Transnational Governance PDF

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Business & Society
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DOI: 10.1177/0007650312462666
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Transnational Governance,
Deliberative Democracy,
and the Legitimacy of
ISO 26000: Analyzing
the Case of a Global
Multistakeholder Process
Rdiger Hahn1 and Christian Weidtmann2
Abstract
Globalization arguably generated a governance gap that is being filled by
transnational rule-making involving private actors among others. The democratic legitimacy of such new forms of governance beyond nation states is
sometimes questioned. Apart from nation-centered democracies, such governance cannot build, for example, on representation and voting procedures
to convey legitimacy to the generated rules. Instead, alternative elements of
democracy such as deliberation and inclusion require discussion to assess
new instruments of governance. The recently published standard ISO 26000
is an interesting example of transnational governance. ISO 26000 was developed in a lengthy multiorganizational process for the purpose of giving guidance on the social responsibility of organizations. By assessing the specific
case of ISO 26000, this study sheds light on the question of how legitimacy
beyond nation-state democracy is ensured or constricted. Centering on the
idea of deliberate democracy and democratic legitimacy, the study offers
in-depth insights on the normative legitimacy of the development process of
1
Universitt Kassel, Kassel, Germany

Heinrich-Heine-Universitt Dsseldorf, Dsseldorf, Germany
Corresponding Author:
Rdiger Hahn, Universitt Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences,
70599 Stuttgart, Germany.
Email: [email protected]
The article was accepted during the editorship of Duane Windsor.
Downloaded from bas.sagepub.com at Flinders University on February 20, 2016
Hahn and Weidtmann
91
ISO 26000. Positioned on the interface of business studies and public policy,
this article contributes to the academic literature on transnational governance and on the role of multistakeholder processes in shaping the role of
business in society.
Keywords
standardization, transnational governance, organizational responsibility, ISO
26000, legitimacy, deliberative democracy
Ongoing globalization tendencies are arguably connected with a decreasing

regulative power of nation states and a growing influence of (multinational)
corporations and different interest groups (e.g., Beck, 2005; Habermas, 2001;
Hurrelmann, Schneider, & Steffek, 2007; Wettstein, 2010). Politics is no longer tied exclusively to national governments and state actors. At the same
time, private actors and especially private (multinational) enterprises are
called to take over responsibilities and leverage their resources for societal
issues as well as to actively engage in shaping the rules of doing business
(e.g., Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). However, a critical
mindset toward private enterprises and their influence in society often prevails (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). Moreover, related concepts such as corporate responsibility so far seem to be elusive and crudely defined at best
(Dahlsrud, 2008) and measures pursued under the notion of corporate responsibility vary widely.
Against this background, in 2001 the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) set out to draft a unilateral standard on social responsibility (SR) to provide a common and internationally agreed characterization of
organizational responsibilities (ISO, 2009c). The new guideline ISO 26000
sets out to encourage every organization . . . to become more socially responsible by using this International Standard. Furthermore, it aims to offer ways
to integrate socially responsible behavior into the organization (ISO, 2010e,
p. vi). To facilitate SR, it offers guidance on the scope of SR for various types
of organizations. As a noncertifiable, voluntary guidance document it provides
best-practices examples and possible courses of actions on the implementation
of responsible management practices of various kinds of organizations. (Hahn
2012a, 2012b)
However, given the above noted decreasing regulative power of nation
states coupled with the growing influence of private actors some scholars
foresee a governance gap (Quack, 2010). This gap is increasingly being filled
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Business & Society 55(1)
by transnational rule-making and institution-building as the number and proliferation of different kinds of standards demonstrates (Gilbert, Rasche, &
Waddock, 2011). Such standards are often regarded as new governing mechanisms involving private, civil society, and state actors and they play an
important role in international business relations to overcome the institutional
barriers of single nation states (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Wieland, 2007).
Other than laws and regulations, the resulting norms and guidance documents
are usually voluntary in use, not legally binding, and not enforceable (Fransen
& Kolk, 2007). Many scholars share a concern that new modes of governance
do not always sit easily within traditional conceptions of (democratic) legitimacy and accountability (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007; Quack, 2010; Srensen &
Torfing, 2005; Zrn, 2004). Some even suggest that there might be a severe
mismatch between new forms of governance on one hand and traditional
representative institutions on the other (Skelcher, 2007). Such critical views
point to the managerial relevance of the present topic: Organizations (and
especially private businesses) are increasingly expected to actively participate in shaping the rules of society. However, it is sometimes feared that
transnational governance might threaten traditional representative democracy since it would undermine the distinction between state and society (e.g.,
Srensen & Torfing, 2007). Therefore, the development process of ISO
26000 proves to be an interesting object of study since it not only deals with
an intensely debated field in international business (namely, the SR of organizations). Its mode of finding consensus in a multiorganizational, multistakeholder process is particularly suitable for a legitimacy assessment in
light of the previously highlighted issues of transnational governance.
Since traditional elements conveying legitimacy (such as elections, democratic representations, and public control) do not apply to the novel elements
of governance in question, new ways of establishing democratic procedures
granting legitimacy are being discussed. Within this context, this study
reverts to the concept of deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2000, 2001;
Habermas, 1994, 1996, 2003) that focuses on open and inclusive deliberation
instead of democratic representation and elections. Based on this thinking,
the general conditions as well as the open and more subtle elements of deliberation in the development process of ISO 26000 are analyzed in this article.
The aim is to shed light on the question of how legitimacy beyond nationstate democracy is ensured or constricted. The analysis of the unique ISO
26000 development process thus contributes to the scholarly conversation on
transnational governance and on the standardization of SR. It provides
insights on the prospects and limitations of using (and analyzing) elements of
deliberative democracy and normative legitimacy for standardization
Hahn and Weidtmann
93
processes on the intersection of political and managerial science. Castka and

Balzarova (2008a, p. 303) claim that the extensive multistakeholder discourse
leading to the development of ISO 26000 resulted in the most legitimate
CSR document currently available. However, they do not give further reason on how legitimacy comes into place and why ISO 26000 should be
regarded as a legitimate document. This article distinguishes input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy, and output legitimacy (Dingwerth, 2007;
Quack, 2010; Scharpf, 1997) to pursue three main questions: (a) How legitimate is the participation of various societal players in the development process of ISO 26000? (i.e., input legitimacy). (b) How legitimate is the design
of the development process? (i.e., throughput legitimacy). The third question dealing with output legitimacy, (c) Is the outcome of the development
process suitable to serve the functions for which it was set up? (i.e., output
legitimacy), can only be answered partly and preliminarily for reasons discussed separately below.
Following this introduction, the remainder of this article is structured into
four sections. Since aspects of normative legitimacy have so far mainly been
covered in political science, the article will commence in the first section by
introducing ISO 26000 as an element of transnational governance in the
realm of international management and business research. The single case
study research design is then justified. The second section begins by sketching the connections and differences between empirical legitimacy (which has
intensively been used within organizational science so far) and normative
legitimacy. This outline of different legitimacy aspects is used as a starting
point for the theoretical underpinnings of normative legitimacy. The concept
of deliberative democracy is then explored and the different dimensions of
legitimacy are itemized along different criteria that will be used for the subsequent analysis. Based on these insights, the centerpiece of this article is an
in-depth analysis of the development process leading to the publication of
ISO 26000 in Section 3. Finally, a conclusion is reached in the final section.
ISO 26000 and Transnational Governance:

