Purpose of construction

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969.]
CITY
OF
BAGUIO,
REFORESTATION
ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR.,
FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J.
BUCHHOLZ,petitioners, vs. HON. PIO R. MARCOS,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
BELONG LUTES, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents.

1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C . Claridad, Augusto Tobias and Feria,
Feria, Lugtu and La'O for petitioner.
Bernardo C . Ronquillo for respondent.

SYLLABUS
1.LAND REGISTRATION; REPUBLIC ACT 931; PETITION TO REOPEN
CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER RA 931; PERSONALITY OF
LESSEES TO APPEAR IN REOPENING OF PROCEEDINGS; INSTANT
CASE. The case at bar involves RA 931 which allows a petition for
reopening on lands "about to be declared" or already "declared land of the
public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right, however, is
made to cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such parcels of land

as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise

provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." The lessee's
right is thus impliedly recognized by R.A. 931. With the fact of lease, no
question need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931. From this standpoint,
lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings. Insofar as R.A.
931 is concerned, it would seem that lessees come within the purview of
those who, according to the Rules of Court, may intervene in an action. For,
they are persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties." In the event herein petitioners are able to
show that they are legitimate lessees, then their lease will continue. And this,
because it is sufficient that it be proven that the land is leased to withdraw it
from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it beyond the reach of a
petition for reopening. Private petitioners, therefore, who aver that they are
lessees, have the necessary personality to intervene and oppose respondent
Lutes' petition for reopening.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CADASTRAL COURT OVER PETITION TO
REOPEN IN INSTANT CASE NOT JURISDICTIONALLY TAINTED BY
WANT OF PUBLICATION. This Court in De Castro vs.
Marcos, supra, involving exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the
question, held, after a discussion of law and jurisprudence that: "In sum, the
subject matter of the petition for reopening - a parcel of land claimed by
respondent Akia - was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed
by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio Cadastral Court already
acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The petition, therefor, need not
be published ." We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the
power of the cadastral court over petitions to reopen, as in this case, is not
jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.
3.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; TITLE OF ACT TO DETERMINE
CONGRESSIONAL WILL. The office of statutory interpretation is to
determine legislative intent. When engaged in the task of construing an
obscure expression in the law or where exact or literal rendering of the words
would not carry out the legislative intent, the title thereof may be resorted to
in the ascertainment of congressional will. Reason therefor is that the title of
the law may properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to

legislative intention. This is especially true in this jurisdiction. It has been

observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature,
more thoroughly read than the act itself, and in many states is the subject of
constitutional regulation." The constitutional injunction that the subject of the
statute must be expressed in the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of
command because "the Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to ready during its deliberations the entire text of the bill."
Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the title of a bill, which, while not an
enacting part, no doubt "is in some sort a part of the act, although only a
formal part." These considerations are all the more valid here because R.A.
931 was passed without benefit of the congressional debate in the House
from which it originated as House Bill 1410, and in the Senate.

DECISION

On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to
reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims.
His prayer was that the land be registered in his name upon the grounds that:
(1) he and his predecessors have been in actual, open, adverse, peaceful
and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times,
or before July 26,1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his predecessors
were illiterate Igorots without personal notice of the cadastral proceedings
aforestated and were not able to file their claim to the land in question within
the statutory period. cda
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr.,
Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition to
the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm lessees upon agreements
executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square
meters on March 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959, and
for 14,771 square meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.
On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.

SANCHEZ, J p :
Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to
reopen cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private petitioners
specifically question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that they have no
personality to oppose reopening. The three-pronged contentions of all the
petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period
next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition was not
published; and (3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public land in
question, have court standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:
On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened, Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite,
were instituted by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of
Baguio. It is not disputed that the land here involved (described in Plan Psu186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final
decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922.

On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied private
petitioners' right to intervene in the case because of a final declaratory relief
judgment dated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court
of First Instance of Baguio] which declared that such tree farm leases were
null and void.
On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred that
said declaratory relief judgment did not bind them, for they were not parties
to that action.
On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May
8, 1962, allowed petitioners to cross-examine the witnesses of respondent
Lutes.
On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private
petitioners' opposition to his reopening petition. On October 25, 1962, private
petitioners' rejoinder was filed.

On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners'

opposition to the reopening. A motion to reconsider was rejected by the court
on November 5, 1963. On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of
Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the petition to reopen. This motion was
adopted as its own by the Reforestation Administration. They maintained the
position that the declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding on
those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24, 1964.
On April 6, 1964, private petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds.
On September 17, 1964 the court denied for lack of merit the City's motion
as well as the April 6, 1964 motion to dismiss made by private petitioners.
On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals
on certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction. 1 They
there questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen
and the latter's order of August 5, 1963 dismissing private petitioners'
opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a
P500-bond.
Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30, 1965.
The court held that petitioners were not bound by the declaratory judgment
heretofore stated. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that as lessees,
private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of the cadastral
case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.
Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966, respondents
moved to dismiss the petition before us. On August 5, 1966, petitioners
opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due course.
1.Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening
proceedings?
First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.
The title of the Act reads

"AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE

PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS,
OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF
LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND,
BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED
WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE
APPROVAL OF THIS ACT."
Section 1 thereof provides
"SECTION 1.All persons claiming title to parcels of land
that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who
at the time of the survey were in actual possession of
the same, but for some justifiable reason had been
unable to file their claim in the proper court during the
time limit established by law, in case such parcels of
land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have
been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within
the fourty years next preceding the approval of this Act,
are hereby granted the right within five years 2 after the
date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a
reopening of the judicial proceedings under the
provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and
fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said
parcels of land as have not been alienated,
reserved, leased, granted,
or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by
the Government, and the competent Court of First
Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the
Government, through the Solicitor General, and if after
hearing the parties, said court shall find that all
conditions herein established have been complied with,
and that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof have
been paid from the time when land tax should have
been collected until the day when the motion is

presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings

reopened as if no action has been taken on such
parcels." 3

We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land
registration case where oppositors were "foreshore lessees of public land," a
principle was hammered out that although Section 34, Land Registration Act,
4 " apparently authorizes any person claiming any kind of interest to file an
opposition to an application for registration, . . . nevertheless . . . the
opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right
independent of, and not at all subordinate to, the rights of the
Government." 5 The opposition, according to the Leyva decision, "must
necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the
public domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent upon the duly
authorized representatives of the Government to represent its interests as
well as private claims intrinsically dependent upon it.
But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Normally and logically,
lessees cannot there present issues of ownership. The case at bar, however,
stands on a different footing. It involves a special statute, R.A. 931, which
allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared"
or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial
proceedings. Such right, however, is made to cover limited cases, i.e.,
"onlywith respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated,
reserved, leased,
granted,
or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed
of
by
the
Government." 6 The lessee's right is thus impliedly recognized by R.A. 931.
This statutory phrase steers the present case clear from the impact of the
precept forged byLeyva. So it is, that if the land subject of a petition to
reopen has already been leased by the government, that petition can no
longer prosper. cdphil
This was the holding in Director of Lands vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31,
1966. The reopening petition there filed was opposed by the Director of

Lands in behalf of 62lessees of public land holding revocable permits issued

by the government. We struck down the petition in that case because the
public land, subject-matter of the suit,had already been leased by the
government to private persons.
Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the
lessees alone, but through the Director of Lands. But we may well scale the
heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain the view that
only the Director of Lands 7 can here properly oppose the reopening petition.
Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees be left at the
mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court close its eyes to
the fact of lease that may be proved by the lessees themselves, and which is
enough to bar the reopening petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that
this situation should happen. The point is that, with the fact of lease, no
question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931. From this
standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.
The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes
the more patent when we take stock of their averment that they have
introduced improvements on the land affected. It would seem to us that
lessees, insofar as R.A. 931 is concerned, come within the purview of those
who, according to the Rules of Court, 8 may intervene in an action. For, they
are persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties." 9 In the event herein private petitioners are
able to show that they are legitimate lessees, then their lease will
continue. And this, because it is sufficient that it be proven that the land is
leased to withdraw it from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it
beyond the reach of a petition for reopening. 10
In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by respondent
Lutes herein, the cadastral court should have ruled on the validity of private
petitioners' tree farm leases on the merits. Because there is need for
Lutes' right to reopen and petitioners' right to continue as lessees to be
threshed out in that court. We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who
aver that they are lessees, have the necessary personality to intervene in
and oppose respondent Lutes' petition for reopening.

2.Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under R.A.
931, should have been published in accordance with the Cadastral Act.

years next preceding the approval of this Act." There thus appears to be a
seeming inconsistency between title and body.

To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of this
Court in De Castro vs. Marcos, supra, involving exactly the same set of facts
bearing upon the question. We there held, after a discussion of law and
jurisprudence, that: "In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening
a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia was already embraced in
the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the
Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction over the said property.
The petition, therefore, need not be published." We find no reason to break
away from such conclusion.

It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on
constitutional grounds. No charge has been made here or in the courts
below that the statute offends the constitutional injunction that the subject of
legislation must be expressed in the title thereof. Well-entrenched in
constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions will not be
entertained by courts unless they are "specifically raised, insisted upon and
adequately argued." 11 At any rate, it cannot be seriously disputed that the
subject of R.A. 931 is expressed in its title.

Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the

November 13, 1922 decision in the Baguio Townsite Reservation case to
show, amongst others, that the land here involved was part of that case.
Petitioners do not take issue with respondent Lutes on this point of fact.
We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the
cadastral court below over petitions to reopen, as in this case, is not
jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication. cdtai
3.A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral court
have power to reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the application of
respondent Lutes?
The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were
instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November
13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961.
It will be noted that the title for R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes
"the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of
title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval
of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of
parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the
public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings institutedwithin the forty

This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.

Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus difficult
to stray away from the true path of construction, unless we constantly bear in
mind the goal we seek. The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a
moment forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the words of, a wellknown authority, "[t]he true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the
meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be
enforced." 12 In varying language, "the purpose of all rules or maxims" in
interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the law." 13 They "are only
valuable when they subserve this purpose." 14 In fact, "the spirit or intention
of a statute prevails over the letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary, the letter of the law." 16 By this, we do not "correct the act of the
Legislature, but rather . . . carry out and give due course to" its true intent. 17
It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an
obscure expression in the law 18 or where exact or literal rendering of the
words would not carry out the legislative intent, 19 the title thereof may be
resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will. Reason therefor is that
the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide
to legislative intention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For the
reason that by specific constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill. 21 In such case, courts "are compelled by the Constitution

to consider both the body and the title in order to arrive at the legislative
intention." 22
With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that
confronts us. We take another look at the title of R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO
AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND
THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING
THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT." Readily to be noted is that the title is not
merely composed of catchwords. 23 It expresses in language clear the very
substance of the law itself. From this, it is easy to see that Congress
intended to give some effect to the title of R.A. 931.
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of R.A.
931 aforesaid from which surfaces a seeming inconsistency between the
title and the body attended Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's
predecessor. That prior law used the very same language in the body thereof
and in its title. We attach meaning to this circumstance. Had the legislature
meant to shake off any legal effects that the title of the statute might have, it
had a chance to do so in the reenactment of the law. Congress could have
altered with great facility the wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it
did not.

It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the
Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself, and in many states is
the subject of constitutional regulation." 24 The constitutional injunction that
the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill, breathes
the spirit of command because "the Constitution does not exact of Congress
the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill." 25 Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the title of a bill, which, while
not an enacting part, no doubt "is in some sort a part of the act, although
only a formal part." 26 These considerations are all the more valid here
because R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of congressional debate in the
House from which it originated as House Bill 1410, 27 and in the Senate. 28

The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and
positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court proceedings of claims to
parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered
within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." That title is
written "in capital letters" by Congress itself; such kind of a title then "is
not to be classed with words or titles used by compilers of statutes" because
"it is the legislature speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a
deduction that the phrase last quoted from R.A. 931 "by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered" was but inadvertently omitted from the body. Parting
from this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between the title and
body. In line with the views herein stated, the title belongs to that type of
titles which should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions expressed
in the body. 30 At the very least, the words "by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered" in the title of the law stand in equal importance to the phrase in
Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted." cdphil
Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider, the choice of
construction we must give to the statute does not need much reflection. We
lean towards a liberal view. And this, because of the principle long accepted
that remedial legislation should receive the blessings of liberal
construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A.
931 is a piece of remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief
to landowners who, before the Act, had no legal means of perfecting their
titles. This is plainly evident from the explanatory note thereof, which reads:
"This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person
or claimant who has any interest in any parcel of land
which has been declared as public land in cadastral
proceeding for failure of said person or claimant to
present his claim within the time prescribed by law.
There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to
certain parcels of land have not had the opportunity to
answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their
claims in the corresponding cadastral proceedings for
lack of sufficient notice or for other reasons and
circumstances which are beyond their control. Under

C.A. No. 276, said persons or claimants have no more

legal remedy as the effectivity of said Act expired in
1940.
This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing
law within which said persons or claimants with
meritorious claims or interests in parcels of land may
seek justice and protection. This bill proposes to give
said persons or claimants their day in court. Approval of
this bill is earnestly requested."
In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should
never be permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which
can otherwise be discovered. Legal technicalities should not abort the
beneficent effects intended by legislation.
The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931,
claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land
that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered
within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by
that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court
of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on November 13, 1922,
comes within the 40-year period.
FOR THE RESONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the
cadastral court's orders of August 5, 1963, November 5, 1963 and
September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and void; and the cadastral
court is hereby corrected to admit petitioner's oppositions and proceed
accordingly.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes,
J.B.L.,
Dizon,
Makalintal,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ ., concur.

Zaldivar,

Fernando,

Concepcion, C .J ., Ruiz Castro and Capistrano, JJ ., did not take part.

When construction is resorted to

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170735. December 17, 2007.]
IMMACULADA L. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL
SECURITY
COMMISSION
LEGAL
AND
COLLECTION,
SOCIAL
SECURITY
SYSTEM, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This is petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
assailing the 2 June 2005 Decision 1 and 8 December 2005
Resolution 2 both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85923. the
appellate court affirmed the Order and Resolution both of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 10048, finding Immaculada L.
Garcia (Garcia), the sole surviving director of Impact Corporation, petitioner
herein, liable for unremitted, albeit collected, SSS contributions.
Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita
Fernandez, and Consuelo Villanueva were directors 3 of Impact Corporation.
The corporation was engaged in the business of manufacturing aluminum
tube containers and operated two factories. One was a "slug" foundry-factory
located in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, while the other was an Extrusion Plant in

Cainta, Metro Manila, which processed the "slugs" into aluminum collapsible
tubes and similar containers for toothpaste and other related products.
Records show that around 1978, Impact Corporation started encountering
financial problems. By 1980, labor unrest besieged the corporation.
In March 1983, Impact Corporation filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a Petition for Suspension of Payments, 4 docketed as
SEC Case No. 02423, in which it stated that:
[Impact Corporation] has been and still is engaged in the
business
of
manufacturing
aluminum
tube
containers . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In brief, it is an on-going, viable, and profitable
enterprise.
On 8 May 1985, the union of Impact Corporation filed a Notice of Strike with
the Ministry of Labor which was followed by a declaration of strike on 28 July
1985. Subsequently, the Ministry of Labor certified the labor dispute for
compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in an Order 5 dated 25 August 1985. The Ministry of Labor, in the same
Order, noted the inability of Impact Corporation to pay wages, 13th month
pay, and SSS remittances due to cash liquidity problems. A portion of the
order reads:
On the claims of unpaid wages, unpaid 13th month pay
and non-remittance of loan amortization and SSS
premiums, we are for directing the company to pay the
same to the workers and to remit loan amortizations and
SSS premiums previously deducted from their wages to
the Social Security System. Such claims were never
contested by the company both during the hearing
below and in our office. In fact, such claims were
admitted by the company although it alleged cash
liquidity as the main reason for such non-payment.

WHEREFORE, the dispute at Impact Corporation is

hereby certified to the National Labor Relations
Commission for compulsory arbitration in accordance
with Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
The company is directed to pay all the entitled workers
unpaid wages, unpaid 13th month pay and to remit to
the Social Security System loan amortizations and SSS
premiums previously deducted from the wages of the
workers. 6
On 3 July 1985, the Social Security System (SSS), through its Legal and
Collection Division (LCD), filed a case before the SSC for the collection of
unremitted SSS premium contributions withheld by Impact Corporation from
its employees. The case which impleaded Impact Corporation as respondent
was docketed as SSC Case No. 10048. 7
Impact Corporation was compulsorily covered by the SSS as an employer
effective 15 July 1963 and was assigned Employer I.D. No. 03-2745100-21.
In answer to the allegations raised in SSC Case No. 10048, Impact
Corporation, through its then Vice President Ricardo de Leon, explained in a
letter dated 18 July 1985 that it had been confronted with strikes in 1984 and
layoffs were effected thereafter. It further argued that the P402,988.93 is
erroneous. It explained among other things, that its operations had been
suspended and that it was waiting for the resolution on its Petition for
Suspension of Payments by the SEC under SEC Case No. 2423. Despite
due notice, the corporation failed to appear at the hearings. The SSC
ordered the investigating team of the SSS to determine if it can still file its
claim for unpaid premium contributions against the corporation under the
Petition for Suspension of Payments.
In the meantime, the Petition for Suspension of Payments was dismissed
which was pending before the SEC in an Order 8 dated 12 December 1985.
Impact Corporation resumed operations but only for its winding up and
dissolution. 9 Due to Impact Corporation's liability and cash flow problems,

all of its assets, namely, its machineries, equipment, office furniture and
fixtures, were sold to scrap dealers to answer for its arrears in rentals.

subscription was already fully paid. The petitioner raised the same
arguments in her Position Paper. 16

On 1 December 1995, the SSS-LCD filed an amended Petition 10 in SSC

Case No. 10048 wherein the directors of Impact Corporation were directly
impleaded as respondents, namely: Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de
Leon, 11 Pacita Fernandez, Consuelo Villanueva, and petitioner. The
amounts sought to be collected totaled P453,845.78 and P10,856.85 for the
periods August 1980 to December 1984 and August 1981 to July 1984,
respectively, and the penalties for late remittance at the rate of 3% per month
from the date the contributions fell due until fully paid pursuant to Section 22
(a) of the Social Security Law, 12 as amended, in the amounts of
P49,941.67 and P2,474,662.82.

