Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably

failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva,
Adm.Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647].
Javellana v. Lutero
GR. No. G.R. No. L-23956

July 21, 1967

FACTS:
On March 1963, the Roman Archbishop in Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against Elpidio
Javellana in the municipal court which was presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The hearing was
reset four times, all at the behest of Elpidio Javellanas lawyer who gave reasons as flimsy as a
painful toe, or an unfinished business transactions in Manila. This last postponement was granted
by the municipal court, with a warning that no further postponements shall be allowed. When the
case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty. Hautea
appeared although one Atty. Romy Pea who was present in court verbally moved for the
postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to a business
transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the defendant and
his counsel were well aware of the court's previous admonition that no further postponement of
the case would be granted, and then manifested that the witnesses and the evidence for the
plaintiff were ready for presentation on that date.
The verbal motion was denied, and plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence. During the
hearing, a telegram arrived from Atty. Hautea asking for a postponement of the hearing.
However, the hearing still continued. The court on the same date rendered judgment for the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
About 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition for relief (from the
judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying that the
decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the merits, and,
pending determination of the petition, that an injunction issue restraining the enforcement of the
decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that his absence on the date of the trial was
excusable as he attended to a very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his
departure for the latter city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo
might be delayed and that he might not arrive on time for the trial of the case as set; that he
called at both the law office and the residence of the counsel for the private respondent to inform
him of the desired postponement and the reason therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at the
time; that he exercised utmost diligence and precaution in the sense that while in Manila he sent
a telegram to the respondent judge, asking for postponement; and that notwithstanding all the
foregoing, the municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his absence and that of
his client, allowed the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and rendered a
decision against the petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in court. Counsel for the
petitioner further asserted that his client has a good and substantial defense, which is, that the
complainant had given his client an option to buy the premises subject-matter of the complaint
below, and that a reopening of the case would cause the private respondent no real injury.
Issue: W/N Atty. Hautea was negligent in his duties as a lawyer.
HELD:
A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and
with due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial with
diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case,
such as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious
that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel.
The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal admonition by the
judgment that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for hearing
on August 27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to
so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict between his business transactions and
his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the appellant appeared at the trial.

His absence on the latter date was not occasioned by illness or some other supervening
occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented him from appearing in court.
It was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give preferential
attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a mere marionette that
must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals more than just a
modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice.
VILLASIS VS CA
FACTS: An action for quieting of title with recover of possession and damages by the private
respondent was granted by CFI. Petitioner went to the CA, they were given 45 days to submit
their brief. However, they have failed to file their brief because of their counsels utter inaction
and gross indifference and neglect since receipt of due notice to file it. They have change their
counsel but the period of filing brief had already expired.
ISSUE: WON Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared
himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its
preferences. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the copies,
have been violated.
RULING: The appellate court gave them all the time and opportunity to duly prosecute their
appeal by filing their brief in the interval to no avail. The appellate court committed no error
therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and justifiable
reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for their
counsel's utter inaction and grow indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief for a year
since receipt of due notice to file the same.
Vda. de Bacaling vs. Laguna
54 SCRA 243
Facts:
Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land where petitioner
and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, constructed a residential house Unable to pay the
lease rental an action for ejectment. The filing of said case spawned various court suits such as
petition for certiorari, which further prolong the litigation process.
Issue: Should the petitioners counsel deserved condemnation before SC.
Held: Yes. The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by
petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counsel deserves the vigorous
condemnation of this Court, because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari
which should only be resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by a
inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply
wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really meritorious cases.
Collado v. Hernando, 161 SCRA 639, 645 (1988), where the petitioner also filed both an appeal
and later a petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court described this "as a classic case of forumshopping which this Court definitely cannot and will not countenance.
Tan vs Lapak
350 SCRA 74
Lawyer not bound to accept all cases.
Facts:
This is a complaint filed by Rosita Tan against Atty. Jose L. Lapak for misconduct,
based on respondents failure to file with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of
a resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing complainants appeal. Complainant alleged that

