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910

GIERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

BASIC
OmLINE PLAN

BLACKLISTS OPERATIONS
TO

OCCUPY

JAPAN PROPER AIID KOREA

AFTER StRREDER OR COLLAPSE

Edition 3

8 August 1945

GENRA
HADQARER
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
BASIC

MONS
8 August 1945
1.

The attached basic outline plan covers operations to occupy JAPAN Proper

and KOREA after surrender or collapse of the Japanese Government and IUperial High
Command.
2.

Pending issue of over-all directives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this

Plan is circulated to Senior Commanders and Staff Sections of the United States
Army Forces, Pacific as a guide in their planning and preparation for prompt action
upon termination of organized resistance in the areas to be occupied.

Plans and

preparations for this eventuality will be developed and maintained in and advanced
state of readiness by higher echelons of this Command as a matter or urgent priority.
3.

The Plan is being forwarded to the 0Commander-in-Chief,

United States

Pacific Fleet and the Commander, United States Army Strategic Air Force for their
information.
4. Directives for the several operations to be conducted and indicated studies
in support of the Plan will be issued by this Headquarters at appropriate times.
The Plan itself will be amended in detail from time to time as conditions alter.
5. Every precaution will be observed to prevent such planning and preparation
from becoming a basis for unfounded rumors of impending termination of the war.
These activities represent preparation for an eventuality which might occur at any
time, and while of highest priority, in no way reflect a belief in imminence of a
cessation of hostilities.
For the Commander-in-Chief:
R. J. MARSHALL,
Maior General. UT S. Army.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
OFFICIA]

....~
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GENERAL HEADrUARTERS
:ITEDI

L^v,^'

STATES ARiY

FORCES, PACIFIC

'BASIC

tS9W~~~

~ ~~:~.OUTLIMIE PLAN
FOR
BBLACELISTA OPERATIONS
TO OCCUPY
JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA
AFTER SURRMiDER OR COLLAPSE

TABLE OF CONlE2TS

PAGE

Paragraph 1 - DIRECTIVE.

(1-3)

Paragraph 2 - ASSUiPTIOIS.

(3-6)
3-5

a. Hostile.
b.

Own Forces.

5-6

Paragraph 3 - OPERATIONS.
a.

(6-23)
6-9

Concept.

b. Employment of Forces.
(1) Organization.

9-10

(2) Forces.

10-11

(3)

11-12

Coordination.

c. Operations Required.
(1) General.

12-14

(2) PHASE I.

14-16

(3)

16-17

PHASE II.

(4) PHASE III.

(5)
d.

17-19

Contingent Operations.

19

Forces Required.

19-20

Paragraph 4 - LOGISTICS.

(20-23)

Paragraph 5 - IISCELLANEOUS.

(23-24)
.:!

-17

;GENERAL HEADQUARTEFS
1

TUNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

) 4

BASIC
OUTLINE PLAN
FOR
IBLACKLIST'

OPERATIONS

TO OCCUPY
JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA
AFTER SIRRENDER OR CCLLAPSE
8 August 1945
1., DIRECTIVE.
a.

This Plan is formulated pursuant to directives of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff contained in radiograms WX-17064/14 June 1945,

of the Commander-in-Chief,
It

and to verbal directive

United States Army Forces, Pacific, 22 June 1945.

covers operations of United States Army and attached forces under CINCAFPAC

control, subsequent to sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government

and High Command,

to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA,

establish control of armed

forces and civil population, and impose thereon those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.
The Plan provides for inclusion of the remaining RYUKYS
CINCAFPAC's areas of responsibilityi

among

and regards them as minor off-shore islands

of JAPAN Proper, to be occupied when means become available.

Provisions for extended occupation of the several areas and imposition of ultimate surrender terms therein will be covered in subsequent plans upon
receipt of necessary directives.
CINCPAC's corresponding plan for conduct of the Naval and Amphibious
operations involved in
b.

occupation of JAPAN Proper and KOREA is

entitled 'CAMPUS'.

Assigned Responsibilities.
(1)

CINCIFPAC is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the

following basic responsibilities:

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iahdB preparations for the campaign in JAPAN.

JUMdII
lg
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~He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States

Pacific Fleet in the plans and preparations for the naval
and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN (WX-62774.
3 April 1945).
(b)

Preparation of plans for occupation of JAPAN Proper

(WX-17064/14 June 1945).

(c)

Command of United States Army Occupation Forces in JAPAN

(VYs-62773/3 April 1945).

(d)

Military Government in JAPAN to include the four main

islands, adjacent off-shore islands, 4S1W-TO and TSUSHIMA
ISLAED (W-79828/9

(e)

lay 1945).

Control of U.S.-held positions in

the RYITYB, including

Military Government (V 73 BG i52/18 July and COINGCH/CIO

211820 July).
(f)

Preparation of plans for occupation of KOREA in which Allied

Forces will participate.

