Chapter 2

Reforming and Reconstructing the

Security Sector
Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

Introduction1
Developed since the late 1990s, the concept of security sector reform (SSR)2
increasingly shapes international programmes for development assistance,
security cooperation, democracy promotion, and post-conflict peacebuilding.
This process is driven by the understanding that an unreformed security
sector represents a decisive obstacle to the promotion of sustainable
development, democracy and peace. The SSR concept thus bridges those
previously separate international discourses of security policy, peace and
democracy promotion, and development assistance. These cross-sectoral
characteristics make the SSR approach innovative and promising while
simultaneously rendering it more demanding in terms of conceptualisation
and actual implementation.
For a better understanding of the SSR approach, it is important to
distinguish between three very different reform rationales which gave rise to
the SSR concept. First, following the end of the Cold War, Western
governments in the framework of their new defence diplomacy put
emphasis, bilaterally as well as through multilateral security institutions such
as the OSCE and NATO,3 on the promotion of democratic civil-military
relations in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. With other
multilateral actors coming into the picture, notably the EU and the Council
of Europe, this approach soon began to expand to non-military elements of
the security sector such as the judiciary, police, and border guards.4 Second,
as a consequence of the increase in intrastate conflict in the 1990s, the
development community started to recognise the importance of the securitydevelopment nexus and to embrace SSR as an opportunity for development
cooperation. Following the lead of the United Kingdom, Western donor
countries and multilateral development actors such as the OECD and UNDP

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Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

embedded SSR into development assistance policies and programmes.5

Finally, SSR gained most practical relevance in the context of externallyassisted reconstruction of fragile and failed states as well as states emerging
from violent intra- or interstate conflict.6 Within the UN discourse, SSR
together with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and the
rule of law is increasingly viewed as a key to success in post-conflict
peacebuilding efforts.7
It is the latter SSR rationale post-conflict peacebuilding that this
chapter considers. The underlying assumption is that SSR in post-conflict
settings imposes additional and distinct challenges compared to SSR in other
contexts. Thus, security sector reconstruction that is SSR in post-conflict
settings is viewed as a variation on the broader theme of security sector
reform, albeit one of rapidly increasing importance. The chapter starts with a
brief conceptualisation and contextualisation of security sector reform in
order to lay the foundation for the subsequent discussion of the specific
features of SSR in post-conflict peacebuilding. This will be followed by a
review of lessons learned thus far from practical cases of security sector
reconstruction. The chapter will conclude with a number of policy
recommendations drawn from this analysis.
Security Sector Reform Concept and Context
Although SSR is still an evolving and contested concept, and lessons learned
from practical experience are still scarce, SSR has emerged as a key concept
which is increasingly accepted at least in principle by development
practitioners, security experts, democracy advocates, and those engaged in
post-conflict peacebuilding. SSR is essentially aimed at the efficient and
effective provision of state and human security within a framework of
democratic governance. In practical terms, SSR varies substantially
according to the specific reform context, three of which will be introduced in
this section: developmental, post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts
each reflecting different rationales for reform. Clarifying these different
contexts will open the way for a more detailed discussion of SSR in postconflict peacebuilding.
The Security Sector from a Governance Perspective
There is no generally accepted definition of what the security sector
comprises. Nonetheless, there appears to be a convergence on broad and

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

25

narrow notions of the term. The narrow notion reflects a traditional

governmental approach which is premised upon a state-centric view of
security and the states monopoly of coercive force. Accordingly, the
security sector can be considered as the component of the public sector
responsible for the provision of internal and external security. It rests on two
pillars: (a) the state security (and justice) apparatus, and (b) the relevant
civilian bodies responsible for the management and control of that
apparatus.8
Though still within the confines of the narrow government approach,
this definition reflects a broad notion of security for two reasons.9 First, it
does not cover the military alone, but acknowledges the important, and in
some countries predominant, role of non-military security forces either in
the provision of security or, on the contrary, as a source of insecurity.
Consequently, apart from the armed forces, the state security apparatus
includes the police, gendarmerie and paramilitary forces, the intelligence and
secret services, border guards and customs authorities, as well as justice and
penal institutions. The inclusion of the latter category of actors such as
criminal investigation and prosecution regimes, prison services, etc. into the
security apparatus reflects the growing importance of internal security
issues, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11.
Second, this definition of the security sector adds a normative political
dimension in the sense that it posits the state security apparatus as
accountable to government authority or as UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan put it that the security sector should be subject to the same
standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other [public]
service.10 Consequently, apart from the security apparatus, the security
sector includes the elected and duly appointed civil authorities, such as the
executive government, the relevant ministries (so-called power ministries,
particularly the ministries of defence and the interior), the parliament and its
specialised committees, as well as the judicial authorities and special
oversight bodies such as human rights commissions and ombudsmen. The
role of these bodies is to ensure that the security apparatus is managed in an
efficient and effective way and is held accountable to current standards of
democracy and human rights.
Given the centrality of the security sector as the sole agent of the
exercise of legitimate force in the nation-state, there are good reasons to
expect that the shift from government to governance has generally been
modest in the security sector.11 However, this focus on a security sector
understood to be confined to state institutions falls short of reality in many
countries, in established democracies as well as in developing countries, in

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Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

post-authoritarian and post-conflict states. More often than not, non-state

actors, armed groups, as well as civil society organisations play an important
role in providing, as well as in undermining, security. From a governance
perspective, this calls for a broader understanding of the security sector
which should include non-statutory security forces and non-statutory civil
society groups as well.12 As will be shown below, this holds particularly true
for post-conflict countries.
Given the increasing importance and, particularly in post-conflict
cases, the prevalence of private and other non-statutory security actors,
armed groups such as guerrilla and liberation armies, irregular paramilitary
organisations as well as private armies of warlords, political party militias
and mercenaries all have to be considered either part of the de facto security
sector or at least important actors shaping security sector governance. This
also holds true for private military and security companies which have
become a key feature of many conflict and post-conflict theatres (see
Chapter 3). Finally, again with particular relevance to post-conflict settings,
foreign troops may also play a crucial role in the provision of security.
Foreign troops impacting on the security sector governance of the host
country may take the form of international peace support operations,
deployments of allied troops, or even occupying forces.
Furthermore, given the relevance of civil society for democratic
governance, non-statutory civil society actors such as the media, nongovernmental organisations, research institutions, and community groups
may play an important role in the oversight of the security apparatus. They
can contribute to the creation of an informed public sensitised to security
sector governance issues, and they can provide the state institutions
responsible for the management and oversight of the security apparatus with
alternative expertise (see Chapter 4).
Considering civil society actors and armed non-state actors as
component parts of the security sector in the broad sense helps to transcend
its essentially state-centric nature which, in an increasing number of cases,
wrongly assumes that the monopoly of the means of legitimate coercion rests
solely with the state and its institutions.13 While necessary from a
governance perspective, the broadening of the security sector to include nonstate actors is much less desirable from a government perspective,
particularly with regard to armed non-state actors. However, from
government and governance perspectives, the limited or, even better, noninvolvement of armed non-state actors in security sector governance, and a
strong role for civil society actors, is more desirable than not.

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

27

The Concept of Security Sector Reform

The point of departure for security sector reform is a dysfunctional security
sector, i.e. a security sector which does not provide security to the state and
its people in an efficient and effective way or, even worse, which is itself a
cause of insecurity and violent conflict. Moreover, in line with the
aforementioned normative dimension of SSR, and in view of the fact that
non-democratic states may also have efficient and effective security sectors
(though primarily for the purpose of regime security), a security sector must
be considered dysfunctional if it is deficient in terms of democratic
governance. Thus, SSR is meant to turn a dysfunctional security sector into a
functional one, thereby reducing security deficits (lack of security or even
provision of insecurity) as well as democratic deficits (lack of oversight over
the security sector). This double objective of developing an affordable,
effective, and efficient security apparatus within a framework of democratic
accountability constitutes the uncontested core of the SSR concept.14
The SSR agenda favours a holistic approach in a double sense
firstly, by integrating all those partial reforms such as defence reform, police
reform, intelligence reform and judicial reform, which in the past were
generally seen and conducted as separate efforts; and secondly, by linking
measures aimed at increasing efficiency and effectiveness of security forces
to overriding concerns of democratic governance. Consequently, it has to be
emphasised that reforms aimed to modernise and professionalise security
forces without ensuring their democratic accountability are not consistent
with the SSR concept as commonly understood. Such activities would fall
rather under the heading of technical assistance in the framework of old
defence diplomacy, which was aimed at beefing up the armed and security
forces of allies irrespective of governance considerations.15 By definition,
SSR-related activities must be aimed at improving the governance of the
security sector.
Given the scope and complexity of the SSR concept, the range of SSR
activities that are recommended and implemented by the actors involved is
quite extraordinary. They range from political dialogue, policy and legal
advice, training programmes, to technical and financial assistance. Two
major categories of reform activities can be distinguished each reflecting
one of the two core elements of SSR:16
First, measures aimed at restructuring the security apparatus. These
SSR activities include partial reforms such as military and, more
generally, defence reform as well as police reform, intelligence

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Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

reform, judicial reform, prison reform, etc. In line with the holistic
approach of SSR, it is imperative to link each area of engagement
because efforts will not succeed unless complementary work is carried
out in other areas. From a security governance perspective, activities
aimed at engaging and integrating non-state armed actors into the state
security apparatus might also be considered as a part of this category
of SSR activities.
Second, measures aimed at strengthening civilian management and
democratic accountability of the security apparatus. These SSR
activities include reforms of the relevant ministries and their
management capacities (particularly financial management) as well as
parliamentary and judicial oversight mechanisms. From a security
sector governance perspective, capacity building in favour of
specialised civil society actors would also fall into this category of
SSR activities.
A third category specific SSR-related activities addressing the legacies of
conflict will be introduced in the next section. Beyond these broad
categories of SSR activities, a number of cross-cutting reform measures must
be mentioned because they impact on, or even link, several component parts
of the security sector. Such reform measures would include the development
of norms, standards and good practices specific to the security sector, the
strengthening and adaptation of the constitutional and legal framework of
security sector governance as well as comprehensive and inclusive national
security reviews as a precondition and catalyst for successful SSR.
Contexts of Security Sector Reform
In practical terms, SSR varies according to the specific reform context.
There is general agreement that no common model of SSR exists and that, in
principle, each country engaging in SSR constitutes a special case and hence
a different reform context. However, for analytical purposes, broad SSR
contexts may be distinguished which contain a number of similar cases
depending on the criteria for categorisation. If the level of economic
development, the nature of the political system and the specific security
situation are used as points of departure, the following three SSR contexts,
or rather context clusters, emerge as typical each reflecting a different
rationale for reform (see Table 2.1):

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

29

the developmental context in relatively stable developing countries

(key criterion: socio-economic development);
the post-authoritarian primarily post-communist context in
transition countries (key criterion: political system);
the post-conflict context in countries engaged in rebuilding the state
after conflict (key criterion: security situation).17
Relatively good opportunities for externally-assisted SSR activities tend to
exist in developing countries which have embarked on a process of
democratisation after elections or other forms of peaceful change, in postauthoritarian transition states which aim at joining a regional organisation
making democracy a requirement for membership (e.g. potential EU and
NATO members), and in those post-conflict states in which international
peace support operations offer a basis for reconstruction and local actors
show a certain capacity and readiness for reform. In many other cases,
however, prospects for externally-assisted SSR are rather dim. In particular,
this applies to countries in armed conflict, to fragile and post-conflict states
at early stages of conflict transformation, as well as to authoritarian regimes
and so-called illiberal democracies where the will to reform is lacking. This
does not necessarily mean that SSR should not be promoted in these
countries, but that this task will be even more challenging with higher
political risks attached than is the case in more conducive environments.
The framing conditions, the nature of external involvement, the
specific security sector problems and the challenges and possibilities for
SSR may be very different depending on the specific reform context. What
all three contexts have in common, however, is that SSR tends to be
externally induced. In most cases, external (development and security) actors
tend to initiate SSR programmes, fund them to a large extent, and often
provide the bulk of expertise needed for implementing these programmes.
Where local will for reform is lacking, external actors often facilitate SSR
programmes by means of political incentives or pressure. Furthermore, there
seems to be a tendency among external actors to promote their own (i.e.
Western) reform models, which rarely fit the specific SSR context on the
ground. In all three reform contexts, there are tensions between external
imposition and local ownership of SSR. Finding a balance between
international good practice in this area and domestic political culture of
reforming states is a conditio sine qua non for successful SSR, though, at the
same time, this tension is inherent to the SSR concept itself and thus not
amenable to easy solutions.

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Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

Table 2.1: Contexts of Security Sector Reform18

Developmental
context

Post-authoritarian
context

Post-conflict
context

Key criteria

Socio-economic
development

Political system

Security situation

Key problem

Development deficit

Democratic deficit

Security deficit

Key reform
objective

Development

Democratisation

Peacebuilding

General
reform
process

Transition from
underdeveloped to
developed economy

Transition from
authoritarian to
democratic system

Transition from armed

conflict to sustainable
peace

Nature of
external
involvement

Reform pressure
through development
assistance coupled
with political
conditionality

Perspective of
accession to regional
organisation (e.g. EU,
NATO) as incentive
for reform

Reform pressure
through international
(mostly UN-led)
peace support
operations

Key external
actors

Western donor
countries;
development
organisations (e.g.
UNDP, World Bank);
transnational actors

Western donor
countries;
international
organisations (e.g.
EU, NATO, OSCE);
transnational actors

Multinational peace
troops (mostly UNled); Western donor
countries; UNDP;
transnational actors
(e.g. NGO, PMC)

Specific
security
sector
problems

Poorly managed and

governed security
apparatus; excessive
military spending;
security apparatus
partly funding itself
through own business
activities

Oversized, overresourced, omnipresent security

apparatus; civil but no
democratic control;
strong state but weak
civil society

State structures
collapsed; very weak
civil society; strong
presence of armed
non-state actors;
specific security
problems (e.g. small
arms, landmines)

Possibilities
for SSR

Mixed depending on
political commitment
to reform, strength of
state institutions, role
and state of security
apparatus, regional
security environment,
donor approach to
SSR, etc.)