Background and Research Approach
This article aims to convey aspects of normative legitimacy into the realm of
management and organizational research and to test this conceptual foundation in the context of international business relations. This section establishes
the basis for this effort by providing a brief introduction of the ISO standard
as a key element of transnational governance before outlining the validity of
a single case study as the main research method for the study.
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Research Background
The ISO 26000s lengthy and intensive development process comprising
several stages of drafting and consensus-finding among different groups of
society can be regarded as a prominent example of transnational governance
in a field that has seen much discussion and little consensus so far (Crane,
Matten, et al., 2008). Former research in managerial and in political science
has dealt with adjacent issues within the realm of transnational governance.
A robust stream of research focuses on assessing the functionality and effectiveness of decentralized and nonbinding modes of self- or soft regulation on
the level of single actors, industries, or technologies by means of conceptual
and empirical research (e.g., Fransen & Kolk, 2007; King & Lennox, 2000;
Koutalakis, Buzogany, & Brzel, 2010; Lyon & Maxwell, 2001). In a global
business context, the ISO and its numerous national standardization organizations can be characterized as the most important institution(s) for voluntary technical and nontechnical standards. Thus it is not surprising that
different ISO standards have gained extensive recognition within managerial
research (e.g., Beck & Walgenbach, 2005; King, Lennox, & Teerlak, 2005;
Tamm Hallstrm, 2004; Terlaak, 2007). Brzel and Risse (2010) indicate
that various forms of transnational governance can indeed potentially replace
hierarchical governance. However,
like governments, whose coercive capacity is reinforced by their
legitimacy, non-state market driven systems require legitimacy to justify policy development . . . Unlike sovereign states, which by definition possess legitimate authority, . . . non-state market driven systems
must actively achieve political legitimacy. (Bernstein & Cashore,
2007, p. 351)
This article specifically aims at fostering the understanding of the (potential)
legitimacy of such forms of international standardization on a normative
level. To achieve this goal, the specific case of ISO 26000 is discussed.
Such aspects of legitimacy are indeed an intensely discussed field in contemporary research (see Ansell, 2008; Quack, 2010). Wolf (2006), Risse
(2006), or Bernstein and Cashore (2007), for example, explored aspects of
legitimacy within transnational governance with a distinct focus on political
science. Other than the present study, however, previous scholarship concentrates on deriving an initial analytical framework rooted in a political
science background. Empirical research on different transnational governance has emerged only recently so that Meidinger (2008) as well as
Hahn and Weidtmann
95
Sundstrm, Furusten, and Soneryd (2010) still identify a shortage of empirical studies on participation and legitimacy. The present article complements
this stream of research by means of an in-depth analysis based on a single
case study building on concepts from different scholarly disciplines. It puts
a special emphasis on political science, social philosophy, and jurisprudence
by applying these insights to the field of transnational governance and international business.
Object of Study, Method, and Data

For the ISO, the development of ISO 26000 was a unique approach. Their
former standardization efforts up to then did not build on the insights and
input of such a heterogeneous group of participants including experts from
outside the ISO system. With regard to ISOs worldwide influence and pervasiveness, this process can be positioned as a critical case on the interface
between international standardization and transnational governance. As
such, it qualifies as a holistic single case study (see Sigglekow, 2007; Yin,
2009) offering a rich analysis of the legitimacy of the development process.
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) propose using multiple methods of data
collection by multiple investigators. As described below, a variety of data
sources has been employed to analyze the lengthy development process of
ISO 26000.
During the analysis, the authors found that current theories of legitimacy
used in managerial and organizational sciences were not suitable to assess
the increasingly important phenomena of transnational governance in the
business sphere. Thus this study focuses on the development of ISO 26000
as a distinct and so far unique process within transnational standardization.
It is anchored in an interdisciplinary realm of organizational and political
science. By focusing on aspects of normative legitimacy, this article supplements studies within organizational science which so far mainly used neoinstitutional theory to discuss the proliferation of different ISO standards
(see Beck & Walgenbach, 2005; King et al., 2005; Tamm Hallstrm, 2004).
The data for the empirical findings were derived from the extensive material
on the development process provided by the ISO. At the time when ISO
26000 was published in November 2010, these data included more than
1,600 documents accessible via the online ISO Livelink area (http://www
.iso.org/wgsr). This material comprised, for instance, various drafts of ISO
26000, minutes of the working group meetings, working documents, resolutions, comments, and results of ballots. These documents have been independently screened and analyzed by both authors. The data is complemented
96
by narrations of experts who participated in the development process.

Additionally, surveys conducted by independent researchers and by ISO
itself were also included in the analysis.
Theoretical Context of Legitimacy

Before applying the research design introduced above to the empirical data
of the ISO 26000 development process, the following section presents the
various aspects of legitimacy as the underlying theoretical construct of this
study. Initially, a general distinction is made between empirical legitimacy
(focusing on the actual acceptance of social rules, organizations, or structures) and normative legitimacy (referring to the question under which conditions such rules, organizations, or structures can be perceived as legitimate).
Then, building on the concept of deliberative democracy, the notion of normative legitimacy is more concretely examined by categorizing it into an
input, a throughput, and an output dimension to allow for a better itemization
for this and potentially also for following empirical case studies.
Empirical and Normative Legitimacy

The exact notion of legitimacy varies by scientific discipline, and depending on the object of investigation, research objective or otherwise (Johnson,
Ridgeway, & Dowd, 2006; Kumar & Das, 2007). When referring in particular to organizational and political science, a first and common distinction can be made between empirical (or sociological) legitimacy focusing
on the actual acceptance of social rules, organizations, or structures and
normative legitimacy, which refers to the question under which conditions
such rules, organizations, or structures can be perceived as legitimate
(Dingwerth, 2007).
The notion of empirical (or sociological) legitimacy is often used in organizational science. In his seminal article, for example, Suchman (1995, p. 574)
framed it as a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. In her interdisciplinary
work between political and organizational science, Quack (2008, p. 8) similarly described it as peoples perceptions of the rightfulness and appropriateness of authority for their acceptance and support for political and social
order. In sum, empirical legitimacy can thus be understood as generalized
perception of social acceptance (Vergne, 2011, p. 484) placing the factual
acceptance in the middle of thinking (Dingwerth, 2007). Without such
Hahn and Weidtmann
97
socially assigned legitimacy, an organizations ability to achieve its goals

might be considerably constricted. According to these terms, legitimacy is
the empirical outcome of actual acceptance within society which is large
enough to ensure the survival of the legitimacy seeking institution or
organization.
Normative legitimacy, however, asks for the reasons why social rules,
organizations, or structures can be perceived as legitimate. In past scholarship, normative legitimacy has been intensively covered within political science in references, for example, to processes and procedures that constitute
certain (political) rules and structures. Dingwerth (2007) consequently also
terms the main aspects as democratic legitimacy and thus concentrates on
democratic criteria of inclusiveness, transparency, and equality, which also
play a central role in this analysis. Institutions that are perceived to hold normative legitimacy are those with a widely accepted mandate that has been
rightfully imposed (Quack, 2010). Therefore, the normative question of
acceptability and how it can be achieved from a procedural perspective takes
precedence. In short, empirical legitimacy focuses on the acceptance of a
governing instrument by actors, whereas normative legitimacy addresses the
legitimacy principles in developing and possibly enforcing these instruments
or as Dingwerth (2007, p. 15) phrases, When do people have good reason to
accept decisions as rightful? Despite the fact that they are usually discussed
independently, both concepts are deeply connected: Acceptance in empirical
legitimacy can relate to normative principles and such principles that are
brought forward in philosophical or political beliefs can influence empirical
legitimacy beliefs. By focusing on normative legitimacy, the authors aim to
complement the perspective of empirical (or social) legitimacy that often prevailed in previous organizational studies and business research (e.g. Vergne,
2011). As stated in the introduction, the notion of normative legitimacy
within transnational governance is of growing relevance in international
management. This study focuses this view and sets the stage for consecutive
studies of the ISO 26000s empirical legitimacy, which can only be assessed
after the standard has been in use for some time.
Instrumental and Normative Perspectives

When turning to normative legitimacy (i.e., focusing on the acceptability of
governance processes), an instrumental as well as a normative perspective
needs to be distinguished. Normative legitimacy of nongovernmental institutions is receiving growing attention due to the indicated shift in attention
from national governments toward institutions of transnational governance
98
imposing worldwide standards or rules (Ansell, 2008; Quack, 2010). Yet

