Estandarte Vs People of The Philippines
Estandarte Vs People of The Philippines
Estandarte Vs People of The Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 156851-55
the petitioner with a subpoena on August 28, 2000 and another on August 30,
2000, requiring her to submit her counter-affidavit.8
On September 6, 2000, instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed before
the City Prosecutor a Motion for Bill of Particulars with Motion for Extension of
Time to File Counter-Affidavit.9 In the Motion for Bill of Particulars, petitioner
alleged that there were no specific criminal charges that were stated in the
subpoenas. Thus, petitioner insisted that she cannot intelligently prepare her
counter-affidavit unless the criminal charges and the laws she violated are
specified.10
On March 10, 2000, the City Prosecutor issued an Order11 attaching the private
complainants Bill of Particulars,12 pertinent portions of which read:
1. That complainants are charging respondent for violation of Sec. 68 and
69 of PD 144513 in connection with the above-entitled case;
2. That to support their complaint, private complainants adopt the
investigation report of the provincial [sic] Auditor on [sic] complaint No. 23
and 25 which states:
Complaint 23 & 25
The principal Ms. Estandarte accepted cash and in kind donations without
being properly channeled and accounted first by the property custodian
and the cash without first deposited in the Trust Fund.
xxxx
and directing the petitioner to file her counter-affidavit.14 Petitioner filed her
counter-affidavit limiting herself only to the charges specified in the Bill of
Particulars.15
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor referred the case back to the OmbudsmanVisayas. The latter found sufficient grounds to hold petitioner liable for five counts
of violation of Section 3(e)16 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and filed before the RTC the corresponding
Informations,17 all dated October 12, 2001, with the following charges:
1. In Criminal Case No. 1918, for receiving cash donations from private
individuals and establishments in the total amount P163,400.00;18
Petitioner claims that the RTC erred when it overlooked the following
"formulations," viz:
(1) THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS)
CANNOT NOW QUESTION THE "BILL OF PARTICULARS" FILED BY
COUNSEL FOR COMPLAINANTS;
(2) WHEN THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WENT
BEYOND THE "BILL OF PARTICULARS" FILED BY THE
COMPLAINANTS THROUGH THEIR COUNSEL, SHE WAS
EFFECTIVELY DENIED OF HER RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.32
The petition is partly meritorious.
The Court shall first discuss the procedural aspect of the case.
The herein assailed RTC Order dated September 24, 2002 denied petitioners
Motion for Reinvestigation, and the other assailed RTC Order dated December
20, 2002 denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
From the RTC, petitioner went straight to this Court via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 apparently on the basis of Section 2(c), Rule 4133 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that in all cases where only questions of law
are raised, the appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC shall be to the
Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.34
However, considering that herein assailed Orders are obviously interlocutory
orders, the proper recourse of petitioner should have been by way of a petition
for certiorari as prescribed in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which
specifically allows the aggrieved party to file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.35
The herein petition for review on certiorari assails the jurisdiction of the RTC in
issuing the Orders in question denying petitioners Motion for Reinvestigation, on
the ground that the five Informations filed against the petitioner contained
charges beyond the Bill of Particulars filed by the private complainants, thereby
depriving her of due process.
The Court has treated a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in cases where the
subject of the recourse was one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. 36
Moreover, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard
procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits based on records
and evidence of the parties.37 Proceeding from the time-honored principle that
rules of procedure should promote, not defeat substantial justice, the Court may
opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve the substantial issues raised by the
parties.38
Accordingly, the Court shall treat the instant petition as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since the primordial issue to be
resolved is whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners Motion for Reinvestigation.
Thus, the Court will now proceed to determine the merits of the present petition.
On the first assigned error, petitioner insists that the Ombudsman-Visayas should
have limited the charges filed against her to the crimes mentioned in the Bill of
Particulars, and that the filing of the Informations charging her with crimes
different from those specified in the Bill of Particulars violates her right to due
process.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a bill of particulars is not
allowed by Administrative Order No. 7, entitled Rules of Procedure in the Office
of the Ombudsman39 (A.O. No. 7); and that therefore the Ombudsman cannot be
bound by the Bill of Particulars submitted by private complainants.