(2)

CINCPAC is
(a)

charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with:

Making plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious

phases of the invasion of JAPAN.
Commander-in-Chief,

He cooperates with the

United States Army Forces, Pacific, on

the plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN

('WX-62774/3 April 1945).

(b)

Responsibility for Military Government in the M&RIANAS,

BONIIS, VOLCANOESS, IZlB. KURILES and MARCUS ISLAND (JCS i231).

Y'

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c.

Tentative term of surrender for JAPAN require in substance (JCS 1275).

(1)

Cessation of hostilities and prompt disarmament of Japanese

forces and people wherever located.

(2)

Relinquishment of all power by the Japanese Government to the

designated military commander.

(3)

Continuation of maintenance of law and order by constituted

Japanese officials and police.

(4)

Relinquishment of war-making materials and installations and

evacuation of personnel from Japanese-occupied

territories as

directed by the designated Military Commander.

d.

Although CINCGAPAC plans are drawn with the primary missions of

occupying JAPAN Proper and KCREA and a collateral mission of completing occupation
of RYIKYB when means become available, preparation for execution of these missions
recognizes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct CINGAFPAC to assume similar
responsibilities with regard to additional areas in the Western Pacific.
2.

ASSUTION.
a. Hostile.
(1)

That the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command may

surrender at any time.

(2)

That surrender of Japanese Commanders in occupied areas outside

JAPAN Proper may have to be imposed by force.

(3)

That in event the Japanese Government and High Command in KOREA

fail to conform to surrender in JAPAN Proper, appropriate
offensive measures will be taken without diversion of means
allocated to occupation of JAPAN Proper.

Sl f;;*,'\, '*'* '

.' I.

-3

That there is reasonable probability of active post-surrender

(4)

resistance of considerable proportions within JAPAN Proper,

....
p.

..

bi.y sA cidal elements of the armed forces who will

rpeicar

take advantage of any weakness on the part of our forces.

(5)

That total Japanese forces to be disarmed vill probably amount

to:
Army Ground Combat and Service
Air Combat and Service (Army & Navy)
Naval Crews and Personnel of Shore
Establishments

JAPAN Proper

KOREA

1,060,C000
475,000

33,000
27,000

242,000C

10,000

00

p70,000
1,727. o00

1,727,

Total
(6)

1,997,000

That Civilian Volunteer Defense Units requiring disarmament

JAPAN Proper

may total:

KOREA

1,000,000
700,000

TORYO PLAIN
KOBE-KYOTO-OSAKA
NAGOYA

375,000

North HONSHU
SHIKOKU
KYSHU

60,000
150,000
675, 000

Other Areas

250.000

3,210,000
Total

35,000
3.210,000
3,245,000

That armament of these units will be incomplete and confined to

light weapons.
(7)

That, while at best the civil population of JAPA~N Proper will

observe an attitude of non-cooperation with our forces, some
degree of cooperation may be expected from the civil population
of XIELA.

(8)

That stocks and production of foodstuffs within JAPAN Proper

and KOREA as a whole will, in general, remain adequate to maintain a minimum subsistence level for the population.

That,

initially, assistance in distribution of foodstuffs, end some

reiriforcement of supplies to major urban areas, will be required
to prevent starvation and epidemic.

- 4

()

mmunications in JAPAN Proper will be

Tl tcSqa a.nrair

42

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zu

d by air operations to require widespread

rehabilitation of critical facilities prior to resumption of

essential transportation of foodstuffs and to large-scale movement of our Occupation Forces into inland areas.
(10)

That allocation of ship tonnage will be required during the

early post-surrender period for transportation of materials
for shelter for considerable elements of urban populations in
JAPAN Proper to prevent epidemic and active unrest during the
winter season.

That such action will be required in KOREF

to

a lesser degree,
b.

Own FOrces.
(1)

(a)

That participation by Allied Forces in the occupation of

KOREA will be covered in subsequent directives by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,

(b)

That Allied Forces which may participate in occupation of

JAPAN Proper will constitute a component of AFPAC Forces.

(2)

That the area of CINCAFPhC control in the RYUKYIB will be extended to include unoccupied portions of that Archipelago.

(3)

That the Commanding General,

United States Army Strategic Air

Force will support the operations to occupy JAPAi Proper and

KOREA, subject to such other connnitments as may be directed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.
(4)

That, subject to futher instructions of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, prompt occupation of JAPAN Proper constitutes a first
charge upon resources available to CINCAPAC,
tjASTAF.

CIUNCAC and CG

Concurrent occupation of KOREA constitutes a charge

second only to JAPAN Proper in allocation of such resources.

(5)

That CINCAFPAC will be charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

with- ipsition 'of 'surieer itrms upon all Japanese located
wit'i

his
h

areas o

i ty
assigng'esponsibli

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(6)

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That CINCAFPAC will be designated to coordinate and enforce upon

the Central Japanese Government and Imperial High Command the
demands upon those bodies of Commanders designated to occupy
areas outside JAPAN Proper.

