan forces in north, 300304; strategic

Commu-

Communist

relations

Fang Chen-wu, 63
Feng Chih-an, 4, 7,
63,

80,

92,

48,

74,

76,

96,

99,

131;
autonomy proclaimed by
Yin Ju-keng, 97; Chinese estab-

lish administrative system in, 9697; Chinese irregulars in, 47; de-

tention of

Tao Shang-ming,

96in, 129; lawlessness in, 49; silver smuggling, 82,

129; smuggled goods, see Smuggling; Yin agrees to Japanese
advisers in hsien, 97; Yin assumes entire control, 97; see also

drug

104,

Fifth National Army, 143

Fifth Route Army, i

Army, 55, 157, 163,

Kwangtung Army, 142

179

Formosans, 151

Demilitarized zone, East Hopei, 29,

traffic

East Hopei Autonomous Council, East Hopei Autonomous Gov91, 94, 95,

101, 102, 108, 214

Donald, Mr,, 172

Dornei, 22, 309, 310, 317
Doshisha University, 333

88

Fujii, Hitoshi, 20977

Fujiwara interests, 237
Fukien revolt, 80, 279
Furukawa interests, 237

Fu

Tso-yi, 91, 101, 148, 304

G
Germany, 355
Godo, Takuo, 252
Goh, Seinosuke, 320
Goto, Fumio, 215

Grand Canal, 98
Great Britain, 83, 84, 86, 207, 231,
237, 240, 269
Great Japan Production Party, 204
Guerrilla warfare, 315, 316

ernment
Doihara, Kenji, 67, 89,
96, 97,

28

France, 84

Dan, Baron Takuma, 209

97;

8,

111, 279, 309

Fu Hung-chin,

47,

see

feng-p'iao, 396

Fifty-first

46,

Association,

Japan

First

45,

war base in north

Shansi, 299-300
Ex - Servicemen's

Feng Yu-hsiang,

China

Kuomintang

ment, 29; aids smuggling, see

Smuggling; formation of, 109
Economies of China and Japan
compared, 355-357
Eighth Route (Communist) Army,

quoted, 23,

316;

East Hopei Autonomous Council,

97; inaugurated, 97-98; Nanking
orders arrest of Yin Ju-keng, 98;
original members, 98
East Hopei Autonomous Govern-

Hamada, Kunimatsu,
Hamaguchi, Yuko,

Han

Fu-chu, 90,
104, 279, 295

harakiri, 244

243, 244
200, 201

91,

94,

101,

102,

INDEX

410

Hashimoto, Colonel Kingoro, 207

Hasegawa, Vice-Admiral, 284
Hata, Shunroku, 332
Hayashi, Senjuro, 212, 214, 221,
250, 257
Hayashi Cabinet, 236, 255, 258,
269; Diet resolution on Charter
Oath, 257, 258; dissolution of
Diet, 259; establishes Price Policy
Commission, 267; formation of,
249-252; general election, 260-263,
265-267; gold shipments begin,
254, 255; institutes Cabinet Planning Board, 268; Ozaki questionnaire, 256, 257; parties excluded,
250; policy of Foreign Minister
Sato, 258, 259; political struggle
after election, 267-269; sets up

Education and Culture CommisYuki's handling of

sion, 267;
budget, -253, 254
Hidaka, Mr., 20, 21, 22
Hirano, Manabu, 319
Hiranuma, Baron, 205, 211, 213,
222, 249, 271
Hirohito, 75, 336; see Japan, Emperor
Hirota, Koki, 49, 126, 214, 215,
221, 224, 271
Hirota Cabinet, 128; aims of reac-

anti-Comintern
tionaries,
239;
pact, 231; Baba budget, 226, 232233, 242, 250; Diet "reform," 228230; economic policies, 224-226;
financial -economic crisis, 235, 242244; formation of, 221-224; Hamada's speech to Diet, 243-244;
import exchange licensed, 242;
nationalization of electric

power

industry, 226; Parliamentary System Investigation Commission,

229, 230, 243; pledges to army,
223-224; "positive" foreign policy,
224; prorogues Diet, 244; reactionary bills, 228; shifts in army,
226, 227, 246-247; tax policy, 233-

