Contract Law 1 Act
Contract Law 1 Act
Contract Law 1 Act
B First Year
UNIT I
Introduction to the Indian Contract Act, 1872
A contract may be defined as a legally binding agreement or, in the words of Sir Frederick Pollock: A promise or set
of promises which the law will enforce.
Section 2(h) of Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines contract as An agreement enforceable by law. Thus, formation of a
contract there must be an agreement, and the agreement should be enforceable by law.
The agreement will create rights and obligations that may be enforced in the courts. The normal method of
enforcement is an action for damages for breach of contract, though in some cases the court may order performance
by the party in default.
Enforceability of Contracts
Void Contracts: A void contract is one where the whole transaction is regarded as a nullity. It means that at
no time has there been a contract between the parties. Any goods or money obtained under the agreement must
be returned. Where items have been resold to a third party, they may be recovered by the original owner.
Voidable Contracts: A contract which is voidable operates in every respect as a valid contract unless and
until one of the parties takes steps to avoid it. Anything obtained under the contract must be returned, in so far as
this is possible. If goods have been resold before the contract was avoided, the original owner will not be able to
reclaim them.
Unenforceable Contracts: An unenforceable contract is a valid contract but it cannot be enforced in the
courts if one of the parties refused to carry out its terms. Items received under the contract cannot generally be
reclaimed.
All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful
consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.
Proposal or Offer
Proposal definition [SECTION 2(a)]
When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining
the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal.
Communication of Proposal
Communication, acceptance and revocation of proposals [SECTION 3]
The communication of proposals, the acceptance of proposals, and the revocation of proposals and acceptances,
respectively, are deemed to be made by any act or omission of the party proposing, accepting or revoking, by which
he intends to communicate such proposal, acceptance or revocation, or which has the effect of communicating it.
Thus, a proposal may be communicated in any way which has the effect of laying before the offeree the willingness to
do or abstain. It may for example be done by words of mouth, or by writing, or even by conduct.
An offer which is expressed by conduct is called an implied offer and the one which is expressed by words, written or
spoken, is called an express offer.
For example, a bid at an action is an implied offer to buy, stepping into an omnibus, and consuming eatables at a self-
service restaurant.
A fire broke out in the defendants farm. He believed that he was entitled to the free services of Upton Fire Brigade
and, therefore, summoned it. The Brigade put out the fire. It then turned out that the defendants farm was not within
free service zone of the Upton, which therefore, claimed compensation for the services. The court said: The truth of
the matter is that the defendant wanted the services of Upton; he asked for the services of Upton and Upton, in
response to that request, provided the services. Hence, the services were rendered on an implied promise to pay for
them.
An offer cannot be accepted unless and until it has been brought to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made.
This principle enabled the Allahabad High Court in Lalman v Gauri Datt to deal with a matter involving a very crucial
question on this point.
Defendants nephew absconded from home. He sent his servant in search of the boy. When the servant had left, the
defendant by handbills offered to pay Rs.501 to anybody discovering the boy. The servant came to know of this offer
only when he had already traced the missing child. He, however, brought an auction to recover the reward. But his
action failed. BAERJI J explains: In my opinion a suit like the present can only be founded on a contract. In order to
constitute a contract, there must be an acceptance of an offer and there can be no acceptance unless there is
knowledge to the offer.
Intention to Contract
There is no provision in the Indian Contract Act requiring that an offer or its acceptance should be made with the
intention of creating a legal relationship. But in English law it is a settled principle that to create a contract there must
be a common intention of the parties to enter into legal obligations.
Business matters
Supreme Courts view
The Supreme Court noted the general proposition that in addition to the existence of an agreement and the presence
of consideration there is also the third contractual element in the form of intention of the parties to create legal
relations.
Letters of intent
A letter of intent merely indicates a partys intention to enter into a contract on the lines suggested in the letter. It may
becomes a preclude to a contract. However, where a letter stated that it would be followed by a detailed purchase
order which carried an arbitration clause, it was held that the letter was not a supply order and the arbitration clause
contained in it did not by itself fructify into an arbitration agreement.
General Offers
Acceptance by performing conditions, or receiving consideration [SECTION 8]
Performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which
may be offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal.
A company offered by advertisement to pay 100 pound to anyone who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza,
colds or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball according to printed directions. It was added
that 1000 pound is deposited with the Alliance Bank showing our sincerity in the matter. The plaintiff used the smoke
balls according to the directions but she nevertheless subsequently suffered from influenza. She was held entitled to
recover the promised reward.
Harvey v Facey
The plaintiff relegraphed to the defendants, writing: Will you sell us Bumper Hall Pen? Telegraph lowest cash price.