(7)

That commitments necessary for prompt and effective occupation

of JAPAN Proper and KOREA will take priority over any further
commitments on the mainland of ASIA or FORCSSA,

(8)

That military necessity will require prompt and widespread

physical occupation of JAPAN Proper in order to effectively
accomplish disarmament and bring home the fact of surrender to
the Japanese people.

(9)

That occupation in KOREA may be confined to major centers providing control of the Japanese Governmental and Military
Organizations, and the communications of more populous areas.

(10)

That uncertainties of the internal situation in JAPAN will

necessitate mounting out of initial Occupation Forces prepared
for landings against local opposition.

(11)

That repatriation of personnel of the Japanese armed forces

and their auxiliaries into JAPAN Proper from whatever source
will be subject to prior approval by CINCAFPAC,

(12)

That redeployment will continue until the full requirements

of these operations and any further operation which may be
directed into the mainland of ASIA and FORIDSA are satisfied.

(13)

That one Marine Corps of three Divisions will be immediately

available to CINCGFPAC for occupation purposes.

3.

OPERATIONS.
a.

Concept.

(See Chart, Annex 3 a, General Concept of Operations).

This Plan covers the 'Occupation Period'

control of JAPAN Proper and of KDREA is

only.

During this period,

established by progressive occupation,

initially utilizing forces available to CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC at the time of

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JAPAN is

disarmed and provisions made for early turn-over

to separate 'Post-War* Governments and Armies of Occupation in JAPAN Proper and

KOREA.
The preparation and conduct of the operations are decentralized to
designated Army Commanders and their corresponding Naval Task Force Commanders
to the greatest extent consistent with essential coordination by Superior Headquarters.
For planning purposes, it
Forces immediately available,

is visualized that dispatch of AFPAC

to JAPAN and KOREA, is in strength to occupy selec-

ted major strategic centers against local opposition if offered.

These forces

are mounted with the maximum expedition permitted by availability of sea and air
transport and are provided with appropriate naval support.

Strong air and mobile

ground forces, provided with immediately available naval support and amphibious
transportation, are established at these points in order to isolate JAPAN from
ASIA, seize control of higher echelons of government in both JAPAN Proper and
KOREA, immobilize enemy armed forces,
citrant elements in the two countries.

and initiate operations against any recalThese strategic centers remain occupied

in strength and serve as bases from which air and ground action can be brought to
bear wherever required and from which subsequent occupations are conducted as
rapidly as the availability of forces, transportation and the internal situation
permits.
Follow-up forces are rapidly dispatched to initial objectives by all
available transportation means as arranged by the respective Army Commanders.
Additional areas are occupied in two priorities as follows:
Selected strategic points to establish control of remaining
major industrial and political centers and avenues of sea communications.
Selected minor areas to establish control of food supply and
of principal overland and coastwise communications.
Objectives selected for occupation in the three priorities or phases
outlined in preceding paragraphs are:
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PHASE I

- KIfNTO PLAIN, SASEBO-NAGASAKI, KOBE-OSAKA-KYOTO, KEIJO (KOREA),

AOMORI-OMflIATO.

PHASE II

- JAPAN:

SHIDNGSEKI-FUKYUL A, NAGOYA, SAPPORO (HOKKAIDO).

KOREA:
PHASE III

FTSAN.

- JAPAN:

HIROSHIMA-KURE. KOCHI (SHIKOK) , OKAYAMA, TSURUGA.

OTOMARI, SENDAI, NIIGATA.

KOREAL

GUNSAN-ZMSHU.

(Reference Map: Eastern Asia, 1/1,000,000, Army Map Service,

Revised (AMS 3) 1944. Japanese place names used).
Additional points in PHASES II

and III are occupied within means available as

deemed necessary by Army Commanders in accomplishment of their missions.

The directed occupations permit control of the political, economic
and military life of the two countries.

The areas designated in JAPAN include 60

percent of the population, 80 percent of industrial capacity and 48 percent of

food production.

Those in KOREA include 39 percent of the population, 18 percent

of the industrial capacity and 44 percent of the food production.

Occupations in addition to those outlined above which may be required
by national policy or Japanese at'it

ns are directed by CINCAFPAC as dictated by

the situation existent at the time.

Disarmament of Japanese Armed Forces and establishment of control of
communications are primary initial missions of the Occupation Forces.
The United States Pacific Fleet conducts the naval and amphibious
phases of the operations.
The Plan as drawn initially visualizes surrender prior to 'OLYMPIC'.
In event surrender or collapse occurs after initiation of 'OLYMPIC*, occupation
of unoccupied objectives listed above proceeds as outlined, leaving minimum garrison in the 'OLYMPIC*

and any minor occupied areas.

Relative timing of the operations is dependent upon the shipping

position at initiation date.

b D' at

Consequently, preliminary estimates of timing are

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made as planning guides and indications of relative priority for shipping allocations only.

Forces are dispatched in shipping and air lift

allocated for move-

ment of forces of the respective Armies as rapidly as they can be mounted.

