Acting Up a Text: The Scholarship of Performance and the Performance of Scholarship

Text and Act: Essays on Music and Performance by Richard Taruskin

Review by: John Butt
Early Music, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May, 1996), pp. 323-328+330-332
Published by: Oxford University Press
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John Butt

Actingup a text: the scholarshipof performance

and the performanceof scholarship
RichardTaruskin, Textand act: essayson music
and performance
(New York:Oxford UniversityPress,1995),
hardback?32.50,paperback?13.99
It is difficult to express my opinion that this is the
most significant publication in the field when the
reputations of so many friends and colleagues are
strewn throughout its pages in various stages of
bloody dismemberment.On the other hand, given
that it is writtenby yet another close friend and colleague, it is equally difficult to side exclusivelywith
the 'victims'. Perhapsthe best I can do is somehow
to show the superlative value of the book while
demonstrating that some of its author's views are
not necessarily eternally binding or-outside the
context of his particularwriting environment-necessarilytrue.
The most significant publication in the field?
What field?It could loosely be termed 'performance
practice criticism' perhaps, or 'the ideology of authenticity',and it is a field that RichardTaruskinhas
not only dominated,but largelydefined over the last
15years. There have been severalother fine writers
on the subject-those, for instance, who appeared
along with Taruskinin a 1984 issue of Early music,
and in a volume issuedby OxfordUniversityPressin
1988'-but Taruskin'svoice has been the loudest,
the most influential and by far the most thoughtprovoking.His strengthsas a scholarcome not only
from his own experienceas a significantperformer
of earlymusic (a side to his careerthat is, alas, now
dormant), but also from the sheer breadth of his
scholarly expertise: 15th-century music, Russian
music and Stravinskyas the focal points, but virtually every issue of historiography,criticism and
theory besides. As the book also shows, his mastery
of fields outside 'pure'musicology is vast:the reader

will find frequent references to literary theory,

anthropology, philosophy and law, usually presented in a pertinent,coherent and non-pretentious
way.
Textand actpresentsvirtuallyall Taruskin'smajor
writing on performancecriticism,beginning with a
student piece of 1972 (essay 16), edited with postscripts and a new introduction (some 50 pages) in
1994;there is now no excuse for those who continue
to quote Taruskin'sviews from hearsay,since everything is now conveniently in one place. Seeing the
essaystogether,one marvelsat the breadthof material-chapters on Beethoven,Mozart,Bach, Josquin,
Busnoys,Monteverdiand Stravinsky,not to speakof
copious discussion of theoreticalissues.
Of course, there are disadvantagesin presenting
all the essaystogether. There is a certain amount of
repetition of views and arguments,and a parsimonious editor might well have slimmed the book
down somewhat. However, part of the potency of
Taruskin'swriting is its rhetoricalforce;some of the
repetition actually contributes to the overall argument, by presenting material in slightly different
ways. Indeed, the effect is not unlike the rhetorical
aspect of music. But, as with musical works, the
unity and order of the arguments is often the
reader/listener'sconstruction-the book can yield
almost as many internal contradictions as coherences, as I shall show later. The basic division of the
book into two sections, 'In theory' (essays addressing specific critical issues) and 'In practice' (essays
addressing particular performances) makes sense,
althoughthereis some degreeof overlapbetweenthe
two, particularlythe critique of Nelson Goodman's
philosophical definition of the musical work
(pp.207f.) which appearsin the first chapter of the
'practical'section.
The rangeof publicationsfrom which these essays
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323

aredrawnis also astonishing:e.g. Nineteenth-century

music,Currentmusicology,Earlymusic,Notes, Opus,
New Yorktimes,MusicalAmerica.It is rareto find an
authorwho can addressso many types of readership
with equal skill. Indeed, it is rare to find a scholar
who makes such a successfuljournalist,or to find a
music journalist who is both scholarly and stylish:
this writing places Taruskin on a par with Shaw,
Tovey and Virgil Thomson. He has a remarkable
control of colloquial-sometimes even purposely
ugly-expressions: 'If all that EarlyMusic was was
taste, why then we could take it or leave it.' (p.4) Of
his more spectacularpictorialdisplaysI could single
out the comparisonof successivetempos by a variety
of Beethoven conductors, rendered as a horse race
(p.242) and, my favouritesentence of all, 'Now that
we have had Beethoven lite from ChristopherHogwood and Brahmslite from JohnEliotGardiner,and
even Wagner lite from Mr. Norrington, it was inevitablethat someone would bring us Stravinskylite,
even a lite "Rite."'(pp.365-6) Even if one disagreed
with everyword of the book, the writing is alwaysa
joy to read.
Taruskin'scentral argument (most comprehensively stated in essay 4) can be condensed into a diagnosis, a judgement and an axiom: his diagnosis is
that very little historicalperformanceis, or can be,
truly historical-much has to be invented; that the
actual styles of historical performancewe hear accord most strikingly with modern taste; that the
movement as a whole has all the symptoms of 20thcentury modernism, as epitomized by the objectivist, authoritarian Stravinsky in his neoclassical
phase. His judgement is not that historical performance practiceis intrinsicallywrong, ratherthat it is
a true and indeed 'authentic'representationof modernist thinking. (Needless to say, he would preferit
to move in what he sees as the 'postmodernist',
'postauthoritarian'direction.) And the axiom on
which much of his work hinges is that the methods
on which we base-and by which we judge-scholarshipare not those on which we base artisticperformance. Eachmay inform the other, but the one cannot be reducedto the other. Thus the inclusion of a
couple of essays addressingthe question of editing
helps to consolidateone of Taruskin'scentralpoints,
encapsulatedin the title: performance,of any kind,
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should be an act and not reduced to the status of a

text. Performanceis significantfor its human component and not for its objectiveveracity.
These centralargumentsare supportedby several
other opinions: the 'seductivesimplicities of determinism and utopianism have got to be resisted ..
and ... the endlessly renegotiated social contract,
dowdy patchwork though it be, is the only cause
worth defending' (p.192). This ties in with
Taruskin's concern for the audience-an opinion
that interestinglyseems to grow in the lateressays,as
he becomes further removed from his performing
career-a move from a production-orientedsystem
to a 'proper'reassertionof consumer values (p.47).
This development is also shadowed by Taruskin's
somegrowingdistastefor the concept of Werktreue,
as
central
to
modernist
he
sees
performance
thing
(whether 'historical'or 'mainstream')and one that
'inflicts a truly stifling regimen by radicallyhardening and patrollingwhat had formerlybeen a fluid,
easilycrossedboundarybetweenthe performingand
composing roles' (p.1o).
His reservations about the work-concept-the
idea of individual, fully formed and authoritarian
pieces of music-ties in with his distrustof the composer as an authoritarianfigure.So much of historical performance, runs Taruskin's argument, is
bogged down with questions of the composer's intentions, and, what is worse, those of a most mundane and provincialkind, when in fact 'We cannot
know intentions ... or rather,we cannot know we
know them. Composersdo not alwaysexpressthem.
If they do expressthem, they may do so disingenuously. Or they may be honestly mistaken, owing to
the passageof time or a not necessarilyconsciously
experiencedchange of taste.' (p.97) In his view, our
need to gain the composer's approval 'bespeaks a
failureof nerve, not to say an infantile dependency'
(p.98). This argument is bolstered with an impressive arrayof cases where composers changed their
minds, did not expect their intentions to be followed, or were simply working in an environment
(especiallyopera) where adaptationsand cuts were a
matterof daily routine.
So if authority comes neither from the work
nor exclusively from the composer, where are we
to turn? To ourselves, would seem to be the short

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answer:'Authenticity... is knowing what you mean

