Persons and Family Relations Case Digest (2016 Collation)
Persons and Family Relations Case Digest (2016 Collation)
Persons and Family Relations Case Digest (2016 Collation)
TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
PERSONS AND
FAMILY
RELATIONS
LAW
First Sem Cases
Table of Contents
Preliminaries2
Human Relations
14
Prejudicial Question
Civil Personality
Citizenship
34
Marriage
35
Void Marriages
29
33
46
Psychological Incapacity 53
Voidable Marriages 76
Legal Separation
78
81
Property Relations 85
The Family as an Institution
103
Family Home106
Paternity and Filiation
Adoption
125
Support
130
108
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Human Relations
ALFREDO M. VELAYO v. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD.
G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956, FELIX, J.
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute
law, should be compensated by damages.
Facts:
Shell supplies fuel needs of CALI. However, due to financial crisis it failed to
pay Shell and its other creditors. Thus, they entered into an agreement that they
would present suits against the corporation but to strive for a pro-rata division of the
assets, and only in the case of non-agreement would the creditors file insolvency
proceedings. However, when Shell PH assigned the credit to Shell oil its American
Sister Corporation, the latter filed a case against CALI for the collection of assigned
Credit attaching the C-54 plane of CALI which the creditors opposed and filed
damages against Shell for breach of their agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Shell shall be liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes, Under Article 21 of the Civil Code states that any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. This is the legal remedy
for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes.
Another rule is expressed in Article 23 which compels the return of a thing
acquired without just or legal grounds. This provision embodies the doctrine that no
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, which has been one
of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil
Code goes as far as to provide that: Even if an act or event causing damage to
anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the Shell, the latter shall
be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited with mere much
more reason the Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith
and with betrayal of confidence.
Shell taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to
be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the
manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them, and believing it most
probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case
schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States,
where CALIs plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously
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ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style
COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO v. RANIDA D. SALVADOR
and RAMON SALVADOR
G.R. No. 168512, March 20, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article 20, NCC provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party
who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal
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Prejudicial Question
LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT
OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO,
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988, GANCAYCO, J.
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Civil Personality
ANTONIO GELUZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND OSCAR LAZO
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961, REYES, JBL, J.
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Citizenship
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHULE Y. LIM
G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, provides that the citizenship
of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. Since the requirement applies only to legitimate children, an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother automatically becomes a Filipino upon birth.
Facts:
Chule Y. Lim was born as an illegitimate child of her Chinese father and Filipino
mother in 1954. Her birth records show that she is a Chinese citizen. Nearly four (4)
decades later, Chule filed a petition for correction of entries of her birth records,
alleging among others that she is a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
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Marriage
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014, PEREZ, J.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Facts:
Tecla Hoybia Avenido and Eustaquio Avenido were married in 1942 in Talibon,
Bohol, but the records of the Local Civil Registrar therein, including their marriage
certificate, were lost due to World War II. Their union bore four (4) children. Eustaquio
soon abandoned his family in 1952, and married Peregrina Hoybia Avenido in 1979.
After Eustaquios death, Tecla filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage of Peregrina and Eustaquio on the ground that Tecla is Eustaquios legal
wife. Tecla presented as evidence the certifications of loss of her marriage certificate,
the birth certificates of her children, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who
attended Tecla and Eustaquios marriage ceremony.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented during trial proves the existence of
Teclas marriage to Eustaquio.
Ruling:
Yes. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a
marital union, it is not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a persons birth certificate, the testimony of the witnesses to the
marriage, and even the testimony of the solemnizing officer may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between the parties. Likewise, since the due
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Whether or not Rommel can change his sex from male to female by law or
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Register Law (Act 3753), a birth certificate, which includes
a declaration of a persons sex, is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Since there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
The change cannot also be granted even on the grounds of equity, since the
changes would have serious and wide-ranging consequences. Marriage, one of the
most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. Changing Rommels sex in his
birth certificate will substantially alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment.
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Void Marriages
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Psychological Incapacity
DIANA M. BARCELONA v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON
G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, Carpio, J.
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be
alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Diana. It was
alleged that during their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. She withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband
when she suffered several miscarriages. She even requested him to leave the
conjugal dwelling. The petition further alleged that Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
Diana filed a motion to dismiss the said petition on the ground that it failed to state a
cause of action. The petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity, that it existed from the celebration of the
marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, it is devoid of any reference
of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of Diana to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, it did not even state the marital obligations
which Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition states a cause of action.
Ruling:
Yes. The petition states the legal right of Tadeo, the correlative obligation of
Diana, and the act or omission of Diana in violation of the legal right.
Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriage provides:
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Whether or not the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already
Ruling:
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it
must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief" that
the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries
to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her
alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry. These efforts, however, fell short of the
"stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence.
The
respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not report Jerrys
absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. She
did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. There was no other corroborative evidence to
support the respondents claim that she conducted a diligent search.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged
efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already
dead.
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Voidable Marriages
AURORA A. ANAYA v. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970, JBL Reyes, J.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is
not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage.
Facts:
Palaroan filed for an action for annulment of his marriage with Anaya on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The CFI of
Manila dismissed his complaint upholding their marriage. Anaya also filed for
annulment of marriage on the ground that Palaroan had divulged to Anaya that
months prior to their marriage, he had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative
of his which Anaya considered a fact that wrecked their marriage thus she averres
that there was fraud in the contracting of their marriage. The court considered
Anayas allegation of fraud as insufficient thus they dismissed her claim.
Issue:
Whether or not non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship is a ground for
annulment of marriage.
Ruling:
No. Non-disclosure of pre-marital relationships is not a ground for annulment.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one
of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and
it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul
a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or
feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly
given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to
give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
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Legal Separation
JOSE DE OCAMPO v. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960, BENGZON, J.
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between
husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
Facts:
After years of marriage, Ocampo discovered on several occasions that his wife
was maintaining illicit affairs with a Jose Arcalas when Ocampo sent her to study
beauty culture in Manila. When she finished her course, she left Ocampo and that he
even caught her with an affair with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame.
Ocampo filed for legal separation. She did not made any answer to the RTC and
admits having such sexual relation so when the case was appealed to the CA, the CA
construed such confession a confession of judgment thus they did not decree the
legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not there was collusion between Ocampo and Floreniano.
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Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA is correct in decreeing a legal separation.
Ruling:
Yes. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit
sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it
would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek relief from the courts, but because
he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned
the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par.
(4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both
parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it
was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. The Constitution itself however
does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as
it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the same. With the enactment of the Family
Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out
the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal
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Property Relations
MOISES JOCSON v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ,
ERNESTO VASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989, MEDILEA, J.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Facts:
The petitioner and respondent are the surviving offsprings of the spouses
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. Poblete died before emilio without her estate
being settled. Emilio died shortly. Emilio executed three documents in his lifetime
which conveyed by sale to Agustina, one of the respondents, majority of his property
including 1/3 share in the estate of Agustina. The petitoner, Moises, assailed the
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Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is a common property of the parties and
their property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
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Ruling:
Yes. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that
Elna and Bruno suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively
with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his
residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to
be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondents psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The disputed
property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July
26, 1983, at the time when they were already living together. Hence, it should be
considered as common property of the parties.
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In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Rey alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did
she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in
her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and
December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00. On the other hand, while
there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there
is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent
of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be
equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the
existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their
share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
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Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the Art. 151 of the Family Code is applicable herein.
Ruling:
NO. Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is
not exclusively among family members. The inclusion of Ayson as defendant and
Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family
Code. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to the
husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers
and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by
affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, Ayson, who is
described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are
considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
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"Sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of
the New Civil Code as members of the same family.
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Pedro Hernando. However the same was
dismissed by the RTC on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law, the
complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a
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HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. v. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA, in his
capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City,
and ALBERTO MORENO
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan
Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Moreno failed to comply with Article 151
of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. The RTC however denied the motion and agreed with Moreno that earnest
efforts towards a compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case
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Ruling:
NO. In Magbaleta, the Court ruled that once a stranger becomes a party to a
suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition
precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can
prosper. Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively
between or among family members. Petitioner makes much of the fact that the
present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between
brothers. However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that
would make the ruling in Magbaleta inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his
wife, as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and
Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits
involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under Article 150 of the
Family Code. Since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among
members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked
only by a party who is a member of that same family.
Family Home
FLORANTE F. MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.
G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws protective
mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop.
Facts:
Jose Manacop and his wife purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot with
a bungalow. E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F.
Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC to collect indebtedness. Instead of
filing an answer, Manacop and his company entered into a compromise agreement
which was approved by the court. A motion for execution was filed which the lower
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Yes. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the
subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in
Article 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo ruling explicitly enunciated that said
provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to
August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a
family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the
subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it
follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop. Since the
debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued
prior to August 3, 1988, Manacop cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of
the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Facts:
A judgment against Jose Modequillo was rendered by the CA. The said
judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued. The
sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land owned by Modequillo. A motion to quash
and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging
therein that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to
the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced
against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article
155 of the Family Code.
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Yes. In the present case, the residential house and lot of Modequillo was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil
Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the
Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the
Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). Under Article 162 of the
Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time
of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Thus, the family home of Modequillo is not exempt from execution of the
money judgment. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or
was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988.
Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does
not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
Despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated
under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on
his grandmother for legal support.
Facts:
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Perla Patricio and her two sons inherited from her husband several properties
including a parcel of land with a residential house. Marcelino Marc, one of her sons,
instituted an action for partition before the RTC which was granted. Upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by Dario III on appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint for
partition filed by Patricio and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family
home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a
minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the
minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino Dario and
Perla Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.
Issue:
Whether or not partition of the family home is proper where one of the coowners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Ruling:
Yes. The rule is that if there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the
family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there
is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age. Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV is dependent on legal support
not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family
home and his being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV
cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did
not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish
his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal
age.
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Yes. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on
January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his
wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution
of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of
the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942
and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child Mariano. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that
during that initial period, Emiliano and his wife were still living under the marital roof.
Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were
indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation
between Emiliano and his wife. The Court admit that Emiliano was already suffering
from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move
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Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not Article 285 of the Civil Code applies in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that the action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of
the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
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Adoption
HERBERT CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO
and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998, ROMERO, J.
In cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes
a proper issue for determination.
Facts:
Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony are the natural children of Herbert
Cang and Anna Marie Clavano. Later due to the extramarital affairs of Herbert, Anna
filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. The decree of legal
separation conferred Anna the custody of the children. Meanwhile, Ronald V. Clavano
and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna
Marie, filed a petition for adoption the three children before the Branch 14 of RTC
Cebu City. This petition was accompanied by an affidavit of consent executed by
Anna. The affidavit further alleged that Herbert had long forfeited his parental rights
over their children.
Herbert, upon knowing the institution of such petition for adoption, went home
to the Philippines and interposed his opposition to the adoption claiming that the
petition was defective since it lacks his consent. He also moved for the reacquisition
of his custody over his children and the same was later granted by Branch 19 of RTC
Cebu City. Later, the RTC Branch 14, issued a decree granting the petition for
adoption and in doing so, the RTC ruled that Herbert has abandoned his children and
such abandonment is a ground for dispensing with his consent to the adoption. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decree of adoption. Motion for reconsideration filed by
Herbert was likewise denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for adoption was defective for lack of Herberts
consent.
Ruling:
Yes. Based on Article 188 of the Family Code, the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption is a requisite for its validity. Nevertheless, the
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A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority
vested in natural parents over the adopted child.
Facts:
Angelie Anne Fajardo, the child of Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon out of
their common law marriage, was offered for adoption to Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes
and Nelson Cervantes. Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was also
executed by Gina Carreon. Later, Spouses Cervantes filed a petition for adoption
before the RTC of Rizal which granted the petition making Angelie Anne Cervantes
the child of the spouses Cervantes.
Later, the spouses Cervantes received a letter from the biological parents of
Angelie demanding a sum of money to which they never heeded. The biological
parents threatened to get back the child in case of non-payment. True to their word,
Gina Carreon took the child and brought her to her residence. Demand to return the
child were also unheeded. This prompted spouses Cervantes to file a petition for a
writ of Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Gina Carreon is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
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It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.
Facts:
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is the biological child of Honorato B. Catindig
and Gemma Astorga Garcia out of wed-lock. Due to the demise of Gemma, Honorato
filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child and prayed that Stephanies
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers surname, and that her
surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. The trial court granted the
petition and pronounced Stephanie as the child of Honorato and shall be known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Later, Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. The trial court, however, denied the same
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as
her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
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The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action.
Facts:
In an order granting the petition for adoption filed by spouses Dr. Diosdado
Lahom and Isabelita Lahom, Jose Melvin Sibulo became the child of spouses Lahom.