Occupation of selected objectives may be initiated by employment of airborne
forces.
Occupations subsequent to PHASE I are conducted by Army Comianders
as rapidly as the situation and availability of forces pernit.

Amphibious lift

is made available in each Army area for this purpose.

The initiation date for the operation (EB*-Day) is

designated by

CINCAFPAC pursuant to instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will probably precede wVJ-Day'.
Occupation of PHASE I objectives utilizes in general the forces earmarked for "OLYMPIC',

plus some elements from 'CORON=T".

utilize PHASE I forces,

demand.

augmented by "CORONET"

Subsequent occupations

forces as the situation may

PHASE I forces are regarded as firm allocations for commitment as rapidPHASE II forces are allocated to Army Commanders for olanning

ly as practicable.

Durposes and are subject to release by CINCAFPAC as required.

An AFPAC Reserve

Major units as received on redeploy-

is retained for disposition as necessary.

ment are considered as AFPAC Reserve.

Allocations of forces are frequently amended to incorporate changes

in availability incident to "OLYMPIC* and 'CORONET*.
In event further operations on the mainland of ASIA or FORMOSA are
directed, they are initiated subsequent to occupation of PHASE I objectives and
establishment therein of adequate protective air and naval elements.
b.

Employment of Forces.
(1) Organization.
(a) United States Army Forces, Pacific.
For organizatioi

of United States Army Forces, Pacific,

and allocation of areas of responsibility for 'BLACKLIST*

operations, see Annexes 3 a, General Concept,
I'

J"I I

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'

ited

ation of

and 3 b

States Army Forces

-.( , Organization of United States Army Forces,

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'<b)(
United States Pacific Fleet

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Organization of the United States Pacific Fleet for these

operations is as prescribed by CINCPAC.
(c) United States Army Strategic Air Force.
Organization of the United States Army Strategic Air Force
for these operations is as prescribed by the Commanding
General thereof.
(2) Forces.
(a)

UNITED STATES ARMY Command of U.S. Army resources in

FORCES, PACIFIC
the Pacific.
(.Except Alaskan Department, USASTAF and Southeast Pacific).
Operations of U.S. Army Forces,
"BLACKLIST" operations.
Command of AFPA Occupation Forces
and imposition of surrender terms in
assigned areas of responsibility.
Approval of repatriation of Japanese
Forces and nationals to JAPAN Proper.
Theater Command, SWVPA.
1.

Sixth Army

Landing forces, KYUSHU, SH1KOKU,

and Western HONSHU area.
Operations of Occupation Forces
same area.

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Preparation of Sixth Army elements

from Western Pacific.
Mounting of elements transported
under Sixth Army control.
-

Landing forces, KOREA.

Operations of Occupation Forces
same area.
Preparation of ienth ~Army elements

from Western Pacific.

Moun
-tof
elements transported
2
unuer -e
-Ay
control.
3.

Eighth Army

Landing forces, Northern HONSHU,

HOKKAIDO, 'iSAkFUTO~
Operations of Occupation Forces,
same area.

Preparation of Eighth Army elements

from vestern Pacific.
Mounting of elements transported
under Eighth Army control.
4.

First Army
Preparations for further operations
as directed.
~when available)
Far East Air

~.

Force

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Land-based air support, "BLACKLIST'

operations.
Troop carrier operations.
Preparation of iaAF elements for
displacement to JAPAN and KOREA.
Establishment of FEAF elements in
designated locations.

^- 10 -

6.

Preparation and mounting of U.S.

Army Forces from Middle Pacific for
CINCAFPAC as directed.
Logistic support and administrative
control of U.S. Army Forces in Middle
Pacific.

United States
Army Forces.

7.

Logistic support of U.S. Army Forces,

Western Pacific.
Logistic support of 'BLACKLIST"
operations.
U.S. Garrisons, Vestern Pacific,
as directed.
Preparation and mounting of Base
Service elements transported under
USABFESPAC control.
Disposition of captured Japanese
war material as directed.

United States
Army Forces,
Western Pacific

Preparation and mounting of Naval

and Marine elements, SWPA, for C1NCPAC.

8. Naval Forces,
SWPA

Naval cover and support, "BLACKLIST"

operations.
Naval and amphibious phase,
"BLACKLIST" operations, including, <,
Sixth, Ten'th and Eighth ArnmyVoperations.
Preparation and mounting of U.S.
Naval and Marine elements from POA.
Theater Command, POA.

(b) UNITED STATES

PACIFIC FLEET
(as arranged)

6() UNITED STATES ARY

STRATEGIC AIR
FORCE
(as arranged)
(3)

Transport of troops by air as

arranged.
VHB operations.

Coordination.
(a) Command relationships between the United States Army Forces,
Pacific, the United States Pacific Fleet and the United States
Strategic Air Force, in the conduct of "BLACKLIST" operations,
are as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(b) Commanders, Sixth, Tenth and Eighth Armies^are charged with
the coordination of planning of operations within their
respective assigned areas of responsibility.