The Court agrees with the OSG. Clearly, the act of the prosecutor in granting the
petitioners Motion for Bill of Particulars is an act contrary to the express mandate
of A.O. No. 7, to wit:
Section 4. Procedure- The preliminary investigation of cases falling under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be
conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following provisions:
xxxx
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of
jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be
entertained. If the respondent desires any matter in the complainants
affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the
time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of
this section.
The Court finds the argument of petitioner that when the City Prosecutor was
deputized by the Ombudsman-Visayas to conduct the preliminary investigation,
any action taken therein is, in effect, an action of the Ombudsman, who is bound
by the act of the City Prosecutor in granting the Motion for Bill of Particulars, and
is not tenable.
Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 expressly provides
that those designated or deputized to assist the Ombudsman shall be under his
supervision and control. Indubitably, when the City Prosecutor is deputized by the
Office of the Ombudsman, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the
Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to
direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the prosecutors decision.40
Consequently, in the present case, petitioner has no valid basis for insisting that
the Ombudsman-Visayas must be bound by the erroneous act of the City
Prosecutor in granting petitioners Motion for Bill of Particulars. Laws and
jurisprudence grant the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to reverse or
nullify the acts of the prosecutor pursuant to its power of control and supervision
over deputized prosecutors. Hence, it was within the prerogative of the
Ombudsman-Visayas not to consider the Bill of Particulars submitted by the
private complainants.
This brings the Court to the second assigned error.
Petitioner claims that her right to due process was violated when the
Ombudsman-Visayas filed the Informations charging her with violations of R.A.
No. 3019, which went beyond the charges specified in the Bill of
Particulars.41Petitioner further argues that since there were no criminal charges
stated in the subpoenas served on her on August 28, 2000 and August 30, 2000,
she was not properly informed of the nature of the crime which she was
supposed to answer in her counter-affidavit.42
While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman and therefore should not be the basis for determining
what specific criminal charges should be filed against herein petitioner, it
behooves the Ombudsman to accord the petitioner her basic rights to due
process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
In a preliminary investigation, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the petitioners basic due process rights, such as the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting
documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents in her defense,43 to wit:
counter-affidavit to the charges; and whether the charges in the five Informations
filed against petitioner were based on the same acts complained of and stated in
the subpoena and the documents attached thereto?
While there is no rule that the initial complaint filed against an accused with the
prosecutors office should specifically state the particular law under which he is
being charged, it is a basic elementary rule that the complaint should specifically
allege the criminal acts complained of, so as to enable the accused to prepare
his answer or counter-affidavit accurately and intelligently.
The determination of the issue whether the criminal charges were indeed alleged
or specified in the subpoenas and in the documents attached thereto, is a factual
issue and therefore outside the province of this Court. It is a well-settled rule that
the Supreme Court is not the proper venue in which to consider a factual issue,
as it is not a trier of facts.46
In resolving the question whether petitioner was denied due process, the RTC or
this Court cannot rely on the disputable presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed. The RTC should have required the petitioner to submit
the subpoenas and the attached documents served on her to enable it to
examine the same and resolve whether the petitioners right to be informed was
violated. It was only upon ascertaining this fact that the RTC could have validly
determined whether petitioner was denied due process.
It must be stressed that the primordial issue in the present petition is not whether
the Ombudsman-Visayas had correctly found a probable cause to justify the filing
of the five Informations against herein petitioner, but whether she was not
accorded due process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation as to entitle
her to a reinvestigation. A valid and just determination of whether there is a
probable cause on the part of the Ombudsman to bring the cases to court against
petitioner would ensue only when the petitioner has been fully accorded due
process in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
A preliminary investigation is a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or
investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial
officer.47 Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to
usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting
the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the
crime, with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be
prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a
realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case.48 In order to satisfy the due
process clause, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in
the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity.49 A
preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More
important, it is a part of the guarantee of freedom and fair play which are
birthrights of all who live in our country.50
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders
dated September 24, 2002 and December 20, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bago City, Branch 62 are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for
determination whether petitioner was denied due process in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice