Senate Hearing, 111TH Congress - Wall Street and The Financial Crisis: The Role of High Risk Home Loans
Senate Hearing, 111TH Congress - Wall Street and The Financial Crisis: The Role of High Risk Home Loans
Senate Hearing, 111TH Congress - Wall Street and The Financial Crisis: The Role of High Risk Home Loans
111671
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
VOLUME 1 OF 5
APRIL 13, 2010
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE ROLE OF HIGH RISK HOME LOANS
VOLUME 1 OF 5
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S. Hrg. 111671
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
VOLUME 1 OF 5
APRIL 13, 2010
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
(
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON
57319 PDF
2010
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(II)
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CONTENTS
Opening statements:
Senator Levin ....................................................................................................
Senator Coburn .................................................................................................
Prepared statements:
Senator Levin ....................................................................................................
Senator Coburn .................................................................................................
Senator Collins .................................................................................................
Page
1
12
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130
132
WITNESSES
TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 2010
James G. Vanasek, Former Chief Credit Officer (19992004) and Chief Risk
Officer (20042005), Washington Mutual Bank ................................................
Ronald J. Cathcart, Former Chief Enterprise Risk Officer (20062008), Washington Mutual Bank .............................................................................................
Randy Melby, Former General Auditor, Washington Mutual Bank ...................
David Schneider, Former President of Home Loans, Washington Mutual
Bank ......................................................................................................................
David Beck, Former Division Head of Capital Markets, Washington Mutual
Bank ......................................................................................................................
Stephen J. Rotella, Former President and Chief Operating Officer, Washington Mutual Bank .............................................................................................
Kerry K. Killinger, Former President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman
of the Board, Washington Mutual Bank ............................................................
ALPHABETICAL LIST
OF
14
18
20
51
53
83
85
WITNESSES
Beck, David:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Cathcart, Ronald J.:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Killinger, Kerry K.: ..................................................................................................
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement with attachments ...........................................................
Melby, Randy:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Rotella, Stephen J.:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Schneider, David:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Vanasek, James G.:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
53
163
18
138
85
179
20
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83
169
51
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134
EXHIBIT LIST
207
(III)
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IV
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VI
Page
21. WaMu Corporate Credit Review, Home Loans, Wholesale Specialty Lending-FPD, 2007 Targeted Review (132 of the 187 (71%) files were reviewed
[and] . . . confirmed fraud on 115 [and 17 were] . . . highly suspect.
. . . 80 of the 112 (71%) stated income loans were identified for lack
of reasonableness of income[.] 133 (71%) had credit evaluation or loan
decision errors . . . 58 (31%) had appraisal discrepancies or issues that
raised concerns . . .) .........................................................................................
Documents Related to WaMu Retail Channel:
22.a. WaMu internal memorandum, dated November 2005, re: So. CA Emerging Markets Targeted Loan Review Results (Of the 129 detailed loan
reviewed that have been conducted to date, 42% of the loans reviewed
contained suspect activity or fraud, virtually all of it attributable to
some sort of employee malfeasance or failure to execute company policy ..
b. WaMu Retail Fraud Risk Overview, Prepared by Risk Mitigation, November 16, 2005 ............................................................................................
23.a. WaMu internal email chain, dated November 2005: re: Retail Fraud
Risk Overview (I had a very quick meeting with David Schneider, Tony
Meola and Steve Stein today to review the deck and the memo regarding
the retail fraud risk review. The good news is that people are taking
this very seriously.) ........................................................................................
b. WaMu internal email chain, dated August 2005, re: [names redacted]
Risk Mit Loan review data Confidential (. . . he did not want to
give axes to the murderers.) .........................................................................
24. WaMu Privileged and Confidential Memorandum, dated April 2008, re:
Memorandum of Results: AIG/UG and OTS Allegation of Loan Frauds
Originated by [name redacted] .........................................................................
25. Office of Thrift Supervision Memorandum, dated June 19, 2008, re: Loan
Fraud Investigation ..........................................................................................
26. WaMu OTS Exam Summary As of July 22, 2008 (OTS AQ #22 Loan
Fraud Investigation.) (excerpts) .......................................................................
27. WaMu internal email chain, dated August 2006, re: Hudson 3010598427
Purchase (Sales has NOT hit oiur [sic] funding goals.) .................................
28. WaMu Market Risk Committee (MRC), Minutes of the December 12, 2006
Meeting (The primary factors contributing to increased delinquency appear
to be caused by process issues including the sale and securitization of
delinquent loans, loans not underwritten to standards, lower credit quality
loans and seller servicers reporting false delinquent payment status.) .........
29. WaMu internal Memorandum, dated September 2007, re: Westlake HLC
Investigation Update .........................................................................................
30. WaMu Significant Incident Notification (SIN), Date Incident Reported
04/01/2008, Loss TypeMortgage Loan (One Sales Associate admitted
that during that crunch time some of the Associates would manufacture
assets statements from previous loan docs and submit them to the LFC.
She said the pressure was tremendous from the LFC to get them the
docs since the loan had already funded and pressure from the Loan
Consultants to get the loans funded.) ..............................................................
31. WaMu Internal Investigative Report, dated May 2008, re: Westlake Home
Loan Center (. . . tremendous pressure from the Loan Consultants and
from the LFC Team Manager to get the asset documents to the LFC
because the loan was already funded.) ............................................................
32.a. WaMu internal email chain, dated December 2007, re: Employee
HELOC Fraud (. . . 75 suspect HELOC loans have been identified
(approved & in pipeline) . . . with a current outstanding balance of
$3,318,101.) ....................................................................................................
b. WaMu Significant Incident Notification (SIN), Date Incident Reported
05/01/2008, Loss TypeHELOC Fraud (Risk Mitigation reviewed 25
HELOC loans . . . with a total exposure of $8,538,600.00.) ......................
33. Radian Guaranty Inc. Review of Washington Mutual Bank, August-September 2007 (This results in an overall Unacceptable rating with a
score of 68.) (excerpts) ......................................................................................
34. WaMu Corporate Credit Review, 2008 Home Loans, Risk Mitigation and
Mortgage Fraud, 2008 Targeted Review (excerpts) ........................................
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VIII
Page
50. WaMu internal email, dated November 2006, re: Goldman Sachs New
Issue Home Eq Commentary (External) (LBMC paper is among the worst
performing paper in the mkt in 2006.) ............................................................
51. WaMu internal email, dated February 2008, re: Screen shot (Attaching
copy of Evidence of Walking Away In WaMu Mortgage Pool, February
23, 2008, Mishs Global Economic Trend Analysis ........................................
52. WaMu internal email, dated March 2007, re: our discussion yesterday
and what the street perception will be (WaMu subprime ABS delinquencies
top ABX components) ........................................................................................
53. WaMu Leads in Risky Type of LendingAnalysis Shows Thrift Makes
Frequent Loans for Investment Homes, April 17, 2007, Wall Street Journal ......................................................................................................................
54.a./b./c.: WaMu/Goldman Sachs email chains, dated March, May, and July
2007, regarding repurchase issues......................................... 682, 684,
55. WaMu internal email, dated August 2007, re: Scenarios (From todays
meeting, I understand that we dont have the courage to evaluate this
scenario.) ............................................................................................................
56. WaMu internal email, dated May 2008, re: WSJ on repurchaseslikely
will lead to some IR questions although we are not mentioned (7 Step
process) ..............................................................................................................
57. WaMu internal email, dated June 2008, re: Repurchase Recommendations
W/E 6/20/08 (The actual loans we do buy back are real stinkers.) ............
58. Worst Ten in the Worst Ten, document prepared by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 11/13/08 (The table below sets forth
the ten metropolitan areas experiencing the highest rates of foreclosure
as reported by Realty Trac (the Worst Ten MSAs). . . . Long Beach
Mortgage Co. . . . 11,736.) ...............................................................................
Documents Related to Compensation:
59.a./b. Documents regarding Long Beach compensation, 2004 (excerpts) and
2007 ............................................................................................ 701, 708
60.a. WaMu, Home Loans, 2007 Product Strategy, Strategy and Business
Initiatives Update (Retail Loan Consultant 2007 Incentive Plan Focus
on High Margin Products) (excerpts) ...........................................................
b. Washington Mutual, Home Loan Credit Risk F2F, December 6, 2006
(Internal Forces . . . Overages; Internal Forces . . . Overage Proposal).
(excerpts) ........................................................................................................
c. Excerpt from Washington Mutual Lenders Addendum to Closing Instructions, September 2007 (showing inclusion of Yield Spread Premium
in compensation of third part mortgage broker) .........................................
61. Long Beach processing center internal email, dated September 2004,
re: Daily ProductivityDublin (. . . its time for the mad dash to the
finish line!) ........................................................................................................
62. Washington MutualHome Loans flyer, dated November 2006, Presidents ClubTake the Lead! ............................................................................
63.a. Washington Mutual, Home Loans Group, Presidents Club 2005Maui,
Awards Night Show Script (excerpts) ..........................................................
b. Washington Mutual, Home Loans Group, Presidents Club 2006, Funeral Skit related to Countrywide ...............................................................
c. WaMu, Home Loans Group, Presidents Club 2006, I Like Big Bucks
Skit .................................................................................................................
d. SEALED EXHIBIT: Washington Mutual, Home Loans Group, Presidents Club 2005Maui, Awards Night Show Script. (Unredacted
version of Exhibit 63a.) .................................................................................
64. Cheryl Feltgen 2007 Performance Review (Growth 35%) .............................
65. WaMu internal email, dated January 2008, re: comp (But we have to
convince our folks that they will all make a lot of money by being with
WaMu.) ..............................................................................................................
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66. WaMu internal email, dated July 2008, re: Comp (We would like to
have the HR committee approve excluding the exec com from the 2008
bonus and to approve the cash retention grants to the non NEOs. This
would allow me to respond to questions next week regarding the bonus
plan on the analyst call. And it would help calm down some of the
EC members.) ....................................................................................................
67. WaMu internal email, dated March 2008, re: WaMu Board Shields Executives BonusesWSJ Article (March 5, 2008) .................................................
68. WaMu creditors could challenge payments to Killinger, others, The Seattle
Times, October 1, 2008 .....................................................................................
Documents Related to Various Issues:
69.a. WaMu internal email, dated October 2007, re: Can you take a look
at this before Monday and give your blessing? (I dont trust Goldy
on this. They are smart, but this is swimming with the sharks. They
were shorting mortgages big time while they were giving CfC advice.) .....
b. WaMu/Goldman email chain, dated February 2007, re: Request to Talk
(. . . Goldman and Long Beach/WaMu have had a long standing and
successful relationship for years.) .................................................................
70. WaMu internal email, dated May 2005, re: Strategic Planning Meeting
(The avalanche of publicity on interest only, home equity, neg am and
sub-prime expansion that has occurred in just the last three or four
weeks is amazing.) ............................................................................................
71. WaMu internal email, dated March 2006, re: Organizational Changes
in Enterprise Risk Management ......................................................................
72. Washington Mutual Internal Memorandum, dated October 2006, re: State
of ERM: Effectiveness and Resource Adequacy Overview ..............................
73. WaMu internal email, dated January 2007, re: Year-End 2006 Message
for the Home Loans Risk Management Team (Recognize that we are
all in sales passionately focused on delivering great products and service
to our customers.) ..............................................................................................
74. WaMu internal email, dated February 2008, re: Credit Cost Forecast
(Un)reliability (. . . I would add poor underwriting quality which in
some cases causes our origination data to be suspect. . . .) ..........................
75. WaMu internal email, dated February 2008, re: 4pm 10K Audit Committee Meeting (I would suggest using the word majority and deleting
the word significantly. . . .) ..........................................................................
76. WaMu internal email, dated March 2007, re: Draft Subprime Mortgage
GuidanceDraft WaMu Position (Based on Todays conversation, I dont
see a need to do anything now.) .......................................................................
77. WaMu internal email, dated March 2007, re: Follow-up information to
last evenings call regarding subprime interagency guidance, etc. . . .
(If we implement the NTM changes to all loans, then well see additional
drop of 33% of volume.) ....................................................................................
78.a. WaMu internal email chain, dated March 2005, re: Updates (I have
never seen such a high risk housing market as market after market
thinks they are unique and for whatever reason are not likely to experience price declines. This typically signifies a bubble.) ................................
b. WaMu memorandum, dated September 2004, re: Perspective (If the
economy stalls, the combination of low FICOs, high LTVs and inordinate levels of exceptions will come back to haunt us.) ................................
79. WaMu internal email, dated August 2007, re: Looking back (Your fingers
must be smoking.) .............................................................................................
80. WaMu, July 2008, Home Loans Story, External & Internal Views ..............
81. WaMu internal email, dated February 2007, re: Long Beach 2nd Lien
Disposition (. . . how best to dispose of 433MM of performing 2nd lien
loans in the Long Beach warehouse.) ..............................................................
82. Long Beach Mortgage Loan Coordinator Convicted of Lying to Grand
Jury In Connection With Mortgage Fraud Investigation, Department of
Justice News Release, December 17, 2007 .....................................................
83. Subprime Lending: A Net Drain on Homeownership, Center for Responsible Lending Issue Paper No. 14, March 27, 2007 .......................................
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84. Long Beach Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, January 2006 ................
85. Washington Mutual Bank Mortgage Loan Purchase and Sale Agreement,
October 2005 .....................................................................................................
86. WaMu Prospectus Supplements (excerpts):
a. WaMu Series 2007-OA3 ................................................................................
b. WMALT Series 2007-OA3 ............................................................................
c. WaMu Series 2007-OA4 ................................................................................
d. WMALT Series 2007-OA4 ............................................................................
87. Responses to supplemental questions for the record submitted by Senator
John Ensign to Kerry Killinger, Former President, CEO, and Chairman
of the Board, Washington Mutual Bank .........................................................
88. Responses to supplemental questions for the record submitted by Senator
John Ensign to Stephen Rotella, Former President and Chief Operating
Officer, Washington Mutual Bank ..................................................................
89. SEALED EXHIBIT: Response to supplemental questions for the record
submitted by Senators Carl Levin and Tom Coburn regarding the potential sale of Washington Mutual Bank submitted to Kerry Killinger,
Former President, CEO, and Chairman of the Board, Washington Mutual
Bank ...................................................................................................................
90. Washington Mutual, Fannie Mae Alliance and Freddie Mac Business
Relationship Proposal .......................................................................................
* Retained in the files of the Subcommittee
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U.S. SENATE,
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room
SD342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Levin, Kaufman, Coburn, Collins, and Ensign.
Staff Present: Elise J. Bean, Staff Director/Chief Counsel;
Zachary I. Schram, Counsel; Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk;
David H. Katz, Counsel; Allison F. Murphy, Counsel; Adam Henderson, Professional Staff Member; Jason E. Medica, Detailee
(ICE); Christopher Barkley, Staff Director to the Minority; Anthony
G. Cotto, Counsel to the Minority; Robert Kaplan, Intern; Jeff
Kruszewski, Law Clerk; Ryan McCord, Law Clerk; Kevin Rosenbaum, Intern; Andrew Tyler, Law Clerk; Tyler Gellasch (Senator
Levin); Ted Schroeder, Nhan Nguyen, and Geoff Moulden (Senator
Kaufman); Mark LeDuc, Neil Cutter, and Ivy Johnson (Senator
Collins); Michael McBride and John Lawrence (Senator Ensign).
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Our Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations will come to order.
In the fall of 2008, America suffered a devastating economic assault. It left deep wounds. Millions lost their jobs; millions lost
their homes. Good businesses shut down; financial markets froze.
The stock market plummeted, and once valuable securities turned
worthless. Storied financial firms teetered on the edge or went
under. The contagion spread worldwide. And in October 2008,
American taxpayers were hit with a $700 billion bailout of Wall
Street. That bailout was a bitter pill to swallow, but it stanched the
bleeding. The economy stabilized, and the Nation and the world
began to recover.
Nearly 2 years later, we are still recovering. As part of that recovery effort, we as a Nation need to understand what went wrong,
try to hold perpetrators accountable, and fortify our defenses to
ward off another such assault in the future.
To rebuild our defenses, it is critical to understand that the recent financial crisis was not a natural disaster. It was a man-made
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economic assault. People did it. Extreme greed was the driving
force, and it will happen again unless we change the rules.
The Senate has a Subcommittee that is designed to do in-depth,
bipartisan investigations into complex issues. It is the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, and in November 2008, we decided to devote our resources to an examination of some of the
causes and consequences of the financial crisis which continues to
this day.
In the last year and a half, the Subcommittee has dug into the
facts. To date, we have conducted over 100 interviews and depositions. We have consulted with dozens of government, academic, and
private sector experts on a raft of banking, securities, financial,
and legal issues. We have collected and initiated review of millions
of pages of documents. Given the extent of the economic damage
and the complexity of its root causes, the Subcommittees approach
has been to develop detailed case studies to examine each stage of
the assault and lay bare key issues at the heart of the financial crisis.
Todays hearing is the first in a series designed to examine the
financial firms, the financial instruments, and the regulatory and
market safeguards that failed us. We will hold four hearings over
the next 2 weeks. Throughout, the hearings will examine the role
of Wall Street and its use of complex financial instruments to
transact business, from mortgage-backed securities to collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs), structured investment vehicles, credit default swaps, and more. We will examine how high-risk investments
displaced low-risk investments, even at taxpayer-insured banks;
how securitizations and financial engineering ran wild; how synthetic investments trumped investments in the real economy; and
how credit default swaps turned investing in America into gambling on the demise of one American company or another. We will
explore why the regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the
market itself failed to rein in the abuses.
The goals of the Subcommittee hearings are threefold: to construct a public record of the facts in order to deepen public understanding of what happened and try to hold some of the perpetrators accountable; to inform the ongoing legislative debate about the
need for strong financial reforms; and to provide a foundation for
building better defenses to protect Main Street from the excesses
of Wall Street.
So let us start at the beginning with an overview, before we
plunge into the specifics of todays hearing.
Prior to the early 1970s, when someone wanted to buy a home,
typically they went to their local bank or mortgage company, applied for a loan, and after providing detailed financial information
and a downpayment, qualified for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage.
The local bank or mortgage company then commonly kept that
mortgage until the homeowner paid it off 15 or 30 years later.
Bank regulations required lenders to keep a certain amount of capital for the loans they issued, so there was a limit to how many
home loans one bank could have on its books.
Banks got the idea of selling the loans on their books to someone
else. They made profit on the sales while getting fresh capital to
make new loans to prospective borrowers. Better yet would be if
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they could sell the loans on their books in bulk in quick, efficient,
and predictable ways.
Wall Street came up with the mechanism of securitization. Lenders bundle up large numbers of home loans into a loan pool and
calculate the amount of mortgage payments going into that pool
from the borrowers. A shell corporation or trust is formed to hold
the loan pool, and the revenue stream is used to create bonds
called mortgage-backed securities that could be sold to investors.
Wall Street firms helped design the loan pools and securities,
worked with the credit rating agencies to obtain favorable ratings
for the securities, and sold the securities to investors like pension
funds, insurance companies, municipalities, university endowments, and hedge funds.
For a while, securitization worked well, but at some point things
got turned on their head. The fees that banks and Wall Street
firms made from their securitization activities were so large that
securitization ceased to be a means to keep capital flowing to housing markets and became an end in itself. Mortgages began to be
produced for Wall Street instead of Main Street, and Wall Street
bond traders sought more and more mortgages in order to generate
fees for their companies and large bonuses for themselves.
To satisfy Wall Streets growing appetite for mortgage-backed securities and to generate additional income for themselves, banks
began to issue mortgages to not only well-qualified borrowers, but
also high-risk borrowers. High-risk loans provided a new fuel for
the securitization engines on Wall Street. Banks liked high-risk
loans because they tended to generate higher fees and interest
rates and produced more profits than low-risk loans. They could
also be sold quickly, keeping the risk off the banks books. Wall
Street treated high interest rate loans like gold ore and were willing to pay more for them.
Lenders began steering borrowers looking for a 30-year fixed
mortgage to higher-risk loans instead, often using gimmicks like
low initial teaser rates. Some lenders began qualifying borrowers
if they could afford to pay a low initial rate rather than if they
could pay the higher later rate, expanding the number of borrowers
who could qualify for the loan. These practices also allowed borrowers to qualify for larger loans.
When a borrower sought a bigger house, the loan officer or mortgage broker profited from higher fees and commissions, the bank
profited from higher fees and a better price on the secondary market, and Wall Street profited from a larger yield to be sliced up and
sold to investors for big fees. Volume and speed, as opposed to loan
quality, became the keys to a profitable securitization business.
Lenders that sold the loans they originated passed on the risk and
so lost interest in whether the sold loans would be repaid. Even
some purchasers lost interest in the creditworthiness of the securities they bought so long as they could purchase insurance in the
form of credit default swaps that paid off if a mortgage-backed security defaulted.
As long as home prices kept rising, the high-risk loans that became fuel for the securitization market posed few problems. Those
who could not pay off their loans refinanced or sold their homes,
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4
and as Exhibit 1j 1 showsa chart which we will put up hereover
the 10 years before the crisis hit, housing prices shot up faster
than they had in decades. Those higher home prices were made
possible in part by the high-risk loans that allowed borrowers to
buy more house than they could really afford.
Some who saw the housing bubble was going to burst made bets
against existing mortgage-backed securities. They sold those securities short, even in some cases while selling the same securities to
their customers. Some even made bets against mortgage-backed securities they did not own, using what are called naked credit default swaps. Wall Street made money hand over fist.
But the party could not last, and we all know what happened.
The housing bubble burst, and prices stopped climbing. Investors
started having second thoughts about the mortgage-backed securities being churned out by Wall Street. In July 2007, two Bear
Stearns offshore hedge funds specializing in mortgage-related securities suddenly collapsed. That same month, the credit rating agencies downgraded hundreds of subprime mortgage-backed securities,
and the subprime market went cold. Banks, security firms, hedge
funds, and other investors were left holding suddenly unmarketable mortgage-backed securities whose value was plummeting. The
economic assault had begun.
Banks and mortgage brokers began closing their doors. In January 2008, Countrywide Financial Corporation, a $100 billion thrift
specializing in home loans, was seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the FDIC, and sold to the Bank of America.
That same month, one credit rating agency downgraded nearly
7,000 mortgage-backed securities and CDOs, an unprecedented
mass downgrade.
In March 2008, as the financial crisis worsened, the Federal Reserve engineered the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan Chase. In
September 2008, in rapid succession, Lehman Brothers declared
bankruptcy, AIG required an $85 billion taxpayer bailout, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the government, and
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding
companies to gain access to Federal Reserve lending programs. A
week later, on September 25, 2008, Washington Mutual Bank, a
$300 billion thrift, then the sixth largest depository institution in
America, was seized and sold to JP Morgan Chase. It was the largest bank failure in U.S. history.
By then, hundreds of billions of dollars in toxic mortgages had
been dumped into the financial system like polluters dumping poison into a river. The toxic mortgages polluted the river of commerce not upstream, but downstream, Wall Street bottled the polluted water, and rating agencies slapped an attractive label on
each bottle, promising safe drinking water. Wall Street sold the
bottles to investors. Regulators observed the whole sordid process
but did little to stop it while profits poured into the participating
banks and security firms. Investors the world overpension funds,
universities, municipalities, and more, not to mention millions of
homeowners, small businesses, and U.S. taxpayersare still paying the price and footing the cleanup bill. That is the big picture.
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Today we start to look at the individual pieces of that picture in
order to deepen our understanding of what happened. We begin by
shining a spotlight on the high-risk home loans and mortgagebacked securities that those loans produced, using as a case history
the policies and practices of Washington Mutual Bank. This Friday,
we will examine the banking regulators charged with ensuring the
safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system, again using
Washington Mutual as a case history. In the following two hearings, we will turn to the role of credit rating agencies, investment
banks, and others.
Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), rose out of the ashes of the
great Seattle fire to make its first home loan in 1890. For many
years, it was a mid-sized thrift specializing in home mortgages. In
the 1980s and 1990s, WaMu entered a period of rapid growth and
acquisition, expanding until it became the Nations largest thrift,
with $188 billion in deposits and 43,000 employees. In 2003, its
long-term CEO, Kerry Killinger, said he wanted WaMu to become
the Walmart of banking, catering to middle- and lower-income
Americans and helping the less well off buy homes.
WaMu held itself out as a well-run, prudent bank that was a pillar of its community. But in 2005, WaMu formalized a strategy
that it had already begun to implementa movement from low-risk
to high-risk home loans. That move to high-risk lending was motivated by three little words: gain on sale.
Gain on sale is a measure of the profit made when a loan is sold
on the secondary market. This chart, which we will put up over
there, is taken from Exhibit 3 in the books.1 It shows a slide from
an April 18, 2006, PowerPoint presentation entitled Shift to Higher Margin Products, which was given to the WaMu board of directors by the president of WaMus Home Loans Division.
In the upper left, there is a box in that Exhibit 3 that lists the
gain on sale for each type of loan that WaMu offers, and as you
can see from this chart, the least profitable loans are governmentbacked and fixed loans. The most profitable are Option ARM, home
equity, and subprime loans. Subprime at 150 basis points is eight
times more profitable than a fixed loan at 19 basis points.
Now, those numbers are not estimates or projections, by the way.
They are the product of actual loan data collected by WaMu.
WaMu traditionally had sold mortgages to well-qualified or
prime borrowers. But in 1999, WaMu bought Long Beach Mortgage
Company, LBMC, which was exclusively a subprime lender, lending to people whose credit histories did not support their getting
a traditional mortgage. Long Beach operated by having third-party
mortgage brokers bring proposed subprime loans to its doors,
issuing financing to the borrower, and paying the brokers a fee.
Even then, Long Beach made loans for the express purpose of packaging them, selling them to Wall Street and profiting from the gain
on sale.
In 2003, Long Beach made and securitized about $4.5 billion in
home loans. By 2006, its loan operations had increased six-fold,
and Long Beachs conveyor belt sent almost $30 billion in subprime
home loans into the financial system.
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Subprime lending can be a responsible business. Most subprime
borrowers pay their loans on time and in full. Long Beach, however, was not a responsible lender. Its loans and mortgage-backed
securities were among the worst performing in the subprime industry. An internal email at WaMus primary Federal regulator, the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), stated that Long Beach mortgage-backed securities prior to 2003 have horrible performance.1
LBMC finished in the top 12 worst annualized net credit losses in
1997 and 1999 through 2003, and this email said LBMC, or Long
Beach, nailed down the number 1 spot as top loser . . . in 2000
and placed third in 2001.
In 2003, things got so bad that WaMus Legal Department put
a stop to all Long Beach securitizations until the company cleaned
up its act. An FDIC report noted at the time that of 4,000 Long
Beach loans reviewed, less than one-quarter, about 950, could be
sold to investors.2 Another 800 were unsalable, and the rest, over
half of the loans, had deficiencies that had to be fixed before a sale
could take place. Several months later, WaMu allowed Long Beach
to start securitizing its loans again as well as selling them in bulk
through what were called whole loan sales.
In 2004, trouble erupted again. An internal WaMu audit of Long
Beach found that relaxed credit guidelines, breakdowns in manual
underwriting processes, and inexperienced subprime personnel.
. . . coupled with a push to increase loan volume and the lack of
an automatic fraud monitoring tool led to deteriorating in loan
quality.3 Many of the loans defaulted within 3 months of being sold
to investors. Investors demanded that Long Beach repurchase
them. Long Beach had to repurchase over $875 million in loans in
2005 and 2006, lost over $107 million from the defaults, and had
to cover a $75 million shortfall in its repurchase reserves.
In response, WaMu fired Long Beachs senior management and
moved the company under the direct supervision of the president
of its Home Loans Division, David Schneider. Washington Mutual
promised its regulator that Long Beach would improve. But it did
not.
In 2008, WaMus president, Steve Rotella, emailed the CEO,
Kerry Killinger, that Long Beachs delinquencies are up 140% and
foreclosures close to 70%. . . . It is ugly, he wrote.4 Five months
later, in September, he emailed that Long Beach has
[r]epurchases, [early payment defaults], manual underwriting,
very weak servicing/collections practices and a weak staff.5 Two
months after that, in November 2006, the head of WaMu Capital
Markets in New York, David Beck, wrote to Mr. Schneider that,
[Long Beach] paper is among the worst performing in the market.
. . .6
At the end of 2006, Long Beach saw another surge in early payment defaults. Mr. Schneider sent an email to his subordinates
that, We are all rapidly losing credibility as a management
1 See
2 See
3 See
4 See
5 See
6 See
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
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team.1 2008 was no better. Audit after audit detailed problems.
WaMus chief risk officer, Ron Cathcart, forwarded an email from
a colleague about Long Beach, noting Appraisal deficiencies . . .
Material misrepresentations . . . Legal documents were missing or
contained errors or discrepancies . . . loan decision errors . . . deterioration was accelerating in recent vintages with each vintage
since 2002 having performed worse than the prior vintage.2
In June 2007, WaMu shut down Long Beach as a separate entity
and took over its subprime lending operations. It issued several
subprime securitizations. The subprime market then froze in the
fall of 2007, and WaMu ended all of its subprime lending. By then,
as shown in this chart,3 from 2000 to 2007, Long Beach and WaMu
together had securitized at least $77 billion in subprime loans.
Today, although AAA-rated securities are supposed to be very
safe with low default rates of 1 to 2 percent, Long Beachs mortgage-backed securities have loan delinquency rates of 20, 30, 40,
and even 50 percent, meaning as much as half of their underlying
loans have gone bad. Those are AAA-rated securities.
Washington Mutuals problems were not confined to its subprime
operations, and the chart that I referred to is going up now showing this huge, steep increase in securitizations of Washington Mutual and Long Beach subprime home loans through 2006. Then, of
course, the bottom fell out in 2007.
Washington Mutuals problems, as I indicated, were not confined
to its subprime operations. In August 2007, more than a year before the collapse of the bank, WaMus president, Steve Rotella,
emailed CEO, Kerry Killinger, saying that aside from Long Beach,
WaMus prime business was the worst managed business I had
seen in my career.4
When Washington Mutual talked about its prime mortgage business, it used the term loosely. While the borrowers who received
loans from WaMus loan officers tended to have better credit scores
than Long Beachs subprime borrowers, that was not always the
case. WaMu loan officers routinely made very risky loans to people
with below average credit scores. And just like at Long Beach, in
WaMus loan business volume was king. Loan officers got paid per
loan and got paid more per loan if certain volume targets were met.
Loan processors were given volume incentives as well as were entire loan processing centers. Even risk managers were evaluated in
part on the extent to which they supported revenue growth targets.
Loan officers also got paid more for closing high-risk loans than
low-risk loans.
Not surprisingly, people cut corners to keep the conveyor belt
moving and increase their pay. For example, a April 2008 placement from a WaMu internal corporate fraud investigator states,
One Sales Associate admitted that during the crunch time some
of the Associates would manufacture asset statements from previous loan documents because the pressure was tremendous and
1 See
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
4 See Exhibit
2 See
3 See
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they had been told to get the loans funded, whatever it took. 1
Her words, whatever it took.
In fact, WaMu personnel regularly identified fraud problems
with its so-called prime loans, but the problems received little attention from management. Perhaps the most compelling evidence
involves two top loan producers at two different WaMu offices
called Montebello and Downey in Southern California. Each of
those loan offices made hundreds of millions of dollars in home
loans each year and consistently won recognition for their efforts.
In 2005, an internal WaMu review found that loans from those two
offices had an extremely high incidence of confirmed fraud. These
are quotes: 58 percent for Downey, 83 percent for Montebello.2
The review found that, virtually all of itand they are referring here now to confirmed fraudvirtually all of it stemming
from employees in these areas circumventing bank policy surrounding loan verification and review. 3 The review went on:
Based on the consistent and pervasive pattern of activity among
these employees, we are recommending firm action be taken to address these particular willful behaviors on the part of the employees named.
That review had taken over a year to complete and was discussed with senior management at the bank, including Home
Loans president, David Schneider, but virtually none of the proposed recommendations were implemented. The fraud problem was
left to fester until 2 years later when, in June 2007, one of the
banks mortgage insurance companies refused to insure any more
loans issued by the loan producer from the Montebello office and
complained to WaMus State and Federal regulators about fraudulent borrower information.
WaMu then conducted another internal investigation, this one
lasting 10 months. In April 2008, a WaMu audit and legal team
produced an internal memorandum which at first WaMu tried to
keep from its regulator, OTS. But the OTS examiner in charge demanded to see the memorandum, and it was eventually turned
over. He told our staff that once he read it, he considered it the
last straw that changed his view of how the bank dealt with fraud.
The April 2008 memorandum, which is Exhibit 24,4 stated that
employees at the Montebello Loan Center consistently described
an environment where production volume rather than quality and
corporate stewardship were the incented focus. At that loan center, 62 percent of the sampled loans from 2 months in 2007 contained misrepresentations and suspected loan fraud. The memorandum noted that similar levels of fraud had been uncovered at
the same loan center in 2005, and that no action had been taken
in response. The memorandum raised the question of whether the
billions of dollars in loans from that center should be reviewed
given the longstanding fraud problem and the fact that the loans
may have been sold to investors. Those fraudulent loans, shocking
in themselves, were symptomatic of a larger problem.
1 See
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
4 See Exhibit
2 See
3 See
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WaMu failed to ensure that its employees issued loans that met
the banks credit requirements. Report after report indicated that
WaMu loan personnel often ignored the banks credit standards.
December 12, 2006, minutes from a WaMu Market Risk Committee
stated, for example, [d]elinquency behavior was flagged in October
[2006] for further review and analysis. . . . The primary factors
contributing to increased delinquency appear to be caused by process issues including the sale and securitizationsale and
securitizationof delinquent loans, loans not underwritten to
standards, lower credit quality loans and seller services reporting
false delinquent payment status.1
A September 2008 review found that controls intended to prevent
the sale of fraudulent loans to investors were not currently effective, and there was no systematic process to prevent a loan . . .
confirmed to contain suspicious activity from being sold to an investor.2 In other words, even where a loan was marked with a red
flag indicating fraud, that did not stop the loan from being sold to
investors. The 2008 review found that of 25 loans tested, 11 reflected a sale date after the completion of the investigation which
confirmed fraud and said there is evidence that this control weakness has existed for some time.
Sales associates manufacturing documents, large numbers of
loans that dont meet credit standards, offices issuing loans in
which 58, 62, or 83 percent contained evidence of fraudulent borrower information, loans marked as containing fraud but then sold
to investors anywaythose are massive, deep-seated problems, and
they are problems that inside the bank were communicated to senior management but were not fixed.
Now, WaMus flagship mortgage product, the Option ARM, was
also marked by shoddy lending practices. The Option ARM is an
adjustable rate mortgage which typically allowed borrowers to pay
an initial teaser rate, sometimes as low as 1 percent for the first
month, and then imposed a much larger floating interest rate
linked to an index. The option in the loan name refers to an arrangement which allowed borrowers to choose each month among
four types of payments: payments that would pay off the loan in
15 or 30 years, an interest-only payment, or a minimum payment
that did not cover even the interest owed, much less the principal.
If the minimum payment options were chosen, the unpaid interest would be added to the loans principal, causing the loan amount
to increase rather than decrease over time. In other words, the borrower could make payments as required but still owe the bank
more money on the principal each month. It was a negative amortizing loan.
Option ARMs allowed borrowers to make very low minimum payments for a specified period of time, before being switched to higher
payment amounts. Most borrowers chose the minimum payment
option. After 5 years, or when the loan principal reached a specific
amount of negative amortization, such as 110 or 115 or 125 percent
of the original loan amount, whichever came first, the Option ARM
would recast. The borrower would then be required to make the
1 See
2 See
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fully amortizing payment needed to pay off the loan within the remaining loan period. The required payment was typically much
greater, often double the prior payment, causing payment shock
and increasing loan defaults.
WaMu was eager to steer borrowers to Option ARMs. Because of
the gain from their sale, the loans were profitable for the bank, and
because of the compensation incentives, they were profitable for
mortgage brokers and loan officers. In 2003, WaMu held focus
groups with borrowers, loan officers, and mortgage brokers to determine how to push that product. A 2003 report summarizing the
focus group research stated, Few participants fully understood the
Option ARM. . . . Participants generally chose an Option ARM because it was recommended to them by their loan consultant. . . .
Only a couple of people had any idea how the interest rate on their
loan was determined.1
It said that while borrowers generally thought that negative amortization was a moderately or very bad concept, that perception
could be turned around by mentioning that price appreciation
would likely overcome any negative amortization. And the report
stated, The best selling point for the Option ARM loan was [borrowers] being shown how much lower their monthly payment
would be . . . versus a fixed-rate loan.
That year, 2003, WaMu originated $30 billion in Option ARMs.
To increase Option ARM sales, WaMu increased the compensation
paid to employees and outside mortgage brokers for the loans and
allowed borrowers to qualify for the loan by evaluating whether
those borrowers could pay a low or even the minimum amount
available under the loan rather than the higher payments that
would follow recast. In 2004, WaMu doubled its production of Option ARMs to more than $67 billion.
WaMu loan officers told the Subcommittee that they expected the
vast majority of Option ARM borrowers to sell or refinance their
homes before their payments increased. As long as home prices
were appreciating, most borrowers were able to refinance. Once
housing prices stopped rising, however, refinancing became difficult. At recast, many people became stuck in homes they could
not afford and began defaulting in record numbers.
WaMu became one of the largest originators of those types of
loans in the country. From 2006 until 2008, WaMu securitized or
sold a majority of the Option ARMs it originated, infecting the financial system with these high-risk mortgages. Like Long Beach
securitizations, WaMu Option ARM securitizations performed badly
starting in 2006, with loan delinquency rates between 30 and 50
percent and rising.
Destructive compensation schemes played a role in the problems
just described. Hearing exhibits will show how Washington Mutual
and Long Beach compensated their loan officers and processors for
loan volume and speed over loan quality. Loan officers were also
paid more for overcharging borrowers, obtaining higher interest
rates or more points than called for in the loan pricing set out in
the banks rate sheets, and were paid more for including stiff prepayment penalties. Loan officers and third-party mortgage brokers
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were also paid more for originating high-risk loans than low-risk
loans. These incentives contributed to shoddy lending practices in
which credit evaluations took a back seat to approving as many
loans as possible.
The compensation problems didnt stop in the loan offices. They
went all the way to the top. WaMus CEO received millions of dollars in pay, even when his high-risk loan strategy began losing
money, even when the bank began to falter, and even when he was
asked to leave his post. From 2003 to 2007, Mr. Killinger was paid
between $11 million and $20 million each year in cash, stock, and
stock options. That is on top of four retirement plans, a deferred
bonus plan, and a separate deferred compensation plan. In 2008,
when he was asked to leave the bank, Mr. Killinger was paid $25
million, including $15 million in severance pay. That is $25 million
for overseeing shoddy lending practices that pumped billions of dollars of bad mortgages into the financial system, another painful example of how executive pay at some U.S. financial firms rewards
failure.
The information uncovered by this Subcommittee is laid out in
over 500 pages of exhibits. These documents detail not only the
shoddy lending practices at Washington Mutual and Long Beach,
they show what senior management knew and what they said to
each other about what they found. Senior executives described
Long Beach as, terrible and a mess, with default rates that
were, ugly. With respect to WaMu retail home loans, internal reviews described, extensive fraud from employees willfully, circumventing bank policy. Controls to stop fraudulent loans from
being sold to investors were described as, ineffective. WaMus
president described it as, the worst managed business he had seen
in his career. That was the reality inside Washington Mutual.
To keep that conveyor belt running and feed the securitization
machine on Wall Street, Washington Mutual engaged in lending
practices that created a mortgage time bomb. We have an exhibit,
Exhibit 1b,1 which summarizes the lending practices that produced
high-risk mortgages and junk securities, including targeting highrisk borrowers, steering borrowers to higher-risk loans, increasing
sales of high-risk loans to Wall Street, not verifying income and
using stated income or liar loans, accepting inadequate documentation loans, promoting teaser rates, interest-only and pick-a-payment loans which were often negatively amortizing, ignoring signs
of fraudulent borrower information, and more.
The last two bullet points on the chart deserve particular scrutiny. We are going to hear today how, at a critical time, Washington Mutual securitized loans that had been selected specifically
for sale because they were likely to go delinquent without informing investors of that fact. Getting them sold became an urgent goal.
We will also hear that, at times, Washington Mutual securitized
loans that had already been identified as being fraudulent, also
without informing investors.
WaMu built its conveyor belt of toxic mortgages to feed Wall
Streets appetite for mortgage-backed securities. Because volume
and speed were king, loan quality fell by the wayside and WaMu
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churned out more and more loans that were high-risk and poor
quality. Once a Main Street bank focused on financing mortgages
for its customers, Washington Mutual was taken in by the shortterm profits that even poor-quality mortgages generated on Wall
Street.
Washington Mutual was not, of course, the only one running a
conveyor belt, dumping high-risk, poor-quality mortgages into the
financial system. Far from it. Some of the perpetrators like Countrywide and New Century have already been hit with Federal enforcement actions and shareholder lawsuits. Others may never be
held accountable. But all of us are still paying the price.
This Subcommittee investigation and the Wall Street excesses
that we have uncovered provide an eerie replay of a 1934 Senate
Committee investigation into the causes and consequences of the
1929 Stock Market Crash. That 1934 investigation found, among
other things, the following.
One, many instances where investment bankers were derelict in
the performance of their fundamental duty to the investing public
to safeguard, to the best of his ability, the intrinsic soundness of
the securities that he issues.
Two, an utter disregard by officers and directors of banks of the
basic obligations and standards arising out of the fiduciary relationship extending not only to stockholders and depositors but to
persons seeking financial accommodation or advice.
Three, compensation arrangements that were an incentive to
bank and securities officers to have the institutions engage in speculative transactions and float securities issues which were hostile
to the interests of these institutions and the investing public.
Four, in retrospect, the fact will emerge with increasing clarity,
this investigation found, that the excessive and unrestrained speculation which dominated the securities markets in recent years has
disrupted the flow of credit, dislocated industry and trade, impeded
the flow of interstate commerce, and brought in its train social consequences inimical to the public welfare.
That is what the Senate Committee found in 1934. Ironically,
several of the banks investigated in 1934 were also participants in
the 2008 financial crisis, another crisis fueled by Wall Street excesses.
The question facing Congress is whether we have the political
will to try to curb those excesses. Hopefully, this investigation and
our findings and recommendations will help strengthen the political will to put an end to the excesses of Wall Street.
Finally, I want to commend my Ranking Member, Senator
Coburn, and his staff for their great support and involvement in
this investigation. They have walked with us. They have worked
with us each step of the way. I now turn to Senator Coburn for his
opening remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN
Senator COBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having this hearing. I think it is going to be beneficial as we go
through the process of all of these hearings in looking at what happened, and why it happened.
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solutely could not afford. In my home State of Oklahoma, we have
suffered 22,000 foreclosures in the past 18 months and 50,000 foreclosures are projected by 2012.
As we move forward, understanding events like the collapse of
WaMu are essential to ensuring that we do not make the same
mistakes again. But I will emphasize again, the mistakes didnt
have to be made had Congress done its job, and we failed miserably.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and I look forward to being the pinprick to make sure that we continue to do the
oversight in the future, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Coburn.
Let me now call our first panel of witnesses for this mornings
hearing: James Vanasek, the former Chief Credit Officer from 1999
to 2004 and Chief Risk Officer from 2004 to 2005 of Washington
Mutual Bank; Ronald Cathcart, the Chief Risk Officer of Washington Mutual Bank from 2006 to 2008; and Randy Melby, the
former General Auditor of Washington Mutual Bank. We appreciate each of you being with us this morning.
Pursuant to Rule 6, all witnesses who testify before the Subcommittee are required to be sworn, so I would ask each of you to
stand. Please raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to this
Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. VANASEK. I do.
Mr. CATHCART. I do.
Mr. MELBY. I do.
Senator LEVIN. We are going to be using a timing system today.
About one minute before the red light comes on, you will see the
light change from green to yellow, which will give you an opportunity to conclude your remarks. Your written testimony will be
printed in its entirety in the record. We would ask that you attempt to limit your oral testimony to no more than 5 minutes.
Mr. Vanasek, we are going to have you go first, followed by Mr.
Cathcart, and then finish up with Mr. Melby, and then we will
turn to questions after that is concluded.
Mr. Vanasek, please proceed. Make sure your microphone is on,
too, and that you speak right into it.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES G. VANASEK,1 FORMER CHIEF CREDIT
OFFICER (19992004) AND CHIEF RISK OFFICER (20042005),
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
Mr. VANASEK. OK. Mr. Chairman, Senator Coburn, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity
to discuss the mortgage and financial crisis from the perspective of
a Chief Credit Officer in the sixth-largest bank in this country.
I was the Chief Credit Officer and later the Chief Risk Officer
of Washington Mutual during the period of September 1999 to December 2005, when I retired. Prior to serving in this capacity, I had
worked for several large banking companies in senior credit-oriented roles, including PNC, First Interstate Bank, Norwest/Wells
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rather than draining reserves at the point where losses are at their
lowest point.
At one point, I was forced by external auditors to reduce the loan
loss reserve of $1.8 billion by $500 million or risk losing our audit
certification. As the credit cycle unfolded, those reserves were sorely needed by the institution. In my opinion, the Basel Accord on
bank capital requirements repeats the same mistake of using
short-term history rather than through-the-cycle information to establish required capital levels, and as such has been a complete
and utter failure.
The conventional wisdom repeated endlessly in the mortgage industry and at Washington Mutual was that while there had been
regional recessions and price declines, there had never been a true
national housing price decline. I believe that is debatable. But it
was widely believed, and partially on this premise, the industry
and Washington Mutual marched forward with more and more
subprime high loan-to-value and option payment products, each one
adding incrementally to the risk profile.
Thank you for your time and attention. I will be happy to address your questions.
Senator LEVIN. Thanks, Mr. Vanasek. Mr. Cathcart.
TESTIMONY OF RONALD J. CATHCART,1 FORMER CHIEF ENTERPRISE RISK OFFICER (20062008), WASHINGTON MUTUAL
BANK
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factors came together to create unprecedented financial conditions
which the market was not equipped to handle. Due to a lack of regulation and lax lending standards, mortgage brokers operated without oversight and underwriting quality suffered as a result. The
banking industrys focus shifted from customer selection to assetbased lending as banks became conduits for Wall Street, which
could and would securitize whatever mortgage pool the bank originated. Rating agencies and regulators seemed to be lulled into a
sense of complacency, and the Government-Sponsored Enterprises
opened their risk envelopes and guaranteed and warehoused increasingly risky products.
Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts and experiences. I look forward to the Subcommittees review of this matter
and I am prepared to answer any questions.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cathcart. We thank
you all for your statements, which we have had an opportunity to
read.
Mr. Melby.
TESTIMONY OF RANDY MELBY,1 FORMER GENERAL AUDITOR,
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
1 The
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of managements operational objectives; and, two, to promote effective business processes to internal control at a reasonable cost.
The board, management, and employees of WaMu were accountable and responsible for establishing both an adequate and effective internal control environment and for balancing risk and reward in determining and executing business strategies. In other
words, internal audit does not set or determine business strategies.
We audit those processes established to execute against business
strategies determined by both the board and management. As defined by COSO, internal control is a process effected by the board,
management, and employees designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives related to the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
I was hired by the Audit Committee to assist the board, management, and employees strengthen WaMus overall system of internal
control by improving and upgrading its internal audit function.
When I joined WaMu in 2004, the company was at the tail end
of a string of significant acquisitions that resulted in, among other
things, multiple and disparate systems and a manually intensive
business process environment. And the Internal Audit Department
was very traditional and in need of being elevated to the next level
of professionalism, credibility, and to be positioned as a forerunner
in effecting change and delivering strategic and value-added internal audit services.
For example, in 2005, we turned over close to 50 percent of the
audit staff, or approximately 40 to 45 people. Most of this turnover
was by design, and we began upgrading the overall quality and experience of the audit team. Turnover was cut in half to 24 percent
in 2006 and improved to below 20 percent in 2008, which is in line
with other large financial services internal audit departments. In
addition, 2005 was a year where we focused on our Internal Audit
Department infrastructure by initiating an audit process improvement project, enhanced our professional practices group, developed
internal metrics and MIS, started performing cross-organizational
audits, and improved overall Audit Committee reporting.
In 2006, I hired a deputy general auditor, an IT audit director,
a professional practices audit director, and an audit director to
oversee and redesign our audit approach for assessing credit risk.
All came from outside of WaMu and reported directly to me and
came with over 75 combined years of internal audit experience.
These changes were significant, specifically as it relates to credit
risk. Corporate Credit Review was positioned within WaMu as an
independent function that was separate from internal audit. This
group was responsible for providing an independent assessment of
WaMus overall credit risk and credit quality and reported up
through the enterprise chief risk officer. These changes were designed to provide enhanced audit coverage of the credit review
function. We redesigned our audit processes. The company acquired
Providian Card Services, and we integrated the Providian audit
team into our Audit Department, approximately 30 professional internal auditors, and we continued performing more risk-based and
strategic audits.
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Last, we received an external review, which is required by the
Institute of Internal Auditors Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, and received the highest rating assigned.
In 2007, we continued hiring external talent to keep pace with
the rapid changes occurring within WaMu. We achieved our full
staffing plan for the first time since I joined the company, which
allowed us to reduce our reliance on external co-source resources.
We enhanced the overall quality of our ongoing risk assessments
with the focus on emerging risks, and Corporate Fraud Investigations was merged and integrated into the Audit Department, and
I hired an Investigations Director from the outside who reported directly to me.
In 2008, we continued enhancing the quality of our assurance
work. We enhanced our continuous risk assessment process with a
focus on enterprise-wide risk assessments, and we continued performing high-risk, cross-organizational audits.
Last, during my tenure as General Auditor, Internal Audit consistently reported to executive management and the Audit Committee those areas of the company that required significant improvement as well as those areas that were well controlled.
I look forward to answering any of your questions to the best of
my ability. Thank you.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much.
We are going to have an opening round, which is a 20-minute
opening round, so that each of us will take up to that. In our subsequent rounds, we may have a little shorter period, but we will start
with that approach.
First, let me start with questions about Long Beach Mortgage.
This was WaMus primary subprime lender. Let me start with you,
Mr. Vanasek. Did Long Beach have an effective risk management
regime when you arrived at WaMu?
Mr. VANASEK. No, sir, they did not.
Senator LEVIN. And did they develop an effective risk management regime while you were there?
Mr. VANASEK. No, sir, they did not.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cathcart, when you were there from 2006 to
2008 at WaMu, did Long Beach have an effective risk management
regime?
Mr. CATHCART. No, sir.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Now, since Long Beach was exclusively a subprime lender, its loans were all high risk in a sense.
I gather that subprime loans are high risk for a number of reasons.
Is that correct?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, that is correct.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Vanasek, would you agree?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes, I agree.
Senator LEVIN. Now, take a look, if you all would, at Exhibit 1c.1
This is based on WaMu data, and it shows the Long Beach and
WaMu securitizations of subprime loans. In 6 years, starting from
2000 all the way through 2006, the securitization of subprime home
loans went from $2.5 billion all the way up to $29 billion. And then
in 2007, the number dropped dramatically, not because Long Beach
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Mr. VANASEK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Melby, one of the first audits that you
oversaw after joining WaMu was an April 2006 audit of Long
Beach, and that is Exhibit 10,1 if you will look in your exhibit book.
This is entitled Memorandum, April 17, 2006, to the Board of Directors Audit Committees of Washington Mutual. It is from you,
and it is regarding Long Beach Mortgage Company Repurchase
Reserve Root Cause Analysis. This was submitted to the Boards
Audit Committee. Is that correct?
Mr. MELBY. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. And on page 1 at the bottom, it says the following: LBMC [Long Beach] experienced a dramatic increase in
early payment defaults. Those are EPDs. Do you see that about
eight lines from the bottom?
Mr. MELBY. Yes, I do.
Senator LEVIN. LBMC [Long Beach] experienced a dramatic increase in EPDs [early payment defaults] during the third quarter
of 2005, it says there, and, The early payment default recourse
provisions of whole loan sales agreements led to a large volume of
required loan repurchases.
Now I am going to sayand you can say if this is accuratethat
Long Beach ended up repurchasing more than $800 million in
loans, incurring a loss of $100 million. And your memo goes on to
say at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2 that Long Beach
did not record an appropriate level of repurchase reserves for the
repurchase obligations and, As a result, gains on those sales were
overstated and not corrected until the first quarter of 2006. Is that
correct?
Mr. MELBY. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. Then on page 2, the first bullet point, Management Control Weaknesses were identified by you at that first bullet point, which is about two-thirds of the way down. Relaxed credit guidelines, breakdowns in manual underwriting processes, inexperienced subprime personnel, coupled with a push to increase loan
volume and the lack of an automated fraud monitoring tool exacerbated the deterioration in loan quality. Is that correct?
Mr. MELBY. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. Did the audit find that Long Beach then was consistently approving poor loans?
Mr. MELBY. That is a fair assessment.
Senator LEVIN. And did it find that Long Beach had weak controls over the loan approval process?
Mr. MELBY. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. And the push to increase loan volume made
things worse?
Mr. MELBY. In my opinion, it did.
Senator LEVIN. And did you inform senior management of the
problems?
Mr. MELBY. We did, yes.
Senator LEVIN. What was their response?
Mr. MELBY. An action plan was put together, which is part of Internal Audits process and something thatthey were receptive to
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the changes. It is something that was monitored on a go-forward
basis.
Senator LEVIN. So they indicated they would make changes.
Mr. MELBY. They did, yes.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cathcart, look at Exhibit 16,1 if you would.
Now we are at January 2007. This is an email chain at the end
of December 2006 and beginning of January 2007 between you and
your colleagues at Washington Mutual about the quality of assets
at Long Beach. And you write, Long Beach represents a real problem for WaMu. That is the way you start that memo. What was
the problem that you were identifying at that time?
Mr. CATHCART. I had seen a number of internal audits prepared
by Randy Melbys group that indicated significant control weaknesses. I was seeing reports that indicated poor performance of the
securitized portion of Long Beach mortgages which put us in the
lowest quartile of performance. And I believed that we had gaps in
our controls associated with Long Beach.
Senator LEVIN. And had there been a surge of loans that had to
be repurchased as well?
Mr. CATHCART. There was a surge of loans just after I arrived,
and I believe that was the $800 million that Mr. Melby was just
talking about.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, in 2006, Washington Mutual
made Long Beach a direct subsidiary of the bank and put it under
the direct supervision of the Home Loans Division, but that did not
seem to help. Mr. Melby, take a look at Exhibit 19.2 Your audit
teamthis is August 20, 2007issued another Long Beach audit
report, and it reported a failure to follow underwriting guidelines
and if you look at Exhibit 19, accurate reporting and tracking of
exceptions to policy does not exist. That is on page 2. Do you see
that?
Mr. MELBY. I do, yes.
Senator LEVIN. That is called a high risk to the business unit.
Is that correct?
Mr. MELBY. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. And in this audit, you also say that when credit
rules were tight, a Long Beach employee did not always comply
and instead approved loans that were riskier than the bank said
it wanted to originate. Is that correct?
Mr. MELBY. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. Now, specialty lending is what Washington Mutual called its subprime operations after it abolished Long Beach
as a separate entity and took over the subprime lending function
itself, right?
Mr. MELBY. That is correct, yes.
Senator LEVIN. Now, wholesale specialty lending was its brokerinitiated subprime operation, right?
Mr. MELBY. That is my understanding, yes.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cathcart.
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, that is correct.
1 See
2 See
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Senator LEVIN. Now, if you will look at Exhibit 21,1 you will see
there a review of wholesale specialty lending FPD, which is first
payment defaults, and that was distributed to you, Mr. Cathcart,
so presumably you saw that at the time. Is that correct?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, it is.
Senator LEVIN. It also went to the chairman and chief executive
officer, Mr. Killinger. Do you see that on the right?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, I do.
Senator LEVIN. And to Mr. Rotella, Steve Rotella. Do you see
that on the right?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, I do.
Senator LEVIN. And to David Schneider.
Mr. CATHCART. Correct.
Senator LEVIN. OK. He was the president of Home Loans at that
time.
Now, on page 3 of that report, it identifies two high-risk issues,
and this is on the top of page 3. Do you see where it says that?
Ineffectiveness of Fraud Detection Tools.
Mr. CATHCART. Correct.
Senator LEVIN. And Weak credit infrastructure impacting credit
quality, do you see that?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. And those were high risk?
Mr. CATHCART. Correct.
Senator LEVIN. To the company.
Mr. CATHCART. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. Now, this review that we are looking atand this
is, again, Exhibit 21this review looked at 187 loans that had first
payment defaults. In other words, the first payment was not even
made in those 187 loans. I am now reading down here on page 3
of this exhibit. One hundred thirty-two of the 187 were reviewed,
and 115 had confirmed fraud. Do you see where that is there?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. So 132 sampled were identified with red flags,
reading from this report, and of that, 115 had confirmed fraud, 80
had unreasonable income listed, which means that the income that
someone said they had was not reasonable for that occupation or
that person. Is that correct?
Mr. CATHCART. Correct. There should be a reasonableness test
when these subprime mortgages are originated.
Senator LEVIN. And 80 of these 115sorry, 80 of the 132 had unreasonable income. Then it says 133 had evaluation or loan decision errors. Do you see that?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, I do.
Senator LEVIN. Do you see where it says 87 exceeded program
parameters?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. Now, why didnt WaMu clean this up, do you
know? I mean, this is a report that went right to Mr. Killinger. Mr.
Rotella and Mr. Schneider received copies of this audit. Do you
know why this continued, why this was not cleaned up at that
time?
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Mr. CATHCART. I can only tell you that it was my role as chief
enterprise risk officer to ensure that both senior management and
the Board was made aware of these findings and that they understood the contents. I cannot speak for management actions.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Mr. Vanasek, do you want to add anything to that? Do you know why they were not cleaned up?
Mr. VANASEK. No. I was retired by that time.
Senator LEVIN. You were retired by then. Mr. Melby.
Mr. MELBY. My response would be similar to Mr. Cathcarts. Our
job is to report the issues. We do extensive follow-up, and we reported up through the Board accordingly.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, according to this memo, the push
to increase loan volume made things worse. Is that correct?
Mr. CATHCART. That is correct
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, if you would look at Exhibit 22, the
problem at WaMu was not confined to Long Beach. Exhibit 22a.1
Now, this is an internal WaMu memo from November 2005 called
Southern California Emerging Markets Targeted Loan Review Results. It says at the top, Due to a sustained history of confirmed
fraud findings over the past three years from the Emerging Markets and Retail Broker Program areas, the Home Loans Risk Mitigation Team recently conducted a targeted review of loans originated in two Southern California Community Fulfillment Centers.
Now, Community Fulfillment Centers are WaMus loan processing
offices. Is that correct, Mr. Vanasek?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, the memo was addressed to you. Do
you remember the investigation?
Mr. VANASEK. I do.
Senator LEVIN. We are going back here to 2005. The investigation focused on two WaMu loan offices called Montebello and Downey, and reviewed the loans issued by WaMu employees and also
loans that were brought to the offices by third-party mortgage brokers who were paid a fee when a loan that they brought was financed by the bank. Is it correct that Montebello and Downey offices were headed by two of WaMus top loan producers and that
a lot of loans came out of each of those offices, as much as $1 billion in mortgages in a year?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes, that is correct.
Senator LEVIN. And the memo discusses a year-long internal investigation that WaMus own employees conducted into suspected
fraud affecting loans issued by the Montebello and Downey offices,
which are referred to as Community Fulfillment Centers (CFCs).
Among the findings, here is what the memo says, in the middle of
the page there: . . . an extensive level of loan fraud exists in the
Emerging Markets CFCs, virtually all of it stemming from employees in these areas circumventing bank policy surrounding loan
verification and review . . . 42% of the loans reviewedand this,
again, is in the middle of the page42% of the loans reviewed
contained suspect activity or fraud, virtually all of it attributable
to some sort of employee malfeasance or failure to execute company
policy.
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Behind Exhibit 22a is that PowerPoint presentation, Exhibit
22b,1 called Retail Fraud Risk Overview, and that provides a lot
of detail about this 2005 investigation, as well as Exhibit 23b,2
which is an email with data showing that the percentage of loans
containing fraudulent information at the Montebello office was 83
percent and the percentage at the Downey office was 58 percent.
So now back to Exhibit 22b. It gives some examples of the fraud
found. Here is one on page 10 of that memo, Fraud Loan Samples. Here is what that sample says. This is page 10, Exhibit 22b,
loan number, and it gives the number. Misrepresentation [of] the
borrowers identification and qualifying information were confirmed
in every aspect of this filemisrepresentation, every aspect of this
fileincluding Income . . . Possible Strawbuyer or Fictitious borrower. The credit package was found to be completely fabricated.
Throughout the process, red flags were over-looked, process requirements were waived. . . .
Mr. Vanasek, those fraud percentages, 83 percent, 58 percent,
those are truly eye-popping numbers, are they not?
Mr. VANASEK. They are.
Senator LEVIN. And the report said that most of the fraud was
due to willful behavior of WaMu employees. Did that surprise you
when you read it?
Mr. VANASEK. No.
Senator LEVIN. The memo came out in November 2005. You left
the bank in December 2005.
Now, Mr. Melby, you had become auditor a year earlier, in December 2004. Were you told about this report?
Mr. MELBY. Not at the time.
Senator LEVIN. All right. So you didnt know about this report at
the time.
Mr. MELBY. At the time, no.
Senator LEVIN. Now take a look at Exhibit 22a.
Let me just ask you, Mr. Vanasek, you said you were not surprised at those numbers. As I said, these are really unbelievable
numbers to an outsider like me, I mean, fraud at that level. Why
werent you surprised?
Mr. VANASEK. There had been long rumors of those offices regarding this kind of activity and suspicion about it. Nancy Gonseth,
the author of this memo, came forward and talked to a number of
people on my staff. We invited Ms. Gonseth to come to Seattle and
sit down and see if it moved from the area of suspicion to the area
of fact, and this report that you see is the net result of that discussion. It was forwarded to David Schneider, as head of the mortgage
lending area, for action. I did not have the authority to remove
these loan originators.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, let me just finish this line of questioning, and I will turn this over then to you, Senator Coburn. I
am a little over my 20 minutes, but it is all right. I will just finish
this one line of questioning.
Now, in Exhibit 22a, it said that, Based on the consistent and
pervasive pattern of activity among these employees, we are recom1 See
2 See
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Senator COBURN. And were the items that Senator Levin highlighted, Exhibits 10 and 22 in terms of this own internal lookare
you aware that at any time the Board was made aware of each of
those studies, whether the CEO or others were? Was the Board as
a whole ever made aware of those studies, that you are aware of?
Mr. CATHCART. I dont recall any reports to the Board that highlighted these problems.
Senator COBURN. Would you think that would be important to
Board members, to understand that 73 percent or 53 percent of the
loans didnt qualify even under the loose standards?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, Senator, I considered it material. And although I wasnt aware of this particular issue, I was concerned that
the internal Fraud Investigations Group, which looked at employee
fraud, was not as effective as it could be. So during my tenure,
after several quarters, I moved that group, which at the time reported into the retail part of the bank. I moved it under the Chief
Internal Auditor, Randy Melby, who took over the function. He restaffed it, put a new hire in charge, and after that happened, these
internal employee fraud investigations were picked up, taken up by
audit. And as a result, that way, I could be very sure the Board
was aware of the results, which is what happened after that
change took place.
Senator COBURN. Were you ever rebuked by the Board for giving
too pessimistic an outlook in terms of the risks of the actions of the
mortgage unit?
Mr. CATHCART. No, I wasnt.
Senator COBURN. Were there any questions of the Board members to you about your assessment of the risk parameters that we
talked about in terms of what Senator Levin outlined in both Exhibit 10 and Exhibit 22?
Mr. CATHCART. Well, I can recall certainly my first risk report to
the Board, which was in April 2006, there was no discussion.
Senator COBURN. Is it your feeling, both Mr. Vanasek and Mr.
Cathcart, that the Board was responsive to the areas of concern
that you raised?
Mr. CATHCART. I would say the Board was responsive. The Board
would continually ask management why progress hadnt been made
on certain chronic issues which were repeat items from both internal audit, credit review, and from the regulators. But it appeared
as if there was little consequence to these problems not being fixed.
Senator COBURN. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Vanasek, on Exhibit 78a,1 there is an email exchange between you and Mr. Killinger where he said, I have never seen
such a high-risk housing market. . . . This typically signifies a
bubble. You responded, All the classic signs are there. Wasnt
this email written just months after WaMu made a strategic decision to shift to riskier lending?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes, it was.
Senator COBURN. How do you account for the fact that somebody
has seen a bubble, and by definition, a bubble is going to burst, and
then their corporate strategy is to jump into the middle of that
bubble?
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Mr. VANASEK. Correct.
Senator COBURN. In the viewpoint of packaging loans to be resold, what was the attitude inside WaMu in terms ofeverybody
knew they had a lot of poor loans. I mean, all this data we have
collected. Yet WaMu was still packaging loans and the rating agencies were still giving them AAAcredit rating agencies. What was
the attitude? You could package as much junk as you want and
still get a AAA rating and move it out the door? What was the culture that said we can keep doing this even though we know we are
selling a product that is not worth the paper it is written on?
Mr. VANASEK. I would suggest you need to address that question
to Mr. Beck and Mr. Schneider, who were responsible on the credit
side. We were not responsible for selecting mortgages that would
go into pools. We had no part in that whatsoever.
Senator COBURN. But you did see it happening?
Mr. VANASEK. We did see large volumes of mortgage-backed securities being created
Senator COBURN. Right.
Mr. VANASEK [continuing]. And it was viewed as a profit center
in the Washington Mutual Capital Corp. But I didnt know or
didnt see that they were being selective in terms of what was
going in versus what was not going in.
Senator COBURN. All right. Mr. Cathcart, any comments on that?
Mr. CATHCART. Well, I would agree that as a Chief Risk Officer,
I didnt participate in the selection process and had understood
that these were almost pari passu type selections, in other words,
randomly sampled portfolios, and if that isnt the case, that would
surprise me. I think there was a belief that the rating agencies, if
the rating agencies were able toand I wasnt part of the process,
but if the rating agencies were satisfied with the tranching of the
securitization, then it would satisfy the market. But I would agree
with Mr. Vanasek that the question is properly directed at the
group that sold the portfolios.
Senator COBURN. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask unanimous consent for Senator Collins opening
statement to be placed in the record.1
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much for that. It will be made
part of the record. Senator Kaufman.
Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this incredibly important hearing at an incredibly important time.
Mr. Vanasek, you mentioned in your opening statement that you
thought the repeal of Glass-Steagall was a big mistake. Could you
kind of expand on why you thought that was a big mistake?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes. I think when you create a situation like
Washington Mutual Capital Corporation, you encourage the very
question that just was asked of me. I also thought that perhaps the
talent was not sufficiently available for all of the companies that
suddenly started creating mortgage-backed securities and filling
the marketplace.
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Senator KAUFMAN. And this may be above your pay grade. What
would you think about reinstituting that in light of what happened?
Mr. VANASEK. I think certainly I am not an expert on GlassSteagall, but I think certainly elements of it deserve to be considered.
Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. You mentioned about FICO
scores, and I understand you dont do the individual mortgages and
you are not familiar with the section in The Big Short where he
talks about in horrifying detail, how FICO scores were just used.
Mr. VANASEK. Yes.
Senator KAUFMAN. Can you comment on how FICO scores were
used at Washington Mutual?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes. FICO scores were the best single indicators
we had in terms of predicting default or successful underwriting.
We moved more and more to FICO scores over time because of
what was happening with conventional underwriting, where we
would have in the past looked at either tax returns or pay stubs
or other things we would have looked at, we would have had different kinds of appraisals. They wouldnt have been drive-by appraisals. It would have been full appraisals, and so forth. So in the
absence of those more detailed forms of underwriting and analysis,
we had relied more heavily on FICO.
Senator KAUFMAN. And the barbelling you were talking about, do
you think that went on?
Mr. VANASEK. I am sure that it went on. It was evidenced thoroughly in the book that certain packagers of mortgages did that
and then the rating agencies would take and pool them and rate
80 percent of them AAA, even though the individual mortgages
were nowhere near AAA.
Senator KAUFMAN. And do you think it went on at Washington
Mutual?
Mr. VANASEK. I cant answer that. I dont, again, know the selection process that went into the pools.
Senator KAUFMAN. Where that went on, how would you characterize that behavior? I mean, is that just kind of the rules of the
road, let the buyer beware, caveat emptor?
Mr. VANASEK. I think it was gaming the rating agencies.
Senator KAUFMAN. Gaming, meaning
Mr. VANASEK. Meaning that they knew how the ratings agencies
were putting these ratings on the pools and so long as that was the
case, they didnt see any problem with putting low FICO score
mortgages in with high FICO score mortgages if they could still get
the AAA rating.
Senator KAUFMAN. But then you had to wrap these mortgages up
and get them into mortgage-backed securities and sell them to people. I mean, was there any requirement that you disclose that you
were using this technique to get around the rating agencies?
Mr. VANASEK. I dont believe there was. I believe the rating agenciestheir job was to look at the distribution of FICO scores within
those mortgages and I am not sure that they did it.
Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, but I am just saying, now we get past
them. They are doing it. We have gotten around them. We have figured a way to get around them. But then we actually take the se-
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curities with the rating agencies and we are giving them out to the
people who are purchasing the mortgage-backed securities. Now, I
think they would assume, not just because a rating agency said it,
but it would seem to me that Washington Mutual kind of said that
this was not being arranged in a deceptive way.
Is that fair toI mean, what is the responsibility to the people?
OK, the rating agencies, we know they failed their responsibility.
What is the responsibility to Washington Mutual when it sells
mortgage-backed securities to disclose to the folks that buy them
that this is how we go about business? I understand the rating
agencies failed theirs. What about Washington Mutuals responsibility?
Mr. VANASEK. I think we had a responsibility to share with them
the distribution of FICO scores and other characteristics of the
mortgages in a full disclosure environment.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Cathcart, what do you think?
Mr. CATHCART. I am not familiar with the disclosure rules surrounding the securitizations and didnt participate in the selection
or the disclosure.
Senator KAUFMAN. All right.
Mr. CATHCART. But I would like to pick up on something that
Mr. Vanasek said concerning FICO scores. There were two things
that happened with respect to FICO scores. There was definitely an
overdependence on them, but under the surface, the bank had
changed the way it originated. Banks changed the way they were
originating loans, which I think is what Mr. Vanasek already said.
But the second change was the customer behavior also changed
and we had a phenomenon which we had never seen before, which
was that a buyer who bought a house that ended up being so-called
underwater, where the house was worth less than the mortgage,
actually stopped making payments. We first saw this in 2006, and
what resulted is when you looked at the delinquency rates for a
population of borrowers, you found that the high FICO score borrowers were delinquent at exactly the same rate as the low FICO
score borrowers, which in theory was impossible. So it had the
whole industry scratching its head. That phenomenon appeared
about Q4 of 2006.
In retrospect, what became clear was that in the past, borrowers
would have first let their credit cards go and the very last asset
that they allowed to go delinquent was their home. This time
around, it literally went in reverse, where it was deteriorating
housing prices that caused the mortgage to go delinquent and the
credit cards were preserved. And we actually saw that phenomenon
in our credit card portfolio, where we found that people who didnt
own houses had performance that did not deteriorate in the earlier
stages of the cycle, whereas people who owned homes deteriorated.
And that was completely counterintuitive.
So these sorts of changes, when you throw them into an environment where there is an overdependence on FICO, results in really
basically steering with the lights out.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Melby, do you have any comments on
that, FICO scores?
Mr. MELBY. I have nothing more to add.
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that the approach that the OTS took was much more light-handed
than I was used to. It seemed as if the regulator was prepared to
allow the bank to work through its problems and had a higher degree of tolerance than I had expected with the otherthan I had
seen with the other two regulators. I would say the relationship
was good, but in the case of Long Beach Mortgage, for example, in
my experience, regulators would have closed that channel down if
management hadnt much earlier than the OTS was prepared to.
Senator KAUFMAN. For both of you, wouldnt one explanation be
that the people at the very top as the agencies had a self-regulatory attitude? As a matter of fact, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, at the very top, Alan Greenspan, we should be selfregulating. I mean, as opposed to a political thing that somehow
someone is getting a political deal because they know someone. I
know that is way above your pay gradewhich of those seem more
compelling as an excuse for the fact?
Mr. CATHCART. I wouldnt characterize it as an excuse, but I
would say that the OTS did believe in self-regulation.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Vanasek.
Mr. VANASEK. I think you have to look at the fact that Washington Mutual made up a substantial portion of the assets of the
OTS and one wonders if the continuation of the agency would have
existed had Washington Mutual failed. So I think they had a very
strong mutual interest in the company succeeding.
Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. Mr. Cathcart, Mr. Vanasek talked
about a stated income loan. Can you give us your definition of a
stated income loan?
Mr. CATHCART. A stated income loan is one where the loan consultant asks the person how much they make and they enter that
onto the credit application.
Senator KAUFMAN. And there is no further follow-up of that number?
Mr. CATHCART. Correct.
Senator KAUFMAN. When was that developed? I guess it was during your period, Mr. Vanasek, is that right?
Mr. VANASEK. It preceded me by some period of time, but it became a higher percentage of the loans over time as it became more
market acceptable.
Senator KAUFMAN. And Mr. Cathcart, why do you think stated
income loans became a higher percentage of the loans that were
being originated?
Mr. CATHCART. Well, as Mr. Vanasek said, it originated as a
product for self-employed individuals who didnt have pay stubs
and whose financial statements didnt necessarily reflect what they
made. It was intended to be available for only the most creditworthy borrowers and it was supposed to be tested for reasonableness so that a person who said that they were a waiter or a lowerpaid individual couldnt say that they had an income of $100,000.
I think that the standards eroded over time. At least I have become aware, reading all that has happened.
Senator KAUFMAN. Right.
Mr. CATHCART. Standards eroded over time and that it became
a competitive tool that was used by banks to gather business, so
that if a loan consultant could send his loan to Bank A or Bank
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B, the consultant would say, well, why dont you go to Bank B? You
dont have to state your income.
I do think, thinking it through, that there was a certain amount
of coaxing that was possible between the loan consultant and the
individual, which would be something which would be invisible to
a bank that received the application and the only test for that
would be reasonableness, which as you have heard there were some
issues with in the portfolio.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Vanasek, how far up the management
chain in Washington Mutual do you think they are aware that the
percentage of stated loan incomes that people were engaging in,
what Mr. Cathcart said, and that more and more this is becoming
a way to get around the rules in order to package as many mortgages as possible to then sell off in mortgage-backed securities?