Operations

are conducted under the principle of maximum practicable

decentralization of control in order to achieve objectives
in minimum time.

Commanders of Naval and Air Task Forces

meet with Army Commanders concerned for coordination of

planning of operations as directed by their respective Superior
Commanders.

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(c) Details of coordination of operations of United States

Army Forces, Pacific and elements, United States Pacific
Fleet, within JAPAN Proper and KOREA are arranged directly
between Army and Naval Task Force Commanders concerned.
(d) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, conducts
troop-carrier operations to provide to Army Commanders the
maximum practicable air lift of troops to JAPAN and KOREA.
He coordinates with the USASTAF and ATC as hereafter directed
by CINCAFPAG the details of employment of available combat
and transport aircraft for troop movement purposes.
CINCAFPAC arranges with CINCPAC for appropriate transfer

(e)

to Naval control of naval vessels, equipment,

supplies and

Intelligence material.
As arranged with CINCAFPAC,

(f)

CINCPAC establishes and commands

naval terminal and base facilities in JAPAN Proper and KOREA,

which are required for support of forces under his command
or control.
c.

Operations Required.
(1)

General.
(a)

Designation.
These operations constitute the "B" or "BAKER"

series of

operations conducted by United States Army Forces, Pacific.

Individual operations are designated by numbers within
blocks of twenty assigned each of the Army Headquarters
concerned.

"B"-Day is

the date designated by CINCAFPAC

for initiation of the operations.

Tasks.

(b)

1.

General Tasks.
The following general tasks are assigned Army Commanders
within their respective zones of responsibility:

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a. Establish control of the armed forces and civil

population in areas assigned and impose thereon prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate
military action.
b.

Prepare for establishment of separate post-war

Governments and Armies of Occupation in JAPAN Proper
and KOREA as subsequently directed.

2.

Common Tasks.
The following tasks are common to the several operations
projected in this Plan and apply within areas prescribed
by the Army Commander concerned:
a. Destroy hostile elements which oppose by military
action the imposition of surrender terms upon the
Japanese.

jb. Disarm and demobilize Japanese armed forces and their

auxiliaries as rapidly as the situation permits.
Establish control of military resources insofar as
is practicable with means available.
c.

Control principal routes of overland communications.

Control principal routes of coastwise communications,
in coordination with Naval elements as arranged with
the appropriate Naval Commander.

d.

Institute Military Government and insure that law

and order are maintained among the civilian population.
Facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which
contributes to the subsistence, clothing and shelter
of the population.

e. Recover, relieve and repatriate Allied Prisoners of

War and Civilian Internees without delay.

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f.

Secure and safeguard intelligence information of

value to the United States.

Arrange with the U.S.

Navy for mutual interchange and unrestricted access

by each Service to matters of interest thereto.
g.

Suppress activities of individuals and organizations

which may be inimical to the operations of the
Apprehend War Criminals as

Occupation Forces.
directed.
h.

Assist with elements of the initial Occupation Forces

the occupation of subsequent objectives as directed.

i. Prepare to impose terms of surrender beyond immediate

military requirements as directed.
L.

Prepare to extend controls over the Japanese as

required to implement policies for post-war
occupation and government when prescribed.

k.

Prepare to transfer responsibilities to agencies of

the post-war Governments and Armies of Occupation
when established.

1. Assist the United States Pacific Fleet as necessary

in establishment of naval facilities for naval
search and control of coastwise communications as
arranged.
(2) PHASE I.

(See Chart, Annex 3 c (2), Concept of PHASE I Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

Area

Operation

Force

"BAKER-TTENTY"

KANTO PLAIN

Eighth Army

"BAKER-TWO"

SASEBO-NAGASAKI

Sixth Army

"BAKER-TEN"

OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE

Sixth Army

"BAKER-FORTY

KEIJO

-Tent-h-Army

"BAKER-TWENTY-ONE'

AOMORI-OMINATO

Eighth Army

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(b) Tasks.

y Commander arranges with the appropriate

ommander the details of employment of an
ampnlolous

lr;

01 one-alvision capacity ior pos;-

PHASE I short-range amphibious operations as required

in the Army area concerned.
2.

Operation "BAKER-TWENTY"; KANTO PLAIN area; Eighth Army;

Target Date for "Y" Day, B / 15.
By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy
the KANTO PLAIN area; establish control for CINCAEPAC
of the Central Japanese Government and Imperial High
Command; establish designated air and mobile ground
forces for overland and short-range amphibious
operations in the Eighth Army area as required.

3.

Operation "BAKER-TWO"; SASEBO-NAGASAKI area; Sixth Army;

Target Date for "A" Day, B / 20.
By joint overseas expeditionary operations occupy the
area SASEBO-NAGASAKI; establish designated air and
mobile ground forces for overland and short-range
amphibious operations in the Sixth Army area as
required; assist the U.S. Pacific Fleet as necessary
in establishment of naval base facilities in the
SASEBO-NAGASAKI area.

