Land Titles and Deeds Cases

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO
TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016
Members
Editors: Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Luigi Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
LAND TITLES
AND DEEDS
First Sem Cases
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
Table of Contents
TORRENS SYSTEM 2
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
33
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
53
NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES58
DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LAND 63
CANCELLATION OF TITLE 66
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
67
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TORRENS SYSTEM
MANUELA GREY Y ALBA, et al. v. ANACLETO R. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 5246, September 16, 1910, TRENT, J.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto; It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government, and all the branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the
general description "to all whom it may concern.
Facts:
Manuela Grey y Alba, et al. are the only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and
Honorato Grey who are deceased. When the decedents were still living, they purchased
three parcels of land. The petitioners then sought to register the three parcels of land. Their
petition was granted by the court and a decree was issued. Anacleto dela Cruz filed a
petition to reverse the grant of the court. According to him, the two lots were owned by his
father by virtue of a state grant and he inherited the same. He alleged that at the time of
registration, he was occupying the property. The petitioners insist that the appellee was
occupying these parcels of land as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his
name in their petition. Anacleto prayed that the decree be modified to exclude the two
parcels of land purportedly owned by him. The court re-opened the case and modified the
decree excluding therefrom the two lots. According to the court, failure on the part of the
petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two
parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, constituting fraud. Petitioners
claimed honest belief that the appellee was occupying the said parcels of land as their
lessee at the time they applied for registration.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in re-opening the case and modifying the decree
Ruling:
Yes. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of
any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court
of Land Registration a petition for review within one year. Although Anacleto was not served
with notice, he was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on
the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons, including
Anacleto, whether his name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation. That decree
was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed
that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. Proof of
constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to re-open a
case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his
right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved. There must be actual or
positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud. The main principle of registration is
to make registered titles indefeasible.
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CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO v. N.M. SALEEBY

G.R. No. L-8936, October 2, 1915, JOHNSON, J.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at
the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
Facts:
Consuelo Legarda and Mauro Prieto and N.M. Saleeby occupy adjoining lots. Between
their lots exists a stone wall. Plaintiffs filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration to
register their lot. The court decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and
thus an original certificate of title is issued in their favour. The certificate included the wall.
Six years after their registration, defendant filed a petition for registration in the same Court.
The court granted the petition and decreed that the title of defendant be registered; an
original certificate of title was therefore issued in his favour, included in the certificate is also
the subject wall.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Land Registration erred in including the subject wall in the
certificate of defendant
Ruling:
Yes. In case of two certificates of title purporting to include the same land, the earlier
in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in
part, comprised in the earlier certificate; where two certificates purport to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title. The title once
registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ANTIPAS VASQUEZ AND BASILIO
GAYARES v. RUFINA ABURAL, et al.
G.R. No. 14167, August 14, 1919, MALCOLM, J.
Registration of title under Torrens system becomes final, indisputable, and conclusive
upon finality of the order of the court adjudicating the land in favour of the applicant.
Facts:
Cadastral proceedings were commenced in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental upon
application of the Director of Lands. Notice of the proceedings was published in the Official
Gazette as provided by law. The trial judge also issued general notice to all interested
parties. Victoriano Siguenza presented an answer asking for registration in his name of Lot
1608. By declaration of general default, Lot 1608 was adjudicated in favor of Victoriano on
September 21. On November of the same year, the court declared final the order in favor of
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Victoriano. 8 months after finality of the order, Antipas Vasquez and Basilio Gayares asked
the court to re-open the case to receive evidence they will present. The petitioners claim
that Lot 1608 is part of their hacienda and thus they are the owners thereof. Victoriano
contended that the case cannot be re-opened.
Issue:
Whether petitioners may reopen the case despite the fact that the order of the court
attained finality
Ruling:
No. Since the judgment of the court on September 21 became final, and no action was
taken by the petitioners within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal,
the SC is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The prime purpose of the Torrens
System, as established in the Philippines by the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to
decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable.
STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. CITY OF PASIG
G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not
preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein.
Facts:
Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. is the owner of a parcel of land with a TCT no.
39112, which indicated that it was located in Pasig. Later on, the land covered by TCT no.
39112 was consolidated by another located in Cainta, with a TCT no. 518403. The
consolidated TCTs were then divided into three TCTs, all bearing the Cainta address. The
Municipality of Pasig filed a petition to correct the location stated in the three TCTs from
Cainta to Pasig, which was granted by the court. Pasig then filed a complaint against Sta.
Lucia for collection of real property taxes. Sta. Lucia claimed that it has been paying real
property taxes to Cainta ever since. The RTC ruled in favour of Pasig, saying that the TCTs
are conclusive as to ownership and location.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in ruling in favour of Pasig by just relying on the face of
the TCTs
Ruling:
Yes. A certificate of title shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein and
conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. However, while
certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the whole world,
including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely confirm or
record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the
true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they
permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other. Although it is true that Pasig is the
locality stated in the TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta can aver that
the metes and bounds of the subject properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal
that they are within Caintas boundaries.
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REGALIAN DOCTRINE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANESSA C. SANTOS,
MICHELLE C. SANTOS, all represented by DELFIN C. SANTOS, Attorney-in-fact
G.R. No. 180027, July 18, 2012, PEREZ, J.
All claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title, must be
traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing
that land had been let into private ownership through the States imprimatur, such land is
presumed to belong to the State.
Facts:
Respondents purchased three parcels of unregistered land formerly owned by
Generosa Asuncion, Teresita Sernal, and spouses Antona. The three parcels of land were
consolidated into a single lot (Lot 3). Respondents filed with the RTC an application for
original registration over Lot 3. The RTC directed the DENR to report on the status of Lot 3.
DENR submitted a report saying that Lot 3 is an alienable and disposable land since March
15, 1982. Respondents submitted a Certification by the DENR-Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that Lot 3 is classified as alienable and disposable since
March 15, 1982. During the trial, respondents presented the testimonies of Generosa,
Teresita, and spouses Antona all saying that they have been in possession of the lots for
more than 30 years before the sale. The Government maintains that the land in question still
forms part of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether the respondents application for registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. Jura Regalia means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and the
source of all private titles. Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is presumed to belong to the
state. Those who seek the entry of such land into the Torrens system of registration must
first establish valid title thereto as against the state. Respondents failed to establish valid
title in this case. They anchored their claim on prescription provided under Section 14(2) of
PD 1529; for prescription to run against the state, the land must be proven to be patrimonial
in character. To be patrimonial, there must be an express declaration by the state that the
land is no longer needed for public service or the development of national wealth, or that
the property has been converted to patrimonial. Until then, the period of prescription against
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the state will not commence to run. The express declaration contemplated is separate and
distinct from mere classification that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents were
not able to prove that prescription has begun to run against the state.
VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171726, February 23, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The fact that the area within which the subject parcels of land is located is being
used for residential and commercial purposes does not serve to convert the subject parcels
of land into agricultural land. There must be a positive act from the government
declassifying the land.
Facts:
L. Yu Chang entered into a barter with the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur whereby
the former exchanged his 400 square meter land located in the barrio of San Roque for
another 400 square meter land owned by the latter located in the barrio of San Juan. When
L. Yu Chang died, his wife and children inherited the land. A Deed of Transfer and
Renunciation of their rights over the land was executed by the heirs of L. Yu Chang in favour
of Vicente Yu Chang and Soledad Yu Chang. They filed a petition for registration for the land.
They declared that they are the co-owners of the subject land; that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation
and possession of the above described parcels of land for more than 100 years; and that
they have continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed the property in the concept of
owners. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition claiming that the land forms
part of the public domain and not subject to private appropriation. The RTC granted the
petition but the CA reversed it, saying that there must be a positive act from the
government declassifying the land as forest land before it could be deemed alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Petitioners insist that the subject land
could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are buildings,
residential houses, and government structures existing in the land.
Issue:
Whether the application for land registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act
from the government. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession
can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012, REYES, J.
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Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods
provided by law do not automatically convert said property into private property or release
it from the public domain.
Facts:
East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation (ESRDC) filed an application for
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 1309. Portions of the property were
purchased from Francisco Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale and Rosario Tan, Nemesia
Tan, and Mariano Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale.
ESRDC claims that lot 1309 had been classified by the DENR as alienable and disposable,
and that its predecessors have been in possession of the land for more than 30 years, thus
the land is considered private land and can be acquired by acquisitive prescription.
Issue:
Whether ESRDC has acquired the land through prescription
Ruling:
No. Without an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public
service or development of national wealth, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription. It
is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law. The DAR converted the same from agricultural to industrial only on
October 16, 1990; therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject property had been declared
patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive period began to run.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY v. SPOUSES JOSE AND MAGDALENA YBANEZ
G.R. No. 161380, April 21, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
A free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effect.
Facts:
Casimiro Ybanez sold to Aznar Brothers Realty Company (Aznar brothers) a parcel of
unregistered agricultural land (Lot 18563) in which they executed a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Casimiro died intestate leaving as heirs his wife and his children. The heirs of Casimiro
executed a document entitled Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person and Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby they divided
and adjudicated among themselves Lot No. 18563. By the same document, they sold the
entire lot to their co-heir, Adriano D. Ybaez who then sold the lot to Jose R. Ybanez. After
the sale, Jose filed a Free Patent application for Lot 18563 and in due course an OCT was
issued over the lot. Aznar brothers contested the free patent issued in favor of Jose alleging
that they are the owners of Lot 18563 and it was already a private property at the time of
application and therefore free patent cannot be issued.
Issue:
Whether a free patent may be issued over private land
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Ruling:
No. Lot 18563 is the private land of Casimiro. In their Deed of Absolute Sale, Casimiro
expressly warranted that the land was his own exclusive property. With the ownership of
Aznar Brothers being established in this case, the free patent issued to Jose R. Ybaez by the
Government was invalid because the Government had no authority to dispose of land
already in private ownership. Private ownership of land as when there is a prima
facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants is
not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land
Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to
grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to
private ownership. Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent
partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered
by it is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain.
DOLORES CAMPOS v. DOMINADOR ORTEGA, SR., AND JAMES SILOS
G.R. No. 171286, June 2, 2014, PERALTA, J.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law
Facts:
Dolores Campos and her husband were occupying the entire second level of a
residential structure located in Mandaluyong (Hulo estate). The lot on which said structure is
erected is owned by the government while the structure itself is owned by Dominga Boloy.
Dolores and her husband had been leasing the second level since 1966. In 1977, under the
Zonal Improvement Program [ZIP] of the then Metro Manila Commission, in coordination with
the Local Government of Mandaluyong, a census of the Hulo estate was conducted wherein
Dolores qualified as a bona fide occupant. As a consequence, Dolores was assigned an
identifying house number. After receiving the status of a bona fide occupant, Dolores
followed up with the National Housing Authority (NHA) concerning the award of the property
to them in line with the ZIP, more particularly after learning that all bona fide occupants may
be allowed to buy the property. Dolores however learned that the property was awarded to
Dominador Ortega, Sr. and James Silos by the NHA. Four days later, a Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed by the heirs of Dominga Boloy in favor of the respondents, followed by the
issuance of a TCT.
Dolores claimed that they have acquired vested right over the property and filed a
case for specific performance against respondents to surrender their title to the NHA and
directing the NHA to recognize plaintiffs right over the property. The respondents countered
that the Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except through a direct
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether the TCT can be subject to collateral attack
Ruling:
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No. The case for specific performance instituted by petitioner effectively attacks the
validity of respondents' Torrens title over the property. Ultimately, the objective of such claim
is to nullify the title of respondents to the property in question, which, in turn, challenges the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is a collateral attack and not
permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens title. Under Section 48 of PD 1529,
a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
VERGEL PAULINO AND CIREMIA PAULINO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ADMINISTRATOR of the LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 205065, June 4, 2014 MENDOZA, J.
Reconstitution presupposes the existence of an original certificate of title which was
lost or destroyed. If there was no loss or destruction, there is nothing to reconstitute.
Facts:
Spouses Paulino filed a petition for reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No.
301617 with the RTC, alleging that its original copy was among those titles that were razed
during the fire. Without awaiting the LRA Report, the RTC rendered the decision, granting the
petition for reconstitution. However, RTC received the LRA Report, stating that TCT No.
301617 was registered in the name of a certain Emma B. Florendo and that it was previously
the subject of an application for administrative reconstitution. It was also discovered that the
original copy of the title on file in the Registry of Deeds was among those saved titles from
the fire.
The Republic of the Philippines filed its Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing RTC decision granting the petition for reconstitution. The CA granted the
petition ruling that RTC lacked jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of the original copy of
TCT No. 301617, there being no lost or destroyed title.
Issue:
Whether there should be reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 301617
Ruling:
No. Before jurisdiction over reconstitution proceedings may be validly acquired, it is a
condition sine qua non that the certificate of title has not been issued to another person. If a
certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction
over the petition for issuance of new title. The RTC lacked jurisdiction to order the
reconstitution, there being no lost or destroyed title over the real property. Respondent duly
proved that TCT No. 301617 was in the name of a different owner, Florendo, and the
technical description appearing on TCT No. 301617 was similar to the technical description
appearing in Lot 939, Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. RT-55869 (42532) in the name of
Antonino.
The same rule applies if in fact there is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name
and in the possession of another person and said title is existing. Accordingly, the judgment
rendered by the RTC is null and void, which may be attacked anytime.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANKLIN M. MILLADO
G.R. NO. 194066, JUNE 4, 2014 VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Actual notice to the occupants and the owners of the adjoining property under
Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. 26 is mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon the court in a petition
for reconstitution of title.
Facts:
Respondent filed a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
2108. He claimed that despite efforts he exerted to locate the owners duplicate of OCT No.
2108, he was unable to find it. Upon verification with the Registry of Deeds, the original copy
of OCT No. 2108 was likewise not found in the files of said office. The trial court ordered
respondent to submit the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may have any
interest in the property. Respondent submitted only the names and addresses of the
owners/actual occupants of the adjoining lots. The trial court granted the petition for
reconstitution.
The Republic of the Philippines thru the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA, arguing
that the trial court gravely erred in granting the petition for reconstitution despite noncompliance with all the jurisdictional requisites. It pointed out that respondent failed to
notify all the interested parties, particularly the heirs of the registered owners. The CA
dismissed petitioners appeal and held that the respondent had satisfactorily complied with
the statutory notice requirements.
Issue:
Whether lack of actual notice rendered the reconstitution proceedings void
Ruling:
Yes. The registered owners appearing in the title sought to be reconstituted, their
surviving heirs, are interested parties who should be notified of reconstitution proceeding
under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of R.A. 26. For petitions based on sources
enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and 3(f), Section 13 adds
another requirement aside from publication and posting of notice of hearing: that the notice
be mailed to occupants, owners of adjoining lots, and all other persons who may have an
interest in the property. Notwithstanding the sale supposedly effected by vendors claiming
to be heirs of the registered owners, they remain as interested parties entitled to notice of
judicial reconstitution proceedings.
Where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining
jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be
void. As such, the court upon which the petition for reconstitution of title is filed is dutybound to examine thoroughly the petition for reconstitution of title and review the record
and the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional requirements. The nonobservance of the requirement of actual notice invalidates the whole reconstitution
proceedings in the trial court. The proceedings were therefore a nullity and the Decision was
void.
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NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and ELVIRA B. CALALANG v. ROSARIO CALALANGGARCIA ET AL.
G.R. No. 184148, June 9, 2014, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The phrase Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba Calalang merely describes the
civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered owner Pedro Calalang. This does not
mean that the property is conjugal.
Facts:
Pedro married Encarnacion, with whom he had three children, namely Rosario,
Leonora and Carlito. Encarnacion died in 1942. In 1967, he married Elvira, with whom he had
two children, namely Nora and Rolando. While Encarnacion was still alive, Pedro acquired an
unregistered parcel of land. After Pedro married Elvira, he applied for a free patent over the
land. In 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued an original certificate of title, which indicated him
as the sole owner in the following manner: Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba
Calalang.
In 1984, after the five-year prohibitory period, Pedro sold the land to his daughter,
Nora. Pedro died in 1989. His children by his first marriage, Rosario, et al. then filed an
action for the annulment of sale in the RTC. They claimed that they were co-owners of the
land by virtue of succession, and that Pedro should have obtained their consent before he
sold it to Nora. They also claimed that their father acquired the land during the first marriage
as conjugal property, from their maternal grandmother, Francisca.
Issue:
Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its
transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
Ruling:
Yes. The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree:
SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. Every certificate of
title shall set forth the full names of all persons whose interests make up the full
ownership in the whole land, including their civil status, and the names of their
respective spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship, residence and postal
address. If the property covered belongs to the conjugal partnership, it shall be
issued in the names of both spouses.
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property
in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale. The records do not show
that the subject property belonged to respondents maternal grandparents. The evidence
respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of
Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as far as she can
remember and that the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from her
maternal grandparents. She was unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale,
nor was she able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration issued in
the name of either of her parents.
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SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINA
ABALON/HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON v. MARISSA ANDAL, LEONIL ANDAL,
ARNEL ANDAL, SPOUSES DOMINDOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA, and HEIRS of
RESTITUTO RELLAMA, represented by his children ALEX, IMMANUEL, JULIUS and
SYLVIA, all surnamed RELLAMA
G.R. No. 183448/G.R. No. 183464, June 30, 2014, SERENO, J.
A forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the genuine
title, which is valid and has not been cancelled.
Facts:
A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Bernardina Abalon over the subject
property in favor of Restituto M. Rellama. Then was subdivided into three portions sold to
Spouses Peralta, Lotivio and the Andals. TCTs were issued in their names. Mansueta Abalon
and Amelia Abalon filed the case against Rellama, Spouses Peralta and the Andals
contending that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forged document averring that the owners
duplicate copy of Oct No. (O) 16 had always been with Abalon and that upon her death, it
was delivered to them. Rellama alleged that the deed of absolute sale executed by Abalon is
genuine and that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 had been delivered to him upon the
execution of the said deed of transfer. Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their
separate answers to the complaint, mainly alleged that they are buyers in good faith and for
value.
Issue:
Whether the title issued in the names of the Andals is valid
Ruling:
Yes. A forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto,
pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from
the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. The qualifying point here is that there must
be a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the transfers starting from the
original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value and that includes the transfer to the
forger must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee.
There is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken in the case of the
Andals. Neither were they proven to have knowledge of anything that would make them
suspicious of the nature of Rellamas ownership over the subject parcel of land. The Andals
were buyers in good faith. The validity of their title to the parcel of the land bought from
Rellama must be upheld. To the Andals, there was no doubt that Rellama was the owner of
the property being sold to them, and that he had transmissible rights of ownership over the
said property. Thus, they had every right to rely on the face of his title alone.
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HECTOR L. UY v. VIRGINIA G. FULE; HEIRS OF THE LATE AMADO A. GARCIA, HEIRS
OF THE LATE GLORIA GARCIA ENCARNACION; HEIRS OF THE LATE PABLO GARCIA;
and HEIRS OF THE LATE ELISA G. HEMEDES
G.R. No. 164961, June 30, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
A purchaser cannot ignore facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard,
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the
title of the vendor.
Facts:
The disputed land was included in the Operation Land Transfer (OLT). The DAR issued
emancipation patents and original certificates of title covering the disputed land to the
farmers-beneficiaries, one of whom sold his portion to Hector Uy who then registered his title
thereto. Respondent heirs of Conrado, filed a complaint that the certificates of title of the
petitioner be cancelled.
The RTC ruled for respondent. In his appeal, petitioner insisted that the RTC erred in
holding that he had not been an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value; and in
declaring void and ordering the cancellation of TCTs. But the CA ruled that even assuming
that they had no notice of any defect in their transferors titles, and the lands sold to them
should be included in the DARs OLT program, no valid title could have passed to them
because the transfers are void under PD 27. Thus, petitioner is clearly not a qualified
transferees of the lands sold to them.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was a purchaser in good faith
Ruling:
No. The standard is that for one to be a purchaser in good faith in the eyes of the law,
he should buy the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property, and should pay a full and fair price for the same at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the
property was the owner and could convey title to the property.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he
relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry
for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of
good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is
the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the
time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in
the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to
convey title to the property. Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law
itself puts the buyer on notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence
by scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to
determine the sellers title and capacity to transfer any interest in the property.
The absence of the third condition put the petitioner on notice and obliged him to
exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificates of title and examining all
factual circumstances in order to determine the sellers title and capacity to transfer any
interest in the lots. Consequently, it is not sufficient for him to insist that he relied on the
13 | P a g e