235
Hirota's

three

principles, 53, 93,

100, 125, 144; as originally presented to China, 126; defined by
Hirota to Diet, 124-125; formally

launched, 75; inconclusive diplomatic exchanges on, 124, 127128;

negotiations

initiated

at

Nanking, 99-100; preliminary exchanges on, 95

Ho Chien, 279
Ho Ying-chin, 21, 41, 44, 54, 78,
100, 102, 103, 114, 169
Honda, Tadao, 74

Hongkong,

86,

142

Honjo, General, 226

Hopei-Chahar Political Council,
7,

10,

9,

20,

105,

109,

no,

i,

123,

attitude of its officials,

degree of autonomy,
107-108; drawing closer to Nanking, i; formal inauguration delayed, 103, 106, 118; formation
of, 100-108; hesitates to carry out
Japan's projects, 3; increasing
Japanese influence on, 135; Japanese advisers of, 4; less than a
135,

3,

187;

16,

17;

pliant tool, 3; members of, 3,

107;
precautions against plainclothes agents, 6, 7, 8
Hopei province, excesses in Paotingfu, 293-294; invasion of 1933,
42-43; offensive in 1937, 292-293,

294-295

Ho-Umetsu agreement,
79, 107, no; causes

59, 66, 76,

for Japan's

pressure, 54; forces Nanking to

issue "Goodwill Mandate," 58;

Ho

Ying-chin rejects three added

56, 57; Ho's written acceptance of the nine original de-

demands,

mands, 57; irregularities of, 57;

nine demands verbally accepted
by Ho, 55-56; significance of, 5758; three added demands, 56
Hsiao Chen-ying, 89, 91, 92, 94
Hsing Chung Corporation, 188
Hsingan province, 61; execution of
high Mongol officials in, 62; liberal Japanese policy in, 61-62;
restrictions on Mongols' autonomy,, 62
Pin, 22, 44, 45, 90

Hsiung

Hsuan Chieh-hsi,
Hsu Yung-chang,

Hu

88
89, 91

Shih, 99
Huang Fu, 42, 43, 50

Hui Tung Aviation Corporation,

53'

189

Idzumo, 282
Ikeda, Seihin, 251, 262

INDEX
Ikki, Kitokuro, 213, 222

Imperial Council, 336

Imperial League of Young

Officers,

205, 207

Inner Mongolia,

no, 304, 305;

Autonomous Government of, 62;
autonomy movement, 62, 63; Federated Autonomous Government
60,

established, 304, 305; Japanese

penetration adapted to local setting, 60; Japan's encroachment
on, 3; Mongol grievances against
Chinese, 60-61; Mongolian Political
Council, 63; new MonCouncil,
148;
golian Political
princes ignore Japan's overtures,
62; princes of, 61, 62; Pu Yi's influence as Emperor of Manchoukuo, 62; scope for Mongol ma-

neuvering limited, 63; stages of

Japan's advance into, 61; three
territorial centers of Mongolian
people, 60; see also Chahar provChin-Doihara agreement,
ince,
Hsingan province
International Settlement, 138, 278
Inouye, Junnosuke, 200, 208, 209,

210
Inouye, Nissho, 2ogn
Inukai, Tsuyoshi, 209
Inukai Ministry, see Seiyukai Cabinet

Ishimoto, Baroness, 333

Ishimoto, Gonshiro, 41
Isogai, Rensuke, 73, 100, 106, 127
Itagaki, Seishiro, 73, 202, 249
Italo-Ethiopian dispute, 73
Italy, 224, 355