~.

Operation "BAKER-TEN";

OSAKLA-YOTO-KOBE area; Sixth Army;

Target Date for "K" Day, B / 23.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy
the area OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE; establish designated air
and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range
amphibious operations in the Sixth Army area as
required; assist the U.S. Pacific Fleet as necessary
in establishment of naval base facilities in the
KOBE area.

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[n.jsitl,
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-15^,-

5.

Operation "BAKER-FORTY';

KEIJO area (KOREA); -Te-th--Ar-my;

Target Date for 'E" Day, B / 27.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations occupy the
KEIJO area of KOREA; establish control of the Japanese
Central Government and Army-Navy Command of KOREA;
establish designated air and mobile ground forces for
overland and short-range amphibious operations in
y area as required.

Tenth-rAh

6.

Operation

the

BAKER-TWEiTYf-ONE";

AOMORI-OIINA&TO area; Eighth

Army; Target Date for "0, Day, B / 30.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations,

occupy

the AOCDRI-OiJNATO area; establish designated air and

mobile ground forces for overland and short-range
amphibious operations in Northern HONSHU, HOKKAIDO
and KARAFUTO as required.
(3)

(See Chart, Annex 3 c (3), Concept of PHASE II

PHASE II.
(a)

Operations)

Areas Occupied.
Area

Force

*BAER-ONE"

SIMOWNOSEKI-FUKLUOKA

Sixth Army

*BAKER-LEVE"

NAGOYA

Sixth Army

BAKER-TWENTY-THREE'

SAPPORO

Eighth Army

FUBAN (KOREA)

-B-

Operation

BAKER-FORTY-OhE '
(b)

rmy

Tasks.
1. Operation WBAKER-ONE"; SHiMONOSEKI-FUDKDKA area; Sixth Army;
Target Date for 'C* Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.
Occupy the area SHIMONOSEKI-FLUgTKA of northern KYUSHU;
establish ground and designated air forces for

*X': X

,. . accomplishment
...
of coimon tasks.

-16an

g
b

or

'f 7

'*

4t 4A

Xr

"Vl3

.A

I!
2.

Operation "BAiER-ELEVEN";
Target Date for "M"-Day,

NAGOYA area; sixth Army;

as designated by CG, Sixth Arzny.

Occupy the NAGOYA area of Southeastern HOINSHU;

establish ground forces and air staging facilities
for accomplishment of common tasks.

2.

Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-THREE": SAPPORO area; Eighth

Army; Target Date for "h" Day, as designated by Cc,
Eighth Army.
Occupy the SAPPORO area of HOKKILLO; establish
ground forces and air staging facilities for
accomplishment of common tasks.

Coordinate

activities with CINCPAC forces occupying the KURTLE

ISLANDS.
4.

Operation "BAKER-FORTY-ONE";

iULAN area; Tenth-Army;

Target Date for "HR" ay, as designated by CG, Tenth ainy.

Occupy the FUJAN area of southern KOHEA; establish
ground forces and air landing facilities for
accomplishment of common tasks.
(4)

(Dee Chart, Annex 3 c (4),

PhASE III.

Concept of PHAiL III

Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

Operation

Area

force

"BAKER-TbHREE

HiROSHIMiA- URE

Sixth Army

"BAKER-FOUR"

KOCHI (SlIAOKU)

Sixth Army

"BAKER-FIVE"

OKAYA!A

Sixth Army

"BAKBR-TELVE"

TSURUGA

Sixth Army

"BAKER-TWENTY- TWO"

OTOIARI

Eighth Army

SINDAI

Eighth Army

"BA- R-TWENTY-1IVE"

NIIGATA

Eighth Army

"BAKER- FORT -ThWOr

GUNSAN-ZENSHU

^-T.X
.~t.~m

BAKER-TWEZISTY- FOUR"

\ :

a-''

- 17-

Operation "BAKER-THREE";

1.

HIROSHIMA-KURE area; Sixth Army;

Target Date for 'F" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the area HIROSHIMA-KURE of Western HOCSHU;
establish ground forces and air landing facilities
for accomplishment of common tasks.
KOHI area; Sixth Army; Target

Operation *BAKER-FOURM;

2.

Date for *G* Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the KOCHI area of SHIKOKU; establish ground
forces and air staging facilities for accomplishment
of common tasks.
BAKER-FIV7E; OKAYAUA area; Sixth Army; Target

Operation

9.

Date for 'I"

Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the OKXYAIM

area, northern shore of the INIALND

SEA; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.
Operation "BAKER-TWELVE";

TSLRUGA area; Sixth Army;

Target Date for 'N" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the TSURUGA area of FUKUI Prefecture and adjacent points as required; establish ground forces
and air staging facilities for accomplishment of
common tasks.
S. Operation 'BAKER-TWMNTY-TWO";
Target Date for "Q0 Day,

OTOKARI area; Eighth Army;

as designated by CG, Eighth

Army.
a.