and whence comes that knowledge.And more than
that, even, authenticityis knowingwhat you are,and
acting in accordancewith that knowledge.'(p.67) In
fleshing out this concept Taruskintends to draw on
two theoriesin modern thought:the historyof receptionas a majorcarrierof meaningand traditionas an
alternative to authority. According to reception
theory,'Changeof context adds as much meaningas
it may take away' (p.267); the meaning, for us, of
Don Giovanni has been 'mediated by all that has
been thought and said about it since opening night,
and is thereforeincomparablyricher than it was in
1787.'Reconstructionof originalmeaning (and here
Taruskinclearlyincludes reconstructionof original
performancepractice) 'should add its valuablemite
to the pile' but cannot substitute for the pile itself.
His conception of tradition also follows from this:
tradition is 'cumulative, multiply authored, open,
accommodating, above all messy, and therefore
human' (p.192). For the performerthis means less
fetishizationof documents and instrumentalhardware, more listening to one another, reaction and
competition; historically informed performance is
productiveonly when it spawns its own 'viableoral
tradition'(p.194).
Many readers,at this stage, might well be led to
agree with the popular mythology that Taruskinis
fundamentallyopposed to the whole enterprise of
historical performance.Furthermore,the temporal
progression of the essays suggests that he has progressivelydistancedhimself from it (only the earlier
writings refer periodicallyto 'our movement'). But,
as his introduction and postscripts to the essays
often aver,he believeshimself to be continuallymisrepresentedas a crusty opponent to the movement
when all he intends to show is its shortcomings.Perhaps part of the problem is that his praise for the
movement and his recommendationsfor its direction are far less stronglyargued,most often couched
in ambivalent terms and consequently less easy to
summarizethan his pointed criticisms.Eventhe historicallyminded performerTaruskinmost respects
is treated in a very odd way over the course of the
essays: first (1987) he states unequivocally that 'in
RogerNorrington and the London ClassicalPlayers
I can point at least to musicians whose work

exemplifieseveryprincipleI hold dear, and who are

keeping the promise of authenticity in ways their
colleaguesand competitors,most of them, have not
begun to imagine.' (p.230) So startling is Norrington's qualitythat Taruskinpredictshis work will not
sell as well as Hogwood's, since 'You have to pay attention to it.' (p.234) In the 1989essay on Norrington's recording of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony
Taruskinis still complimentarybut disappointedby
Norrington's rigid approachto tempo. By the time
we get to 1991(essay20) Taruskingives the following
judgement of Norrington (apparentlyapplied to all
his work, not just the Ninth): in comparison to the
work of Toscanini, Furtwinglerand Nikisch, his 'is
fleeter, lighter,drier,brittler,more uniform in every
way. And it is therefore less individuallycharacterized, less particularlymemorable, less consequential-which is preciselythe way it wants to be, and
the way the passive, distractedcontemporaryaudience evidentlyneeds it to be.' (p.363)
Throughoutthere are intimations that the movement has failed in some wider objective to revolutionize performance:'A movement that might, in
the name of history, have shown the way back to a
truly creative performance practice has only furthered the stifling of creativityin the name of normative controls.' (p.13) Yet, only a few pages later
Taruskingives a virtuallycontraryopinion: 'The enthusiasticreviews I have entered on behalf of many
"historical"performers ... should offer sufficient
testimony to my esteem for first-rateperformance
practice research,for the inferences it has allowed
imaginativeminds to draw,and for the benefits that
have on occasion accrued therefrom to listeners.'
(p.18) Laterhe even states that 'At its best it is the
best thing now going.' (p.192) The most vertiginous
clash of this kind comes with essay 13 (1987),where
in the main text he sees the brightestfuture for performanceas that on present-rather than past-instruments, when they are played in a postmodern,
transgressiveand inspired way; i.e. the mainstream
has become original, historical performancepasse.
In the postscriptof 1994,on the other hand, he states
blatantly that 'the best specialist performers get
much closer to their chosen repertory than their
"mainstream"counterpartsmanage to do' (p.3o6),
and that 'those who have the vision will want to
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use the old-er, new-instruments' ('new' in this