Japan,

71; agriculture, 198, 199,

225; anti -Fascist, 216, 261, 265,
anti-militarism,
223,
193,
270;
226, 227, 261, 262, 273, 317, 318;
arms expenditure, 213-214, 223,
237, 252, 253, 321, 322; army extremists, 192, 202-207, 212, 214,
222, 236, 238, 331; army pamphlets, 204; army vs. moderates,
54, 212-217, 220, 222, 228, 239-241;
210;
assassinations,
209,
192,
banks, 199; "Big Three" of army,

246, 247, 250, 252; budgets, 192,

229, 253-254, 259, 260, 321, 322,
339, 340; bureaucracy, 193; bu-

411

reaucrats, 215; Cabinet's position,

194-195, 201; capitalists, 194, 196,
197, 198, 200, 202, 203, 206, 223,
224, 239, 250; Communism, 196,
204; conservative army leaders,
192, 236, 238, 245, 246; Constitution, 230; controlled economy,
223, 224, 225-226, 237, 239, 324330;
coup d'etat, see military
conspiracies; deficit loans, 225,
239, 242, 254, 322, 340; democracy, 194, 197, 198, 201, 211, 230;
Diet's position, 194, 196; dual
diplomacy, 195, 206; dual government, 195, 201, 206, 247; Elder
Statesmen, 195, 218; elections,
209, 216, 217, 260, 334; electric
power industry, 226, 255; Emperor's
193-194, 201;
position,
Ex-Servicemen's Association, 204,
205, 207; farmers, see peasants;
Fascism, see military-fascist; Feb-

ruary 26th incident,

see military
conspiracies; foreign assets, 324,
326; foreign trade, 198, 199, 323,
342, 354; Genro, see Elder Statesmen; gold production, 323, 324;
gold reserves, 323, 324, 325; gold
shipments, 323; gold standard,
207, 208, 209; heavy industry
and army, 192-193, 237-239, 250252, 262, 263, 276; heavy industry
vs. light industry, 186-189, 2 37"
241, 262, 263, 344, 346; House of
Peers, 194, 269; Imperial family,
see Emperor's position; Imperial
Household Ministry, 196, 213,
222; independents, 217; industry,
198, 199, 226; inflation, 242, 243,
2 54> 34034 1 > 345' labor, 199, 207,
landowners,
217, 227)' 263-265;
196, 198, 199, 202; "legal leftists,"
265; martial law, 218, 219, 227;
middle classes, 199, 202, 207;

military

conspiracies, 127, 192,

206, 207, 209-210, 212, 217-221,
222;
196,
192,
military-fascist,
200, 202, 205, 207, 212, 223, 224,
236, 241, 242, 243-245, 246, 247,
Mobilization Secrets
261;
259,
Bill, 228; moderates, see army vs.

moderates; monarchist bureaucracy, see bureaucracy; monopoly

capital, 198; national debt, 341;

newspapers,

see

press;

parlia-

INDEX
mentary government,

see

democ-

parties, 252-253, 268, 269;

party leaders, 223, 227, 243, 248,
249, 253, 268, 269; patriotic societies, 204, 205; Peace Preservation Law, 228; peasants, 198, 199,
207, 214; position of army and
navy, 193, 195, 206; press, 3, 201,
317; prices, see inflation; Privy
Council, 195-196, 201, 213, 222,
231, 249, 320; productive expansion, 239, 252, 255; proletarians,
see labor; public opinion, 201, 220;

racy;

reactionary societies, 204, 205;

royal family, see Emperor's position; Seditious Literature Bill,
228; Socialism, 204; stock market,
225; Supreme War Council, 195,
202; system of government, 193196; terrorism, 212, 222, 223; taxation, 223, 233, 234, 235, 239, 242,
252, 254, 341, 342; textile industry, 198; trade unions, 264, 265;
unemployment, 199; weakness of
yen, 325, 326, 327; workers, see
labor;
young officers, 202-203;

Young Women's

Association, 205
Japan-China-Manchoukuo bloc, 53,

75

Japan Proletarian Party, 333

Japanese conquest of, 41;
occupation of Shanhaikuan, 41;