despite the fact that Supreme Court had granted respondent an extension of the time to file the
petition for review on certiorari and she had paid respondent his fee, the latter nonetheless failed
to file the petition. The respondent denied the allegations against him and the case was referred
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. IBP
passed a resolution that respondent be reprimanded and ordered to restitute to complainant the
amount of P1,000.00.
On August, 8, 1990, Atty. Lapak still asked for the balance of P5,000.00 which complainant had
agreed to pay despite the fact that the Supreme Courts resolution had already become final at
that time due to his failure to file the petition within the extended period or on June 25, 1990.
Respondent also never informed or explained to Tan that a petition for review was no longer
possible or perhaps that another remedy was still open.
Respondent advanced two reasons why he did not file a petition for review on certiorari in
the Supreme Court, which were: (1) Respondent asserted that complainant only engaged his
services to pursue her appeal in the Court of Appeals which was dismissed due to the failure of
complainants former counsel, Atty. Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura, to file the appellants brief;
and (2) because complainant failed to pay the balance of P1,000.00 of his fee.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Lapaks failure to file the petition for review on certiorari
can be excused by the fact that Tan only engaged his services to pursue her appeal in the Court
of Appeals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that he has the right to decline employment,
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take
up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.
Nor can respondent excuse himself for his failure to file the petition for review on certiorari
on the ground that complainant failed to pay what she promised to pay. Complainant agreed to
pay P5,000.00. Of this amount, she paid respondent P3,000.00 and later P1,000.00, leaving only
a balance of P1,000.00. Even if this balance had not been paid, this fact was not sufficient to
justify the failure of respondent to comply with his professional obligation which does not depend
for compliance on the payment of a lawyers fees.
As respondent utterly failed to comply with his professional commitment to complainant, it is,
therefore, not just for him to keep the legal fee of P4,000.00 which complainant paid him. He
has not rightfully earned that fee and should return it to complainant.
Hence, Atty. Jose L. Lapak is reprimanded and ordered to refund to complainant Rosita Tan
the amount of P4,000.00.
Discussion:
Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not refuse his
services to the needy unless a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively or
competently;
or
b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a
present client and the prospective client. (Rule 14.03). Moreover, Rule 14.04 provides that a
lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the
same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
Once a lawyer accepts to accept the cause of a client, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client, saved by the rules of law legally applied.
Moreover, the misconduct of Atty. Lapak was a violation of the following:
Canon 17, which states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him;

Canon 18, Rule 18.03, which provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable; and,
Canon 18, Rule 18.04, a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to clients request for information.
EDRIAL vs. QUILAT-QUILAT
FACTS: Respondents filed an action for recovery of a parcel of land against Petitioner Edrial. The
case was first filed by Atty. Lituanas, lawyer of the LAPIL Negros Oriental however, a new counsel
from CLAO ( Ciizen Legal Assistance Office) handled the case in replacement of Atty. Lituanas.
After the case was repeatedly reset for hearing, postponed and suspended; and despite notice
nobody appeared. The case was dismissed by the court after it ordered for the case submission
for decision for the fourth time. Herein petitioners filed a petition to reopen the case, however it
was denied by Dumaguete RTC. They filed again in CA but CA affirmed RTC's decision. Petitioners
contend that a reversal thereof would have allowed them to complete their presentation of
evidence. Hence affirming RTC's decision, the CA allegedly violated petitioners right to due
process.
ISSUE: Did CA err in affirming Dumaguete City RTC Order?
DECISION: NO, parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and caused
repeated delays cannot ask for reopening of the trial for the purpose of presenting additional
evidence. They can no longer complain of alleged violation of their right to due process. In fact,
the Court thrice considered its Order to submit the case for decision .Petitioners were given
several opportunities to present their evidence but they squandered them. Petitioners were
intentionally seeking delay the resolution of the case because they were in physical possession
of the land in dispute. The Court is dismayed on lawyer's practice of repeatedly seeking
extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without
submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestations of their failure. The CPR
requires that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs,
shall not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their
failure to do so ( Rule 12.03). Morever, they should avoid any action that would unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes ( rule 12.04). Petition
denied.