Occupy the OTOMARI area of KARAFUTO; establish

ground forces and air staging facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

b.
r
oN
g

d1fi'0-

Coordinate activities with CINCPAC forces occupying

theR
'

IEEISLANDS
,4

:i

F
mrr r t >,P I'v
am:

'.w

*3 i

I 19i
ed.

bi-

^ F111i

O3.-erka tida

iBAKER-TWENTY-FOUR";

SENDAI area; Eighth

Army; Target Date for 'S' Day, as designated by CG,

Eighth Army.
Occupy the SENDAI-MSATUSHIMA

area of 1i[YAGI

Prefecture; establish ground forces and air landing

facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.
i.

Operation 2BAKER-TWENT-FIVE" ; NIIGATA area; Eighth

Army; Target Date for "U" Day, as designated by CG,
Eighth Army.
Occupy the NIIGATA area of Northwestern HONSHU;
establish ground forces and air landing facilities
for accomplishment of common tasks.

8.

Operation "BAKER-FORIY-TWO";
Army;

GUNSAN-ZENSHU area; Tenth-

Target Date for "P" Day,

as designated by CG,

lentlh-Army.
Occupy the GUN-AN- ZENSHU area of Southwest KOREA;
establish ground forces and air landing facilities
for accomplishment of common tasks.

(5)

Contingent Operations.
(a) Headquarters, First Army, upon activation, is allocated
tasks of planning for and conducting further A.PAC operations
as directed.
(b) Requirements for further AFPAC operations and consequent
amendments in allocations for JAPAN and KOREA are formulated
upon receipt of information concerning objectives and areas to
be occupied.

d.

Forces Required.
(1) Estimates of the over-all ground and air requirements for Occupation
Forces to accomplish PHASE I, II and III objectives, and Troop Lift
Requirements for movement in naval assault shipping ana by air are
shown in Annex 3 d (1).
X7ri,'
7

, 1

-- .-,,

I IPT-

(2)

"A solution" for employment of major units, ground forces, in

"BLACkLI1T"

operations is shown in Annex 3 d (2).

':3 ;~ '~:i;^)
~ep4 A
"0

L2:2S--i5
1erations

(4)

land-based air forces in the Vestern Pacific for

p

is

shown on Chart, Annex 3 d (3).

Allocations of Naval assault shipping to meet Troop Lift Requirements for such types (Annex 3 d (1)) and of Naval Support, are
made by CINCPAC.

Allocations of aircraft for troop lift are

made by CG, Far East Air Forces, who arranges for use of aircraft
of the USASTAF and A'C as available.
(5) Estimates of Forces Required are amended to meet changes in the
situation, by timely issue of amended Annexes 3 d (1), 3 d (2)
and 3 d (3)
4.

LOGISTICS.

(See Annex 4, Logistics).

a. General.
l1) Present logistic planning and instructions covering operation
"OLYMPIC" are applied to the maximum extent possible in these
operations, consistent with major changes in strategic and
tactical concept.
(2) United States Army and troops attached for the conduct of
operations under the control of CINCAFPAC are staged, equipped
and mounted out with prescribed equipment and supplies to the
extent practicable and in the time alloted from the PHILIPPINES, RYUKYUS, MARIANAS, and/or HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
(3) Naval forces employed in support of this operation under the
control of CINCPAC are supported as directed by him.
(4) United States Army Strategic Air Force is supported logistically
in accordance with current arrangements and directives.
b. Responsibility for Logistic Support.
(1) CINCAFPAC is responsible for the logistic support of United
States Army Forces and attached troops under his operational
~-,

control employed in these operations, except for Classes II,

IV-,and -V slpple.s.for Marine and associated Naval forces.
(2- C-INCPAC'isXie
for the logistic support of Naval services
,Lz~-pinsible
~.
- 20 -

___-y

under his control.

In addition, he is responsible for equipping

and providing mounting-out supplies for Marine and associated

'i 1F!

'

,^

1talors',hich operate under the control of CINCAFPAC and

r ls^pod

sesJIIriD

(3) The Commanding Gener'

d V for those forces.

ted States Army Forces, Western

Pacific, is responsible (except for the provision of Air Force

technical and air ammunition supply) for provision of logistic
support for all troops in occupational areas to the water line
of the respective areas.
(4) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, is responsible
for the provision of Air Force technical and air ammunition supply
for all United States Army Air Force troops (except the United
States Army Strategic Air Force elements based in the RYUKYUS),
employed in these operations, including Marine Air Forces under
the operational control of CINCAFPAC.
(5)The Commanding Generals of Armies are charged with responsibility for logistic support of all troops in their respective
Appropriate service troops are attached

occupational areas.

to Armies for the purpose of rendering direct logistic support

in each Army area.
(6) The Commanding Generals, United States Army Forces, Middle
Pacific, Western Pacific and Tenth Army are responsible for
re-equipping all units staging in and mounting from their
respective areas (and the Commanding General, Far East Air
Forces for technical equipment of Air Force units) to the
limit of availability of equipment and supplies.