The defendants replied also by telegram: Lowest price for Bumber Hall Pen, 900 pound. The plaintiff immediately
sent their last telegram stating: We agree to buy Bumper Hall Pen for 900 pound asked by you. The defendants
refused to sell the plot.
The Lordships pointed out that in their first telegram, the plaintiffs asked two questions, first, as to the willingness to
sell and, second, as to the lower price. The defendants answered only the second, and gave only the lowest price.
They reserved their answer as to the willingness to sell. Thus, they made no offer. The last telegram of the plaintiffs
was an offer to buy, but that was never accepted by the defendants.
Catalogues and display of goods: A shopkeepers catalogue of prices is not an offer, only an invitation to
offer.
Announcement to hold auction: An auctioneers announcement that specified goods will be sold by
auction on a certain day is not an offer to hold the auction.
Definiteness of proposal: A classified advertisement to the effect: cocks and hens 25s each has been
held to be not an offer to sell.
Free distribution of articles: Not a contract of sale
Thus acceptance is the assent given to a proposal, and it has the effect of converting the proposal into promise.
This is another way of saying that an agreement is an accepted proposal. Every agreement, in its ultimate analysis, is
the result of a proposal from one side and its acceptance by the other.
1. Communication to Offeror
2. Communication to Acceptor
3. When Communication is not necessary
Communication of Acceptance
Acceptance by external manifestation or overt act.
SHAH J says An agreement does not result from a mere state of mind: intent to accept an offer or even a mental
resolve to accept an offer does not give rise to a contract. There must be some external manifestation of that intent
by speech, writing or other act.
B had been supplying coal to a railway company without any formal agreement. B suggested that a formal agreement
should be drawn up. The agents of both the parties met and drew up a draft agreement. It had some blanks when it
was sent to B for his approval. He filled up the blanks including the name of an arbitrator and then returned it to the
company. The agent of the company put the draft in his drawer and it remained there without final approval having
been signified. B kept up his supply of coals but on the new terms and also received payment on the new terms. A
dispute having arisen B refused to be bound by the agreement.
Acceptance by Conduct
Mere mental assent to an offer does not conclude a contract either under the Indian Contract Act or in English Law.
Communication to Offeror Himself
Acceptance must be communicated to the offeror himself. A communication to any other person is as ineffectual as of
no communication has been made.
Facts The plaintiff offered by means of a letter to purchase his nephews horse. The letter said: If I hear no more
about the horse, I consider the horse mine at pount 33.15s. To this letter, no reply was sent. But the nephew told
the defendant, his auctioneer not to sell the horse as it was already sold to his uncle. The auctioneer by mistake put
up the horse for action and sold it. The plaintiff sued the auctioneer on the ground that under the contract the horse
had become his property and, therefore, defendants unauthorized sale amounted to conversion. But the action
failed.
Communication of acceptance should be from a person who has the authority to accept. Information received from an
unauthorised person is ineffective.
Facts The plaintiff was an applicant for the headmaster-ship of a school. The managers passed a resolution
appointing him, but the decision was not communicated to him. One of the members, however, in his individual
capacity informed him. The managers cancelled their resolution and the plaintiff sued for breach of contract.
In certain cases, communication of acceptance is not necessary. The offeror may inform a particular mode of
acceptance, then all that the acceptor as to do is to follow that particular mode.
BOWEN LJ observed as: But there is this clear gloss to be made upon that doctrine, that as notification of
acceptance is required for the benefit of the person who makes the offer, he may dispense with notice to himself
and there can be no doubt that where the offeror expressly or impliedly intimates a particular mode of acceptance as
sufficient to make the bargain binding it is only necessary for the other person to follow the indicated method of
acceptance; and if the person making the offer expressly or impliedly intimates in his offer that it will be sufficient to
act on the proposal without communicating acceptance of it to himself, performance of the condition is a sufficient
acceptance without notification.
Mode of Communication
Acceptance should be made in prescribed manner
Acceptance has to be made in the manner prescribed or indicated by the offeror. An acceptance given in any other
manner may not be effective. particularly where the offeror clearly insists that the acceptance shall be made in the
prescribed manner. For example,
A offered to buy flour from B requesting that acceptance should be sent by the wagon which brought the offer. B sent
his acceptance by post, thinking that this would reach the offeror more speedily. But the letter arrived after the time of
the wagon. A was held to be not bound by the acceptance.
A departure from that manner does not of itself invalidate the acceptance. A duty is cast on the offeror to reject such
acceptance within reasonable time.
1. a minor departure from the prescribed mode of communication should not upset the fact of acceptance
provided that the communication is made in an equally expeditious way.
2. for, in a case, where the offeree was told to reply by by return of post it was said by the Court of Exchequer
Chamber that a reply sent by some other method equally expeditious would constitute a valid acceptance.
When the parties are at a distance and are contracting through post or by messengers, the question arises when is
the contract concluded.