face of the certificates of title, for he must further show that he exercised reasonable
precaution by inquiring beyond the certificates of title. Failure to exercise such degree of
precaution rendered him a buyer in bad faith.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES JOAQUIN MANGUARDIA AND SUSANA MANALO, et al. v. HEIRS

OF SIMPLICIO VALLES AND MARTA VALLES, et al.
G.R. No. 177616, August 27, 2014, DEL CASTILLO, J.
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon
him who asserts that standing. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke the
ordinary presumption of good faith that everyone is presumed to act in good faith.
Facts:
A Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 835 was executed by Simplicio and Marta in favor of
their brothers, Melquiades and Rustico; Simplicios daughter, Adelaida; and Martas
daughter, Encarnacion. The Deed of Absolute Sale ostensibly bore the signature of Marta
and the thumb marks of Simplicio and his wife.
Respondents commenced an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Certificates of
Title and Deeds of Sale, Cancellation of Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession and
Damages against petitioners in the RTC, averring that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale is
a forgery because Marta and Simplicio were long dead when the said document was
executed. In their Answer, the heirs of spouses Manguardia averred that their predecessorsin-interest were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value, having acquired the lots
from their registered owners and occupants, Pedro and Soledad. The RTC declared the Deed
of Absolute Sale void ab initio because there was no proof that the vendors, Marta and
Simplicio, were still alive in 1968.
Issue:
Whether petitioners predecessors-in-interest were buyers in good faith and for value
Ruling:
No. The transfers of the properties in question did not go far, but were limited to
close family relatives by affinity and consanguinity. Good faith among the parties to the
series of conveyances is therefore hard if not impossible to presume. Petitioners did not
provide any sufficient evidence that would convince the courts that the proximity of
relationships between/among the vendors and vendees in the questioned sales was not used
to perpetrate fraud. There is nothing to dispel the notion that apparent anomalies attended
the transactions among close relations. The parties to the alleged original sale and the
witnesses were close relatives. Similarly, the vendors and vendees in subsequent sale
transactions were either the co-vendees themselves in the original sale, first cousins, and
close relatives by consanguinity and affinity. These transactions between close relatives
happened at a time when everybody knew everyone, in a place where vendees lived in close
proximity to the vendors, and to the disputed properties.
This is not to say however, that a sale between close relatives is automatically
anomalous. It is just that in this particular case, the circumstances strongly show that fraud
was committed by relatives against relatives and the evidence adduced by petitioners was
insufficient to remove the cloud of doubt pertaining to the good faith of their predecessorsin-interest in acquiring the properties in question.
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ENRIQUETA M. LOCSIN v. BERNARDO HIZON, CARLOS HIZON, SPS. JOSE MANUEL &
LOURDES GUEVARA
G.R. No. 204369, September 17, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
A purchaser of property under the Torrens system cannot simply invoke that he is an
innocent purchaser for value when there are attending circumstances that raise suspicions.
Facts:
Locsin filed an ejectment case against Aceron to recover possession over the land.
Eventually, they entered into a compromise agreement. Locsin later went to the United
States without knowing whether Aceron has complied with his part. In spite of her absence,
she continued to pay the real property taxes on the subject lot. Later on, she discovered that
the property was sold by a one Marylou Bolos to Bernardo but it was titled under his son,
Carlos.
Locsin sent Carlos a letter requesting the return of the property since her signature in
the purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a forgery but Carlos denied Locsins
request, claiming that he was unaware of any defect or flaw in the title and he is, thus, an
innocent purchaser for value and good faith. Locsin filed an action for reconveyance. The
RTC dismissed the complaint holding that Locsin cannot simply rely on the apparent
difference of the signatures in the deed and in the documents presented by her to prove her
allegation of forgery and that respondents are all buyers in good faith.
Issue:
Whether respondents are innocent purchasers for value
Ruling:
No. Bolos certificate of title was free from liens and encumbrances on its face.
However, the failure of Carlos and the spouses Guevara to exercise the necessary level of
caution in light of the factual milieu surrounding the sequence of transfers from Bolos to
respondents bars the application of the mirror doctrine. The presence of anything which
excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls
within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith.
Bernardo and Carlos should have investigated the reason behind the arrangement.
They should have been pressed to inquire into the status of the title of the property in
litigation in order to protect Carlos interest. It should have struck them as odd that it was
Locsin, not Bolos, who sought the recovery of possession by commencing an ejectment case
against Aceron, and even entered into a compromise agreement with the latter years after
the purported sale in Bolos favor. Instead, Bernardo and Carlos took inconsistent positions
15 | P a g e

when they argued for the validity of the transfer of the property in favor of Bolos, but in the
same breath prayed for the enforcement of the compromise agreement entered into by
Locsin.
As regards the transfer of the property from Carlos to the spouses Guevara, the
existence of the sale is highly suspicious. No document, contract, or deed evidenced the sale
in favor of the spouses Guevara. The same goes for the purported payment of the purchase
price of the property. Also, the fact that Lourdes Guevara and Carlos are siblings, and that
Carlos agent in his dealings concerning the property is his own father, renders incredible the
argument that Lourdes had no knowledge whatsoever of Locsins claim of ownership at the
time of the purported sale.
AMBROSIO ROTAIRO (substituted by his spouse MARIA RONSA YRO ROTAIRO, and
his children FELINA ROTAIRO ET AL.) v. ROVIRA ALCANTARA AND VICTOR
ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 173632, September 29, 2014, REYES, J.
When the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a
defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation, he cannot find solace
in the protection afforded by a prior registration. Neither can such person be considered an
innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.
Facts:
Alcantara and Ignacio mortgaged the subject property to Pilipinas Bank. After two
years, property was parceled out by them and sold to different buyers, one being Rotairo.
However, Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan obligation, thus, Pilipinas bank, being
the highest bidder, foreclosed the mortgage. and sold it to Rovira, who happens to be
Alcantara's daughter. Rovira filed a case for the recovery of possession of the land. The RTC
dismissed the complaint ruling that the transaction between Ignacio & Co. and Rotairo was
covered by P.D. No. 957. Rovira, as successor-in-interest, was well aware of the condition of
the property which she bought from the Pilipinas Bank, because she lives near the land, and
at the time she purchased it she was aware of the existing houses or structures on the land.
She was, therefore, not entitled to the relief prayed for in her complaint. On appeal, the CA
set aside the RTC decision and ordered the turnover of possession of the property to Rovira.
According to the CA, Section 181 of P.D. No. 957 protects innocent lot buyers, and where
there is a prior registered mortgage, the buyer purchases it with knowledge of the mortgage.
Issue:
Whether Rotairo is a buyer and builder in good faith
Ruling:
No. Rovira does not deny that she is the daughter and an heir of Alcantara, one of the
parties to the contract to sell (and the contract of sale) executed in favor of Rotairo. The
vendors heirs are his privies. Based on such privity, Rovira is charged with constructive
16 | P a g e

knowledge of prior dispositions or encumbrances affecting the subject property made by her
father.
More than the charge of constructive knowledge, the surrounding circumstances of
this case show Roviras actual knowledge of the disposition of the subject property and
Rotairos possession thereof. After the contract to sell was executed, Rotairo immediately
secured a mayors permit for the construction of his residential house on the property.
Rotairo, and subsequently, his heirs, had been residing on the property since then. Rovira,
who lives only 50 meters away from the subject property, knew that there were structures
built on the property. Rovira, however, claims that she did not bother to inquire as to the
legitimacy of the rights of the occupants, because she was assured by the bank of its title to
the property. But Rovira cannot rely solely on the title and assurances of Pilipinas Bank; it
was incumbent upon her to look beyond the title and make necessary inquiries because the
bank was not in possession of the property. Where the vendor is not in possession of the
property, the prospective vendees are obligated to investigate the rights of one in
possession. A purchaser cannot simply close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on guard, and thereafter claim that he acted in good faith under the belief
that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. Hence, Rovira cannot claim a right better
than that of Rotairo's as she is not a buyer in good faith.
SPOUSES MARIO OCAMPO and CARMELITA F. OCAMPO v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINO U.