They are

further charged with supplying to all units mounted, to the

extent available, accompanying equipment and supplies as
prescribed by this headquarters.
c

(7) With respect to logistic arrangements for RYUKYUS, O.I. No 2,

this headquarters, 30 July, governs for this operation.

c.

''
Resunnly

'

Resupply is by "AUTO'

TI: :UPPLY'

to the extent practicable with

- 21 -

"

Il

the then currently available resources, as follows:

(1)

In the event *B"-Day occurs considerably prior to "X"-Day

-for operation 'OLYMPIC", resupply, and supply of the bulk of
have to be imported, is by ding from MIDDLE and

TE1zTLR\N
-ACIFlC

shipping becomes available.

Thereafter, shipping set upfor the support of "OLYMtIC"

is

diverted in quantities necessary to meet "BLACKLIST' requirements.

(2)

In the event OB"-Day occurs at a time shortly approaching or

immediately subsequent to "X"-Day, resupply, and supply of
construction materials as indicated above, is by diversion of
direct shipping set up for "OLYMPIC", augmented as may be required, within availability, from bases in the PACIfIC under
the control of CINCAFPAC.

d.

Evacuation and Hospitalization.

(1) Evacuation of casualties by all services from the occupies areas
initially is

by naval assault shipping, followed at the earliest

practicable date by the employment of aircraft and hospital

ships.
(2)

Fixed-bed hospital units are established in occupied areas

at the earliest practicable date, functioning initially in
existing buildings or under canvas.

(3)

Evacuation of Prisoners of War and liberated nationals of

United Nations is as prescribed in Annex 5 f, Basic Plan, Care
and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.

e.

Transportation.
(1)

CINCPAC provides Naval assault shipping for the transportation

of initial, follow-up and succeeding Task Ebrces, with accompanying equipment and supplies from mounting areas to the objective.

(2)

Replenishme

supplies

replacement equipment and construction

materials are tranaprted diireCt from the UNITED STATE6 or

bases as indicated in ;

- 22 -

,aral

ab::
ove, in heavy shipping

as arranged for by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC..

(3)

The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, plans for and
executes air dropping of emergency supplies to Prisoners of
War and civilian internees of United Nations held in known
iJapanee

mps,, exclusive

fhose in areas under the juris-

diction of

Commander,

Command, as indicated in Appendix A,

f.

Southeast Asia

to Annex 4, Logistics.

Construction.
(1) Construction in the occupied areas is limited to provision
of minimum essential operative, facilities.

Use of imported

materials is kept to an absolute minimum, Japanese materials

being utilized to the extent of availability.
(2) CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC are each responsible for the construction of Army and Naval facilities and installations required
for the support of the forces under their respective controls.
(3)

Construction materials and Engineer construction effort required to construct facilities and installations necessary
for the support of the forces operating under their control
are provided by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, respectively.

(4)

The Commanding Generals of Armies are responsible for the construction and development of approved Army construction projects in their respective areas immediately following initiation
of operations.

g.

Local Resources.
Maximum use will be made of available local resources, including

existing installations and labor.

Disarmed Japanese Military Forces are utilized

for labor to the extent practicable.

5.

MISCrELLANEOUS.
a. For Communications Plan, see Annex 5 a.
see Annex 5 b.

b.

For Assumed Terms of Surrender,

c.

For Basic Plan for Establishment of Control of the Armed Forces and

Military Resources of the Enemy, see Ann.ex

c^-;

d. For Basic Intelligence Plan, including Initial Handling of War

- 23 -

-D
Criminals and Security Suspects, see Annex 5 d.
e.

For G-2 Estimate of the Hostile Situation, "BLACKLIST" Operations,

see Annex 5 e.
f.

For Bai

Civilian Internees,

g.

of Allied Prisoners of War and

Pr
Iair
rinel
9

Sj
X

lif

For Summary of CINCPAC Plan "CAMPUS" for Naval and Amphibious

Operations, see Annex 5 g.

h. This Plan will be supported by the following:
(1)

"Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government".

This Plan

covers Military Governments and Relations of Occupation Forces

with the Civil Population in JAPAN Proper and KOREA during the
"Occupation Period", i.e., up to the transfer of responsibility
to the post-hostilities Governments and Armies of Occupation.
(2) iroop Lists, "BLACKLIST" Operations.

.~~~__

A
~

':

'

! li

I-DISTRIBUTION
.- T
IT
-,
" I:5LALl

I/

T
Sl'

Edition 3
8 August 1945

CG, First Army .............

CG, Sixth Army.

... 3

.......

*...
..................

.3

CG, Eighth Army .......................

CG, Tenth Army
CG FEAF.......................... ............

.3
3
3

CG, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific...... ..

Staff, GHQ

CG ASCOM "C"-

........................
................. 15

I^P^~~~~~~

4:6i4<;