Mr. VANASEK. I have to believe that given the long-term experience of the executives that they knew.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Cathcart.
Mr. CATHCART. I would say that all of the review functions were
identifying that as a risk issue and that, therefore, both senior
management and the Board were aware.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Melby.
Mr. MELBY. I would agree.
Senator KAUFMAN. What size mortgages could you get stated income on? Could it go on in any mortgage that Washington Mutual
offered, do you know?
Mr. VANASEK. I am not aware of any particular limit that existed, but I could be incorrect.
Mr. CATHCART. I do not recall the guidelines. I believe stated income was a carve-out of the entire population so there were certain
prequalifications in place that would allow the offering of a stated
income loan. But I do not have any details associated with that.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Vanasek, do you think when a stated income loan was resold, do you think the prospectus disclosed that,
in fact, the loan was made without verification of a borrowers income?
Mr. VANASEK. Well, again, Mr. Beck would probably be the best
source for that, but the indications were that it may have been in
the prospectus. Whether anyone paid attention to all of the detail
in the prospectus, I do not know.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Cathcart.
Mr. CATHCART. I am not familiar with the offering memoranda,
but I would say that stated income loans were a market standard
of sorts, and it would not surprise me that buyers were aware that
stated income loans were in the portfolio.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Melby, do you have anything to add on
this?
Mr. MELBY. I have nothing to add.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Melby, do you think the line managers
knew that loan originators were knowingly sponsoring mortgage
applications that contained lies?
Mr. MELBY. I think the answer is yes. We had certainly picked
that up in several of our investigation reports through discussions,
through our independent investigation work.
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not addressed thoroughly and promptly in the fashion that I was
accustomed to seeing.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Cathcart, do you have the same opinion,
that it was not addressed in a timely manner based on the number
of examples that were being reported to the top of the company,
that there was, in fact, fraud going on at the lower levels on the
origination forms?
Mr. CATHCART. I would agree it was not responded to appropriately, and I would also agree with Mr. Vanaseks comment that
Washington Mutual was unusual in the fact that it allowed these
gaps to continue for as long as it did.
Senator KAUFMAN. All right. Mr. Melby.
Mr. MELBY. I would agree with those comments.
Senator KAUFMAN. I guess that is all the questions I have, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman.
Let me just pick up on that comment of yours, Mr. Melby, about
the allegations going to the Board in 2008, allegations of fraud.
This is Exhibit 24,1 which I think you were referring to. We have
seen the earlier reports showing extensive fraud in applications.
We have seen that they were not acted upon, and now we have a
report going to the Board on April 4, 2008. I think this is probably
what you were referring to, Mr. Melby, when you said that the report on the subject of fraud went to the Board in 2008. Is that correct?
Mr. MELBY. Yes, that is correct.
Senator LEVIN. On page 3 of this memo, Exhibit 24, right there
in the middle, it says that the 2005 and 2007 reviews found high
levels of misrepresentation and suspected loan fraud for this [office]
(62% of the 2007 sampled loans). That was the same office, in
other wordsthe events of 2007 were covered in the 2008 report
that we are looking at. Those high fraud levels continued. This is
the same office, again, that had 83 percent in the earlier audit,
right?
Mr. MELBY. Correct.
Senator LEVIN. Now, what was your reaction, Mr. Melby, to the
fraud finding in this 2008 report that another investigation 2 years
earlier had found similar results?
Mr. MELBY. Well, this was a series of questions that had been
asked of me. This is the report and the work that we had done that
simply pulled it all together. So the previous work done by the Risk
Mitigation Group within Home Loans back in 2005, subsequent
samples being tested in late 2005 all the way through 2007, it was
clear there was a pattern of conduct with the same fraud findings
were occurring which led us to certainly conclude that action had
not been taken.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, were you appalled, basically,
when you found that action had not been taken during this period?
Mr. MELBY. I was deeply concerned to the point where there was
no question that this had to be escalated up to the Audit Committee.
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Senator LEVIN. All right. What was the reaction now? You talked
to senior managers, I believe Mr. Killinger, Mr. Rotellais that
correct?about this.
Mr. MELBY. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. And what was their reaction?
Mr. MELBY. It has been a while. Certainly concerned, but I do
not have an explanation for you as to a response as to why this
was not addressed. Again, we reported the facts, and our job was
to make certain that we had action on it this time going forward.
Senator LEVIN. And when you talked toI take it you talked
with Mr. Schneider as well?
Mr. MELBY. On this report, yes.
Senator LEVIN. What was his reaction?
Mr. MELBY. Mr. Schneider was certainly concerned with the
issues. Mr. Schneider had some concerns with some of the accuracy, I think, of some of the issues in the report. We vetted those
issues and felt we had done a thorough job and stood by the results
of our work.
Senator LEVIN. So he disputed some of the facts.
Mr. MELBY. We did not sit down specifically and talk. I know Mr.
Schneider had some concerns with some of the issues, but for the
most part did not dispute the overall results of the report.
Senator LEVIN. On page 2 of this exhibit, the second bullet point
there, it says that Home Loans Risk Mitigation generated alerts
that identified patterns of fraudulent loan practices and provided
remediation recommendations that were not acted upon by [Home
Loans] Senior Management. Employee interviews conducted during
this investigation consistently described an environment where production volume rather than quality and corporate stewardship
were the incented focus.
Then if you go back again on page 3, if you look at that bullet
point at the top of page 3 of that exhibit, it says there that, Loan
Producers were compensated for volume of loans closed and Loan
Processors were compensated for speed of loan closing rather than
a more balanced scorecard of timeliness and loan quality. It says
there that, Employee interviews conducted during this investigation consistently described an environment where production volume rather than quality and corporate stewardship were the
incented focus.
How did senior management, Mr. Melby, react to the finding that
compensation incentives put loan speed and volume over loan quality?
Mr. MELBY. I do not recollect a specific discussion around that
other than we had concluded and made our conclusion just drawing
on what we felt was a preponderance of evidence over the prior 2
years based on other internal reports as well as our own interviews
with employees.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cathcart, what was your reaction to this
2008 report? Were you surprised basically that nothing had been
done following the 2005 investigation?
Mr. CATHCART. I do not recall this report. It happened shortly before I left.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Appendix B in this report, near the top
it says, Outside of training sessions that Risk Mitigation con-
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ducted in late 2005, there was little evidence that any of the recommended strategies were followed or that recommendations were
operationalized. Do you see that?
Mr. MELBY. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. OK. How does a bank that turns out loans of
which 58 or 62 or 83 percent contain misrepresentations or fraudulent borrower information, how does a bank operate that way and
expect that there is going to be any confidence in the loans that
it is issuing? In other words, how does it claim to be a reliable institution with these kind of numbers, Mr. Vanasek?
Mr. VANASEK. Well, it is very difficult, obviously. If you will permit me, Senator, a short story. Earlier on in my career at the bank,
I conducted three meetings with groups of underwriters in the
mortgage area at three different locations, and I asked them one
simple question: Can you make the decisions that you arrive at
hold? And the answer was universally no, because the loans were
always escalated up, so if they declined a loan, it was escalated to
a higher level, a marketing manager who would ultimately approve. That was part of the environment.
Senator LEVIN. Basically they did not want to slow down loan
production.
Mr. VANASEK. Correct.
Senator LEVIN. It was too profitable, and it would have gone to
a competitor. Is that basically the problem?
Mr. VANASEK. Correct.
Senator LEVIN. And the other question that is raised, though, by
this exhibit is whether or not investors who bought these loans
needed to be notified of the fraud. And if you look at both the bottom of page 3 and the bottom of page 4, it raises the question, since
there was such a significant amount of it in those particular areas,
that the investors who bought them might need legally to be notified.
Mr. VANASEK. If the seller knows there is fraud, I think they are
compelled to reveal it.
Senator LEVIN. Now, the fraud problem is not limited to
Montebello and Downey. Take a look at Exhibit 30,1 if you all
would. This is a WaMu document called Significant Incident Notification. It is dated April 1, 2008, about loans that were issued in
2007 by another WaMu retail loan office called Westlake Village,
which is near Los Angeles.
The first bullet point in Exhibit 30 says, Many of the loans had
several fraud findings such as fabricated asset statements, altered
statements, income misrepresentation and one altered statement
that is believed to have been used in two separate loans.
Third bullet point. One Sales Associate admitted that during
that crunch time some of the Associatessome of the associates
would manufacture asset statements from previous loan documents and submit them to the [Loan Fulfillment Center]. She said
the pressure was tremendous from the LFC to get them the docs
since the loan had already been funded and pressure from the Loan
Consultants to get the loans funded.
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The next bullet says that loan consultants did not instruct them
to falsify documentation and just told them to get the loans funded
with whatever it took. Whatever it took.
Exhibit 31,1 if you take a look at that. That memo summarizes
the same investigation. It says that, Sales Associates would take
[asset] statements from other files and cut and paste the current
borrowers name and address.
Mr. Cathcart and Mr. Melby, were you informed about this investigation at the Westlake Village office? Did you know about it, Mr.
Cathcart?
Mr. CATHCART. I was aware of it based on this correspondence,
yes.
Senator LEVIN. You were aware of it at the time?
Mr. CATHCART. This email is me being informed of this.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Mr. Melby.
Mr. MELBY. Yes, the Investigation Group reported to me, so I
was aware.
Senator LEVIN. Now, do you know if that loan officer was held
accountable in any way? Do you have any knowledge of that?
Mr. MELBY. No, I do not. Senator, my understanding on this, we
did a lot of investigation reports. It is my opinionI think that this
individual was terminated.
Senator LEVIN. I think, though, that they were offered a job within the bank before they left. I think they left the bank but were
offered jobs. Do you know if I am wrong on that?
Mr. MELBY. I am not aware of that.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, banks that find out about high rates
of fraud affecting their loans and then do not do anything about
them is emblematic of how banks contributed to the financial crisis, putting short-term profits first, letting deep-seated problems
responsible for poor loan quality fester, churning out and selling
billions of dollars of defective-quality loans, and it all helped poison
our financial system with toxic mortgages.
I have some additional questions, but we have a 10-minute round
on this one, so I will turn it back to Dr. Coburn and then come
back for a third round.
Senator COBURN. I have one serious question, and you can answer it one of two ways, one inside or one being outside. If you
were an investor in Washington Mutual and you knew what was
going on, would you consider that as being a material adverse risk
factor from Washington Mutual?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes
Senator COBURN. Mr. Cathcart.
Mr. CATHCART. When you say what was going on, I am
Senator COBURN. Well, I am talking about the fraud, from
Westlake to all these others, the idea that the incentive was paying
people to get loans done whether they were qualified or not. Nobody knows exactly what percentage of the portfolio of loans they
were making were in that category, but it was a significant number, everybody would agree. Would you consider that a material adverse condition for Washington Mutual?
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Mr. CATHCART. I cannot really comment because it sounds like
a technical term, and I am not
Senator COBURN. Well, it is a very clear term. It is an SEC requirement that if, in fact, a company has a material adverse effect
on it, it is required to report it.
Mr. CATHCART. I probably would have to speak to the auditors
of the company to define what a significant deficiency was. It
sounds as if it would be a disclosable event.
Senator COBURN. Well, think about it if you were a shareholder
only, would you consider this to be a material adverse impact on
your ownership?
Mr. CATHCART. If I were a shareholder in a bank that I became
aware had big problems of fraud in its origination process, I would
not want to own the shares of that bank.
Senator COBURN. That is right. You would want to be notified.
Mr. CATHCART. Yes.
Senator COBURN. All right. Mr. Melby.
Mr. MELBY. I would state it the same way. I would need a clearer
definition of adverse material misstatement, but as a shareholder,
obviously very concerning, and I would again, like Mr. Cathcart,
probably would not own shares of that organization.
Senator COBURN. Let me ask you a follow-up question, each of
you, and this probably does not apply to Mr. Vanasek because he
was not there at the time. Was senior management, upper-level
management, aware of these problems, in your opinion?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, I would say senior management was aware.
Senator COBURN. Mr. Melby.
Mr. MELBY. Yes.
Senator COBURN. All right. Thank you. I have no other questions,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Melby, take a look, if you would, at Exhibit
34.1 This is a September 8, 2008, report from the Corporate Credit
Review group. I think this review is not part of your audit team,
but a copy of the report was sent to your staff, Debbie DahlAmundson. Is that correct?
Mr. MELBY. Debbie Dahl-Amundson.
Senator LEVIN. She is on your staff?
Mr. MELBY. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. She was on your staff. Now, this internal investigation found that WaMu loans marked as containing fraudulent
information were nonetheless being sold to investors. This is a very
significant issue.
Page 3, first bullet point. Here is what it says in that first bullet
point near the top: Of the 25 loans tested, 11 reflected a sale date
after the completion of the investigation which confirmed fraud. It
goes on to say, There is evidence that this control weakness has
existed for some time. First of all, that is a heck of a way of describing selling securities which contain fraudulent mortgages as a
control weakness, but we will let that euphemism stand there for
a moment. The important part is that it existed for some time, this
failure.
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Eleven of 25 loans tested reflected a sale date after completion
of the investigation which confirmed fraud.
Now, this is all serious business, but I have got to tell you, it
gets doubly serious when you get into this area, after fraud is
found, nonetheless a security containing that fraudulent mortgage
is still put on the market.
Now, the executive summary at the top of this report, which, according to its front page, went to Mr. Rotella and Mr. Schneider,
as well as to you, Mr. Melby, this page 2 says the following: The
overall system of credit risk management activities and processes
exhibits weakness and/or has deficiencies related to multiple business activities. Exposure is considerable and immediate corrective
action is essential in order to limit or avoid considerable losses,
reputation damage, or financial statement errors. Repeat findings,
if any, are significant.
So it looks like to me that there was not sufficient interest at
WaMu to fix the shoddy lending practices. As long as Wall Street
had a big enough appetite for junk mortgages, WaMu would just
dump defective loans into the pool of commerce and just hope that
they would be diluted and that nobody would notice.
Again, I do not know if you have a comment on this, but we
would welcome it. First, Mr. Melby, do you have a comment on
this? Do you remember receiving this?
Mr. MELBY. I do. I remember receiving the report, and, again,
this was written by the Corporate Credit Review group. My only
reaction would be to the first bullet regarding your comment earlier about the control weaknesses existed for some time. In my
view, this is the same issue that has been reported not only by
Risk Mitigation but, again, in our reports as well.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cathcart, do you have any comment on this?
Mr. CATHCART. Well, this report was obviously written 6 months
after I left, but I can certainly understand the language. Repeat
findings, if any, are significant is and requires improvement
rating is really the only tool that this team and risk management
had to be able to bring senior managements attention to these
problems.
Senator LEVIN. I have a number of questions that I will have to
withhold asking because of the time issue here. But basically I
would refer in terms of how this higher-risk lending strategy came
into existence, Exhibit 2a,1 which is a January 2005 presentation
to the Finance Committee of the Board of Directors about the higher-risk lending strategy. Page B1.2 says, In order to generate more
sustainable, consistent higher margins within Washington Mutual,
the 2005 Strategic Plan calls for a shift in our mix of business, increasing our Credit Risk Tolerance while continuing to mitigate our
Market and Operational Risk positions. It then tasked the Corporate Credit Risk Management to develop a framework for execution of the strategy.
Mr. Vanasek, did you get necessary institutional support to effectively manage the credit risk that is inherent in a higher-risk lending strategy such as that? Did you get institutional support to
carry out this kind of a higher-risk strategy?
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Mr. VANASEK. I would have to say no, Senator, in the sense that
we wanted to impose strict limits in terms of the dollar amounts
of various types of loans being made. We found that to be very difficult to do. So there were continuing issues here about the strategy versus the opinion of the credit risk area.
Senator LEVIN. Now, on page B1.4 of that Exhibit 2a, there is a
definition of higher-risk lending. It says it consists of Consumer
Loans to Higher Risk Borrowers, including subprime loans, singlefamily residential, and consumer loans to borrowers with low credit scores at origination. In the footnote, it says that means FICO
scores under 660.
Did WaMu, not just Long Beach but did WaMu issue loans to
borrowers with FICO scores under 660? Do you know, Mr.
Vanasek?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes, they did, and again, that was a sort of thing
you wish to limit highly. The only reason to do that would be to
meet a CRA requirement. There was a debate in the industry, Senator, about what constituted subprime. It used to be that anything
below 660 was considereda FICO score of 660 was considered
subprime, and the industry seemed to adopt the 660 limit. So it
was, again, evidence of the overall deterioration going on.
Senator LEVIN. Now, we have put in these exhibits, Exhibit 1i.1
This is based on data on loan originations from WaMus Securities
and Exchange filings from 2004 to 2008. What these numbers show
is that in 2003, fixed mortgages, the traditional mortgages, make
up about two-thirds of WaMus loan originations, and that percentage shrank every year until 2007, when they accounted for only
one-quarter of the loans that WaMu originated. Meanwhile, higherrisk mortgages, including Option ARMs, home equity, and subprime loans, increased from one-third of the mortgages in 2003 to
three-quarters of the mortgages by 2007.
Do those figures reflect the implementation of the strategy of
moving to higher-risk loans, would you say?
Mr. VANASEK. I would say, yes.
Senator LEVIN. During these years, WaMu cut back on its loan
originations overall, but while cutting back, it also changed the mix
from lower- to higher-risk loans, as indicated in that strategy. Is
that correct?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes, correct.
Senator LEVIN. I want to ask just another quick question about
the Option ARM to both you, Mr. Vanasek and Mr. Cathcart, as
risk managers. Did you have concerns about the Option ARM?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes, we had concerns from the standpoint of the
negative amortization that was accumulating and we had been reassured that in the past, borrowers would negatively amortize during difficult times and then make up for lost payments in the good
times. But the percentage and the potential percentage for negative
amortization was very large, and, of course, the attendant payment
shock was also very large, which was a concern to credit.
Senator LEVIN. And Mr. Cathcart, did you have concerns?
Mr. CATHCART. Well, I would say there was a lot of focus and
concern on disclosure issues. In other words, ensuring that when
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the product was sold, that the customer understood the product,
and a great deal of focus between the regulators and the bank took
place on that front.
As far as the structure of the product itself is concerned, the criteria associated with origination were supposed to be sufficiently
strong, meaning the borrowers were supposed to be sufficiently
strong that the negative amortization was not considered to be a
key issue. Of course, I had concerns about it, because negative amortization is intuitively counter to what standard risk appetite
would suggest, but I would say the portfolio had performed very
well, and in retrospect, was overly dependent on the continued appreciation in house prices.
Senator LEVIN. And when WaMu qualified a borrower for an Option ARM loan, did the bank use the payment that the borrower
would have to make at a recast or did they use a lower payment?
Mr. CATHCART. It used the lower rate, Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Would you agree with that, Mr.
Vanasek?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. Was there a high risk in doing that?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. And is it true that, as shown in Exhibit 37,1 page
7 of that exhibitat times, 95 percent of WaMus Option ARM borrowers were making minimum payments, which led to no or negative amortization? Are you able to find that quickly?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes, I found it, Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Does that strike you as being accurate?
Mr. VANASEK. Yes, it does.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Dr. Coburn.
Senator COBURN. I have one last question for Mr. Cathcart. If
you will go to Exhibit 64,2 this is the 2007 performance review for
the Head Risk Manager of the Home Loans Division of WaMu and
you are listed as one of the reviewers. Many banks try to isolate
the risk managers from sales pressures. But at WaMu, the first
performance goal for the Home Loans Risk Manager, which represents 35 percent of the evaluation, is growth. Under growth, it
is specified, achieve net income, $340 million. Sales targets are laid
out. Home equity is $18 billion. Subprime is $32 billion. Option
ARM is $33 billion. Alt A is $10 billion.
The second performance goal is risk management, which is worth
only 25 percent of the valuation, and I would remind you this is
for the Head Risk Manager of the Home Loans Division. Am I
reading this performance review correctly, that the Home Loans
Risk Manager was instructed to put achieving net income growth
targets above risk management, and did you agree with those performance goals?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, Senator, you are reading it correctly. No, I
didnt.
Senator COBURN. OK. Was her compensation tied to the results
of a performance review?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, it was.
1 See
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Senator COBURN. Does it strike you as strange that the performance goals for the head of risk management is small risk management but sales volume and profit?
Mr. CATHCART. Yes, it does.
Senator COBURN. All right. Thank you. I have no other questions.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Senator Kaufman.
Senator KAUFMAN. No questions.
Senator LEVIN. Are you all set? We thank you all. It has been
a long panel, but the other ones will be equally long, if that gives
you any comfort. We are going to try to work here. I am not sure
whether we will take a break for lunch or not. We will have to kind
of play that by ear. But you are all excused. Thank you.
Mr. CATHCART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. We will now move to our second panel of witnesses, David Schneider, former President of Home Loans of Washington Mutual Bank, and David Beck, former Division Head of
Capital Markets of Washington Mutual Bank.
First, let me extend our appreciation for both of you being with
us today. We look forward to your testimony, and as I indicated to
the previous panel and to all panels, all of the witnesses that testify before this Subcommittee by our rules are required to be
sworn. So at this time, I would ask you both please to stand and
to raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to this
Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do.
Mr. BECK. I do.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. We are going to again use the timing
system, where one minute before the red light comes on, you will
see lights change from green to yellow. It gives you an opportunity
to conclude your remarks. Your full written testimony will be printed in the record in its entirety. Please limit your oral testimony to
no more than 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider, please go first, followed by Mr. Beck, and then we
will proceed to questions. Mr. Schneider.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID SCHNEIDER,1 FORMER PRESIDENT OF
HOME LOANS, WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
1 The
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away from market risk towards credit risk, for example, by holding
more adjustable-rate mortgages. This strategy was called a higherrisk lending strategy and would have been implemented through
the banks Asset and Liability Committee. ALCO made decisions on
which loans to hold and which to sell based on the loans risk-return profile and other relevant issues, including the type and geographic location of the loans WaMu already had on its books.
Although WaMu intended to change its business strategy, market conditions soon caused WaMu to go in another direction. As
house prices peaked, the economy softened, and credit markets
tightened, WaMu adopted increasingly conservative credit policies
and moved away from loan products with greater credit risk.
WaMu increased documentation requirements, raised minimum
FICO scores, lowered LTV ratios, and curtailed underwriting exceptions. My team also enhanced WaMus fraud detection programs.
During my time at WaMu, we reduced and then entirely stopped
making Alt A loans and Option ARM loans. Alt A lending ended
in 2007. Option ARM loans decreased by more than a half from
2005 to 2006, and by another third from 2006 to 2007. WaMu
stopped offering Option ARM loans altogether at the beginning of
2008.
When the subprime lending operation at Long Beach was placed
under my supervision in 2006, I was asked to address the challenges its business presented. During that year, I changed Long
Beach management twice. As I became more familiar with Long
Beach Mortgage, I concluded that its lending parameters should be
tightened, so across various loan products we raised FICO scores,
lowered LTV ratios, established maximum loan values, increased
documentation requirements, improved programs to detect and prevent fraud, and in 2007 eliminated stated income lending. As a result, the percentage of approved Long Beach loans that were based
on full documentation increased every year I oversaw Long Beach,
and the percentage of loans with combined LTV ratios greater than
90 percent decreased every year over that same period.
More broadly, WaMu eliminated many subprime products and
then stopped originating subprime loans entirely. As a result,
WaMus subprime lending declined by a third from 2005 to 2006
and by 80 percent from 2006 to 2007.
When I began my job at Washington Mutual, my goal was to
evaluate and improve our home lending efforts in all respects. As
market changes began to change, my team and I worked very hard
to adapt to the new conditions and at the same time address the
challenges WaMu faced. During the time I was President of Home
Loans, we acted to reduce the size and associated risk of the Home
Loans business. Specifically, we closed its broker and correspondent lending channels. We closed Long Beach Mortgage. We
eliminated a number of higher-risk loan products and bolstered
quality controls through tightening credit standards, improving the
automated underwriting tools, enhancing fraud detection and prevention, and curtailing underwriting exceptions.
I hope this brief summary has been helpful and I look forward
to your questions. Thank you.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Schneider. Mr. Beck.
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TESTIMONY OF DAVID BECK,1 FORMER DIVISION HEAD OF
CAPITAL MARKETS, WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
1 The
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to repurchase a loan and sellers often disagree. Perhaps not surprisingly, these negotiations lead to outcomes that vary from loan
to loan and transaction to transaction. Occasionally, it is the seller
that identifies problems with a loan in the first instance and initiates the repurchase process without demand from the buyer.
Toward the end of 2007, the WaMu group responsible for evaluating and responding to repurchase requests was placed under my
direction. That group reviewed repurchase requests to determine if
they presented valid grounds for repurchase of a loan at issue.
When appropriate, the group also made repurchase demands to
those financial institutions from which WaMu had acquired loans.
The group, which came to be called the Repurchase and Recovery
Team, also created a computer modeling process to identify loans
which WaMu had sold that might present a repurchase obligation.