DIONISIO, represented by ARTEMIO SJ. DIONISIO
G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014, REYES, J.
Prescription and laches cannot apply to registered land covered by the Torrens
system because under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
Facts:
In 1996, Dionisio filed a complaint for forcible entry against Mario and Felix because
they built a piggery in his property without his consent. He claims that he purchased it from
Capistrano and was able to obtain a free patent over it. Mario claims that the property is
owned by his wife Carmelita who inherited it from her father and that they have been in
possession of the land since 1969. The MTC dismissed the complaint ruling that Dionisio
failed to establish his prior possession of the disputed parcel of land. But on appeal, the RTC
held that the respondents were able to establish that the subject property is indeed part of
the parcel of land covered by OCT No. M-4559 registered in the name of Dionisio.
Considering that OCT No. M-4559 is registered under the name of Dionisio, the RTC opined
that the respondents, as successors-in-interest of Dionisio, are entitled to the possession of
the subject property as an attribute of their ownership over the same. On the other hand,
the RTC averred that the petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support their
claim that they indeed own the subject property.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA claiming that respondents cause of
action in the recovery of possession case is already barred by laches. However, the CA
affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
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Whether respondents cause of action is barred by laches
Ruling:
No. As owners of the subject property, the respondents have the right to recover the
possession thereof from any person illegally occupying their property. This right is
imprescriptible. Assuming that the petitioners indeed have been occupying the subject
property for a considerable length of time, the respondents, as lawful owners, have the right
to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
ELIZA ZUNIGA-SANTOS, represented by her Attorney-in Fact, NYMPHA Z. SALES v.
MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY
G.R. No. 197380, October 8, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
If there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession, the action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years, the
reference point being the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title.
Facts:
Eliza is the owner of 3 parcels of land. She had a second husband named Lamberto
with whom she did not have any children. She was forced to take care of Lamberto's
daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to make it appear that the she was Eliza's
daughter. Pursuant to void and voidable documents, Lamberto succeeded in transferring
Elizas properties in favor of Gran.
Eliza filed a complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title against Gran.
Gran filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground that an action upon a written contract must be
brought within 10 years from the time the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the
time of registration of the questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds.
Issue:
Whether the action for nullity of the void deed of conveyance has prescribed
Ruling:
No. To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for
reconveyance, the plaintiffs possession of the disputed property is material. If the real
owner remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and
possession of the property does not run against him and in such case, the action for
reconveyance would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
Eliza did not remain in possession of the properties. It was Gran who was in
possession of the subject properties, there being an admission by the petitioner that the
property covered by TCT No. 224174 was being used by Grans mother-in-law. Elizas relief in
the Complaint for the surrender of three properties to her bolsters such stance. And since
the new titles to the subject properties in the name of Gran were issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Marikina on July 27, 1992, January 29, 1976, and November 26, 1975, the filing of
the petitioners complaint before the RTC on January 9, 2006 was beyond the ten-year
prescriptive period, warranting the Complaints dismissal all the same.
18 | P a g e

ONOFRE ANDRES, substituted by his heirs, namely: FERDINAND, ROSALINA,
ERIBERTO, FROILAN, MA. CLEOFE, NELSON, GERMAN, GLORIA, ALEXANDER, MAY,
ABRAHAM, AND AFRICA, ALL SURNAMED ANDRES v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 173548, October, 15, 2014, LEONEN, J.
A bank that accepts a mortgage based upon a title which appears valid on its face
and after exercising the requisite care, prudence, and diligence appropriate to the public
interest character of its business can be deemed a mortgagee in good faith. The
subsequent consolidation of title in its name after a valid foreclosure shall be respected
notwithstanding later proof showing that the title was based upon a void transaction.
Facts:
Spouses Andres acquired during their marriage a parcel of land covered by TCT. No.
NT-7267. When they died, their children, among them was Onofre, agreed in an extrajudicial
partition of the one-half while the other half was sold to Roman, also one of the children.
Roman was issued a new TCT. PNB alleged that the Spouses Andres mortgaged the property
to PNB and that RTC transferred ownership of the properties of the deceased to their only
living heir, Reynaldo Andres. Spouses Reynaldo Andres and Janette de Leon used this title
and mortgaged the property to PNB. This was without Onofres consent.
Onofre Andres, claiming ownership over the property, filed a complaint for
cancellation of title, reconveyance of property alleging that Onofre Andres nephew Reynaldo
Andres was in collusion with his mother, Lydia Echaus-Andres, in executing a falsified
document denominated as Self-Adjudication of Sole Heir.
PNB denied the material allegations in the complaint. It argued that it conducted an
investigation on the property and that the title presented to PNB by Reynaldo Andres and his
wife was free from adverse claims.
Issue:
Whether PNB is an innocent mortgagee for value and in good faith
Ruling:
Yes. PNB sent its appraiser and credit investigator Gerardo Pestao to conduct an
ocular inspection of the property. He also went to the relevant government offices to verify
the ownership status of the property. There was an on-going construction of a residential
building during his inspection, so he appraised this building as well, in case the land proved
insufficient to cover the applied loan. These acts complied with the standard operating
practice expected of banks when dealing with real property. Also, the two-year period under
Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court had lapsed and petitioner heirs did not allege if any
heir or creditor of Roman Andres and his wife had invoked their right under this provision.
The title resulting from the foreclosure sale, therefore, is to be protected.
AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS v. SPOUSES ALFREDO REVILLA AND THE HEIRS OF
PAZ REVILLA
G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014, LEONEN, J.
19 | P a g e

Those who rely in good faith on a clean title issued under the Torrens system for
registered lands must be protected. On the other hand, those who purchase unregistered
lands do so at their own peril.
Facts:
Spouses Revilla are owners of land located in Cavite. They faced financial difficulties,
so Paz Castillo-Revilla borrowed money from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias. By way of security,
the parties verbally agreed that Amada would take physical possession of the property,
cultivate it, then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the loan and realty taxes and
that upon full payment of the loan, Amada would return the property to the Revilla spouses.
Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document entitled Kasulatan
ng Bilihan ng Lupa before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite with the Revilla Spouses as
sellers and Amada as buyers. Consequently, Tax Declaration in the name of the Revilla
spouses was cancelled, and a new one was issued to Amada. Then Amada sold the property
to the Casorla spouses who then sold it to the Sun Spouses. When Alfredo Revilla returned
from Saudi Arabia, he discovered that the propertys tax declaration was already in the
name of the Sun spouses.
Spouses Revilla filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment of sales and
transfers of title and reconveyance of the property with damages against Amada, who
contends that the Sun spouses were buyers in good faith for value.
Issue:
Whether the property should be reinstated in favor of Revilla spouses
Ruling:
No. Amada argues that the subsequent buyer of the disputed parcel of land is in good
faith. The issue of whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where
the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchase was made from the registered
owner whose title to the land is clean. The good faith argument cannot be considered as this
case involves unregistered land. In any case, this is a defense personal to the Sun spouses
and cannot be borrowed by petitioner. The Sun spouses no longer raised this argument on
appeal, but only made a partial appeal regarding legal interest on the award
HEIRS OF GREGORIO LOPEZ, represented by ROGELIA LOPEZ, et al. v.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [now substituted by PHILIPPINE
INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INC.]
G.R. NO. 193551, November, 19, 2014, LEONEN, J.
The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only
where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of
the registered owner. It does not apply when the land is not yet registered with the Registry
of Deeds.
Facts:
Lopez owned a parcel of land. When she died, she was survived by her three sons.
The sons died, only one of them, Teodoro, was survived by children: Gregorio, Enrique,
Simplicio and Severino. Petitioners are Simplicio substituted by his daughter Eliza and heirs
20 | P a g e

of Gregorio and Severino. Enrique is deceased. Petitioners discovered that Enrique executed
an affidavit of self-adjudication and sold the property to Marietta. They demanded the
nullification of the documents. Marietta, who was already in possession of the property,
refused. Consequently, Marietta obtained a loan from DBP and mortgaged the property as
security. The mortgage was annotated to the title. Then Marietta failed to pay her loan to
DBP, which foreclosed the land and was awarded as highest bidder.
Petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of document, recovery of possession,
and reconveyance of the property. The RTC ruled in their favor ruling that Marietta was not
an innocent purchaser for value because when the deed of absolute sale was executed, the
property was only covered by a tax declaration in the name of the heirs of Gregoria Lopez.
Issue:
Whether the property was validly transferred to Marietta and, eventually, to DBP
Ruling:
No. Marietta cannot claim the protection to innocent purchasers for value. There was
no certificate of title to rely on when she purchased the property from Enrique. At the time of
the sale, the property was still unregistered. What was available was only a tax declaration
issued under the name of Heirs of Lopez. At the very least, the unregistered status of the
property should have prompted Marietta to inquire further as to Enriques right over the
property. She did not. Hence, she was not an innocent purchaser for value.
Likewise, DBP is not a mortgagee in good faith. DBP failed to exercise the degree of
diligence required of banks when it accepted the unregistered property as security for
Mariettas loan despite circumstances that should have aroused its suspicion. The protection
accorded to mortgagees in good faith cannot be extended to mortgagees of properties that
are not yet registered or registered but not under the mortgagor's name.
FLORENTINO W. LEONG AND ELENA LEONG, et al. v. EDNA C. SEE

G.R. No. 194077, December 3, 2014, LEONEN, J.
An innocent purchaser for value is someone who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and
fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another persons
claim.
Facts:
Spouses Florentino and Carmelita owned the subject property wherein Elena,
Florentino's sister-in-law, was allowed to stay. She had stayed with her in-laws on the
property rental-free for over two decades until the building they lived in was razed by fire.
21 | P a g e

Upon the spouses divorce, the property went to the wife Carmelita, who then sold it to See.
In lieu of Florentino's signature of conformity in the deed of absolute sale, Carmelita
presented to Edna and her father, witness Ernesto See, a waiver of interest notarized in
Illinois. In this waiver, Florentino reiterated his quitclaim over his right, title, and interest to
the land.
Edna was aware of the Leong's relatives staying in the house of the land. Carmelita
assured her that her nieces and nephews would move out, but demands to vacate were
unheeded.
Edna filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Elena and to the other
relatives. She alleged that after the fire razed the building, Elena erected houses without
Carmelita's consent. In response, Elena alleged the titles legal infirmity for lack of
Florentino's conformity to its sale.
Issue:
Whether See is a buyer in good faith and for value
Ruling:
Yes. She conducted further inquiry by relying not only on the certificate of title, but
also on Florentinos waiver. She went to the Register of Deeds to verify the title and relied on
the marriage settlement agreement. She exerted due diligence. By her overt acts, Edna See
verified the authenticity of Carmelitas land title at the Registry of Deeds of Manila. There
was no annotation on the same thus deemed a clean title. Also, she relied on the duly
executed and notarized Certificate of Authority issued by the State of Illinois and Certificate
of Authentication issued by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Illinois in support
to the Waiver of Interest incorporated in the Deed of Absolute Sale presented to her. The
Certificate of Authority shows that it is valid and regular on its face. The Certificate of
Authority is a notarized document and presumed valid and duly executed. Edna Sees
reliance on the notarial acknowledgment is sufficient evidence of good faith.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DONATO SANCHEZ and
JUANA MENESES represented by RODOLFO S. AGUINALDO
G.R. No. 212388, December 10, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
Before a certificate of title which has been lost or destroyed may be reconstituted, it
must first be proved by the claimants that said certificate of title was still in force at the
time it was lost or destroyed, among others.
Facts:
Respondents filed a petition for reconstitution of OCT since when they executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, it could not be registered because the owners copy of OCT
was missing. They alleged that the OCT was issued in the name of the spouses Sanchez,
pursuant to Decree No. 41812 issued in relation to a decision by CFI. The Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) requested the trial court to require respondents to
submit some documents but respondents did not comply. Nonetheless, the trial court gave
due course to their petition for reconstitution. The LRA then questioned the legality of the
reconstitution on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence.
Issue:
22 | P a g e

Whether the evidence is sufficient to merit reconstitution
Ruling:
No. The mere existence of TCT No. 10202, later cancelled by TCT No. 44365, which, in
turn, was superseded by TCT No. 80792, clearly shows that the OCT which respondents seek
to be reconstituted is no longer in force, rendering the procedure, if granted, a mere
superfluity.
If indeed OCT was lost or destroyed, it is necessary that the RD issue a certification
that such was in force at the time of its alleged loss or destruction. Definitely, the RD
cannot issue such certification because of the dearth of records in support of the alleged
OCT in its file. The presentation of alleged derivative titlesTCT No. 10202, TCT No. 44365
and TCT No. 80792will not suffice to replace this certification because the titles do not
authenticate the issuance of OCT having been issued by the RD without any basis from its
official records. It is a wonder how the derivative titles were issued when the existence of
OCT could not be established based on the RDs records. The RD failed to explain how it was
able to make an annotation of the original registration of the lot under OCT when
respondents are now asking for its reconstitution. It is also highly suspicious why
respondents are asking the for reconstitution of OCT when, supposedly, it has already been
cancelled and new titles have already been issued based on transfers purportedly made by
respondents. The reconstituted OCT has no use when the lot has already been transferred
to other persons. It will practically be of no value or worth to respondents.
SPOUSES CARLOS J. SUNTAY AND ROSARIO R. SUNTAY v. KEYSER MERCANTILE,
INC.
G.R. No. 208462, December 10, 2014, MENDOZA, J.
Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.
Facts:
Keyser entered into contract to sell with Bayfront Development Corporation to
purchase a condo unit, Unit G and two parking lots. However, the Contract to Sell was not
registered with RD of Manila, thus the unit name remained in the name of Bayfront with a
clean title.
Spouses Suntay also purchased condominium units executing a Contract to Sell but
Bayfront failed to deliver said units and reimburse the full purchase price paid by the
Suntays. Spouses Suntay filed an action before HLURB which rescinded contract in favor of
the them. In the writ of execution, the Sheriff levied the properties including Unit G and the
two parking lots. Considering that CCT was registered with the Bayfront with a clean title,
the sheriffs deemed it proper to be levied. An auction sale was held and spouses Suntay
were the highest bidders. The Certificate of Sale was issued in their favor and this was
annotated at the back of the CCT. Keyser discovered the levy and sale in favor of Suntays
and filed a complaint for annulment of the auction sale before RTC
Issue:
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Whether Spouses Suntay have better rights over the condominium property
Ruling:
Yes. Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in the
absence of any suspicion, is not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate the
title of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate. He is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.
The subject property was registered land under the Torrens System covered by CCT
with Bayfront as the registered owner. At the time that the Notice of Levy was annotated,
the title had no previous encumbrances and liens. Evidently, it was a clean title. The
Certificate of Sale, pursuant to an auction sale, was also annotated, with Bayfront still as the
registered owner. It was only almost a year later, that Keyser was able to register its Deed of
Absolute Sale with Bayfront. Prior to such date, Spouses Suntay appropriately relied on the
Torrens title of Bayfront to enforce the latters judgment debt.
IMELDA SYJUCO, et al. v. FELISA BONIFACIO and VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate
his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court
of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Facts:
Imelda Syjuco, et al. own and have registered in their names under a TCT a part of
the Maysilo estate. They discovered that Felisa Bonifacio, a purported owner of another lot in
the same estate, has sold Syjuco, et al.s land in favor of VSD Realty & Development
Corporation. In their action to quiet title against the respondents before the RTC, they
contended that although the TCTs of Syjuco, et al. and VSD Realty contain different technical
descriptions, said certificates actually pertain to one and the same property. Also, they
allege that the respondents title could only have been obtained through fraud.
Issue:
Whether the action to quiet title by Syjuco, et al. has prescribed
Ruling:
No. The filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed real property
is in the possession of the plaintiff. The rule on the incontrovertibility or indefeasibility of title
has no application as the contending parties claim ownership over the subject land based on
their respective certificates of title thereon which originated from different sources. Syjucos
title shows that it originated from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917, while Bonifacios
title shows that it likewise originated from the same OCT, but registered on April 19, 1917.
This case affirmed the earlier finding that there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration
date of which had already been decisively settled as of May 3, 1917 and not April 19, 1917.
Thus, the OCT dated April 19, 1917 is null and void.
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UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 187892, January 14, 2015, PERALTA, J.
The person who can file the petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate are the
registered owner, his assigns, or persons in interest in the property.
Facts:
In filing the petition for reconstitution of an OCT before the RTC, UMM alleged that it
is the registered owner of a mining patent issued by the then President Macapagal and that
the OCT issued in its name could not be located despite a diligent search. The RTC dismissed
the petition as it found that the purported owners duplicate of the OCT was not signed by
the then register of deeds on its face and dorsal side. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether UMM may file a petition to reconstitute the OCT
Ruling:
Yes. UMM admitted that it was not the owner of the land on which the mining patent
was issued as the same was owned and registered in the name of Rapu Rapu Minerals, Inc.
UMM has no legal capacity to institute a petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate.
UMMs admission established that the surface land covered by its mining patent, which title
is sought to be reconstituted, is not owned by the same. Thus, not having an interest on the
land amounting to a title to the same, UMM is not possessed of a legal personality to
institute a petition for judicial reconstitution of the alleged lost OCT.
MARIFLOR HORTIZUELA v. GREGORIA TAGUFA, et al.
G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015, MENDOZA, J.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title,
because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Facts:
Before the disputed property was named in favor of Gregoria Tagufa, Mariflor
Hortizuelas parents owned the same. Although untitled, the property was mortgaged to DBP
by Hortizuelas parents, who failed to redeem the same upon their non-payment of a loan. In
the foreclosure sale of the property, Tagufas husband bought the same using Tagufas
money. An agreement was concluded between Tagufas husband and Hortizuela, her sister,
that the property will be conveyed to her upon demand. After finding out that the property
was registered under Tagufas name, Hortizuela filed a complaint for reconveyance and
recovery of possession against Tagufa.
Issue:
Whether an action for recovery of possession constitutes a collateral attack
Ruling:
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No. A certificate of title is merely evidence of ownership or title over the particular
property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor
can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in
the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
Hortizuelas complaint was not a collateral attack on the title which warrants a
dismissal. An action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam
available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens
system. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set aside but,
respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to reconvey the land
from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
IMELDA SYJUCO, et al. v. FELISA BONIFACIO and VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
A certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had
already been registered and that an earlier certificate for the same land is in existence.
Facts:
Imelda Syjuco, et al. own and have registered in their names under a TCT a part of
the Maysilo estate. They discovered that Felisa Bonifacio, a purported owner of another lot in
the same estate, has sold Syjuco, et al.s land in favor of VSD Realty & Development
Corporation. In their action to quiet title against the respondents before the RTC, they
contended that although the TCTs of Syjuco, et al. and VSD Realty contain different technical
descriptions, said certificates actually pertain to one and the same property. Also, they
allege that the respondents title could only have been obtained through fraud.
Issue:
Whether the title of the respondents is indefeasible
Ruling:
No. There cannot be two or even several certificates of title on the same parcel of
real property because a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of
land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case and a
second decree for the same land would be null and void since the principle behind original
registration is to register a parcel of land only once. The indefeasibility of a title under the
Torrens system could be claimed only if a previous valid title to the same parcel of land does
not exist. Where the issuance of the title was attended by fraud, the same cannot vest in the
titled owner any valid legal title to the land covered by it; and the person in whose name the
title was issued cannot transmit the same, for he has no true title thereto.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CORAZON SESE and FE SESE