Jehol,

preliminaries,

40-41

2,

178,

Kodo, 204
Kokuhonsha,

205, 206, 211, 213, 215,

222

Kokumin Domei,

217, 266, 267, 272

KokutsU) 309
Konoye, Fumimaro, 221, 261, 270,

3H
2, 272, 317; adverse trade balance, 323, 342, 354;
Aikawa seeks American loan,

Konoye Cabinet,

army

346-355;

emerge, 331-332;
erals

Board

and
of

reextremists
arrests of lib-

radicals,

Cabinet

332,
333;
Councillors,

321, 332; Capital Control

327, 329-330; control of cotton textile industry, 328, 329; expansion of war industry, 329-330;
319,

Law,

foreign exchange licensing tightened, 324, 325; Foreign Trade

Control Law, 327-329; formation
and personnel of, 269-273; Gold
Fund Special Account Law, 325;

Gold Production Law, 32471; gold

shipments, 323-324, 343; Imperial
Council meets, 336;
Imperial
Headquarters set up, 330-331; import control, 327, 328, 343; National Mobilization Bill, 343-346;
by

parties, 344-346;
mobilization,"
318;
Minister,
war
332;
expenditures, 321, 322,
339> 340

opposition

Suetsugu made Home

Koreans,

Kamei, Kanichiro, 319

129,

131,

144,

145,

151,

383, 401

372

Kanin, Prince, 246

Kashii, Kohei, 219
Kato, Kanji, 201
Kato, Kanju, 265, 333
Katsuki, Kiyoshi, 18; statement on
Japan's war aims, 18; proclamation by, 27
Kawabe, Torashiro, 332
Kawagoe, Shigeru, 87, 143
Kawashima, Yoshiyuki, 75, 214, 220,
226
Kaya, Okinobu, 271
Kazami, Akira, 272
Kikuchi, Takeo, 2 ion
Kita, Seiichi, 21

Knatchbull-Hugessen,

Mission,

i?9' 2 59

"spiritual

Jimmukai, 210

Rang Te,

Kodama Economic

Sir

Hughe,

Ku Chu-tung,
Ku Meng-yu,

175, 180

105

Kuhara, Fusanosuke, 349, 350

Kung, Dr. H. H., 84, 172, 303
Kuomintang, 50, 57, 58, 70, 75,
77; actions of July 1936 plenum,
139-141; Chiang's address to July
1936 plenum, 140-141; Chiang's
speech on foreign policy at Fifth
Congress, 93; Fifth National Congress convenes at Nanking, 90;

inaugural ceremony of November 1935 plenum, 80-81; measures taken by February 1937
plenum, 175-177; new party and
Cabinet posts at December 1935
plenum, 104, 105; plenary ses-

INDEX
sion, March 29- April 2, 1938, in
Hankow, 364
Kuomintang-Communist relations,
i, 79, 161, 179; Chiang Kai-shek
prepares to renew an ti -Commu-

nist

campaign, 152-153, 164, 165,

166, 167; Communist armies join
in Szechuan and begin march
Communist armies
north, 79;
reach the northwest, 154-155;

Communist

armies

withdraw

from Kiangsi,

54, 79;

Communist

party adopts united front policy,

Hu

Tsung-nan's First
Army defeated by Reds, 161;
front,
progress toward united
180-185; interviews by Mao Tsetung, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai,
181-185; united front exchanges
at February 1937 Kuomintang
plenum, 176-177; united front
155-157;

of 1930, 200,

201, 203, 205, 207

Lu Chung-yu,

135

Lukouchiao incident,
2 73>

8,

11,

15, 40,

alleged Japanese instigators, 972; armistice, n; Chinese divisions mobilized, 22; Chinese version of, 9-11; clash at
Kwang An Men, 26-27; clashes
1

3 ?'

near Peiping, 27-29; diplomatic

negotiations at Nanking, 19-22;
early Japanese actions stimulated
by, 16; fulfilment of settlement
begins, 19; Japanese maneuvers,
6,
11,
15;
Japanese reinforcements, 16, 18, 19; Japanese version of, 8-9; legal issues of, 12-15;
like Mukden incident, 8, 972; set-

tlement accepted
18; terms of July
16;

Nanking,

by

settlement,

ultimatum by Japanese head-

quarters, 25

completed, 279-280

Kwantung Army,

41, 44, 45, 50, 53,

63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 73, 89, 91, 97,
no, 129, 190, 250, 290, 296, 297,
304, 347, 348, 351

Kyushu Imperial

413

London Naval Treaty

Lungyen mines,

Lung Yun,

188,

189

279

University, 333

Machida, Chuji, 319

Maeda, Yonezo, 319
Makino, Nobuaki, 207,

210,

213,

218, 221

Manchoukuo,

Ladybird^ 286

Langfang incident, 19, 23-25

League Assembly's Manchurian

re-

port, 41

Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick, 84, 86

Chi-shen, 279
Hai-tien, 98
Kung-po, 152
Ming, 88
Shou-hsin, 108, 148
Ssu-hao, 135

Li
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li
Li

Tsung-jen, 92, 105, 111, 139, 140,

142, 338
Li Yuan-cheng, 98
Lin Keng-yu, 10

Lin
Liu
Liu
Liu
Liu
Liu

Sen,

i,

127

Chieh, 107
179
Hai-hsun, 88
Hsiang, 279
Ju-ming, 4, 7
Tsei, 119
Chili,

Lo
Lo Wen-kan, 41
Lo Yu-wen, 88

46, 47, 51, 52, 63,

64, 65, 66, 68, 71, 75, 1 08, no,
124, 125, 209, 212, 221, 252, 306,
308, 309, 346, 347, 348, 351, 352,

353;
campaign against "banditry," 397-405; civil service, 367368; Concordia Society, 368, 377383, 395; economic development,

386-392; education, 369-374; narcotic drugs, 383-386; press, 374377;

"protected village" campaign, 392-397
Manchuria News Publishing Association, Ltd., 376

Manchurian Heavy Industrial Development Company, Ltd., 348

Manchurian volunteers, 398, 401404

Mao

Tse-tung, 79, 156, 181

Marco Polo Bridge,

see

Lukouchiao

incident

Matsudaira, Tsuneo, 222

Matsui, Colonel, 7, 9, 10
Matsui, Colonel Gennosuke, 68

INDEX

414

Matsui, Iwane, 332

Matsukata, Prince, 197
Matsuo, Denzo, 221
Matsuoka, Yosuke, 320
Mazaki, Jinzaburo, 214, 220, 222,
350
Maze, Sir Frederick, 134
Meiji, Emperor, 257
Minami, Jiro, 206, 207, 226
Minobe, Professor, 201, 213
Minseito, 197, 208, 211, 215, 217,
241, 250
Minseito Cabinet, 200, 201, 206,
207, 208, 209, 217, 265, 266
Mitsubishi, 197, so8, 210, 238
Mitsui, 197, 208, 209, 238, 251, 350
Miyazaki, Sadao, 277, 278
Monthly Bulletin, League of Nations, 83

Mori

interests,

238

Morishima, Goro,

Muto, General,

Muto

Araki

73, 74
44, 212, 214

Mazaki triumvirate,

202, 203, 204, 205, 206

spices, 3;

rumors of upset

in, 4,

North China Garrison,

18, 54, 56,

70, 73, 91, 98; new commander,
18; numbers increased, 135, 137,

138
National
Peoples'
Salvation Association, 160

Northeastern

Northeastern
160,

159,

troops,
161, 167;

157,

i,

158,

reorganiza-

tion of, 179

O
Ohara, Naoshi, 221
Okada, Keisuke, 212, 215, 218, 221
Okada Cabinet, 212, 215, 216, 217
Okamura, Neiji, 44, 45, 50
Okamura, Yasuji, 73, 74
Okawa, Shumei, 2 ion

Okura

interests,

Outer Mongolia,

237
60, 62,

360

Ozaki, Yukio, 217, 248, 249 257

N
Nagai, Ryutaro, 250, 262, 271, 272
Nagata, Tetsuzan, 214
Nakajima, Chikuhei, 250, 262, 271,
272
Nakamura, Rotaro, 250, 252
Nakayama, Shoichi, 43

Nankai University,

33, 34, 35, 120,

137

Nanking, fall of, 286, 287; excesses

of Japanese troops, 287, 288
Nankoxv Pass, 290
National Mobilization Bill, 343,
346
National Salvation Association, 136
Life Weekly incident, 58-59
Nichiren, 20977
Nien Kwang-yao, 88
Nineteenth Route Army, 80, 279

New

Nippon Sangyo Kabushiki Kaisha

Industrial
(Japan
Company,
238, 346, 350
Ltd.)
Nishi, General, 221
"Nishihara" loans, 314
,

Noguchi interests, 238

Nonaka, Shiro, 220
North China, 3, 40, 70, 73, 77, 90,
95; crisis of June 1935, 59; exploitation under Japanese au-

Pa Tao, 372
Pai Chien-wu, 69
Pai Tsung-hsi, 92, 105,
139, 140, 142, 279

Pakhoi incident,

in,

138,

144, 145, 232

Pan Yu-kwei, 308

Panay bombing, 286, 287
Paoantui
Corps),
103,

chow)

Preservation

(Peace
4,

17,

19, 31, 32, 33, 34'

East
108;
units, 8,

Hopei
29,

30,

(Tung31,

96,

98, 108

Peiping Branch Military Council,

42, 44, 54, 55, 75-76, 88, 97,

100,

107

Peiping National University, 99

Peiping Political Council, 42, 50^
53' 54> 7

Peiping Students' Union, 103, 113,

116,

122

Peiping under Japanese rule, 306;

economic life, 306-308; education,
310-314; puppet government, 308, 314, 315; outward aspects, 306;

radio and press, 308-

310

Peng Te-huai, 280

Pu

Yi,

380

INDEX
Raven Trust Company,

Shimpeitai, 212
Shiono, Suehiko, 271
collapse of,

83

Red

Swastika Society, 386

S

Sa Chien-li, 152

tion,"

Saionji, Prince, 195, 197, 209, 211,

213, 249
Saito, Makoto, 211, 213, 218, 221
Saito, Takao, 228
Saito Cabinet, 212, 215
Sakai, Takashi, 56, 70
Sakurai, Colonel, 10

Sato, Naotake, 2, 186

Seiyukai, 197, 208, 210,

2, 73,
134-135' *43> i44>
186-190; results in North China,
188-190; Sung-Tashiro agreement,
188

Sino-Japanese

215,

tlement, 282; Japanese blockade

coast, 283, 284;
Hungjao Airdrome incident, 280-281; preliminaries of, 276, 278, 280-282

Shanghai Mainichi, 105

Shansi province, invasion of, 295299; capture of Taiyuan, 297298; Chu Teh's analysis of Japanese army, 298, 299; righting at

Great Wall passes, 296, 297;

Japanese supply lines disrupted,

Kwantung Army
and North China forces, 305, 306;
297; rivalry of

campaign, 299-300

Shantung province, campaign

in,

at
Chinese
victory
Taierhchuang, 338; cotton mills
336-338;

destroyed in Tsingtao, 337; early

Japanese advances, 336, 337; general operations postponed, 295;

Han Fu-chu executed, 337

Shao Li-tzu, 163, 166, 167
Shen Chung-ju, 152

Shidehara, Kijuro, 200, 203,

207
Shigeto, Colonel, 207
Shih Yu-san, 96, 135
Shimomura, Hiroshi, 222

peace

negotiations,

Kai-shek's
Chiang
speech on prolonged resistance,
289;
danger of Chinese split
288,