Rather good if
external incentives
available, e.g. EU
membership strong
state institutions,
professional security
forces, broader
democratisation
process)

In principle rather
poor weak and
contested statehood,
privatisation of
security depending
on foreign
commitment and local
readiness to reform

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

31

Security Sector Reconstruction the Post-Conflict Context

Most of the activities currently subsumed under the heading of SSR take
place in post-conflict societies emerging from intra- or interstate conflict
which are embarking on a process of reconstructing all dysfunctional parts of
the public sector. Clearly, engaging in SSR in post-conflict environments
poses special challenges, and also presents particular opportunities. On the
one hand, SSR seems to be particularly difficult in a post-conflict setting,
usually characterised by weak state institutions, a fragile inter-ethnic or
political situation, with influential military and non-military security forces,
both statutory and non-statutory, and precarious economic conditions. On the
other hand, given the external resources made available through post-conflict
peace support and peacebuilding interventions, the receptiveness of postconflict societies to external support for all kinds of reform, even in the most
sensitive areas such as the security sector, and the quite obvious need to
right-size the security sector and reform or even reconstruct it after the end
of the conflict, post-conflict situations are generally viewed as representing
windows of opportunity for SSR programmes. However, this does not
necessarily apply to cases where an interstate war or foreign military
intervention aimed at regime change and resulting in transitional occupation
preceded post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, because the ensuing security
environment may simply be too adverse.
Post-Conflict SSR as a Challenge of Security Governance
From a governance perspective, post-conflict peacebuilding reflects highly
complex constellations of interaction. A multitude of actors, particularly
armed non-state actors such as international peace support forces,
transnational private military companies (PMCs) and local non-statutory
armed groups, must be taken into account. Also, post-conflict peacebuilding
takes place on several levels of engagement beyond, above and below the
state level. This is evidenced by the fact that post-conflict theatres are
characterised by two distinct features which represent additional challenges
for SSR: the privatisation and the internationalisation of security, which
tends to be much greater in post-conflict cases than in the other contexts
discussed above.
Post-conflict settings are more often than not characterised by the
strong presence of armed non-state actors whose political ambitions and
economic stakes will have to be taken into account in post-conflict
peacebuilding. Furthermore, the former conflict parties, as well as the

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Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

international forces tasked to keep the peace, may have hired the services of
PMCs which have their own stake in post-conflict peacebuilding. Efforts
aimed at stabilising the security situation immediately after conflict tend to
conspicuously ignore these armed non-state actors. This may impact
negatively on the long-term objectives of peacebuilding, which include the
reestablishment of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The
privatisation of security in post-conflict settings tends to be contrasted by
the absence of strong civil society actors who could engage in increasing
public pressure for the demilitarisation and deprivatisation of security. The
combination of a strong involvement of armed non-state actors and a weak
role for civil society bodes ill for security sector governance. However, it is a
distinct feature of post-conflict environments and, thus, a specific challenge
for security sector reconstruction.
International intervention is the rule of post-conflict peacebuilding
rather than the exception. In most cases, a transitional administration under
the auspices of the UN or other international institutions, supported by the
military strength of an international peace support operation, has to reimpose
some sort of a monopoly of coercive force and step in as a provisional
government often for a considerably longer period of time than initially
expected. The activities of intervening military forces tend to influence the
development of a new national security apparatus and the implementation of
specific post-conflict SSR-related measures such as DDR, SALW
programmes and mine action. Peacekeepers may even engage in capacitybuilding activities aimed at strengthening civilian management,
parliamentary oversight and the role of civil society in security sector
governance. The internationalisation of security in post-conflict settings
tends to be contrasted with a shortage of local capacity and, thus, by a lack
of local ownership in post-conflict peacebuilding because physical security
will have to be provided by international actors while sufficient local
capacity is gradually being developed a process which can be very lengthy.
As mentioned above, finding a balance between external imposition and
local ownership of SSR is a particularly challenging, but nevertheless
crucial, task in the post-conflict context.
Specific Objectives of Post-Conflict SSR
SSR in post-conflict settings security sector reconstruction follows the
same two key principles as SSR in other contexts, namely (re-)establishing
security forces which are able to provide public security in an effective and
efficient manner and within a framework of democratic governance. What

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

33

makes security sector reconstruction different from security sector reform,

however, is the fact that it must deal with the legacy of past armed conflict.
This may include armed non-state groups that need to be disbanded or
integrated into new force structures; oversized armed forces that need to be
downsized; former combatants (including child soldiers) that need to be
disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated; surplus weapons that need to be
removed; landmines and unexploded ordnance that need to be cleared;
transitional legal regimes that need to be implemented; large numbers of
perpetrators that need to be prosecuted; widespread trafficking in human
beings that needs to be combated, etc. These legacies all have in common
that, to a greater or lesser extent, they relate to the security sector and impact
the conditions for security sector reform.
Consequently, apart from restructuring or reconstructing the
security apparatus and strengthening or establishing civilian control and
democratic accountability, SSR in post-conflict peacebuilding has to tackle a
third objective, namely to address this broader category of related reform
and reconstruction activities.19 Thus, more often than not, disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, measures against
proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons as well as mine
action, rule of law and transitional justice, and anti-trafficking programmes
are viewed as components of SSR in post-conflict peacebuilding, but not
necessarily of SSR in developmental and post-authoritarian contexts (see
parts III and IV of this book). Needless to say given the broader range of
core tasks, security sector reconstruction is even more challenging than
standard SSR in developmental and post-authoritarian contexts.
Lessons from Post-Conflict SSR
The relationship of SSR to the multi-actor, multi-level dynamics of postconflict peacebuilding processes is inherently complex. Relatively few
dedicated SSR programmes have been enacted to date in post-conflict
contexts, but a range of activities that fall within the scope of post-conflict
SSR can be traced within past and ongoing post-conflict peacebuilding
efforts. This section seeks to highlight briefly a number of lessons from the
international communitys practical experience in SSR in different postconflict settings and how security sector reconstruction relates to the broader
security governance challenges in states emerging from conflict.
Consequently, four key themes are considered: the framing conditions or
specific contexts for security sector reconstruction; the role and influence of

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Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

external actors; the challenges and dilemmas of fostering local ownership,

and, finally, the sequencing of related activities.
Framing Conditions
The collapse of political and societal institutions, and a breakdown of the
rule of law, are common to all contexts of post-conflict reconstruction. The
post-conflict landscape generally includes a wide availability of weapons,
refugees and internally displaced persons and porous borders, exacerbating
the openings for organised crime. Post-conflict security actors may be
characterised by politicisation, ethnicisation and corruption, uncontrolled
spending, a lack of professionalism and poor oversight. The vacuum left by a
deficient state security sector risks being filled by a range of non-statutory
actors with their own aims and agendas. Bringing such actors under civilian
and democratic control through restoring the states monopoly on the use of
force is therefore a critical peacebuilding challenge.
Beyond these general framing conditions, knowledge of the specific
reform and reconstruction context is essential in order to inform external
interventions and avoid embedding divisions in reconstructed security
sectors. From a security perspective, the type of conflict, its duration and the
level of violence have serious consequences for the willingness of
stakeholders to cooperate. Persistent factionalism, an ethnic or religious
dimension to the conflict, and the level of civilian involvement in hostilities
all contribute to residual hostility that will need to be considered as shown
by the failure of peacebuilding in Somalia in the formulation and
implementation of security sector reconstruction programmes if security and
sustainable peace are to be achieved.
The political context, taking into account the nature and extent of
political development prior to the conflict, is equally pertinent to the shape
of security sector reconstruction programmes as they are conceived and
implemented. Different opportunities appear in reconstructing security in
states characterised by strongly centralised dictatorial regimes such as Iraq
in comparison to a feudal system with much power held by regional
stakeholders as in Afghanistan. In particular, the opportunities to reconstruct
the security sector will be conditioned by the characteristics of the preconflict security sector which in many such cases would have been regimefocused and weakly governed. Importantly though, the previous political
dispensation, as well as a range of other contextual factors such as religion,
will deeply colour local actors expectations for reconfigured governance
structures. The regional political context for security sector reconstruction

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

35

must also be taken into account given the range of transnational security
threats and the potential for neighbours to act as spoilers.
Finally, the socio-economic context will have a direct bearing on
openings for security sector reconstruction. States with higher standards of
living are more likely to achieve long-lasting peace. However, States that are
the subject of peacebuilding efforts tend to be characterised by limited social
and economic capital, including reliance on economic and food assistance,
coupled with an absence of infrastructure and skills. These factors,
exacerbated by long-standing governance deficits, represent significant
barriers to security sector reconstruction.
These security, political and socio-economic histories are interrelated,
deeply engrained, and can only be influenced to a certain extent by external
actors. They therefore represent an essential dimension, alongside external
involvement and local capacity, of the available political space for building
peace.20 Domestic characteristics and root causes are therefore highly
relevant to the scope and possibilities for successful SSR even when external
actors have substantial political and military strength. As discussed below, to
achieve sustainable results, security sector reconstruction projects should be
firmly grounded in these local realities even though these realities can
represent as much a part of the problem as a part of the solution.
External Involvement
Addressing security sector governance issues before windows of opportunity
close either as a result of suboptimal governance practices becoming
embedded or, at worst, a return to conflict is essential. While post-conflict
contexts do not represent a blank canvas for reform and reconstruction, the
near collapse of state structures represents a chance for thorough change not
necessarily found in other reform settings. The resources and commitment of
dedicated external actors have been a critical factor in furthering the security
and development goals of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. However, with
regard to security sector reconstruction, a number of valid concerns should
be highlighted regarding both the policy dimension and the practical
consequences of such interventions.
Key external actors may include a combination of peacekeeping
forces, transitional administrations, development and donor agencies as well
as relevant NGOs and commercial companies. Regional actors such as the
EU or Economic Community of West African States can play a key role in
providing linkages to international organisations as well as a local
knowledge and commitment that these larger actors do not have. At the

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Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

policy level, external approaches to SSR have frequently lacked coordination

or have been shaped by domestic experiences that do not apply to other
reform contexts. In processes involving a combination of actors, there is a
consequent need for more joined up approaches by the various external
actors involved in SSR in order to ensure policy coherence. On the ground,
challenges to coordination are mirrored by problems in cooperation
generated by organisations with overlapping mandates but contrasting
priorities and approaches.
Engaging in SSR in post-conflict settings requires a long-term
commitment by external actors. This requires a sustained resource flow
although resources are not enough as demonstrated by the continued
failure of SSR in Haiti despite major pledges from the US, France and
Canada, among others.21 Even more important is a political will to sustain
involvement until national actors are mature enough to assume responsibility
for their own security sector governance. If this does not happen, then
unfulfilled expectations of local actors can have significant repercussions on
the wider goals of the peacebuilding process. Political exit strategies need
to be replaced by transfer strategies keyed to realistic and durable
benchmarks. This dilemma is evident in Iraq where achieving security sector
reconstruction goals is being impeded by the inability of the US-led
coalition, in conjunction with reconstituted Iraqi security forces, to provide a
basic level of security as a precondition for the provision of services or
rebuilding the economy.22
Legitimacy is also essential for external intervention. The continued
insurgency in Iraq also demonstrates both the inadequacy of external
military power as a force for change, and the role that perceived illegitimacy
can have in strengthening those groups opposing new governance structures.
In contrast, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) successfully oversaw the resettling of over 100,000 refugees and
internally displaced persons, the building of a civil administration from
scratch, the holding of free and fair elections, and the emergence of an
independent nation after centuries of Portuguese colonial rule, followed by
military occupation by Indonesia and extreme violence. Critically, this
startling success was underpinned by credible security guarantees and an
international presence that was welcomed openly by the local population.23
The nature of the contributions provided by external actors must be
tailored to the specific needs of the given reform context. Military personnel
have often been at the forefront of the international communitys SSR
programming. However military skills sets, while appropriate to activities
such as defence reform, do not necessarily lend themselves to developing

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

37

governance frameworks or building capacity in local actors. Conversely,

development actors, who are more exposed to the challenges of capacity
building, have been reluctant to engage in the security field. What is
required, as described by Brzoska and Heinemann-Grder, is a
multidisciplinary approach involving legal and constitutional experts,
military and police professionals, experts in human resources management,
persons and agencies with experience in demobilisation, re-trainers and
labour market experts.24
The potentially negative impact of external actors on post-conflict
societies must also be acknowledged in order to be minimised as much as
possible. There is a danger of causing a dependency culture which creates
de facto multilateralist states that leave nothing behind when international
support is withdrawn.25
Local Ownership
The importance of local ownership to successful security sector
reconstruction has become so widely acknowledged as to become a truism.
The difficulty lies in implementing measures which enshrine this principle
when the ability to implement change resides essentially with external
actors. However the importance of societal reform mirroring institutional
developments cannot be overstated in States with long legacies of weak or
authoritarian governance. In general terms, local ownership, understood as
an expression of national will, is essential for SSR. Local actors need to be
involved in security sector reconstruction processes from the outset in order
gradually to build local capacity and allow for the eventual handover of
responsibility from external actors, as difficult as this may be. Kosovo and
Bosnia and Herzegovina are two examples where externally-imposed SSR
has not proved conducive to sustainable reform.
Local ownership also requires societal, as well as institutional, repositioning in order to restore faith in armed and security forces in postconflict states. Consultation and discussion therefore represent important
mechanisms for surmounting the historical legacies of recently reformed
security sector institutions. Civil society involvement in reconstructing the
security sector is intended to narrow such gaps between security institutions,
newly-elected political authorities and the populace, building confidence
through demystifying a sector traditionally characterised by secrecy. It is
also an effective means of moving away from donor-driven SSR
perspectives. Support for research institutes, media organisations, and other

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Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

civil society actors focusing on security issues can increase the space for
debate on SSR issues.
Local capacity should be considered as a practical rather than
aspirational or normative goal. Compatibility of new structures and
mechanisms with available long-term resources is essential for sustainability.
More broadly, moving from the absence of war to stable peace is untenable
without taking into account issues of capacity, leadership and participation.
This is reflected in the case of Sierra Leone, generally seen as a positive
example of an SSR process led by one committed external actor. However,
there is concern that the high quality of training and equipment provided by
the British cannot be sustained once support is reduced and full
responsibility returned to national actors, which may weaken morale and
may dampen other reform activities.26 In another context, US support for
regional powerbrokers in Afghanistan may have helped in the military
struggle against the Taliban, but has been counterproductive in terms of
strengthening central government in Afghanistan. Beyond obvious peace
spoilers, the misguided support of uncivil society also includes
organisations set up with the goal of accruing donor funding as, for example,
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Chapter 4). Building the proper kinds of
local capacity, ensuring that organisations are genuinely representative and
accountable, is therefore critical.
Sequencing of Reforms
A broad conceptualisation of SSR is important in order to map the range of
related actors and issues that security sector reconstruction processes are
designed to address. However, such approaches may result in laundry lists
which provide little concrete guidance for planning interventions. How SSR
efforts are sequenced is key to long-term sustainability of reform. Although
basic security is a precondition for SSR, if security is achieved solely
through external actors or at the expense of the human rights of citizens, then
long-term stability cannot be achieved. Consequently, SSR must go hand in
hand with a broader democratic transformation of the countrys political and
legal system. However, it is also important to note that while
democratisation is an important precondition for SSR, the relationship
between democratisation and democratic governance of the security sector is
less clear. In the West African sub-region, democratic openings in a number
of States have occurred in the context of security sectors that remain geared
towards the security of the regime in power rather than the security of all of
its citizens.27