G.R. No. 185092, June 4, 2014, MENDOZA, J.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person
by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Facts:
Corazon and Fe Sese filed with the MTC an application for original registration of land
over a parcel of land in Bulacan. They alleged that they acquired the same through a
donation inter vivos from their mother. In support of their application, the Seses submitted
various documents, among which is the disputed survey plan stating that the survey is
inside an alienable and disposable area. The MTC found the application sufficient, hence,
issuing its approval. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, opposed; but the
lower court decided in the Seses favor.
Issue:
Whether the subject land is alienable
Ruling:
No. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration or claiming ownership
who must prove that the land is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land is alienable or disposable. There
must be an existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
The Seses cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation indicating that the survey was
inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land. A mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors
assertion, the Seses have not sufficiently proven the land in question has been declared
alienable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCA SANTOS, et al.
One who applies for registration of ownership over a parcel of land has the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.
Facts:
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Francisca Santos, et al. filed an application for registration of four parcels of land in
Taguig, as accompanied by the required documents. The RTC approved the same despite the
OSGs opposition.
Issue:
Whether the subject lands are alienable
Ruling:
No. There is no proof that the subject lots had been classified as alienable and
disposable, because a mere notation in the Conversion Plan, even if it had been formally
offered in evidence, is not the required proof of a positive government act validly changing
the classification of the land in question. The evidence required to establish that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable are: (1) CENRO or
PENRO certification; and (2) a true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. The
foregoing documents had not been submitted in evidence. A mere certification issued by the
Forest Utilization & Law Enforcement Division of the DENR is not enough. Evidence on record
is not sufficient to prove that the subject lots had been declared alienable and disposable
lands.
KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG, INC. v. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The approval by city and municipal boards and councils of an application for
subdivision through an ordinance should be understood to include approval of the
reclassification of the land covered by said application from agricultural to the intended nonagricultural use.
Facts:
Laguna Estate Development Corporation (LEDC) filed a request with the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform for the conversion of 10 parcels of land in Laguna to be converted from
agricultural to residential land, pursuant to R.A. No. 3844. The then minister granted the
request provided that certain conditions are complied with. Kasamaka-Canlubang, Inc. (KCI)
filed a petition with the DAR for the revocation of the conversion order, alleging that LEDC
failed to comply with the requisite of developing the subject lands. DAR partially revoked
eight of the said lands conversion. The Office of the President deemed seven of the lands
exempt from the coverage of the R.A. No. 6657. The CA dismissed KCIs petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the subject lands agricultural lands
Ruling:
Yes. When city and municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating
an area or district in their cities or municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial
zone, pursuant to the power granted to them under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of
1959, they were, at the same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for
non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the implementation of and compliance with their
zoning ordinances. The logic and practicality behind such a presumption is more evident
28 | P a g e

when considering the approval by local legislative bodies of subdivision ordinances and
regulations. To hold otherwise would render the approval of the subdivision application with
no practical effect; for as long as the property covered by the application remains classified
as agricultural, it could not be subdivided and developed for non-agricultural use.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRISANTO RANESES

G.R. No. 189970, June 9, 2014, VILLARAMA, J.
The applicant bears the burden to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and
disposable.
Facts:
Crisanto Raneses filed an application for original registration of land title over two (2)
parcels of land located in Taguig. There being no opposition and upon Raneses compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC issued an order of general default against all
persons except the Republic of the Philippines. The RTC granted the request but Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) opposed the same, alleging that the subject properties are
below the 12.50 elevation, hence, forming part of the bed of Laguna Lake and are, therefore,
indisposable and inalienable. The RTC still decided in Raneses favor and the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the subject properties are alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain
Ruling:
No. The Regalian doctrine, as embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Raneses merely presented that Conversion Subdivision Plan with the annotation that
the subject properties were inside alienable and disposable land area Project No. 270B as
per LC Map No. 2623 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968 and the InterOffice Memorandum from the LLDA. Raneses reliance on the said annotation and inter-Office
Memorandum is insufficient. The pieces of evidence submitted by Raneses hardly satisfy the
documentary requirements.
CARMEN T. GAHOL v. ESPERANZA COBARRUBIAS
G.R. No. 187144, September 17, 2014, PERALTA, J.
One of the requirements for the issuance of a Townsite Sales Application form is a
certificate of no home lot.
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Facts:
Gahol applied for Townsite Sales Application (TSA) with the DENR for the land
adjacent to her property. Cobarrubias filed a protest, stating that she and her family are
occupying the same. The DENR decided in Gahols favor and the Office of the President
dismissed Cobarrubias appeal. The CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether Gahol is qualified to own the disputed property
Ruling:
No. Carmen Gahol did not submit a certificate of no home lot and was still issued a
TSA despite the fact that she owns another lot in Baguio City. The untruthfulness of her
statements in the TSA shall render her disqualified. Gahols application must be rejected
because one of the requirements was that the applicant must not own any other property,
but Gahol is a registered owner of a residential lot. She also stated that there are no signs of
improvement or occupation in the said lot, but it was in fact occupied by the Cobarrubias.
Gahol is therefore disqualified due to the untruthful statements in her application.
HOLY TRINITY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ,
et al.
G.R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
6657.
Land that is not devoted to agricultural activity is outside the coverage of R.A. No.
Facts:
The Dakila property, which was registered in the name of Freddie Santiago, was freely
relinquished by tenants Susana Surio, et al. to various successors while Holy Trinity Realty &
Development Corporation purchased the remaining properties from Santiago and transferred
the title to its name. It proceeded to subdivide the Dakila property into six lots. The
Sangguniang Bayan ng Malolos passed a resolution which reclassified four of the lots
belonging to Holy Trinity. Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of one of the previous
tenants, Felix Surio, wrote to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Bulacan, requesting an
investigation of the sale of the Dakila property.
The DAR Regional Office decided to redistribute the subject property to qualified
farmer beneficiaries as it opined that the sale was a prohibited transaction under P.D. No. 27
and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Secretary affirmed but the Office of the President
reversed the formers ruling. The CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether Dakila Property is agricultural land within the coverage of R.A. No. 6657
Ruling:
No. An agricultural land, according to R.A. No. 6657, is one that is devoted to
agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
30 | P a g e

land. Consequently, before land may be placed under the coverage of R.A. No. 6657, two (2)
requisites must be met, namely: (1) that the land must be devoted to agricultural activity;
and (2) that the land must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. Agricultural activity includes the "cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products; and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with
such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. For land to be covered
under Presidential Decree No. 27, it must be devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must
be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein.
DANILO ALMERO, et al. v. HEIRS OF MIGUEL PACQUING

G.R. No. 199008, November 19, 2014, BRION, J.
It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
Facts:
Miguel Pacquing acquired agricultural lands in Tagum city through a homestead
patent. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent Miguels representative a notice
of coverage placing his estate under R.A. No. 6657s Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. Miguel failed to reply and instead, filed a Voluntary Offer to Sell the property with
the DAR. Because Miguel died during the pendency of the proceedings, his sole heir, Linda
Pacquing adjudicated to herself ownership over the property and filed an application for
retention with the DAR of the same lot. The DAR denied it and its decision became final and
executory.
Linda filed with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator a petition to cancel Danilo
Almero, et al.s Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs), which were granted in the
latters favor for being farmer-beneficiaries of cultivated portions of the same property. The
petition was dismissed for Lindas failure to file her position paper. The TCTs covering the
portions of the property cultivated by Napoleon Villa, Sr. and transferred by Linda to the
former were nullified by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Subsequently, they issued titles to Almero, et al. over the same property.
Issue:
Whether the lands under the homestead grant are exempt from agrarian reform
coverage
Ruling:
No. Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the
original homestead only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. That parcels of land
are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of
land reform. In order for the homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs to retain
31 | P a g e

their homestead, the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) they must still be the owners
of the original homestead at the time of R.A. No. 6657s effectivity, and (b) they must
continue to cultivate the homestead land. Linda, as the direct compulsory heir of the original
homestead grantee, is no longer cultivating the homestead land. Though the parcels of land
are covered by homestead patents, it will not automatically exempt them from the operation
of the land reform.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 188494, November 26, 2014, REYES, J.
A Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO
certification, by itself, fails to prove the alienable and disposable character of a parcel of
land.
Facts:
Remman Enterprises, Inc. filed with the RTC an application for registration of the
subject properties in Taguig. The State, through the OSG, interposed its opposition. The RTC
granted the application but the CA reversed, explaining that the survey plans and technical
descriptions submitted by Remman failed to establish the true identity of the subject
properties.
Issue:
Whether Remmans application for registration of the subject property should be
granted
Ruling:
No. It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for the land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Thus, the property registration of a corporation merely relying on the CENRO Certification
must be dismissed for failure to prove that the land had been declared alienable and
disposable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES JOSE and PERLA CASTUERA
G.R. No. 203384, January 14, 2015, CARPIO, J.
The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable
and disposable character of the property.
Facts:
Andres Valiente sold his lot in Zambales to the spouses Castuera. The spouses, in
turn, filed with the RTC an application for original registration of title over the said property.
The OSG filed its opposition. The RTC granted the same, holding that the spouses have
32 | P a g e

preponderantly shown that they are the lawful owners and the actual possessors of the lot.
The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether the advance plan and the CENRO certification are sufficient proofs of the
alienable and disposable character of the property
Ruling:
No. Spouses Castuera, as applicants for the registration of title, must present a
certified true copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or classification of the land as
alienable and disposable and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by PENRO or CENRO. The applicant
must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable,
as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the
DENR Secretary's declaration or the President's proclamation must be certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of such official record. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMMANUEL CORTEZ
G.R. No. 186639, January 5, 2014, REYES, J.
Lands of the public domain that are patrimonial in character are susceptible to
acquisitive prescription and, accordingly, eligible for registration under Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529, but the period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time
that the State officially declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public use, public service, or for the development of national wealth.
Facts:
Emmanuel Cortez filed with the RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title
over a parcel of land in Manila. As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an order of
general default and it granted Cortezs application. It ratiocinated that there is sufficient
basis to grant the relief prayed for as there was competent evidence established that the
possession of the land applied for and his predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the same, under claim of title and in the concept of
owners. In the appeal by the OSG, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision and ruled that
Cortez was able to prove that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable, as
evidenced by the declaration or notation from the Bureau of Forest Development.
Issue:
Whether Cortezs application for registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. The only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law
is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are
alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau
33 | P a g e

of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
There is no official declaration from the state attesting to the patrimonial character of
the subject property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run
against the State, much less that he has acquired title to the subject property by virtue
thereof. It is of no moment that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property for 57 years at the time he applied for the registration of
title thereto. It is not the notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation
of an alienable and disposable public land for the mandated periods that converts it to
patrimonial.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.
Proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of
the application.
Facts:
Remman Enterprises, Inc. filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of
title over two parcels of land in Taguig, with Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
opposing the same. The RTC granted the application, opining that the elevations of the
subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 m, thus,
not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether Remmans application for registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are
mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property. That the subject properties are not part of the bed of
Laguna lake does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the Remman to prove, with
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
The certifications presented by Remman are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable. In addition to the certification issued by the proper
government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the
legal custodian of the records. Respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that
it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
34 | P a g e
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF

FISHERIES (ANCF) and DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her capacity as ANCF
Superintendent v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION L. SIN,
ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN,
JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA
G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
There must be a positive act by the government declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable.
Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of Maxima Lachica who was the
owner of a parcel of land situated in Aklan. They filed a complaint against the ANCF
Superintendent claiming that ANCF usurped the land they inherited. They asserted that they
were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. ANCF
countered that the land was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 which allocated it as a civil
reservation for educational purposes of ANCF and that the land is timberland which is not
susceptible of private ownership. The MCTC, RTC, and CA unanimously held that respondents
retain private rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the said
proclamation.
Issue:
Whether respondents retain private rights to the property
Ruling:
No. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State,
it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government. The respondents have the burden to identify a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed
to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is
inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Respondents cannot be considered to
have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property.
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CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-630, November 15, 1947, MORAN, C.J.
Aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential
lands.
Facts:
Alexander A. Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate,
Inc., in December 1941. The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war. In May 1945,
he sought to register it but was denied by the Register of Deeds on the ground that he
cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction because he is an alien. Krivenko went to the CFI of
Manila which sustained the refusal of the RD.
Issue:
Whether an alien may acquire residential land
Ruling:
No. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution embraces all lands of any kind of the public
domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the
conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. The three branches of the
government have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots. Under
Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their
alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino
citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to
prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII which closes the only remaining
avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
Section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in Section 1. Both
sections must, therefore, be read together.
The persons against whom the prohibition is directed in Section 5 are the very same
persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the nontransferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under Section 1
includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural
land under Section 5. The only difference between "agricultural land" under Section 5, is
that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and
not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of
the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of
whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
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ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN DAVID ONG and JIMMY ONG v. COURT OF APPEALS
and SOLEDAD PARIAN
G.R. Nos. 113472-73, December 20, 1994, QUIASON, J.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.
Facts:
Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to Soledad Parian, wife of Ong Yee. Ong Yee is the
brother of Ong Ching Po. Both of them died subsequently. The sale was evidenced in a
notarized Deed of Sale which was registered in the RD in the name of Parian, who said that
she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to Ong Ching Po. When her husband
died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Petitioners
refused to vacate the said premises, claiming that their father, Ong Ching Po, bought the
said land from Ong Joi Jong and was conveyed to them. Petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance against respondent who, in turn, filed an action for quieting of title against
them. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent which was affirmed by the CA.
Ong Ching Po claims that they have an agreement that the land be registered in the name of
respondent in order to avoid legal complications and to facilitate registration and transfer
and that the said title would be transferred by the respondent to Ong Ching Po or his
successors-in-interest and that she would be holding the title in trust for him.
Issue:
Whether an alien can acquire and own real property in the Philippines
Ruling:
No. Ong Ching Po cannot claim that he merely used private respondent as a dummy
to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he
was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. The capacity to acquire private land
is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private
land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire
lands of the public domain." The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the
"disposition, exploitation, development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and
other natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty
percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands. Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he
was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property.
CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI v. COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS
GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG
G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.
The transfer of an interest in a piece of land to an alien may no longer be assailed on
constitutional grounds after the entire parcel has been sold to a qualified citizen.
Facts:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen died in 1968, leaving real properties in the
Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow Helen Meyers Guzman and son David Guzman.
37 | P a g e