institutions within the sphere of transnational governance usually have no
legally binding or implementing power similar to those of governmental
rule. They shape the ways of doing business either through voluntary selfbinding measures (e.g., industry codes of conduct or standards of behavior)
or by posing external pressure on actors within their sphere of influence
(e.g., when a voluntary standard becomes a de facto standard). However,
normative legitimacy deficits have been identified as generating problems
with social acceptance . . . and perceptions of normative legitimacy flagged
as influential for the effectiveness of transnational governance (Quack,
2010, pp. 7-8). Therefore, lacking normative legitimacy of transnational
governance institutions and their development processes could limit the
influence of these institutions if they are not perceived to be legitimate
modes of governance by those who are affected. If the new standard or
similar efforts of transnational governance fail to demonstrate their legitimacy they might be especially fragile and prone to scrutiny (e.g., by political and civil society actors). Such a legitimacy crisis could thus trigger a
deteriorating effectiveness and efficiency of the standard or could even put
it into question in general. These thoughts so far point to an instrumental
perspective of legitimacy since a legitimate development process might
foster social acceptance and voluntary obedience (or at least the proliferation of usage of the standard).
The problem with an exclusively instrumental approach, however, is twofold. First, the causal relationship between a legitimate development process
of transnational governance (defined by whichever criteria) and adherence to
the resulting norms and standards is empirically not assured and thus ambiguous. Second, the mere perception of legitimacy cannot be a sufficient rationale for truly legitimate standardization processes since it might succumb to
a superficial mantle of legitimacy (Raz, 1990, p. 3) or as Wettstein (2010,
p. 280) illustrates, This perception of legitimacy may or may not be justified; accordingly, we must distinguish between normative authority and
authority that is merely de facto. An instrumental view of legitimacy thus
does not provide a moral grounding but is rather fuelled by the supposed
outcome. Starting from the normative deficiencies of a narrow instrumental
approach, Scherer and Palazzo (2007) persuasively argue that a particular
concept such as (C)SR needs to build on a normative justification to overcome the mentioned deficits. In following their reasoning it can be argued
that a normative perspective is especially important for a voluntary norm,
which sets out to provide guidance on SR: A standard that particularly influences the behavior of organizations toward society can be expected to build
Hahn and Weidtmann
99
on a legitimate development process characterized by its acceptability in

society. This thought, however, directly begs the question of what constitutes
a legitimate development process.
Democratic Legitimacy and Deliberative Democracy in

Transnational Governance
When elaborating on the rules and conditions under which a given instrument of governance is deemed legitimate, nowadays democratic principles
normally stand at the center of thinking (Steffek, 2003). As mentioned earlier, new forms of governance are often connected with a global democratic
deficit that must be reduced if world-wide arrangements are to be legitimate
(Linklater, 1999, p. 477). As a consequence, establishing effective democratic procedures is regarded as essential in gaining legitimacy (Clark, 2007).
From a top-down perspective, democratic arrangements provide legitimation
to institutions, rules, and norms (Abromeit & Stoiber, 2007). From a bottomup perspective, these arguments are supposed to safeguard that those who are
affected by the respective instrument of governance are not subjected to rules
that they cannot accept. With transnational governance, however, the traditional perspective of (representative) democracy becomes weaker since such
forms of governance are not subject to the principle of elected individuals
representing the people (Kjr, 2004; Sundstrm et al., 2010). Consequentially,
new ways of establishing democratic procedures granting legitimacy are
being discussed. The question of democratic legitimacy becomes even more
pressing when looking at the various players influencing transnational governance beyond the single state. Businesses are licensed to operate as economic actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or similar interest
groups are licensed to act as advocates for specific issues. However, none of
these actors are elected or democratically controlled by the public (Scherer
& Palazzo, 2007).
An approach compatible with new forms of governance under the conditions of globalization is often seen in the concept of deliberative democracy
(esp. Habermas, 1994, 1996, 2003). According to this concept, democratic
legitimacy is achieved if all parties that are affected by an instrument of
policy have the opportunity to participate in its development through deliberation. The centerpiece of legitimacy thus rests in communication processes
that aim at building consensus (or at least mutual understanding) among the
actors involved (Dryzek, 2000). Apart from the need to find alternatives
modes of democratic legitimization beyond traditional (nation-based)
democracy, various scholars point to the inherent benefits of deliberative
100
democracy. Barker (2007), for example, argues that deliberative democracy [. . . has] been developed in part to remedy the deficiencies of democracy (p. 25) and he adds that
there is a difference between a government that stands above and
beyond subjects, and a process of rule deliberation and rule-making in
which all those affected by the rules are involved. Simple representative government does not provide the latter. Democracy as a feature of
politics does. (p. 27)
The same applies to transnational governance: International norm setters
such as the ISO rely on voluntary involvement in norm development processes and on voluntary adherence to the norms. Consequentially, they build
on deliberative processes to underpin the authority of their products
(Higgins & Tamm Halmstrm, 2009, p. 995) or put differently, any norm
derived from such a governance process has to prove that it can be considered
justified by being tested in a deliberative process with the affected parties
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Such testing places extensive demands on the
governance processes to include criteria of deliberative democracy to gain
democratic legitimacy as will be discussed in greater detail below.
Criteria of the Input,Throughput, and Output Dimension of

Normative Legitimacy
Building on the concept of deliberative democracy, normative legitimacy in
transnational governance derives from processes and results of public consultation, which are not part of national democratic decision making. The
outcome of such processes achieves its legitimacy from the degree to which
these processes reflect the plurality of views in the public sphere and among
the affected parties (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). The challenge here is to identify new criteria for democratic will formation (and legitimization) beyond
nation states integrating new actors such as businesses and NGOs. To assess
normative legitimacy and expose such deliberate democracy criteria, the
dimensions of input, throughput, and output legitimacy require consideration
(Dingwerth, 2007; Quack, 2010; Zrn, 1998). Normative legitimacy is not
subject to a digital 1-0 assessment but instead ranges on a continuum that
will be assessed based on the criteria introduced in the following (similar to
Abromeit & Stoiber, 2007).
First, the input dimension deals with the question of which parties should
be involved in decision making. Turning to democratic legitimacy, the initial
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101
question centers around the aspect of how to define the notion of the people
in transnational governance. Because transnational governance crosses the
border of nation states, the answer goes beyond the simple question of citizenship. Instead, the main issue from the perspective of deliberate democracy
is whether the interests of all the relevant actors are sufficiently considered
(i.e., is the governance process outcome based on the approval of the direct
addressees and of those additional potential actors who are indirectly concerned). When examining transnational governance and in particular international standardization, it is necessary to consider whether the standard is
derived directly or indirectly from the authentic preferences and needs of the
parties concerned, and whether it appropriately considers the demands and
preferences of the rule addressees (Matz, 2005; Scharpf, 1997). To elaborate,
this aspect deals with the key participants of the rule-generating and decisionmaking processes. To achieve democratic legitimacy, those who are affected
by a decision must be able to take part in the preceding governance processes
and have an equal opportunity to engage in the discourse (Deitelhoff &
Mller, 2005; Risse, 2006). The underlying rational is that a broad inclusion
of constituents contributes to rationality and stability of the process due to a
more extensive articulation of reasons (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007).
Significantly, effective deliberative processes rely on the meaningful input of
the participants so that the qualification or expertise of those included in public consultation can be included as additional criterion (Quack, 2010).
Second, throughput legitimacy builds on a given input legitimacy and
covers the precise features of decision making within the governance process. It asks which conditions need to be fulfilled when taking decisions (i.e.,
does the outcome rest on fair procedures of decision making) and thus deals
with the procedural level of discoursive decision making (Matz, 2005). The
central question addresses the way in which decisions are made (Rapkin &
Braaten, 2009). Throughput legitimacy focuses on how the aggregation of
individual preferences is established and in how far the rule-making actors
are accountable for their actions toward the rule-following actors (Bckstrand,
2010). In democratic governmental systems, rulers are accountable to citizens through mechanisms of representation and elections. In transnational
governance, however, no conventional electoral procedures guarantee a legitimate representation. In deliberative democracy instead, legitimacy is gained
through procedures of deliberation in a public sphere (Habermas, 1996). As a
result, the analysis focuses on the modalities of communication and decision
making as well as the transparency of the process and its underlying rules.
Process transparency is regarded as an enabling factor of accountability
influencing democratic legitimacy. The argument is that the chance of
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(public) control of decision-making processes is an essential aspect of

accountability because it leads to decisions that are based on reason rather
than on the sole basis on the asymmetric power resources of the participants
(Deitelhoff & Mller, 2005; Meidinger, 2008). The vital assumption for the
approval of legitimate process throughput is that only informed actors are
able to voice their concerns and thus to actively integrate themselves to exert
their monitoring-function within transnational governance (Take, 2008).
Third, to complete the picture, the output dimension is introduced as last
element of normative legitimacy. Whereas input and throughput legitimacy
refer to the procedural aspects of a deliberative process, output legitimacy
refers to the actual result of a process and its problem-solving capacity (Rapkin,
& Braaten, 2009). Thus it is a subsequent element of normative legitimacy that
is based on the aspects of democratic legitimacy presented above. Accordingly,
output legitimacy is a twofold dimension: The first aspect examines whether
the process fulfills the goals it set for itself and whether the (intended) outcome
is achieved (Matz, 2005). The second aspect refers to the quality of this outcome, that is, whether the outcome is suitable to problem solving and leads to
the desired goals (Bckstrand, 2010). Both aspects can be summarized as normative since the goals to which both aspects of output legitimacy refer to are
not an unambiguous and objective final state but rather prone to (normative)
interpretation (not least since SR or corporate responsibility itself is a distinctively normative concept; e.g., Hahn, 2011). However, despite being an element of normative legitimacy, the output dimension is not a constituent element
of democratic legitimacy since it lacks the procedural focus of the other two
(Dingwerth, 2007). Instead, it focuses on the outcome of the preceding procedures. As a result, output legitimacy will only be a side aspect in the analysis
below. Since ISO 26000 has to date only been in use for a limited time, the
actual outcome of applying the new standard cannot be assessed, yet.
Consequently, an assessment of the quality of the problem-solving capacity of
the standard will have to await the results of subsequent empirical studies.
However, in the meantime the potential institutional effectiveness of ISO
26000 can cautiously be assessed insofar as it can be derived from input and
throughput legitimacy as well as from its actual content.
Analysis and Discussion of the Normative

Legitimacy of ISO 26000
Based on the concept of normative legitimacy, this section undertakes a
detailed analysis of the development process of ISO 26000. It covers the
main elements of deliberative democracy that were introduced above. To
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103
elaborate, the evaluation is structured along the basic dimensions of input

legitimacy (focusing on the balance and expertise of stakeholder representativeness and on the balance of regional representativeness) and on
throughput legitimacy (focusing on the modalities of communication and
modalities of decision making and on the transparency of the development process). Furthermore, a brief outlook on output legitimacy will also
be provided.
Input Legitimacy of ISO 26000

Input legitimacy refers primarily to the representativeness of the rule
addressees in the development process. In doing so, it facilitates consideration of the interests of all the relevant parties. Due to the extensive range of
addressees and due to the broad content of SR the participatory quality of the
decision-making processes is a decisive factor to assess the input legitimacy
of ISO 26000. As a result, this section assesses whether a balanced representation of the various relevant stakeholder groups is achieved and whether
such a representation then leads to an appropriate consideration of the various interests. The focus of the analysis is on the balance of the different
stakeholder groups per se as well as in terms of their regional (geographical)
representativeness. These two measures were chosen because the ISO 26000
is intended as an inclusive document that can be used by various types (and
sizes) of organizations from different societal backgrounds or industries in
different parts of the world (ISO, 2010e). Consequently, the assessment of
these two criteria aims to indicate whether the composition of the ISO SR
Working Group participants reflects this theoretically unlimited sphere of
usage (thus fulfilling the general requirement of deliberation by appropriately allowing for the participation of all parties who might be affected by
the standard).
Balance and expertise of stakeholder representation. Due to the fact that a
radical democratic representation (in terms of full participation of every single actor) is impossible to achieve, Habermas (1994), in his concept of deliberative democracy, embraces the idea of moving to an association of citizens
(in form of NGOs, civil society networks, or otherwise) to facilitate a representation of stakeholder ideas. Other scholars, however, dismiss the idea that
such a representation can be suitable to act for a global society. Apart from
the fact that, for example, marginalized groups might not be represented and
transparency might not be ensured within these groups (Kjr, 2004), Howse
(2001) already quite generally criticizes international civil society as a selfselecting mlange of individuals and organizations. (p. 362) Nevertheless, a
104
representation of some form appears necessary to ensure the effectiveness of

deliberative processes through information transfer as well as opinion and
preference formation (Clark, 2007).
Already earlier efforts in the (C)SR domain such as the later revisions of
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises embraced a variety of
stakeholders. For the revision of the OECD guidelines in 2000 and 2011, an
informal consultation committee of different actors was convened (Salzmann,
2005). This group, however, included only selected NGOs and experts from
trade unions and business representatives without necessarily ensuring a balance of different stakeholder groups. Moreover, NGO representatives were
only included in the drafting phase where they participated in focus groups to
comment and brainstorm on relevant issues. The ISO 26000 development
process stroke a new path in systemizing the representation. Members of the
ISO Working Group (WG) were subdivided in six stakeholder categories
(Consumers, Government, Industry, Labor, NGO, and Service,
support, research and others [SSRO]; ISO, 2005b) to support a balanced
representation of the different stakeholders that meets the various interests of
the addressees of the guideline. ISO member bodies (i.e., those national bodies that represent their country within the ISO) were allowed to nominate up
to six persons (one for each of the six stakeholder categories). These nominees held an expert status that included the right to participate actively at
the different drafting stages (ISO, 2004b, 2009d). Each member body was
also encouraged to establish a national mirror committee to integrate further
expertise into the development process to support the WG experts. Moreover,
international or regional non-ISO organizations could acquire a so called
D-liaison status with the right to nominate up to two experts with the same
status as other nominated experts (ISO, 2004b).
Since SR as subject of ISO 26000 involves numerous issues beyond mere
technical standardization, the inclusion of experts from various stakeholder
groups seems appropriate to generate a broad expertise within the community
of nominated experts. Therefore, the decision to include D-liaison experts
can be regarded as beneficial for the overall expertise of the group if it can be
assumed that those D-liaisons who nominated experts are especially well
equipped to deal with various aspects of SR. This conclusion is supported by
the type of prominent D-liaisons who sent experts to the WG (e.g., UN Global
Compact, Transparency International, World Health Organization, Global
Reporting Initiative, and numerous others).
In May 2010 the WG consisted of 450 experts from more than 80 countries (ISO, 2010c). The overall representation within the WG showed no
dominating share of any single group so that the setting of a maximum
Hahn and Weidtmann
105
number of experts from each stakeholder group (and country) effectively

restricted, for example, financially more affluent groups from dominating
the process. When drawing on the Gini coefficient as an indicator of inequality in distribution, a value of 0.18 in May 2010 (improved from 0.27 in
March 2005) indicates a comparably well-balanced representation. This
trend toward equal representation correlated with a disproportionately high
growth of smaller groups and an increasing overall number of experts during
the development process. However, since private enterprises were expected
to be the main adopters of the ISO 26000 (Castka & Balzarova, 2008b;
Schmiedeknecht, 2008), it might have been argued that they should have
been represented with a higher share to reflect the anticipated factual diffusion of the guideline. Apart from building on speculation (since during the
development process the standard was apparently not in use, yet), such a
claim does not ally with the fact that an overarching goal of ISO 26000 is to
contribute to sustainable development (ISO, 2010e). Sustainable development reflects the idea of global intragenerational and intergenerational justice (World Commission on Environment and Development [WCED],
1987). Since the ISO 26000 focuses not only on the needs of its direct users
but also on the needs of all groups of society, the representativeness of the
addressees in the development process should not (only) be equated with the
representativeness of the anticipated eventual users of ISO 26000 but more
importantly with the representativeness of those who might be affected by it.
In addition to these aspects, the composition of the WG with its six categories of stakeholders where each single expert represents the interests of its
whole group can also be discussed from a more fundamental perspective. It
might be argued that the grouping of participants was too inaccurate to reflect
the manifold demands of the various stakeholders within each group. The two
groups probably most affected in the process were Industry and NGO.
For example, small and medium-sized enterprises as well as large transnational corporations are both included in the Industry group despite their
very different attributes and concerns (Perera, 2009), whereas the NGO
group can be regarded as even more heterogeneous due to the combination of
such diverse aspects as human rights and biodiversity under the same roof
(Bostrm & Tamm Hallstrm, 2010). While this heterogeneity indeed might
have hampered the decision-making processes within these groups, a further
differentiation into various subgroups would have increased the number of
experts. Such an increase could have led to difficulties in consulting, voting,
and reaching consensus. Furthermore, Wieland (2007) suggests that exceeding a critical mass of experts is likely to introduce significant barriers for an
effective development progress. In this case, since the WG meetings required
106
the realization of substantial resources, it appears that the final number of

experts was close to reaching its maximum capacity. Instead of a further differentiation of stakeholder groups, differing concerns and viewpoints could
already be voiced within these groups. This procedure directly leads to the
question of the input legitimacy of each single group since the experts are
supposed to represent the position of their various principals. Here again, a
balanced representation of those principals who develop the position of the
whole group (as well as its outcome, which is respectively voiced by the
expert) clearly requires assessment. Such an analysis, however, was beyond
the scope of this study.
As was the case with the WG experts from different stakeholder groups, a
balanced representation of stakeholders is also needed in the already mentioned national mirror committees. More specifically, the aim of these committees was to integrate potentially different national stakeholder interests
into the international development process. The integration of interests was
achieved via a continuous exchange of information and the option to submit
comments to the WG (Castka & Balzarova, 2008b; ISO, 2009c). While
already in 2006, 72% of participating countries had mirror committees, only
62% had representatives from all six stakeholder categories and 30% of the
countries admitted that their committees were not in accordance with the
principle of a well-balanced representation of participation (ISO, 2007a). As
a consequence, the participating parties of the WG meeting in May 2009
were again requested to take active measures to achieve an appropriate balance across the stakeholder categories in their mirror committees (ISO,
2009f). Due to the unbalanced representation in some mirror committees,
communication might have been unbalanced or influenced by the interests of
certain stakeholders thus limiting democratic legitimacy in this aspect.
Balance of regional representation. Since ISO 26000 is intended as a worldwide standard, the regional balance of representation can be regarded as a
supplementary criterion of input legitimacy. Former standard-setting processes were sometimes criticized for an insufficient representation of developing country experts that led to a Westernization of standards (Castka &
Balzarova, 2008b; Gilbert & Rasche, 2007). The most visible effort to ensure
a regional balance in the ISO 26000 development process was the twinned
leadership of the WG that was led by the ISO member bodies Brazil and
Sweden (ISO, 2009c). Furthermore, in May 2010, 70% of the WG experts
came from developing countries up from 47% in May 2005 (ISO, 2010c).
Hence, during the lengthy consultation process toward developing the ISO
26000 the regional allocation of experts increasingly mirrored the actual
(albeit highly simplified) status of worldwide society.
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107
Nevertheless, given that the guideline might have been assumed to be

mainly employed by organizations from industrialized countries, one could
have argued that this representation does not reflect the real circumstances of
future ISO 26000 adoption. However, at the time of development it was not
yet clear where the potential users of the standard would come from so that
any bias toward a specific group would not be justified if solely taken on
grounds of speculation. To avoid such a bias, the representation should
instead reflect the true circumstances of society. Such a reflection helps to
prevent any ex-ante limitation of input legitimacy and more significantly,
reflect the claim of sustainable development that explicitly highlights the
essential needs of the worlds poor (WCED, 1987, p. 43). This claim
directly triggers the question of how such a representation can be achieved.
Each country had the same weight in the development process irrespective of
other criteria such as population or GDP. This is not unproblematic when
picturing that, for example, China and the U.S.A. had the same voting power
as Barbados. However, attaching voting power to GDP might directly conflict with the idea of sustainable development (since it would lose sight of the
voices of the poor), whereas an allocation on the grounds of total population
could potentially suppress the needs of minorities (White, 2005).
In summary, the analysis above indicates that a perfect input legitimacy
based on a full representativeness of all possible addressees of ISO 26000 is
neither given nor potentially even possible. Perfect representation could only
be achieved when virtually all addressees are included, as the underlying
allocation mechanisms could otherwise always be criticized. Yet perfect representation is an unrealistic goal since it would inhibit any decision making
and consulting process (Take, 2008) and thereby would directly impede
throughput legitimacy. Nevertheless, an asymmetric distribution of power
within such a multistakeholder discourse could destabilize the entire process.
Strong individual participants could use their resources to oppress opposing
positions, which could threaten the power balance. In an early survey by
Schmiedeknecht (2008), 78% of the participating experts raised concerns that
some groups might have a higher influence than others. Despite these objections, the vast majority still agreed that the process was inclusive (86%), fair
(83%), and democratic (81%). As a result, overall, the participatory quality of
the WG tends to be balanced (at least in terms of ISOs self-defined categories). Consequently, the development process was not characterized by significantly unbalanced participation or by a substantially asymmetric
preallocation of power. However, the aspect of unbalanced mirror committees does cast a slight cloud on the democratic legitimacy of the process
input. The endeavors to institute those committees can generally be regarded
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as suitable to cascade representation down to the different member bodies

and to foster the communicative processes within these groups. Nevertheless,
the realization of this idea was not flawless and thus provides opportunities to
improve input legitimacy in transnational governance (e.g., in downstream
groups). The next section now turns to evaluate whether and how the otherwise balanced representation is reflected in the processes of consultation and
decision making.
Throughput Legitimacy of ISO 26000

The modalities of communication and decision making within the development process as well as the transparency of the process as an enabling factor
of accountability can be regarded as the main elements of throughput legitimacy. Furthermore, in addition to open communication, informal avenues
of decision making such as behind the scene talks or the political power of
certain players in the process can be relevant aspects in transnational decision making. Consequently, they play an important role in the development
of ISO 26000 (see Bowers, 2006). Despite their potential influence, such
informal consultations are generally not included when assessing democratic
legitimacy as they do not comprise an open (but merely a hidden) inclusion
of actors. The authors will nevertheless revert to this aspect in the later
analysis and point out opportunities and limits of such forms of participation.
Modalities of communication. As stated above, democratic legitimacy in
deliberative processes is achieved through open communication based on
equal rights of participation. The ISO aimed to ensure open communication
between the WG-participants as well as with externals (ISO, 2004b). The following analysis will determine whether the process shows indications of
barrier-free communication for the participants as a precondition for effective
communication.
The first area of analysis is the physical WG meetings, which can be
regarded as the main international platform of communication among the
WG participants. The eight plenary meetings provided opportunities for
direct communication and exchange among the participants (ISO, 2007c).
The average participation quota of WG experts was 58% (ISO, 2009e). With
several hundred attending experts these meetings were quite large compared,
for example, with the consultations preceding the revisions of the OECD
guidelines that were conducted in much smaller groups (Salzmann, 2005). To
avoid underrepresentation of experts from organizations with limited financial resources (and thus linking this aspect of throughput legitimacy directly
to the aspect of balanced representation from input legitimacy), the ISO
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established the SR Trust Fund. This fund covered the main costs for participating at the WG meetings of eligible individuals to increase and broaden a
balanced stakeholder involvement (ISO, 2008b). Additionally, ISO member
bodies from developing countries could obtain support from the ISO/
DEVCO committee. Thus a number of institutional arrangements were
made to lower potential barriers for participating at the WG meetings. This
support enhanced the potential of personal communication within the development process and thereby strengthened opportunity for a balanced and
inclusive deliberation.
Beyond physical WG meetings and mirror committees, the participating
actors could submit their particular standpoints on any topic of the development process and thus have it (potentially) included into the discussions. Just
as with the year 2000 revision of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, these comments were made publicly available. With the publication on the ISO online area Livelink they can be regarded as part of the
discourse process that potentially additionally allowed for a monitoring of
the involved parties by outside actors. The fact that several thousand written
comments were submitted and published before each meeting indicates that
this communication channel was actively used. However, active commenting
is not sufficient to justify a conclusion of legitimate decision-marking processes. First, a key question is whether these comments were heard, discussed, and incorporated in the subsequent decisions. The multistakeholder
WG conferences and the different task groups facilitated discussions and
incorporation of comments into the various drafts. In addition, they provided
abundant opportunities for further formal and informal consultation (van
Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2008). A survey by Schmiedeknecht (2008) already
indicated that the participants themselves mostly perceived the decisions to
be the output of inclusive and transparent stakeholder discussions. For obvious reasons however, the previously mentioned informal consultations in
particular represented a black box for this study.
Notwithstanding, language as another practical aspect of communication,
can be analyzed. Just like in every other ISO standard development process,
English was the official language. While taskforces provided translations of
the most important documents (in particular in Spanish and French) no simultaneous translation took place at the WG meetings. Missing translation proves
a potential impediment to democratic legitimacy during the development
process since it excluded those experts who lacked sufficient knowledge of
English from participating effectively in direct communication (Tamm
Hallstrm & Bostrm, 2010). In summary, this analysis of the communication procedures concludes that the procedures of the ISO 26000 development
110
held no significant obstacles to hinder open communication. Yet the language