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

39

In the ideal case, security sector reconstruction should emerge from a

restated national security policy that includes such sectoral policies as
defence and intelligence. Higher-level policy reform should form the basis of
constitutional and legal reform which reinforces democratic control and
shapes the roles and functions of security organisations. This should be
mirrored by compatible personnel and resource management structures that
are transparent and accountable. These steps, which should be supported by
effective and regular evaluation procedures, cannot take place in the absence
of viable national capacity, and should therefore be a key focus of donor
assistance. In the reality of the early post-conflict period, this ideal model
must be set against the immediate goals of rebuilding state capacity to
address security threats.
Security sector reconstruction is directly and indirectly linked to the
range of security governance challenges that need to be addressed as part of
post-conflict peacebuilding. The governance dimension of the SSR concept
provides a thread which links security issues where the military aspect is
only one dimension such as DDR and SALW, to political security issues like
engaging armed non-state groups and to societal security issues such as
transitional justice or human trafficking. Pursuing these linkages in policy
and programming terms is essential in order to address the consequences of
coordination and cooperation problems, as well as to inform priority-setting
in current and future interventions.
An important aspect of sequencing lies in determining how and when
to return responsibility to local actors. Political deadlines and exit strategies
are antithetical to meaningful reconstruction, with engagement being the key
to meaningful results. Early withdrawal of external support undermines
opportunities to embed sustainable locally-owned security sector institutions
and oversight mechanisms.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The increasing application of the SSR concept by a range of international
actors is evidence of the growing awareness that SSR is an essential element
in addressing a number of security and development goals. This chapter has
considered the SSR concept in the particular context of post-conflict
peacebuilding where it is situated as an essential requirement among the
governance challenges of states emerging from conflict. Such contexts are
inherently complex, combining external intervention with the long-term goal
of states reassuming responsibility for their own security.

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Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

Experience in implementing SSR as part of post-conflict

peacebuilding efforts has demonstrated the importance of context in shaping
external interventions and optimising opportunities for capacity-building
among local actors. The international community now has significant
experience in assisting the reconstruction of states following armed conflict,
and lessons can be identified and, more importantly, applied, which should
help to shape future interventions. The following recommendations are
therefore proposed:
Enhancing governance capacity should not be considered an option in
the security dimension of the reconstruction effort. Without investing
in oversight mechanisms, the key requirement of sustainable, locallyowned reform cannot be achieved.
As difficult or seemingly counterproductive as it may seem in the
short-term, participative reform processes involving a range of local
actors are critical in order to embed reform in wider societal
structures. The building of local capacity should therefore support the
full range of activities led by external actors.
International actors must intervene swiftly, but be prepared for
extended involvement both in political and financial terms. However,
advantages gained through political commitment and resources will be
undermined if interventions lack legitimacy. Linking interventions to
the provisions of peace agreements or broader international mandates
are therefore very significant.
Sequencing of security sector reconstruction needs to reflect realities
on the ground and should be based on comprehensive needs
assessments. In particular, transfer strategies to local actors must be
founded on objective criteria relating to the feasibility of such
measures.
SSR is part of wider reform efforts and must be linked to other
elements of the peacebuilding process. At the strategic level this
means that coordination mechanisms should be simplified and key
goals agreed upon by donors, international organisations and other
major actors. On the ground, cooperation strategies must be based on
information sharing and the selection of fit to task human and
technical resources. Developing a framework that better integrates
these activities could have considerable benefit for coordination and
priority setting at the strategic level and in the field.

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

41

This chapter has sought to clarify the SSR concept and its specific
application to post-conflict peacebuilding. The lessons which come from this
analysis are therefore applicable to a wide range of stakeholders. In
particular, the UN has a central role in policy-setting, coordination and
implementation and the new Peacebuilding Commission may serve as its
primary instrument. Bilateral donors as well as international and regional
actors also have a clear responsibility to coordinate SSR interventions and
further develop the linkages between SSR and other aspects of the
peacebuilding agenda. But the key responsibility for SSR rests with local
actors. SSR can only be achieved in post-conflict contexts if a genuine
transformation is achieved that sets the security of citizens above partisan
interests or regime loyalties. Embedding such a transformation in the
agencies and actors responsible for the provision of security and its oversight
is a fundamental condition for sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding.
Notes
1

3
4
5
6

This chapter draws on earlier publications by the authors, including Bryden A.,
Understanding Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction, Bryden A., Hnggi, H.
(eds.), Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector (Lit: Mnster, 2004), pp. 259275; Hnggi, H., Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction, Bryden,
A., Hnggi, H. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 3-18; Hnggi, H., Sicherheitssektorreform (SSR)
Konzept und Kontexte, Sicherheit und Frieden/Security and Peace no. 3 (2005,
forthcoming); Hnggi, H., Tanner, F., Promoting security sector governance in the EUs
neighbourhood, Chaillot Paper no. 80 (EU Institute for Security Studies: Paris, 2005).
Security sector reform is the term of choice in this chapter because it is most commonly
used by practitioners as well as analysts. Reference is made, however, to alternative terms
such as security system reform, used by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); justice and
security sector reform, introduced by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP); and security sector transformation, which is increasingly being used in the
African context to underline the need for fundamental change in governance processes in
the security sector. For an overview of the earlier literature on the SSR concept see
Hnggi, H.., Conceptualising, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
See, for instance, Cottey, A., Forster, A., Reshaping Defence Diplomacy. New Roles for
Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper no. 365 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), pp. 31-40.
Hnggi, H., Tanner, F., op. cit., pp. 25-42.
See, for instance, Brzoska, M., Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector
Reform, DCAF Occasional Paper no. 4 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces: Geneva, 2003).
See, for instance, Bryden, A., Hnggi, H., op. cit., particularly chapters in part III.

42

7
8

9
10
11
12

13
14

15

16
17

18
19
20

21

Alan Bryden and Heiner Hnggi

United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc. S/PRST/2005/30 (12 July 2005). See also Chapter 1.
For an authoritative definition of the security sector in the narrow sense see Informal
DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Security Issues and
Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: Paris, 2000), p. 8.
For a discussion of the broad notion of security see Chapter 1.
Annan, K., Peace and Development One Struggle, Two Fronts, Address of the United
Nations Secretary General to World Bank Staff (19 October 1999), p. 5.
For a discussion of the shift from government to governance see Chapter 1.
For authoritative definitions of the security sector in the broad sense see UNDP (2002), p.
87; OECD DAC, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Security System Reform and
Governance (OECD DAC: Paris, 2005), pp. 20-21, available at URL
<www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf>.
See Wulf, H., Internationalisierung und Privatisierung von Krieg und Frieden,
BICC/DCAF Schriften zu Sicherheitssektor und Konversion no. 11 (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2005).
According to the OECD DAC, security sector reform seeks to increase partner countries
ability to meet security needs in their societies in a manner consistent with democratic
norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. OECD
DAC, op. cit., p. 11.
These attempts are not unusual as noted in a recently published report of the OECD DAC:
In this context, there is a danger that traditional security-related programmes be simply
re-labelled as SSR without a serious review of their contents to ensure that they support a
governance-oriented approach to the security system. OECD DAC, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
For a systematic catalogue of SSR activities see Hnggi, H., Tanner, F., op. cit., annexe
V.
One should, however, be aware that highly developed countries, consolidated
democracies and states which are internally and externally secure also face pressures to
reform their security sectors, particularly in response to new security requirements
accentuated by 9/11 and its aftermath or to deficiencies in international security
governance related to the effects of globalisation. These pressures are not specific to a
given reform context but are more generally applicable.
This table, though revised and updated, is drawn from Hnggi, H., Conceptualising, op.
cit., p. 10.
Ball, N., Reforming Security Sector Governance, Conflict, Security & Development vol.
4, no. 3 (December 2004); Hnggi, H., Conceptualising, op. cit., pp. 9, 14.
Doyle and Sambanis characterise these three dimensions as a peacebuilding triangle in
which positive support is required along each dimension but, importantly, more of one
element can substitute to an extent for deficiencies in other areas. Doyle, M.W.,
Sambanis, N., Building Peace: Challenges and Strategies After Civil War, The World
Bank Group, 1999, p.15.
Law, D., Security Sector Reconstruction in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings, Brzoska,
M., Law, D. (eds.), Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations (2006,
forthcoming).

Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector

43

22 See: Slocombe, W., Iraqs Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform Under Fire,
Bryden, A., Hnggi, H. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 232-255.
23 See: Hood, L., Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste, Brzoska, M., Law, D. (eds.), op.
cit.
24 Brzoska, M., Heinemann-Grder, A., Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Under International Auspices, Bryden, A., Hnggi, H. (eds.), op. cit., pp.
121-142 (136).
25 Cawthra, G., Luckham, R., Governing Insecurity (London: Zed, 2003), p. 325.
26 Bryden, A., NDiaye, B., Olonisakin, F., Democratising Security Sector Governance in
West Africa: Trends and Challenges, Conflict, Security and Development vol. 5, no. 2
(August 2005), pp. 203-226 (221).
27 For an analysis of the relationship between democratisation and security sector
governance in the West African sub-region see: Bryden, A., NDiaye, B., Olonisakin, F.,
op. cit., pp. 203-226.