Isidro Carino Vs Commission On Human Rights - GR No. 96681 - December 2, 1991
Isidro Carino Vs Commission On Human Rights - GR No. 96681 - December 2, 1991
Isidro Carino Vs Commission On Human Rights - GR No. 96681 - December 2, 1991
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the
case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were
promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal
from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions
"without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on
the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-towork orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those
charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and
Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to
hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were
denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;"
there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while
expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by
the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has
commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R.
Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative
disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they
(CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the
same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to
the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals
to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil
or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and
superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers
and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with
the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as
Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human
rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims
of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power toinvestigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It
may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency
in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and
quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to
subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out,
to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in
the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace
or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the
taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle.
The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or
with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers
in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More
particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted
actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their
classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of
the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it
appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court
itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are
correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in
not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for
reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the
Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction
and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground
traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have
been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the
administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should
result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's
conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the
Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government
agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent
Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." SO ORDERED.
injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.