289;

avoided,
211,

241, 250, 265, 266

Seiyukai Cabinet, 208, 209
Shakai Taishuto, 217, 223, 241, 249,
264, 267, 319, 334
Shang Chen, 69, 74, 76, 88, 89, 94,
98, 103, 109
Shanghai, hostilities at, 282-285;
Ambassador wounded,
British
283; Chinese bombs fall in Set-

results of

Showakai, 215, 217, 250, 266, 267,

269
Sian coup, see Arrest of Chiang
Kai-shek at Sian
Sinkiang, 360
Sino-Japanese "economic coopera-

288,

289;

expectations

Tokyo not borne out, 288;

feelers by Trautmann, 336; reat

ported Japanese terms, 336

Smuggling, 52, 109, 129-134, 145
Social Mass Party, see Shakai Taishuto
Sogo, Shinji, 250
Soong, Dr. T. V., 50, 172
South Manchuria Railway, 194, 399
South Manchuria Railway Company, 129, 188, 320, 348, 380
Southwest Political Council, 80, 92,
100, 104, 138, 139, 140
Soviet Union, 54, 203, 214, 231, 236,
237, 240, 360
Students' National Salvation Union,

136
Suetsugu, Nobumasa, 250, 319, 320,
332, 344
Sugiyarna, Gen, 2, 236, 252, 262,
271

Suiyuan invasion, by puppet troops,

149, 186; defeated by Fu Tso-yi,
148-149; effects of Chinese vicFengtai occupied, 147conferences
military
by
Kai-shek,
147;
planes
Chiang
on
147;
birthday,
Chiang's
given
plans for renewal of, 3, 148;
warning signals in Hopei, 147tory, 149;

148;

148

206,

Suiyuan

province,

304;

Autonomous

formed, 305

Sumitomo,

197, 208

Sun Fo, 177

Sun Ming-Chiu,
Sun Yat-sen, 80,

167
177

campaign in,
Government

INDEX

416
Sun Yat-sen, Madame,
Sung Che-yuan, 3, 27,

177, 311
28, 65, 67,
69, 76, 89, 90, 92, 98, 101, 102, 103,
104, 107, 109, no, 135, 187, 188;

accepts terms of July

agree-

22; emerges from retreat at

Loling, 18, 189; retires to Loling,

ment,

3> 189
Suzuki, Bunji, 319
Suzuki, Kantaro, 213, 218
Suzuki, Kisaburo, 211, 215, 217, 253
Sze Liang, 152
Szechuan armies, i; reorganization

of,

i,

180,

279

Tachibana, Kozaburo, 21072

Tada, Hayao, 70, 72, 73, 76
Takahashi, Korekiyo, 211, 214, 216,

197, 200,

refugees, 36;

shell-

ing of Chinese city, 36; Soviet

Consulate destroyed, 36-37
Tokonami, Takejiro, 215
Tokyo Imperial University, 333,
334
Trautmann, Dr. Oskar P., 336
Tsai Ting-kai, in, 279

Tsao Ju-lin, 135

Tsinghua University,
Tsou Lu, 92, 104
Tsou Tao-fen," 152
Tuckwo, 286

99, 113

Lin-kuo, 28

29; Chinese casJapanese casualties,

Mission,
31; Japanese Military
incident,
29;
30;
preliminary
origins of East Hopei Paoantui,
29
Tungpei troops, see Northeastern

ualties,

349

315
105,

cesses, 32-33;

Tungchow mutiny,

Tanaka Memorial, 349

Tang Erh-ho, 314,

Tang Yu-jen, 100,
Tangku Truce, 29,

An Men,

115
Peace Preservation Headquarters, 40, 69
Tientsin uprising, 31; bombing by
Japanese planes, 33, 34, 35; casualties, 38; immediate causes of,
suc32;
preliminary Chinese

