056-Violeta Tudtud Banate Et Al vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (Liloan, Cebu), Inc G.R. No. 163825 July 13, 2010
056-Violeta Tudtud Banate Et Al vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (Liloan, Cebu), Inc G.R. No. 163825 July 13, 2010
056-Violeta Tudtud Banate Et Al vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (Liloan, Cebu), Inc G.R. No. 163825 July 13, 2010
163825
1 of 6
2 of 6
3 of 6
Dismayed with the reversal by the CA of the RTCs ruling, the petitioners filed the present appeal by certiorari,
claiming that the CA ruling is not in accord with established jurisprudence.
THE PETITION
The petitioners argue that their claims are consistent with their agreement with PCRB; they complied with the
required full payment of the subject loan to allow the release of the subject properties from the mortgage.
Having carried out their part of the bargain, the petitioners maintain that PCRB must honor its commitment to
release the mortgage over the subject properties.
The petitioners disregard the cross-collateral stipulation in the mortgage contract, claiming that it had been novated
by the subsequent agreement with Mondigo. Even assuming that the cross-collateral stipulation subsists for lack of
authority on the part of Mondigo to novate the mortgage contract, the petitioners contend that PCRB should
nevertheless return the amount paid to settle the subject loan since the new agreement should be deemed rescinded.
The basic issues for the Court to resolve are as follows:
1. Whether the purported agreement between the petitioners and Mondigo novated the mortgage contract
over the subject properties and is thus binding upon PCRB.
2. If the first issue is resolved negatively, whether Banate can demand restitution of the amount paid for the
subject properties on the theory that the new agreement with Mondigo is deemed rescinded.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to deny the petition.
The purported agreement did not novate the mortgage contract, particularly the cross- collateral stipulation thereon
Before we resolve the issues directly posed, we first dwell on the determination of the nature of the cross-collateral
stipulation in the mortgage contract. As a general rule, a mortgage liability is usually limited to the amount
mentioned in the contract. However, the amounts named as consideration in a contract of mortgage do not limit the
amount for which the mortgage may stand as security if, from the four corners of the instrument, the intent to
secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. This stipulation is valid and binding between the parties and
is known as the "blanket mortgage clause" (also known as the "dragnet clause)."
In the present case, the mortgage contract indisputably provides that the subject properties serve as security, not
only for the payment of the subject loan, but also for "such other loans or advances already obtained, or still to be
obtained." The cross-collateral stipulation in the mortgage contract between the parties is thus simply a variety of a
dragnet clause. After agreeing to such stipulation, the petitioners cannot insist that the subject properties be
released from mortgage since the security covers not only the subject loan but the two other loans as well.
The petitioners, however, claim that their agreement with Mondigo must be deemed to have novated the mortgage
contract. They posit that the full payment of the subject loan extinguished their obligation arising from the
mortgage contract, including the stipulated cross-collateral provision. Consequently, consistent with their theory of
a novated agreement, the petitioners maintain that it devolves upon PCRB to execute the corresponding Deed of
Release of Mortgage.
We find the petitioners argument unpersuasive. Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or
modificatory. It is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the
place of the former; it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent that it remains
4 of 6
compatible with the amendatory agreement. An extinctive novation results either by changing the object or
principal conditions (objective or real), or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a third person in
the rights of the creditor (subjective or personal). Under this mode, novation would have dual functions one to
extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its place requiring a conflux of four
essential requisites: (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (3)
the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation.
The second requisite is lacking in this case. Novation presupposes not only the extinguishment or modification of
an existing obligation but, more importantly, the creation of a valid new obligation. For the consequent creation of
a new contractual obligation, consent of both parties is, thus, required. As a general rule, no form of words or
writing is necessary to give effect to a novation. Nevertheless, where either or both parties involved are juridical
entities, proof that the second contract was executed by persons with the proper authority to bind their respective
principals is necessary.
Section 23 of the Corporation Code expressly provides that the corporate powers of all corporations shall be
exercised by the board of directors. The power and the responsibility to decide whether the corporation should
enter into a contract that will bind the corporation are lodged in the board, subject to the articles of incorporation,
bylaws, or relevant provisions of law. In the absence of authority from the board of directors, no person, not even
its officers, can validly bind a corporation.
However, just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts for and on his behalf, the board of
directors may validly delegate some of its functions and powers to its officers, committees or agents. The authority
of these individuals to bind the corporation is generally derived from law, corporate bylaws or authorization from
the board, either expressly or impliedly by habit, custom or acquiescence in the general course of business.
The authority of a corporate officer or agent in dealing with third persons may be actual or apparent. Actual
authority is either express or implied. The extent of an agents express authority is to be measured by the power
delegated to him by the corporation, while the extent of his implied authority is measured by his prior acts which
have been ratified or approved, or their benefits accepted by his principal. The doctrine of "apparent authority," on
the other hand, with special reference to banks, had long been recognized in this jurisdiction. The existence of
apparent authority may be ascertained through:
1) the general manner in which the corporation holds out an officer or agent as having the power to act, or
in other words, the apparent authority to act in general, with which it clothes him; or
2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or constructive knowledge thereof, within
or beyond the scope of his ordinary powers.
Accordingly, the authority to act for and to bind a corporation may be presumed from acts of recognition in other
instances when the power was exercised without any objection from its board or shareholders.
Notably, the petitioners action for specific performance is premised on the supposed actual or apparent authority of
the branch manager, Mondigo, to release the subject properties from the mortgage, although the other obligations
remain unpaid. In light of our discussion above, proof of the branch managers authority becomes indispensable to
support the petitioners contention. The petitioners make no claim that Mondigo had actual authority from PCRB,
whether express or implied. Rather, adopting the trial courts observation, the petitioners posited that PCRB should
be held liable for Mondigos commitment, on the basis of the latters apparent authority.
