From Common Property To Co-Management: Lessons From Brazil's First Maritime Extractive Reserve
From Common Property To Co-Management: Lessons From Brazil's First Maritime Extractive Reserve
From Common Property To Co-Management: Lessons From Brazil's First Maritime Extractive Reserve
Abstract
Marine extractive reserves (MER) are being established in coastal areas of Brazil to protect traditional coastal populations and
the marine resources upon which their livelihoods depend. This paper examines the challenges Brazils rst open-water MER is
facing in trying to achieve these goals. Results from a pilot project in Arraial do Cabo, Rio de Janeiro suggest that signicant social
barriers to collective action exist and that local resource governing institutions are not robust. Consequently, shers are not
becoming decisive players in the decision-making process. The implications of these conclusions for future maritime conservation
policy in Brazil are explored.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Keywords: Brazil; Extractive reserve; Collaborative management; Marine protected area
1. Introduction
Small-scale shing communities worldwide have long
developed local tenure arrangements that govern coastal
resources based on traditional ecological knowledge
[13]. Such institutional arrangements include limitations on resource access, gear and seasonal restrictions.
It is widely acknowledged that these regimes can provide
locally relevant and environmentally sustainable solutions to resource degradation [4,5]. At the cornerstone
of this model of productive conservation is the longterm participation of resource users [6].
In Brazil, a new marine conservation paradigm is
emerging which goes beyond crude protectionism.
Maritime extractive reserves (MER), a new type of
collaboratively managed marine protected areas, are
being established in order to protect marine resources
while sustaining the livelihoods of traditional resource
user communities. This approach to conservation is
supported by common property theory that questions
$
This work is based on research carried out for partial fullment of
a doctoral degree at the London School of Economics. This study was
nanced by the Portuguese Ministry of Science and Technology. Full
text is available at the Digital Library of the Commons at: http://
dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/
*Tel.: +1-508-495-2370; fax: +1-508-495-2258.
E-mail address: [email protected] (P.P. da Silva).
2. Collaborative management
Common to most denitions of collaborative or comanagement is the sharing of power and responsibility
between governments and communities. Co-management is often described as a middle course between pure
State management and pure communal property
1
Beach seining is a type of shing that involves a large drag net used
in shallow, inshore waters.
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420
Table 1
Design principals for robust CPR regimes [3]
Design principle
Description
Clear boundaries
Congruence
Collective choice
Monitoring
Graduated sanctions
Conict-resolution
mechanisms
Minimal recognition
of rights to organize
informative
advisory
co-operative
consultative
instructive
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421
Since their creation, a broader reassessment of existing conservation categories has been carried out resulting in the new National
System of Conservation Units [19].
This effort has also been supported by the G-7 Pilot Program to
Save the Brazilian Rainforests, on e of the largest multilateral
environmental initiatives to date.
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Table 2
Current MERs [12]
Name
Municipality/
State
Degree
Area (ha)
Pop.
Florian!opolis,
SC
Arraial do
Cabo, RJ
Maragojipe/
Cachoeira, BA
Prado, BA
N 53320/05/92
1.444
600
S/N 03/01/97
56.769
3000
S/N 14/08/00
8.117
1150
S/N 21/09/00
38.174
800
Fishery
Shellsh, crustaceans, multiple sh
Multiple marine sheries and
shellsh
Multiple marine sheries
Multiple marine sheries
5. Methodology
4
it will be interesting to see how reserve boundaries, enforcement
and other institutional arrangements are tted for off shore artisanal
shing eets like those of the Northeast of Brazil.
5
SCUBA shers.
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423
Table 3
Fishing days per Beach [16]
Beach
No. of days
No. of canoes
Praia Grande
Praia dos Anjos
Prainha
Praia do Pontal
21
12
7
4
42
12
7
4
Days
Days
Days
Days
canoes
canoes
canoes
canoes
Table 4
Fishery access sequence on Praia Grande [17]
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Canoe
Day
12
34
56
78
910
1112
1314
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Canoe
Day
1516
1718
1920
2122
2324
2526
2728
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Canoe
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
2930
3132
3334
3536
3738
3940
4142
After day 21 the user access system starts again from day one.
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424
Fig. 4. Group size and ethnic divisions among A.C. shers [16].
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Table 5
Breakdown of gear/access ownership on Praia dos Anjos [16]
Total no. of owners on P. dos Anjos
10
5
5
37.5
62.5
50
425
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Table 6
Evaluation of institutional strength over time [3,16]
Design principal
Pre-1960
Pre-reserve
Potential for
1. Clearly dened
Boundaries
Yes
Yes
2. Congruence
between
appropriation and
provision rules and
local conditions
Yes
No. Excludability
problems existed and drag
net shrimp trawlers
commonly trawled local
waters.
No. Fishers do not feel
they earn enough to live on
and ownership has become
concentrated and too many
days have been added to
each beach leading to rent
dissipation.
3. Collective-choice
arrangements
Yes
Yes
4. Monitoring
Yes
Yes
5. Graduated
sanctions
Yes
6. Conict-resolution
mechanisms
Yes
7. Minimal
recognition of rights
to organize
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Coastal communities are not organic wholes. Difference and diversity must be taken into account as well
as existing power structures that may distort or
constrain participation. If not, extractive reserves
could potentially reinforce inequitable power structures instead of promoting broad-based participatory
conservation.
Conservation practitioners cannot assume that traditional resource management systems are just, equitable and up-to-date. An assessment of the existence
and health of these institutions should be undertaken
before creating the utilization plan. Information on
the state of these institutions is essential in order to
design effective regimes to collaboratively manage
natural resources.
Regional universities and non-governmental organizations could play an important role in building the
capacity of shing communities to co-manage reserves. Financial management, participatory research
and management methods are examples of areas
where external agents could play a key role.
Communities may need to go through a process of
social preparedness before reserve creation. In
Arraial do Cabo this process should have involved
bringing shers together from different gear groups
and/or beaches in order discuss and resolve common
problems. This process should also include secondary
stakeholders such as local government and shing
associations and sher families. Participatory research methods could guide this process and help
ensure transparency.
In order for government to build trust with shing
communities, relationships of reciprocity need to be
developed. This relationship will disintegrate quickly if
parties do not hold up their promises. Brazilian smallscale shers have historically lived outside the law.
Negative experiences with the State have left shers
wary and care should be taken to renew relationships
between the State and resource user groups.
Fishing communities are unlikely to be able to take
sole responsibility for these initiatives and will not
succeed in long-term conservation and development
goals without external assistance. With the growing
number of planned reserves, CNPT will need more
funding and staff to carryout the tasks associated
with this network of marine protected areas.
Clear guidelines for voting and nancial management
should be in place to ensure the legitimacy and
transparency of the organization. Pocket chart
voting, for example, could provide the necessary
legitimacy while ensuring voter privacy.
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428
Extractive reserves in general represent the rst conservation units in which specically involve local
communities in their design and management. These
initiatives have enormous potential for conserving
coastal areas and securing the livelihoods of coastal
populations. This study suggests, however, that in order
for these goals to be realized both parties must be willing
and able to carry out their role in the process.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to the pescadores de canoa and other
shers from Arraial do Cabo for the time they spent
painstakingly explaining their shing rituals, culture and
opinions. Special thanks to Dr. Anthony Hall for
providing excellent guidance from the conceptualization
of this study to its nal completion. Finally, I would like
to thank the Portuguese Ministry of Science and
Technology for funding this study and NOAA Fisheries
for giving me the time to write this article.
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