When this process identified loans that presented a repurchase obligation, the repurchase team would affirmatively approach buyers
to notify them of that conclusion. In this way, WaMu took proactive
action to address potential repurchase obligations.
I hope that this very brief introduction has been helpful to the
Subcommittee and I would be happy to answer any questions that
you may have. Thank you.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Beck.
We will have rounds of 10 minutes this time, and we will have
more than one round.
Mr. Schneider, the gain on sale numbers for the various kinds
of loans were based on WaMus own data. If you look at Exhibit
3,1 which is an April 18, 2006, presentation that you put together
for the WaMu Board of Directors about the high-risk lending strategy, you will see that on page 5 is a chart entitled, Shift to High
Margin Products. On the left of that chart is information about
the gain on sale which is produced by the higher-risk loans. We
have enlarged that part of the chart so that you can see it better.
It shows that WaMu earned about 19 basis points for a fixed loan,
a traditional loan, while Option ARMs earned 109, home equity
loans earned 113 basis points, and subprime loans earned 150
basis points, about eight times more than the fixed loans.
Is it fair to say that the gain on sale for the subprime loans was
much higher than fixed loans because the bank was able to charge
higher fees and interest rates? Is that basically the case? Mr.
Schneider.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Senator. If you look at the gain on
sale, there are a number of factors that would have driven what
would be the ultimate gain on sale. Fixed tended to have a fairly
low gain on sale because it was a highly commoditized product that
generally went to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Subprime tended
to have a large gain on sale, A, because of the additional credit risk
that investors would demand from the product, and B, because it
was probably less competitive than
Senator LEVIN. Does that mean higher interest rates?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir.
Senator LEVIN. OK. And Option ARMs?
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Senator LEVIN. And the audit that you saw when you first got
there, that 2006 audit, which is Exhibit 10,1 was the reason, as I
understand it, that you were asked to take responsibility for Long
Beach, is that correct?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I actually took responsibility for Long Beach at
the beginning of 2006 and one of the primary drivers was the increase in repurchase demands that Long Beach had experienced,
and that was the first area that we looked at.
Senator LEVIN. Then you saw the audit?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Correct.
Senator LEVIN. Then you ordered a crackdown on early payment
defaults at Long Beach, is that correct?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. Then they surged again a year later when you
wrote Exhibit 13,2 a December 2006 email to your colleagues,
Short story is this is not good. . . . we have a large potential risk
from what appears to be a recent increase in repurchase requests.
. . . We are all rapidly losing credibility as a management team.
That is Exhibit 13a. Does that sound familiar?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, it does.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Eight months later, in an August 20,
2007 audit reportthat is Exhibit 19here is what you said.3 Repeat IssueUnderwriting guidelines established to mitigate the
risk of unsound underwriting decisions are not always followed
. . . accurate reporting and tracking of exceptions to policy does
not exist. . . . Do you see that?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. What page are you on, Mr. Chairman?
Senator LEVIN. That is on page 3, repeat issue. Do you see that
at the top? High risk.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, I do.
Senator LEVIN. Repeat IssueUnderwriting guidelines established to mitigate the risk of unsound underwriting decisions are
not always followed. . . . Then it says that is high risk. The next
one, high risk, accurate reporting and tracking of exceptions to
policy does not exist. . . . So do you see that now?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do.
Senator LEVIN. All right. So Long Beach was continuing to issue
poor quality loans, is that fair to say?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think it is fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that the
underwriting group and the audit group, as well as myself, were
less than satisfied with the progress being made, which is the reason we ultimately decided to shut down the operation.
Senator LEVIN. Yes. When did you finally shut it down and
transfer it to WaMu?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. It was shut downwhen Long Beach was shut
down, we stopped originating subprime mortgages through brokers,
which was the business that Long Beach did. I think that was
third quarter of 2007.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, the vast majority of Long Beach mortgages, your data shows about 95 percent were sold or securitized.
1 See
2 See
3 See
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Exhibit 1c,1 if you will look at it, is based on WaMu data. The Long
Beach Mortgage annual securitizations increased more than tenfold, from $2.5 billion in the year 2000 to more than $29 billion in
the year 2006. From 2000 to 2007, Long Beach and WaMu together
securitized $77 billion in subprime mortgages, producing mortgagebacked securities. Now, those are the securitization numbers. This
is WaMus own summary of its subprime securitizations as of June
2008.
So Long Beach and WaMus subprime securitizations doubled
from 2005 to 2006, going from $14 to $29 billion. Long Beach at
the same time was cutting back on loan originations during 2006,
which means that WaMu was purchasing subprime loans from
other lenders and mortgage brokers through its conduit and other
channels. Is that right so far? Are you with me so far?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, Senator. I think if you look at that chart
up there, that shows securitizations. There were also a number of
whole loan sales done in 2005. I am not sure of the exact numbers.
And the other
Senator LEVIN. Those are based on your numbers. Do you have
any problem with the numbers you see there in terms of
securitizations?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. In terms of securitizations, I do not.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, why were so many Long Beach mortgages defaulted? Why were Long Beach securities consistently
among the worst performing in the marketplace?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Senator, I dont have that market data in front
of me.
Senator LEVIN. Well, but you know that they were consistently
among the worst performing securities in the marketplace. Those
mortgages which were made part of those securities, you know
that.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. If you look at the performance of Long Beach,
I dont think any of us were happy with the performance
Senator LEVIN. No, not happy, but they were among the worst
performing. Why is it true? Why was that true?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that is primarily true because Long
Beach tended to originate higher credit risk assets than other
subprime mortgage originators.
Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, it stopped issuing the
securitizations in 2003 while it worked on correcting the problems,
is that correct?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am sorry. I didnt hear the question.
Senator LEVIN. When WaMu discovered that Long Beach was
issuing a large number of loans that violated its own credit policies,
it stopped securitizations in 2003 to correct the problems, to give
it a chance to correct the problems, is that correct?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is my understanding. I wasnt
Senator LEVIN. Why werent securitizations halted in 2005, 2006,
and 2007 when similar underwriting problems were uncovered?
That is my question.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Senator, I wasnt there in 2003. I dont know
what the
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Senator LEVIN. No, I am saying why wasnt it stopped in 2005,
2006, and 2007?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think as we looked at the originations and the
overall quality coming out, we felt that there waswe were given
the right disclosures and that if loans proved to be fraudulent or
have a problem, we would be buying themwe would buy them
back out.
Senator LEVIN. Dr. Coburn.
Senator COBURN. Thank you.
Would you put up the percentage chart on WaMu project originations and purchases by percentage.1 In fairness to your testimony
in terms of the declining nature, however, this pie chart represents,
in fact, the percentages of the originations of WaMu as a percentage. Based on your testimony, what we see is something very different, what actually happened versus what you said, because you
can see that each year, fixed mortgages go down and non-conforming loans still are increasing, versus your testimony that said
that was not the case, that when you came on board, things started
to change.
So two questions for that. Did things change because you all
made an active process to change, or was the market souring so
much that you couldnt market those loans?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. If you look at the charts there, those are percentages there and
Senator COBURN. Right. They are percentages.
Mr. SCHNEIDER [continuing]. The aggregate volumes went down
significantly. Some of the items I focused on were subprime. I took
over subprime in 2006. It was 16 percent of the volume at that
time. By the time we got to 2007, it was 5 percent on a very small
base. Option ARMs declined from 22 percent to 18 percent during
the time I was there, and by the time we got to 2008, Option ARMs
were zero. And then the other ARM product would be more conventional hybrid ARMs, so those would be loans that would be sold to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Senator COBURN. Would you put up the WaMu origination and
purchases by loan type, 2003 to 2007. So not only were the percentages declining, but the absolute dollars
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes.
Senator COBURN [continuing]. Were declining. And why was
that?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. As we addressed the Home Loans business from
2005 until 2008, I think there was a general consensus that the
size of the mortgage business was too large relative to the size of
the bank. We wanted to help bring that size of the aggregate business down. We closed a number of sites, actually reduced the employment level of Home Loans by probably 50 percent during that
time.
Senator COBURN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add, Washington
Mutuals executive summary that was put forth,2 and we will have
it available as part of our Fannie Mae alliance and Freddie Mac
business relationship proposal. And I am sorry you dont have this
1 See
2 See
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in front of you, but one of the things it said is the key to the proposal is it provides significant liquidity for Option ARM originations, with more advantageous credit parameters, competitive Gfees, and preferred access to their balance sheet relative to our current agreement with Fannie.
Between 2000 and 2008, Washington Mutual sold more than
$500 billion in loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. How did that
affect Washington Mutuals bottom line?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Senator Coburn, I can only really speak to the
time I was there in 2005 to 2008. We were going through some
very difficult challenges. I think the home loans business was losing money for most of that time period and we were working aggressively to see if we could help remedy that.
Senator COBURN. All right. How important was the relationship
with Freddie Mac in the banks decision to Option ARMs? Would
you have been optioning ARMs if Freddie Mac hadnt been there?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. Washington Mutual, Senator, had originated Option ARMs for years. I think it provided another source
of liquidity for the company to sell its Option ARMs by having
Freddie Mac buy them.
Senator COBURN. OK. So they were sold for years to Freddie
Mac, right? Had Freddie Mac not been there, would there have
been a market in the last 2 years that you werethe last 2 years
before you wound this all down, outside of Freddie Mac?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. There would have been.
Senator COBURN. Would it have been as advantageous as the relationship with Freddie Mac?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am not sure of the specific economics.
Senator COBURN. Can you look at Exhibit 4,1 the presentation,
Way2Go! Be Bold! Are you familiar with this PowerPoint presentation?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am.
Senator COBURN. When and where did you give this presentation?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I dont know the specifics. If I recall correctly,
this presentation was given a number of times, so I would have
given it to folks in staff functions. I would have given the presentation to sales and operating functions, as well, so
Senator COBURN. Anybody above you that you would have given
it to?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I might have shown it to Mr. Rotella or Mr.
Killinger.
Senator COBURN. What did you intend be bold?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. This was done in, I think, early 2007. We had
gone through a very difficult time, and quite honestly, I was just
trying to help improve the morale of the Home Loans business,
which was feelingI think everyone was feeling badly about what
was happening.
Senator COBURN. On the second page of the presentation, there
is a slide of an organizational chart that has the caption, We are
all in sales. Were you ever concerned that heavy emphasis on
sales with no oversight risk management was problematic?
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Senator COBURN. OK. You have said under Exhibit 50 that Long
Beach paper was the worst performing paper in 2006.1 How were
you made aware of these problems?
Mr. BECK. Just give me a moment to get to that, Dr. Coburn.
Dr. Coburn, this is an email that I wrote from an investor conference. The Long Beach relative performance was discussed repeatedly with investors at the conference, so I would have been
made aware of their relative performance, as you say, talking to
people in the market.
Senator COBURN. OK. Did you continue selling similar Long
Beach paper even after making that comment?
Mr. BECK. Yes, we did.
Senator COBURN. OK. Did you alter your securitization practices
based on that knowledge?
Mr. BECK. I cannot recall that we did, Dr. Coburn.
Senator COBURN. I asked the other panel, and Mr. Vanasek and
Mr. Cathcart said investors should know about fraud problems. I
also asked if they were owners, should they. There is also an SEC
requirement that requires notification of any material adverse factor. Were you aware of the nature and depth of the problems with
the significant number of loans that were originated that either did
not qualify, had false documentation, or had no documentation?
Mr. BECK. I was not aware of the specific documents that you
referenced earlier. No, I was not.
Senator COBURN. So you were seeing the end results of what had
come through, and you were packaging it and selling it. And after
you received the information that its performance was poor, did
you inquire to say why is our paper performing more poorly than
others?
Mr. BECK. Yes, we did a couple of things, Dr. Coburn. In the
course of our securitization before the loans are pooled, there are
post-closing reviews, many of which you have seen in this documentation that are done by Origination, and their intent is to identify and remove loans from the pool or that will come to me and
my team that have underwriting defects.
After we receive the salable loans, an underwriting due diligence
process is undertaken where a statistically significant sample of
the loans is taken, both adverse as well as random, to try to identify any further underwriting defects and have those loans removed
from the pool so that when we come to the process of securitization,
the loans are all performing, they are current, and loans with underwriting defects should have been removed.
Now, as you know, and as we have seen, some loans with fraud
and with underwriting defects do slip through. That happens. And
it is not a good thing for us ever. We have an operational and
reputational problem, and we have a big financial problem, as we
have talked about, in terms of repurchase liability. Each transaction, though, does have a warrant on it, and the investors can
ask us to repurchase the loans.
Senator COBURN. All right. So your ability to sell into the future
is dependent on the quality of the product that you are selling
today?
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Mr. SCHNEIDER. Senator, it was a very big challenge. I spent a
lot of time trying to make Long Beach as successful as possible. I
tried management changes. We changed products. So it was a significant challenge.
Senator KAUFMAN. Great. Thank you very much.
Senator LEVIN. Thanks, Senator Kaufman.
First on the numbers of originations and securitizations, you testified that the Option ARM lending decreased by more than 50 percent from 2005 to 2006. What you, of course, leave out is that your
Option ARM lending in 2006 was still significantly higher than it
was in 2003. And you also do not mention that the major reduction
that you will see in originations occurred on your fixed traditional
loans. That is what caused the major drop from 2003. From that
point on, there was a slightly different story with different mortgages, but the major drop which you and others from WaMu refer
to came in the fixed, 30-year loans, and that drop took place when
you decided to engage in a higher-risk strategy. So you got less
origination and purchases of your traditional loans, your lower-risk
loans, and you instead engaged, starting in 2004, in this higherrisk strategy, and we saw what the outcome of it was.
But in terms of Option ARMsand we will put this in the
recordaccording to your SEC filings, Option ARMs were $30.1 billion in 2003, went up to $67 billion in 2004, went up to $63 billion
from the 2003 level in 2005, and still was above the 2003 level in
2006. Fixed loans went from $263 billion in 2003, dramatically
down in 2004 to $77 billion, then $78 billion, then $47 billion. So
the real explanation here for this shift that you make big reference
to has to do with the dropping of the fixed loans, securitizations
and originations. The increase in the Option ARMs was pretty
steady through 2006. Although it dropped, as you point out, from
2005 to 2006, still it was above the 2003 level.
I want to talk to you about Exhibit 50, Mr. Beck.1 This is a November 2006 memo that has been made reference to about Long
Beach paper being among the worst performing paper in the market. This was in November 2006. And then the Comptroller of the
Currency, the OCC, did an analysis on the highest rates of foreclosure in 2008, and this is in Exhibit 58,2 and it showed Long
Beach being in the top ten in nine out of ten metro areas.
Were you aware of these findings of the OCC?
Mr. BECK. No, I was not.
Senator LEVIN. Should you have been made aware of them?
Mr. BECK. Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar at all with this document. This is from the OCC?
Senator LEVIN. Yes. I am asking, should you have been aware of
the OCC findings, given your position, should
Mr. BECK. I was not aware of this particular report
Senator LEVIN. No, I am not talking about the report. I am saying should you have been familiar with their findings. That is all.
Mr. BECK. I cannot say.
Senator LEVIN. Take a look at Exhibit 22a now,3 if you would.
This is a November 2005 internal WaMu memo called So. CA
1 See
2 See
3 See
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[Southern California] Emerging Markets Targeted Loan Review Results. It describes a year-long internal investigation into suspected
fraud affecting loans issued from your two processing centers,
Montebello and Downey. You heard in the prior panel that it laid
out an extensive level of loan fraud. Forty-two percent of the loans
reviewed contained suspect activity or fraud, virtually all of it attributable to some sort of employee malfeasance. And then in Exhibits 22b and 23b,1 there is additional detail about the investigation, including the percentage of loans containing fraudulent information at the Montebello office at 83 percent, the percentage in the
Downey office 58 percent.
Now, were you aware at the time of those findings?
Mr. BECK. No, I was not. I am not copied on this.
Senator LEVIN. Should you have been?
Mr. BECK. I was aware that there was fraud, as I said earlier,
and I was aware that certain loans had underwriting defects. And
as part of the post-closing review that Origination was conducting,
I understood that loans with identified fraud or underwriting defects would have been removed from the pool of loans that I was
going to be securitizing.
Senator LEVIN. You thought they were going to be removed?
Mr. BECK. Yes, that is what I believed.
Senator LEVIN. And did you check to see if that was true?
Mr. BECK. What we did subsequent to that, Mr. Chairman, is to
do a due diligence review separate and distinct by the underwriter,
WCC, or
Senator LEVIN. Did you check to see whether they were removed
before you put those securities on the market?
Mr. BECK. No, I did not.
Senator LEVIN. Purchasers of these securities are relying on you
as an underwriter to provide truthful information. You had evidence of the fraud. You knew of it. You had heard of it. And yet
you did not check to see whether or not that the fraud-tainted
mortgages were removed from the security. Wasnt that your job or
part of your job?
Mr. BECK. I understood that there was fraud.
Senator LEVIN. Shouldnt you have checked to make sure that
the fraudulent, tainted mortgages were not part of those securities
before you peddled them? Isnt that part of your job?
Mr. BECK. No, it is not. The important aspect of thisand I take
your pointit is important to not sell loans that are defective.
However, the post-closing review is conducted by the origination
channel, conducted by Credit in the origination channel.
Senator LEVIN. Who is that specifically?
Mr. BECK. The post-closing review would be conducted by the Operations Department within the origination channel with the help
of Credit.
Senator LEVIN. Give me the names of the people in charge.
Mr. BECK. Well, I would point you to the prior panel, ultimately.
Senator LEVIN. All right. So it was their job to check to make
sure that the mortgages that they and you knew were tainted were
not part of securities.
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Mr. BECK. Yes, that the process in place was removing loans that
were defective.
Senator LEVIN. And it was not your job, it was their job, the previous panels job?
Mr. BECK. I had a separate responsibility to conduct underwriters due diligence, which we did.
Senator LEVIN. All right. And you never asked to see if they were
removed?
Mr. BECK. I did not.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Schneider, take a look at Exhibit 24,1 if you
would. Fraud problems resurfacing with a gusto in early 2008. This
is an April 4 memo from the WaMu Corporate Fraud Investigation
and Audit Section. It says that one of the mortgage insurers refused to insure any more loans issued by the loan officer from the
Montebello loan office. That was the same loan officer who was investigated in 2005. It describes the earlier 2005 investigation, and
states that virtually no actions were taken in response to it. It says
that another review of loans issued by the Montebello office in
2007and this is what is now reported in this April 2008 audit
found that 62 percent contained fraudulent information.
Were you aware of this audit?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, I was, Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. All right. What did you do?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. This audit was actually conducted by the Legal
and HR group. I was aware of it, but they were conducting it.
Whenever I found out about cases of fraud, I asked that an investigation happen. We had no interest in fraud, no interest in our
originators perpetrating the fraud.
Senator LEVIN. Yet it continued to happen year after year after
year, and you are selling the securities that those fraudulent mortgages are included in. Now, what action did you insist upon? You
are out there selling these securities.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. In the cases where we found fraud in loans, we
would buy those loans back.
Senator LEVIN. It is not where you found it. It is where people
complained about it. But when you saw that audit, in April, you
saw the continuation of fraud year after year, it said the 2005
fraud continued, it said in 2007 the fraud continued. You are out
there selling securities. Do you not have a responsibility to take
steps to make sure that fraud ends so you are not just looking back
after someone finds out after the security is sold, but that you take
actions to prevent those securities from being sold? Isnt that your
responsibility?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is my responsibility to handle fraud.
Senator LEVIN. And what actions did you take when this April
4, 2008, memo came to your attention?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. We terminated the people who admitted to committing that fraud.
Senator LEVIN. Did you offer them jobs?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, I did not.
Senator LEVIN. Did the company offer them jobs?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. To the people we terminated?
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volved in the Presidents Club, which made sure those all-expensepaid trips were made.
How does that happen? You have loan officers under investigation year after year after year. Instead of being disciplined or fired,
they are given rewarding trips to Hawaii and the Bahamas. How
does that happen?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, in cases of fraud where there is
an investigation, I ask the HR group and the Legal group to do the
fraud investigations. If they came back with a recommendation to
terminate or punish an employee, then I would have taken that
recommendation.
Senator LEVIN. Were you aware of the fact those investigations
were going on in every one of those years?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I was not.
Senator LEVIN. Should you have been?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. It depended on how big people thought it was.
Senator LEVIN. Wasnt there a recommendation in 2005 to take
action against those officers?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That 2005 report, which I see here, was something I was not familiar with. I do not know what the specific recommendations were. That was right at the beginning of the time
I joined the company.
Senator LEVIN. Back in 2005, this is what was recommended. Exhibit 22a at the bottom.1 This memorandum outlines a few of the
most egregious activities identified based on targeted reviews with
particular documentation of specific areas of failure to follow policy.
Based on the consistent and pervasive pattern of activity among
these employees, we are recommending firm action be taken to address these particular willful behaviors on the part of the employees named.
Well, that firm action was paid trips to Hawaii and the Bahamas. That is what the action was. Are you troubled by that? Do
you think the bank should be troubled by that?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think anytime
Senator LEVIN. Do you think your investors should be troubled
by that? Should your stockholders, should anybody be troubled by
that except us?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, anytime there is fraud, we took
it very seriously.
Senator LEVIN. No, when there was fraud, what you do is reward
the folks that are being investigated with trips. That is the action,
year after year, to the Presidents Club. And then you say in this
Exhibit 62,2 by the way, you hope to see all these folksnot specifically these folks, but you hope to find the employees, the top sales
people of WaMu, hope to see them all in Hawaii, David Schneider.
Take a look, if you would, Mr. Schneider, at Exhibit 30.3 It is an
internal WaMu document called a Significant Incident Notification dated April 1, 2008. Now, this is Westlake Village, so that is
near Los Angeles. These were loans that were issued in 2007, but
the report is dated April 1, 2008.
1 See
2 See
3 See
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First bullet point: Many of the loans had several fraud findings
such as fabricated asset statements, altered statements, income
misrepresentation and one altered statement that is believed to
have been used in two separate loans.
The third bullet point: One Sales Associate admitted that during
that crunch time some of the Associatesnow, we are talking here
about Westlake Villagewould manufacture asset statements
from previous loan documents and submit them to the LFC. And
this associate said the pressure was tremendous from the LFC to
get them the documents since the loan had already funded and
pressure from the Loan Consultants to get the loans funded.
Take a look at Exhibit 31.1 This is a memo summarizing the
same April 2008 investigation. Page 2 of Exhibit 31. Sales Associates would take [asset] statements from other files and cut and
paste the current borrowers name and address.
Now, were you informed, Mr. Schneider, about the investigation
of the Westlake Village office?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I was, Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. I am not sure. You said, I was or I wasnt?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I was.
Senator LEVIN. Were you aware that WaMu employees were cutting corners, engaging in fraud to churn out a high volume of
loans?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, when that happened, we took it
very seriously. In no way did I think that fraud shouldnt be treated with the utmost seriousness, and I think ultimately some of our
sales associates were terminated for their behavior that violated
our code of conduct.
Senator LEVIN. The two guys that were terminated told us they
were offered jobs. But my question is, what did you do at the time?
Did you get back into those securities and make sure that the people who bought them were notified?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I dont know specifically what was done, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. Did you find out at the time? Did you ask?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I dont recall asking.
Senator LEVIN. Take a look at Exhibit 28.2 These are minutes
dated December 12, 2006, from the Market Risk Committee,
WaMu. Page 4.
Near the bottom, delinquency behavior was flagged in October
[2006] for further review and analysis when recent securitization
deals appeared to have more severe delinquency behavior than experienced in past deals. The primary factors contributing to increased delinquency appear to be caused by process issues including the sale and securitization of delinquent loanssale and
securitization of delinquent loansloans not underwritten to
standards, lower credit quality loans and seller services reporting
false delinquent payment status. What did you do about it?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I was not a member of the Market Risk Committee, so I have not seen this document before today.
1 See
2 See
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Senator LEVIN. You never saw the document at that time? Does
it trouble you now that this was the first time you have seen this
document?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think I saw it yesterday in preparation.
Senator LEVIN. Yesterday, you saw it for the first time?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir.
Senator LEVIN. What was your reaction?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That it should not happen.
Senator LEVIN. Should not happen. These are securities that
happened on your watch.
Mr. Beck, they are on your watch, too. Were you aware of these
documents?
Mr. BECK. I am.
Senator LEVIN. Were you then?
Mr. BECK. I was aware of this at the time. I do recall this, and
we bought the securitieswe bought the loans back
Senator LEVIN. That were brought to your attention? So you
went out and looked for them?
Mr. BECK. Yes, we did.
Senator LEVIN. Did what?
Mr. BECK. We bought the loans back that we sold
Senator LEVIN. Did you go out and look for them after you found
out about it? When you read these documents
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN [continuing]. That fraudulent mortgages had been
securitized
Mr. BECK. This document says that we sold loans that were delinquent and that is never right. That is never what we represent,
and
Senator LEVIN. And what did you do? At the time you saw this,
right?