The defendant in this case had applied for allotment of 100 shares in the plaintiff company. A letter of allotment
addressed to the defendant at his residence was posted in due time, but it never reached the defendant. Nevertheless
he was held bound by the acceptance.
The only difference that the section makes is in the position of the acceptor. In England when a letter of acceptance is
posted, both the offeror and the acceptor become irrevocably bound. But in India, the acceptor does not become
bound by merely posting his acceptance. He becomes bound only when his acceptance comes to the knowledge of
the proposer. The gap of time between the posting and the delivery of the acceptance can be utilised by the acceptor
for revoking his acceptance by a speedier communication which will overtake the acceptance.
Counter proposals
An acceptance containing additions, limitations, or other modifications shall be rejection of the offer and shall
constitute a counter-offer.
However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but which contains additional or different terms which
do not materially alter the terms of the offer shall constitute an acceptance unless the offeror promptly objects to the
discrepancy; if he does not object, the terms of the contract shall be the terms of the offer with the modifications
contained in the acceptance.
If the proposal prescribes a manner in which it is to be accepted, and the acceptance is not made in such manner, the
proposer may, within a reasonable time after the acceptance is communicated to him, insist that his proposal shall be
accepted in the prescribed manner, and not otherwise; but if he fails to do so, he accepts the acceptance.
Partial acceptance
Acceptance should be of the whole of the offer. The offeree cannot accept a part of its terms which are favourable to
him and reject the rest. Such an acceptance is another kind of counter proposal and does not bind the offeror.
If an acceptance carries a condition subsequent, it may not have the effect of a counter-proposal. Thus, where an
acceptance said: terms accepted, remit cash down Rs.25,000 by February 5, otherwise acceptance subject to
withdrawal, this was not a counter-proposal, but an acceptance with a warning that if the money was not sent the
contract would be deemed to have been broken.
Even where the acceptance of a proposal is not absolute and unqualified the proposer may become bound, if, by his
subsequent conduct, he indicates that he has accepted the qualifications set up.
An application for shares was made conditional on an undertaking by the bank that the applicant would be appointed
a permanent director of the local branch. The shares were allotted to him without fulfilling the condition. The applicant
accepted the position as a shareholder by accepting dividends, filing a suit to recover it and by pledging his shares.
It was, therefore, held that he could not content that the allotment was void on the ground of non-fulfillment of the
condition as he had by his conduct waived the conditions.
Provisional acceptance
An acceptance is sometimes made subject to final approval. A provisional acceptance of this kind does not ordinarily
bind either party until the final approval is given.
A tender is in the same category as a quotation of prices. It is not an offer. When a tender is approved, it is converted
into a standing offer. A contract arises only when an order is placed on the basis of the tender. These principles were
laid down by the Bombay High Court in the well-known case of Bengal Coal Co Ltd v Homee Wadia & Co.
Lapse of Offer
1. Notice of revocation
2. Lapse of Time
3. By failure to accept condition precedent
4. By death or insanity of offerer
Revocation of Acceptance
Section 5: Revocation of proposals and acceptances
A proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the
proposer, but not afterwards.
An acceptance may be revoked at any time before the communication of the acceptance is complete as against the
acceptor, but not afterwards.
NOTICE OF REVOCATION
Withdrawal before expiry of fixed period
Where an offeror gives the offeree an option to accept within a fixed period, he may withdraw it even before the expiry
of that period.
The defendant left an offer to sell a quantity of indigo at the plaintiffs office allowing him eight days time to give his
answer. On the 4th day however the defendant revoked his proposal. The plaintiff accepted it on the 5th day. Holding
the acceptance was useless.
Where the agreement to keep the offer open for a certain period of time is for some consideration, the offeror cannot
cancel it before the expiry of that period.
It is necessary that the communication of revocation should be from the offeror or from his duly authorised agent. But
it has been held in the case of Dickinson v. Dodds, that it is not enough if the offeree knows reliably that the offer
has been withdrawn.
Where an offer of a general nature is published through newspapers, it can be withdrawn by the same media and the
revocation will be effective even if a particular person, subsequent to the withdrawl, happened to perform its terms in
ignorance of the withdrawal.
Where before acceptance a proposal is renewed in some parts of it and not in its entirety as proposed earlier and the
letter purports it to supersede the earlier communication, such proposal is no longer available for acceptance.
Revocation of Bid
In the case of an auction, the assent is signified on the part of the seller by knocking down the hammer. A bid may
be retracted before the hammer is down.
