SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 191031. October 5, 2015.]

DOLORES L. HACBANG and BERNARDO J.
petitioners, vs. ATTY. BASILIO H. ALO, respondent.

HACBANG,

DECISION
BRION, * J :
p

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 13 October

2009 Decision and the 21 January 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83137. 1 The CA armed the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court's (RTC) dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. Q
99-36660 2 for lack of cause of action.
AIDSTE

ANTECEDENTS
On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving
several properties behind. Among these was Lot No. 8-A of subdivision Plan
Psd-6227 located at Espaa Street, San Juan, Rizal, 3 covered by Transfer
Certicate of Title (TCT) No. (19896) 227644 (the subject lot).
Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang,
and his siblings: Perfecto Hacbang, Joaquin Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang,
and Dolores Hacbang Alo. Petitioner Dolores L. Hacbang is the grandchild of
Perfecto while petitioner Bernardo Hacbang (Bernardo) is a son of Joaquin. The
respondent Basilio Alo is the son of Dolores.
Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y
Testamento. He left one-half of his properties to his parents and devised the
other half including the subject lot to his sister Dolores. The pertinent
portions of his will read:
FOURTH: By these presents I give, name, declare and institute as heirs
my parents BASILIO HACBANG and MARIA GABORNY DE HACBANG of
one-half of all my properties, whether real, personal or mixed, in
whatever place they may be found, whether they were acquired before
or after the execution of this testament, including all the properties that
at the time of my death I may have the power to dispose of by will, and
which properties consist of the following:
Fifty (50) percent of the shares of stock that I own in the "SAMAR
NAVIGATION CO. INC."
A parcel of land with its camarin situated in the Municipality of Carigara,
Province of Leyte.
A parcel of land in the Barrio of Pinamopuan, of the Municipality of
Capoocan, Province of Leyte.
A parcel of land with house and planted to coconuts in the Barrio of
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Sorsogon, Municipality of Sta. Margarita, Province of Samar.

FIFTH: The other remaining half of my properties wherever they
may be located, by these presents I give, cede and hand over
to my sister Dolores Hacbang, which properties are more
particularly described as follows:
Fifty (50) percent of my stockholdings in the "SAMAR NAVIGATION CO.,
INC."
A piece of land with one house where the Botica San Antonio is located,
in the Municipality of Calbayog, Province of Samar.
A piece of land with house in Acedillo St., Municipality of Calbayog,
Province of Samar.
AaCTcI

A piece of land with 1 camarin in the barrio of Sorsogon, Municipality of

Sta. Margarita, Province of Samar.
Six (6) Parcels of land located in "NEW MANILA," Municipality of San
Juan, Province of Rizal, in 7th St., described as follows: Block 7, Lots 16,
18, 20 and 22, and in 3rd Street, Block 3, Lots 4 and 6.
A piece of land situated in Espaa St., Municipality of San Juan
del Monte of the Province of Rizal, marked as Lot 8-A, Block
17, of 1,403 square meters in area. 4

On 16 April 1937, a petition for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and
the settlement of his estate was led before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila. The petition was docketed as SP. PROC. No. 51199.
On 21 May 1937, the CFI admitted Bishop Sofronio's will to probate.

The records are bare with respect to what happened next. They show,
however, that the CFI ordered the proceedings to be archived on 2 November
1957.
On 24 September 1971, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City appears to
have issued TCT No. 169342 over the subject lot in the name of respondent
Basilio H. Alo. TCT No. 169342 cancelled TCT No. 117322/T-500. However, this
Court cannot determine the circumstances surrounding the issuance of TCT
No. 169342 or the relationship between TCT No. 117322/T-500 and TCT No.
(19896) 227644 due to the inadequacy of the documents on record.
On 17 March 1975, Dolores Hacbang Alo moved to revive the settlement
proceedings because the CFI had not yet completed adjudicating the
properties.
On 23 May 1975, the CFI denied the motion for revival because the
order to archive "had long become nal and executory." 6
On 1 February 1999, petitioners Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo led a
petition to cancel TCT No. 169342 on the ground that it was fraudulently
secured. In support of their allegations, they submitted the 5 March 1997
Investigation Report of Land Registration Authority (LRA) Investigator Rodrigo
I. Del Rosario. The report concluded that TCT No. 117322 was of "doubtful
authenticity" and was neither derived from TCT No. 117322 nor issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on 24 September 1971 at 2:30 PM.
In his Answer dated 18 August 1999, Basilio denied all allegations of
irregularity and wrongdoing. He also moved to dismiss the petition because
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the petitioners were neither heirs nor devisees of Bishop Sofronio and had no
legal interest in the subject lot.
On 7 January 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition because the
petitioners had no right to prosecute the case on the subject lot. The RTC
noted that Bishop Sofronio's will had already been admitted into probate in
1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question. Though
the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated
his heirs: Bishop Sofronio's parents were compulsory heirs entitled to half of
his estate while the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, was devised
the remaining half (the free portion). Thus, the petitioners, who are neither
compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not real parties in interest.
EcTCAD

The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on 19

August 2003.
The petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that: (1) Bishop Sofronio's
will did not validly transfer the subject property to Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2)
the probate of the will is not conclusive as to the validity of its intrinsic
provisions; and (3) only a nal decree of distribution of the estate vests title
on the properties from the estate on the distributees. 7 The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 83137.
They further argued that the distribution of the estate should be
governed by intestate succession because: (1) the subject property was not
adjudicated; and (2) the settlement proceedings were archived and dismissed.
Thus, all the properties passed on to and became part of the estate of Bishop
Sofronio's parents. The petitioners concluded that they had legal interest in
the subject lot as representatives of their ascendants, the other children of
Bishop Sofronio's parents.
In his appeal brief, the respondent insisted that the petitioners do not
have a clear legal right to maintain the suit because: (1) as collateral relatives,
they cannot invoke the right of representation to the estate of Bishop
Sofronio; and (2) they are not real parties in interest and have no right of
action over the subject lot.
On 13 October 2009, the CA armed the RTC's order of dismissal. The
CA held that the admission of Bishop Sofronio's will to probate precluded
intestate succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid or failed to
completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the
settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose
its validity merely because the proceedings were archived. Undoubtedly,
Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate.
The CA denied the petitioners' claim to a right of inheritance by
representation. It held that the presence of Bishop Sofronio's parents during
his death excluded his brothers and sisters from being compulsory heirs; the
petitioners cannot represent those who are not entitled to succeed.
Considering that they are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs,
petitioners have no legal interest in the subject property.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on 21
January 2010. The denial paved the way for the petitioners to le the present
petition for review on certiorari.
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THE PETITION
The petitioners argue: (1) that the CA erred when it failed to rule on the
validity of TCT No. 169342; (2) that the probate proceedings of the estate was
dismissed, not archived; and (3) that the CA erred when it used Bishop
Sofronio's will as basis to declare that they are not real parties in interest.
HSAcaE

In his Comment, the respondent maintained that the petitioners had no

right over the property and moved to dismiss the present petition.
OUR RULING
At the outset, this Court observes that the parties and even the lower
courts erroneously applied the provisions of the present Civil Code to the will
and the estate of Bishop Sofronio. The law in force at the time of the
decedent's death determines the applicable law over the settlement of his
estate. 8 Bishop Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code
in 1949. Therefore, the correct applicable laws to the settlement of his estate
are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and the 1901 Code of Civil Procedure.
In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code,
successional rights are vested at the precise moment of the death of the
decedent. Section 657 of the Spanish Code provides:
Art. 657. Los derechos a la sucesin de una persona se
transmiten desde el momento de su muerte. 9

The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a

moment's interruption. This provision was later on translated and adopted as
Article 777 of our Civil Code. 10
As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance
passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death not at the time the
heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition, nor at the distribution of
the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the decedent's
ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.
For intestate heirs, this means that they are immediately entitled to
their hereditary shares in the estate even though they may not be entitled to
any particular properties yet. For legatees and devisees granted specic
properties, this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and
devises at that immediate moment without prejudice to the legitimes of
compulsory heirs.
Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that
was probated in 1937. He left half of his properties to his parents and the
remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The admission of his will to
probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity. 11
Unfortunately, the settlement proceedings were never concluded; the
case was archived without any pronouncement as to the intrinsic validity of
the will or an adjudication of the properties. Because of this, the petitioners
posit that intestate succession should govern. They maintain that the entire
inheritance should have gone to Bishop Sofronio's parents, the petitioners'
ascendants. Thus, they claim to have a legal interest in the subject lot as
representatives of the other children of Bishop Sofronio's parents.
HESIcT

We do not nd the petitioners' argument meritorious.

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Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of

his estate, whether under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil
Code. Article 763 of the Spanish Code provides:
Art. 763. El que no tuviere herederos forzosos puede disponer por
testamento de todos sus bienes o de parte de ellos en favor de
cualquiera persona que tenga capacidad para adquirirlos. El que tuviere
herederos forzosos slo podr disponer de sus bienes en la forma y
con las limitaciones que se establecen en la seccin quinta de este
capitulo.

This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of
his estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to
succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his
property provided he does not impair their legitimes. This provision was later
translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code. 12
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of
disposition. Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over
intestacy. 13 As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and interpreted in
a way that would render all of its provisions operative. 14 Hence, there is no
basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently
applies.
Even though the CFI archived the settlement proceedings, there is no
indication that it declared any of the dispositions in the will invalid. The
records are understandably bare considering the probate proceedings were
initiated as early as 1937. Nonetheless, we nd no reason to doubt the
intrinsic validity of the will.
Bishop Sofronio was free to dispose of his estate without prejudice to the
legitimes of his compulsory heirs. Bishop Sofronio's only compulsory heirs
were his parents. 15 Their legitime was one-half of Bishop Sofronio's estate. 16
Considering that Bishop Sofronio gave his parents half of his estate, then he
was free to dispose of the free portion of his estate in favor of his sister,
Dolores Hacbang Alo. Thus, his will was intrinsically valid.
The CFI's failure to adjudicate the specic properties is irrelevant
because Bishop Sofronio did not just name his heirs; he also identied the
specic properties forming part of their inheritance. The dispositions in the will
rendered court adjudication and distribution unnecessary.
The petitioners' contention that only a nal decree of distribution of the
estate vests title to the land of the estate in the distributees is also incorrect.
Again, ownership over the inheritance vests upon the heirs, legatees, and
devisees immediately upon the death of the decedent.
At the precise moment of death, the heirs become owners of the estate
pro-indiviso. They become absolute owners of their undivided aliquot share
but with respect to the individual properties of the estate, they become coowners. This co-ownership remains until partition and distribution. Until then,
the individual heirs cannot claim any rights over a specic property from the
estate. This is because the heirs do not know which properties will be
adjudicated to them yet. Hence, there is a need for a partition before title over
particular properties vest in the distributee-heirs.
caITAC

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However, heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed specic properties do

not require Court adjudication to identify which particular properties become
theirs; the testator had already identied these. From the very moment of the
testator's death, title over these particular properties vests on the heir,
legatee, or devisee.
On 3 April 1937, title over the subject lot passed on to the respondent's
mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, at the exact moment of her brother's death.
From that moment on, she was free to dispose of the subject lot as a
consequence of her ownership.
On the other hand, Bishop Sofronio's parents, Basilio and Maria Gaborny
Hacbang, never acquired the title over the subject lot. Thus, it never became
part of their estate. Clearly, the petitioners who claim to represent the
children of Basilio and Maria Gaborny in the spouses' estate have no legal
right or interest over the subject lot.
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action an act
or omission that violates the rights of the plainti. 17 A cause of action
requires:
(1) a legal right in favor of the plainti;
(2) a correlative duty of the defendant to respect the plainti's right;
and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plainti's
right. 18
Every action must also be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest: the party who stands to be beneted or injured by the
judgment. 19 These fundamental requirements are not merely technical
matters; they go into the very substance of every suit.
The petitioners came to the courts praying for the annulment of the
respondent's title yet they failed to show that they are entitled to even ask
for such relief. They have no right over the subject lot and the respondent has
no legal obligation to them with respect to the subject lot. Even if we assume
that the respondent fraudulently or irregularly secured his certicate of title,
the bottom-line is that the petitioners have no legal standing to sue for the
cancellation of this title. This right only belongs to the rightful owner of the
subject lot.
Judicial power is the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. 20
Courts settle real legal disputes involving the rights and obligations between
parties. If either of the parties is not the real party in interest, the Court
cannot grant the reliefs prayed for because that party has no legal right or
duty with respect to his opponent. Further litigation becomes an academic
exercise in legal theory that eventually settles nothing a waste of time that
could have been spent resolving actual justiciable controversies.
ICHDca

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, ** Del Castillo, Leonen and Jardeleza, *** JJ., concur.
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Footnotes
* Designated as Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2222 dated September
29, 2015.
** Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per
Special Order No. 2223 dated September 29, 2015.
*** Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza, per
Special Order No. 2246 dated October 5, 2015.
1. Both penned by Associate Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate Justices
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Isaias P. Dicdican.
2. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
3. Now E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.
4. Rollo, pp. 93-97, 370-378.
5. Id. at 98.
6. Id. at 104.
7. Citing Salandanan v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 127783, June 5, 1998, 290 SCRA
671 and Reyes v. Barrato-Datu, G.R. No. L-17818, January 25, 1967, 19
SCRA 85.
8. Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530 (1953).
9. CDIGO CIVIL DE ESPAA, Art. 657 (1889).
10. Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent.
11. An Act Providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in
the Philippine Islands [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Act No. 190, Sec. 625
(1901). This provision was subsequently adopted in Art. 838 of the Civil
Code.
12. Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate
or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One with compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said
heirs.

13. See Section 657, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and Rule 82, Section 1 of the
1997 Rules of Court which revoke letters of administration and suspend
intestate proceedings upon the discovery and probate of the decedent's will;
See also Cuenco v. Court of Appeals , 153 Phil. 115, 129 (1973) citing Uriarte
v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 144 Phil. 205 (1970).
14. Articles 788 and 791, CIVIL CODE.
15. Art. 807, CDIGO CIVIL DE ESPAA adopted as Art. 887, CIVIL CODE.
16. Art. 809, CDIGO CIVIL DE ESPAA adopted as Art. 889, CIVIL CODE.
17. Rule 2, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court.
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18. 424 Phil. 617, 623 (2002).

19. Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.
20. Art. VIII, Section 1, PHIL. CONST.

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