We disagree with this position.
5 of 6
Under the doctrine of apparent authority, acts and contracts of the agent, as are within the apparent scope of the
authority conferred on him, although no actual authority to do such acts or to make such contracts has been
conferred, bind the principal. The principals liability, however, is limited only to third persons who have been led
reasonably to believe by the conduct of the principal that such actual authority exists, although none was given. In
other words, apparent authority is determined only by the acts of the principal and not by the acts of the agent.
There can be no apparent authority of an agent without acts or conduct on the part of the principal; such acts or
conduct must have been known and relied upon in good faith as a result of the exercise of reasonable prudence by a
third party as claimant, and such acts or conduct must have produced a change of position to the third partys
detriment.
In the present case, the decision of the trial court was utterly silent on the manner by which PCRB, as supposed
principal, has "clothed" or "held out" its branch manager as having the power to enter into an agreement, as
claimed by petitioners. No proof of the course of business, usages and practices of the bank about, or knowledge
that the board had or is presumed to have of, its responsible officers acts regarding bank branch affairs, was ever
adduced to establish the branch managers apparent authority to verbally alter the terms of mortgage contracts.
Neither was there any allegation, much less proof, that PCRB ratified Mondigos act or is estopped to make a
contrary claim.
Further, we would be unduly stretching the doctrine of apparent authority were we to consider the power to undo or
nullify solemn agreements validly entered into as within the doctrines ambit. Although a branch manager, within
his field and as to third persons, is the general agent and is in general charge of the corporation, with apparent
authority commensurate with the ordinary business entrusted him and the usual course and conduct thereof, yet the
power to modify or nullify corporate contracts remains generally in the board of directors. Being a mere branch
manager alone is insufficient to support the conclusion that Mondigo has been clothed with "apparent authority" to
verbally alter terms of written contracts, especially when viewed against the telling circumstances of this case: the
unequivocal provision in the mortgage contract; PCRBs vigorous denial that any agreement to release the
mortgage was ever entered into by it; and, the fact that the purported agreement was not even reduced into writing
considering its legal effects on the parties interests. To put it simply, the burden of proving the authority of
Mondigo to alter or novate the mortgage contract has not been established.
It is a settled rule that persons dealing with an agent are bound at their peril, if they would hold the principal liable,
to ascertain not only the fact of agency but also the nature and extent of the agents authority, and in case either is
controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it. As parties to the mortgage contract, the petitioners
are expected to abide by its terms. The subsequent purported agreement is of no moment, and cannot prejudice
PCRB, as it is beyond Mondigos actual or apparent authority, as above discussed.
Rescission has no legal basis; there can be no restitution of the amount paid
The petitioners, nonetheless, invoke equity and alternatively pray for the restitution of the amount paid, on the
rationale that if PCRBs branch manager was not authorized to accept payment in consideration of separately
releasing the mortgage, then the agreement should be deemed rescinded, and the amount paid by them returned.
PCRB, on the other hand, counters that the petitioners alternative prayer has no legal and factual basis, and insists
that the clear agreement of the parties was for the full payment of the subject loan, and in return, PCRB would
deliver the title to the subject properties to the buyer, only to enable the latter to obtain a transfer of title in her own
name.
We agree with PCRB. Even if we were to assume that the purported agreement has been sufficiently established,
6 of 6
since it is not binding on the bank for lack of authority of PCRBs branch manager, then the prayer for restitution
of the amount paid would have no legal basis. Of course, it will be asked: what then is the legal significance of the
payment made by Banate? Article 2154 of the Civil Code reads:
Art 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligation to return it arises.1avvphi1
Notwithstanding the payment made by Banate, she is not entitled to recover anything from PCRB under Article
2154. There could not have been any payment by mistake to PCRB, as the check which Banate issued as payment
was to her co-petitioner Mary Melgrid Cortel (the payee), and not to PCRB. The same check was simply endorsed
by the payee to PCRB in payment of the subject loan that the Maglasangs owed PCRB.
The mistake, if any, was in the perception of the authority of Mondigo, as branch manager, to verbally alter the
mortgage contract, and not as to whether the Cortels, as sellers, were entitled to payment. This mistake (on
Mondigos lack of authority to alter the mortgage) did not affect the validity of the payment made to the bank as
the existence of the loan was never disputed. The dispute was merely on the effect of the payment on the security
given.
Consequently, no right to recover accrues in Banates favor as PCRB never dealt with her. The borrowersmortgagors, on the other hand, merely paid what was really owed. Parenthetically, the subject loan was due on
January 18, 1998, but was paid sometime in November 1997. It appears, however, that at the time the complaint
was filed, the subject loan had already matured. Consequently, recovery of the amount paid, even under a claim of
premature payment, will not prosper.
In light of these conclusions, the claim for moral damages must necessarily fail. On the alleged injurious
publication, we quote with approval the CAs ruling on the matter, viz:
Consequently, there is no reason to hold [respondent] PCRB liable to [petitioners] for damages. x x x [Petitioner]
Maglasang cannot hold [respondent] PCRB liable for the publication of the extra-judicial sale. There was no
evidence submitted to prove that [respondent] PCRB authored the words "Mortgagors surreptitiously caused the
transfer of ownership of Lot 12868-H-3-C x x x" contained in the publication since at the bottom was x x x Sheriff
Teofilo C. Soon, Jr.s name. Moreover, there was not even an iota of proof which shows damage on the part of
[petitioner] Mary Melgrid M. Cortel.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 19, 2003 and its resolution dated May 5, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74332. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Abad, Villarama, Jr., and Mendoza, JJ., concur.