A liquor ship was knocked down to a bidder at a public auction. This was subject to the confirmation by the Chief
Commissioner who had the power before granting the licence to inquire into the financial condition of the bidder. The
bidder had to pay one-sixth part of the price immediately and in case of any default on his part the Government had
the power to re-auction the shop and the shortfall, if any, was recoverable from the bidder. He failed to pay one-sixth
part and, therefore, the Chief Commissioner did not confirm the bid and ordered resale. Resale realized much less
than the original bid and the question of bidders liability to pay the shortfall arose.
The court said: It is not disputed that the Chief Commissioner had disapproved of the bid offered by the respondent.
If the Chief Commissioner had granted sanction in favor of the respondent, then there would have been a completed
transaction and he would have been liable for any shortfall on the resale.
LAPSE OF TIME
An offer lapses on the expiry of the time, if any, fixed for acceptance. Where an offer says that it shall remain open for
acceptance up to a certain date, it has to be accepted within that date. For example, where an offer was to last until
the end of March and the offeree sent a telegram accepting the offer on 28th March which was received by the offeror
on 30th March, it was held that the option was duly exercised.
Where the offer is subject to a condition precedent, it lapses if it is accepted without fulfilling the condition. Where a
salt lake was offered by way of lease on deposit of a sum of money within a specified period, and the intended lessee
did not deposit the amount for 3 long years, it was held that this entailed cancellation of the allotment.
An offer lapses on the death or insanity of the offeror, provided that the fact comes to the knowledge of the offeree
before he makes his acceptance.
In the case of Dickinson v Dodds, it was held that an offer cannot be accepted after the death of the offeror.
Revocation of Acceptance
According to English law an acceptance once made is irrevocable. In the words of Anson: Acceptance is to offer what
a lighted match is to a train of gunpowder. Both do something which cannot be undone. This rule is obviously
confined in its operation only to postal acceptance. It is suggested in Anson that in other cases an acceptance can
be revoked at any time before acceptance is complete, provided, of course, that the revocation itself is communicated
before the acceptance arrives.
In India, on the other hand, acceptance is generally revocable. An acceptor may cancel his acceptance by a speedier
mode of communication which will reach earlier than the acceptance itself. Section 5 is the relevant provision.
Definitions
In the words of Pollock, Consideration is the price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the promise thus
given for value is enforceable. Another simple definition is by Justice Patterson: Consideration means something
which is of some value in the eyes of the law.. It may be some benefit to the plaintiff or some detriment to the
defendant.
When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing or does or
abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is
called a consideration for the promise.
It means price for which the promise of the other is bought a valuable considerations a price of the promise some
of value received by the promisee as an inducement of the promise quid pro quo ( something in return) may be of
some benefit to the plaintiff or some detriment to the defendant.
Promissory Estoppel
The doctrine of promissory estoppel prevents one party from withdrawing a promise made to a second party if the
latter has reasonably relied on that promise.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was first developed in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co [1877] but was lost
for some time until it was resurrected by Lord Denning in the controversial case of Central London Property Trust
Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd [1947].
In general, estoppel is a shield not a sword it cannot be used as the basis of an action on its own. It also does not
extinguish rights.
The general rule is that when one party agrees to accept a lesser sum in full payment of a debt, the debtor has given
no consideration, and so the creditor is still entitled to claim the debt in its entirety. This is not the case if the debtor
offers payment at an earlier date than was previously agreed, because the benefit to the creditor of receiving payment
early can be thought of as consideration for the promise to waive the rest of the debt. This is the rule formulated
in Pinnels Case (1602)
An act or abstinence which is to be a consideration for the promise must be done or promised to be done in
accordance with the desire of the promisor.
Facts: The plaintiff constructed some shops in a market under the orders of the Collector. The defendant occupied a
shop and promised to pay some commission to the plaintiff and did not pay. In an action against the defendant, it was
held not maintainable.
Court Held: The only ground for the making of the promise is the expense incurred by the plaintiff in establishing the
Ganj (market) but it is clear that anything done in that way was not at the desior of the defendants so as to constitute
consideration. The act was the result not of the promise but of the Collectors order.
Thus to constitute a good consideration, act or abstinence must be at the desire of the promisor.
An act done at the promisors desire furnishes a good consideration for his promise even though it is of no personal
significance or benefit to him.
It was thought advisable to erect a town hall at Howrah provided sufficient subscription could be got together for the
purpose. To this end the Commissioners of Howrah municipality set out to work to obtain necessary funds by public
subscription. The defendant was a subscriber to this fund for Rs.100 having signed his name in the subscription book
for the amount. On the faith of the promised subscriptions, the plaintiff entered into a contract with a contractor for the
purpose of building the hall. But the defendant failed to pay the amount and contended that there was no
consideration for this promise.
He was held liable. Persons were asked to subscribe knowing the purpose for which the money was to be applied,
they knew that on the faith of their subscription an obligation was to be incurred to pay the contractor for the work. The
promise is: In consideration of your agreeing to enter into a contract to erect, I undertake to supply money for it. The
act of the plaintiff in entering into contract with the contractor was done at the desire of the defendant (the promisor)
so as to constitute consideration within the meaning of Section 2(d).
