Lipat, Jeanelle Rose R.

G.R. No. L-6512

JD1 Consti1

June 19, 1953

JOSE D. VILLENA, petitioner,

June 19, 1953

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MAKATI, RIZAL, ET AL., petitioners,

Villena vs Secretary of Interior

Please be advised that His Excellency, the President, has decided, for the
good of the public service, to take over and assume directly the
investigation of the administrative charges against you, for falsification of
public documents in connection with the lease of the Makati-Mandaluyong
Ferry, engaging in the practice of law without previous permission, and
extortion, which are now pending investigation before the Provincial
Governor and the Provincial Board of that province, and to designate the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal as special investigator of this Office to conduct
the investigation of the said charges. Copy of the designation of the said
official as Special Investigator is enclosed, for your information.

JUGO, J.:

In view of the serious nature of the aforementioned charges against you and
in order to promote an orderly, fair, and impartial investigation thereof, you
are hereby supended from office effective immediately, your suspension to
last until the termination of the administrative proceedings against you
aforementioned.

In view of the mutual relations of the two above entitled cases, they were submitted
to this Court and considered together.

The provincial Governor and the Special Investigator had been advised
hereof.

In case G.R. No. L-6512, on December 16, 1952, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed
an information in the Court of First Instance of said province against Mayor Jose D.
Villena charging him with falsification of a public document in criminal case No.
3874 of said court. On January 9, 1953, the court, after due trial, found him guilty
and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of from eight years, eight months and one
day to nine years and eight months. On October 29, 1952, the complainant, Catalina
Esteban, who considered herself an aggrieved party, filed with the Office of His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, administrative charges against said
Mayor based on the falsification. On October 31, 1952, the Office of the President
referred said charges to the Provincial Governor of Rizal for appropriate action. On
December 17, 1952, the Office of the President addressed a communication to said
Governor inviting his attention to the fact that an in- formation had been filed in
court against Mayor Villena, and on the same date the Governor suspended Mayor
Villena. After the expiration of thirty days, that is, on January 16, 1953, the Governor
reinstated him in accordance with section 2189 of the Revised Administration Code.
Inasmuch as the Provincial Board had not conducted any investigation of the
charges, Catalina Esteban filed a petition with the Office of the President inviting his
attention to that fact. On February 9, 1953, the Acting Executive Secretary, Marciano
Roque, by authority of the President, addressed a communication to Mayor Villena,
as follows:
MANILA, February 9, 1953
SIR:

Respectfully,
By authority of the President:
MARCIANO
Acting Executive Secretary

ROQUE

The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal was appointed by the Office of the President as
investigator in the following communication:
MANILA, February 9, 1953
SIR:
Pursuant to the provisions of section 64 (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code in relation to section 79 (c) of the same Code, you are hereby
designated Special Investigator to conduct an investigation of the
administrative charges against Mr. Jose D. Villena, Municipal Mayor of
Makati, Rizal, for falsification of public documents in connection with the
lease of the Makati-Mandaluyong Ferry, engaging in the practice of law
without previous permission, and extortion. Copy of the original complaint
for falsification of public documents is enclosed. You may request the
Provincial Governor of Rizal or the Provincial Board to turn over to you all
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Lipat, Jeanelle Rose R.

JD1 Consti1

the papers regarding the said charges, attention being invited to the enclosed
copy of our letter of even date to the Provincial Board.
In this connection, we wish to state that the respondent should be given
sufficient notice in advance of the said date and place of the investigation,
and full opportunity to defend himself personally or by counsel.
Immediately after the investigation, please submit to this office the
complete records of the aforesaid charges including the transcript of the
stenographic notes and exhibits, together with your findings and
recommendation.
Respectfully,
By the authority of the President,
MARCIANOROQUE
Acting Executive Secretary
The
Pasig,
Copy furnished:
The
The
MANILA

Provincial

Secretary

Fiscal
Rizal

of

Honorable
Justice

It will be noticed that the Fiscal was instructed in the above communication "that the
respondent should be given sufficient notice in advance of the date and place of the
investigation, and full opportunity to defend himself personally or by counsel."

Villena vs Secretary of Interior

CHARTERED
CITIES
AND
OTHER
LOCAL
POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS. Section 79 (c) of the Administrative Code speaks of
direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices under the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should be
interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same Code which grants to the
Department of the Interior "exclusive supervision over the administration of
provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political
subdivisions,"
2. ID.; ID.; INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES; MEANING OF THE
WORD "SUPERVISION". In the case ofPlanas vs. Gil (37 Off. Gaz.,
1228) this court observed that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is
an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies
authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power
real and effective. if supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not
automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts
and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation. The principle
there enunciated is applicable with equal force to the present case. The
Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation
of the charges against petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that
purpose.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERVISION BY THE SECRETARY.-As regards the
challenged power of the Secretary of the Interior to decree the suspension of
the herein petitioner pending an administrative investigation of the charges
against him, the question, it may be admitted, is not free from difficulties.
There is no clear and express grant of power to the Secretary to suspend a
Mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the
power appears lodged in the Provincial Governor by section 2188 of the
Administrative Code which provides that "The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgement of any crime
involving moral turpitude."