aspect indicates that there is still room for improvements for future processes
of transnational governance
Modalities of decision making. The next level of analysis addresses the
modalities of decision making within the standard development process. To
gain an impression on how aggregations of preferences took place within the
WG, the focus is placed on the question on how far the rules for taking major
decisions followed the preconditions of democratic processes. Within deliberative democracy, the ideal outcome would be a consensus that is achieved
through open discourses in a noncoercive environment (Habermas, 1996).
The overall proceeding principle within the ISO 26000 project is founded on
the idea of achieving a consensus among the participants (ISO, 2005a). The
ISO itself defines consensus as a
general agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into account the
views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments. (ISO, 2004a, p. 26)
However, this definition is not necessarily equivalent to unanimity. This
evaluation can already be illustrated by a debate that took place even before
the WG was constituted: In the beginning, the question of whether ISO
26000 should be designed as a certification standard or as a guideline was
subject to intense discussions (Castka & Balzarova, 2008c). The final (yet
strongly debated) consensus was to refrain from the idea of certification due
to difficulties in verifying an extremely diverse concept (such as SR) as well
as due to the unsatisfying status of the verification industry at the time.
The ISO 26000 development process was then divided into several successive stages. To complete one stage and enter the next, a continuously
improved draft version of the guideline had to be approved. The aim of this
approach was the continuous improvement and approval of all drafts with
the result being the publication of a new guideline or standard as an official
ISO document. To make the consensus-principle applicable, it was presented
in concrete terms for each project stage. Figure 1 illustrates these stages
graphically.
Figure 1 depicts how during the Preparatory Stage, the WG composed
four consecutive Working Drafts. Each of these versions was sent out to all
experts for comments and received an extensive amount of input by the different stakeholders. Through this input numerous changes were successively
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Hahn and Weidtmann
Stage
Preparatory
Stage
Commiee
Stage
Enquiry
Stage
Approval
Stage
Document
Working
Dra1 - 4
Commiee
Dra
Dra InternaInterna
onal Standard
Final Dra InterInter

naonal Standard
Mode of
DecisionMaking for
Approval
Judgement by
leadership
-majority of
vong P-members;
Backing of D-liaisons
-majority of
vong P-members;
-majority of all
vong members;
-majority of
vong P-members;
-majority of all
vong members;
Figure 1. Stages and modalities of decision making in the ISO 26000 development
process.
implemented. To complete this stage and finalize the Working Draft, a judgment by the WG leadership determined whether a consensus among the participating experts was reached so that the development process entered the
Committee Stage (ISO, 2008d). This second stage is regarded as the principle stage of the process since it included the first robust draft of ISO 26000
(ISO, 2004a). While it was made clear from the beginning, that there will be
no voting in the WG (ISO, 2005a, p. 5) compiling the Working Drafts, the
decision-making modality for completing the Committee Draft changed to
a two-thirds majority vote of the national member bodies who actively participated in the development process (so called P-members; ISO, 2004a,
2009e). Clearly, since it is no longer based on finding an overarching consensus, such voting abandons the idea of an ideal discourse. On the other hand,
whereas decisions solely stemming from the ideal speech situation are arguably too idealistic (Habermas, 1994, p. 4), decisions should at least be
based on mutual understanding of the participants positions and values
(Dryzek, 2000). This approach generally allows a deviation from a strong
consensus principle. In the committee draft stage, each P-member was supposed to represent a national consensus of all participating stakeholder categories (ISO, 2008c). Additionally, the backing of the D-liaison organizations
was requested and could be expressed through comments on the Committee
Draft. However, these comments were not counted as formal votes (ISO,
2007b). In March 2009, the second stage was completed after about 70% of
all P-members agreed to the Committee Draft and 75% of the D-liaison organizations expressed their support (ISO, 2009a). Beyond the official ISO rules,
however, these results offer some leeway for interpretation: When the 14
P-members who officially abstained from voting or did not react to vote are
included into the calculation, the active supportive votes account for 58% of
all member bodies entitled to vote. Hence, whether this formal agreement
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reflects a true fundamental consensus or not remains inconclusive since not

all member bodies took part in the vote. Nevertheless, the conclusion can be
made that the free choice to take part in (or absent from) the voting process
meets the requirements of a democratically coined normative legitimacy.
In the last two stages (Enquiry Stage and Approval Stage), the number of members who were permitted to vote was increased to all ISO member bodies (and not only the active P-members; ISO, 2004a). Again, a
two-third majority among the P-members was needed to finalize the stages.
This time however, no more than a quarter of negative votes of the total
number of all votes cast were allowed (i.e., including those member bodies
that were not active in the development process; ISO, 2004a, 2009e). This
tightening of voting rules raised the formal hurdle to achieve approval along
with the increasing number of voting parties. Furthermore, the backing of
the D-liaisons was again requested and had to be determined on the basis of
the given comments (ISO, 2007b). All comments needed either to be
reviewed and resolved or rejected by the WG leadership (ISO, 2009e). In
March 2010, the Draft International Standard and in September 2010 the
Final Draft International Standard was approved (ISO, 2010a, 2010d). In
the last voting round, the final draft reached 72 positive votes with five
negative votes and 11 abstentions. This allocation of votes led to the direct
publication of ISO 26000 in November 2010 (ISO, 2004a, 2010b).When
reflecting on these modalities of decision making for the project milestones,
the changing voting rules as well as the status of the D-liaisons deserve special attention. The closer the development process came to the final release
of the guideline, the more parties had to be considered and included in voting. While a consensus among the individual WG experts was necessary for
the approval of the Working Draft, the field of consensus was gradually
expanded to all ISO member bodies and the D-liaison organizations when
reaching the final release of the guideline. As a result, not only the number
of involved parties increased but also the approval modus changed from a
consensus among individuals to a majority consensus among institutions.
In particular during the final stages, this mode of consensus can be
regarded as an aggregation of institutional preferences based on a previous
aggregation of individual preferences. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that
consensus as perceived by the ISO changed its meaning significantly during the process (from a general agreement and harmony type to a majority
opinion determined by voting procedures). While this interpretation presents
a different notion of consensus than initially intended, it nevertheless seems
to be a reasonable approach to ensure the final publication of the standard.
Gaining unilateral consensus amongst virtually all parties at this stage appears
Hahn and Weidtmann
113
to be unfruitful (particularly when considering the highly contested content

and meaning of SR by the different stakeholders). As a result, voting procedures, which set out to find a broad majority of agreement and which are at
the same time open for all relevant actors can be deemed legitimate in a
democratic sense of throughput legitimacy. This reasoning, however, implies
that all votes by the member bodies build on an upstream consensus and
legitimacy amongst the individual stakeholders within each of the member
bodies. Here, a closer look at the votes of the member bodies in connection
with the consensus principle reveals some further insights that helps to interpret the voting results discussed above.
One of the 11 abstentions in the final voting came from the German member body. Within this member body, the groups Government, SSRO,
NGO, and Consumers voted in favor of the final standard, whereas the
Industry abstained from voting and Labor rejected the publication of
ISO 26000 (Schoenheit, 2010). Thus, despite a supporting majority, no consensus could be reached, which finally led to the abstention of this member
body. There are two possible reasons for this outcome leading to very different conclusions regarding the legitimacy of the processes within this member body so that this demeanor offers further interesting empirical insights
with regard to normative legitimacy: It might have been possible that the
German unions (as the main actors of the Labor group) were powerful
enough to overrule the majority of other groups that were in favor of the
standard. Such a course of action would indicate a drastic imbalance of
power radiating from input to throughput legitimacy. The reason for the
German abstention was, however, instead the result of a preceding decision
taken by the German member body as early as 1996 saying that no decision
can be made if a party with substantial interest in any new standard does not
agree with the majority. This rule inevitably leads to a continuously used
harmony type consensus principle (in line with ISOs efforts) to generate
an inclusive and unbiased development process. While the abstention
induced by the two Labour representatives was labeled as unsatisfactory
for the German member body by some of the German experts (see Halfmann,
2010; Schoenheit, 2010) it also casts an interesting light on the overall
throughput legitimacy: If such a procedure were followed in all member
bodies, the distinct approval of the Final Draft International Standard would
indeed indicate a very broad support of ISO 26000 among the different
stakeholder groups in the different member bodies.
However, even unanimous support by the member bodies does not automatically imply support by the external experts (namely, the D-liaisons).
The D-liaison experts were considered equitable to the ISO-experts in the
114
Preparatory Stage. They were, nevertheless, not entitled to vote during

the final ballots. Despite being asked to comment on the later draft versions
there was no minimum quota for supportive comments. This approach
matches with the role of outside experts (e.g., representing different NGOs)
in the revision process of the OECD guidelines. As a result, a certain room
for interpretation was given. Moreover, the fact that the achievement of a
resolved status for a comment also includes possible rejections indicates
a potential hazard since comments may be rejected just to speed up an
approval. Thus an assumed support of the D-liaisons might be vulnerable as
some organizations could still have had significant objections. Given these
facts, the ISO 26000 approval could be criticized for potentially being
biased. Notwithstanding (and different from the revision process of the
OECD guidelines), it has to be emphasized, however, that the issues for
which D-liaisons stand as advocates should ideally be represented already
in one of the six regular stakeholder categories that justifies the role of
D-liaisons as advising experts. A formal voting right for these organizations
could otherwise have led to an excess of votes from a specific group especially since there was no predefined maximum number of D-liaisons from
any area.
Transparency of the development process. The ISO 26000-project was initiated as a multiorganizational, multistakeholder discourse for the initially
discussed reasons. Consequentially, the different modi operandi need to be
comprehensible for external actors to allow their active participation. The
usual procedures of the ISO were widely adopted and only selectively customized to the unique preferences of ISO 26000 (e.g., with special operating
procedures for D-liaison organizations; ISO, 2007b). The complexity of
these rules might inhibit transparency and traceability in particular for those
stakeholders who were new or not directly involved in the development process. To reduce this problem (at least for the actors involved), various tools
of internal and external communication (newsletters, seminars, press
releases, or the provision of WG documents via the online ISO Livelink
area) as well as a task group (providing internal guidance on the special
working procedures of the WG) were installed (ISO, 2008a, 2009c). However, based on the reactions toward the change in decision-making modalities between the Working Draft (consensus by the experts) and the Committee
Draft (voting by the member bodies), these efforts can be interpreted as not
entirely successful. Since only the Working Drafts are usually (largely
autonomously) prepared by the experts, the new modalities were technically
still in accordance with the early resolution that stated that there was to be
no voting in the WG. Nevertheless, this change was perceived as a breach
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of the consensus principle (Tamm Hallstrm & Bostrm, 2010). Since it was
apparently not communicated clearly in advance it restricted the requirements of deliberate democracy.
Apart from the internal transparency regarding procedures and processes,
one of the most important steps to ensure transparency affecting throughput
legitimacy was the publication of the voting results and comments in a nonanonymous manner, that is, relating them to the respective organizations and
member bodies (ISO, 2009a, 2009b). Such a procedure is in line with the
principles of an open expression of opinions in deliberative democracy in
which the importance of a public sphere is highlighted (Habermas, 1996).
However, it does not follow democratic practices of secret ballots. On one
hand, this forces the different stakeholders and actors at least partially out of
their anonymity thus potentially hampering freedom of expression if such a
public naming reduces an expression of opinions. On the other hand, such
publicity potentially improves the possibilities to exchange ideas and thoughts
while also limiting the options to revert to dogmatic positions which might
hamper deliberations by assigning each comment or vote to a specific stakeholder or institution. This approach of publicity is in line with the idea of
consensus finding as expressed by the ISO. Since all of the involved actors
with their related votes and comments (including the final approval of ISO
26000 as an official ISO guidance document) are public, they can also be
held accountable for their decisions within the process as well as for possible
contrary behavior afterwards. This last point becomes highly relevant when
applying ISO 26000. By allowing for monitoring by external third parties, the
overall transparency of the project thus adds to its democratic legitimacy.
Interestingly, whereas aspects such as comments, votes, and procedures were
extensively and transparently documented, the physical meetings of the WG
instead used a closed-door-policy excluding, for example, media attendance.
Apparently, albeit not supported by all of the groups involved (see Tamm
Halmstrm & Bostrm, 2010), this approach was chosen to foster an open
communication within the WG itself to avoid strategic arguing. In sum, this
multifaceted approach seems to be a suitable compromise as foundation for
reasonably transparent and at the same time open communication.
In conclusion it can be assessed that a largely robust general development
framework generating throughput legitimacy was in place. However, in the
end, the responsibility lay with the participating actors themselves to use this
framework to generate throughput legitimacy through consultation and open
discourses. Here, the intensive involvement (with several thousand comments and a rather active expression of opinion) can be regarded as a positive
indicator. Indeed, the participants themselves already confirmed at an early
116
stage of the development process that they generally regarded the process as
inclusive, fair, legitimate, and transparent (Schmiedeknecht, 2008). However,
as discussed above, some participants also mentioned a perceived uneven
distribution of influence of different stakeholder groups contrary to the
intended balanced stakeholder representativeness. Nevertheless, such aspects
may have resulted from the participants own behavior rather than from an
insufficient institutional framework.
Preliminary Thoughts on Output Legitimacy of ISO 26000

As mentioned above, an extensive evaluation of output legitimacy will only
be possible after the new standard is in use for some time. Consequently, at
this point in time, from the two main aspects of outcome legitimacy (i.e., the
actual results of the process as well as the problem-solving capacities of its
outcome) only an assessment of the results of the process is feasible. An
assessment of the problem-solving capacity of ISO 26000 would inevitably
require conducting an extensive empirical study on the effectiveness of the
new standard in fostering SR in various types of organizations (comparable
to preceding studies, for example, of the effectiveness of the ISO 14001 or
ISO 9001; e.g., Aravind & Christmann, 2011; Beck & Walgenbach, 2005;
King et al., 2005; Naveh & Marcus, 2005).
When referring to the results of the process, possible trade-offs between
the legitimacy on one hand and the efficiency and effectiveness of the discourse and development processes on the other hand are relevant. At an early
stage of the process, Wieland (2007) emphasized that high legitimacy (in
terms of a broad inclusion of various stakeholders) could potentially lead to
low effectiveness (in terms of the inhomogeneous interests of the parties
involved) and efficiency (in terms of endless debates and an inability to come
to an agreement). Such a trade-off could thus ultimately inhibit output legitimacy. Indeed, the development of ISO 26000 was a lengthy process that took
two years longer than initially planned. This delay can be regarded as an
indicator of a trade-off. Yet in the end, a consensus was reached leading to the
publication of ISO 26000. Thus a necessary condition of the output legitimacy was finally fulfilled. This alone, however, is not sufficient to achieve
output legitimacy.
In particular the aspect of problem-solving capacity will most probably
be subject to debate. In this regard, it is first necessary to define which
problems ISO 26000 is designed to tackle. Given the broad aim of the
guideline, which is to encourage every organization . . . to become more
socially responsible by using this International Standard and to offer ways
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to integrate socially responsible behaviour into the organization (ISO

2010e, p. vi), the answer to this question can be quite multifaceted. Hahn
(2012a), for example, discusses the prospects of ISO 26000 in providing an
efficient organizational management infrastructure for responsible management processes, whereas Schwartz and Tilling (2009) are rather skeptical
when it comes to the usefulness of the new standard. Furthermore, Van
Hoivik (2011) provides insights into how the new standard might help smalland medium-sized enterprises in initiating a participatory dialogue process
to embed a deeper understanding of CSR into the organization. Hahn (2012b)
generally proposes that ISO 26000 will be most useful for small- and
medium-sized enterprises and for those companies that did not deal with
their social responsibility in a systematic way before, which would indicate
certain limitations to output legitimacy.
Despite these early efforts to assess the usefulness of ISO 26000, further
research is necessary to deal with the question of how far ISO 26000 can
achieve the above mentioned self-determined and admittedly rather vague
goals and in how far it will actually be accepted by business and civil society
actors.
Conclusion and Outlook

At the beginning the authors stated that there is growing recognition of the
proliferation of various forms of transnational governance relevant in an
international business context. Concerns of a possibly lacking democratic
legitimacy of new governing mechanisms were also mentioned. In the light
of this analysis one may conclude that much has been achieved in terms of
legitimacy when looking at the specific example of the ISO 26000s development process. The analysis has shown that this process is characterized by a
relatively high level of normative legitimacy stemming in particular from its
multiorganizational, multistakeholder approach involving experts from different regions, organizational settings, and interest groups. This evaluation
stands in stark contrast to former standardization efforts in the broad domain
of SR, which derived their input from a much less diverse base of participants (see Clapp, 1998, for ISO 14001; Mattli & Bthe, 2003, for ISO in
general; Take, 2008, for several environmental standards). This outcome is
not self-evident in light of some of the highly controversial issues which the
ISO 26000 development process faced.
A final look at one of these issues exposes some interesting aspects on the
meaning of political bargaining in deliberate democracy: At the beginning of
the ISO 26000 development there was a debate on the question whether it
118
should be certifiable or not. On one hand, some participants from industry

saw the opportunity for signaling good organizational conduct through
such a certificate and some NGO representatives voiced their hope that a
certifiable standard would be more easily accepted and could thus better
introduce a worldwide minimum standard for social responsibility compared
with a noncertifiable standard. On the other hand, other industry representatives feared the high costs of certification and some NGO participants argued
that a certifiable standard would abet greenwashing and a misleading usage
of the certificate. Yet the most critical stance against certification came from
the labor representatives. Instead of a voluntary standard, labor unions and
the International Labour Organization (ILO) instead preferred legal rules and
binding legislation ideally on a global level. This could not be provided by
the ISO. Furthermore, the ILO has its own system of international labor standards that were not intended to become less important vis--vis ISO 26000.
However, a worldwide standard on SR without the participation of the labor
group would have seriously constricted the legitimacy of the standard since a
broad stakeholder representation would not have been achieved. The ISO
recognized this and put substantial efforts into securing the participation of
the ILO as an important worldwide advocate of labor issues. A memorandum of understanding was signed which secured the position of the ILO in
the development process. A position in all important decision-making committees was guaranteed and the ILO was granted veto power in the case that
ISO 26000 would interfere with internationally codified labor rights as set
down by the ILO.
The special position of the ILO can be regarded as detrimental for an
ideal speech situation. In general, bargaining is not an option in the pure
form of discoursive ethics. It undermines the free exchange of arguments
and thus hinders an ideal discoursive outcome, which should be based solely
on the quality of arguments and not on the power of the involved parties.
The consultations with the ILO, however, certainly included bilateral negotiations and some form of bargaining. Does this then undermine the democratic legitimacy of the process from the very beginning? As already
discussed above in brief, the idea of an ideal speech situation can be dismissed for its lack of feasibility in particular with regard to issues involving
highly heterogeneous positions. The politically motivated talks between the
ISO and the ILO can now be examined from two sides: On one hand, one
could argue that they (potentially) undermine the democratic legitimacy of
the development process already ex-ante since they inflate the relative position of the ILO vis--vis other stakeholders. On the other hand, the memorandum of understanding might even enhance democratic legitimacy, which
Hahn and Weidtmann
119
would be severely limited in the absence of this important stakeholders

group. The present study suggests that the latter was the case (in particular
when reflecting the relatively high level of input legitimacy and the reasonable modes of communication and decision making as relevant aspects of
throughput legitimacy). The question of democratic legitimacy thus shifts to
preceding processes: If the development of the ILO labor standards was
coined by a high degree of democratic legitimacy, their preferred inclusion
to ISO 26000 would be justified. In sum, this aspect directly points to the
need to understand the limitations of deliberate democracy in transnational
governance or, more precisely, to understand which compromises need to be
made to enable normative legitimacy in the first place. The brief excursus
illustrated that it might not be possible to implement such new modes of
governance without falling back to some sort of political bargaining. For all
intents and purposes, however, such bargaining inhibits deliberative democracy (at least theoretically) but it also served as an enabling factor of democratic legitimacy for the ISO 26000 development process.
Moreover, this review of the ISO 26000 development process has shown
how new forms of transnational governance beyond nation states might work
in practice and which drawbacks and critiques they face. From a multidisciplinary perspective integrating organizational as well as political science, the
analysis provided evidence of the legitimacy potential of this process with its
opportunities as well as its limitations as an instrument of transnational governance. It seems that the ISOs efforts to achieve a reasonable balance of participation were partly successful although a full and equitable balance of
stakeholders could not be achieved. The obvious limitations of the concept of
deliberative democracy within transnational governance come to the fore,
however, if one measures the degree of normative legitimacy (and deliberate
democracy) mainly (or even solely) on the aspect of involvement of the direct
and indirect stakeholders: In practical management such an extensive inclusion might not be achievable, for instance when critical NGOs are refusing to
engage in stakeholder dialogue with companies due to feasibility, skepticism,
and other reasons, or when vulnerable citizens in the third world are not able
to voice their opinion due to practical constraints such as a lacking accessibility, language difficulties, or otherwise. The goal of a perfectly inclusive representation thus does appear to be unrealistic already due to constraining
factors such as availability of experts and other resources (similar ISO,
2010e). Nevertheless, a perfectly inclusive representation still illustrates the
ideal benchmark against which such new forms of governance might be measured. Yet a broad inclusion of stakeholders might not only generate positive
results via a high level of input legitimacy but, in effect, an extensive and
120
diverse set of participants might additionally create difficulties in ensuring

throughput legitimacy since it potentially hampers consensus-finding.
Notwithstanding the ISOs apparent quest to ensure input and throughput
legitimacy in the development process, its sustained efforts to achieve consensus might additionally lead to a situation in which the individual value for
the users is rather low if the achieved consensus builds on too many compromises. Such an outcome is possible for corporations as well as for other organizations or their stakeholders. Corporations, for example, may feel impelled
to make too many concessions and compromises when extensively implementing the ISO 26000 guidelines, whereas other groups (such as NGOs,
consumers, or employers) might perceive the final guideline as too weak to
truly enforce organizational responsibilities. In both cases, the ISO 26000
development process would still be characterized by its normative legitimacy. Yet this legitimacy would rather be superficial as it would not apply to
the standard itself. Overall, such normative legitimacy would not help in
strengthening the standards of empirical legitimacy.
Finally, it is possible that the voluntary nature of the new standard could
lead to mere superficial claims of adherence and possible greenwashing tendencies in the future. If this were indeed the outcome of using ISO 26000, the
assessed normative legitimacy would not be helpful in fostering SR in organizations through transnational governance. If, however, the new standard helps
organizations to better implement responsible management practices, it might
actually prove to be a meaningful instrument of governance (Hahn, 2012b).
Neither of these possible outcomes, however, is directly connected with the
legitimacy assessment but rather to the content and nature of voluntary standards and modes of de-governmentalized governance. Nevertheless, the inclusion of a diverse set of stakeholders, including reputable and well-known
organizations such as Transparency International or the OECD already
resulted in a broad attention toward the new standard. However, whether this
attention will lead to a broad acceptance within business and society or not
depends on the empirical legitimacy (i.e. the actual acceptance) it will gain
amongst the different stakeholders. Moreover, it is essential that these stakeholders perceive the usage of the guideline as beneficial for themselves.
Otherwise the guideline will probably perish from insignificance. These
potential outcomes offer several possibilities for future research on ISO 26000.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers of Business & Society for
their valuable comments that helped to improve this article considerably.
Hahn and Weidtmann
121
Authors Note
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 51st International Studies
Association Annual Convention 2010 and at the Academy of Management Annual
Meeting 2011.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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Zrn, M. (2004). Global governance and legitimacy problems. Governance and
Opposition, 39, 260-287.
Author Biographies
Rdiger Hahn is a full professor of business, esp. sustainability management, at the
Universitt Hohenheim, Germany. His research interests include, for example, sustainability management, CSR, sustainability reporting, and international & strategic
management in developing countries. He recently published in internationally
renowned journals such as, for example, Business Strategy and the Environment,
International Business Review, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Business
Research, and Organization & Environment.
Christian Weidtmann graduated from the Heinrich-Heine-Universitt Dsseldorf
(Germany). He is an auditor at an international multisector retailing group. His field
Hahn and Weidtmann
129
of work includes worldwide audits of various functions of different group companies

and due diligence projects. Previously, he worked as lecturer and research assistant at
the Faculty of Business and Economics at the Heinrich-Heine-Universitt Dsseldorf.

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462666

66Business & SocietyHahn and Weidtmann

Reprints and permission: http://www.

Rdiger Hahn1 and Christian Weidtmann2

Universitt Kassel, Kassel, Germany

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Ongoing globalization tendencies are arguably connected with a decreasing

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processes on the intersection of political and managerial science. Castka and

ISO 26000 and Transnational Governance:

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Object of Study, Method, and Data

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by narrations of experts who participated in the development process.

Theoretical Context of Legitimacy

Empirical and Normative Legitimacy

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socially assigned legitimacy, an organizations ability to achieve its goals

Instrumental and Normative Perspectives

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imposing worldwide standards or rules (Ansell, 2008; Quack, 2010). Yet

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on a legitimate development process characterized by its acceptability in

Democratic Legitimacy and Deliberative Democracy in

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Criteria of the Input,Throughput, and Output Dimension of

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(public) control of decision-making processes is an essential aspect of

Analysis and Discussion of the Normative

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elaborate, the evaluation is structured along the basic dimensions of input

Input Legitimacy of ISO 26000

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representation of some form appears necessary to ensure the effectiveness of

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number of experts from each stakeholder group (and country) effectively

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the realization of substantial resources, it appears that the final number of

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Final Dra InterInter