Facts: The repair of a temple was in progress. As the work proceeded, more money was required and to raise this
money subscriptions were invited and a subscription list raised. The defendant put himself down on the list for Rs. 125
and it was to recover this sum that the suit was filed. The plaint found the consideration for the promise as a reliance
on the promise of the subscriber that they have incurred liabilities in repairing the temple.
Judgment: The learned judge held that there was no evidence of any request by the subscriber to the plaintiff to do
the temple repairs. Since, the temple repairs were already in progress when the subscriptions were invited. The action
was not induced by the promise to subscribe but was rather independent of it. Hence, no recovery was allowed.
Unilateral promises
A unilateral promise is a promise from one side only and is intended to induce some action by the other party. The
promisee is not bound to act, for he gives no promise from his side. But if he carries out the act desired by the
promisor, he can hold the promisor to his promise. An act done at the request of the offeror in response to his
promise is consideration, and consideration in its essence is nothing else but response to such a request.
The defendant promised Rs.500 to a fund started to rebuild a mosque but nothing had been done to carry out the
repairs and reconstruction. The subscriber was, therefore, held not liable.
Facts: The owner of a house had mortgaged it. The house was in the occupation of his son and daughter-in-law. He
told them that the house would become their property if they paid off the mortgage debt in installments and they
commenced payment.
Judgement: The fathers promise was a unilateral contract, a promise of the house in return for their act of paying the
installments. It could not be revoked by him once the couple entered on performance of the act, but it would cease to
bind him if they left it incomplete and unperformed.
InPournami Oil Mills v State of Kerala, the Government was not permitted to go back on its earlier promise of wider
exemption from sales tax in pusuance of which certain industries were set up. A subsequent notification curtailing the
exemption was held to be applicable to industries established after the notification. A promise which is against public
policy or in violation of a statutory prohibition cannot be the foundation of an estoppel.
Estoppel of licensee
A person who had acquired title to the land of a Council by adverse possession, agreed subsequently to hold the
same under a term license from the Council. On the expiry of the term, the Council told him to hand over possession
He tried to assert his title by adverse possession. He was not allowed to do so. Whatever rights he acquired became
substituted under the new arrangement which he voluntarily accepted. The new arrangement constituted a
promissory estoppel against him.
It means that as long as there is a consideration for a promise, it is immaterial who has furnished it. It may move from
the promisee, or, if the promisor has no objection, from any other person.
Dutton v Poole
Facts: A person had a daughter to marry and in order to provide her a marriage portion, he intended to sell a wood of
which he was possessed at the time. His son (the defendant) promised that if the father would forbear to sell at his
request he would pay the daughter 1000. The father accordingly forbore but the defendant did not pay. The
daughter and her husband sued the defendant for the amount.
Judgment: The court held that if a man should say, Give me a horse, I will give your son 10, the son may bring the
action, because the gift was upon the consideration of a profit to the son, and the father is obliged by natural affection
to provide for his children. There was such apparent consideration of affection from the father to his children, for
whom nature obliges him to provide, that the consideration and promise to the father may well extend to the children.
The whole object of the agreement was to provide a portion to the plaintiff. It would have been highly inequitable to
allow the son to keep the wood and yet to deprive his sister of her portion. He was accordingly held liable.
Facts: The plaintiff was to be married to the daughter of one G and in consideration of this intended marriage G and
the plaintiffs father entered into a written agreement by which it was agreed that each would pay the plaintiff a sum of
the money. G failed to do so and the plaintiff sued his executors.
Court Held: Although the sole object of the contract was to secure a benefit to the plaintiff, he was not allowed to sue
as the contract was made with his father and not with him. It was held that no stranger to the consideration can take
advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit.
The case laid the foundation of what subsequently came to be known as the doctrine of Privity of contract, which
means a contract is a contract between the parties only and no third person can sue upon it even if it is avowedly
made for his benefit.
Facts: Plaintiffs (Dunlop & Co) sold certain goods to one Dew & Co and secured an agreement from them not to sell
the goods below the list price and that if they sold the goods to another trader they would obtain from him a similar
undertaking to maintain the price list. Dew & Co sold the motor tyres to the defendants (Selfridge & Co) who agreed
not to sell the tyres to any private customer at less than the list prices. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for breach of
this contract.
Court Held: Assuming that the plaintiffs were undisclosed principals, no consideration moved from them to the
defendants and that the contract was unenforceable by them. Only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it.
It cannot be conferred on a stranger to a contract as a right to enforce the contract in personam. Also if a person with
whom a contract not under seal has been made is to be able to enforce it, consideration must have given by him.