Tung

218, 221, 228, 239

Takahashi, Tan, 56, 95
Takeshita, Yoshiharu, 97
Taki, Masao, 272

Tanaka, Giichi,

Tien

Tientsin-Tangku

106,

120

46, 47, 48, 50,

53> 54> 57> 63, 74, 79, 9<>> 9<3> 99>
107;
acceptance of additional
Japanese demands, 50-51; additional Japanese demands after
signature, 48; first Japanese in-

31;

troops

Twenty-ninth Route Army,

10,

3,

8,

31, 67, 88, 89, 103, 107,

109, 123, 138, 275, 295; at-

26,

108,

titude

and plans of commanders

of, 22-23, 27; attitude of troops,

17, 18; commanders of, 4; divi-

vasion of Hopei, 42; fulfilment

of additional Japanese demands,

sions of, 4; Japanese military ad-

51-53; line fixed by, 46;

visers, 4;

no agree-

ment on additional Japanese

of

numbers

of,

de-

text

mands, 48; parts

suppressed, 45-46; preliminary negotiations, 43; second Japanese invasion of Hopei, 42, 43; "secret
protocols" attached to, 48; signature of, 44; significance, 46-47;
text of, 44-45

Tao Shang-ming,

96, 97
Tashiro, Kanichiro, 135, 188
Tatung, 286
Teikoku Rayon scandal, 212
Te Wang, 62, 63, 68, 148, 304
Teradaira, Captain, 10
Terauchi, Juichi, 221, 222, 223, 224,

226, 227, 228, 230, 236, 244, 249,

252, 3*5 332
Thirty-second Army, 69, 89, 103

Uchida, Ryohei, 207

Ugaki, Kazushige, 245,

246,

249,

3*9> 3 20

Umetsu, Yoshijiro, 398

United States, 84, 85, 231, 237, 240,
288, 333, 356; purchases China's
85

silver,

Ushio, Keinosuke, 222

U. S. S. R., see Soviet Union

Uyeda, Kenkichi, 3, 221

W
Wakatsuki, Reijiro, 200, 207

Wang

Chia-chi, 88

INDEX
Wang

Ching-wei, 50^ 65, 78, 79,

104, 105, 169, 288; attempted assassination of, 78, 80-81
Chung-hui, 20, 21, 22
Hsia-tsai, 98

Wang
Wang
Wang
Wang
Wang
Wang
Wang
Wang

Keh-min,

70, 314, 315

Lei-chai, 10
Tao, 204, 372, 378, 381, 395
Tsao-shih, 152
Yi-fan, 88

Yi-tang, 107, 314, 315

University, 333
Watanabe, Jotaro, 218
Watson, Thomas J., 346, 347

Waseda

Wei, Wilson

S.,

309

-wei-jen, 367

Wu
Wu

Pei-fu, 308

Ting-chang, 105

Yamagata, Prince, 197

Yamazaki, Tatsunosuke, 250
Yanaihara, Tadao, 333

Yang Hu,

281

417

Yang Hu-cheng,

158, 163, 165, 167,

179

Yang Sen, 111

Yang Yi-chow, 88
Yao Chin-shen, 88
Yenching University,

99, 113
Hsi-shan, 70, 92, 104, 111, 279
Yi Ching, 311
Yin Ju-keng, 29, 31, 90, 96, 97,
98, 108, 109, 129
Yin Ti-hsin, 98
Yokohama Specie Bank, 194, 209
Yonai, Mitsumasa, 250, 271
Yoshida, Shigeru, 221
Yoshino, Shinji, 271
Yu Han-mou, 139, 142, 279

Yen

Yu Hsueh-chung,

55, 57,
165, 168, 179
Liang, 76, 87

Yuan
Yuan

157,

Shih-kai, 314
Yuasa, Hachiro, 333
Yuasa, Kurahei, 222
Yui, O. K., 277, 280
Yuki, Toyotaro, 250, 252, 253

163,

CO

126951