Both of them are also American citizens. Helen conveyed to David all her rights over the six
parcels of land they inherited. David then sold the land to Emilio Cataniag. Petitioners, who
are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint questioning the constitutionality of the two
conveyances between Helen and David, and between the latter and Cataniag. They
claimed ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption. The trial court dismissed
the complaint. The CA affirmed and further held that, although the transfer of the land to
David Rey may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more
point in allowing petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on to and was thus
already owned by a qualified person.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified citizen
renders moot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made
Ruling:
Yes. Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain, except only by way of legal succession. However, jurisprudence is consistent that "if
land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to
a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid." If the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but
also urban lands is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim
or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. Since the disputed land is
now owned by Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be
assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our land in Filipino hands
has been served.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME
PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC.
G.R. No. 73002, December 29, 1986, NARVASA, J.
The reckoning point in determining whether a person is qualified to acquire
land is the time the right to own it is obtained and not the time of registration of
ownership.
Facts:
The land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc from Mariano and Ancer Infiel, both members of the
Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities. The possession of the Infiels dates back
before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. The sale took place on October 29, 1962.
The CFI ordered the registration in favor of Acme. However, the Director of Lands appealed
asserting that the registration proceedings were done only on July 17, 1981, long after the
1973 Constitution had gone into effect. He contends that since Section 11 of Article XIV
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from
the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme.
38 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed
Ruling:
Yes. The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the
time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the
public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If they were then already private lands,
the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations
obviously does not apply. Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure. The land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired
from the Infiels by Acme. The Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could
have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter
of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate. Acme had a perfect right to make
such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that
matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from
acquiring and owning private lands. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at
the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land.
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUCIA M. GOMEZ

G.R. No. 189021, February 22, 2012, SERENO, J.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable.
Facts:
Gabriel Gomez was alleged to have been originally in possession of Lot No. 2872 in
Kalibo, Aklan. In 1936, his nephew Emilio Gomez, who was the father of respondent, bought
the lot in a public auction and declared it under the name of the heirs of Gabriel Gomez.
Emilio declared part of Lot No. 2872 under his name. When he died in 1969, his surviving
spouse and children allegedly took continuous possession and occupancy of the lot, for
which they paid real property tax. The lot was partitioned. Respondent filed an Application
for registration of title with regard to her part. Herein petitioner filed its Opposition.
Petitioner alleged that respondent failed to prove that the subject lot was alienable and
disposable and that the requirements of P.D. No. 1529 had not been complied with. The CA
held that the Certification made by the Geodetic Engineer that the land was alienable and
disposable was sufficient.
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Issue:
Whether respondent was able to sufficiently prove that the land was alienable and
disposable
Ruling:
No. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to
the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.
Respondent submitted two certifications issued by the DENR but they are not
sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR and it includes the CENRO which
issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. Respondent
applied for registration of a lot with an area over 50 hectares. The CENRO certificate covered
the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which is beyond the authority of
the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R. VEGA, ROGELIO R.

VEGA, LUBIN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA R. VEGA, NAMELY: FRACISCO L. YAP, MA.
WINONA Y. RODRIGUEZ, MA. WENDELYN V. YAP and FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR.
G. R. No. 177790, January 17, 2011, SERENO, J.
The rule regarding substantial compliance with the requirement of a CENRO or
PENRO certification and certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR
Secretary applies pro hac vice.
Facts:
Respondents filed an application for registration of title covering a parcel of land
located in Los Baos, Laguna. They alleged that they inherited the subject land from their
mother. The Republic filed an opposition on the ground that the subject land or portions
thereof were lands of the public domain and not subject to private appropriation. During the
hearing, respondents presented several exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements, as well as witnesses to prove respondents Vegas ownership, occupation and
possession of the land including the testimony of Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of
the CENRO under DENR. His report stated that the area subject of the investigation was
entirely within the alienable and disposable zone, and that there was no public land
application filed for the same land by the applicant or by any other person. The
corresponding decree of registration was issued.
40 | P a g e

Issue:
Whether respondents have sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable
and disposable
Ruling:
Yes. To comply with the Property Registration Decree, respondents should have
submitted a CENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original classification by the
DENR Secretary. Respondents failed to do so. However, despite such failure, there has been
substantial compliance with the requirement. First, respondents Vegas were able to present
Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO whose testimony and written report under oath constituted
substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature of the subject land. Second, the
Subdivision Plan formally offered as evidence expressly indicates that the land is alienable
and disposable. Finally, the LRA never raised the issue. The absence of any effective
opposition from the government, coupled with other pieces of evidence persuades this Court
to rule in favor of respondents. It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial
compliance applies pro hac vice. To establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original
registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO
certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR
Secretary. As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely
on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the
ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government
to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from
the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently
pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future
applications.
CHARLES L. ONG v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175746, March 12, 2008, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it
and of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Facts:
Charles Ong, in behalf of his brothers, filed an Application for Registration of Title
over a lot situated in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. They alleged that they are the co-owners and
that it is their exclusive property having acquired it by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista
and Alicia Villamil. The Republic of the Philippines opposed and asserted that neither
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier and
that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private
appropriation.
Issue:
41 | P a g e

Whether the application for registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. The subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. The tax declaration presented, although not conclusive but it
constitutes a good indicia of possession, was issued in 1971, and this would still fall short of
the required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier. Further, possession alone is not
sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession and occupation. The law speaks of possession and occupation, which seeks to
delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the
words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction.
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot, neither he
nor his brothers actually occupied it. Petitioners predecessor-in-interest testified that he and
his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they bought the same from
spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997. Petitioners evidence failed to establish
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO ESPINOSA

G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012, REYES, J.
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial.
Facts:
Domingo Espinosa filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land
situated in Consolacion, Cebu. He alleged that the property is alienable and disposable, that
he purchased it from his mother, and together with his predecessor-in-interest, they had
been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. He
submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-000893 to prove the identity of the
land. As proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the
annotation on the advance survey plan made by the Chief of the Map Projection Section,
stating that it was verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area. He also presented two
tax declarations. Petitioner opposed. The lower courts were unanimous in holding that
Espinosas application is anchored on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section
48(b) of the PLA and that the grant thereof is warranted.
Issue:
42 | P a g e

Ruling:
No. Espinosas claim of an imperfect title over the property in question is based on
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, not Section 14(1) because he repeatedly alleged that he
acquired title through his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest of the subject
property for 30 years, or through prescription. Since Section 14(2) applies, the subject
property being supposedly alienable and disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2)
provides, only private properties may be acquired through prescription and under Articles
420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public
service or intended for the development of national wealth, are considered private. There
must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. Thus, granting that Isabel
and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate period of 30
years, this does not operate to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit
allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. Applying Section 14(1), albeit
improper, Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property dated back to
June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and disposable. On the other hand,
Applying Section 14(2), Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. The
application for registration is denied.
JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO LOILO ESPINEDA and DAISY ALIADO
MANAOIS, represented in this act by their Attorney-in-Fact, MA. WILHELMINA E.
TOBIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012, REYES, J.
Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods
provided under the Civil Code will not convert it to patrimonial or private property. There
must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of national wealth.
Facts:
Petitioners filed with the RTC an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land situated in Indang, Cavite, alleging that they acquired the property from Gregonio
Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996, and that they have been
in possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The RTC granted the
application, but the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for the requisite
period of 30 years. Appellees possession over the subject property can be reckoned only
from 21 June 1983, the date when according to evidence, the subject property became
alienable and disposable. From said date up to the filing of the application for registration of
title over the subject property on 14 June 2001, only 18 years had lapsed.
43 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether the petitioners acquired ownership over the property through prescription
Ruling:
No. The petitioners application is anchored on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 as they
do not claim to have possessed, by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest, the subject
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Unfortunately, the petitioners failed to demonstrate
that they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the property in the requisite manner.
While there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by testimonial evidence, the
same is futile and frivolous. The testimonies of Margarito Pena and Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias do
not merit consideration and do not make up for the inherent inadequacy of the 11 tax
declarations submitted by the petitioners. Furthermore, the petitioners application was filed
after only one year from the time the subject property may be considered patrimonial.
DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, was issued by the DAR
only on July 13, 2000, which means that the counting of the 30-year prescriptive period for
purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can only start from
such date. Before the property was declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion order,
it cannot be acquired by prescription.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. METRO INDEX REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 198585, July 2, 2012, REYES, J.
Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a
mere fiction.
Facts:
Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation filed with the RTC an application for
confirmation of title over three parcels of land located in Indang, Cavite. Respondent claimed
that they bought the properties and it had been declared for tax purposes in its name since
2006. According to Metro Index, the properties were alienable and disposable as evidenced
by a certification from DENR, and that respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the subject properties for more than 50 years. One of the witnesses of Metro
Index claims that her parents were in possession since 1956. Moreover, the properties are
planted with coconut, banana, santol, palay and corn.
Issue:
Whether the respondent is entitled to the benefits of P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of
imperfect titles
Ruling:
44 | P a g e

No. Respondents evidence demonstrated that its predecessors-in-interest started to
possess and occupy the properties sometime in 1956 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
and thus, its claim is premised on Section 14(2) of P.D. No.1529. It is not the notorious,
exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public
land for the mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial. The indispensability of an
official declaration that the property is now held by the State in its private capacity or placed
within the commerce of man for prescription to have any effect against the State cannot be
overemphasized. There is no official declaration and, the respondents application should
have been dismissed outright. Moreover, the possession and occupation of the respondent
and its predecessors-in-interest was not in the manner contemplated by law. Tax
declarations are mere bases for inferring possession. They must be coupled with proof of
actual possession for them to constitute "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence of a claim of
ownership. The number of coconut trees is unspecified while the number of fruit-bearing
trees is too few (three santol, one avocado and one star apple). The mere planting of a sign
or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense
tract of territory.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC. v. THE LAND

REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY
G.R. No. L-8451, December 20, 1957, FELIX, J.
A corporation sole, which consists of one person only, is vested with the right to
purchase and hold real estate and to register the same in trust for the faithful or members
of the religious society or church for which the corporation was organized.
Facts:
Mateo Rodis, a Filipino citizen, executed a deed of sale in favor of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., a corporation sole with a Canadian citizen, as actual
incumbent. When the deed of sale was presented to the RD for registration, the latter
required said corporation to submit an affidavit declaring that 60% of the members thereof
were Filipino citizens. As the RD had some doubts as to the registrability of the document,
the matter was referred to the LRC which rendered a resolution holding that the vendee was
not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines. Petitioner consistently maintained
that a corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent, is not prohibited or
disqualified to acquire and hold real properties. Respondents averred that although it might
be true that petitioner is not the owner of the land purchased, he has control over the same.
Issue:
Whether Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. may acquire private
agricultural lands
Ruling:
Yes. The bishops or archbishops as corporation sole are merely administrators of the
church properties that come to their possession, in which they hold in trust for the church.
45 | P a g e

Through this legal fiction, however, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a
corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death not his personal heirs but to his
successor in office. The power of a corporation sole to purchase real property, like the power
exercised in the case at bar, is not restricted although the power to sell or mortgage
sometimes is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church concerned
represented by said corporation sole. Lands held in trust for specific purposes may be
subject of registration (Section 69, Act 496), and the capacity of a corporation sole to
register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may be issued in its name. It
is absurd that while the corporations sole that might be in need of acquiring lands for the
erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools and cemeteries which they are
expressly authorized by law to acquire in furtherance of their freedom of religion they could
not register said properties in their name. The court might safely state that even before,
every corporation sole then organized and registered had by express provision of law the
necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the
territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was created,
independently of the nationality of its incumbent single member and head, the bishop of the
dioceses.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CECILIA GRACE L. ROASA, married to GREG

AMBROSE ROASA, as herein represented by her Attorneys-in-Fact, BERNARDO M.
NICOLAS, JR. and ALVIN B. ACAYEN
G.R. No. 176022, February 2, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, what is important in

computing the period of possession is that the land has already been declared alienable and
disposable at the time of the application for registration.
Facts:
Respondents filed an application for registration of title with the RTC on December
15, 2000, claiming ownership over the lot by reason of purchase. According to her, the
property is an agricultural land planted with corn, palay and others, and that respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted
possession and occupation of the land under bona fide claim of ownership since the 1930's.
Also, they have declared the land for taxation purposes. The Republic opposed the
application contending that the tax declarations and tax payment receipts, did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence and that the subject lot is a portion of the
public domain. However, the Republic did not present any evidence to support its opposition.
Issue:
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Whether the application for confirmation of imperfect title should be granted
Ruling:
Yes. The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made,
has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence,
the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree should be interpreted to include possession before the declaration of the
lands alienability as long as at the time of the application for registration, the land has
already been declared part of the alienable and disposable agricultural public lands.
The subject lot has been declared alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982. This is
more than 18 years before respondent's application for registration, which was filed on
December 15, 2000. Moreover, the unchallenged testimonies of two of respondent's
witnesses established that the latter and her predecessors-in-interest had been in adverse,
open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner even before June 12,
1945.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. NEMESIO

