Sales Cases Batch 5 Digest (Incomplete)
Sales Cases Batch 5 Digest (Incomplete)
Sales Cases Batch 5 Digest (Incomplete)
CASE 1: CASTRO A
ABRIGO vs DE VERA; June 21, 2004 (Art.1544)
FACTS:
Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot to Rosenda
Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The sale became a
subject of annulment between the vendor and vendees.
The parties came to a compromise agreement that
Gloria will be given a year to buy back the property and
failure to buy would render the sale to Rosenda and
Rosita as binding. Gloria failed to buy the property so
the vendees declared the lot in their name.
Unknown to Rosenda and Rosita, Gloria
obtained a free patent over the parcel of land
involved.On October 16, 1997, Rosenda and Rosita
subsequently sold the property to herein petitioner Sps.
Abrigo. While on October 23, 1997, Gloria sold the
property to herein respondent De Vera.
De Vera filed an action for forcible entry against
Sps Abrigo. The case was dismissed because of the
agreement of the 2 parties (neither of them can
physically take possession of the property in question
until the termination of the instant case). Sps Abrigo
filed the instant case for annulment of document
against De Vera and Gloria.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On
appeal, the CA ruled that a void title could not give rise
to a valid one. It dismissed the appeal of De Vera. It
likewise dismissed the appeal of petitioners for
damages. On reconsideration, CA ruled in favor of
De Vera finding that he is a purchaser in good
faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that
she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of
her vendor and thus must be protected.
ISSUE:
Who has a better right to the property
HELD:
Respondent De Vera has a better right over the
property. Being a purchaser of good faith and for value,
she must be protected. CA amended decision affirmed.
The present case involves what in legal
contemplation was a double sale the sale by Gloria
to Rosenda and Rosita and the formers sale to
respondent De Vera. Art. 1544 of the Civil Code
provides that a double sale of immovable
transfers ownership to 1) the first registrant in
good faith; 2) then, the possessor in good faith
and 3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title. The principle is full accord
with Sec. 51 of PD 1529 which provides that no deed,
mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument except
a will purporting to convey or affect registered land
until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not
registered, it is only binding between the vendor
and vendee.
Petitioners, unaware that the property was
covered by the Torrens system, registered the sale
under Act 3344. Respondent registered under the
Torrens system. In this case, the registration under
the Torrens system shall prevail. This is in
accordance with the insight of J. Paras if the land is
registered under LRA (torrens), and it is sold but
the subsequent sale is registered not under LRA
but 3344, such sale is not considered registered.
It is consistently held that that Art. 1544
requires the second buyer to acquire the
immovable in good faith and to register it in good
faith. Mere registration is not enough; good faith
must concur with the registration. The governing
principle is primus tempore, potior jure(first in time,
stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first
buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first
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HELD:
Yes. Article 1544 provides:
x x x. Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Petitioner contends that the due and proper registration
of the sheriffs deed of final conveyance on December 2,
1986 amounted to constructive notice to private
respondents. Thus, when private respondents bought
the subject property on May 17, 1988, they were
deemed to have purchased the said property with the
knowledge that it was already registered in the name of
petitioner bank. However, It is a well-known rule in this
jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land
have the legal right to rely on the face of the Torrens
Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need to
inquire further, except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.
Also, Before private respondents bought the subject
property from Guillermo Comayas, inquiries were made
with the Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of Lands
regarding the status of the vendors title. No liens or
encumbrances were found to have been annotated on
the certificate of title. Neither were private respondents
aware of any adverse claim or lien on the property other
than the adverse claim of a certain Geneva Galupo to
whom Guillermo Comayas had mortgaged the subject
property. But, as already mentioned, the claim of Galupo
was eventually settled and the adverse claim previously
annotated on the title cancelled. Thus, having made the
necessary inquiries, private respondents did not have to
go beyond the certificate of title. Otherwise, the efficacy
and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of Title
would be rendered futile and nugatory.
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