context meaning new to the performer,ratherthan
of recentorigin). This sort of backand forthbetween
what seems total condemnationto what seems to be
fulsome praise characterizesthe entire volume; the
net result of all this is that there are apparentlygood
'historical'performersand there are bad ones.
So what constitutes good historicalperformance
for Taruskin?One thing that seems clear is that
many performances need to be 'more historical',
particularlyif the historicalevidenceimplies creative
departures from the text, something he demands
particularlyfor the performance of Mozart piano
concertos (p.167).He seeks a returnto a conception
of classicalmusic that began to die out two centuries
ago, something that would bring the music closer to
the values of pop music than 'classical'(p.170).Another useful comparison, which unfortunately he
uses in only one chapter (essay 15), is that between
'crooked' and 'straight'performance.Straightperformance is fine 'if what you want out of music is
somethingto sit back and relaxto' while the crooked
performersare the 'realartists',such as MusicaAntiqua Kl61n,whose 'responsesare conditioned not by
generic demands that can be easily classified ... but
by highly specific, unclassifiable,personal and intensely subjectiveimaginings' (p.317).In short, historicallyinformed performanceis all very well provided the 'literalism' (i.e. following of some
documentary evidence) is 'inspired':2 Roger Norrington, with his strict adherence to Beethoven's
metronome markings; Christopher Page, with his
Stravinskyesqueapproach to 15th-centurycourtly
songs, whose style 'arose out of a fundamental rethinking of the repertoryin its specific details, and
on as close to its own aesetheticand historicalterms
as human nature and human epistemics allow,
rather than from the acceptance of a standard of
beauty or of audience appeal imported unreflectingly from past experience' (p.351);Gustav Leonhardt produces joyful results in Bach performance
through 'passionate and committed experiment
with original instruments' (p.148); while Nikolaus
Harnoncourt refuses to succumb to the customary
effortsto prettifyand sanitizeBach'sseveremessage
in the sacredmusic (essay14).
As TaruskinremarksregardingFurtwingler'satti326

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tude to performance,it seems that for his own tastes

'anythingis all right if it is enough so' (p.242). Retreating somewhat from his insistence that we cannot and should not be slaves to historicalevidence,
he seems to suggest that we should do preciselythis
if it causes us to refashion ourselvesand produce a
performancethat is fully committed. As is so often
the case,Taruskin'shuff and puff reducesto the simple statementthat dull performerswill use historical
evidence dully and inspiring performerswill use it
inspiringly.But it is probablyworth all the huff and
puff, since Taruskin'svery approachbetraysa passionate commitment to the issues. His is the work of
an inspiredperformer.
Another conclusion that could be inferred from
Taruskin'sapproachis that everyoneconcernedwith
issues that are remotelyhistoricalwill use history to
serve their current needs. In other words, the initially surprising affirmation that historical performance is largelymodern make-believeis true insofar
as it applies to any historical undertaking,whether
written,manufacturedor performed.Any seemingly
objectiveaccount of an event or narrativein history
will be a modern construction;what we call historical 'facts' are inevitably ventriloquists' dummies
which speak in our voices and with our prejudices.
This condition does not, however,renderthe historical enterprise invalid. It merely restates what we
havetacitlyknown all along:historyis usefulbecause
it teaches us about ourselvesand helps us form our
own identities. Thus Taruskin'scomplaints of passive literalismin the endeavourof historicalperformance could equallybe appliedto the entire field of
music history, and this is doubtless the direction in
which much of his futurework will go.
There are two interconnectedareas where I take
most issue with Taruskin:his desire to 'democratize' performance by catering to the needs and
wishes of the audience; and his tendency to promote postmodernism as the answer to all modernism's ills. He introduces the issue of audience
satisfaction within his argument that all classical
performanceis under the grip of the work-concept,
all joining 'the ranksof museum curators,with disastrous results-disastrous that is, for the people
who pay to hear them' (p.13).Does this imply that
there is some standard by which we may test

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whether or not the audience has had its money's

worth, whether or not it has been cheated of some
profounderexperience?
Things become a little clearerwith the next reference, for now Taruskinidentifieshimself as a member of the audience (this is the non-performer
Taruskinof 1994): 'My first commitment is to the
mortals-that is, the audience-and to their interests, since I am one of them.' (p.18)Using the force
of the oppressedmassesto justifyone's own position
is a common tactic among politicians-particularly
those who advocate a reduction in 'government'in
the name of the people'sfreedom.This impressionis
strengthenedon p.47,where he statesthat he is 'glad
to see increasingimpatiencewith an excessivelyproduction-orientedsystem of values in classicalmusic
and the proper reassertionof consumer values (yes,
audience response) as a stylistic regulator', surely
the language of a free marketeer.But most of the
evidence he cites for this shift in priority concerns
changesat the productionlevel ratherthan a revolution from the bottom up: pluralism in the concert
scene, the breakingdown of the walls between the
'high' and the 'low' in the field of classicalcomposition. In other words, the shift is in the direction of
what Taruskin believes the audience should want
ratherthan unequivocalevidenceof the people'swill
at work. What would count as evidence in any case?
If consumer values are the issue, surelythe remarkable prosperityof Taruskin'sbete noir, Christopher
Hogwood, must be strong evidence;somebodymust
have bought all those records. Of course, the audience may have been stunningly uninspired in its
choice of purchase,perhapscruellyhoodwinked by
the hype of authenticity.But if this is the case, how
can Taruskininsist that the audience calls the tune?
If he wishesto persistin so harsha view of Hogwood,
he must, along with 'virtuallyall important artistic
movements since Romanticism ... have shared in
[the] contempt for the public as arbiter of taste'
(pp.72-3).3That Taruskinsurely agreeswith me on
this point is suggested by his comment regarding
RogerNorrington on p.234 (quoted above): 'I don't
know whether his work will prove as marketableas
Hogwood's. Probablynot: You have to pay attention
to it.'
Taruskindistances himself from the dictatorship