Mr. BECK. Right. We bought the loans back.
Senator LEVIN. Yes, I know. Did you go out and look for them?
Did you initiate the recovery of
Mr. BECK. Yes. Tom Lehmann worked for me, the person that is
making this report, and
Senator LEVIN. You told him at the time, go and find every single
one of these loans, and on all these other documents, as well, now,
where you found all these fraudulent loans
Mr. BECK. I am talking about this specific question right
Senator LEVIN. How about the previous question?
Mr. BECK [continuing]. Because I remember this
Senator LEVIN. How about the previous documents?
Mr. BECK. When weso when we identified
Senator LEVIN. When you saw these documentswe have talked
three or four documents here.
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. When you saw these documents, you are saying,
in every case, you told your people, go and find every single security that incorporated these fraudulent loans. We are going to buy
them back. Is that what you
Mr. BECK. That is not what I said. No. I said I remember and
recall this specific event because we did go outbecause we
securitized loans that were delinquent, which we represent that we
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wont do and we shouldnt do, and these were loans purchased from
third parties and the loan servicing tape that we got from them
was incorrect. It was wrong. And when we found that out, we went
and purchased these loans back.
Senator LEVIN. You notified everybody?
Mr. BECK. Yes, I believe we did. I believe we made a filing on
this particular issue.
Senator LEVIN. Now, what about the earlier ones where the
fraud was identified in those offices? Did you go back and identify
what securities incorporated those mortgages that were fraudulent
from those offices?
Mr. BECK. I am not certain, Mr. Chairman, that the loans from
that analysis ever got into a securitization in the first place.
Senator LEVIN. Did you check out when you saw the audits?
Mr. BECK. I never saw the audits.
Senator LEVIN. You never saw the two audits that we have
talked about here today?
Mr. BECK. No.
Senator LEVIN. Should you have seen them?
Mr. BECK. I dont know the answer to that. I didnt see the audits. What I relied on was that Originations post-closing review
would remove defective loans before they were put in the warehouse to sell
Senator LEVIN. And did you ever check that out and see if it was
done?
Mr. BECK. No, I did not.
Senator LEVIN. Senator Kaufman, I have more, but I want to
just
Senator KAUFMAN. I just have one question. I see this November
17, 2005, report found 42 percent of the loans contained suspect activity or fraud. Did you go and buy those back, do you know?
Mr. BECK. I dont know that those loans were sold.
Senator KAUFMAN. OK. Thank you.
Senator LEVIN. Did you check?
Mr. BECK. I did not. I wasnt copied on the report.
[Pause.]
Senator LEVIN. Now, in general, Mr. Beck, were you aware of the
2005 and the 2008 investigations that we have been discussing? Is
your answer, no, you were not aware of them at the time?
Mr. BECK. I was not.
Senator LEVIN. Did you supervise the program that was set up
to investigate any complaint about your securities and your loans?
Was there a seven-step program that Long Beach had set up? Do
you remember that?
Mr. BECK. Yes, I do.
Senator LEVIN. And that was to affirmatively investigate a complaint about the loans, is that correct?
Mr. BECK. Yes. That was set up at the end of 2006, beginning
of 2007
Senator LEVIN. You supervised that program, right?
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. And did you set up a similar program for WaMus
loans?
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Mr. BECK. That program was designed for Long Beach. We
didnt
Senator LEVIN. My question is, did you set up a similar program
for WaMus loans?
Mr. BECK. The Repurchase and Recovery Team also looked at requests for repurchase for WaMu loans, but the seven-step process
that you are referring to was used with Long Beach
Senator LEVIN. Does that mean
Mr. BECK [continuing]. As best I can recall.
Senator LEVIN. You had all this evidence that there was fraud
in various offices of WaMu. Why was that not set up for WaMus
loans?
Mr. BECK. We had a significantly higher level of repurchase requests from Long Beach and
Senator LEVIN. Take a look, if you would, at Exhibit 34.1 Now,
Exhibit 34 is a report from WaMus corporate credit review group
and it found that WaMus loans marked as containing fraudulent
information was nonetheless sold to investors. If you will take a
look at page 3, in the first bullet point
Here is what it says. The controls that are intended to prevent
the sale of loans that have been confirmed by Risk Mitigation to
contain misrepresentations or fraud are not currently effective. So
the controls are not effective. There is not a systematic process to
prevent a loan in the Risk Mitigation Inventory and/or confirmed
to contain suspicious activity from being sold to an investor. The
coding of the user to defined risk mitigation field in Fidelity does
not directly affect the salability of the loans.
A review was completed of a sample of the 25 loans . . .this
is a sample of 25 loans closed in 2008with the appropriate coding in the Risk Mitigation field. . . . Of the 25 loans tested, 11 reflected a sale date after the completion of the investigation which
confirmed fraud. There is evidence that this control weakness has
existed for some time.
Do you recall this report and that finding, Mr. Beck?
Mr. BECK. I do not.
Senator LEVIN. Should you have seen this report?
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. Were you aware that for some time, WaMu had
been selling loans to investors even after the loans had been
marked as containing fraudulent information?
Mr. BECK. No.
Senator LEVIN. Well, now you were head of the Capital Markets
Group, right, at that time?
Mr. BECK. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. Is there any way that you should not have been
informed about this?
Mr. BECK. I would expect that I would be informed of this, yes.
Senator LEVIN. I mean, this is damning stuff. You are working
for a bank which according to a 25-loans test had almost half reflecting a sale after an investigation has confirmed fraud, and this
review says that failure has existed for some time, that control
weakness has existed for some time.
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Now take a look at Exhibit 40b,1 if you would. Senator Kaufman,
any time you want to jump in here, please do.
Exhibit 40b. Now, this one is going to take some difficult following because it is an email chain, so we have to start at the first
email, which is on page 4it is at the endand work back up to
page 1. But take a look on page 4. You will see there on February
14, 2007, Michael Liu writes to Mr. Elson. Mr. Elson is the Senior
Vice President for Portfolio Management, and here is the subject,
Option ARM MTAwhich is the Monthly Treasury Average
Option ARM MTA and Option ARM MTA Delinquency. Notice
that, delinquency. So now we have an Option ARM MTA, which is
an Option ARM that has an interest rate adjusting to the monthly
Treasury average, is that right?
Mr. BECK. That is right.
Senator LEVIN. And the email points out some information
FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios about the delinquent non-conforming Option ARMs. Do you see where it says that? It says some
information there about FICO scores and about
Mr. BECK. Some points for Option ARM
Senator LEVIN [continuing]. Loan-to-value ratios. Do you see that
there?
Mr. BECK. I do.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, a few minutes later, still on February
14, working ourselves now to page 3, you will see that Elson forwards this email to somebody whose name, I believe, is Youyi
Chen. Do you know who that person is?
Mr. BECK. I do.
Senator LEVIN. Is that a man or a woman?
Mr. BECK. It is a man.
Senator LEVIN. A man. So Mr. Chen is being sent this email,
subject, Option ARM Delinquency. It says, Youyiattached is a
description of the Option ARMs that were delinquent in the 2006
[fourth quarter]. You can see that it is very much a function of
FICOs and Low Document loans. We are in the process of updating
the . . . matrix. . . . Your comments are appreciated.
So now go up that page and you will see shortly thereafter, a
couple hours thereafter, there is a letter or an email sent from
and you said Mr. Chen, is that correct? Did you say it was a male
or a female? I am sorry.
Mr. BECK. It is a male.
Senator LEVIN. A male. From Mr. Chen to you, February 14, subject, Option ARM Delinquency. This answers partially Mr. Schneiders questions.. . . Apparently Mr. Schneider had asked some
questions on the breakdown of the Option ARM delinquencies. The
details . . . show Low fico, low document, and newer vintages are
where most of the delinquency comes from, not a surprise.
Now, the next email if you keep going up is from you, the same
day. You are forwarding that email on Option ARM delinquencies
to Mr. Schneider and to Cheryl Feltgen, who is the Head Risk
Manager in the Home Loans Division, and here is what you wrote.
What you wrote is at the top of the page. Please review. The performance of newly minted option arm loans is causing us problems.
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Cheryl can validate but my view is our alt a (high margin) option
arm is not performing well. We should address selling first quarterthat is 2007, that is the quarter you are inas soon as we
can before we loose the opp[ortuni]ty.
So in response to the delinquency assessment on Option ARMs
in your portfolio, you want to sell the newly originated Option
ARMs, newly minted, in your words, as soon as you can, right?
Are you with me so far?
Mr. BECK. Yes, I am.
Senator LEVIN. That is what you want to do.
Now, later that dayso we are still working up this chain of
emailslater that day, same subject, Option ARM Delinquencies.
This is from you to David Schneider. It is now Sunday, February
18, 2007. You are stillI am sorry, this is from Schneider. I made
a mistake. This is from David Schneider to you and it says,
Cheryl, your thoughts? A copy goes to you and to Cheryl Feltgen.
Now Mr. Schneider is saying, Cheryl, your thoughts? Do you remember this, Mr. Beck?
Mr. BECK. Yes, I do recall this.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Schneider, do you remember this?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, later that daywe are still on Exhibit
40b 1Ms. Feltgen replies, subject still Option ARM Delinquency,
The results described belowand I am reading now from her
emailare similar to what my team has been observing. California Option ARMs, large loan size ($1 to $2.5 million) have been
the fastest increasing delinquency rates in the [single-family residential] portfolio.. . . There is a meltdown in the subprime market
which is creating a flight to quality.
I was talking to Robert Williams just after his return from the
Asia trip where he and Alan Magleby talked to potential investors
for upcoming covered bond deals backed by our mortgages. There
is still strong interest around the world in USA residential mortgages. Gain on sale margins for Option ARMs are attractive. This
seems to me to be a great time to sell as many Option ARMs as
we possibly can. Kerry Killinger was certainly encouraging us to
think seriously about it at the MBR, which is the Monthly Business Review, last week. What can I do to help? David, would your
team like any help on determining the impact of selling certain
groupings of Option ARMs on overall delinquencies?
That is refreshing, someone who is making clear what is really
going on. Ms. Feltgen describes, a meltdown in the subprime
market, a flight to quality. Who is going to buy Option ARMs
which are going to be delinquent? Well, she has talked to WaMu
executives who have just been to Asia, talked to investors who are
interested in bonds backed by WaMu mortgages and she writes,
there is still strong interest around the world in USA residential
mortgages. In other words, we can still sell our Option ARMs
some places. And so she writes, This seems to me to be a great
time to sell as many Option ARMs as we possibly can.
Mr. Beck, you had said pretty much the same thing, sell the Option ARMs, as soon as we can before we lose the opportunity. The
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idea is to sell as many of these delinquency-prone loans as possible
to investors before their performance gets worse and WaMu gets
stuck with them.
The only way that can happen is because you guys at WaMu
knew something that potential investors didnt, and that is that
these loans were likely to go delinquent. Now, here is what happened.
Mr. Schneider, you reply late that Sunday evening. The subject
again, Option ARM Delinquencies. And here is what you suggest
in this email. You say, DBand that is Mr. Beck, I assume
and CFMs. Feltgenyou ask Mr. Beck to select the potential
sample portfolios and coordinate with finance on buy/sell analysis, and then you ask Ms. Feltgen to run credit scenarios.
Now we are going to the first page of this Exhibit 40b. Now it
is Tuesday, February 20. Everything is in motion. Mr. Beck, you
send an email early in the morning, 7:17 a.m. Subject, Re Option
ARM Delinquency to Ms. Feltgen and to Mr. Schneider, making a
plan to supply loan-level detail and coordinate with finance.
Now, in the final email of the chain, which is at the top of page
1 there, the subject line now reads, Urgent need to get some work
done in next couple days. That is added above Option ARM Delinquency. Ms. Feltgen directs her staff to start analyzing the Option
ARM loans in the portfolio. She wrote, We are contemplating selling a larger portion of our Option ARMs than we have in the recent
past. . . . this could be a way to address California concentration,
rising delinquencies, falling house prices in California with a favorable arbitrage given that the market seems not to be yet discounting a lot for those factors. And she asks for input on portions, her words, of the Option ARM portfolio that we should be
considering selling.
Now turn to Exhibit 41,1 if you would. So far, both of you remember everything I have read, do you?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Beck.
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, turn to Exhibit 41. This is another
email chain, the same day, February 20. Mr. Shaw sends to Ms.
Feltgen an analysis of the key characteristics of loans in the WaMu
portfolio that contributed to rising delinquency rates. Shaw to
Feltgen and a few others, subject, Urgent need to get some work
done in next couple of days on Option ARM Delinquencies. Cheryl,
I reviewed the HFIthe hold for investmentprime loan characteristics that contributed to the rising 60+ delinquency rates between January 2006 and January 2007. The results of this analysis
show that seven combined factors contain $8.3 billion of [hold for
investment] Option ARM balances which experienced above-average increases in the 60+ delinquency rate during the last 12
months. This is an 821% increase, or 10 times faster than the average increase of 79%.
I recommend that we select loans with some or all of these characteristics to develop a [hold for sale] pool,shift them, in other
words, from holding on to them to selling them. Then he lists the
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factors that went into this change. He lists eight specific factors,
one being Option ARM loans; two, recent vintages, 2004 to 2007;
three, in California; four, in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut;
jumbo loans; and specific FICO scores. And then he wrote, I recommend we select loans with some or all of these characteristics
to develop a [hold for sale] pool.
So he presented a recipe for selecting Option ARM loansthose
most likely to go delinquentso they could be put up for sale before they actually went delinquent and got stuck on WaMus books
or discounted. Is that right? Is that a fair reading of that, Mr.
Beck?
Mr. BECK. Mr. Shaw is laying out the risks as he sees them in
the pool
Senator LEVIN. He is laying out
Mr. BECK [continuing]. And the risk factors that are going to contribute to delinquencies.
Senator LEVIN. Yes.
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, that day, Ms. Feltgen emails the recipe
on to you, Mr. Beck. This is the top of that Exhibit 41.1 The subject
is, Some thoughts on targeted population for potential Option
ARM MTA loan sale. She writes, it might be helpful insight to
see . . . the components of the portfolio that have been the largest
contributors to delinquency in recent times. The whole focus here
is delinquency, delinquency, delinquency.
Now take a look at 42b.2 This chain of emails starts 5 days later,
on February 25, 2007. The first email is from you, Mr. Beck, to
yourself and to Mr. Schneider and Mr. Rotella, and here is what
you wrote. David and I spoke today. Hes instructed me to take
actions to sell all marketable Option ARMs that we intend to transfer to portfolio in the first quarter 2007. That amounts to roughly
3B [$3 billion] of Option ARMs available for sale. I would like to
get these loans into [hold for sale] immediately so that I can sell
as many as possible in the first quarter. Sounds urgent. Mr. Beck,
is the David you are referring to there, Mr. Schneider?
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Mr. Schneider, do you recall giving that instruction to Mr. Beck?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I recall a decision being made in
ALCO to sell more Option ARMs and provide more liquidity and
capital for the company.
Senator LEVIN. Yes. Do you remember giving that direction?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, I do.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, about 2 weeks after this email, the
Market Risk Committee gives approval to move up to $3 billion in
Option ARMs out of the investment portfolio and into the sale portfolio, is that correct?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is correct.
Senator LEVIN. And Exhibit 43 is the March 9, 2007, minutes of
the Market Risk Committee reflecting the unanimous approval to
transfer.3 Now, how many of the $3 billion in Option ARMs that
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3 See
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were authorized for sale by the Market Risk Committee were, in
fact, sold? Do you know?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I dont know, Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. Do you know, Mr. Beck?
Mr. BECK. I dont recall precisely
Senator LEVIN. How about approximately?
Mr. BECK. Half.
Senator LEVIN. Was it about a billion-and-a-half?
Mr. BECK. Half.
Senator LEVIN. It was about half. So we will say about a billionand-a-half of the $3 billion. Do you know which were sold and
which werent?
Mr. BECK. No.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, the reason that Option ARM loans
were selected is because they were most likely to go delinquent.
The market was not yet aware of it. Did you notify investors when
you securitized Option ARM loans into the RMBSes that the delinquency rates for several WaMu securities had gone upwere expected to go up? Did you notify the investors?
Mr. BECK. Mr. Chairman, the market was keenly aware.
Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether investors were notified?
Mr. BECK. Investors were notified of the risk characteristics of
the loans.
Senator LEVIN. Were they notified that there was a billion-anda-half dollars in loans that were selected because they were Option
ARMs and that it was your expectation that Option ARMs were
going to go delinquent in greater numbers? Were they notified specifically of your findings?
Mr. BECK. No.
Senator LEVIN. Now, those Option ARMs, at least the ones that
are called WMALT 2007, OA3that is Exhibit 1g,1 if you will take
a look at itthey show the delinquency rates for many, or a number of WaMu securities. That ARM, which is where you put these
delinquency-prone Option ARMsand by the way, Option ARMs
are supposed to be primebut these delinquency-prone Option
ARMs nowyou wont be able to see that. You will have to look
in your book. That is Exhibit 1g. They now have a delinquency rate
of more than 50 percent, which means more than half of the underlying loans are now delinquent. More than a quarter of the underlying mortgages are in foreclosure.
Mr. Beck, purchasers of securities were relying on you as an underwriter to provide complete and truthful information. Is that correct?
Mr. BECK. Yes, they are.
Senator LEVIN. Complete and truthful information?
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. Did the investors know everything that you knew
about these expected high delinquencies?
Mr. BECK. Mr. Chairman, the risk characteristics that Mr.
Shaw
Senator LEVIN. No. Were they notified? I am asking you a specific question. You had an expectation that Option ARMs in your
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tors of everything that they needed to know in order that the information be complete and truthful. That is what your testimony is
under oath.
Mr. BECK. It is a very real possibility that the loans that went
out were better quality than Mr. Shaw laid out.
Senator LEVIN. And you do not
Mr. BECK. A very real possibility.
Senator LEVIN. And there is a very good possibility that they
were exactly the quality that he laid out? Is that right?
Mr. BECK. That is right.
Senator LEVIN. OK. And you do not know, and apparently you
do not care, and the trouble is you should have cared because there
is an obligation to make sure that your investors know, and they
did not know what you knew, critical information that you knew.
That is the problem.
Senator Kaufman, do you want to
Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, I just want to see if I got this straight.
On this list it shows that some of the high FICO loans are the very
ones that have the highest delinquency rates. Is that right, the
memo from Robert Shaw on February 20, Exhibit 41? So telling
him that there was a high FICO really would be deceptive when
you knew those were the units that were having the high delinquency rate, correct?
Mr. BECK. Senator, could you repeat the question, please?
Senator KAUFMAN. If you look at Exhibit 41 where Shaw lists options, he lists a bunchhe says that the FICOincreasing delinquencies among FICOs of 700 to 739 was an 1,197-percent increase, FICOs of 780 plus a 1,484-percent increase; FICOs of 620
to 659, an 820-percent increase. So someone looking at the portfolio, the high FICOs were really the ones that were having an incredible increase in their delinquency rates. Is that fair?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Senator, they had a high increase in actual
rates, but the actual rate was 0.4 percent, which means four out
of 1,000.
Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, but it waswell, why is thefor the 7
24.2 billion?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is the aggregate size of that pool. That is
not the amount that is delinquent.
Senator KAUFMAN. And what percentage of that would be delinquent?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is 0.4 percent of the amount.
Senator KAUFMAN. OK. Let me ask you one other question while
we are on that. On the earlier memo, it showed there were FICO
rates from 510 to 540.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. What document are you on, Senator?
Senator KAUFMAN. That is on the February 14, 2007maybe I
have this wrong, from Michael Liu to Richard Ellison. He lists the
attached spread sheet with a total Option ARMs, it says $105 million in non-accrual between FICO 501 to 540.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Senator, which document?
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Senator KAUFMAN. The page that ends 135, Exhibit 40b.1 The
last page.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, Senator. Once a loan goes into non-accrual,
goes delinquent, its credit score gets impacted very significantly, so
that would not be a surprise, nor would it be indicative of what the
loan was originated at.
Senator KAUFMAN. So you mean after it goes delinquent, then
the FICO score for the person that borrowed it drops, and this
shows their FICO score after the delinquency, not at the time they
apply for the loan.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is correct.
Senator KAUFMAN. OK. Thank you.
Senator LEVIN. I think I just have one additional question. When
you said that investors were told of the characteristics of loans,
they were told of all the characteristics of loans. Did they know,
were they informed that loans with those or some of those characteristics had a greater propensity towards delinquency in WaMus
analysis? Were they told that?
Mr. BECK. They were not told of the WaMu analysis.
Senator LEVIN. So they may have been given a long list of characteristics of loans, but they were not informed that loans with
those or some of those characteristics, according to a WaMu analysis, had a greater propensity towards delinquency. Is that correct?
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Do you have anything else?
Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. Mr. Beck, you said that at this point
most people knew that the subprime mortgage market was in pretty bad shape. What was the psychology of the people buying mortgage-backed securities at that point if they knew that this was a
pretty bad situation? Which I think by then they did.
Mr. BECK. They did, but they did not know how bad it was ultimately going to get, and so at that point in time, they were demanding wider margins for the securities that they bought, but had
not stopped buying them yet.
Senator KAUFMAN. OK. Thank you.
Senator LEVIN. You made reference to the subprime market
going down. Option ARMs are prime. They are not subprime, right?
They are supposed to be prime mortgages. Isnt that correct?
Mr. BECK. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you both. You are excused. We appreciate
your being here.
We will go to our third panel. Does our reporter need a break?
I was hoping you would say yes. I will not ask our media whether
they need a break or not.
We are going to take a 10-minute break. We are going to resume
at 2:30 p.m.
[Recess.]
Senator LEVIN. We will come back into session now, and we will
call our final panel of witnesses for the hearing: Stephen Rotella,
the former President and Chief Operating Officer of Washington
Mutual Bank; and Kerry Killinger, the former President, CEO, and
Chairman of the Board of Washington Mutual. We appreciate both
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of you being with us this afternoon and look forward to your testimony. As you have no doubt heard, we have a rule, Rule VI, that
requires all witnesses who testify before our Subcommittee to be
sworn, and at this time, I would ask you both to please stand and
raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to this
Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. ROTELLA. I do.
Mr. KILLINGER. I do.
Senator LEVIN. The timing system will be the same that I believe
you heard, but it means that a minute before the red light comes
on, you will see the lights change from green to yellow. That will
give you an opportunity to conclude. Your written testimony will be
made part of the record in its entirety. We would ask that you try
to limit your oral testimony to no more than 5 minutes, and, Mr.
Rotella, I think we are going to have you go first, followed by Mr.
Killinger.
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN J. ROTELLA,1 FORMER PRESIDENT
AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, WASHINGTON MUTUAL
BANK
1 The
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Subsequently, the decline in the housing market accelerated, and
it was not long before the financial crisis was in full swing. We continued our efforts as the team raised capital, and, in fact, the day
the company was seized, our primary regulator, the OTS, determined that WaMu was well capitalized. All of us wanted the opportunity to finish what we had started in 2005.
I thank you for inviting me here today, and I look forward for
your questions.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rotella. Mr. Killinger.
TESTIMONY OF KERRY K. KILLINGER,1 FORMER PRESIDENT,
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD, WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
Mr. KILLINGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I very much appreciate the opportunity
to contribute to your investigation of the financial crisis. In addition to my oral testimony, I have submitted extensive written testimony.
I was an employee of Washington Mutual for more than 30 years
and was honored to be its chief executive officer for 18 of those
years. And thanks to the efforts of tens of thousands of our employees, the bank enjoyed many successes over most of that tenure as
CEO. However, the financial crisis and the seizure of the bank in
September 2008 were devastating to the company, its customers,
employees, investors, and communities. And as CEO, I accept responsibility for all of our performance and am deeply saddened by
and sorry for what happened.
Now, beginning in 2005, 2 years before the financial crisis hit,
I was publicly and repeatedly warning of the risks of a potential
housing downturn. And we did not just talk about it, but instead
we did some things about it.
Unlike most of our competitors, we aggressively reduced our residential first mortgage originations by 74 percent, and we cut our
home loan staffing in half between 2003 and 2007. Our market
shares of prime and subprime loan originations declined by 50 percent over this period.
We also deferred plans to grow many of our loan portfolios and
instead returned capital to shareholders through share repurchases
and cash dividends. We sold 30 percent of our loan servicing portfolio. We reduced and then eliminated broker and correspondent
lending. We cut subprime and Option ARM originations dramatically in 2006 and 2007 and eliminated those products in 2008.
Now, with the benefit of hindsight, had we known that housing
price declines of 40 percent or more would occur in key markets
served by the company, we would have taken even more draconian
measures.
Washington Mutual was a Main Street bank dedicated to serving
everyday consumers. Most of our activities centered on providing
checking, savings, investment, and credit card services to millions
of customers. Our residential lending was a declining part of the
companys business since 2003 and contributed only 13 percent of
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And the unfair treatment of the company did not begin with its
unnecessary seizure. In July 2008, the company was excluded from
the Do Not Short list, which protected many Wall Street banks
from abusive short selling. The company was similarly excluded
from the hundreds of meetings and telephone calls between Wall
Street executives and policy leaders that ultimately determined the
winners and losers in this financial crisis. For those that were part
of the inner circle and were too clubby to fail, the benefits were obvious. For those of us outside of the club, the penalty was severe.