On 23 January 1998, Ricardo de Leon died following the death, too, of

Pacita Fernandez died on 7 February 2000. In an Order dated 11 April 2000,
the SSC directed the System to check if Impact Corporation had leviable
properties to which the investigating team of respondent SSS manifested
that the Impact Corporation had already been dissolved and its assets
disposed of. 17

Period Unremitted
(3%
Month)
August
1980
December 1984
August
July 1984

1981

Interest
to P453,845.78 P49,

Amount Penalties TOTAL

Per
941.67 503,787.45

to P10,856.85 P2,474,662.82 2,485,519.67

Summonses were not served upon Eduardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, and
Consuelo Villanueva, their whereabouts unknown. They were all later
determined to be deceased. On the other hand, due to failure to file his
responsive pleading, Ricardo de Leon was declared in default.
Petitioner filed with the SSC a Motion to Dismiss 13 on grounds of
prescription, lack of cause of action and cessation of business, but the
Motion was denied for lack of merit. 14 In her Answer with
Counterclaim 15 dated 20 May 1999, petitioner averred that Impact
Corporation had ceased operations in 1980. In her defense, she insisted that
she was a mere director without managerial functions, and she ceased to be
such in 1982. Even as a stockholder and director of Impact Corporation,
petitioner contended that she cannot be made personally liable for the
corporate obligations of Impact Corporation since her liability extended only
up to the extent of her unpaid subscription, of which she had none since her

In a Resolution dated 28 May 2003, the Social Security Commission ruled in

favor of SSS and declared petitioner liable to pay the unremitted
contributions and penalties, stating the following:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission
finds, and so holds, that respondents Impact
Corporation and/or Immaculada L. Garcia, as director
and responsible officer of the said corporation, is liable
to pay the SSS the amounts of P442,988.93,
representing the unpaid SS contributions of their
employees for the period August 1980 to December
1984, not inclusive, and P10,856.85, representing the
balance of the unpaid SS contributions in favor of
Donato Campos, Jaime Mascarenas, Bonifacio Franco
and Romeo Fullon for the period August 1980 to
December 1984, not inclusive, as well as the 3% per
month penalty imposed thereon for late payment in the
amounts
of
P3,194,548.63
and
P78,441.33,
respectively, computed as of April 30, 2003. This is
without prejudice to the right of the SSS to collect the
penalties accruing after April 30, 2003 and to institute
other appropriate actions against the respondent
corporation and/or its responsible officers.
Should the respondents pay their liability for unpaid SSS
contributions within sixty (60) days from receipt of a
copy of this Resolution, the 3% per month penalty for

late payment thereof shall be deemed condoned

pursuant to SSC Res. No. 397-S.97, as amended by
SSC Res. Nos. 112-S.98 and 982-S.99, implementing
the provision on condonation of penalty under Section
30 of R.A. No. 8282.
In the event the respondents fail to pay their liabilities
within the aforestated period, let a writ of execution be
issued, pursuant to Section 22 (c) [2] of the SS Law, as
amended, for the satisfaction of their liabilities to the
SSS. 18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 19 of the afore-quoted Decision
but it was denied for lack of merit in an Order 20 dated 4 August 2004, thus:
Nowhere in the questioned Resolution dated May 28,
2003 is it stated that the other directors of the defunct
Impact Corporation are absolved from their contribution
and penalty liabilities to the SSS. It is certainly farthest
from the intention of the petitioner SSS or this
Commission to pin the entire liability of Impact
Corporation on movant Immaculada L. Garcia, to the
exclusion of the directors of the corporation namely:
Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez
and Conzuelo Villanueva, who were all impleaded as
parties-respondents in this case.
The case record shows that there was failure of service
of summonses upon respondents Eduardo de Leon,
Pacita Fernandez and Conzuelo Villanueva, who are all
deceased, for the reason that their whereabouts are
unknown. Moreover, neither the legal heirs nor the
estate of the defaulted respondent Ricardo de Leon
were substituted as parties-respondents in this case
when he died on January 23, 1998. Needless to state,
the Commission did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons or estates of the other directors of Impact

Corporation, hence, it could not validly render any

pronouncement as to their liabilities in this case.

Furthermore, the movant cannot raise in a motion for

reconsideration the defense that she was no longer a
director of Impact Corporation in 1982, when she was
allegedly eased out by the managing directors of Impact
Corporation as purportedly shown in the Deed of Sale
and Assignment of Shares of Stock dated January 22,
1982. This defense was neither pleaded in her Motion to
Dismiss dated January 17, 1996 nor in her Answer with
Counterclaim dated May 18, 1999 and is, thus, deemed
waived pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which has suppletory application to
the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission.
Finally, this Commission has already ruled in the Order
dated April 27, 1999 that since the original Petition was
filed by the SSS on July 3, 1985, and was merely
amended on December 1, 1995 to implead the
responsible officers of Impact Corporation, without
changing its causes of action, the same was instituted
well within the 20-year prescriptive period provided
under Section 22 (b) of the SS Law, as amended,
considering
that
the
contribution
delinquency
assessment covered the period August 1980 to
December 1984.
In view thereof, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review.
Respondent SSS filed its Comment dated 20 January 2005, and petitioner
submitted her Reply thereto on 4 April 2005.

The Court of Appeals, applying Section 28 (f) of the Social Security

Law, 21 again ruled against petitioner. It dismissed the petitioner's Petition in
a Decision dated 2 June 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution
dated 28 May 2003 and the Order dated 4 August 2004
of the Social Security Commission are AFFIRMED in
toto. 22
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate
court's Decision but her Motion was denied in a Resolution dated 8
December 2005.
Hence, the instant Petition in which petitioner insists that the Court of
Appeals committed grave error in holding her solely liable for the collected
but unremitted SSS premium contributions and the consequent late penalty
payments due thereon. Petitioner anchors her Petition on the following
arguments:
I. SECTION 28(F) OF THE SSS LAW PROVIDES THAT
A MANAGING HEAD, DIRECTOR OR
PARTNER IS LIABLE ONLY FOR THE
PENALTIES
OF
THE
EMPLOYER
CORPORATION AND NOT FOR UNPAID SSS
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE EMPLOYER
CORPORATION.
II. UNDER THE SSS LAW, IT IS THE MANAGING
HEADS, DIRECTORS OR PARTNERS WHO
SHALL BE LIABLE TOGETHER WITH THE
CORPORATION. IN THIS CASE, PETITIONER
HAS CEASED TO BE A STOCKHOLDER OF
IMPACT CORPORATION IN 1982. EVEN
WHILE SHE WAS A STOCKHOLDER, SHE
NEVER PARTICIPATED IN THE DAILY
OPERATIONS OF IMPACT CORPORATION.

III. UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE CORPORATION

CODE, ONLY DIRECTORS, TRUSTEES OR
OFFICERS
WHO
PARTICIPATE
IN
UNLAWFUL ACTS OR ARE GUILTY OF
GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND BAD FAITH
SHALL
BE
PERSONALLY
LIABLE.
OTHERWISE,
BEING
A
MERE
STOCKHOLDER, SHE IS LIABLE ONLY TO
THE EXTENT OF HER SUBSCRIPTION.
IV. IMPACT
CORPORATION
SUFFERED
IRREVERSIBLE
ECONOMIC
LOSSES,
EVENTS WHICH WERE NEITHER DESIRED
NOR CAUSED BY ANY ACT OF THE
PETITIONER. THUS, BY REASON OF
FORTUITOUS EVENTS, THE PETITIONER
SHOULD BE ABSOLVED FROM LIABILITY.
V. RESPONDENT SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
FAILED MISERABLY IN EXERTING EFFORTS
TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
LEVIABLE
ASSETS
OF
IMPACT
CORPORATION,
PERSON/S
AND/OR
ESTATE/S OF THE OTHER DIRECTORS OR
OFFICERS OF IMPACT CORPORATION.
VI. THE

HONORABLE COMMISSION SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN NOT RENDERING A JUDGMENT
BY DEFAULT AGAINST THE DIRECTORS
UPON WHOM IT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION.

Based on the foregoing, petitioner prays that the Decision dated 2 June 2005
and the Resolution dated 8 December 2005 of the Court of Appeals be
reversed and set aside, and a new one be rendered absolving her of any and
all liabilities under the Social Security Law.

In sum, the core issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not petitioner,
as the only surviving director of Impact Corporation, can be made solely
liable for the corporate obligations of Impact Corporation pertaining to
unremitted SSS premium contributions and penalties therefore.
As a covered employer under the Social Security Law, it is the obligation of
Impact Corporation under the provisions of Sections 18, 19 and 22 thereof,
as amended, to deduct from its duly covered employee's monthly salaries
their shares as premium contributions and remit the same to the SSS,
together with the employer's shares of the contributions to the petitioner, for
and in their behalf.
From all indications, the corporation has already been dissolved.
Respondents are now going after petitioner who is the only surviving director
of Impact Corporation.
A cursory review of the alleged grave errors of law committed by the Court of
Appeals above reveals there seems to be no dispute as to the assessed
liability of Impact Corporation for the unremitted SSS premiums of its
employees for the period January 1980 to December 1984.
There is also no dispute as to the fact that the employees' SSS premium
contributions have been deducted from their salaries by Impact Corporation.
Petitioner in assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, distinguishes the
penalties from the unremitted or unpaid SSS premium contributions. She
points out that although the appellate court is of the opinion that the
concerned officers of an employer corporation are liable for the penalties for
non-remittance of premiums, it still affirmed the SSC Resolution holding
petitioner liable for the unpaid SSS premium contributions in addition to the
penalties.
Petitioner avers that under the aforesaid provision, the liability does not
include liability for the unremitted SSS premium contributions.
Petitioner's argument is ridiculous. The interpretation petitioner would like us
to adopt finds no support in law or in jurisprudence. While the Court of
Appeals Decision provided that Section 28 (f) refers to the liabilities

pertaining to penalty for the non-remittance of SSS employee contributions,

holding that it is distinct from the amount of the supposed SSS remittances,
petitioner mistakenly concluded that Section 28 (f) is applicable only to
penalties and not to the liability of the employer for the unremitted premium
contributions. Clearly, a simplistic interpretation of the law is untenable. It is a
rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. 23 The liability imposed as
contemplated under the foregoing Section 28 (f) of the Social Security
Law does not preclude the liability for the unremitted amount. Relevant to
Section 28 (f) is Section 22 of the same law.
SEC. 22. Remittance of Contributions. (a) The
contributions imposed in the preceding Section shall be
remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each
calendar month following the month for which they are
applicable or within such time as the Commission may
prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to
remit such contributions shall be liable for their payment
and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein
prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a
penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from
the date the contribution falls due until paid. If deemed
expedient and advisable by the Commission, the
collection and remittance of contributions shall be made
quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the contributions
payable by the employees to be advanced by their
respective employers: Provided, That upon separation of
an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but
not due shall be credited or refunded to his employer.
Under Section 22 (a), every employer is required to deduct and remit such
contributions penalty refers to the 3% penalty that automatically attaches to
the delayed SSS premium contributions. The spirit, rather than the letter of a
law determines construction of a provision of law. It is a cardinal rule in

statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term

used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the
intendment of the law, must be made. 24Nowhere in the provision or in the
Decision can it be inferred that the persons liable are absolved from paying
the unremitted premium contributions.
Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon
the judge to apply them regardless of personal belief or predilections
when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application not interpretation
thereof is imperative. 25 However, where the language of a statute is vague
and ambiguous, an interpretation thereof is resorted to. An interpretation
thereof is necessary in instances where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. A law is deemed
ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably wellinformed persons in either of two or more senses. 26 The fact that a law
admits of different interpretations is the best evidence that it is vague and
ambiguous. 27 In the instant case, petitioner interprets Section 28 (f) of
theSocial Security Law as applicable only to penalties and not to the liability
of the employer for the unremitted premium contributions. Respondents
present a more logical interpretation that is consistent with the provisions as
a whole and with the legislative intent behind the Social Security Law.
This Court cannot be made to accept an interpretation that would defeat the
intent of the law and its legislators. 28
Petitioner also challenges the finding of the Court of Appeals that under
Section 28 (f) of the Social Security Law, a mere director or officer of an
employer corporation, and not necessarily a "managing" director or officer,
can be held liable for the unpaid SSS premium contributions.

Section 28 (f) of the Social Security Law provides the following:

(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be
committed by an association, partnership, corporation or
any other institution, its managing head, directors or

partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this

Act for the offense.
This Court agrees in petitioner's observation that the SSS did not even deny
nor rebut the claim that petitioner was not the "managing head" of Impact
Corporation. However, the Court of Appeals rightly held that petitioner, as a
director of Impact Corporation, is among those officers covered by Section
28 (f) of the Social Security Law.
Petitioner invokes the rule in statutory construction called ejusdem generic;
that is, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
According to petitioner, to be held liable under Section 28 (f) of the Social
Security Law, one must be the "managing head," "managing director," or
"managing partner." This Court though finds no need to resort to statutory
construction. Section 28 (f) of the Social Security Law imposes penalty on:
(1) the managing head;
(2) directors; or
(3) partners, for offenses committed by a juridical person
The said provision does not qualify that the director or partner should
likewise be a "managing director" or "managing partner." 29 The law is clear
and unambiguous.
Petitioner nonetheless raises the defense that under Section 31 of the
Corporation Code, only directors, trustees or officers who participate in
unlawful acts or are guilty of gross negligence and bad faith shall be
personally liable, and that being a mere stockholder, she is liable only to the
extent of her subscription.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code, stipulating on the liability of directors,
trustees, or officers, provides:

SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers.

Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for
or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or
who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any
personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty
as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and
severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by
the corporation, its stockholders or members and other
persons.
Basic is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality
separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it as well as from
that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. A corporation is a
juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting
for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. Following
this, the general rule applied is that obligations incurred by the corporation,
acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole
liabilities. 30 A director, officer, and employee of a corporation are generally
not held personally liable for obligations incurred by the corporation.
Being a mere fiction of law, however, there are peculiar situations or valid
grounds that can exist to warrant the disregard of its independent being and
the lifting of the corporate veil. This situation might arise when a corporation
is used to evade a just and due obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or
perpetrate fraud, to carry out other similar unjustifiable aims or intentions, or
as a subterfuge to commit injustice and so circumvent the law. 31 Thus,
Section 31 of the Corporation Law provides:
Taking a cue from the above provision, a corporate director, a trustee or an
officer, may be held solidarily liable with the corporation in the following
instances:
1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases,
the officers of a corporation

(a) vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts

of the corporation;
(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in
directing the corporate affairs;
(c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the
prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or
members, and other persons.
2. When a director or officer has consented to the
issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge
thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary
his written objection thereto.
3. When a director, trustee or officer has contractually
agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and
solidarily liable with the Corporation.
4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific
provision of law, personally liable for his corporate
action. 32
The aforesaid provision states:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers.
Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for
or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or
who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any
personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty
as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and
severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by
the corporation, its stockholders or members and other
persons.
The situation of petitioner, as a director of Impact Corporation when said
corporation failed to remit the SSS premium contributions falls exactly under

the fourth situation. Section 28 (f) of the Social Security Law imposes a civil
liability for any act or omission pertaining to the violation of the Social
Security Law, to wit:
(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be
committed by an association, partnership, corporation or
any other institution, its managing head, directors or
partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this
Act for the offense.
In fact, criminal actions for violations of the Social Security Law are also
provided under the Revised Penal Code. The Social Security Law provides,
in Section 28 thereof, to wit:
(h) Any employer who, after deducting the monthly
contributions or loan amortizations from his employees'
compensation, fails to remit the said deductions to the
SSS within thirty (30) days from the date they became
due shall be presumed to have misappropriated such
contributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer the
penalties provided in Article Three hundred fifteen of the
Revised Penal Code.
(i) Criminal action arising from a violation of the
provisions of this Act may be commenced by the SSS or
the employee concerned either under this Act or in
appropriate cases under the Revised Penal Code: . . . .
Respondents would like this Court to apply another exception to the rule that
the persons comprising a corporation are not personally liable for acts done
in the performance of their duties.
The Court of Appeals in the appealed Decision stated:
Anent the unpaid SSS contributions of Impact
Corporation's employees, the officers of a corporation
are liable in behalf of a corporation, which no longer
exists or has ceased operations. Although as a rule, the

officers and members of a corporation are not

personally liable for acts done in performance of their
duties, this rule admits of exception, one of which is
when the employer corporation is no longer existing and
is unable to satisfy the judgment in favor of the
employee, the officers should be held liable for acting on
behalf of the corporation. Following the foregoing
pronouncement, petitioner, as one of the directors of
Impact Corporation, together with the other directors of
the defunct corporation, are liable for the unpaid SSS
contributions of their employees. 33
On the other hand, the SSC, in its Resolution, presented this discussion:
Although as a rule, the officers and members of a
corporation are not personally liable for acts done in the
performance of their duties, this rule admits of
exceptions, one of which is when the employer
corporation is no longer existing and is unable to satisfy
the judgment in favor of the employee, the officers
should be held liable for acting on behalf of the
corporation. . . . . 34
The rationale cited by respondents in the two preceding paragraphs need not
have been applied because the personal liability for the unremitted SSS
premium contributions and the late penalty thereof attaches to the petitioner
as a director of Impact Corporation during the period the amounts became
due and demandable by virtue of a direct provision of law.
Petitioner's defense that since Impact Corporation suffered irreversible
economic losses, and by reason of fortuitous events, she should be absolved
from liability, is also untenable. The evidence adduced totally belies this
claim. A reference to the copy of the Petition for Suspension of Payments
filed by Impact Corporation on 18 March 1983 before the SEC contained an
admission that:

"[I]t has been and still is engaged in business" and "has

been and still is engaged in the business of
manufacturing aluminum tube containers" and "in brief,
it is an on-going, viable, and profitable enterprise" which
has "sufficient assets" and "actual and potential incomegeneration capabilities."
The foregoing document negates petitioner's assertion and supports the
contention that during the period involved Impact Corporation was still
engaged in business and was an ongoing, viable, profitable enterprise. In
fact, the latest SSS form RIA submitted by Impact Corporation is dated 7
May 1984. The assessed SSS premium contributions and penalty are
obligations imposed upon Impact Corporation by law, and should have been
remitted to the SSS within the first 10 days of each calendar month following
the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the SSC
prescribes. 35
This Court also notes the evident failure on the part of SSS to issue a
judgment in default against Ricardo de Leon, who was the vice-president
and officer of the corporation, upon his non-filing of a responsive pleading
after summons was served on him. As can be gleaned from Section 11 of
the SSS Revised Rules of Procedure, the Commissioner is mandated to
render a decision either granting or denying the petition. Under the aforesaid
provision, if respondent fails to answer within the time prescribed, the
Hearing Commissioner may, upon motion of petitioner, or motu proprio,
declare respondent in default and proceed to receive petitioner's
evidence ex parte and thereafter recommend to the Commission either the
granting or denial of the petition as the evidence may warrant. 36

On a final note, this Court sees it proper to quote verbatim respondents'

prefatory statement in their Comment:
The Social Security System is a government agency
imbued with a salutary purpose to carry out the policy of
the State to establish, develop, promote and perfect a

sound and viable tax exempt social security system

suitable to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines which shall promote social justice and
provide meaningful protection to members and their
beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness,
maternity, old-age, death and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden.
The soundness and viability of the funds of the SSS in
turn depends on the contributions of its covered
employee and employer members, which it invests in
order to deliver the basic social benefits and privileges
to its members. The entitlement to and amount of
benefits and privileges of the covered members are
contribution-based. Both the soundness and viability of
the funds of the SSS as well as the entitlement and
amount of benefits and privileges of its members are
adversely affected to a great extent by the nonremittance of the much-needed contributions. 37
The sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries. This
Court will not turn a blind eye on the perpetration of injustice. This Court
cannot and will not allow itself to be made an instrument nor be privy to any
attempt at the perpetration of injustice.
Following the doctrine laid down in Laguna Transportation Co., Inc. v. Social
Security System, 38 this Court rules that although a corporation once formed
is conferred a juridical personality separate and distinct from the persons
comprising it, it is but a legal fiction introduced for purposes of convenience
and to subserve the ends of justice. The concept cannot be extended to a
point beyond its reasons and policy, and when invoked in support of an end
subversive of this policy, will be disregarded by the courts.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 2 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85923 is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH FINALITY. Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, as sole surviving director
of Impact Corporation is hereby ORDERED to pay for the collected and

unremitted SSS contributions of Impact Corporation. The case is

REMANDED to the SSS for computation of the exact amount and collection
thereof.

DECISION

SO ORDERED.

FERNANDO, J p:

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.

A certification by respondent Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo C. Noriel,

that respondent National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming
Mills, Company, Inc. disregarding the objection raised by petitioner, the
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), is assailed in this
certiorari proceeding. Admittedly, in the certification election held on
February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of
petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations
implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast
suffices for certification of the victorious labor union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent. 1 There were four votes cast by employees who
did not want any union. 2 On its face therefore, respondent Union ought to
have been certified in accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner,
undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case of Allied
Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations 3 that
spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast.
Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that
there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director.
Implicit in the comment of respondent Director of Labor
Relations, 4 considered as an answer, is the controlling weight to be
accorded the implementing rule above-cited, no inconsistency being shown
between such rule and the present Labor Code. Under such a view, the
ruling in the Allied Workers Association case that arose during the period
when it was the Industrial Peace Act 5 that was in effect and not the present
law, no longer possesses relevance. It cannot and should not be applied. It is
not controlling. There was no abuse of discretion then, much less a grave
one.

||| (Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No.
170735, [December 17, 2007], 565 PHIL 193-215)

POWER TO CONSTRUE
1. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-43760. August 21, 1976.]
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS (PAFLU), petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, HONORABLE CARMELO C. NORIEL,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS
(NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.,
INC., respondents.

Guevara, Pineda, Guevara & Castillon for petitioner.

Olalia, Dimapilis & Associates for respondent Union (NAFLU).
Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor
Jesus V. Diaz for respondent Bureau of Labor Relations, etc., et al.

This Court is in agreement. The law is on the side of respondent Director, not
to mention the decisive fact appearing in the petition itself that at most, only
ten of the spoiled ballots "were intended for the petitioner Union," 6 thus

rendering clear that it would on its own showing obtain only 424 votes as
against 429 for respondent Union. Certiorari does not lie.
1. What is of the essence of the certification process, as noted in Lakas Ng
Manggagawang Pilipino v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. 7 "is that every labor
organization be given the opportunity in a free and honest election to make
good its claim that it should be the exclusive collective bargaining
representative." 8 Petitioner cannot complain. It was given that opportunity. It
lost in a fair election. It came out second best. The implementing rule favors,
as it should, respondent Union. It obtained a majority of the valid votes cast.
So our law prescribes. It is equally the case in the United States as this
excerpt from the work of Cox and Bok makes clear: "It is a well-settled rule
that a representative will be certified even though less than a majority of all
the employees in the unit cast ballots in favor of the union. It is enough that
the union be designated by a majority of the valid ballots, and this is so even
though only a small proportion of the eligible voters participates. Following
the analogy of political elections, the courts have approved this practice of
the Board." 9
2. There is this policy consideration. The country is at present embarked on
a wide-scale industrialization project. As a matter of fact, respondent firm is
engaged in such activity. Industrialization, as noted by Professor Smith,
Merrifield and Rothschild, "can thrive only as there is developed a stable
structure of law and order in the productive sector." 10 That objective is best
attained in a collective bargaining regime, which is a manifestation of
industrial democracy at work, if there be no undue obstacles placed in the
way of the choice of a bargaining representative. To insist on the absolute
majority where there are various unions and where the possibility of invalid
ballots may not be ruled out, would be to frustrate that goal. For the
probability of a long drawn-out, protracted process is not easy to dismiss.
That is not unlikely given the intensity of rivalry among unions capable of
enlisting the allegiance of a group of workers. It is to avoid such a
contingency that there is this explicit pronouncement in the implementing
rule. It speaks categorically. It must be obeyed. That was what respondent
Director did.

3. Nor can fault of a grave and serious character be imputed to respondent

Director presumably because of failure to abide by the doctrine or
pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Allied Workers Association
case. The reliance is on this excerpt from the opinion: "However, spoiled
ballots, i.e., those which are defaced, torn or marked (Rules for Certification
Elections, Rule II, sec. 2[j]) should be counted in determining the majority
since they are nevertheless votes cast by those who are qualified to do
so." 11 Nothing can be clearer than that its basis is a paragraph in a section
of the then applicable rules for certification elections. 12 They were
promulgated under the authority of the then prevailing Industrial Peace
Act. 13 That Legislation is no longer in force, having been superseded by the
present Labor Code which took effect on November 1, 1974. This
certification election is governed therefore, as was made clear, by the
present Labor Code and the Rules issued thereunder. Absent a showing that
such rules and regulations are violative of the Code, this Court cannot ignore
their existence. When, as should be the case, a public official acts in
accordance with a norm therein contained, no infraction of the law is
committed. Respondent Director did, as he ought to, comply with its terms.
He took into consideration only the "valid votes" as was required by the
Rules. He had no choice as long as they remain in force. On a proper
showing, the judiciary can nullify any rule if found in conflict with the
governing statute. 14 That was not even attempted here. All that petitioner
did was to set forth in two separate paragraphs the applicable rule followed
by respondent Director 15 and the governing article 16 . It did not even
bother to discuss why such rule was in conflict with the present Labor Code.
It failed to point out any repugnancy. Such being the case, respondent
Director must be upheld.
4. The conclusion reached by us derives further support from the deservedly
high repute attached to the construction placed by the executive officials
entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and
Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary
Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on February 3, 1975,
the present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back
as May 1, 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to November
1, 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to November 1, 1974.

It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really
serious and careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid
any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the
interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re
Allen, 17 a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt
from the leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in
1891: "The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by
the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is
entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the
statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no
authorities need be cited to support it." 18 There was a paraphrase by
Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty, 19 a 1918
decision: "Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it,
and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be
controlled thereby." 20 Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in
numerous decisions. 21 As was emphasized by Chief Justice Castro, "the
construction placed by the office charged with implementing and enforcing
the provisions of a Code] should be given controlling weight." 22
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against
petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU).
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and

the

DISTRICT

COLLECTOR OF THE
PORT OF SUBIC, petitioners, vs.HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, res
pondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J p:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, 1 assailing the
Decision 2 and the Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified
the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-2003 4 on the tariff
classification of wheat issued by petitionerCommissioner of Customs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 272003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified

||| (Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,

G.R. No. L-43760, [August 21, 1976], 164 PHIL 389-396)

according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin;

680 PHIL 681-695

list of corporations,

and

(3)

port of discharge.5 The

regulation

ports of discharge,

provided

commodity

an

exclusive

descriptions

and

countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified

SECOND DIVISION

either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade
wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.

[G.R. No. 179579. February 1, 2012.]

CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or
Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this

On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining

Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from notice. 9

procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential. 6

Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss. 10 They alleged

that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December

case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the

2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief 7 with the Regional

classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3)

Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. It anticipated the implementation of the

CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in

regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit

nature; and (4) the claimsof respondent were speculative and premature,

from China. 8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without

because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent's

following the mandateof the Revised Administrative Code on public

products. They likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary

participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the

injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the

University of the Philippines Law Center.

issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule
that administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared otherwise.

Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it

to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and

On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in

examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be

the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would

subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to

just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the

pay 133% more than was proper.

RTC rendered its Decision 11 without having to resolve the application for
preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.

Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection

clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated non-flour

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:

millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the
regulation was confiscatory in nature.

subject Customs Memorandum

and OF NO

Order

FORCE

27-2003

is

AND

declared

INVALID
EFFECT.

Respondents Commissioner of Customs, the District Collector of Subic or

anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease and desist from

Hence, this Petition.

enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.

Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
SO ORDERED. 12
I. THE
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given
that the issue raised by respondent concerned the quasi-legislative
powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief

COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED

was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it.

QUESTION OF SUBS

The court considered that respondent was a regular importer, and that the

TANCE

latter would be subjected to the application of the regulation in future

NOT

transactions.

WITH THE LAW AND

WHICH
IN

IS

ACCORD

PREVAILING
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that
petitioners had not followed

JURISPRUDENCE.

the basic requirements ofhearing and

publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that petitioners

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS

had "substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a

GRAVELY ERRED IN

quasi-legislative predetermination." 13 The lower court pointed out that a

DECLARING

classification based on importers and ports of discharge were violative of the

THE

due process rights of respondent.

HAS

TRIAL

THAT
COURT

JURISDICTION

OVER THE CASE.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners
appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense ofCMO 272003. 14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that,
since the regulation affected substantial rights ofpetitioners and other
importers, petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice,
hearing and publication.

The Petition has no merit.

We

shall

first

discuss

propriety of an action for declaratory relief.

Rule 63, Section 1 provides:

the

Who may file petition. Any

Petition filed by respondent before the lower

person interested under a deed,

court meets these requirements.

will, contract or other

First, the subject of the controversy is

written instrument, or whose

the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by

rights are affected by a statute,

petitioner Commissioner of Customs.

executive order or regulation,

Communications v. NTC, 16 we held:

ordinance,

or

other

Thedetermination of whether a specific

governmental regulation may,

rule or set of rules issued by an administrative

before

agency contravenes the law or the constitution

breach

any

or

violation

thereof, bring an action in the

is

appropriate Regional Trial Court

courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the

to

power of judicial review or the power to

determine

any

question of construction
validity

arising,

declaration of his

or

and

for

rights

The

the

law,

jurisdiction of the

treaty,

regular

international

or

executive agreement, presidential decree,

or

order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in

the courts, including the regional trial

requirements of an

action

for

declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must

be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for
determination. 15 We

within

declare

duties, thereunder.

judicial

In Smart

find

that

the

courts. This is within the scope of judicial

power, which includes the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action
the

validity of the

acts of the

departments. Judicial

power

political

includes

the

duty of the courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion

amounting

to

lack

or

excess ofjurisdiction on the part of any branch

judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the

or

case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not

instrumentality of the

Government.

(Emphasis supplied)

into the validity but into the correctness or

Meanwhile,

in Misamis

Oriental

Association of Coco

Traders,

Inc. v.

propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a

court, when confronted with an interpretative
rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the

Department of Finance Secretary, 17 we said:

. . . [A] legislative rule is in the
nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the

rule; (ii) go

to

substitute

its

the

opposite

judgment;

extreme

or (iii) give

and
some

intermediate degree of authoritative weight to

the interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)

details thereof. . . .In addition such rule must be

Second, the controversy is between

published. On the other hand, interpretative

rules are designed to provide guidelines to the
law which the administrative agency is in

in

considering

inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the

authority of the

agency; (ii) whether

that

have

adverse

interests.

Petitioners are summarily imposing a tariff rate

it

administrative
is

reasonable;

and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to

proper procedure. But the court is not free to
substitute its judgment as to the desirability or
wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its
delegation of administrative

judgment,

Third, it is clear that respondent has a

legislative rule a court is free to make three

delegated

parties

that respondent is refusing to pay.

charge of enforcing.
Accordingly,

two

has

committed those questions to administrative

legal

and

substantive

interest

in

the

implementation of CMO 27-2003. Respondent

has adequately shown that, as a regular
importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has
actually made shipments of wheat from China to
Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in
December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be
subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003.
The

regulation

calls

for

the

imposition of different tariff rates, depending on

the

factors

enumerated

therein.

Thus,

respondent alleged that it would be made to pay

with the said agency. We believe and so find

the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat,

that Petitioner has presented such a stake in

instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In

the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with

addition, respondent would have to go through

standing

the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which

supplied)

would undoubtedly toll its time and resources.

The lower court correctly pointed out as
follows:

to

file

this

petition. 18 (Emphasis

Finally, the issue raised by respondent

is ripe for judicial determination, because
litigation is inevitable 19 for the simple and

. . . As noted above, the fact that

petitioner

is

precisely

into

uncontroverted reason that respondent is not

the

included in the enumeration of flour millers

business of importing wheat, each and every

classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus,

importation will be subjected to constant

as the trial court stated, it would have to file a

disputes which will result into (sic) delays in

protest case each time it imports food grade

the delivery, setting aside of funds as cash

wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.

bond required in the CMO as well as the

resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see
that business uncertainty will be a constant

It is therefore clear that a petition for

declaratory relief is the right remedy given the
circumstances of the case.

occurrence for petitioner. That the sums

Considering

involved are not minimal is shown by the

discussions during the hearings conducted
as well as in the pleadings filed. It may be
that the petitioner can later on get a refund but
such

has

been

foreclosed

because

the

would

the

questioned

affect

the

substantive

rights of respondent as explained above, it

therefore follows that petitioners should have
applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII,
Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code,

Collector of Customs and

the Commissioner of Customs are

regulation

that

bound

by

their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund

to wit:

Section 3. Filing. (1) Every

have

agency

newspaper of general

shall

file

with

University of the

the

Philippines

been

circulation

published

at

least

in

two

(2)

Law Center three (3) certified

weeks before the first hearing

copies ofevery rule adopted by

thereon.

it.

Rules

in

force

on

date of effectivity of this

the

(3) In

Code

be observed.

(3) months from that date shall

thereafter

be

the

rules on contested cases shall

which are not filed within three

not

case of opposition,

the

When an administrative rule is merely

bases of any sanction against

interpretative in nature, its applicability needs

any party of persons.

nothing further than its bare issuance, for it

gives no real consequence more than what the

xxx xxx xxx

law itself has already prescribed. When, on the

Section

9. Public

Participation.

not

merely providing for the means that can

otherwise required by law, an

facilitate or render least cumbersome the

agency

implementation of the

shall,

(1)

as

If

other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond

far

as

law

but

substantially

practicable, publish or circulate

increases the burden of those governed, it

notices of proposed rules and

behooves the agency to accord at least to those

afford

the

directly affected a chance to be heard, and

opportunity to submit their views

thereafter to be duly informed, before that new

prior to the adoption of any rule.

issuance is given the force and effect of law. 20

interested

parties

Likewise, in Taada v. Tuvera, 21 we

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule

or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall

held:

The clear object of the above-

legislature. While the people are

quoted provision is to give

kept

the general public adequate

media of the

notice of the

deliberations

various

laws

abreast

by

the

mass

debates

and

in

the Batasan

which are to regulate their

Pambansa

actions

as

diligent ones, ready access to

citizens. Without such notice

the legislative records no

and publication, there would be

such publicity accompanies the

no

law-making

and

conduct

basis

for

the

applicationof the

would

without

legis

non

publication, the people have

be

the

no

means of knowing

presidential

or otherwise burden a citizen

actually been

for

much

transgression of a

decrees

less

way of informing

whatsoever,

themselves of the

even

constructive one.

contents

Perhaps at no time since the

establishment of the
Republic

has

Philippine
the

what
have

promulgated,

law of which he had no notice

not

the

process of the

height of injustice to punish

the

for

President. Thus,

maxim "ignorantia
excusat." It

and

and

definite

specific

texts of such

decrees. (Emphasis supplied)

Because petitioners failed to follow the
requirements

enumerated

by

the

Revised

publication of laws taken so vital

Administrative Code, the assailed regulation

significance that at this time

must be struck down.

when the people have bestowed

upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the

Going now to the content of CMO 272003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional

for

being

violative of the

equal

protection

clause of the Constitution.

under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade

The equal protection clause means

that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in the same
place

in

like

the other hand, even if the importers listed

circumstances.

Thus,

the

wheat, they would only be made to pay 3%

tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due.
The regulation, therefore, does not become
disadvantageous to respondent only, but even
to the state.

guarantee of the equal protection oflaws is not

It is also not clear how the regulation

violated if there is a reasonable classification.

intends

For a classification to be reasonable, it must be

importations

shown

misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-

that

distinctions;

(1)
(2)

it
it

rests
is

on

substantial

germane

to

the

to

"monitor
and

more
thus

closely

wheat

prevent

their

2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this

purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing

end,

conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all

application of the

members of the same class. 22

possibility that other corporations that are

Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not

meet these requirements. We do not see how
the quality of wheat is affected by who imports
it, where it is discharged, or which country it
came from.

but

results

in

the

regulation

opposite.

The

forecloses

the

excluded from the list import food grade wheat;

at the same time, it creates an assumption that
those who meet the criteria do not import feed
grade wheat. In the first case, importers are
unnecessarily

burdened

to

prove

the

classification of their wheat imports; while in the

Thus, on the one hand, even if other

second, the state carries that burden.

millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have

imported food grade wheat, the product would
still be declared as feed grade wheat, a
classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs al

so went beyond his powers when the regulation
limited the customs officer's duties mandated by

Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as

feasible to do so and when such

amended. The law provides:

analysis is necessary for the

proper classification, appraisal,

Section

and/or

1403. Duties of Customs Offic

Appraise

into

the

Philippines of imported articles.

er Tasked to Examine, Classify,

and

admission

Imported

Likewise, the customs officer

Articles. The customs officer

shall

tasked to examine, classify, and

unit of quantity in which they

appraise imported articles shall

are usually bought and sold,

determine

whether

the

and appraise the imported

packages

designated

for

articles in accordance with

examination

and

their

determine

the

Section 201 of this Code.

contents are in accordance

Failure

with the declaration in the

entry,

invoice

pertinent

and

documents

on

part of the customs officer

other

subject him to the penalties

prescribed

manner as to indicate whether

under

Section

3604 of this Code.

the articles have been truly

and correctly declared in the

The

provision

entry as regard their quantity,

the customs officer

measurement,

determine

and

to

comply with his duties shall

and

shall make return in such a

weight,

the

the

must

mandates
first

that

assess

and

classification of the

imported

tariff

imposed.

tariff classification and not

article

imported contrary to law. He

Unfortunately,

shall submit samples to the

classified

laboratory for analysis when

the customs officer had the chance to examine

before

CMO
the

may
23-2007

article

be
has
even

already
before

it.

In

effect,

unreasonable

classification

in

petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished

application of the

the

petitioner Commissioner ofCustoms went

powers

granted

and Customs Code

with

importation

it

when

by

the

Tariff

to

wheat

regard

no

longer

required

the customs officer's prior examination

and

assessment of the proper classification of the

wheat.

regulation.

is

regulations,

well-settled
which

are

that
the

rules

and

product of a

Finally,

beyond his powers of delegated authority when

the

regulation

limited

the

powers of the customs officer to examine and

assess imported articles.
WHEREFORE,

It

the

in

view of the

foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

delegated power to create new and additional

legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory

Carpio,

Brion,

Perez and Reyes,

JJ., concur.

authority granted by the legislature to the

administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and

||| EN BANC

purposes of the law; and that it be not in

contradiction to, but in conformity with, the

[G.R. No. L-16704. March 17, 1962.]

standards prescribed by law. 23

In

summary,

petitioners

violated

respondent's right to due process in the

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitionerappellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, resp
ondent-appellee.

issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to

observe the requirements under the Revised

Ross, Selph & Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant.

Administrative

Solicitor General and Ernesto Duran for respondent-appellee.

violated

Code.

respondent's

Petitioners
right

to

likewise
equal

protectionof laws when they provided for an

SYLLABUS

law should be construed. Such circular, therefore, did not require presidential
approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN

ADMINISTRATIVE RULE AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION
OF LAW; NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS.
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it makes
"makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it
renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p.
194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the
procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced
by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are
usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details
and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement.

4. ID.; INTERPRETATION OF TERMS OR WORDS; RULE WHEN A TERM

OR WORD IS SPECIFICALLY DEFINED IN A STATUTE. While the rule is
that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their wellaccepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is
specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in
enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular
phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another
meaning for some other purpose.

2. ID.; ID.; BINDING EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES ON COURTS;

REQUISITES. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure
fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory
authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement
with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., pp. 195197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best
merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
3. ID.; ID.; CIRCULAR NO. 22 OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION MERELY AN ADVISORY OPINION
AND NEED NOT BE APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT. Circular No. 22
of the Social Security Commission purports merely to advise employersmembers of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law,
they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon which the social security contributions should be based. It
did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It
merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the

DECISION

BARRERA, J p:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No.
22 of the following tenor.
"Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in
computing the premiums due the System, will take into
consideration and include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as
the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these
will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings,
upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% contributions will be
based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month."
Upon receipt of a copy thereof,
petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote
the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular
as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957
expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the
employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions,

and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a

proper interpretation of the term `compensation' for the purposes of"
such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its
amendment and on the general interpretation of the words
"compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further
questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of
the Social SecurityCommission to promulgate it without the approval of
the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that
Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the
President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere
administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general
policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.
The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a
rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act
1161 empowering theSocial Security Commission "to adopt, amend and
repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative
rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose
enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative
agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the
force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker,
Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and
regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority
conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a
statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction
provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in
general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies
and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of
carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency

entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and
regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit. p. 194.)
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority
granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the
policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit. pp. 195-197). On
the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in
view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining
the term "compensation" contained in Section 8(f) of Republic Act No.
1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows:
"(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment
include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any
medium other than cash except (1) that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500 received during the
month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3)
dismissal and all other payments which the employer
may make, although not legally required to do so."
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:
"(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment
include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any
medium other than cash except that part of the
remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the
month."
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses,
allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay
were expressly excluded or exempted from the definition of the term
"compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the
amendatory law. It thus became necessary for
the SocialSecurity Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or

elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those

concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the
law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or
detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and
circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be
construed.
The case of People vs. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on may 30,
1959) cited by appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in
question is a rule or regulation. What was there said was merely that a
regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. Such statement
simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive
in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law
that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only
interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the
Official Gazette before it could take effect.
The case of People vs. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is
not applicable to the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred
by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding
premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his
employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for
violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27 (e) and (f)
of Republic Act No. 1161.
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employersmembers of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law,
they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon which the social security contributions should be based,
and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in
the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the

amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express
elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses,

allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation"

paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay
must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the
amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that
bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or
compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not
whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether,
after the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such
bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act
after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or
words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning
in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a
particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that
particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may
have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other
purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act
1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the
purposes of this Act".Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting
some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express
substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or
judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should
give way to the clear mandate of the new law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B.
L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.

||| (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. L16704, [March 17, 1962], 114 PHIL 555-561)

B. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-6355-56. August 31, 1953.]
PASTOR
M.
ENDENCIA
and
FERNANDO
JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. SATURNINO DAVID, as
Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P.

Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.

2. ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS. Under our system of

constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the
power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged
with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the
interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws
extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a
law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the
meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the
Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the
two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
3. TAXATION; INCOME TAX; TAXING SALARIES OF
JUDICIAL OFFICERS, A DIMINUTION OF THEIR COMPENSATION
AS FIXED BY LAW. The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer (85 Phil., 552) to the effect that the collection of income tax on
the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution, is reiterated.

DECISION

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TAXATION; INTERPRETATION
OF LAWS, A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. The Legislature cannot lawfully
declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official,
specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the
Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. "Defining and
interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may
not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution."
(Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N.W., 2nd, 341, 342; see also 11 Am.
Jur., 714- 715 and 905.) The act of interpreting the Constitution or any
part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

MONTEMAYOR, J p:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No.
590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as
Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia
the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his
salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to
Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the
income tax collected on his salary from January 1, 1950 to October 19,
1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October

20, 1950 to December 31, 1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do
the same question of law, they were jointly submitted for determination
in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather
exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85
Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice
Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and
therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so
ordered the refund of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and
considering the proposition and the arguments pro and con involved in
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,supra, which are raised, brought up and
presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated
by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of
O'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a
judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so
violates the Constitution. We shall now confine ourselves to a discussion
and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic
Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of
appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress,
because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces
what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of
House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9,
Article VIII of our Constitution:
"SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court
and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years,

or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their

office. They shall receive such compensation as may be
fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand
pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand
pesos."
As already stated construing and applying the above
constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers
are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because
the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution
of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the
Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the
decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No.
590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to
authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of
judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
"SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public
officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by
the Constitution or by law."
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision
interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held
that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such
salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the
Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally
including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is
not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do
this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on

the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of

his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise?
To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental
principles regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative
department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of
the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said
laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to
interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to
interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the
pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to
give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
"Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial
function and the legislative branch may not limit or
restrict the power granted to the courts by the
Constitution." (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N. W., 2nd
341, 342.)
"When it is clear that a statute transgresses the
authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it
is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it
without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the
courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental
law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as
Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in
violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so
adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any
other course would lead to the destruction of the
Constitution. Since the question as to the
constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the
courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon
the suggestion that action might be taken by political

agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial

tribunals." 11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)
"Under the American system of constitutional
government, among the most important functions
intrusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of
Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the
determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature
are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal
and State Constitutions." (11 Am. Jur., 905.)
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No.
590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature
is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and
jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

"The rule is recognized elsewhere that the

legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so
as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not
conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise,
the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in
defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied).
"The legislature cannot, upon passing a law
which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as
to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a
declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate
the constitutional inhibition." (11 Am. Jur., 919,
emphasis supplied).

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of

government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws,
but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the
sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare
what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means,
especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a
judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be
undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different
interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative
department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being
clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional
system of government, particularly those governing the separation of
powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering
the practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on
a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old
system where the income tax was paid at the end of the year or
sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All
that the official who had previously received his full salary was called
upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of
paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received
by him in full, and when he later pays his income tax, especially when
the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may
not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the
amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding
the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax
corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into
equal portions corresponding to the number of paydays during the year
and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday,
said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the
income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a

month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of

the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at P12,000 a year, that is to say,
he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, fifteenth
and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the
Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year.
Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further
dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the
income tax deducted from and collected on his salary each half month.
So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt
from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every
payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of
receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not
therefore clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by
P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with
House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would
seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was
the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme
Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of
patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax on their
salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not
enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all
judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of
inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional
officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the
members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the
Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service
Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compared
to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is
relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers
enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals,
about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830
Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court
and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only

of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership
number more than 990 judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial
officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van
Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):
"The primary purpose of the prohibition against
diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the
clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and
competent men to the bench and to promote that
independence of action and judgment which is essential
to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and
pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to persons and
with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being
its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant,
but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other
words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and
the principle on which it proceeds."
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the
Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk
thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving, as low as
P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by
the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for
each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from
income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the
constitutional exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it
were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose
and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the
constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the
Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution)
regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance
than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries."

When a judicial officer assumes office, he does not exactly ask

for exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It
is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the
fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public
interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought
and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this
exemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited
membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards
of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its
portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the
average, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy,
assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally
he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is
rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more
benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager
salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and
its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real,
substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual
or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public
interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with
the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of
Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the
peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of
the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any
speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in
making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity
and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy
this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on
their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively
for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI,
Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the

payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec.

29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the
Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the
United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation.
(Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of
the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United
States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to
the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income
tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines sent to
Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 815). New
and necessary industries are also exempted from taxation for a certain
number of years. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of
public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by constitutional
provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying
taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the
same it not higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution
deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying
taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation,
thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of

Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax
on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates
the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application
of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such
a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Labrador,

JJ., concur.
||| (Endencia v. David, G.R. Nos. L-6355-56, [August 31, 1953], 93 PHIL 696708)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936.]
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO,
and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere.
2. ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. But it
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be

absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution

has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of various departments of government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is 80 far made a
check on the legislative power that his assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a
bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be,
of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene
the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in
the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of
a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly exercises to a
certain extent control over the judicial department. The Assembly also
exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL
ARBITER TO ALLOCATE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES. But in
the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the
other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the

proper allocation of powers between the several departments and

among the integral or constituent units thereof.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE
JUDICIARY IS GRANTED, IF NOT EXPRESSLY, BY CLEAR
IMPLICATION. As any human production, our Constitution is of
course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within
the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide,
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in
the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language
the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies.
If these restrictions and limitations are transcended, it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by
which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for, then, the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in the Constitution are real as they should be in
any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a
period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY". The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation

assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of

authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under
the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL
LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OR EXPEDIENCY OF
LEGISLATION. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments not only
because the Legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF
PALLADIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY; SUCCESS MUST BE
TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power
provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that,
in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this
blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to
mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their
constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of
our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible
of Filipino minds and hearts than in the consultation rooms and court
chambers.

8. ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE

AMERICAN TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.
Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type
where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the
American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions
prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the
fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would
be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to
assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of
Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
examine the validity of statutes (article 81, chapter IV). The former
Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power.
This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter
of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts 121123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary
laws.
9. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION. The nature of the present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. If the
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, a void would be created
in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive
of the entire framework. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and
authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."

10. ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION; CONSTITUTIONAL

GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION TO BE THE
SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION,
RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY. The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that the
assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par.
1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows:
"That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be
the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members, . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the
Legislature over the particular cases therein specified. This court has
had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate
and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and
complete". (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
11. ELECTORAL COMMISSION; HISTORICAL INSTANCES.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal,
is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government. As
early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of
insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its
members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench
of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with
rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the
practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary
Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary
Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;

Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51],
s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws
of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of
Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee
of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise,
in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were
originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High
Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the
election of members of the Upper House of Diet are to be resolved by
the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par.
6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the
authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly
in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests,
the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the
Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art.
19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art.
43) all provide for an Electoral Commission.
12. ID.; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED
STATES. The creation of an Electoral Commission whose
membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by
no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of
1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by
each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no
adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on
January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp.
227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five
members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice
to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the
commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting
separately. Although there is not much moral lesson to be derived from
the experience of America in this regard, the experiment has at least
abiding historical interest.

13. ID.; ID.; FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH THE HISTORY AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS THE EXPRESSION OF THE
WISDOM AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE. The
members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental
law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. To be
sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they
deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of
their own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers
of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan
was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be
said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of
the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate
justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March
4, 1861.)
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN ITS
TOTALITY POWER EXERCISED PREVIOUSLY BY THE
LEGISLATURE OVER THE CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF THE
MEMBERS TO AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL.
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that
the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections
of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional
precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people
acting through their delegates to the Convention to provide for this body

known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite

body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created,
and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership
three justices of the Supreme Court.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS AN
INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION ALTHOUGH FOR
PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION IT IS CLOSER TO THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT THAN TO ANY OTHER. The Electoral
Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary
authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific
function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in
our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is,
to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The
location of the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission
under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is
very indicative. Its composition is also significant in that it is constituted
by a majority of members of the Legislature. But it is a body separate
from and independent of the Legislature.
16. ID.; ID; ID.; GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE AS COMPLETE AND UNIMPAIRED
AS IF IT HAD REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE. The
grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power
in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that
power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction
upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the constitution
(Ex parte Lewis, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 33 S. D.,
260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If the power claimed for the National Assembly
to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the Electoral Commission to lay down a period within which
protest should be filed were conceded, the grant of power to the

commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such a

case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the
National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body
be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant
inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then
be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of
taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the
necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and
wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse
than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution.
The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in
procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the
Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and,
by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is
obvious that this result should not be permitted.

17. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE

INCIDENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS LODGED ALSO IN THE
ELECTORAL COMMISSION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. The
creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of
construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be

deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the

Electoral Commission.
18. ID; ID.; ID.; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO ARGUMENT
AGAINST GRANT OF POWER. The possibility of abuse is not an
argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that
is not susceptible of abuse. If any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not
judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended
to be corrected by the judiciary. The people in creating the Electoral
Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive
determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as it has given to the
Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to
achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within
its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
animated with same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends
for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of
these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given
instances, is inherent in the imperfections of human institutions. From
the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the
exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however
illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases
over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATIONS. The Commonwealth Government was
inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution,
except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof,
went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on November
25, of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the
petitioner was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest
by the herein respondent against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the

Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on

December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner
to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met;
neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a
matter of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in
the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of
this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the
Supreme Court and the six members of the National Assembly
constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only
on December 4 and 6, 1936. If Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the
National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the
presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly
on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of
regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of
protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself
and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter
entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was
not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY CAN NOT DEPRIVE THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF
ITS AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TIME WITHIN WHICH PROTESTS
AGAINST THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE FILED.
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of
members against whom no protests has been filed at the time of its
passage on December 3, 1936, can not be construed as a limitation
upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might
have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
members of the Legislature at the time the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the
Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission

of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge

of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns
of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to
all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any
member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his
duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper
provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a
seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in
said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted
December 6, 1935).
21. ID.; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION UNDER THE JONES
LAW. Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in
force, each House of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when
protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This
was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each
House the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering
each House respectively to prescribe by resolution the time and manner
of filing contest the election of members of said bodies. As a matter of
formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had
already expired, each House passed a resolution confirming or
approving the returns of such members against whose election no
protest had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as
cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those
members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela],
Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89; Urgello vs.
Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs.
Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period,
pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar
vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First
Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has expressly
repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must

be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that
with the power to determine all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably
linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that
power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provision which
authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election
of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it
could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.

DECISION

LAUREL, J p:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking
further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as
admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National
Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of
votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of
office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in
session assembled, passed the following resolution:
"[No. 8]
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS
DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRAQUIENES NO
SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

"Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los

Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la
presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son
aprobadas y confirmadas.
"Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935."
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro
Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the
only protest filed after the passage of Resolution No. 8 aforequoted, and
praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that
the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
"6. La Comision no considerara ninguna
protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este
dia."
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during

which protests against the election of its members should be presented;

(b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted
formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro
Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is
no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly, after
confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral
Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying
herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following
grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the
power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which
power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the
Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in
pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely
to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to hem for decision
and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral
Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly
has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is,
therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance

appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the
Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United
States) as well as under sections 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2)
of article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves
an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed
an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing
the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested
with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly";
that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as
the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any
member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in
the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the
Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the
powers and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law;
that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion
of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring
itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the
legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions as an instrumentality of
the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and
hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December
3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not
and did not deprive the Electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by
its own rules;

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with

quasi- judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior
tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of
sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which
prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed
an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth following as
his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral
Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing Law fixing the
period within which protests against the election of members of the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power
impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasijudicial attributes;

(f) That the Electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation,

is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms
of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither
under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Article II (should be article
VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance
appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law
(No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) has no application
to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it
was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral
Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits
of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before

the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by
paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

There was no appearance for the other respondents. The

issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following
two principal propositions:

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired

jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties
thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23,
1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act
within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by
means of a writ of prohibition;

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral

Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires

confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its members,
and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within
which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of
jurisdiction over protests filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity
created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions,
whose decisions are final and unappeallable;

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in

excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly
upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction
having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue.
Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our
sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it
undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and

vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of

jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that
the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. For example,
the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws.
This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a
law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote
of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in
special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its
consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all
its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its
power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their
support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a
certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The

overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several

departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the
one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or
political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function
as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by
which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in
any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a
period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.
Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as
the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate

constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the

other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned
to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy
the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is
in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of
power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be
remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself
is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are
authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must
be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis, then,
must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be
tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation
rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution
(No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein
petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission
has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and

qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the

previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If,
as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly
has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to
entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935,
then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is
mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating
its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the
resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission
fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should
be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it
does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our
country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The
Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission
may not be interfered with, when the while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting
claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by
the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English
type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers
of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written

constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In

some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts
from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken
as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence
of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their
function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of
statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a
similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this
respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway,
Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2
and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak
Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are
established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if
the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be
thus created in our constitutional system which may in the long run
prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to
answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in
our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are
clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case,
this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now
proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether
the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in

assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of

the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof
by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the
petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of
section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of

three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and
three by the party having the second largest number of votes herein.
The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and
history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its
framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly
appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the
assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . .." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1)
modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows:
"That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be
the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members, . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the
Legislature over the particular cases therein specified. This court has
had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate
and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete"
(Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil.,
886, 888.).

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal

for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was
taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which subcommittee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the
creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear
protests not only against the election of members of the legislature but
also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote
of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment
proceedings against specified executive and judicial officers. For the
purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed
of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of
the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three
members to be designated by the majority party and three by the
minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief
Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The
foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight
modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation
to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from
the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be
designated one each from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive
department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by
the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also
preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24,
1934, subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:
"The elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of either House and all cases contesting the
election of any of their members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by
three members elected by the members of the party
having the largest number of votes therein, three elected

by the members of the party having the second largest

number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice."
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with
comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish
plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon
abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative
Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific
and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as an Electoral Commission.
The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on
Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the
project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The
draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads
as follows:
"(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be
judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest number
of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
presided over by one of said justices."
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by
Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the
whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the sole and exclusive judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the
following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention
in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
xxx xxx xxx

"Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as

to the scope of the meaning of the first four
lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft,
reading: 'The elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly and all cases contesting the election
of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ..' I should like to ask
from the gentleman from Capiz whether the
election and qualification of the member whose
election is not contested shall also be judged
by the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of
the members, there is nothing to be judged;
that is why the word 'judge' is used to indicate a
controversy. If there is no question about the
election of a member, there is nothing to be
submitted to the Electoral Commission and
there is nothing to be determined.
"Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that
the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those who election is not
contested?.
"Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the
gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its
members is just a matter of the rules of the
assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not
necessary. After a man files his credentials that
be has been elected, that is sufficient, unless
his election is contested.
"Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is
sufficient, as we have observed that for
purposes of the auditor, in the matter of

election of a member to a legislative body,

because he will not authorize his pay.
"Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the
municipal president who is elected? What
happens with regards to the councilors of a
municipality? Does anybody confirm their
election? The municipal council does this: it
makes a canvass and proclaims-in this case
the municipal council proclaims who has been
elected, and it ends there, unless there is a
contest. It is the same case; there is no need
on the part of the Electoral Commission unless
there is a contest. The first clause refers to the
case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite
where one person tries to be elected in place of
another who was declared elected. For
example, in a case when the residence of the
man who has been elected is in question, or in
case the citizenship of the man who has been
elected is in question.
"However, if the assembly desires to annul the
power of the commission, it may do so by certain
maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are
submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the
Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the
assembly referring to the elections, returns and
qualifications of the members. When there is no contest,
there is nothing to be judged.
"Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
"Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr.
Delegate.
"Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as
that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos
Norte when I arose a while ago. However I

want to ask more questions from the delegate

from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the
draft cites cases contesting the election as
separate from the first part of the section which
refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
"Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact
the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase 'the elections, returns
and qualifications.' This phrase 'and contested
elections' was inserted merely for the sake of
clarity.
"Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the
Electoral Commission, at its own instance,
refuse to confirm the election of the members?.
"Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
"Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman
yield? .
"THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so
desires.

"Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

"Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz
believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion
does not have the right to contest the election
and qualification of its members?
"Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is
right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if twothirds of the assembly believe that a member
has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only

be retained by the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
"Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the
qualification of the members.
"Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
"Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of
the assembly has the right to question the
eligibility of its members?.
"Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the
eligibility, he must go to the Electoral
Commission and make the question before the
Electoral Commission.
"Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission
shall decide whether the election is contested
or not contested.
"Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
"Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed
if the Electoral Commission has power and
authority to pass upon the qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly even
though that question has not been raised.
"Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power,
because they can only judge."
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft
reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee
in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco,
Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the
difference between the original draft and the draft as amended,
Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
xxx xxx xxx

"Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste

solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por
varios Delegados al efecto to que la primera
clausula del draft que dice: 'The election,
returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly' parece que da a la
Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar
tambin la eleccion de los miembros que no
han sido protestados y para obviar esa
dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tiene
razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft,
de tal modo que se lea como sigue: 'All cases
contesting the election', de modo que los
jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran
solamente a los casos en que haya habido
protesta contra las actas." Before the
amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted
upon the following interpellation also took
place:
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda,
quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomit de
Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Qu dice el Comit?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres
miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria
y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cre Su Seoria
que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el
asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Cremos que si el tribunal o la
Comision esta constituido en esa forma, tanto
los miembros de la mayoria como los de la
minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte
Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la

base de sus mritos, sabiendo que el

partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso
como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran
del partidismo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les
daria el triunfo."
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo
and others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of
ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.)
sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority
party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two
members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority
party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six
(76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of
the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read
as follows:
"(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
composed of three members elected by the party having
the largest number of votes in the National Assembly,
three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices."

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised

it as follows:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral
Commission composed of three Justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of
six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of
whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior
Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly."
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on
February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to
effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the
phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the
words "the election", which was accordingly accepted by the
Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal,
is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies
(ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the
"scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the
disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following
passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed
memorandum of March 14, 1936:
"153. From the time when the commons
established their right to be the exclusive judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their members,
until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed,
in the determination of controverted elections, and rights

of membership. One of the standing committee

appointed at the commencement of each session, was
denominated the committee of privileges and elections,
whose function was to hear and investigate all questions
of this description which might be referred to them, and
to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon,
to the house, from time to time. When an election
petition was referred to this committee, they heard the
parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and
made a report of all the evidence, together with their
opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were
considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house.
The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the
bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the
case was heard and decided by the house, in
substantially the same manner as by a committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select
committee was usually what is called an open one; that
is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum
of the members named was required to be present, but
all the members of the house were at liberty to attend
the committee and vote if they pleased.
"154. With the growth of political parties in
parliament questions relating to the right of membership
gradually assumed a political character; so that for many
years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections
had been tried and determined by the house of
commons, as mere party questions, upon which the
strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus,
for example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated
attacks upon his government, resigned his office in
consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham
election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election,
cases, as conducted under this system, that 'Every
principle of decency and justice were notoriously and

openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the

house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to
adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious
matters, and in questions of higher importance to the
public welfare.' Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished
member of the house of commons, undertook to
propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March
1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to
bring in a bill, 'to regulate the trial of controverted
elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament.'
In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for
leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the
following terms: 'Instead of trusting to the merits of their
respective causes, the principal dependence of both
parties is their private interest among us; and it is
scandalously notorious that we are an earnestly
canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if
we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the
principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of
our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every
contested election, many members of this house, who
are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity
between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in
the contention, and take upon themselves the partial
management of the very business, upon which they
should determine with the strictest impartiality.'

"155. It was to put an end to the practices thus

described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met
with the approbation of both houses, and received the
royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the
celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville
Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it 'was one of the
noblest works, for the honor of the house of commons,
and the security of the constitution, that was ever

devised by any minister or statesman.' It is probable,

that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success
of the remedy, may have led many of the
contemporaries of the measure to the information of a
judgment, which was not acquiesced in by some of the
leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely
confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was
objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief
justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who
had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James
Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the
new system was an essential alteration of the
constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one
of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the
house of commons."
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved
the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted
elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of
the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in
accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict.
c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 [46 & 47
Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5,
c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the
Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by
the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the
courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests
which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in
the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests
against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to
be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916,
chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921
(art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922

(art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or
National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding
legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1,
1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of
February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic
of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is
recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means
unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there
was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of
the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate
provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January
29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five
members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice
to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the
commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting
separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived
from the experience of America in this regard, judging from the
observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the
part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the
United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany,
1913]-Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.),
the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and
political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore,
they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a
constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing
upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in
the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience
of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral

Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers

of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan,
as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98
against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the
Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression
of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln,
First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is
evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It
was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted
the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide
for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view,
a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are
equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested
with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the
limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the
Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department"
of our Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in
that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is
a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired

as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of

that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective
a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman,
36 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in
behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed,
the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral
Commission in such case would be invested with the power to
determine contested cases involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all
times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would
the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority
would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time
to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases
referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that
authority effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has
chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by
the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the
Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the
learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and
necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the National
Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of
according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be
practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of
protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have
pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission

carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit

the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the

petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority
by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of
the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National
Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of
abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not
judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended
to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in
creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this
body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it,
as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted
to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by
the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional
organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action
must be deemed to be animated with the same zealand honesty in
accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the

sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might

leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the
imperfections of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that
the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of
its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which
the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the
present case, there are considerations of equitable character that should
not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the
provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect.
The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year,
and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, was approved by that body on December 3, 11935. The protest
by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do
not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it
does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met
for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last
day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National
Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body has
actually been organized. As a matter of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National
Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the
petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court and the six members
of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were
respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution
No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of
members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling
the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the
National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the

incidental power of regulation in such cases had already barred the

presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time
to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed
in a matter entrusted to is exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This
result was not and could not have been contemplated,and should be
avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been
filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election
contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at
the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in
the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority
incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members
against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in
its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the
Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers
is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly
and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules
of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of
Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is
neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat.
The return of the proper election officers in sufficient, and the memberelect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member
from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12,

pp. 331, 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26).
Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the
decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the
judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the
Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being
informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter
the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming
or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for
carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require
(31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the
order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as
sufficient, without any actual alteration or amendment of the return
(Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec.
166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still
force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when
protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This
was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering
each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner
of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies. As a matter of
formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had
already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or
approving the returns of such members against whose election no
protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted
as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those
members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela],
Second Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period, p. 89; Urgello vs.
Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs.
Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period,
pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs.
Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record-First Period,
vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18

of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have
been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to
determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority
to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus
no law nor constitutional provision which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the
time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And
what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by
indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the legislative, the
executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation
of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments
and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally
to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and
duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent

constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and
perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to
any of the other two departments of the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the
Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass
upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly
were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the
manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not
only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No.
3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and
manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party,and bond or bonds, to be
required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of

its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against the
election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December
3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the
character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and
as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral
Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within
the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Diaz, Concepcion and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election

of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not,
is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably

expressed in the preceding opinion. I am, however, constrained to
withhold my assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election

of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said

The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the

Constitution of judging of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is judicial in

nature. (Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On
the other hand, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a
contested election may be given, is legislative in character. (M'Elmoyle
vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U.
S., 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.).
It has been correctly stated that the government established by
the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of the separation of
powers into legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is
vested in the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of
any clear constitutional provision to the contrary, the power to regulate
the time in which notice of a contested election may be given, must be
deemed to be included in the grant of legislative power to the National
Assembly.
The Constitution of the United States contains a provision
similar to that found in Article VI, section 4, of the Constitution of the
Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States
provides that each house of the Congress shall be the judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has assumed the power to
regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given.
Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code Annotated
prescribes:
"Whenever any person intends to contest an
election of any Member of the House of Representatives
of the united States, he shall, within thirty days after the
result of such election shall have been determined by
the office or board of canvassers authorized by law to
determine the same, give notice, in writing, to the
Member whose seat he designs to contest, of his
intention to contest the same, and, in such notice, shall
specify particularly the grounds upon which he relies in
the contest." (R.S., par. 105.)
The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones
Law, also contained a provision to the effect that the Senate and House

of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the

elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Philippine Legislature passed the
Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:
"The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall by resolution respectively prescribe the time and
manner of filing contest in the election of members of
said bodies, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any,
and shall fix the costs and expenses of contest which
may be paid from their respective funds."
The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the
Electoral Commission was not to erect a body that would be above the
law, but to raise legislative election contests from the category of
political to that of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place
the commission beyond the reach of the law, but to insure the
determination of such contests with due process of law.
Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, Article XV, section 2, of which provides that

"All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue

in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National
Assembly, and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution."
The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to
insure the orderly processes of government, and to prevent any hiatus in
its operation after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands

shall remain operative even after the inauguration of the Commonwealth

of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all
references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippine
Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
government and corresponding officials under the Constitution. It would
seem to be consistent not only with the spirit but with the letter of the
Constitution to hold that section 478 of the Election Law remains
operative and should now be construed to refer to the Electoral
Commission, which, in so far as the power to judge election contests is
concerned, corresponds to either the Senate or the House of
Representatives under the former regime. It is important to observe in
this connection that said section 478 of the Election Law vested the
power to regulate the time and manner in which notice of a contested
election may be given, not in the Philippine Legislature but in the Senate
and House of Representatives singly. In other words, the authority to
prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the election of
members of the Philippine Legislature was by statute lodged separately
in the bodies clothed with power to decide such contests. Construing
section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as
required by Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe the time and
manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National
Assembly is vested in the Electoral Commission, which is now the body
clothed with power to decide such contests.
In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National
Assembly of December 3, 1935, could not have the effect of barring the
right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of the
petitioner. By the same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized
by law to adopt its resolution of December 9, 1935, which fixed the time
within which written written contests must be filed with the commission.

Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolution, the
Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hear and determine the contest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner Jose A.
Angara. Writ denied.

||| (Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, [July 15, 1936], 63
PHIL 139-187)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.]
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA,
IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO
ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR
YIGUEZ
and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA),
represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
RAUL
MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY
ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL
RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary,
Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner,
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff,
respectively, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RETURN TO
ONE'S COUNTRY, NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED. The
right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and
the right to travel.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY
ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. It is the court's wellconsidered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution,is part of
the law of the land [Art. II Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN, DISTINCT AND SEPARATE FROM THE
RIGHT TO TRAVEL. It is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
4. ID.; ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE THREE BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT A GRANT OF ALL THE POWERS INHERENT THERETO.
As the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)]
pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative
power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial
power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.] If this
can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with
a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the
judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said
of the executive power which is vested in one official the President.
5. ID.; PRESIDENT'S POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
EXTENT AND LIMITATION. Consideration of tradition and the
development of presidential power under the different constitutions are
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the
President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. Although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the

scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot

be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.
6. ID.; PRESIDENT'S RESIDUAL POWER TO PROTECT THE GENERAL
WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE; THE POWERS INVOLVED. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of
the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the
people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the
President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. The President
is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is
also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; REQUEST TO BE
ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES; TO BE TREATED AS
ADDRESSED TO THE RESIDUAL UNSTATED POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel,
subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.
8. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; POWER TO DETERMINE GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON ANY BRANCH OR
INSTRUMENTALITY
OF
THE
GOVERNMENT.

The present

Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show
that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did
not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
action is being questioned.
9. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL OF
REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES, NOT A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. We find that from the pleadings filed
by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the
briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and
respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's
decision. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their
followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in
this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the
State and instigate more chaos. With these before her, the President cannot
be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; ITS PROVISIONS PROTECT
ALL MEN, AT ALL TIMES AND UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. "The
Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace,
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times,
and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious
consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281 [1866]).

2. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTIONS; OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL

DETERMINATION. It is a well-settled doctrine that political questions are
not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal
with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase
political question, nor to determine what matters fall within its scope. It is
frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the
judicial power. More properly, however, it means those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
4. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL POWER VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE
PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS, BEYOND PROHIBITION OR EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT REQUIRED FOR ITS EXISTENCE. For a political
question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested
exclusively in the President or Congress, the exercise of which the court
should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary or inherent power against
a civil right which claim is not found in a specific provision is dangerous.
Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public officials to
strike where they please and to override everything which to them represents
evil. The entire Government is bound by the rule of law. The authority implied
in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist because no law has
been enacted specifying the circumstances when the right may be impaired
in the interest of national security or public safety. The power is in Congress,
not the Executive.
5. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; RIGHT TO TRAVEL
INCLUDES RIGHT TO TRAVEL OUT OF OR BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES.
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of abode
and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be
impaired only upon a lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not
even by the President. Section 6 further provides that the right to travel, and
this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines,

cannot be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or

public health, as may be provided by law.
6. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE NO LONGER UTILIZED BY THE
COURT; COURT COMPELLED TO DECIDE THE CASE UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION. The framers of the Constitution believed that the free
use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos
years to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues,
momentousness of consequences or a fear that it was extravagantly
extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike
down an exercise of authoritarian power. Parenthetically, at least two of the
respondents and their counsel were among the most vigorous critics of Mr.
Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of the political question
doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded
by its mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a
convenient resort to the political question doctrine. We are compelled to
decide what would have been non-justiceable under our decisions
interpreting earlier fundamental charters.

7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL A GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION. We do not have to look into the factual bases
of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not the
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall
back upon judicial notice of the implications of a Marcos return to his home
to buttress a conclusion. In the first place, there has never been a
pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national
security and public safety will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed
to return to the Philippines. It was only after the present petition was filed that
the alleged danger to national security and public safety conveniently
surfaced in the respondents' pleadings. Secondly, President Aquino herself
limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to (1) national welfare and
interest and (2) the continuing need to preserve the gains achieved in terms
of recovery and stability. Neither ground satisfies the criteria of national
security and public safety. The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor General or
what the majority calls "catalytic effect," which alone sustains the claim of

danger to national security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult

problem or any troublesome person can be substituted for the Marcos threat
as the catalysing factor. It was precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the
right to travel by Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of
other "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate
period which led the framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact
but to strengthen the declaration of this right.

DECISION

CORTES, J p:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other
aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into
exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the
Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and
consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel
coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television
station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of
"Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to
surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft
chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987]
awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from
afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country.
The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people
power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs.
Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the
government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major

players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of
people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other
armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the
same a split in the ranks of the military establishment that threatened
civilian supremacy over the military and brought to the fore the realization
that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided
elements in the military establishment and among rabid followers of Mr.
Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency and the secessionist
movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos,
to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their
own in the areas they effectively control while the separatists are virtually
free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up in these
groups' determination to wrest power from the government. Not only through
resort to arms but also through the use of propaganda have they been
successful in creating chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign
debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies
left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years
after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in
alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the
nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and
his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of
political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short
space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the
resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return
of former President Marcos and his family to the
Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar
former President Marcos and his family from returning to
the Philippines, in the interest of "national security,
public safety or public health"
a. Has the President made a finding
that the return of former President Marcos and
his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public
safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that
finding,
(1) Have the
requirements of due process
been complied with in making
such finding?

(2) Has there been

prior notice to petitioners?
(3) Has there been a
hearing?
(4) Assuming that
notice and hearing may be
dispensed with, has the
President's decision, including
the grounds upon which it was
based, been made known to
petitioners so that they may
controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that
the return of former President Marcos and his
family to the Philippines is a clear and present
danger to national security, public safety, or
public health a political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may
inquire as to whether the return of former
President Marcos and his family is a clear and
present danger to national security, public
safety, or public health, have respondents
established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the
President's decision to bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting
without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which
would effectively bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum
for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.]

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the
limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that
before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect. llcd
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr.
Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each
state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had
been ratified by the Philippines, provides:

Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including
his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to
any restrictions except those which are provided by law,
are necessary to protect national security, public order
(order public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other
rights recognized in the present Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to

enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in
this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. According to
the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply
whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
family have the right to travel and liberty of abode.
Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in
vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the
issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos
and family have the right to return to the Philippines and
reside here at this time in the face of the determination
by the President that such return and residence will
endanger national security and public safety.

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners,

the question is not a political question as it involves
merely a determination of what the law provides on the
matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand
E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether
the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more
primordial and transcendental right of the State to
security and safety of its nationals, the question
becomes political and this Honorable Court can not
consider it. cdrep
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the
right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question
which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have
their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish
their residence here even if their return and residence
here will endanger national security and public safety?
This is still a justiciable question which this Honorable
Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return
to the Philippines and establish their residence here?
This is now a political question which this Honorable
Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive
authority and competence of the President of the
Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11;
Rollo, pp. 297-299.]

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve
and protect the people. The Government may call upon
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil
service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his
family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and
public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, Anastacio Somoza, Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala,
Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were
among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was
prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary
Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32;
Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of
presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different
light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues,
we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the
controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the
confines of the right to travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt.
1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt. 2766, 69 L

Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to
the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These
are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement
and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration
speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from the "right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right to "be free to
leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be
restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public
order, public health or morals or the separate rights and freedoms of others."
[Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of which
one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country
in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right
to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law
and, under our Constitution,is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases of Kent and Haig, which refer to the issuance
of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not

determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they
relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in
Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence. Cdpr
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether
or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of
legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its
resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to
explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will
involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the
President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the
express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1,
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined
that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power
means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power
means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government." [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power which
is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than
two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a
hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is
vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it
does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the
commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the
power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties
or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress,
and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23]. LLphil

Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the
three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel
in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the
Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government." [At 157.] Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
"[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines"
[Art. VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art.
VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by
actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer
plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations
provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v.

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the

President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers
the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view
that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated
powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius." [Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4; Rollo p. 233.] This
argument brings to mind the institution of the U. S. Presidency after which
ours is legally patterned. **
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States
grappled with the same problem. He said:

Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the

Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought
to settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare;
by the same token, to those who think that constitution
makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future
play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article II in its
opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America." . . . [The
President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the
different persons who held the office from Washington to the early 1900's,
and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship,
he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends
in important measure on who is President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger, who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal
institution. It remained, of course, an agency of
government subject to unvarying demands and duties
no matter who was President. But, more than most
agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and
ethos according to the man in charge. Each President's
distinctive temperament and character, his values,
standards,
style,
his
habits,
expectations,
idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the White
House and pervaded the entire government. The
executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon,
taking its color from the character and personality of the
President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the
constitutional order, therefore altered from President to
President. Above all, the way each President understood
it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the
Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the

electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and

posterity determined whether he strengthened or
weakened the constitutional order. [At 212-213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she
does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the development of
presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a
complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's
powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong
President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973
Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the
parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through
numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the
point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution,
however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored
the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for
checks and balances.LexLib
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the
power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head
of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the
office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not
involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot
be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark
decision ofSpringer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines
and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to
elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National
Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the GovernorGeneral to do so, said:
. . . Here the members of the legislature who constitute
a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively,
are not charged with the performance of any legislative
functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the legislature.
Putting aside for the moment the question whether the
duties devolved upon these members are vested by the
Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they
are not legislative in character, and still more clear that
they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within
the authority of either of these two constitutes logical
ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the
remaining one among which the powers of government
are divided . . . [At 202-203; emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring
words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a
folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what
are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not
establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that

however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not
and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative
and executive action with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into watertight compartments, were
it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from
believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.[At
210-211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty
of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such
does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making
any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider
these principles, among other things, and adhere to them. prcd
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a
decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to
protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It
must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of
power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers
of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and
the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone

that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority

emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who
seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at
whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of
dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The
constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For
the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression,
although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to
the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1988].
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and
the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The
power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward
of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of
the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand
[See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to
preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power
implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances
the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any
government and is best lodged in the President].

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as
protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of
the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe

appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers
that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial
law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses
from returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is
manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and
signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to
return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national
reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under theConstitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not
question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to
allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses
to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied. llcd
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot agree with
the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's
jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for
Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum.
We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may
appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to
us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we
amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before
us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination
thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts
of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If
grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by
law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the
second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining
"judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental
law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971,
42 SCRA 448] that:

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the

Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant
to the principle of separation of powers underlying our
system of government, the Executive is supreme within
his own sphere. However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it
goes hand in hand with the system of checks and
balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and
when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the
Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not
he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department,
which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally
supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the
Court is merely to check not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act .. [At 479-480.].
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there
exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such
postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or
that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented,
there exist factual bases for the President's decision.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the
country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist

insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab

power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police
officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history
of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country,
as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of
the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be
contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it could
handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of
the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that
would break the camel's back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily
and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the
Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will
cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for
the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted
her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State,
acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive
action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is
the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the
fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order.
The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the
faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility. LLjur
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning
to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy
attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of
whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country,
while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its
efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in

foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing

burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during
the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of
the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting
precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily
within the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return
of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few
years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual
and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with
that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President
did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and
under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gancayco,

Grio-Aquino,

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., concurring:
"The threats to national security and public order are real - the mounting
Communist insurgency, a simmering separatist movement, a restive
studentry, widespread labor disputes, militant farmer groups. . . . Each of

these threats is an explosive ingredient in a steaming cauldron which could

blow up if not handled properly." 1
These are not my words. They belong to my distinguished colleague in the
Court, Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. But they express eloquently the
basis of my full concurrence to the exhaustive and well-written ponencia of
Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes.
Presidential powers and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not
derived solely from a particular constitutional clause or article or from an
express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to depend on the imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law. History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded
to the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and
imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers:
"residual," "inherent," "moral," "implied," "aggregate," "emergency." Whatever
they may be called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must if the
governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively
and efficiently. It is in this context that the power of the President to allow or
disallow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines should be viewed. By
reason of its impact on national peace and order in these admittedly critical
times, said question cannot be withdrawn from the competence of the
Executive Branch to decide.
And indeed, the return of the deposed President, his wife and children
cannot but pose a clear and present danger to public order and safety. One
needs only to recall the series of destabilizing actions attempted by the socalled Marcos loyalists as well as the ultra-rightist groups during the EDSA
Revolution's aftermath to realize this. The most publicized of these
offensives is the Manila Hotel incident which occurred barely five (5) months
after the People's Power Revolution. Around 10,000 Marcos supporters,
backed by 300 loyalist soldiers led by Brigadier General Jose Zumel and Lt.
Col. Reynaldo Cabauatan converged at the Manila Hotel to witness the oathtaking of Arturo Tolentino as acting president of the Philippines. The public
disorder and peril to life and limb of the citizens engendered by this event
subsided only upon the eventual surrender of the loyalist soldiers to the
authorities.

Then followed the Channel 7, Sangley, Villamor, Horseshoe Drive and Camp
Aguinaldo incidents. Military rebels waged simultaneous offensives in
different parts of Metro Manila and Sangley Point in Cavite. A hundred rebel
soldiers took over Channel 7 and its radio station DZBB. About 74 soldier
rebels attacked Villamor Air Base, while another group struck at Sangley
Point in Cavite and held the 15th Air Force Strike wing commander and his
deputy hostage. Troops on board several vehicles attempted to enter Gate 1
of Camp Aguinaldo even as another batch of 200 soldiers encamped at
Horseshoe Village.
Another destabilization plot was carried out in April, 1987 by enlisted
personnel who forced their way through Gate 1 of Fort Bonifacio. They
stormed into the army stockade but having failed to convince their
incarcerated members to unite in their cause, had to give up nine (9) hours
later.
And who can forget the August 28, 1987 coup attempt which almost toppled
the Aquino Government? Launched not by Marcos loyalists, but by another
ultra-rightist group in the military led by Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan who
remains at large to date, this most serious attempt to wrest control of the
government resulted in the death of many civilians.
Members of the so-called Black Forest Commando were able to cart away
high-powered firearms and ammunition from the Camp Crame Armory
during a raid conducted in June 1988. Most of the group members were,
however, captured in Antipolo, Rizal. The same group was involved in an
unsuccessful plot known as Oplan Balik Saya which sought the return of
Marcos to the country.
A more recent threat to public order, peace and safety was the attempt of a
group named CEDECOR to mobilize civilians from nearby provinces to act
as blockading forces at different Metro Manila areas for the projected link-up
of Marcos military loyalist troops with the group of Honasan. The pseudo
"people power" movement was neutralized thru checkpoints set up by the
authorities along major road arteries where the members were arrested or
forced to turn back. cdrep

While not all of these disruptive incidents may be traced directly to the
Marcoses, their occurrence militates heavily against the wisdom of allowing
the Marcoses' return. Not only will the Marcoses' presence embolden their
followers toward similar actions, but any such action would be seized upon
as an opportunity by other enemies of the State, such as the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the NPA's, the Muslim secessionists and
extreme rightists of the RAM, to wage an offensive against the government.
Certainly, the state through its executive branch has the power, nay, the
responsibility and obligation, to prevent a grave and serious threat to its
safety from arising.
Apparently lost amidst the debate on whether or not to allow the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines is one factor, which albeit, at first blush appears to
be extra legal, constitutes a valid justification for disallowing the requested
return. I refer to the public pulse. It must be remembered that the ouster of
the Marcoses from the Philippines came about as an unexpected, but
certainly welcomed, result of the unprecedented "people's power" revolution.
Millions of our people braved military tanks and firepower, kept vigil, prayed,
and in countless manner and ways contributed time, effort and money to put
an end to an evidently untenable claim to power of a dictator. The removal of
the Marcoses from the Philippines was a moral victory for the Filipino people;
and the installation of the present administration, a realization of and
obedience to the people's will.
Failing in legal arguments for the allowance of the Marcoses' return, appeal
is being made to sympathy, compassion and even Filipino tradition. The
political and economic gains we have achieved during the past three years
are however too valuable and precious to gamble away on purely
compassionate considerations. Neither could public peace, order and safety
be sacrificed for an individual's wish to die in his own country. Verily in the
balancing of interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential prerogative,
which we do not find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily exercised, to
ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

"The Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in

war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes
of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving
more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man
than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281
[1866]).
Since our days as law students, we have proclaimed the stirring words of Ex
Parte Milligan as self-evident truth. But faced with a hard and delicate case,
we now hesitate to give substance to their meaning. The Court has permitted
a basic freedom enshrined in the Bill of Rights to be taken away by
Government.
There is only one Bill of Rights with the same interpretation of liberty and the
same guarantee of freedom for both unloved and despised persons on one
hand and the rest who are not so stigmatized on the other.
I am, therefore, disturbed by the majority ruling which declares that it should
not be a precedent. We are interpreting the Constitution for only one person
and constituting him into a class by himself. The Constitution is a law for all
classes of men at all times. To have a person as one class by himself
smacks of unequal protection of the laws.
With all due respect for the majority in the Court, I believe that the issue
before us is one of rights and not of power. Mr. Marcos is insensate and
would not live if separated from the machines which have taken over the
functions of his kidneys and other organs. To treat him at this point as one
with full panoply of power against whom the forces of Government should be
marshalled is totally unrealistic. The Government has the power to arrest and
punish him. But does it have the power to deny him his right to come home
and die among familiar surroundings?
Hence, this dissent.
The Bill of Rights provides:

"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same

within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied, Section 6, Art.
III, Constitution)

To have the petition dismissed, the Solicitor General repeats a ritual

invocation of national security and public safety which is hauntingly familiar
because it was pleaded so often by petitioner Ferdinand E. Marcos to justify
his acts under martial law. There is, however, no showing of the existence of
a law prescribing the limits of the power to impair and the occasions for its
exercise. And except for citing breaches of law and order, the more serious
of which were totally unrelated to Mr. Marcos and which the military was able
to readily quell, the respondents have not pointed to any grave exigency
which permits the use of untrammeled Governmental power in this case and
the indefinite suspension of the constitutional right to travel.
The respondents' basic argument is that the issue before us is a political
question beyond our jurisdiction to consider. They contend that the decision
to ban former President Marcos, and his family on grounds of national
security and public safety is vested by the Constitution in the President
alone. The determination should not be questioned before this Court. The
President's finding of danger to the nation should be conclusive on the
Court.
What is a political question?
In Vera v. Avelino (77 Phil. 192, 223 [1946], the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
"It is a well-settled doctrine that political
questions are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal

with such questions has been conferred on the

courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions. It is not so easy, however, to define
the phrase political question, nor to determine
what matters fall within its scope. It is frequently
used to designate all questions that lie outside
the scope of the judicial power. More properly,
however, it means those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government."
We defined a political question in Taada v. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051, 1066
[1957[), as follows: LexLib
"'In short, the term 'political question' connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of
Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."
The most often quoted definition of political question was made by Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., who penned the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr (369 US 186, 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663
[1962]). The ingredients of a political question as formulated in Baker v.
Carr are:
"It is apparent that several formulations which vary
slightly according to the settings in which the questions
arise may describe a political question, which identifies it

as essentially a function of the separation of powers.