of the marketwith one of his 1994postscripts:'I have

alwaysconsidered it important for musicologists to
put their expertise at the service of "averageconsumers"and alert them to the possibility that they
are being hoodwinked, not only by commercial interestsbut by complaisantacademics,biased critics,
and pretentiousperformers.'(p.153)This is laudable
enough, but it does imply that the audience is incapable of making up its own mind and needs the
benevolent dictates of a Taruskinor two. In short,
shifting the performer's responsibility from 'upwards'-to the work, composer or whatever-to
'downwards'-to the audience-does not solve any
problems of responsibility,since the same (and perhaps more) issuessimply reappearin a new position.
One is forced either to accept the judgement of the
audiencein commercialterms,or to dictatewhat the
audienceshould enjoy (which is little differentfrom
dictating how, and in what style, the performer
should play, in the name of historical fidelity, the
composer, or the artwork).
Taruskinmight also be implying another sense of
'pleasingthe audience',one with which I can wholeheartedlyconcur. This is the idea of the performer
taking on something of the audience's role, constantlymonitoringthe performancefrom a listener's
perspective, and reacting to what he hears. While
this is obviouslya golden rule for all performance,it
might take on a special significance in 'historical'
performanceas a very practicalantidote to a surfeit
of factual data. It is preciselythis reflexive attitude
which is so often a sure sign of qualityin visual and
musical arts, in which the earliestpossible stages of
receptionare folded back into the creativeact.
Taruskinmust take creditfor being one of the first
musicologists to introduce the term 'postmodernism' (in essay 13,of 1987); by the time we get to
the 1990s, the term is bandied around by virtually
anyone who wants to appear 'relevant'and up-todate. We even get macabredisputes between scholarstryingto be 'postmodernerthan thou'.4The fault
of this approachis to see postmodernismas the answer to all the evils of modernism,as the way for the
future, even as a happy utopia in which all differences will live side-by-side in a pluralistic flux.
Taruskin, in his first reference to the term (p.16),
tries to erase the utopian element since he directly
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associates utopia with 'authoritarian fulfillment'. postmodern culture.' Taruskin'slater reference to