Now, I have some other suggestions for regulatory reform in my
written statement that I would be happy to discuss further, but
thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions. And I
do request, Mr. Chairman, that my complete statement and any
documents referenced in it through this morning be placed into the
written record.
Senator LEVIN. It will be placed in the record, as will all the
opening statements. We will try a 20-minute first round here.
First on the numbers. Mr. Killinger, in your opening statement
you said that from 2003 to 2007, WaMu reduced its residential first
mortgage originations, reduced its market share, and that may be
accurate, but it is misleading in what it leaves out.
You made a major shift in your strategy and you reduced your
fixed-loan origination in 2003 by almost $200 billion. So most of the
reduction in the mortgage business that you were engaged in came
through the reduction in the fixed-loan 30-year mortgages that we
see on that chart, Exhibit 1i.1
Then if you look at Chart 1c, Exhibit 1c in your book,2 you will
see that the securitization of your subprime home loans continued
to climb right through 2006.
Now, you have said, I believe, that you reduced significantly the
origination of these subprime loans, but is it not true that those
numbers on Exhibit 1b 3 are accurate, that in terms of securitizing
you continued to securitize your subprime home loans right
through 2006? Is that accurate?
Mr. KILLINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You raise an excellent point, and
Senator LEVIN. Are my numbers accurate?
Mr. KILLINGER. And I appreciate having the opportunity to make
a clarification for the benefit of the Committee.
Regarding the first chart, my data was correct that we had a 74percent reduction in our origination from 2003 to 2007. Your point
is correct that a significant part of that reduction was the decline
in fixed-rate mortgage originations. However, that does not reflect
a change in strategy or policy. That reflected low interest rates
that were prevailing in 2002 and 2003 that led to massive
refinancings in the United States. And since I had been at the organization so many years, I can just back you up a couple of years
prior to that
Senator LEVIN. I just wanted to
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2 See
3 See
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anticipated before you joined WaMu, that you realized that changes
to the strategy needed to be implemented. What did you mean by
the companys operations were weaker than you had anticipated?
Mr. ROTELLA. Mr. Chairman, when I was hired in 2005, the
Chief Operating Officer position was a brand new position at
WaMu. Part of the reason for that position being created were substantial problems that had come up in the mortgage business prior
to my arrival. As I mentioned in my oral statement, in 2003 and
2004, there were some substantial issues in market risk management. Mr. Vanasek earlier mentioned a systems project that had
to be written off.
And I just add at the end of my comment on this, the company
bought a number of mortgage companies over the course of about
2000 through 2005. There were 12 mortgage origination systems
when I joined. There were a number of servicing systems. The operation needed a lot of work.
Senator LEVIN. OK. During the prior panels, we went through a
number of documents and audit reports describing problems with
Long Beach. If you will take a look at Exhibit 8b,1 please, page 3.
This is a joint report in 2004 by the FDIC and the State of Washington after a visit to WaMu in 2003. And here is what it said
about Long Beach.
40% . . . of the loans reviewed were considered unacceptable
due to one or more critical errors. This raised concerns over [Long
Beachs] ability to meet the representations and warrantys made
to facilitate sales of loan securitizations, and management halted
securitization activity. A separate credit review report . . . disclosed that [Long Beachs] credit management and portfolio oversight practices were unsatisfactory. . . . Approximately 4,000 of
the 13,000 loans in the warehouse had been reviewed. . . . of
these, approximately 950 were deemed saleable. That is 950 of the
4,000. 800 were deemed unsaleable, and the remainder contained
deficiencies requiring remediation prior to sale.
Do you remember those problems at Long Beach in 2003, Mr.
Killinger?
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. And then you halted the securitizations until the
problems were cleared up. But they began again in 2004. But by
2005, the problems started erupting again with a surge of early
payment defaults. WaMu ended up repurchasing almost $1 billion
in loans, suffered a $100 million loss. Why didnt you halt the
securitizations in 2005 when those problems again appeared?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, again, Senator, we entered Long Beach
Mortgage, as you know, back in 1999 to help better serve that community. When weit was a relatively very smallpart of our business, and when they first encountered some of the securitization
problems or some of the loan quality, we sent a team in to work
on that. We believed that they had made substantial progress with
that.
And then they started to increase the originations again because
we felt that the operational issues were under control. And then we
started to see some additional evidences of difficulties there. The
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actions that we took were to change out managements, to go in and
do some organizational redesign to get to a point where we felt
comfortable that we could proceed with doing both the whole loan
sales and the securitizations that the company did.
Senator LEVIN. Let us talk about those years where you got comfortable. Mr. Rotella, take a look at Exhibit 11,1 if you would. This
is an email chain from April 2006 between you and Mr. Killinger.
You describe the situation at Long Beach. This is April 2006.
The major weak point was the review of Long Beach. . . . delinquencies are up 140% and foreclosures close to 70%. . . . First payment defaults are way up and the 2005 vintage is way up relative
to previous years. It is ugly. Then you cite a number of factors for
why the problems should be solved.
Five months later, you sent Mr. Killinger another email about
Long Beach, which we have marked Exhibit 12,2 if you want to
look at that. In this email chain from September 2006, you wrote
Mr. Killinger the following. Long Beach is terrible, . . . Repurchases, [early payment defaults], manual underwriting, very weak
servicing/collection practices, and a weak staff. You said that you
were addressing the problems.
But the problems didnt get addressed. A year later, now August
20, 2007, and the audit of Long Beach loan origination and underwriting. This is Exhibit 19.3 If you look at page 3 of Exhibit 19,
here is what it says. It is basically the same old problems. Repeat
Issue, so this is a repeat issue, Underwriting guidelines established to mitigate the risk of unsound underwriting decisions are
not always followed. . . . accurate reporting and tracking of exceptions to policy does not exist. . . .
So that takes us up to August 20, 2007. So now let me ask you,
Mr. Rotella, why did these problems exist year after year? What is
the explanation for that?
Mr. ROTELLA. Mr. Chairman, just by way of background, when
I was with JP Morgan Chase, I ran a small subprime business, relative to Long Beach. When I joined in 2005, my initial focus was
on the main home loans business. I shortly became very concerned
about Long Beach around the middle of 2005. We have heard a
couple of times, management was relieved of their duties. That was
my recommendation and responsibility. At the end of 2005, the
folks that were running Long Beach were either asked to leave or
left. I transferred that business at the beginning of 2006 into the
main Home Loans Unit under a group of people who were better
equipped to run it and we went about a process to try to improve
that company.
In addition, while we were doing that, we did bring the volume
in Long Beach down substantially every quarter starting in the
first quarter of 2006. As we went through that process, it became
increasingly clear, as I have indicated in here, that the problems
in Long Beach were deep and the only way we could address those
were to continue to cut back volume and ultimately shut it down.
So from my perspective as the Chief Operating Officer, taking
out management, restructuring the business, bringing down vol1 See
2 See
3 See
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ume, and ultimately shutting it down was a proactive number of
steps.
Senator LEVIN. August 2007, if you will look at Exhibit 79,1 page
2. Now we are in August 2007here is what you write. [Home
loans] (the original prime only)was the worst managed business
I had seen in my career. This isnt just Long Beach. That is, until
we got below the hood of Long Beach. Even before you got to Long
Beach, you said that home loans, which was part of WaMu, was
the worst managed business that you had seen in your career. So
what were the problems with the home loans management?
Mr. ROTELLA. Mr. Chairman, there was a reason I was hired
after 18 years of experience at JP Morgan Chase. As I said earlier,
the company, and this was well known in the industry, in the mortgage business, had experienced significant problems in 2003 and
2004. The problems in the main home loans group, which is where
I focused a lot of my initial attention, were several.
The first I would mention is the management team did not have
a great deal of experience in running a mortgage company that
size. I went through a process, along with David Schneider, who
joined later in the year, of repopulating most of the senior jobs in
that business.
Second, the technology in the business was antiquated, and as I
said earlier, there were literally 12 different production systems as
a result of many acquisitions. There were manual processes in the
business, and relative to what I had seen at my previous employer,
the company had many shortcomings as it related to processing,
closing, and servicing loans.
Senator LEVIN. Now, I think you were here earlier this morning
when we went through with prior panels the 2005 internal WaMu
investigation of the two Southern California loan offices, Montebello and Downey. It found extensive rates of fraud affecting their
loans, rates of 83 percent and 58 percent. That was all on Exhibit
23b,2 if you want to refer to that.
We have also reviewed a memorandum, which is Exhibit 24,3
which was prepared in 2008 after the frauds and evidence of it resurfaced. It found that virtually no actions had been taken following the 2005 investigation, and after reviewing the loans by
Montebello in 2007 found that 62 percent contained fraudulent information.
So year after year after year, we have a couple parts of your company that are apparently engaged in seriously fraudulent loans
with misinformation that is pervasive. So starting in 2005, why
werent any actions taken after that first 2005 review?
Mr. ROTELLA. In the particular case of the 2005 review, I was not
aware of that at the time. I was aware of the 2008 review that you
referenced earlier that came through one of our mortgage insurers.
And I would simply say, Senator, as president of the company with
40,000 employees, first of all, all fraud is bad and any instance of
fraud that was brought to my attention would be turned over to internal audit and/or legal to do a separate review. And if they came
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back and told me that there indeed was fraud, believe me, significant action would be taken.
Senator LEVIN. Well, somebody didnt tell you about it. Is that
what you are saying? You didnt know
Mr. ROTELLA. I am not aware of the 2005 situation, at the time.
Senator LEVIN. Somebody didnt tell you about it?
Mr. ROTELLA. No, sir.
Senator LEVIN. These are very serious allegations. These are
high fraud rates. Now, who should have told you about it?
Mr. ROTELLA. That would normally come from the business or
from the audit or legal department.
Senator LEVIN. And the first you heard of that was when?
Mr. ROTELLA. I became aware of this particular situation when
it was brought to my attention in 2008
Senator LEVIN. That is the first
Mr. ROTELLA [continuing]. As was referenced in your documents
from later in the binder.
Senator LEVIN. Now, in 2007, we had a review. This is Exhibit
21.1 This went to you, also. This was now a problem that corporate
credit review did. High risk: Ineffectiveness of fraud detection
tools, and Weak credit risk infrastructure impacting credit quality. They looked at 187 loans they were reviewing. Of the 187 files
that were looked at, of those 132 that were sampled were identified
with red flags that were not addressed by the business unit.
Eighty had stated income loans that were identified as being unreasonable. Eighty-seven exceeded program parameters. And 133
had credit evaluation or loan decision errors present.
And this was sent to you, according to the cover sheet here, Mr.
Rotella, Exhibit 21. Do you remember this one?
Mr. ROTELLA. I do.
Senator LEVIN. Well, you said you had found out about it in 2008
for the first time. This is 2007.
Mr. ROTELLA. Senator, this report labeled Wholesale Specialty
Lending is about the subprime business. By August 2007, we had
shut that business down. This audit report is reflective of the actions that I took, which were to relieve management of their duties,
take the volume down, and ultimately shut this business down by
the time this was issued.
Senator LEVIN. But you said you first became aware of fraud in
2008 and this shows significant fraud in 2007.
Mr. ROTELLA. I was referring to the two California retail offices
from Montebello and Downey when I mentioned 2008.
Senator LEVIN. If you take a look now at Exhibit 33.2 This is a
report by Radian Guaranty, which insured some of WaMus mortgages. They reviewed a number of 2007 loans to evaluate the underwriting and compliance with their guidance. They found so
many problems that it rated WaMus loan files unacceptable, if you
will look at page 2 on Exhibit 33.
Now, just one of the loan examples. I am picking one from page
5, but there are many. This is a $484,000 loan given to a sign designer. That is somebody who designs signs, who claimed to be
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making $34,000 a month in income. And this is what the report
said. Borrowers stated monthly income of $34,000 does not appear
reasonable. . . . It noted another problem. The loan file appraised
the house at $575,000, but another report said the probable value
was $321,000, an amount less than the loan. That is just one of the
loans that Radian found unacceptable and uninsurable.
Were either of you aware of the Radian report? Mr. Rotella, were
you aware of it?
Mr. ROTELLA. No, sir.
Senator LEVIN. Were you aware of it, Mr. Killinger?
Mr. KILLINGER. No.
Senator LEVIN. Now, look at Exhibit 30.1 We have discussed this
before. This is a Significant Incident Notification. It related to early
payment defaults at the Westlake Village Home Loan Center, and
it said that, in this report, Exhibit 30, it said that One Sales Associate admitted that during that crunch time some of the Associatessome of the associateswould manufacture asset statements from previous loan documents and submit them to the [loan
processing center]. She said the pressure was tremendous from the
[loan processing center] to get them the documents, since the loan
had already funded and pressure from the Loan Consultants to get
the loans funded. All the Sales Associates stated thatthe loan officersdid not instruct them to falsify documentation and just told
them to get the loans funded with whatever it took.
Exhibit 31,2 an internal investigative report about the same incident, says that Sales Associates would take [asset] statements
from other files and cut and paste the current borrowers name and
address.
Were you aware, first, Mr. Rotella, that WaMu employees were
cutting corners and even engaging in fraud to meet volume demands?
Mr. ROTELLA. No, sir.
Senator LEVIN. Were you aware, Mr. Killinger?
Mr. KILLINGER. No, sir. That is an absolute violation of the code
of conduct of the company.
Senator LEVIN. I am sure it is, but were you aware of it? That
is my question. That investigative report, Exhibit 31, were you
aware of that investigative report?
Mr. KILLINGER. In regarding Westlake, I believe it was prior to
this particular report, I had someone give me a call and a tip that
there might have been an issue at that office. I immediately forwarded that information to our internal audit, who did an investigation on that, and I turned it over to them for that investigation.
Senator LEVIN. In terms of that specific exhibit, though, were you
aware of that? Had you seen that?
Mr. KILLINGER. I do not recall this specific exhibit.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Senator Kaufman.
Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Killinger, you seem to have some opinions about why WaMu was seized. Why do you think WaMu was
seized? I know it was after you were gone?
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Mr. KILLINGER. As I mentioned in my comments, I think Washington Mutual was very well positioned with its capital and operating plan to work itself through this financial crisis and I think
it was making excellent progress on that. And I think that it was
seized, in my opinion, in an unnecessary manner. Clearly, there
was a lot of pressure on the financial system and regulators and
policy leaders at that point in time in the wake of the collapse of
Lehman. However, I just dont think the company was treated in
the same equal-handed, fair manner that all other financial institutions were.
And it is very much like oxygenI will use an analogy of oxygen.
None of us can live if oxygen is choked off for a brief period of time,
and liquidity is that equivalent in financial services. Liquidity did
start to become tight, not just for Washington Mutual, but for the
entire industry for a brief period of time. But policy leaders elected
to open up those tubes of oxygen for most banks and gave them a
huge amount of benefits and Washington Mutual inexplicably, in
my opinion, was not allowed to have the benefits of having that oxygen come to them for that brief period of time.
And now, in hindsight, we can see for those that were able to get
through that brief period and start to get back on the mend that
the financial position is just extraordinarily different today than it
was 12 months ago, and I believe Washington Mutual could have
and should have been able to be one of those surviving banks.
Senator KAUFMAN. Why was Washington Mutual specifically? I
mean, is it just bad luck?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, I think there is just an element of timing.
Senator KAUFMAN. I mean, why was it Washington Mutual? The
others were given the oxygen. You were not. Why was that, do you
think?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, obviously, I have had a chance to think
about this for an extended period of time after having been away
and it just doesnt look fair to me. And I think that the company
was not treated fairly earlier in the year when it was excluded on
that do not short list. By removing the target from the backs of
other banks, it put the target on the back of Washington Mutual.
I dont think Washington Mutual was treated fairly when the hundreds of telephone calls and meetings took place between Wall
Street executives and policy leaders to decide the fate of how things
would work. Washington Mutual was excluded from those meetings.
And then I think it is just inexplicable that Washington Mutual
gets quickly seized, and then within a matter of just a few days,
all of these other measures that gave their lifeblood to the rest of
the industry took place. And I just think those are unfair things
and I wanted to speak about that on behalf of all of my fellow and
past employees and investors who I think were harmed as a result
of that.
Senator KAUFMAN. I mean, do you think Wall Street banks were
given preference by the regulators?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, in hindsight, you look at the position we
were in and we made a decision to overnight, instantly, give Wall
Street banks access to becoming bank holding companies and access to the Federal Reserve for liquidity. We very quickly passed
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into mortgage-backed securities, you are passing it along to someone else and there is fraud involved in that. So I am not just talking about WaMu, but you canI mean, I am not missing something here, am I, here?
Mr. KILLINGER. No. All I can talk about is what we did and
Senator KAUFMAN. Yes.
Mr. KILLINGER. When I got concerned, we started pulling back
our operations. We reduced these originations. We cut our market
shares. We started to go in these directions. I didnt know there
was going to be a 40 percent decline in housing prices.
Senator KAUFMAN. Right.
Mr. KILLINGER. Even in the middle part of 2007, Secretary
Paulson was saying, I think this housing thing is contained and it
is not really going to impact the overall economy and lead us into
a recession. Chairman Bernanke was saying something similar
about the containment of the subprime issues. So it really wasnt
until that second half of 2007 when it became pretty obvious to us
that things were going to be pretty difficult and we needed to pull
in our horns even more.
Senator KAUFMAN. But all these registered security deals, you
had to sign them as a CEO, right?
Mr. KILLINGER. No, sir.
Senator KAUFMAN. You did not?
Mr. KILLINGER. No.
Senator KAUFMAN. Who did sign them, do you know?
Mr. KILLINGER. Again, I was not directly involved in any of our
securitizations or those securities, so
Senator KAUFMAN. Let me ask you about FICO, because we
talked about that earlier. WaMu used FICO scores, right?
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes.
Senator KAUFMAN. And are they a good indicator of creditworthiness?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, historically, the two best indicators of a
loan performance was loan-to-value ratio and FICO score, and
those did a pretty good job of predicting how a loan would perform.
There were other factors, such as the amount of income that somebody had and their ability to cover the debt. There were indicators
about full documentation, limited documentation, adjustable rate,
fixed rate, conforming, non-conforming, a lot of things that also impacted. But the two most important were loan-to-value and FICO.
What changed in this cycle is this whole thing about housing
prices declining by 40 percent or more. As you heard, I think, this
morning, all of a sudden, people faced with being underwater in
their mortgages, and guess what, even if they had a decent FICO,
their propensity to become delinquent was much greater.
Senator KAUFMAN. So you dont think any of this had to do with
kind of an explosion that mortgage-backed securities were great,
people were making a lot of money on them, people that originated
them making money on them, brokers were making money on
folks, and Wall Street was making money on it, and that is what
caused the explosion in mortgage-backed securities and that is part
of the problem? It was just the fact that the housing market finally
stopped?
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Mr. KILLINGER. Well, I think they are different topics and certainly somewhat interrelated. I made a comment in my written testimony that there is no simple or single cause of what went on
Senator KAUFMAN. No, I am just saying that was part. I am not
saying there is any one single cause.
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes.
Senator KAUFMAN. I am just saying that was part of it. I think
that at least the literature keeps saying that as this thing grew
and got more and more profitable, people kind of reached out a little bit further and stretched things a little more. Where maybe
something like stated loans may be OK for a while, people just
started taking and using it as a tool in order to get into more mortgage-backed securities so they could feed this gigantic machine that
was so incredibly profitable to everybody involved.
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, there is no question that there was a tremendous growth of capital coming in from Wall Street and interest
in this business and the GSEs
Senator KAUFMAN. Right.
Mr. KILLINGER [continuing]. And that increasingly put pressure,
competitive pressures on everybody to adjust loan terms.
Senator KAUFMAN. But doesnt at that point the compensation
also help, the fact that you wereyou set the compensation, right?
You were part of the process that set the compensation for the
folks out there generating the loans, right?
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes, we did, although I will tell you that people
havemortgage representatives have been paid on commission
Senator KAUFMAN. The commission, but we had
Mr. KILLINGER [continuing]. For many years.
Senator KAUFMAN. We had a chart up here that showed that
there was much more of a commission on the higher-risk, higherreturn products than there were on the lower-risk, lower-return
products, right? 1
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes, although, again, I am not intimately familiar because those were done within the business unit, but I also
know those change each year and so you have got to look at what
was it in each year and not necessarily just to one point in time.
Senator KAUFMAN. OK. Do you know if the FICO scores in some
of these, 550, I mean, do you know what the range was of Washington Mutual FICO scores?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, again, I dont have all the intimate knowledge, but I do know, because I followed what the bulk of the FICO
scores were for our portfolios, and, for example, our Option ARM
portfolio had an average FICO score slightly above 700. Our home
equity was slightly above 730. And our otherprime residential, I
think, was about 718 or so in that range. And I think in the case
of Long Beach or the subprime portfolio we held in portfolio, it was
somewhere in the mid-600s.
Senator KAUFMAN. Now, you understand the problem with using
averages, right?
Mr. KILLINGER. I know it.
Senator KAUFMAN. The barbell effect
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sucking sound as we brought all these things into it, you had to
be concerned that people were beginning to bend the rules, especially with the compensation. I mean, you are a smart man. As you
said, you have loads of experience in this business. You just look
at these things, and you say this business is so big, I do not know
what is going on. This is a business that is exploding. It is exploding in a very competitive time. Peoples compensation was based on
doing well, and doing well meant selling as many risky things as
you could.
I mean, you had to at least have a feeling that there was something going on here that was a little scary.
Mr. ROTELLA. Senator, Chairman Levin repeated a couple of
colorful comments I made in some emails about my views of the
business. As I said in my opening statement, this business was on
an explosive growth path when I joined. It was on an explosive
growth path with a very weak infrastructure.
Senator KAUFMAN. Exactly.
Mr. ROTELLA. I was brought in there to fix that, and I worked
night and day to do that, brought in the people to do that, and we
made a lot of strides.
Senator KAUFMAN. Yes.
Mr. ROTELLA. We also brought that business down significantly.
So if I was not concerned, I would not have taken some of the actions I did to bring in new management, to bring in new technology, to restructure the business, and to take volume down, and
ultimately shut down the subprime business totally, as well as Option ARMs.
Senator KAUFMAN. And also shut down Long Beach, right?
Mr. ROTELLA. I did recommend the shutting down of Long Beach.
Senator KAUFMAN. Good. Let me ask you, Mr. Killinger, just a
final question I have. With all that going on, you get a report from
Mr. Vanasek and Mr. Cathcart; they are worried about an impending crisis due to lax standards and poor internal controls as early
as 2004. When they came and talked about that, didnt it kind of
send chillsI mean, you made Washington Mutual what it is
today. The idea that your two risk officers one right after another
coming in in 2004 and saying, we have got a real big problem
herekind of go through what went through your head between
2004 and 2005 and 2006.
Mr. KILLINGER. This is relating to the subprime business?
Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, the whole thing that they were just concerned about lax standards, poor reports from Long Beach, all the
things that were coming into your officeyou are the CEOand
your two top risk guys are saying we have a real serious problem
here. And, obviously, you hired Mr. Rotella because you were concerned about this.
Mr. KILLINGER. Absolutely. So, again, let me put it very quickly
into perspective.
First, Long Beach mortgage was a very small part of our operation, maybe 3 percent of our employees, and it was just a small
part of what we were doing. So when reports arose that there were
some problems there, the first time I actually instructed our general counsel to go in and work on getting things cleaned up in
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terms of the represenatives and warranties and getting it straightened up, and they thought they were making some progress.
Then I had a brief period where it looked like things were going
along OK. Then we started to get some reports about that we are
seeing some more problems. So we decided to change out management, saying, go ahead, I want a new opportunity to get in here.
And it was also obvious, again, overall that the company had expanded to a size that it was appropriatein 2004, we made a decision to bring in a president and chief operating officer to be able
to be hands-on and be on top of these things because, frankly more
and more of my time was being pulled away from all the things
and travel you have to do as a CEO. And we thought that would
be a very good structure. And I think that was the right thing to
do, and I think that it was not only bringing Mr. Rotella in. He in
turn brought in a lot of talent in the mortgage space where we
needed the most talent, includingyou saw David Schneider and
David Beck, and just a whole host of other people that came in behind it.
So our response to these ongoing problems was to try to fix it,
change out management, try to work as hard as we could, but then
also understanding that the market was getting progressively more
difficult, and that kind of tipped us at one point of saying, I think
we are making some progress here, but the market has gotten
tough enough, let us just plain close that business down.
Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator. Dr. Coburn.
Senator COBURN. Mr. Killinger, I want to refer you to Exhibit
39,1 where, on April 3, 2007, you said, I think we better be well
prepared to defend the Option ARM portfolio. If you will go to Exhibit 39, that is in a statement that you made.
Mr. KILLINGER. OK. Yes.
Senator COBURN. What I would like to know, did you believe at
that time that Option ARMs were likely to cause widespread problems and this would force WaMu to defend its actions?