Later, however, Mrs. Lahom, filed a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before
the RTC on the grounds of strained relationship and utter disregard of Jose Melvin
Sibulo of the needs and feelings of Mrs. Lahom who was then sick. However before
the institution of the case, RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act) took effect and such law
deleted the right of the adopter to rescind a decree of adoption. The RTC dismissed
the petition holding that by virtue of RA 8552, petitions lack of cause of action. Hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, may still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.
Ruling:
No. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code
and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. The Court should now hold that
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Support
EDWARD V. LACSON v. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN
LACSON, represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN
LACSON
G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006, GARCIA, J.
Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of
the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea.
Facts:
Edward V. Lacson and Lea Daban Lacson are the parents of Maowee Daban
Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson. For unknown reason, Edward left their conjugal
home thereby leaving Leah to fend for their children. For a period of 18 years, Leah
and her children transferred from one dwelling place to another not their own.
Records reveal that in a note dated December 10, 1975, Edward promise to give
support to his daughters however, aside from occasional giving of some amount,
Edward failed to fulfill his promise.
In 1995, Leah instituted an action for support in behalf of her daughter before
the RTC of Iloilo City demanding the amount of the support her daughters should
have received. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff sisters and ordered Edward to
pay them the amount equivalent to 216-month worth of support in arrears. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration filed
by Edward was likewise dismissed. Hence this appeal. Before the SC, Edward
contended that the demand required by law was never complied with by Leah thus
the award of support in arrears is not proper.
Issue:
Whether or not the mother of the petitioner failed to make a demand for
support as required by law.
Ruling:
No. The requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime
in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal
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Parental Authority
NERISSA Z. PEREZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C.
PEREZ,
G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996, ROMERO, J.
The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
Facts:
Ray Perez II (Ray Junior or RJ) is the only child of Spouses Ray and Nerissa
Perez and was born after successive miscarriage suffered by Nerissa. Nerissa is a
resident alien of United States while Ray only had tourist visa. The spouses and the
child later went home to the Philippines for a vacation however after the lapse of
such period, Ray decided to stay together with RJ to take care of his sick mother but
has promised to follow Nerissa. However, this never happened. Later the relationship
of the spouses went sour. Despite church mediation, reconciliation has failed.
Subsequently, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus asking Ray to surrender the
custody of their son to her.
The RTC ruled in favor of Nerissa holding that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother. However on appeal, the CA reversed the RTC
decision holding that granting custody to the boy's father would be for the child's
best interest and welfare. Nerissa filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to Nerissa.
Ruling:
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While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are
for some reason separated from each other, it does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation.
Facts:
Ramon R. Villar, a married man, had three children with Daisie T. David out of
their amorous relationship namely; Christopher J, Christine and Cathy Mae. Such
relationship became known to the legal wife and family of Villar. Later, the legal
family of Villar accepted the children. During one of Villars family vacation, they
invited Christopher J., then six years of age, with Daisies permission. However after
such vacation, Villar refused to give back the child. This prompted Daisie to file a
petition for habeas corpus.
The RTC ruled in favor of Daisie and ruled that she has the rightful custody
over Christopher J. However on appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The
CA ruled that the petition for habeas corpus is not proper and that the question of
custody and the question of custody should be brought in a case singularly filed for
the purpose. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is proper to recover the
custody of a child.
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto."
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Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential
right over that of petitioner to be Vincents guardian.
Facts:
Reeder C. Vancil and Helen G. Belmes are common law husband and wife and
they had two children out of such relationship namely Valerie and Vincent. Due to the
death of Reeder, a US-based Navy serviceman, Bonifacia Vancil, the mother of
Reeder, filed a guardianship proceeding over the persons and properties of minors
Valerie and Vincent before the RTC of Cebu City.
Later, the RTC appointed Bonifacia as the legal and judicial guardian of the
persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr. Subsequently, Helen
Belmes filed an opposition to such proceeding contending that she initiated a similar
proceeding. Belmes also filed a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment
of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors
The RTC denied the motion of Belmes and directed Bonifacia to perform her
duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and ruled that
under the law, parents are ipso facto the guardian ad litem of their minor child.
During the pendency of the petition, Valerie attained the age of majority thus making
the guardianship proceeding, in so far as she is concern, moot and academic.
Issue:
Whether or not Helen Belmes should be the guardian of Vincent Vancil.
Ruling:
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