Postmodernism, then, seems to have something to himself as one of 'us happy-go-luckypostmoderns'
do with the subversionof authority.Next he implies (p.183) is perhapsthe most gruesomelyironic in the
that postmodernism in fact has much to do with whole book.
In short, I would be inclined to side with critics
'premodernism', since it revokes the triple nexus
(which has grown up since 18oo) of 'serious-classi- who are scepticalof postmodernismas an ideal (alcal-work'.5This is alreadyan odd situation,for how- though it is certainlyacceptable-indeed useful-as
ever much a postmodernistapproachto music (i.e. a descriptionof the condition we happen to be in);
subversive of musical works) may share with the TerryEagleton,for instance,sees postmodernismas
concepts of music before 18oo, the culturalcontext 'simplyco-extensivewith the commodificationof all
in which music is conceived, produced and used is life in consumercapitalism... an aestheticreflection
radicallydifferent(i.e. feudalism,for the premodern of already aestheticized images',7and Christopher
era;it was, ironically,bourgeois 'freedom'that led to Norris quite rightly condemns Jean-FrangoisLyothe work concept in the first place). So unless tard's denial of any meaning or truth-value 'aside
Taruskinis preparedto talk about music and its per- from the manifold language-gamesthat make up an
formancein the abstract(absolutemusic?),divorced ongoing cultural conversation', since this allows
from its cultural environment (and I'm sure he's Lyotard to affirm that there is no certain way of
not), the pre/postmodernistassociationis consider- denouncing Faurissonfor his assertionthat the Nazi
Holocaust never really happened-according to
ably impoverished.
Later he approvingly quotes a definition of the Lyotard,'there is no commonground between Faupostmodern stance profferedby two legal scholars, risson and those who reject his views'.8 Jirgen
which entails 'rejectioneither of applauseor of de- Habermas, who sees modernity as an unfinished
project, relatespostmodernismto the neoconservajection, which are themselves ... the products of specific culturalmoments, in favorof a somewhatmore tives, those who attempt to 'diffuse the explosive
detached acceptance of the inevitability of change content of culturalmodernity',a group that 'asserts
and our inability to place such changes as occur the pure immanence of art, disputes that it has a
within any master narrative'(p.36). This seems to utopian content, and points to its illusory character
me a 'genuine' definition of postmodernism,6 but in order to limit the aesthetic experience to
one that hardly accords with Taruskin'sapproach privacy.'9
Much of what Taruskinhas to say seems to me
elsewhere:rejection of judgement?a neutral stand,
above culture and ideology?a detached acceptance? close to the spiritof Habermas'scall for the compleBy these standardsvirtually any British conductor tion of the Enlightenment:'What I am after, in a
whose name begins with 'Hog' and ends in 'wood' word, is liberation:only when we know something
must be a postmodernist. Furthermore, many of about the sourcesof our contemporarypracticesand
Taruskin's most trenchant criticisms of historical beliefs, when we know something about the reasons
performanceseem to target an archetypicallypost- why we do as we do and think as we think, and when
modern condition: 'The art works of the past, even we are aware of alternatives,can we in any sense
as they are purportedly restored to their pristine claim to be free in our choice of action and creed,
sonic condition, are concomitantly devalued, de- and responsiblefor it.' (p.19;see, too, the quotation
canonized,not quite takenseriously,reducedto sen- from p.67, above) This, together with numerous
suous play.' (p.138)Perhaps,then, postmodernismis criticisms of historical performance's reliance on
could
precisely what is wrong with 'authentistic'perfor- documentedauthorityand lackof self-resolve,
mance. But on p.176Taruskinclaims to be elatedby almost be a paraphraseof the opening of Immanuel
Kant's famous essay of 1784, 'What is Enlightena letter which links him and the author with postment?'.1o Even the least popular section of Kant's
modernism: 'essays like yours and mine are themselves reflections of our present orientationsessay-that advocatingabsolute monarchy over republicanism,strikesa chord with Taruskin'srespect
specifically the decenteredness and play of
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Table1
'Good'

'Bad'

sharingpart of
1 Performance

Workconcept

responsibilityfor composition
(Music as Act)
2 Plasticityof meaning
Freeornamentation
3 Essential(e.g. Bach'sview of
humanity/Beethoven's

(Music as object/Text)
Literalism,readingdocuments at
face value/'straight'performance
Superficial(e.g. instrumental
hardware,sound surface,trills
ornamentation (p.295))

tempos)

4 Accrued/creative
meaningfor
music and performancestyle
5 Facingup, unflinchingly,to visions
of Bach/Beethoven
6 Tradition(eclectic,
contaminated but interactive)

7 Originality/vision
8Editions, criticallyconflated
from a varietyof sources,to
presentthe music in the
best possible light
9 Censorshipof offensivetexts

io Creation
S sContingency
12 Postmodernism
13 Conductor"
14 Free play/subversiveness

15 Popular

---16 Musicas challenge

17 Messycontingency ---18 Idealism,aiming high even if
something is ultimatelyimpossible
to achieve (p.19)

for the 'inspiredliteralism'of those performerswho

fanaticallyadhereto a particularhistoricalprinciple:
'Argueas much as you will, and about what you will,
only obey!'
Thus to me, Taruskin'sadvocation of passionate
commitment, risk and vision coupled with selfawarenessand a sense of choice in performance,and
responsibilityto both the audience and the richest
and deepest possible meanings of pieces of music,
could be read as a neo-Enlightenmentstance. This
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Intentionalfallacy
Distortion,dilution,sanitizationof
conceptions that do not suit us
Alienated,deviantcultureof
performance (p.194)

Followingthe 'orders'of
documents/ the dead
Besttexteditions that rely
uncriticallyon a single source

Documentarypresentationof
complete text, justifiedby
historicalrelativism(p.358)
Restoration
Historicalnecessity
Modernism
No activeconductor
Authority

Elite

Musicas entertainment
Utopia
Defeatism

posture is inescapablybound to a postmodern condition, to be sure, but it surely should not be confused with the playing superficialsurfaces of postmodernism as a conscious movement-one that,
more often than not, places the aestheticin pride of
place, above the ethical.
Some might already be drawing the conclusion
that I objectmost stronglyto the inconsistenciesand
contradictionsin Taruskin'swriting;that he demonstratestoo many methods of consuming cake.This is

1996

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not strictly the case; consistency is, after all, the

virtue only of a pudding. Furthermore,the paradoxical manner is the direct product of his style of presentation, a style that contributesimmensely to the
impactand characterof the writing.This entailsstating a point in the strongestpossible terms, in direct
or implied opposition to thatwhich he considersundersirable or-more often than not-deplorable.
Givensuch a relentlesssystemof oppositions, it is almost inevitable that one of the positive terms will
clash with another, or that the positive of one pair
will seem to connect with, or imply, the negative of
another. In table 1i list what I consider to be the
most significantpairs, something which at the very
least will provide a summaryof the basic lines of argument throughoutthe book. The firstcolumn gives
the positive ('good') term and second gives the opposing ('bad') term. Verticallines to the left of the
first column link those positive terms which tend to
clashwith one anotherto some degree,while the diagonal lines linking the two columns show possible
connections between positive and negative terms
from different pairs (page numbers are given only
for relativelyrareterms).
In addition to this surveyof the principaloppositions there are also two pairs of terms which are alternativelypositive and negative:

1 Reception

Originalmeaning

2 Priorityofperformance

modeas a maxim for

Priorityof scholarly
modeas a maxim for

performance

performance

In these two cases I presentthe dominant pairing,

but there are significantcases where the two are reversed:in the case of (1) there is Mozart'sfree ornamentation of his piano concertos; Beethoven's
metronome indications and 'tempo of feeling';
Bach'sdarkvision of humanity as epitomized in the
struggleto perform his music; Page's rethinkingof
the repertory'as close to its own aesthetic and historical terms as human nature and human epistemics allow' (p.351).In the case of (2) there aresuch
instancesas on p.269, where performersare accused
of not adopting those recommendationsof scholars
which entail the most creativity; p.346, where
'Monteverdi needs musicology-to save him not

so much from Malipiero as from the virtuosos of

Cologne and from the conservatory that turned
them into what they are.'
Finally, there is the most interesting issue of all,
whereTaruskindoes not and cannot directlyemploy
the negativeterm to offset the positive:
Authenticity
Modernism

Inauthenticity
Postmodernism

Here the entire historical performance movement is judged as being 'authentic', not for the
reasons commonly proffered (i.e. historical accuracy, restoration of original), but because it is
authentic to our own age: 'Messrs. Brtiggen,Norrington, and Bilson ... have been rightly acclaimed
... Conventional performers are properly in awe
and in fear of them. Why? Because, as we are all
secretly aware,what we call historical performance
is the sound of now, not then. It derives its authenticity not from its historicalverisimilitude,but from
its being for better or worse a true mirror of late
20th-century taste. Being the true voice of one's
time is ... roughly forty thousand times as vital and
important as being the assumed voice of history.'
(p. 166) 'Regarding the movement itself I have
alwaysheld that, as a symptomaticallymodern phenomenon, it is not historicalbut is authentic. It is a
message I have had great difficultyin getting across
to musicians, because so many have invested so
heavily in the false belief that authenticity can
derive only from historical correctness ... They
simply do not hear me when I say that what
"historical"performershave actually accomplished
is far more important and valuable than what they
claim to have done.' (p.175)
So historicalperformance-almost alwaysassociated with modernism by Taruskin-is authentic as
the true voice of the times; yet he continually suggests that the movement go in the postmodern direction. Now he must mean either that modernism
is, in fact, not the voice of the times, or (probably
closer) that postmodernism should be the voice of
the times; this would seem to generatean authenticity more by edict than description.
iven Taruskin'srepeatedcomplaints (largelyin
the 1994 additions) of being misunderstood
EARLY MUSIC

MAY 1996

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331

and misrepresented,it would seem that he has some

notion of an 'authentic' reading of 'Taruskin'.Yet,
he clearly admits that his views develop over the
years (although he only really mentions the gulf
between the student piece of 1972 and the remainder). The author's note at the outset mentions that
all essays have been thoroughly re-edited, and that
those 'encountering these pieces for the first time
need never know what they have been spared.'
Taruskin1994 is clearlyadvocatingthat the notion
of the FassungletzterHand be applied to his work:
he is always most 'authentic' the next time he
speaks.
In this review I have tried first to present what I
believe to be his central arguments, then the areas
where I find it hard to agree, or indeed where I
believe he does not agreewith himself;and finallyI
have tried to analysesomething of his style to show
why there are apparentparadoxes.These I consider
the by-product of the style, and thus not essential
to the quality of the work (although their removal
would greatly reduce the rhetorical force of the
writing). Throughout I have also tried to take into
account Taruskin's vast background as a scholar
and the pressingdemands and conditions of the age
in which he writes. Have I produced an 'authentic'
interpretationof Taruskin?CertainlyI might be in
errorin many places, and I have employed not only
my own opinions, but also my views of what I

believe Taruskin'sopinions to be. In short, I have

tried both to present my own performanceand also
to display what I consider 'essential' and most
instructive and inspiring about the text (and
author). I would surely have failed completely if I
had tried to expound on the 'literal'meaning of the
text, with its various inconsistencies, or indeed to
concentrate only on the 'original' meaning of the
text (given the temporal spread of the essays and
the editing of Taruskin1994). This is why I feel the
performance analogy is useful here (despite
Taruskin'sreasonable injunction that the fields of
performanceand scholarshipcannot automatically
be reduced to one another); the text is so rich in
its rhetoricalfabric and semantic multivalencythat
any successfulreadinghas to be as much a 'performance' as a textual exegesis.
At the very least, I hope in my very interpretation
to have demonstrated one of Taruskin's central
points: that there is no such thing as a literal,single
interpretation;that the interpreterneeds to engage
with the text on a varietyof levels, and, most of all,
be true to his own beliefs. Of course, insight into
the personalityand creativityof the original writer
are a significantportion of any successful interpretation, particularlyif the writing is of any quality,
but they are always seen through the eyes of the
interpreter;they cannot exist in a neutral objective
realm.

1 R. Taruskin, D. Leech-Wilkinson, N.
Temperley, R. Winter,' The limits of
authenticity: a discussion', Early music,
xii (1984), pp.3-26; Authenticity and
early music, ed. N. Kenyon (Oxford,
1988).

leaving on applause at the end of a live

recording of Frans Bruiggen:'After an
experience like this G minor, the spellshattering noise is an abomination.' No
room for audience expression here, I
fear.

7 P. Waugh, Postmodernism:a reader

(London, 1992), p.113.

2 Indeed Reinhard Goebel, director of

Musica Antiqua Ki1n, is such a fundamentalist in his devotion to original
sources, that I remember the Guardian
once referring to him as 'the Ayatollah
of the Baroque'.

4 I am thinking here particularly of

the dispute between Gary Tomlinson
and Lawrence Kramer:see Current
musicology,liii (1993), pp.18-4o.

9 Habermas, in Waugh, Postmodernism,p.169.

3 And if one wanted evidence for

Taruskin's contempt for the breaking
down of the performer-audience
divide, his distrust in the mingling of
high and low, one could turn to p.296,
where he berates Philips records for

332

EARLY

MUSIC

5 L. Goehr, The imaginary museum of

musical works(Oxford, 1992).
6 The turn away from master narratives is central to J.-F. Lyotard, The
postmodern condition:a reporton
knowledge(1979), trans. G. Bennington
and B. Massumi with a foreword by F.

Jameson (Manchester, 1984).

8 C. Norris, The truth about postmodernism (Oxford, 1993), pp.16-17.

1o 'Enlightenment is man's release

from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of
his understanding without direction
from another. It is self-incurred when
its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and
courage to use it without direction
from another.'

MAY 1996

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