DUMAGPI, represented by VICENTE DUMAGPI
Adverse possession can only ripen into ownership when the land adversely owned is
classified as an agricultural land. If the disputed land is non-agricultural, adverse possession
cannot ripen into ownership.
Facts:
Nemesio Dumagpi filed a complaint for quieting of title against defendants wherein
he alleged that the lot situated in Siay, Zamboanga del Sur has long been converted into his
private property by operation of law because of his manner and period of possession and
occupation of such. Then, defendants allegedly dispossessed him of a portion of the lot by
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force. He later learned that titles had been issued by the DAR to the defendants. DARs
witness testified that the area is a resettlement site which used to be part of a coal mine
reservation and that it was reclassified and declared as a resettlement site under
Proclamation No. 2342 dated March 14, 1984 and that following DAR guidelines, the verified
a list of qualified beneficiaries included the private defendants who had been personally
cultivating portions which were eventually titled to them. The private defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the controversy involved the implementation of
the agrarian reform law, which is outside the courts jurisdiction. The RTC held that the entire
22-hectare lot claimed by Nemesio had ipso jure attained the character of private property
on account of his continuous, open, notorious and exclusive occupation and cultivation for
30 years prior to the issuance of the CLOAs and OCTs to the private defendants, who were
mere intruders.
Issue:
Whether the 22 hectares had ipso jure attained the character of private property
Ruling:
No. The land Nemesio is claiming was not alienable public agricultural land but in
truth was as a coal mine from 1938 to 1984, a period which overlapped with his claimed
acquisitive possession. Clearly, he cannot invoke Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141 and assert an acquisitive title thereto by reason of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession for 30 years. The CLOAs and OCTs issued over the subject lot were
pursuant to the implementation of the agrarian law under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DAR Secretary. Nemesio has doubtful standing to petition for quieting of title, which is
clearly a collateral attack against the CLOAs and titles the DAR Secretary issued to the
private defendants. He has no title, records, or instruments to uphold, and moreover, under
Section 23 of R.A. No. 6657 as agrarian reform beneficiary he is allowed only three hectares,
not 22. Even granting that his complaint may be treated as one for reconveyance, there is
no ownership or title to reconvey to him because he never had one, not even through
acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the DAR is the real party in interest, since at issue is the
validity of its actions comprising the determination of the qualified agrarian reform
beneficiaries and the issuance of CLOAs and titles to them. Since the implementation of
agrarian law is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary, and issues concerning
the issuance of the subject titles can only be raised to the DAR Secretary, the RTC has no
jurisdiction.
RAFAEL VALES, CECILIA VALES-VASQUEZ, and YASMIN VALES-JACINTO v. MA. LUZ

CHORESCA GALINATO, ERNESTO CHORESCA, TEOFILO AMADO, LORNA PARIAN
MEDIANERO, REBECCA PORCAL, and VIVENCIO ORDOYO
G.R. No. 180134, March 5, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
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The May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum provides that tenants should (a) have actual
knowledge of unregistered transfers of ownership of lands covered by Torrens Certificate of
Titles prior to October 21, 1972, (b) have recognized the persons of the new owners, and (c)
have been paying rentals/amortization to such new owners in order to validate the transfer
and bind the tenants to the same.
Facts:
Spouses Vales executed a Deed of Sale conveying five parcels of registered
agricultural land located in Cabatuan, Iloilo to their three children, herein petitioners.
However, the sale as not registered and at that time, the lands were tenanted. Months later,
PD 27 was passed decreeing the emancipation of tenants. One of the children, Rafael,
executed a sworn declaration that he and his sisters are co-owners of the lands but still the
subject lands were placed under the coverage of the governments Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) Program as properties belonging to Spouses Vales, not to petitioners. Petitioners filed a
letter-request for the retention of the lands and also a petition to be certified as owners,
however, both were not acted upon. Meanwhile, during the period July to August 1987,
petitioners entered into several Agricultural Leasehold Contracts with nine tenants and in
1988, Emancipation Patents were issued in favor of the latter but petitioners claim that they
have no knowledge of such. Petitioners claims exemption from the OLT Program.
Issue:
Whether the subject lands are exempted from the OLT Program by virtue of the sale
Ruling:
No. Petitioners sought exemption of the subject lands from the OLT Program of the
government by claiming ownership thereof on the basis of a sale thereof by the registered
owners, i.e., Spouses Vales, executed on March 3, 1972. However, said transaction, in order
to be valid, should be examined in line with the provisions of the May 7, 1982 DAR
Memorandum. The subject sale was not registered or even annotated on the certificates of
title covering the subject lands. More importantly, the tenants categorically belied having
actual knowledge of the said sale and still recognized Spouses Vales as the landowners.
Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements stated under the May 7, 1982 DAR
Memorandum. The subject lands were correctly placed under the OLT Program of the
government, which thereby warranted the denial of the petition for exemption.
SPOUSES MARIO AND JULIA CAMPOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184371, March 5, 2014, BRION, J.
Persons applying for registration of title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 must prove: (1) that the land sought to be registered forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Facts:
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Petitioners applied for the registration of a parcel of land. In support of their
application, petitioners presented among others tax declarations for the years 1948 and
1954. The Republic filed a formal opposition to the application, which the MTC dismissed for
failure to substantiate grounds for objection. The MTC granted the application. The Republic
appealed to the CA on the ground that the MTC erred in grating the application. The CA
reversed the MTC decision stating that petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse
possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Issue:
Whether petitioners have presented sufficient evidence to show possession and
cultivation
Ruling:
No. Petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land, under a
bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The oldest documentary
evidence presented by petitioners was a 1948 tax declaration over the subject land in the
name of Margarita Laigo. They failed to present evidence of their possession prior to 1948.
In fact, the petitioners, in their application for registration, base their possession of the
subject land only from 1948, and not since June 12, 1945, or earlier as required by law.
SPOUSES ANTONIO AND ERLINDA FORTUNA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014, BRION, J.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
Facts:
Spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration, claiming that they through
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of the lot for more than 50 years. The Republic opposed but was
declared in default for failure to present evidence in support of its opposition. The RTC
granted the application for registration. The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA,
arguing that the spouses did not present an official proclamation from the government that
the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether Spouses Fortuna were able to prove that the land was alienable and
disposable public land
Ruling:
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No. Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered
properties alienable and disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only
establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper government
office.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or
the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and
disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or
legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public
land as alienable and disposable.
SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO BAUTISTA v. FRANCISCO LINDO, et al.
G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law
which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations
between the parties.
Facts:
Bautista inherited a free-patent land which he subdivided and sold to several
vendees. Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against
respondents anchoring his cause of action on the CA 141 or the Public Land Act.
Issue:
Whether Bautista may repurchase the property he previously sold
Ruling:
Yes. Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent. While
the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to
repurchase by the applicant within a period of 5 years from the date of conveyance pursuant
to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made part of the
deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written into every
contract. Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES DANTE AND LOLITA BENIGNO
G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
Applicants for registration of title under PD1529 must prove among others that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain. In order
to prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the
application must include both a CENRO or PENRO certification and a certified true copy of
the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.
Facts:
Spouses Benigno filed with the RTC an Application for Registration of title. After trial
the RTC granted the application for registration. The Republic filed its notice of appeal to the
CA claiming that the decision of the RTC should be rendered null and void for lack of the
required certification from the Secretary of the DENR.
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Issue:
Whether the RTC decision granting the application for registration should be null and
void
Ruling:
Yes. The State will not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public
domain just because its agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of their
duties. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. Spouses Benigno did not present any documentary
evidence to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable public land.
Consequently, the decision of the RTC is rendered null and void since it had no basis in fact
and law to grant respondents application for registration as there was no proof of
alienability adduced.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI
G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015, PERALTA, J.
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.
and
had
and
the
Facts:
Lualhati filed an application for original registration of a parcel of land over which she
and her family had been in possession in the concept of an owner since 1944. In support for
her application she submitted among others, the survey plan, the technical descriptions, real
property tax register and certifications from the DENR that no public land application
covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lands covered by any administrative title.
Issue:
land
Whether Lualhati was able to prove the alienable and disposable character of the
Ruling:
No. To support her contention, Lualhati submitted certifications from the DENRCENRO stating that no public land application or land patent covering the subject lots is
pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title. The certifications are not
sufficient. The applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. The certifications presented by respondent, do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
RODOLFO V. FRANCISCO v. EMILIANA M. ROJAS, et al.
G.R. No. 167120, April 23, 2014, PERALTA, J.
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A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already
decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. Issuance of another
decree covering the same land is null and void.
Facts:
The Franciscos are the applicants for registration in the land registration case from
whence the challenged decision sprung. Guido, alleging that the original of his title could not
be located in the files of the Registry of Deeds, sought for the reconstitution of the same.
Subsequently, it appeared that the application for registration of the parcel of land
overlapped a portion of the area covered by the title of Guido. The RTC granted the
application of the Franciscos due to the absence of opposition. The Rojases, successors-ininterest of Guido, filed a petition for certiorari claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the Land
Registration Court to rule on the application of the Franciscos.
Issue:
Whether the Land Registration Proceeding is the appropriate proceeding in this case
Ruling:
No. Petitioners have based their claim to ownership of the subject lots on the alleged
fact of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. Their application represented to the land
registration court that the parcels of land subjects of the case were unregistered and not yet
brought within the coverage of the Torrens system of registration. As the very nature of the
action limits the subject matter to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, an
ordinary registration proceeding cannot be availed of by petitioner in order to establish
claims over lands which had already been brought within the coverage of the Torrens
system.
LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200894, November 10, 2014, LEONEN, J.
An applicant for land registration or judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect
title under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529 must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Facts:
Canlas applied for original registration of title of a parcel of land. The RTC granted the
application. According to the RTC, Canlas complied with the procedural requirements and
substantiated her application. She sufficiently proved that, through her predecessors-ininterest, she has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an
alienable and disposable parcel of land of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership for more than 30 years.
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Issue:
Whether Canlas has proven open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation
Ruling:
Yes. In land registration cases, the applicants legal basis is important in determining
the required number of years or the reference point for possession or prescription.
Documentary evidence to prove possession was presented and substantiated by the
witnesses testimonies. There were sufficient pieces of evidence to show that petitioner and
her predecessors-in-interest exercised specific acts of ownership such as: farming activities;
allowing the excavation of land for pulang lupa to make clay pots; paying realty taxes;
declaring the property for tax purposes; employing a care taker; causing corrections in
entries in public documents with regard to the land; and demanding unlawful occupants to
vacate the premises.
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC. v.

HON. TEODORO T. RIEL, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR,
BRANCH 85
G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.
The provisions that expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstruction
of an existing Torrens title are Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 26.
Facts:
Petitioner applied for the judicial reconstitution of OCT with the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City claiming that the original had been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the
Quezon City Register of Deeds. UP opposed the petition and the Land Registration Authority
recommended that the petition be dismissed. The RTC dismissed the petition. Petitioner
went straight to the SC on a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition for
judicial reconstitution
Ruling:
No. The petitioner did not present the duplicate or certified copy of the Original
Certificate of Title. It disobeyed Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 26, the provisions that
expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstruction of an existing Torrens title.
The RTC did not lack or exceed its authority in acting on and dismissing the petition
considering that the petition for reconstitution involved land already registered in the name
of UP, as confirmed by the LRA. It would have been contrary to law had respondent dealt
with and granted the petition for judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES JOSE AND PERLA CASTUERA

G.R. No. 203384, January 12 2015, CARPIO, J.
An applicant for registration of title must present a certified true copy of the DENR
Secretarys declaration or classification of the land as alienable and disposable.
Facts:
Spouses Castuera filed with the RTC an application for original registration of title
over the property. The spouses presented an advance plan and a CENRO certification to
support their application. The RTC granted the application. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether the advance plan and the CENRO certification are sufficient proofs of the
alienable and disposable character of the property
Ruling:
No. The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the
alienable and disposable character of the property. As applicants for registration of title, the
spouses must present a certified true copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or
classification of the land as alienable and disposable.
UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 187892, January 14, 2015, PERALTA, J.
Persons who can file the petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate are the
registered owner, his assigns or persons in interest in the property.
Facts:
Ungay Malobago Mines is the registered owner of a mining patent covered by the
OCT. Petitioner found that the Register of Deeds could not locate the copy of the OCT so it
filed with the RTC a petition seeking the reconstitution of the OCT. The RTC dismissed the
petition ruling that since the petitioner is not the owner of the surface land which had
already been titled to Rapu Rapu Minerals it is not entitled to the certificate of title over its
mining patent.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has personality to file the petition for the reconstitution of the
OCT
Ruling:
No. Petitioner admitted that it was not the owner of the land on which the mining
patent was issued as the same was owned and registered in the name of Rapu Rapu
Minerals. Thus, not having an interest on the land amounting to a title to the same,
petitioner is not possessed of a legal personality to institute a petition for judicial
reconstitution of the alleged lost OCT.
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IMELDA LEONARDO, FIDELINO AZUCENA, JOSEFINA, ANITA AND SISA ALL

SURNAMED SYJUCO, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FELISAD BONIFACIO AND
VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
To determine whether an attack on a certificate of title is direct or indirect, the
relevance of the object of the action instituted and the relief sought therein must be
examined.
Facts:
The Syjucos are the registered co-owners of the subject land under TCT No. T-108530.
Subsequently, petitioner learned that a broker offered for sale the same subject land to
another person which was covered by a different TCT under the name of Bonifacio. The
Syjucos filed a petition before the RTC for quieting of title. The RTC ruled in favor of Bonifacio
stating that the technical description of the two TCTs are different. The CA affirmed the ruling
of the RTC and ruled that the case filed before the RTC is a collateral attack on the validity of
Bonifacios TCT, which is in violation of Section 48 of PD1529.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners action is a collateral attack on the certificate of title of
respondents
Ruling:
No. The instituted action in this case is a direct attack on a certificate of title to real
property. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set
aside such judgment or enjoin its enforcement. The attack is indirect or collateral when, in
an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless is made as
an incident thereof.
In their complaint for quieting of title, petitioners specifically pray for the declaration
of nullity and/or cancellation of respondents titles over the subject land. The relief sought by
petitioners is certainly feasible since the objective of an action to quiet title is precisely to
quiet, remove, invalidate, annul and/or nullify a cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ
Under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Facts:
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Cortez filed with the RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel
of land. Among the evidence to support his claim was a survey plan of the property, with the
annotation that the property is classified as alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the
application for registration. The Republic appealed claiming that Cortez was unable to
present a certification from the government that the subject property was alienable and
disposable. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, petitioner presented a survey plan. A survey plan does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the property remains
part of the inalienable public domain. The law provides that an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigators, a legislative act or statute.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC

For purposes of land registration, proof of specific acts of ownership must be
presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for registration
cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual
evidence of possession.
Facts:
Remman Enterprises, Inc., filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of
title over two parcels of land. The Laguna Lake Development Authority opposed asserting
that the lots sought to be registered does not form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. The Republic likewise filed its Opposition alleging that the respondent
failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The
RTC granted the application of Remman Enterprises. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same;
and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
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As to the first requisite, Respondent presented two certifications attesting that the
lots form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. These
certifications do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. It is not
enough for the PENRO and CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. In
addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as
alienable and disposable.
As to the second and third requisites, respondent presented the testimony of the
caretaker of the property that respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed and
cultivated the same since 1943. Other than the testimony, the respondent failed to present
other evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its
predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZURBARAN REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORP

G.R. No. 164408, March 24, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish
that: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public
domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless
of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as
patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of
possession.
Facts:
Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with the RTC an application for
original registration covering a parcel of land. Respondent alleged that it bought the
property, where the previous owner had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner. The Republic opposed the application
alleging that the respondents had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land and that the land was a portion of the public domain.
The RTC granted the application and the CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the application for original registration should be granted
Ruling:
No. There is no evidence that showing that the land in question was within an area
expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable and disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
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EDUARDO LUCENA AND NATIVIDAD PARALES v. COURT OF APPEALS AND RURAL
BANK OF NAUJAN, INC., ROGELIO PINEDA, MARIANITO BAJA, PATRICIA ARAJA,
BRAULIO BAGUS, REYNALDO MAMBIL AND RAMON GARCIA
G.R. No. L-77468, August 25, 1999, QUISUMBING, J.
Subsequent registration by a purchaser in bad faith does not bar an action for
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance is available so long as the land has not passed to
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Facts:
On May 7, 1974, a land previously registered under the names of Eduardo Lucena
and Natividad Parales was foreclosed, and was awarded to the Rural Bank of Naujan. The
Certificate of Sale thereof was registered only on January 9, 1975. After consolidation of
ownership, the Bank sold the land to spouses Baja on July 14, 1975. Consequently, a
certificate of title was issued in favour of the spouses. After two years, Lucena and Parales
filed a complaint for reconveyance. The lower court ruled that the foreclosure sale was void
and that the Bank did not acquire valid title to the property in question.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent registration by spouses Baja is valid
Ruling:
No. The spouses Baja were purchasers in bad faith. When they verified the title of the
subject property, they must have noticed that the certificate of sale was registered only on
January 9, 1975, so that they are presumed to know that the Lucena and Parales had at least
one year from that date or up to January 8, 1976 to redeem the subject property. This fact
would have put a reasonable man on his guard. The spouses cannot claim that they acted in
good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the bank. Not being
innocent purchasers for value, the spouses Baja did not acquire a complete legal and valid
right over the subject property. The subsequent registration of the land in their favor can be
disregarded. Corollarily thereto, Lucena and Parales availed the proper remedy of action for
reconveyance. An action for reconveyance is still available if the property has not yet passed
to an innocent purchaser for value. It is a condition sine qua non for an action for
reconveyance to prosper that the property should not have passed to the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.
HEIRS OF MARIANO, JUAN, TARCELA AND JOSEFA, ALL SURNAMED BRUSAS v.

COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF SPOUSES INES BRUSAS AND CLETO REBOSA
G.R. No. 126875, August 26, 1999, BELLOSILLO, J.
An action for reconveyance is available to a landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name.
Facts:
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Ines Brusas was awarded a free patent and was given a certificate of title covering a
parcel of land. When her siblings supposedly discovered this, the controversy arose. They
asserted that their father was the owner of the subject land which was later on partitioned
between them. On the other hand, Ines insisted that she is the absolute owner. She then
filed a complaint for recovery of six hectares of land alleging that her brothers and sisters
forcibly entered and deprived her of that portion of the property. The Brusas siblings
countered by instituting in the same court an action for reconveyance imputing fraud,
misrepresentation and bad faith to Ines Brusas in using a forged affidavit to obtain title.
Issue:
Whether an action for reconveyance is the proper remedy in case the land is
fraudulently registered in anothers name
Ruling:
Yes. When a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he
has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner, he is considered guilty of fraud. The
landowner then can avail of the remedy of reconveyance. However, an action for
reconveyance presupposes the existence of a defrauded party who is the lawful owner of the
disputed property. Petitioners must prove by clear and convincing evidence their title to the
property, and the fact of fraud committed by the registered owner in registering the property
in her name, but they failed to do so.
What militates heavily against petitioners is the Affidavit executed by them, whereby
they relinquished, ceded and transferred to Brusas their rights and interests over the
controversial property, and recognized her as the absolute owner thereof. It was on the basis
of this affidavit of waiver that Brusas stated in her application for free patent that she was
the sole claimant of the subject property. Certainly this is not fraud.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION), PEDRO BITANGA, FERNANDO BITANGA, GREGORIO BITANGA,
GUILLERMO BITANGA, CLARITA BITANGA together with her husband AGRIPINO L.
RABAGO and MELITONA LAGPACAN, assisted by her husband JORGE MALACAS
G.R. No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, GUERRERO, J.
A lien by reason or on account of the mortgage executed by the registered owner
over the property, which was not annotated on the original certificate of title, could not have
attached to the land.
Facts:
The subject lot was registered under the name of Spouses Bitanga. When the
husband died, the wife mortgaged the entire property in favour of Philippine National Bank.
The mortgage document was registered in the Register of Deeds; however, this mortgage
lien was not annotated on the original certificate of title. Meanwhile, Manila Trading
Company levied upon the wifes share on the property in the fulfillment of her obligation
with MTC. The said share was sold to MTC; and the deed of sale was annotated on the title.
The MTC then sold the lot to Sambrano, who secured the annotation of the said sale on the
title. When the wife failed to settle her obligation with PNB, the latter foreclosed the
mortgage and the lot was awarded to it. After the period of redemption had expired without
the property having been redeemed, PNB consolidated its title over it. The document of
consolidation was, however, not annotated upon the owner's duplicate certificate of title as
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the wife failed to surrender the same. Later, PNB was able to secure a new owner's duplicate
certificate of title in its name and to cancel the owner's duplicate certificate of title in the
name of the spouses. Afterwards, it sold the lot to Reyes; as a result of which, a new owner's
duplicate certificate of title was issued in the latter's name.
Issue:
sale.
Whether the earlier mortgage not annotated on the title prevails over the annotated
Ruling:
No. The failure of the interested party to appear during the registration proceeding
and claim such interest in the land barred him from having such interest annotated on the
certificate of title. A bona fide purchaser for value of a property at an auction sale acquires
good title as against a prior transferee of the same property if such transfer was unrecorded
at the time of the auction sale. A person dealing with registered land is not required to go
behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice
of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate
of title.
CONRADO POTENCIANO (DECEASED) SUBSTITUTED BY LUIS, MILAGROS, VICTOR,
AND LOURDES, ALL SURNAMED POTENCIANO v. NAPOLEON DINEROS and THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL
G.R. No. L-7614, May 31, 1955, REYES, J.
A judgment creditor may not, as purchaser at the auction sale, invoke the protection
accorded by law to purchasers in good faith, if at the time of the auction he already had
notice, thru the third party claim filed by the registered owner, that the property had already
been acquired by the latter from the judgment debtor.
Facts:
Conrado Potenciano bought the subject property from one Gregorio Alcabao. When
he registered the sale, the clerk who made the entry committed an error in copying the
number of the certificate of title. In the entry, it is numbered at TCT No. 28438, while the
true number of the title is 18438. Afterwards, Manila was bombed, the papers presented by
Potenciano were either lost or destroyed. Up to this time, no certificate of title has been
issued to him. Later, Napoleon Dineros sued Alcabao and judgment was rendered in his
favour. As a result, the property in question was attached, it appearing that the property was
still in the name of Alcabao. When the attachment was levied on the property, Potenciano
filed his third party claim thereto. The property was sold to Dineros at a public auction. The
sale was annotated in the certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether Dineros is a purchaser in good faith
Ruling:
No. A purchaser of real property at an execution sale acquires only such right or
interest as the judgment debtor had on the property at the time of the sale. It follows that if
at that time the judgment debtor had no more right to or interest in the property because he
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had already sold it to another, then the purchaser acquires nothing. Such appears to be the
case here, because years before the execution sale and even before the attachment the
judgment debtor had already deeded the property and delivered his certificate of title to
another, who on the following day presented the deed and certificate of title to the Register
of Deeds. In other words, it was registered. This act of registration operated to convey the
property to the buyer.
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC. v. HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ, (EMILIA V. YUMUL AND
VICTORIA V. MOLINO), HEIRS OF SEVERINA P. TUGADE (ILUMINADA AND LEONORA
P. TUGADE, HEIRS OF ETANG P. GATMIN (LUDIVINA G. DELA CRUZ (BY AND
THROUGH ALFONSO G. DELA CRUZ), HILARIA G. COBERO AND ALFREDO G.
COBERO) AND SIONY G. TEPOL (BY AND THROUGH ELENA T. RIVAS AND ELESIO
TEPOL, JR.), AS HEIRS OF DECEDENT PABLO PASCUA
G.R. No. 171531, January 30, 2009, TINGA, J.
The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate of
title of the person from whom he had purchased the property.
Facts:
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 404 was registered under the name of Pablo
Pascua. When Pascua died intestate, one of his four children, Cipriano executed a document
denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales," wherein
he declared himself as the only heir of Pablo and confirmed the sales made by the decedent
during his lifetime, including the alleged sale of the disputed property to spouses Rodolfo. As
a result thereof, TCT No. T-8241 was issued in the name of Cipriano without OCT No. 404
having been cancelled. On the same day, TCT No. T-8242 was issued in the name of the
spouses Rodolfo and TCT No. T-8241 was thereby cancelled. Subsequently, the spouses
Rodolfo sold the disputed property to Guaranteed Homes, Inc. Consequently TCT No. T-8242
was cancelled and TCT No. T-10863 was issued in the name of GHI.
Issue:
Whether the purchaser is bound by original certificate of title.
Ruling:
No. Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in
the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden
defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. It is enough that GHI
had examined the latest certificate of title which in this case was issued in the name of the
immediate transferor, the spouses Rodolfo. A person dealing with registered property need
not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. The act of
registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned.
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement was a nullity, the Court
still has to uphold the title of petitioner. Where the certificate of title was already transferred
to an innocent purchaser, such a fraudulent document becomes the root of a valid title. For
then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.
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CARMELITA FUDOT v. CATTLEYA LAND, INC.

G.R. No. 171008, September 13, 2007, TINGA, J.
The act of registration does not validate an otherwise void contract.
Facts:
Cattleya Land, Inc. purchased the subject property from spouses Tecson in 1992, but
the same was not annotated on the certificate of title. In 1995, Carmelita Fudot presented
for registration the owner's copy of the title of the subject property, together with the deed
of sale purportedly executed by the Tecsons in 1986. Cattleya opposed Fudots application.
Much to its surprise, Cattleya learned that the Register of Deeds had already registered the
deed of sale in favor of Fudot and issued a new title in her name. Consequently, it filed a
complaint for Quieting of Title &/Or Recovery of Ownership, alleging therein that the
signature of the Tecsons on the deed of sale was forged.
Issue:
Whether an alleged buyer who is the holder of and the first one to present the
owner's copy of the title for the issuance of a new TCT has a better right over the property
Ruling:
No. The deed of sale having been forged, it is void. Fudots act of registration does
not validate the void contract. Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed,
contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register
of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the
deed, contract, or instrument. While it operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or
instrument to others, it does not add to its validity nor convert an invalid instrument into a
valid one as between the parties, nor amount to a declaration by the state that the
instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in the land. The registration of Fudot's void deed
is not an impediment to a declaration by the courts of its invalidity.
SPOUSES ALFONSO AND MARIA ANGELES CUSI v. LILIA V. DOMINGO

G.R. No. 195825, February 27, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.
A purchaser in good faith buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the
same.
Facts:
Lilia Domingo was the owner of the lot in dispute. However, one Radelia Sy,
representing herself as the owner of the property, filed a petition for reissuance of a new
owners copy and, as proof, presented a deed of sale purportedly executed by Domingo, and
an affidavit of loss stating that her bag containing the owners copy of certificate of title had
been snatched from her. The RTC granted the petition. Subsequently, Sy immediately
subdivided the property and sold each half to Spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi.
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Resultantly, transfer certificates of title were issued to the buyer spouses, annotated thereon
was the consideration of only one million each but the entire lot had an actual value of not
less than 14 million. Two years thereafter, Domingo learned about the situation.
Consequently, she filed a petition for annulment of titles of Sy, Spouses De Vera and
Spouses Cusi. The RTC granted the same, however, the title of Spouses De Vera and Spouses
Cusi remain valid as they were held purchasers in good faith.
Issue:
Whether Spouses Cusi are purchasers in good faith
Ruling:
No. A purchaser who is aware of the material undervaluation of the purchase price of
the subject property may not be considered a purchaser in good faith as such fact would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make an inquiry in dealing with the property. As the
purchasers of the property, they also came under the clear obligation to purchase the
property not only in good faith but also for value.
It was not enough for the spouses to show that the property was unfenced and
vacant, nor was it safe for them to rely on the face of Sys TCT because they were aware
that it was derived only from a duplicate owners copy reissued by virtue of the loss of the
original duplicate owners copy. That circumstance should have already alerted them to the
need to inquire beyond the face of the Sys TCT. Other circumstances that the spouses were
also aware of that should further put them on guard were particularly the several nearly
simultaneous transactions respecting the property, and the undervaluation of the purchase
price.
NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, TINGA, J.
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.
Facts:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land,
claiming he had purchased it from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than 30 years. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification issued by CENRO-DENR stating that the subject property was an Alienable or
Disposable land. Accordingly, the RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic
appealed arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain that is subject to acquisitive prescription.
Issue:
Whether a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription
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Ruling:
No. The classification of a property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion. Public domain lands
become patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable, there must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth.
Absent any classification and government manifestation, the property is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable, there is no competent evidence that it is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national wealth. It is not susceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, IN HER

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. No. 162243, December 03, 2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of private persons or entities.
Facts:
PICOP was granted a Timber License Agreement covering forest lands. The license
was valid for 25 years and renewable for another 25 years. Upon request of PICOP, President
Marcos signed a 1969 Document purportedly a Presidential Warranty which PICOP claimed
as a contract which guarantees perpetual renewal of its license. Now, PICOP filed an
application with the DENR to convert its Timber License Agreement to an Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) which effectively extends PICOPs license beyond the 50year maximum term in violation Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether granting the IFMA is constitutional
Ruling:
No. Converting the TLA into IFMA would in effect grant PICOP perpetual license and
continuous and uninterrupted possession of its concession areas. Granting to private
entities, via a contract, a permanent, irrevocable, and exclusive possession of and right over
forest lands is tantamount to granting ownership thereof. As aptly provided by the
Constitution, all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JUAN FABIO, NAMELY: DOMINGA C.
FABIO, SOCORRO D. FABIO, LYDIA D. FABIO, ROLANDO D. FABIO, NORMA D. FABIO,
NORMA L. FABIO, ANGELITA FABIO, ROSALIE FABIO, DANILO FABIO, RENATO FABIO,
LEVITA FABIO, IRENE FABIO, TERESITA MOLERA, ROSEMARIE C. PAKAY, LIGAYA C.
MASANGKAY, ALFREDO F. CASTILLO, MELINDA F. CASTILLO, MERCEDITA F.
CASTILLO, ESTELA DE JESUS AQUINO, FELECITO FABIO, AND ALEXANDER FABIO,
REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ANGELITA F. ESTEIBAR AS THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
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G.R. No. 159589, December 23, 2008, CARPIO, J.
Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation in the
concept of an owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as
a title.
Facts:
The heirs of Juan Fabio filed an application for registration of title to a Lot which they
claim to have been in the possession of their predecessors-in-interest for more than 100
years. One of the documents they presented as evidence is an approved survey plan which
contained a notation that reads "this survey falls within the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation xxx." Conversely, the Republic of the Philippines opposed the application,
claiming that the Lot sought to be registered falls within the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation as placed under the exclusive use of the military through three presidential
proclamations. The heirs, on the other hand, maintain that they have acquired a vested right
over the Lot by acquisitive prescription.
Issue:
Whether a lot under military reservation may be acquired through acquisitive
prescription.
Ruling:
No. Being a military reservation, the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation, to which
the Lot is a part of, cannot be subject to occupation, entry or settlement. Public lands not
shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of the
inalienable public domain. In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that it was
already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is
inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration.
MANUEL ALMAGRO JOINED BY HIS SPOUSE, ELIZABETH ALMAGRO v. SALVACION C.