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question."
For a political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power
vested exclusively in the President or Congress, the exercise of which the
court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary or inherent power
against a civil right which claim is not found in a specific provision is
dangerous. Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public
officials to strike where they please and to override everything which to them
represents evil. The entire Government is bound by the rule of law.
The respondents have not pointed to any provision of the Constitution which
commits or vests the determination of the question raised to us solely in the
President.
The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist
because no law has been enacted specifying the circumstances when the
right may be impaired in the interest of national security or public safety. The
power is in Congress, not the Executive.
The closest resort to a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
power may be found in the commander-in-chief clause which allows the
President to call out the armed forces in case of lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or

proclaim martial law in the event of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it.
There is, however, no showing, not even a claim that the followers of former
President Marcos are engaging in rebellion or that he is in a position to lead
them. Neither is it claimed that there is a need to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law because of the arrival of Mr.
Marcos and his family. To be sure, there may be disturbances but not of a
magnitude as would compel this Court to resort to a doctrine of nonjusticeability and to ignore a plea for the enforcement of an express Bill of
Rights guarantee.
The respondents themselves are hardpressed to state who or what
constitutes a Marcos "loyalist." The constant insinuations that the "loyalist"
group is heavily funded by Mr. Marcos and his cronies and that the "loyalists"
engaging in rallies and demonstrations have to be paid individual allowances
to do so constitute the strongest indication that the hard core "loyalists" who
would follow Marcos right or wrong are so few in number that they could not
possibly destabilize the government, much less mount a serious attempt to
overthrow it. LibLex
Not every person who would allow Mr. Marcos to come home can be tagged
a "loyalist." It is in the best of Filipino customs and traditions to allow a dying
person to return to his home and breath his last in his native surroundings.
Out of the 103 Congressmen who passed the House resolution urging
permission for his return, there are those who dislike Mr. Marcos intensely or
who suffered under his regime. There are also many Filipinos who believe
that in the spirit of national unity and reconciliation Mr. Marcos and his family
should be permitted to return to the Philippines and that such a return would
deprive his fanatic followers of any further reason to engage in rallies and
demonstrations.
The Court, however, should view the return of Mr. Marcos and his family
solely in the light of the constitutional guarantee of liberty of abode and the
citizen's right to travel as against the respondents' contention that national
security and public safety would be endangered by a grant of the petition.

Apart from the absence of any text in the Constitution committing the issue
exclusively to the President, there is likewise no dearth of decisional data, no
unmanageable standards which stand in the way of a judicial determination.
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of abode
and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be
impaired only upon a lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not
even by the President. Section 6 further provides that the right to travel, and
this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines,
cannot be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
There is no law setting the limits on a citizen's right to move from one part of
the country to another or from the Philippines to a foreign country or from a
foreign country to the Philippines. The laws cited by the Solicitor General
immigration, health, quarantine, passports, motor vehicle, destierro,
probation, and parole are all inapplicable insofar as the return of Mr.
Marcos and family is concerned. There is absolutely no showing how any of
these statutes and regulations could serve as a basis to bar their coming
home.
There is also no disrespect for a Presidential determination if we grant the
petition. We would simply be applying the Constitution, in the preservation
and defense of which all of us in Government, the President and Congress
included, are sworn to participate. Significantly, the President herself has
stated that the Court has the last word when it comes to constitutional
liberties and that she would abide by our decision.
As early as 1983, it was noted that this Court has not been very receptive to
the invocation of the political question doctrine by government lawyers. (See
Morales, Jr. v. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983]).
Many of those now occupying the highest positions in the executive
departments, Congress, and the judiciary criticized this Court for using what
they felt was a doctrine of convenience, expediency, utility
or subservience. Every major challenge to the acts of petitioner Ferdinand E.
Marcos under his authoritarian regime the proclamation of martial law, the

ratification of a new constitution, the arrest and detention of "enemies of the

State" without charges being filed against them, the dissolution of Congress
and the exercise by the President of legislative powers, the trial of civilians
for civil offenses by military tribunals, the seizure of some of the country's
biggest corporations, the taking over or closure of newspaper offices, radio
and television stations and other forms of media, the proposals to amend the
Constitution, etc. was invariably met by an invocation that the petition
involved a political question. It is indeed poetic justice that the political
question doctrine so often invoked by then President Marcos to justify his
acts is now being used against him and his family. Unfortunately, the Court
should not and is not allowed to indulge in such a persiflage. We are bound
by the Constitution.

The dim view of the doctrine's use was such that when the present
Constitution was drafted, a broad definition of judicial power was added to
the vesting in the Supreme Court and statutory courts of said power.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
This new provision was enacted to preclude this Court from using the
political question doctrine as a means to avoid having to make decisions
simply because they are too controversial, displeasing to the President
or Congress, inordinately unpopular, or which may be ignored and not
enforced.
The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political
question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on
prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of

consequences or a fear that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in

the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of
authoritarian power. Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their
counsel were among the most vigorous critics of Mr. Marcos (the main
petitioner) and his use of the political question doctrine. The Constitution was
accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its mandate from refusing to
invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the political
question doctrine. We are compelled to decide what would have been nonjusticeable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.
This is not to state that there can be no more political questions which we
may refuse to resolve. There are still some political questions which only the
President, Congress, or a plebiscite may decide. Definitely, the issue before
us is not one of them.
The Constitution requires the Court "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
How do we determine a grave abuse of discretion?
The tested procedure is to require the parties to present evidence.
Unfortunately, considerations of national security do not readily lend
themselves to the presentation of proof before a court of justice. The vital
information essential to an objective determination is usually highly classified
and it cannot be rebutted by those who seek to overthrow the government.
As early as Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87, 93 [1905]),the Court was faced
with a similar situation. It posed a rhetorical question. If after investigating
conditions in the Archipelago or any part thereof, the President finds that
public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, can the judicial department investigate the same facts and declare
that no such conditions exist?
In the effort to follow the "grave abuse of discretion" formula in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the court granted the
Solicitor General's offer that the military give us a closed door factual briefing
with a lawyer for the petitioners and a lawyer for the respondents
present. prLL

The results of the briefing call to mind the concurrence of Justice Vicente
Abad Santos in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, (121 SCRA 538, 592 [1983]):
"How can this Court determine the factual basis in order
that it can ascertain whether or not the president acted
arbitrarily in suspending the writ when, in the truthful
words of Montenegro, with its very limited machinery [it]
cannot be in better position [than the Executive Branch]
to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the
Archipelago? (At p. 887). The answer is obvious. It must
rely on the Executive Branch which has the appropriate
civil and military machinery for the facts. This was the
method which had to be used in Lansang. This Court
relied heavily on classified information supplied by the
military. Accordingly, an incongruous situation obtained.
For this Court, relied on the very branch of the
government whose act was in question to obtain the
facts. And as should be expected the Executive Branch
supplied information to support its position and this
Court was in no situation to disprove them. It was a case
of the defendant judging the suit. After all is said and
done, the attempt by this Court to determine whether or
not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ
was a useless and futile exercise.
"There is still another reason why this Court should
maintain a detached attitude and refrain from giving the
seal of approval to the act of the Executive Branch. For it
is possible that the suspension of the writ lacks popular
support because of one reason or another. But when
this Court declares that the suspension is not arbitrary
(because it cannot do otherwise upon the facts given to
it by the Executive Branch) it in effect participates in the
decision-making process. It assumes a task which it is
not equipped to handle; it lends its prestige and
credibility to an unpopular act."

The other method is to avail of judicial notice. In this particular case, judicial
notice would be the only basis for determining the clear and present danger
to national security and public safety. The majority of the Court has taken
judicial notice of the Communist rebellion, the separatist movement, the
rightist conspiracies, and urban terrorism. But is it fair to blame the present
day Marcos for these incidents? All these problems are totally unrelated to
the Marcos of today and, in fact, are led by people who have always opposed
him. If we use the problems of Government as excuses for denying a
person's right to come home, we will never run out of justifying reasons.
These problems or others like them will always be with us.
Significantly, we do not have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos
policy in order to ascertain whether or not the respondents acted with grave
abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of the
implications of a Marcos return to his home to buttress a conclusion.
In the first place, there has never been a pronouncement by the President
that a clear and present danger to national security and public safety will
arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the Philippines. It
was only after the present petition was filed that the alleged danger to
national security and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents'
pleadings. Secondly, President Aquino herself limits the reason for the ban
Marcos policy to (1) national welfare and interest and (2) the continuing
need to preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability. (See
page 7, respondents' Comment at page 73 of Rollo). Neither ground satisfies
the criteria of national security and public safety. The President has been
quoted as stating that the vast majority of Filipinos support her position. (The
Journal, front page, January 24, 1989) We cannot validate her stance simply
because it is a popular one. Supreme Court decisions do not have to be
popular as long as they follow the Constitution and the law. The President's
original position "that it is not in the interest of the nation that Marcos be
allowed to return at this time" has not changed. (Manila Times, front page,
February 7, 1989). On February 11, 1989, the President is reported to have
stated that "considerations of the highest national good dictate that we
preserve the substantial economic and political gains of the past three years"
in justifying her firm refusal to allow the return of Mr. Marcos despite his

failing health. (Daily Globe, front page, February 15, 1989). "Interest of the
nation," "national good," and "preserving economic and political gains."
cannot be equated with national security or public order. They are too
generic and sweeping to serve as grounds for the denial of a constitutional
right. The Bill of Rights commands that the right to travel may not be
impaired except on the stated grounds of national security, public safety, or
public health and with the added requirement that such impairment must be
"as provided by law." The constitutional command cannot be negated by
mere generalizations. LLpr
There is an actual rebellion not by Marcos followers but by the New Peoples'
Army. Feeding as it does on injustice, ignorance, poverty, and other aspects
at underdevelopment, the Communist rebellion is the clearest and most
present danger to national security and constitutional freedoms. Nobody has
suggested that one way to quell it would be to catch and exile its leaders, Mr.
Marcos himself was forced to flee the country because of "peoples' power."
Yet, there is no move to arrest and exile the leaders of student groups,
teachers' organizations, peasant and labor federations, transport workers,
and government unions whose threatened mass actions would definitely
endanger national security and the stability of government. We fail to see
how Mr. Marcos could be a greater danger.
The fear that Communist rebels, Bangsa Moro secessionists, the Honasan
ex-soldiers, the hard core loyalists, and other dissatisfied elements would
suddenly unite to overthrow the Republic should a dying Marcos come home
is too speculative and unsubstantial a ground for denying a constitutional
right. It is not shown how extremists from the right and the left who loathe
each other could find a rallying point in the coming of Mr. Marcos.
The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor General or what the majority calls
"catalytic effect," which alone sustains the claim of danger to national
security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult problem or any
troublesome person can be substituted for the Marcos threat as the
catalysing factor. The alleged confluence of NPAs, secessionists, radical
elements, renegade soldiers, etc., would still be present. Challenged by any
critic or any serious problem, the Government can state that the situation
threatens a confluence of rebel forces and proceed to ride roughshod over

civil liberties in the name of national security. Today, a passport is denied.

Tomorrow, a newspaper may be closed. Public assemblies may be
prohibited. Human rights may be violated. Yesterday, the right to travel of
Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Jovito Salonga was curtailed. Today, it is
the right of Mr. Marcos and family. Who will be tomorrow's pariahs? I deeply
regret that the Court's decision to use the political question doctrine in a
situation where it does not apply raises all kinds of disturbing possibilities.

I must emphasize that General Renato de Villa, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces, has personally assured the Court that a rebellion of the
above combined groups will not succeed and that the military is on top of the
situation. Where then is the clear danger to national security? The Court has
taken judicial notice of something which even the military denies. There
would be severe strains on military capabilities according to General de Villa.
There would be set-backs in the expected eradication of the Communist
threat. There would be other serious problems but all can be successfully
contained by the military. I must stress that no reference was made to a clear
and present danger to national security as would allow an overriding of the
Bill of Rights.
The Solicitor General's argument that the failure of Congress to enact a
statute defining the parameters of the right to travel and to freely choose
one's abode has constrained the President to fill in the vacuum, is too
reminiscent of Amendment No. 6 of the martial law Constitution to warrant
serious consideration. Amendment No. 6 allowed Marcos to issue decrees
whenever the Batasang Pambansa failed or was unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that in his judgment required immediate action.
When the Bill of Rights provides that a right may not be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health and further
requires that a law must provide when such specifically defined interests are
prejudiced or require protection, the inaction of Congress does not give
reason for the respondents to assume the grounds for its impairment.
The fact that the Marcoses have been indicted before American federal
courts does not obstruct us from ruling against an unconstitutional assertion

of power by Philippine officials. Let the United States apply its laws. We have
to be true to our own. cdll
Mr. Marcos may be too ill to withstand the rigors of a transpacific flight. The
agony of traveling while hooked up to machines which have taken over the
functions of his heart, lungs, and kidneys may hasten his death. The physical
condition of Mr. Marcos does not justify our ignoring or refusing to act on his
claim to a basic right which is legally demandable and enforceable. For his
own good, it might be preferable to stay where he is. But he invokes a
constitutional right. We have no power to deny it to him.
The issuance of a passport may be discretionary but it should not be
withheld if to do so would run counter to a constitutional guarantee. Besides,
the petitioners are not asking for passports and nothing else. Any travel
documents or any formal lifting of the Marcos ban as would allow
international airlines to sell them tickets would suffice.
With all due respect for the majority opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the
right to travel. I do not think we should differentiate the right to return home
from the right to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all, the
right to come home must be more preferred than any other aspect of the
right to travel. It was precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel
by Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other
"undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate
period which led the framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact
but to strengthen the declaration of this right. Media often asks, "what else is
new?" I submit that we now have a freedom loving and humane regime. I
regret that the Court's decision in this case sets back the gains that our
country has achieved in terms of human rights, especially human rights for
those whom we do not like or those who are against us.
The respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Raul S. Manglapus has
disclosed a list of former dictators who were barred by their successors from
returning to their respective countries. There is no showing that the countries
involved have constitutions which guarantee the liberty of abode and the
freedom to travel and that despite such constitutional protections, the courts
have validated the "ban a return" policy. Neither is it shown that the

successors of the listed dictators are as deeply committed to democratic

principles and as observant of constitutional protections as President
Aquino.
It is indeed regrettable that some followers of the former President are
conducting a campaign to sow discord and to divide the nation. Opposition to
the government no matter how odious or disgusting is, however, insufficient
ground to ignore a constitutional guarantee.
During the protracted deliberations on this case, the question was asked
Is the Government helpless to defend itself against a threat to national
security? Does the President have to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or proclaim martial law? Can she not take less drastic
measures?
Of course, the Government can act. It can have Mr. Marcos arrested and
tried in court. The Government has more than ample powers under existing
law to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public
safety. But the denial of travel papers is not one of those powers because the
Bill of Rights says so. There is no law prescribing exile in a foreign land as
the penalty for hurting the Nation.
Considering all the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the Philippines,
is entitled to return to and live and die in his own country. I say this
with a heavy heart but say it nonetheless. That conviction is not
diminished one whit simply because many believe Marcos to be beneath
contempt and undeserving of the very liberties he flouted when he was
the absolute ruler of this land.
The right of the United States government to detain him is not the question
before us, nor can we resolve it. The question we must answer is whether or
not, assuming that Marcos is permitted to leave Hawaii (which may depend

on the action we take today), the respondents have acted with grave abuse
of discretion in barring him from his own country. LLpr
My reluctant conclusion is that they have, absent the proof they said they
were prepared to offer, but could not, that the petitioner's return would
prejudice the security of the State.
I was the one who, in the open hearing held on June 27, 1989, asked the
Solicitor General if the government was prepared to prove the justification for
opposing the herein petition, i.e., that it had not acted arbitrarily. He said it
was. Accordingly, the Court, appreciating the classified nature of the
information expected, scheduled a closed-door hearing on July 25, 1988.
The Solicitor General and three representatives from the military appeared
for the respondents, together with former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino,
representing the petitioners.
In about two hours of briefing, the government failed dismally to show that
the return of Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat to the national
security as it had alleged. The fears expressed by its representatives were
based on mere conjectures of political and economic destabilization without
any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions.
Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist
"factual bases for the President's decision" to bar Marcos's return. That is not
my recollection of the impressions of the Court after that hearing.
In holding that the President of the Philippines has residual powers in
addition to the specific powers granted by the Constitution, the Court is
taking a great leap backward and reinstating the discredited doctrine
announced in Planas v. Gil (67 Phil. 62). This does not square with the
announced policy of the Constitutional Commission, which was precisely
to limit rather than expand presidential powers, as a reaction to the excesses
of the past dictatorship.
I can only repeat Justice Black's wry observation in the Steel Seizure Case
(343 U.S. 579) that if it was true that the President had been granted the
totality of executive power, "it is difficult to see why our forefathers bothered
to add several specific items, including some trifling ones, . . . I cannot

accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive
power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic
powers thereafter stated."
I have no illusion that the stand I am taking will be met with paeans of praise,
considering that Marcos is perhaps the most detested man in the entire
history of our country. But we are not concerned here with popularity and
personalities. As a judge, I am not swayed by what Justice Cardozo called
the "hooting throng" that may make us see things through the prisms of
prejudice. I bear in mind that when I sit in judgment as a member of this
Court, I must cast all personal feelings aside.
The issue before us must be resolved with total objectivity, on the basis only
of the established facts and the applicable law and not of wounds that still
fester and scars that have not healed. And not even of fear, for fear is a
phantom. That phantom did not rise when the people stood fast at EDSA
against the threat of total massacre in defense at last of their freedom.
I cannot turn back on the lessons of liberty that I taught for more than three
decades as a professor of Constitutional Law. These principles have not
changed simply because I am now on the Court or a new administration is in
power and the shoe is on the other foot.
Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to come back to the
Philippines against the prohibitions of the government then, Marcos is
entitled to the same right to travel and the liberty of abode that his adversary
invoked. These rights are guaranteed by the Constitution to all individuals,
including the patriot and the homesick and the prodigal son returning, and
tyrants and charlatans and scoundrels of every stripe.

I vote to grant the petition.

||| (Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, [September 15, 1989], 258 PHIL
479-541)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.]
INTEGRATED
BAR
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR
B.
AGLIPAY,
and
GEN.
ANGELO
REYES, respondents.

Arthur D. Lim for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS
The President of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a verbal
directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols
for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In compliance with the
presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent
Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which
detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force
Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the
leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist
the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and

unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is

violative of the Constitution because no emergency situation obtains in Metro
Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for
law enforcement work; hence, said deployment in derogation of Article II,
Section 3 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. When the President calls
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
President's wisdom or substitute its own. It does not, however, prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out
the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The petition failed to
discharge such heavy burden as there was no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces nor
was grave abuse committed because the power to call was exercised in such
a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over
the military. In the performance of the Court's duty of "purposeful hesitation"
before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with
the President's judgment and to doubt is to sustain. The Court also ruled that
the calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself,
which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It
is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the
visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. Under
the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police
patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary

equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. It

cannot be properly argued then that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount
to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in
violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW; PETITIONER INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES HAS
NOT COMPLIED WITH THE REQUISITES OF LEGAL STANDING IN CASE
AT BAR; PETITIONER HAS NOT SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED A
DIRECT AND PERSONAL INJURY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE
QUESTIONED ACT. The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the
IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution
of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of
the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to
improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by
the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the
National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a
formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure,
members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions
on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the
National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which
it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.
Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has
sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or

that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines.
What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law
enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may
cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed
"injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative
and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not
successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of
the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity
of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not
categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise
constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of
allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain
judicial resolution of the controversy.
2. ID.; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT; THE
PRESIDENT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
CALLING OUT THE MARINES. When the President calls the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This
is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out
the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails
to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces.
There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse
was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner
as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the
military. In the performance of this Court's duty of purposeful hesitation"
before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where

such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with
the President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROUNDS FOR THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW
AND SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; SAID
CONDITIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED IN THE CASE OF THE POWER OF
THE PRESIDENT TO CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES. Under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions
must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public
safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the
power to call out the Armed Forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it
becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the
President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the
power to call as compared to the two other powers.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF NECESSITY FOR POWER TO CALL

OUT ARMED FORCES IF SUBJECTED TO UNFETTERED JUDICIAL
SCRUTINY COULD BE A VERITABLE PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER,
AS SUCH POWER MAY BE UNDULY STRAITJACKETED BY AN
INJUNCTION OR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER EVERY TIME IT
IS EXERCISED. The President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified
as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of
the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent
or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider
the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill
over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the
calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a
veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly
straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it

is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent ofthe Constitution to vest upon

the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to
call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the
petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused,
the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from
this Court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE CIVILIAN SUPREMACY CLAUSE NOR DOES IT INFRINGE
THE CIVILIAN CHARACTER OF THE POLICE FORCE. The deployment
of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself,
which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It
is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the
visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact,
the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine
Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to
brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility
to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty
to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW; THE ACT OF THE PRESIDENT IN SIMPLY CALLING ON THE
ARMED FORCES, AN EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE, TO ASSIST THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE IN "JOINT VISIBILITY PATROLS" DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WOULD
WARRANT AN EXERCISE BY THE COURT OF ITS EXTRAORDINARY
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. The term grave abuse of discretion is
long understood in our jurisprudence as being, and confined to, a capricious

and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction. Minus the not-so-unusual exaggerations often invoked by
litigants in the duel of views, the act of the President in simply calling on the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, an executive prerogative, to assist the
Philippine National Police in "joint visibility patrols" in the metropolis does
not, I believe, constitute grave abuse of discretion that would now warrant an
exercise by the Supreme Court of its extraordinary power as so envisioned
by the fundamental law. HSTAcI
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW; CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE MET BEFORE THE PRESIDENT,
AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MAY CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES; SAID CONDITIONS DEFINE THE PARAMETERS OF
THE CALLING OUT POWER AND WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS
COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAID PARAMETERS IS A JUSTIFIABLE ISSUE
AND NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION. It is clear from Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitutionthat the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces of the Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject to two
conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary; and (2) to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these
conditions lay down the sine qua requirement for the exercise of the power
and the objective sought to be attained by the exercise of the power. They
define the constitutional parameters of the calling out power. Whether or not
there is compliance with these parameters is a justiciable issue and is not a
political question. I am not unaware that in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Bernas opined that the
President's exercise of the "calling out power," unlike the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law, is
not a justiciable issue but a political question and therefore not subject to
judicial review. It must be borne in mind, however, that while a member's
opinion expressed on the floor of the Constitutional Convention is valuable, it
is not necessarily expressive of the people's intent. The proceedings of the
Convention are less conclusive on the proper construction of the
fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction

of a statute, for in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature the courts
seek, while in the former, courts seek to arrive at the intent of
the people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.
The conventional wisdom is that the Constitution does not derive its force
from the convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the
intent to be arrived at is that of the people.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IT MAY BE CONCEDED THAT THE EXERCISE OF THE
CALLING OUT POWER MAY BE A "LESSER POWER" COMPARED TO
THE POWER TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND THE POWER TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW, STILL ITS
EXERCISE CANNOT BE LEFT TO ABSOLUTE DISCRETION OF THE
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED
FORCES, AS ITS IMPACT ON THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE
PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION CANNOT BE DOWNGRADED. It
is true that the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution expressly gives the Court the power to review the sufficiency of
the factual bases used by the President in the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law. It does not
follow, however, that just because the same provision did not grant to this
Court the power to review the exercise of the calling out power by the
President, ergo, this Court cannot pass upon the validity of its exercise.
Given the light of our constitutional history, this express grant of power
merely means that the Court cannot decline the exercise of its power
because of the political question doctrine as it did in the past. In fine, the
express grant simply stresses the mandatory duty of this Court to check the
exercise of the commander-in-chief powers of the President. It eliminated the
discretion of the Court not to wield its power of review thru the use of the
political question doctrine. It may be conceded that the calling out power may
be a "lesser power" compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. Even then, its
exercise cannot be left to the absolute discretion of the Chief Executive as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, as its impact on the rights of our
people protected by the Constitution cannot be downgraded. We cannot hold
that acts of the commander-in-chief cannot be reviewed on the ground that
they have lesser impact on the civil and political rights of our people. The

exercise of the calling out power may be "benign" in the case at bar but may
not be so in future cases. THaCAI
MENDOZA, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW; JUDGMENT ON THE SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES RAISED BY
PETITIONER MUST AWAIT AN ACTUAL CASE INVOLVING REAL
PARTIES WITH "INJURIES" TO SHOW AS A RESULT OF THE
OPERATION OF THE CHALLENGED EXECUTIVE DECISION. I submit
that judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised by petitioner
must await an actual case involving real parties with "injuries" to show as a
result of the operation of the challenged executive action. While as an
organization for the advancement of the rule of law petitioner has an interest
in upholding the Constitution, its interest is indistinguishable from the interest
of the rest of the citizenry and falls short of that which is necessary to give
petitioner standing. As I have indicated elsewhere, a citizens' suit challenging
the constitutionality of governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner
must have suffered an "injury in fact" of an actual or imminent nature; (2)
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action by this Court. The "injury in fact" test requires more than injury to a
cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself
among those injured. My insistence on compliance with the standing
requirement is grounded in the conviction that only a party injured by the
operation of the governmental action challenged is in the best position to aid
the Court in determining the precise nature of the problem presented. Many
a time we have adverted to the power of judicial review as an awesome
power not to be exercised save in the most exigent situation. For, indeed,
sound judgment on momentous constitutional questions is not likely to be
reached unless it is the result of a clash of adversary arguments which only
parties with direct and specific interest in the outcome of the controversy can
make. This is true not only when we strike down a law or official action but
also when we uphold it. ESTDIA

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF MILITARY

PRESENCE IN MALLS AND COMMERCIAL CENTERS, I.E., WHETHER
SUCH PRESENCE IS COERCIVE OR BENIGN. In this case, because of
the absence of parties with real and substantial interest to protect, we do not
have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and commercial
centers, i.e., whether such presence is coercive or benign. We do not know
whether the presence of so many marines and policemen scares shoppers,
tourists, and peaceful civilians, or whether it is reassuring to them. To be
sure, the deployment of troops to such places is not like parading them at the
Luneta on Independence Day. Neither is it, however, like calling them out
because of actual fighting or the outbreak of violence. We need to have
evidence on these questions because, under the Constitution, the
President's power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the exercise of
this power is required in the interest of public safety.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J p:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional
grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine
National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the
"AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order.In

compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police
Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction
02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility
patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. 2 Task
Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro
Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. 3 In the
Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and
order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention
program including increased police patrols. 4 The President further stated
that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP
is necessary. 5 Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of
Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. 6 Finally, the President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved. 7
The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility
patrols as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. PURPOSE:
The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between
the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines
partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro
Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other
serious threats to national security.
3. SITUATION:

Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been

perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by
organized syndicates whose members include active
and former police/military personnel whose training,
skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the
present capability of the local police alone to handle.
The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine
Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban
areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those
perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.
4. MISSION:
The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force
to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep
Metro Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained
street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of
high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by
organized crime syndicates whose members include
those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed
active or former PNP/Military personnel.
5. CONCEPT
IN
OPERATIONS:

JOINT

VISIBILITY

PATROL

a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the

NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and
the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro
Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state
against insurgents and other serious threat to national
security, although the primary responsibility over Internal
Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.
b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied
to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated
by organized crime syndicates operating in Metro
Manila. This concept requires the military and police to
work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused,

effective and holistic approach in addressing crime

prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and
police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is to
bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of
basic services to the people and development is
achieved Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine
Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are
responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in
their locality.
c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project,
a provisional Task Force "TULUNGAN" shall be
organized to provide the mechanism, structure, and
procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating,
monitoring and assessing the security situation.
xxx xxx xxx. 8
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle,
North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall,
Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic
Airport. 9
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed
the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN
METRO
MANILA
IS
VIOLATIVE
OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO
MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY
REMOTELY,
THE
DEPLOYMENT
OF
SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN

B) SAID

DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3

OF THE CONSTITUTION;

team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not
violate the civilian supremacy clause inthe Constitution.

DEPLOYMENT
CONSTITUTES
AN
INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN
A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT
(LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF
ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE
CONSTITUTION;

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner
has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the President's factual determination
of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review, and,
(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS

TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO
PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF
THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO
MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY
MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN
WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION. 10
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the
bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP
questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a
Resolution, 11 dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to file
his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General
submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the
President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner
has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not
proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that
the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the

The petition has no merit.

First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the
requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the
President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy
clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. 12

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in
this case.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. 13 The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in
issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. 14 The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. 15
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the
IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution
of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of
the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to
improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by
the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the
National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a
formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure,
members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions
on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the
National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which
it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.
Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has
sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or

that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines.
What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law
enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may
cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed
"injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative
and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not
successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of
the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity
of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not
categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise
constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of
allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain
judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement
of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. 16 In not a few cases,
the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
the people. 17 Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to
the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 18 In this
case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace
and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in
increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency
problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not
go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to
relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the
Marines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination
of the President of the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the
Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that
the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief

powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of

the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP
questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the
aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would
justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It
contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the
calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court "review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment." 19
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining
to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny
since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which
are beyond the review powers of this Court. DTAESI
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential
powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while this Court
gives considerable weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, the
resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes
beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are
in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call
out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be
no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the
general welfare. 20 For one, the realities on the ground do not show that
there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly,
the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point
discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice
Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the
President's powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter,
The American Presidency]. The power of the President
to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to
its existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also

tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of

maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in
any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-inchief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the President's exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the
armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to
keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
xxx xxx xxx 21
Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the President's
power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar
result.
We now address the Solicitor General's argument that the issue involved is
not susceptible to review by the judiciary because it involves a political
question, and thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter
which is appropriate for court review. 22 It pertains to issues which are
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over
actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe
for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are
''political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act
or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function
of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the

workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for
the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Taada v. Cuenco, 23 puts it, political questions refer "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." Thus, if an
issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for
discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people
themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation
of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 24 [p]rominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question.

The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing

that "[T]he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." 25 Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the
Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is
justiciable the problem being one of legality or validity, not its
wisdom. 26 Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has

been given to this Court. 27 When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the official whose action is being questioned. 28
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 29 Under this
definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no
power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it
may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave
abuse of discretion. 30 A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable
controversy. 31
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called
upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional
intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the
armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that
grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such
a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over
the military. In the performance of this Court's duty of purposeful

hesitation" 32 before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional,

only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the
President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law.
xxx xxx xxx
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis
for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced
in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to

be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or

rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or
suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President's action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the
power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have
simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation
and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. 33 That the
intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to
call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission, to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add
that there is a graduated power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed
Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless
violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This
is a graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are
making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and
subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But
when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the
Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my
opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by
anybody.
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have
imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first
sentence: "The President . . . may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion." So we feel that that is sufficient for
handling imminent danger. SAHITC

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels

that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled
by the First Sentence: "The President . . . may call out
such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel that that is
sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or
rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending
the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to
call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their
Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any
concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial
review. 34
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers
highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand the power to impose martial law,
both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil
rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by this Court.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose
martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion
or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not
required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only
criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."
The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude
in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the
President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of
calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts.
Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult
to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the
armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified
as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of
the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent
or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider
the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill
over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the
calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a
veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly
straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it
is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the
military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can
show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the
President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this
Court.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for
calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that,
[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and
carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila . . ." 35 We do not doubt the
veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially in the light
of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent
bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public
utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment
described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the
President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy
clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify
the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is "militarized" in violation
of Section 3, Article II 36 of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.
The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is
evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the
metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the
real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is
the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility
patrols. 37 Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. 39 It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. 40 In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
"insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation
of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. 41

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and

disasters; 44

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has
been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited
provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is
lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief
actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise
any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to a civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of
the PNP.

5. Development of the culture and the arts; 46

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than
assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no
"insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a
violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various
forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals
that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the
implementation and execution of certain traditionally "civil" functions. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious
activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities
that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of
cooperation, are:
1. Elections; 42
2. Administration of
Cross; 43

the

Philippine

National

Red

4. Amateur sports promotion and development; 45

6. Conservation of natural resources; 47

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program; 48
8. Enforcement of customs laws; 49
9. Composite
civilian-military
activities; 50

law

enforcement

10. Conduct of licensure examinations; 51

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high
school students; 52
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities; 53
13. Sanitary inspections; 54
14. Conduct of census work; 55
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board; 56
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting
devices; 57
17. Peace and order policy
government units. 58

formulation

in

local

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a

systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
Congress and, yet, never before questioned. 59 What we have here is
mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities,
not derogation of civilian supremacy.

In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards
the use of military force for domestic purposes has persisted, 60 and
whoseConstitution,unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to
call, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is
allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present
deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act 61 of
the US, the use of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally
prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act
states:
1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of
Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force asposse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both. 62
To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the
use of military personnel, the US courts 63 apply the following standards, to
wit:
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian
law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a
manner that the military personnel subjected the citizens
to the exercise of military power which was regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory 64 in nature, either presently
or prospectively?

xxx xxx xxx

When this concept is transplanted into the present legal
context,
we
take
it
to
mean
that military
involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the
Constitutionor a statute, does not violate the Posse

Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids or

compels some conduct on the part of those claiming
relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be
insufficient. (italics supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case
to determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law
enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court
agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:
3. The designation of tasks in Annex A 65 does not
constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not
control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos.
6, 66 8(k) 67 and 9(a) 68 of Annex A. These soldiers,
second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In
No. 9(d) 69 of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought
to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And
last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The
materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No.
8(c) 70 of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in
character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise
of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power,
the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines
constitutes no impermissible use of military power for
civilian law enforcement. 71
It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed
forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril
our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The
power to call the armed forces is just that calling out the armed forces.
Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of
the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his
authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not
inclined to overrule the President's determination of the factual basis for the
calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January,
2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have
been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely
to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the
joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full
bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not
when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, YnaresSantiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join in the opinion of J. Mendoza.
Bellosillo, J., on official leave.
Panganiban, J., concurs in the result.
||| (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, [August 15,
2000], 392 PHIL 618-675)