Mr. KILLINGER. No.
Senator COBURN. What was the basis for that statement?
Mr. KILLINGER. The statement was I was passing on to some executives a letter that I received from somebody outside of the organization who had an opinion about Option ARMs, and part of why
I was passing it on is to the folks to think through both what does
this mean in terms of what investor interest might be and how we
might need to explain about Option ARMs to the investors in our
company, and also to take a look, again, if market conditions are
changing and, if they are, is there anything else that we should
consider doing in our Option ARM portfolio.
Senator COBURN. Exhibit 11,2 you said, in April 2006, We may
want to continue to sell most of the Long Beach originations until
everyone gets comfortable with credit. Why do you think anyone
would have wanted to buy what you were selling if the Long Beach
product was bad?
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Mr. KILLINGER. Well, again, Long Beachs business model was to
originate and sell its products ever since we bought them, so that
was their sole business model, was to originate and either sell its
loans or into securitizations. We were in the process of changing
that business to move it under the bank so that we had more flexibility to potentially retain some of the loans that we would originate, and we just started to do some of that process. But I wanted
to be assured that before we expanded our volumes and took more
into portfolio and changed what we were doing, that we felt very
comfortable about credit, processes, and all those kinds of things.
Senator COBURN. In Exhibit 50,1 Mr. Beck said to you, in November 2006, that Long Beach Mortgage Computer paper is among
the worst performing paper in the market in 2006. Did you see in
April what Mr. Beck found to be true in November, namely, that
LBMC paper was going to tank?
Mr. KILLINGER. No, I do not recall this.
Senator COBURN. So you were not aware of his statement that
it was the worst in the market?
Mr. KILLINGER. I do not see what you are referring to
Senator COBURN. Mr. Beck said in Exhibit 50, in November 2006,
that Long Beach Mortgage Corporation paper is among the worst
performing paper in the market.
Mr. KILLINGER. OK. I just do not recall seeing this memo.
Senator COBURN. Who is the memo addressed to in front of you?
Mr. KILLINGER. The one I am seeing is David Schneider and Arlene Hyde.
Senator COBURN. So you were unaware of their assessment of
your paper.
Mr. KILLINGER. Again, I just do not recall the specifics of this at
all.
Senator COBURN. OK. Exhibit 78a,2 in this email exchange from
March 10, 2005, with Jim Vanasek, you wrote, I have never seen
such a high risk housing market as market after market thinks
they are unique and for whatever reason are not likely to experience price decline. This typically signifies a bubble.
Is it accurate to say that you saw a bubble in housing prices as
early as March 2005?
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes.
Senator COBURN. Did you see a bubble in housing prices before
March 2005?
Mr. KILLINGER. I do not recall my exact timing. I do remember
making public comments beginning in the middle part of 2005. I
remember talking to the board from time to time about that there
was growing risk because housing prices are growing faster than
the rate of inflation. But also at the same time, I can remember
everybody arguing of why that is going to be OK and it is unlikely
to be a significant downturn in housing.
We were kind of the front edge of trying to assess that there was
a concern here.
Senator COBURN. Well, that follows into my second question because in January 2005 is when you pushed forward a high-risk
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lending strategy for board approval. Only 2 months earlier, if you
saw that prices would decline in the near future, why would you
be pushing through a high-risk strategy on a market that you
thought was a bubble?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, Senator, we approved a new strategic plan
in actually that summer of 2004, and this is not the whole plan.
Remember, this is a small part of our business. But part of that
plan was increasing the subprime portfolio that we had in our portfolio over a period of time. But I also was very careful to say that
is going to be subject to market conditions and we will be opportunistic. And the reality is we did not execute on that. We ended up
shrinking that portfolio that we held, rather than growing it.
Senator COBURN. Yes, and this chart actually shows that.
Mr. KILLINGER. No. What shows is what we held in portfolio, and
the facts
Senator COBURN. The loan originations also show it.
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes, our originations declined and our market
share of subprime originations declined fromfirst of all, we were
only 6 percent, and we cut it to about 3 percent, and that market
share was about half of what we had in the overall market. But
in terms of what we held in portfolio, the portfolio shrank, and we
had plans to grow it.
Senator COBURN. Between 2004 and 2005, at the time you shifted towards this high-risk strategy, at the same time you switched
from doing business with Fannie Mae to doing more business with
Freddie Mac. Is that simply a coincidence? Or was there a business
advantage to moving to Freddie Mac from Fannie Mae?
Mr. KILLINGER. I do not have the personal details of the pros and
cons of doing business with each of them. Those contracts were negotiated actually in the Home Loans group, and I think Mr. Rotella
might have been involved there. So I cannot recall why one was
picked over the other, but we always tried to have them in a good
competitive position.
Senator COBURN. I would like to enter into the record the Washington Mutual document Fannie Mae alliance and Freddie Mac
business relationship proposal from May 2005.1 Here is what your
executive summary says. The key to the Freddie proposal is it provides significant liquidity for our Option ARM originations with
more advantageous credit parameters, competitive G-fees and preferred access to the balance sheet relative to our current agreement
with Fannie. So it was an economically driven position.
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes, that sounds like a better deal, and not just
Option ARMs, but I think I also heard better guarantee fees in
that explanation.
Senator COBURN. All right. I have one final question for you, Mr.
Killinger. At one time towards the end, before the FDIC came in
on your business, were you in negotiations to sell this business?
Mr. KILLINGER. In the spring of 2008, we determined that the
housing market was continuing to soften and that we needed to either raise new capital or seek a merger partner. And the board
went through a very thorough review of alternatives at that time,
and we considered both the potential sale, then we looked at the
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equity infusion that we could get, and we ultimately made a decision to take in $7.2 billion in an equity infusion. And that is what
the board elected to do.
Senator COBURN. And how were you going to do that?
Mr. KILLINGER. We did it. How?
Senator COBURN. So how did you accomplish that $7.2 billion equity infusion?
Mr. KILLINGER. It was a combination, as I recall, of a convertible
preferred that basically most of it would convert into a common
once we got the additional shares approved by shareholders, and
there were certain warrants attached to that, and it was led by a
private equitya number of large institutional investors.
Senator COBURN. So you actually sold that equity and those warrants and that convertible preferred?
Mr. KILLINGER. There was a private placement offering of those.
Senator COBURN. But it was sold.
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes.
Senator COBURN. And who represented the other side of that
transaction? Who was the broker-dealer or the underwriter? Who
was the lead placement firm?
Mr. KILLINGER. The lead placement for us would have been Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers, I believe.
Senator COBURN. OK. All right.
Mr. Rotella, under Exhibit 2a,1 and in your testimony 2 you mentioned that Washington Mutual had adopted the high-risk lending
strategy before you arrived. That is on page 4 of Exhibit 2. You
said, I did not design this strategy on page 5 of your testimony.
Did you mean to imply some distance between yourself and this
strategy?
Mr. ROTELLA. Senator, as I said in my opening statement, shortly after arriving at Washington Mutual and having been an observer from JP Morgan Chase, I was aware of the fact that the
company had an extreme concentration in real estate loans as a
thrift. It had a concentration in Florida and in California, 60 percent of its mortgage assets. As I said earlier, it was going through
explosive growth, particularly in higher-risk lending, and the operating infrastructure was quite weak. That combined with the view
that the housing market was softening led a group of us to begin
a process of diversifying the company and de-emphasizing the
mortgage business, which over time we hoped would lead us to a
company that was concentrated less in real estate and had other
asset classes.
Senator COBURN. So in your testimony, on the one hand you say
that you were simply carrying out the chairman and CEOs strategies as far as the high-risk category; but on the other hand, you
are saying it was your decision to decrease the high-risk lending.
Which is it?
Mr. ROTELLA. Senator, no, I am not saying it was my decision,
but I and others believed that the company needed to diversify
itself and move away from its mortgage legacy. That was a discussion amongst a number of executives and ultimately up to the
1 See
2 See
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Senator COBURN. Were there others that you had conversations
with?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, they were representing us.
Senator COBURN. Who did they have conversations with in terms
of the sale of the business, not raising additional capital but the
sale of the business?
Mr. KILLINGER. There were, I will say, a handful of potential interested parties. We put out a net that was broad, both domestically and internationally, to see if anyone would be a potential
partner at that time, and the investment bankers talked to a number of them, and then there were a couple of parties that we talked
on a more private basis.
Senator COBURN. Would you be so kind as to give the Subcommittee the names of those individuals?
Mr. KILLINGER. I am not sure that has been publicly disclosed.
I am not sure what my rights are.
Senator COBURN. Well, your company is gone, and for us to get
to the bottom of this, we need to know every detail. So you can
refuse to answer, and then we will work on that. But the fact is
that information is going to come out, and good lawyers do not ask
questions they do not already know the answers to. So I think it
would probably be beneficialand I am not a lawyer, by the way
for you to give us that information. You do not have to do it publicly, but you can give it to the Subcommittee.
Mr. KILLINGER. OK.It is Exhibit 89.1
Senator COBURN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Coburn.
Let me go back to your strategy. You say you adopted this shift
to high-risk strategy in 2004 and 2005. Is that correct? But that
it was not implemented, you did not execute it.
Mr. KILLINGER. Not all elements.
Senator LEVIN. Well, you surely executed your focus on high-risk
products. Take a look at Exhibit 6b.2 Take a look at that exhibit,
called Home Loans2007 Strategy Team Goals, Updated 11/12/
07. Your goal is GROWTH, 45%; Drive Nonprime expansion initiative . . . Support market share Increases for nonprime product.
Key to success: Focus by all channels on targeting higher-margin
products. That is higher-risk products.
Mr. KILLINGER. OK. I am sorry. I am behind Tab 6.
Senator LEVIN. You sure tried to execute that new strategy for
at least a year, year and a half.
Mr. KILLINGER. And, Senator, we did execute elements of it.
Senator LEVIN. Well, let us just focus here on higher-margin
products. You want to focus all channels on targeting higher-margin products, drive non-prime expansion initiative. That is your
goal.
Mr. KILLINGER. I am trying to catch up here.
Senator LEVIN. Updated 11/12/07, by the way. Do you see that,
Updated 11/12/07?
1 Exhibit
2 See
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Mr. KILLINGER. OK. I am seeing this, yes. OK. So this is the target for the Home Loans group that we are looking at, not the company.
Senator LEVIN. Right. Drive non-prime expansion.
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. OK.
Mr. KILLINGER. If I could, againbecause I am setting thewith
the board setting the strategy for the overall company, it really
needs to be in the context, when we talked about diversifying the
company, that included having a strategy for entering the credit
card business, and we subsequently did the Providian acquisition,
which was a significant part.
It also had a material reduction in interest rate risk. That is why
we sold so many mortgage servicing rights. And we also had, even
in the Home Loans area, that this would be a lesser part of our
overall business, and that the primary growth of the business
would be in our retail banking stores, and that is where we are
going to open up significant numbers of retail banking stores.
So the overall context of the company is still a shrinkage of the
home lending business, but within the home lending business that
we would have more of a focus on some of these other products.
Senator LEVIN. Some of the other products being high-risk products.
Mr. KILLINGER. Like subprime, but which we did not execute on.
Senator LEVIN. Well, you executed on a bunch of high-risk products. You have Option ARMs, subprime, home equity. You executed
on them.
Mr. KILLINGER. We did execute on expanding our portfolio in
home equity. We did not expand the portfolio of Option ARMs. Option ARMs actually declined in the size of those portfolios.
Senator LEVIN. It was still larger than it was in 2003, so you had
a significant amount of Option ARMs even as late as 2006. But this
is a 2007 document talking about channelingfocus all channels
on targeting higher-margin products. Those are higher-risk products. That is November 2007.
Here is what you said, June 6, 2006, in your report:1 Finally,
our Home Loans group should complete its repositioningthat is
the repositioning that you had decided on in 2004 and 2005, to
focus more on high risk. June 6, 2006, Our Home Loan group
should complete its repositioning within the next 12 monthsso
that is June 2006 to June 2007and will be in a position to profitably grow its market share of Option ARM, home equity, subprime,
and Alt A loans.
Mr. KILLINGER. That was the plan. We just did not execute it because of changing market conditions.
Senator LEVIN. I know, but on June 6, 2006, you are still planning on executing it. This was a plan that you shifted to in 2004
and 2005. So you did execute this for about a year, a year and a
half.
Mr. KILLINGER. We started down that direction, but much less
than what we had planned, and as housing became more challenging, we moved even further away from that plan.
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Senator LEVIN. I understand, but I do not think you ought to get
away with the statement you did not execute it. You did execute
on it for about a year, a year and a half. You tried to execute it
until the market changed.
Mr. KILLINGER. OK.
Senator LEVIN. Now, here is a pie chart we have here which
shows the percentage of your inventory which is high risk compared to the low risk.1 Just take a look at 2003 in blue. In blue,
the majority low-risk, 30-year loans, fixed loans. 2004, look at the
dramatic shift. The red is your high risk, and as a part of your inventory, starting in 2004 going through 2005, 2006, 2007, the blue,
which is your traditional 30-year, typically fixed loans, become no
more than a quarter of your inventory. The high-risk part of the
inventory goes from about a third in 2003 to three-quarters in
2007. So you may have shrunk your total inventory, but as a percentage of your inventory, you are still focused on high-risk products. Is that accurate?
Mr. KILLINGER. No, sir.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Then tell me where that is wrong.
Mr. KILLINGER. But this is a chart not of inventory, it is a chart
of mortgage origination.
Senator LEVIN. I should have said that. Is that accurate in terms
of your originations and your purchases by percentage?
Mr. KILLINGER. I believe it is.
Senator LEVIN. OK. That is fine. I stand corrected. In terms of
originations and your purchases by percentage, two-thirds low-risk,
fixed mortgages in 2003. Starting in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, it become less than a quarter by 2007. And that is the point. You
changed your strategy. You shrunk the whole pie. That is true. But
you also started to implement your high-risk strategy, and that is
clear from your own words which I just read, and when the strategy became frustrated because of the market, you then shrunk the
whole pie. But you did not shrink the percentage of your originations and purchases that went to the high-risk products.
Mr. KILLINGER. And, Senator, the one point I want to be crystal
clear on is that 2002 and 2003 were very unusual years for fixedrate products because the country was going through a massive refinancing boom, and that is where so much of the origination was.
If I went back to a more normalized time, like 2 years before that,
you would have seen a balance that was more reflective of 2004
and 2005 and 2006 than it was of 2003. It is the only point I wanted to make there.
Senator LEVIN. June 12, 2006, I am going to read this again: Finally, our Home Loans group should complete its repositioning
within the next 12 monthsthat is your strategy, June 2006
and will be in a position to profitably grow its market share of
you are trying to grow your market share of high risk in June
2006. That is your plan. Option ARM, home equity, subprime, Alt
A loans, that is your plan, right, in June 2006. I know that it
changed after that, but that was still your strategy. I am just reading your words.
Mr. KILLINGER. We had the plans
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Senator LEVIN. In June 2006, you still had the plan.
Mr. KILLINGER. If market conditions were satisfactory and we
could execute profitably on that
Senator LEVIN. That is always true about market conditions, but
your plan was, Our Home Loans group should complete its repositioning within the next 12 months and will be in a position to
profitably grow its market share of Option ARM, home equity,
subprime, and Alt A. Those are the high-risk loans. I am just
reading your own words.
Now, let us turn to Exhibit 34,1 which is an internal WaMu review by its Risk Mitigation and Mortgage Fraud Group. This is
September 8, 2008. You are right here on the brink of going out
of business, but that is not the point here that I am trying to read.
Take a look at the first finding. This is September 8, 2008. This
is, I think, a couple weeks before you were taken over. The first
finding of the review, page 3. I want to get back to all the fraud
here, because it is one thing to say that you could not know with
certainty that there was a housing bubble that was going to burst,
even though you predicted it. The issue is not that you did not
know when the housing bubble would burst. The problem is what
did you know about what was going on in your own company in
terms of how much fraud was going on. That becomes the issue
that I want to focus on, the level of fraud and what you knew or
did not know about that.
Here is what you were told in 2008. This is September 8, 2008.
The controls that are intended to prevent the sale of loans that
have been confirmed by Risk Mitigation to contain misrepresentations or fraud are not currently effective. Now, that should have
set off some alarm bells. Your fraud controls and misrepresentation
controls are not effective. And it says, There is not a systemic
process to prevent a loan in the Risk Mitigation Inventory and/or
confirmed to contain suspicious activity from being sold to an investor.
And then there is a test of 25 loans; 11 reflect a sale date after
the completion of the investigation which confirmed fraud. That is
going on inside your company. You cannot predict with certainty
the bubble. But this is what is happening inside your company
when you got that report.
Maybe I should ask Mr. Rotella as well. You got this report.
What was your reaction?
Mr. ROTELLA. Senator, any instance of fraud that I became
Senator LEVIN. I know, but what was your reaction to this document? I know any instance of fraudI got that. That is the way
people should react. But now you have a document saying not any
instance. Look, this is what happened. You do not have any controls for fraud and it is going on.
Mr. ROTELLA. Senator, there were instances of fraud I was aware
of over the 312 years I was at WaMu, and as I said, I authorized
Senator LEVIN. No, I mean controls.
Mr. ROTELLA. Budgets, people, expenses to put in fraud monitoring tools.
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Senator LEVIN. Not effective. That is what you were told.
Mr. ROTELLA. Clearly, this report indicates that in September
2008, about 3 weeks before the seizure of the institution.
Senator LEVIN. It says something else. It says that there is evidence that this control weakness has existed for some time. A lack
of controls for fraud, according to this reportthis is your own internal reporthas existed for some time. What was your reaction
when you read that?
Mr. ROTELLA. I dont recollect exactly what my reaction was, but
I can tell you that, reading this now, I have the same reaction I
probably had then. I would not be happy with it and I would authorize people to fix it.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Killinger, what was your reaction?
Mr. KILLINGER. I wasnt at the company at this time.
Senator LEVIN. You had already gone. Well, now that you read
it, what is your reaction? For some time, controls for fraud in your
company were not effective. What is your reaction when you see it
now?
Mr. KILLINGER. Exactly what I just heard from Mr. Rotella. You
read this. It is very serious and you say, get on it. Where are the
resources? And get it fixed.
Senator LEVIN. Now, during a prior panel, we discussed the number of emails that show that a decision was made in early 2007 to
sell Option ARMs that would normally go into the investment portfolio. And the reason that decision was made is because similar Option ARM loans from the fourth quarter of 2006 were already showing serious delinquencies. It was authorized that $3 billion in Option ARMs would be sold on an urgent basis. You were here, were
you, both of you, when I went through those documents?
They were already in the hold-for-investment portfolio, and they
were reclassified on an urgent basis for sale, clearly because there
was an assessment made in those emails it is clear these were likely to be delinquent and damn soon. We had better get rid of these
damn soon. There is a great risk of default.
Now, when you look at Exhibit 40b,1 if you would, on page 2, one
of these emails is February 18, 2007, by Cheryl Feltgen, the Chief
Risk Officer for your Home Loans Division. Here is what she wrote:
There is a meltdown in the subprime market which is creating a
flight to quality. I was talking to Robert Williams just after his return from the Asia trip where he and Alan Magleby talked to potential investors for upcoming covered bond deals backed by our
mortgages. There is still strong interest around the world in USA
residential mortgages. Gain on sale margins for Option ARMs are
attractive. This seems to me to be a great time to sell as many Option ARMs as we possibly can. Kerry Killinger was certainly encouraging us to think seriously about it at the [Monthly Business
Review] last week. What can I do to help? David, would your team
like any help on determining the impact of selling certain
groupings of Option ARMs on overall delinquencies?
Now, I believe, Mr. Killinger, since you are referred to, that you
remember that?
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move. And now you are saying, well, what, sometimes we sell assets? We are talking about these emails, Mr. Killinger.
Mr. KILLINGER. What I also heard this morning was that Mr.
Beck didnt know if we actually sold these or if we soldwhat happened in the transaction, so I am kind of dealing with the transaction. I just dont know what actually happened.
Senator LEVIN. Should you have known? Were you aware
that
Mr. KILLINGER. No, I wasnt aware of specifics on that. These are
not the kind of size and transactions that I would normally get involved in.
Senator LEVIN. You dont get involved in $3 billion authorizations?
Mr. KILLINGER. No. Those would be handled within the group.
Senator LEVIN. Three billion?
Mr. KILLINGER. Yes, out of a $300 billion
Senator LEVIN. Yes, but $3 billion being sold on an urgent basis,
we are going to getwe need $3 billion. We have to do it this quarter. In fact, the loans that we are originating right now, we are
going to sell immediately. That is how urgent it was to move on
this.
Mr. Killinger, you are under oath here. It seems to me if you are
not disturbed by this, you should be, and it is hard for me, frankly,
to accept that you would not be troubled if you had read then what
you heard this morning. And you are saying that if you had read
all those emails back then, you would not have been concerned. Is
that what you are saying?
Mr. KILLINGER. I am saying I would be concerned if there was
anything that was done inappropriate on disclosure, which I dont
know.
Senator LEVIN. No. I am talking about those emails. Would you
have been concerned then if you had read those emails? Would you
have inquired, are we selling these things? Are they part of the $3
billion? Would you have made that inquiry or thought it ought to
be made? Are we disclosing this to investors? Would you have
thoughtwe have made a study of this. We have looked at the reason for these delinquencies. We have a guy who says there are
eight reasons. Here they are. They are laid out. Then you have
emails that are sayingand these were late in the evening, early
morning emails, urgent, urgent, urgent, delinquency. Would that
have troubled you if you had seen those emails then?
Mr. KILLINGER. Again, I did not see the emails and I dont know
what ended up happening on this
Senator LEVIN. Not ended up. I am saying, before. I am just saying the emails. This is before they were securitized. The decision
was made to put up to $3 billion of those mortgages into securities.
Before a decision was picking which ones to put in the securities,
would you have been troubled by those emails? That is my question.
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, I am troubled that it was just on the basis
of performance.
Senator LEVIN. Just what you heard today, just those emails.
That is all I am asking you. If you had seen those emailsyou
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have heard them. I have read them. I will read them again to you.
Would you have been troubled if you had read those emails then?
Mr. KILLINGER. I would have inquired more. I wanted more information.
Senator LEVIN. OK.
Mr. KILLINGER. That is what I want.
Senator LEVIN. OK. Well, I guess that is progress.
Take a look, if you would, at Exhibit 69a.1 This is an email from
you, Mr. Killinger, dated October 12, 2007. This is responding to
a colleagues email discussing the hiring of Goldman Sachs or another investment bank to help WaMu consider ways to reduce its
credit risk or raise new capital. Your senior staffer wrote, we always need to worry a little about Goldman because we need them
more than they need us and the firm is run by traders, presumably meaning they act in their own self-interest and not on behalf
of their clients.
And here is your response. I dont trust Goldy on this. They are
smart, but this is swimming with the sharks. They were shorting
mortgages big time while they were giving CFC advice, CFC being
Countrywide Financial Corporation.
Now, what led you to say that Goldman Sachs was shorting
mortgages big time while giving advice to Countrywide?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, I think this was, again, just a brief comment. I dont recall having any specific knowledge, but I probably
read about that or might have heard in general about what they
were doing at that same time, and I was just trying to make a
point, probably in a little flippant way, that if we are going to engage an investment bank through here to help us on any of these
transactions, we need to understand that they may have a conflict
of interest.
Senator LEVIN. Was that a common perception at the time, that
Goldman Sachs was shorting mortgages big time while giving advice to clients?
Mr. KILLINGER. Well, as I recall, in that time frame, there was
some speculation in the press about that and I think that was kind
of one of the points that was going around on Wall Street at that
time.
Senator LEVIN. But yet you hired Goldman Sachs in the end to
help you out, is that correct?
Mr. KILLINGER. We did use them on the transactions, yes.
Senator LEVIN. Now, in your statement, Mr. Killinger, you described how the Office of Thrift Supervision was on site at WaMu
and approved of WaMus actions, like the decision to raise additional capital. You have mentioned them a number of times, always
that they were kind of supporting or approving what you did. What
you dont mention in your statement was the Office of Thrift Supervisions criticisms of WaMu.
From 2004 to 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision repeatedly
leveled serious criticisms of the bank. Here are a couple samples.
In 2004, several of our recent examinations, they wrote, concluded that the banks single family loan underwriting was less
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that are the product of financial engineering, that are turned into
these high-paying AAA mortgage-backed securities. The short-term
Wall Street profits that have won for too many years over longterm fundamentals have cost this economy dearly.
We heard a story today which is an in-depth story, which I think
is a sad story, which cost the State of Washington and Seattle a
lot of jobs there and around the country. It cost a lot of mortgages
being foreclosed, and that resulted in a lot of homes lost, and were
part of the problem that this economy faced that came to a head
in 2008.
So we will look at other parts of this in the 2 weeks ahead, but
in the meantime, we want to thank our witnesses today for coming
forward. We always appreciate people who are willing to testify,
even when we have problems with that testimony. So we are grateful to the two of you.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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