KWAN, WILLIAM C. KWAN, VICTORIA C. KWAN, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, JOSE
A. ARBAS, AND CECILIA C. KWAN
G.R. Nos. 175806 and 175810, October 20, 2010, CARPIO, J.
To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high
and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
Facts:
The heirs of spouses Kwan filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession
and damages against spouses Duran among others. However, the MTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion the subject lot has become
foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain. It explained that a big portion of
the said lot is presently underwater or submerged under the sea. When the sea moves
towards the estate and the tide invades it, the invaded property becomes foreshore land and
passes to the realm of public domain. The subject land, being foreshore land, should
therefore be returned to the public domain. On appeal to the RTC, the court observed that
the small portion of the subject lot actually remained dry even during high tide. Thus, the
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small dry portion of the land is not within the scope of the well-settled definition of foreshore
and foreshore land as it is not adjacent to the sea and it is not alternately wet and dry by the
ordinary flow of the tides as it is dry land.
Issue:
Whether the disputed portion of the subject has become foreshore land
Ruling:
No. The small dry portion of the subject lot is not foreshore because "it is already dry
land" and is "away from the shoreline." The land's proximity to the waters alone does not
automatically make it a foreshore land. The disputed land remained dry even during high
tide. It is not foreshore land and remains private land.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO ESPINOSA

G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012, REYES, J.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. This presumption is not controverted by a notation made by a surveyorgeodetic engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and disposable because a mere
surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
Facts:
Domingo Espinosa filed an application for land registration. In support of his
application, Espinosa submitted the blueprint of an Advanced Survey Plan to prove the
identity of the land. As proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as
evidence the annotation on the advance survey plan made by a geodetic engineer. The
Republic of the Philippines opposed Espinosas application claiming that Espinosa failed to
prove that the property is alienable and disposable.
Issue:
Whether the notation sufficed to prove that the land is alienable and disposable
Ruling:
No. A surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. The notation
made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and
disposable is not the positive government act that would remove the property from the
inalienable domain. Neither is it the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the
presumption that all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership belong to the
State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
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land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public
domain.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133250, July 09, 2002, CARPIO, J.
Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain and are
inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service.
Facts:
PEA entered into a joint venture agreement with AMARI Corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. Under the JVA, PEA would later transfer to AMARI the reclaimed lands and
foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay. Now, Frank Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus assailing the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a
blatant violation the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable
Ruling:
No. Under the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay
are part of the lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources and
consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be
alienated, unless reclaimed. However, the mere reclamation of these areas does not
convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying
these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.
Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law
has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may
then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition.
Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service.
Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain and within the commerce of man.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY (PRA) v. CITY OF PARAAQUE
G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012, MENDOZA, J.
Reclaimed lands remain public lands and form part of the public domain, owned by
the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real estate taxes.
Facts:
The Philippine Reclamation Authority reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those located in Paraaque City. In 2003, Paraaque
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City Treasurer Liberato Carabeo issued Warrants of Levy on PRAs reclaimed properties
based on an assessment for delinquent real property taxes. In turn, PRA filed a petition for
prohibition with a request not to proceed with the public auction of the subject reclaimed
properties. However, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRAs petition and ruled that
PRA was not exempt from payment of real property taxes, it being a GOCC.
Issue:
Whether reclaimed lands are part of the public domain and, hence, exempt from real
property tax
Ruling:
Yes. The subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. Reclaimed lands are reserved lands for public use, and are
properties of public dominion. The ownership of such lands remains with the State unless
they are withdrawn by law or presidential proclamation from public use. Properties of public
dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale. The assessment, levy and
foreclosure made on the subject reclaimed lands are without basis.
Furthermore, foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the public
domain and were inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to
disposition and further declared no longer needed for public service. The fact that alienable
lands of the public domain were transferred to the PRA and issued land patents or
certificates of title in PRAs name did not automatically make such lands private.
DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LAND

HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, NAMELY: ARTURO TANYAG,
AIDA T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO v. SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R.
GABRIEL, LUZ GABRIEL-ARNEDO MARRIED TO ARTURO ARNEDO, NORA GABRIELCALINGO MARRIED TO FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M. MENDIOLA, MINERVA GABRIELNATIVIDAD MARRIED TO EUSTAQUIO NATIVIDAD, AND ERLINDA VELASQUEZ
MARRIED TO HERMINIO VELASQUEZ
G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J
Possession remains continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.
Facts:
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land. Lot 1 was originally declared
in the name of Jose Gabriel under a Tax Declaration, while Lot 2 was originally declared in
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the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan. Now, the heirs of Tanyag claim that Lot 1 was owned by
Benita Gabriel as declared by her in an Affidavit of Sale whereby she sold the said property
to spouses Gabriel Sulit who in turn sold the same in 1964 to Bienvenido Tanyag, the father
of petitioners. As to Lot 2, petitioners claim that it was sold to Araceli Tanyag in 1968.
Thereupon, petitioners took possession of both properties. They claimed to have
continuously, publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their
caretaker Juana Quinones. Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured a
Tax Declaration in his name over Lot 1 and included a portion of Lot 2. Consequently, in
2000, petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that respondents never occupied the whole
area of the lot neither were they able to set foot on the property for the reason that those
lots had been in actual, open continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the
petitioners for more than thirty years which is equivalent to title. They further contended
that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998 over the subject land in the name of
respondents heirs of Jose Gabriel was null and void from the beginning. On the other hand,
respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against them for they have
not established their ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in
respondents name
Issue:
Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription
Ruling:
Yes. From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000, the
latter have been in continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject land for 31
years. Having possessed the property for the period and in the character required by law as
sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired
ownership over the subject property. Such right cannot be defeated by respondents acts of
declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate of
title in their name in 1998. The act of obtaining an original certificate of title does not
effectively interrupt possession for purposes of prescription.
JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO ILOILO ESPINEDA and DAISY ALIADO
MANAOIS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012, REYES, J.
Tax declarations are not by themselves competent evidence of acquisitive
prescription; they must be supported by competent evidence of acts of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession.
Facts:
Tan and Co. (hereafter registrants) filed an application for land registration over a
parcel of land allegedly purchased from Gatdula, alleging that they and their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the property as owner
for more than 30 years.
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They rely on the following: (1) testimony of their attorney-in-fact on the length of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest, (2) testimony of a caretaker who witnessed the
sale and attested to the length of possession of their predecessors-in-interest, (3) testimony
of a clerk in the Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority finding no issue with the
registration, (4) tax declarations dating from 1961 under the names of their predecessors-ininterest, (5) a single tax declaration dated 2003 under the registrants, (6) a Sangunniang
Bayan resolution dated 1998 reclassifying several lots, including the property, from
agricultural to residential/commercial, (7) a DARCO Conversion order dated 2000 also
converting the same to residential/commercial, and (8) a certification by the DENR dated
2002 stating that the area falls within the alienable and disposable land of the town.
Issue(s):
land
1. Whether there was an express declaration by the State on the character of the
2. Whether the tax declarations and testimonies were competent evidence of

acquisitive prescription
Ruling:
1. Yes. Of the evidence presented, this express declaration is the DARCO Conversion
order dated 2000. However, this means that the period of acquisitive prescription tolls only
from 2000.
2. No. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the
presence of the elements of acquisitive possession using competent evidence. Tax
declarations per se do not qualify as such competent evidence, particularly if the payment of
taxes is episodic, irregular and random.
The tax declarations presented in this case were precisely of the kind, with only 11
tax payments out of the 40 years that the registrants rely upon for their period of
possession. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence presented only mentioned conclusions of
law-- they merely said that there was possession for over 30 years, without stating any
specific acts of ownership or dominion performed during that period.
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO,
BIENVENIDO, all surnamed VALIAO and NEMESIO M. GRANDREA v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA and MANUEL YUSAY
G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011, PERALTA, J.
Mere declarations are at best conclusions of law, and not facts that are required in
order to prove ownership.
Facts:
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The Valiaoas and Grandea filed with the RTC an application for registration of a parcel
of land in Negros Occidental. Their claim to registration is rooted in their predecessor-ininterest, an uncle who purchased the land in 1916, and later sold to them in 1947 upon the
death of the said uncle. It was in 1966 when one of the oppositors, Zafra, dispossessed them
of their property, even leading them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft.
In further support of their claim is a Tax Declaration dated 1976 under their collective title as
heirs of their uncle.
Multiple private parties, later joined by the Republic through the OSG, opposed the
application, arguing that the land is not alienable and disposable, that there was res judicata
given a prior case (which ruled that the lot is of the public domain), and that their
application is unsupported by competent evidence.
Issue:
Whether the evidence presented is competent to support registration of property.
Ruling:
No. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands
of public dominion is on the registrant or claimant, who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable. He must also prove that he performed specific acts
of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are
mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.
There was no evidence to show that the land in question has been classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Although an adverse prior judgment
declared the land as part of a communal forest, the land may subsequently be reclassified.
No such evidence was presented.
Even if the registrants showed that the land was now alienable and disposable land,
they also failed to present specific proof of acts of ownership and dominion over the land.
They presented testimonial evidence as to prior ownership, but as these were not
substantiated by any documents, they were mostly conjectural and self-serving. The tax
declaration was only a single one dated 1976-- it cannot prove possession from before that
year, and at any rate, they are mere indicia of a claim of ownership, and are not necessarily
proof of ownership.
CANCELLATION OF TITLE
ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT v. WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.
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Sec. 108 of PD 1529 is applicable if the correction in the certificate of title involves
only clerical errors, alterations or amendments. Registering for a certificate of title is distinct
from having title to property.
Facts:
In 1965, Adriano Tambuyat married Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat. In 1991, Adriano
acquired the property. However, the TCT covering the property listed the name of the owner
as "Adriano Tambuyat married to Rosario Banguis." Rosario Banguis, however, was actually
married to Eduardo Nolasco since 1975, and their marriage was never annulled.
Adriano died in 1998. A year later, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the
TCT with the RTC. Her ground for cancellation was the erroneous registration of the property
under the name of Adriano married to Rosario, given that Wenifreda was the spouse.
Rosario claimed that the property was actually purchased with her personal funds,
and that she was married to Adriano in 1988, years before the land was purchased. She also
argued that the case was mischaracterized as a summary proceeding, as it was not a mere
correction of entry-- there had to be a determination of whether the property is exclusive or
conjugal, and that she and Adriano had a child whose rights will be adversely affected by the
judgment.
Issue:
Whether the case is a summary proceeding under the Land Registration Act
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 108 of PD 1529 allows for a summary proceeding for clerical errors in a
certificate of title (erasures, alterations, or amendments) in seven instances, of which two
are present in this case: (3) errors, omissions or mistakes in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon or a duplicate certificate, and (7) reasonable grounds for amendment
or alteration of title.
Rosario's opposition is grounded on her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights
of her and Adriano's son (that is, a need for partition), which may have necessitated a fullblown trial, but such is unnecessary as it is impossible for Rosario to have been the owner of
the property, and that the hereditary rights are irrelevant for Wenifreda's petition. However,
there are no issues that would prevent an application of Sec. 108 of PD 1529.
First, Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. The marriage with Wenifreda
subsisted when Adriano entered into a supposed relationship with Rosario. When the New
Civil Code talks of spouses, it refers to a lawfully wedded spouse-- here, the TCT should refer
to Wenifreda.
Second, the deed of sale also shows that the purchaser was Adriano alone, or at the
very least, the property was not solely that of Rosario's. Rosario's statements defeat her
claim: (1) she acknowledged that Adriano is a co-owner, making it unlikely that the property
was exclusive to her, (2) she did not sign as the sole purchaser, just a witness, and (3) she
never signed as a co-vendee-- the only real signature was Adriano's.
Third, it is unnecessary to deal with partition since a certificate of title refers to
registration, and is considered evidence of ownership. Registration is not the equivalent of
title.
73 | P a g e

Withal, the sole error is clerical, and can be resolved as a summary proceeding.
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA IMBORNAL and PEDRO
FERRER, represented by their ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASAREGACHO v. EMILIANA, VICTORIANA, FELIPE, MATEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, AND
EDUARDO, all surnamed IMBORNAL
G.R. No. 182908, August 6, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years from
the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, if
the plaintiff does not have the property in his possession; if he does, it is imprescriptible.
Facts:
Basilia Imbornal owned the Sabangan property which she conveyed to her three
daughters Balbina, Alejandra and Catalina sometime in 1920.
Ciriaco Abrio, Catalina's husband, applied for and was granted a homestead patent
over the Motherland property. He was eventually awarded a Homestead Patent and in 1933,
an OCT. This was later cancelled in 1973 in favor of his heirs. He and his heirs occupied the
northern portion of this land, while the southern was accompanied by Emiliana Imbornal and
the other respondent parties.
An accretion took place in 1949, which adjoined the southern portion of the
Motherland. In 1952, an OCT was issued in favor of a member of the respondent parties.
Another accretion took place in 1971, which abutted the southern portion of the 1949
accretion. In 1978, an OCT was issued in favor of the respondent parties.
In 1984, Francisco, a child of Balbina, filed a complaint for reconveyance, partition
and damages against the respondent parties, claiming that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife,
Catalina, urged the other original Imbornal siblings to sell the Sabangan property and use
the funds to fund the homestead patent application over the Motherland. Due to this, he
claims ownership of the Motherland and both accretions (because the accretions could not
possibly pertain to the respondents as they were not the riparian owners) on the ground that
Ciriaco and his heirs held the land in trust for the original Imbornal sisters. Among the
defenses of the respondent parties is prescription.
Issue:
Whether Francisco's claim is barred by prescription
Ruling:
Yes, as to the Motherland and first accretion. The claim here was that there was an
implied trust due to the use of the proceeds of the sale of the Sabangan property in order to
fund Ciriaco's Motherland patent. Francisco was never in possession of the properties, so the
ten year period applies. With respect to the Motherland, the OCT was issued in 1933; for the
first accretion, in 1952, and for the second accretion, in 1978. The complaint was filed in
1984, more than 10 years after the reckoning point for the Motherland and first accretion.
74 | P a g e

Hence, as to the Motherland and first accretion, the action had already prescribed, but not
as to the second accretion (of 1978).
HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO v. SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MORENITA DE JESUS
G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014, DEL CASTILLO, J.
In an action for reconveyance, the property must be identified by a description of its
location, area and boundaries, often through a survey plan. The lack of such a plan is fatal
to the plaintiffs cause of action.
Facts:
Telesforo Julao filed before the DENR Baguio two Townsite Sales Applications, V-A and
V-B. When he died in 1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs. In 1979, one of his
heirs, Solito, executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights, transferring his hereditary share in the
property covered by V-B to the spouses De Jesus, who would later construct a house on the
property. In 1986, Solito went missing.
In 1996, the DENR issued an order of rejection and transfer of sales rights, with V-B's
application ordered dropped from the records, while V-A may continue. An OCT was issued in
favor of the heirs of Telesforo as to the property in V-A.
In 1999, the petitioner heirs of Telesforo filed a complaint for recovery of posssession
of real property, claiming that the house of the De Jesus spouses (supposedly within V-B)
encroached into their property. Among the defenses of the spouses is that V-A and V-B
pertain to the same property, of which they are the true and lawful owners and possessors.
Issue:
Whether the subject property was properly identified, giving the heirs a cause of
action
Ruling:
No. Art. 434 NCC states that in an action to recover, the property must be identified.
By this, the plaintiff must describe the location, area and boundaries of the property,
normally in a survey plan. The petitioner heirs, not having presented any evidence to
describe their property, have no subject matter that can be the basis of an action for
reconveyance.
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