Mayor Villena now comes to this Court praying that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal be
ordered to desist from proceeding with the investigation and that his (Villena')
suspension be declared null and void. One of the points raised by the petitioner is
that sections 2188 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code vest the power to
investigate a municipal official in the provincial board. This power is not exclusive.
As held in the case of Jose D. Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451,
452, 459, 460), (April 21, 1939) "the fact, however, that the power of suspension is
expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial
governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the
Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by
section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the Provincial Governor does
not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary
of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the
petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the President
may himself suspend the petitioner from office in view of his greater power
of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised
conformably to law.

1. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR; EXECUTIVE SUPERVISION

The case of Lacson vs. Hon. Marciano Roque, etc., et al., 92 Phil. 456 (49 Off. Gaz.,
[1] 93) is different from the present one, for the following reasons:
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Lipat, Jeanelle Rose R.

JD1 Consti1

(1) Lacson had only been indicted but not yet convicted;
(2) Lacson was accused of libel which was not a misconduct in office; whereas in the
present case, the petitioner was accused of falsification of a public document
essentially in relation to the performance of his duties as mayor; and
(3) Lacson was not subjected to an administrative investigation; whereas in the order
appointing the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to conduct the administrative investigation,
the fiscal was enjoined to give the petitioner "sufficient notice of the date and place
of the investigation, and full opportunity to defend himself personally or by counsel".
Section 2078 of the Revised Administrative Code clearly provides that the GovernorGeneral (the President of the Philippines) has the power to suspend, and, if found
guilty of disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office, after
investigation, to remove any provincial officer including an elective governor
(section 2082). If he can do this with regard to provincial officers, it stands to reason
that he has also the same power with regard to municipal officers.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In case G.R. No. L-6540, when Mayor Villena was suspended by order of the
President, Bernardo Umali was the Vice-Mayor. He should automatically, have
assumed the office of Mayor, but he could not do so, because on November 16, 1952,
the Municipal Council had suspended Bernardo Umali and Councilor Abundio Suck,
under section 2223 of the Revised Administrative Code, for alleged "disorderly
conduct" which consisted in that Umali and Suck objected to and protested against
the minutes of the Municipal Council in which it was made to appear that the council
had ratified and validated the contract entered into in behalf of the Municipality of
Makati by Mayor Jose D. Villena, by means of the falsified public document above
mentioned. The Provincial Governor of Rizal appointed Ignacio Babasa the
Councilor who had received the highest number of votes, as acting Mayor. It is
evident that the objection and protest made by Umali and Suck did not constitute, in
any way, "disorderly conduct." The Office of the President ordered the reinstatement
of Umali as vice-mayor and Suck as councilor, but this order was ignored.

Villena vs Secretary of Interior

The petitioners now ask this court for the annulment of the order of preliminary
mandatory injunction and the order of contempt. They contend that the lower court
cases where a mandatory injunction may be issued in order to restore the parties to
the status quo.
In the case of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company vs. Del Rosario, et
al., (22 Phil., 433, 434), Doroteo Jose was suspected by the company of
misappropriating electric current. He was accused of theft but was acquitted.
Notwithstanding this acquittal, the company tried to collect the value of the alleged
misappropriated current from him and upon his refusal, it cut-off the service. This
court issued a preliminary mandatory injunction to compel the company to continue
furnishing current until he question of the misappropriation should have been finally
determined. In the present case, the petitioners by arbitrarily and illegally charging
Umali and Suck with "disorderly conduct", suspended Umali from his position of
vice-mayor to prevent him from assuming the office of acting mayor upon the
suspension of Mayor Villena. In the case of Laxamana vs. Baltazar, 92 Phil. 32, it
was decided that the vice-mayor, by operation of law, assumes the office of the
acting municipal mayor during the suspension of the mayor, and the Provincial
Governor has no power to designate anyone else to such position. The mandatory
injunction was properly issued by the court below in order to place vice-mayor
Umali in the position of acting mayor from which he was ousted without cause,
pending the final determination of the question as to who is entitled to discharge the
duties of Mayor. This is even a stronger case than that of the Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., just cited.
In view of the foregoing, the petition in each of the two cases above-mentioned-G.R.
Nos. L-6512 and L-6540 is denied with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista Angelo and
Labrador, JJ., concur.

Bernardo Umali and Abundio Suck filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in which, in addition to the principal remedy for their reinstatement, they
prayed for a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore them to offices. After the
filing of the proper bond the judge issued said order.
The petitioners herein filed a motion with the Court of First Instance asking for the
dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion for dissolution
and ordered the arrest of Ignacio Babasa for contempt for not complying with the
injunction, but he was allowed to appeal to this court with the filing of a bond.