1. Consideration must move from the promisee and the promisee only.
2. A contract cannot be enforced by a person who is not a party to it even though it is made for his benefit.
Privity of consideration
In India, the view is opposite of the fundamental propositions of English law. Acording to Section 2(d), it is not
necessary that consideration should be funished by the promisee. A promise is enforceable if there is some
consideration for it and it is quite immaterial whether it moves from the promisee or any other person.
Chinnaya v Ramayya
An old lady, by deed of gift, made over certain landed property to the defendant, her daughter. By the terms of the
deed, which was registered, it was stipulated that an annuity of Rs.653 should be paid every year to the plaintiff, who
was the sister of the old woman. The defendant on the same day executed in plaintiffs favour an agreement
promising to give effect to the stipulation. The annuity was however not paid and the plaintiff sued to recover it.
It was held that the deed of gift and the defendants promise to pay the annuity were executed simultaneously and,
therefore, they should be regarded as one transaction and there was sufficient consideration for that transaction.
Privity of contract
The rule of Privity of contract meant a stranger to contract cannot sue has taken firm roots in the English Common
Law. But it has been generally criticised.
Lord Denning observed that where a contract is made for the benefit of a third person who has a legitimate interest to
enforce it, it can be enforced by the third person in the name of the contracting party or jointly with him or, if he
refuses to join, by adding him as a defendant. The third person has a right arising by way of contract and his interest
will be protected by law.
Beswick v Beswick
Facts: B was a coal merchant. The defendant was assisting him in his business. B entered into an agreement with
the defendant by which the business was to be transferred to the defendant. B was to be employed in it as a
consultant for his life and after his death, the defendant was to pay to his widow an annuity of 5 per week, which was
to come out of the business. After Bs death, the defendant paid Bs widow only one sum of 5. The widow brought an
action to recover the arrears of the annuity and also to get specific performance of the agreement.
Court Held: That she was entitled to enforce the agreement. Thus, the plaintiff was allowed to enforce the agreement
in her personal capacity, although she was not a party to it and it was considered not necessary to infer a trust in
favour of the plaintiff.
Beneficiaries under trust or charge or other arrangements: A person in whose favour a charge or other
interest in some specific property has been created may enforce it though he is not a party to the contract.
Marriage settlement, partition or other family arrangements: Where an agreement is made in
connection with marriage, partition or other family arrangement and a provision is made for the benefit of a
person, he may take advantage of that agreement although he is no party to it.
Acknowledgement or estoppel: Where by the terms of a contract a party is required to make a payment to
a third person and he acknowledges it to that third person, a binding obligation is incurred towards him.
Acknowledgment may be express or implied.
Covenants running with land: The rule of privity may also be modified by the principles relating to transfer
of immovable property.
The promise is to pay for a wholly past act and is no more than an expression of gratitude. The past act may explain
why the promise was given and may be a motive for the promise, but furnishes no legal consideration.
McArdle, In re:
Facts: A effected certain improvements to property. The ultimate beneficiaries of the property signed a document
declaring that: In consideration of your carrying out certain alterations and improvements, we the beneficiaries shall
repay to you the sum of 488 in settlement of the amount spent on such improvements.
Court Held: That as the work had all been done and nothing remained to be done by the promisee at all, the
consideration was wholly past consideration and the beneficiaries agreement for the repayment to her out of the
estate was nudum pactum, a promise with no consideration to support it. Thus, the action to enforce the promise was
rejected.
Past act at request good consideration: Exception to the past consideration in the English law is that a
past act done at request will be good consideration for a subsequent promise. If the voluntary courtesy were
moved by a request of the party that gives the promise, it will bind, for the promise.
Other exceptions are: A promise to pay a time-barred debt and a negotiable instrument issued for a past
consideration are both valid.
Position in India
In India, a past consideration may arise in two ways. It may consist of services rendered at request but without any
promise at the time or it may consist of voluntary services.
Past voluntary service: A voluntary service means a service rendered without any request or promise and
there is a subsequent promise to pay for the same. E.g., If A saves B from drowning and B later promises A a
reward. In India, the promise would be enforceable by virtue of Section 25(2) which provides that a promise to
compensate wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor is
enforceable.
Past service at request: b
Consideration as defined in the Act, means some act, abstinence or promise on the part of the promisee or any other
which has been done at the desire of the promisor. E.g.,
A promises to give his new Rolls-Royce car to B, provided B will fetch it from the garage.
The act of fetching the car cannot by any stretch of imagination be called a consideration for the promise. Even
though it is the only act, the promisor desired the promisee to do. Such an act no doubt satisfies the words of the
definition, but it does not catch its spirit. It is for this reason that English common law insisted that consideration must
be of some value in the eyes of the law. It must be real and not illusory, whether adequate or not as long as the
consideration is not unreal, it is sufficient if it be of slight value only.
It is not necessary that consideration should be adequate to the promise. The courts cannot assume the job of
settling what should be the appropriate consideration for a promise. It is up to the parties.
The act in Explanation 2 to Section 25 states that inadequacy of consideration may be taken into account by the
court in determining the question whether the consent of promisor was freely given. E.g.,
A agrees to sell a horse worth Rs.1000 for Rs.10. A denies that his consent to the agreement was freely given. The
inadequacy of the consideration is a fact which the court should take into account in considering whether or not As
consent was freely given.
Forbearance to sue
Forbearance to sue has always been regarded as valuable consideration. It means that the plaintiff has a certain right
of action against the defendant or any other person and on a promise by the defendant, he refrains from bring the
action.
Consideration must be something more than what the promisee is already bound to do. Performance of a legal duty is
no consideration for a promise.
A. Pre-existing Contract with Promisor: Compliance with legal obligation imposed by a contract with the
promisor can be no consideration for a promise.
Promise to pay less than amount due: A promise to pay less than what is due under a contract cannot be
regarded as a consideration.
1. Part-payment by Third Party: Part-payment by a third party may be a good consideration of the whole of
the debt.
2. Composition:
3. Payment before time:
4. Promissory estoppel:
Consideration should be distinguished from motive or a pious desire to fulfil an obligation. Motive is not the same
thing with consideration.
Thomas v Thomas
Facts: A testator, on the death of his death, had verbally said in front of witnesses that he was desirous that his wife
should enjoy certain premises for her life. The executors, who were also the assignees, in consideration of such
desire and of the premises, agreed with the widow to convey the premises to her provided she would pay to the
executors the sum of 1 pound yearly towards the ground rent and keep the said house in repair.
Court Held: On the question of consideration for the agreement between the executors and the widow the court
pointed out that the motive for the agreement was, unquestionably, respect for the wishes of the testator. But that was
no part of the legal consideration for the agreement. Motive should not be confounded with consideration. The
agreement was, however, held to be binding as the undertaking to pay the ground rent was a sufficient consideration.
Exceptions to Consideration
Contracts under seal in English Law
In English law a contract under seal is enforceable without consideration. In the words of Anson: English law
recognises only two kinds of contract, the contract made by deed that is under seal, which is called a deed or
speciality, and the simple contract. A contract under seal means a contract which is in writing and which is signed,
sealed and delivered.
The provisions as to consideration do not affect, as between donor and donee, the validity of any gift which has
actually been made. A gift of movables which has been completed by delivery and gift of immovable which has been
perfected by registration cannot be questioned as to their validity only on the ground of lack of consideration. They
may be questioned otherwise. Where a gift of property was made by registered deed and attested by two witnesses, it
was not allowed to be questioned by the donor on the ground that she was the victim of fraud which she was not able
to establish.
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State to secure a Social order for the Promotion of Welfare of the People Art. 38
Provision for Just and Humane Conditions of Work and Maternity Relief Art. 42
Protection and Improvement of Environment and Safeguarding of Forests and Wild Life
Art. 48-A
Protection of Monuments and Places and Objects of National Importance Art. 49
The Executive The President and Vice President Arts. 52-78, 123
The President Appointment, Removal & Powers of the President Arts. 52-78, 123
To Aid and Advise the President the Collective Responsibility / the Council of Ministers
Arts. 74 & 75
The Council of Ministers to Aid and Advise the Governor Arts. 163 & 164
Anti-defection Law / Disqualification of Members Arts. 101 104 & 10th Schedule
Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and its members Arts. 105 106 and of
the State Legislative Assemblies and their members Arts. 194 195
Bicameralism
UNIT III
Judicial Process Under the Constitution
Nature of Judicial Review
The Constitution if the Supreme law of the land and any law which is inconsistent with the constitution is termed to be
void. Judicial Review is a term refers to the power that can be utilised for judicially reviewing an enactment passed
by the Legislature, or a decision of an administrator, an order of a quasi-judicial authority and/or in a given case, a
decision of the judiciary.
The concept of Judicial Review started from the case of Marbury vs Madison in 1800 in the USA. In this case,
justice John Marshall held that judiciary has inherent power to review actions by legislature even if no explicit
provision is given in the constitution.
To be appointed as a judge of the supreme court, a person must be a citizen of India and
Until 1973, the senior most judge of the supreme court was appointed as the Chief Justice. However, this convention
was broken when Justice AN Ray was appointed as the CJ by passing 3 more senior judges. This was seen as a
blatant assault on the independence of the judiciary. The govt. pleaded that the word consult does not mean that the
president is bound by the advise. He is free to make his own decision.
In 1977, in the case of Union of India vs Sankalchand Seth, which was related to the transfer of a Judge from one
high court to another under Article 222, SC held that the President has the right to differ from the advice provided by
the consultants.
The 11th Presidential Reverence sought clarification on certain doubts over the consultation process to be adopted by
the Chief Justice of India as stipulated in the 1993 case relating to judges appointment and transfer opinion.
Case Law:
This matter was raised again in the case of SC Advocates on Record Association vs Union of India, AIR 1982. In
this case, the SC overruled the decision of the S P Gupta case and held that in the matter of appointment of judges of
high courts and supreme court, the CJ should have the primacy and the appointment of the CJ should be based on
seniority. It further held that the CJ must consult his two senior most judges and the recommendation must be made
only if there is a consensus among them.
As of now, due to the decision in this case, the appointment of the judges in SC and High Courts are fairly free from
executive control. This is an important factor that ensure the independence of the judiciary.
In the aftermath of babri masjid demolition, UP CM Kalyan Singh was punished for contempt of court for failing to
deliver on his promise not to allow any construction in disputed area.
Under original jurisdiction, individuals cannot bring a suit again Govt. of India. The suit must involves a question of law
or fact on which a legal right depends. Further, the suit cannot be because of any commercial relation or political
relation between the two parties.
In the case of State of Karnataka vs Union of India 1978, SC held that the suit filed by State of Karnataka against
the Govt. regarding its objection to the appointment of an inquiry commission is maintainable.
Art 132(1) allows an appeal to be filed in the SC if three conditions are satisfied:
1. The order appealed must be against the judgement of a high court in civil, criminal, or other proceedings.
2. The case involves a question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution.
3. The High Court, under 134A certifies that the case be heard by the SC.
Krishnaswamy vs Governer General in Council 1947 If there is a difference of opinion among High Courts and if
there is no direct decision by SC on that point, it is a substantial question of law that can permit appeal in SC.
There is no similar provision in the American constitution. In US, the court can give ruling only on concrete cases.
In re Kerala Education Bill 1953, SC has interpreted the word may in clause 1 as it is not bound to give its opinion.
If it has a good reason, it may refuse to express its opinion.
In re Special Courts Bill 1979 case, SC has held that opinions given by it under this jurisdiction are binding on all
courts in the country.
In the landmark case of Ayodhya Dispute and Advisory opinion 1994, the SC refused to express its opinion on
whether a temple existed on the disputed location because it was superfluous, unnecessary, and favors a particular
religion.
Judicial Activism
The term judicial activism is intended to refer to, and cover, the action of the court in excess of, and beyond the
power of judicial review. From one angle it is said to be an act in excess of, or without, jurisdiction. The Constitution
does not confer any authority or jurisdiction for activism as such on the Court.
In short, judicial activism means that instead of judicial restraint, the Supreme Court and other lower courts become
activists and compel the authority to act and sometimes also direct the government regarding policies and also
matters of administration.
Judicial Restraint
In adjudging the constitutionality of socio-economic legislation, judges accord deference to the legislative will and
such legislation is not invalidated unless it is patently discriminatory. Judges do not interfere with the policy of the
executive government if it is not contrary to a statute or the Constitution.
Class Notes on Constitutional Law Unit IV (1st Sem / 3 year
LL.B)
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LL.B)
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Center-State Relations
The Power of the Union and the States to carry on trade, etc. Art. 298
However, technically, Proclamation of Emergency is only done upon external aggression or armed rebellion. In the
second case, it is called Presidential Rule, and in the third case it is called Proclamation of Financial Emergency:
Proclamation of Emergency
Art 352 says that if the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or any part
of India is threatened due to outside aggression or armed rebellion, he may make a proclamation to that effect
regarding whole of India or a part thereof.
However, sub clause 3 says that President can make such a proclamation only upon the written advise of the Union
Cabinet. Such a proclamation must be placed before each house of the parliament and must be approved by each
house with in one month otherwise the proclamation will expire.
An explanation to art 352 says that it is not necessary that external aggression or armed rebellion has actually
happened to proclaim emergency. It can be proclaimed even if there is a possibility of such thing happening.
In the case of Minerva Mills vs Union of India AIR 1980, SC held that there is no bar to judicial review of
the validity of the proclamation of emergency issued by the president under 352(1). However, courts power is
limited only to examining whether the limitations conferred by the constitution have been observed or not. It can
check if the satisfaction of the president is valid or not. If the satisfaction is based on mala fide or absurd or
irrelevant grounds, it is no satisfaction at all.
Prior to 44th amendment, duration of emergency was two months initially and then after approval by the
houses, it would continue indefinitely until ended by another proclamation. However after 44th amendment, the
period is reduced to 1 month and then 6 months after approval.
Art 355 says that it is the duty of the Union to protect States against external aggression.
It also says that any acts done or omitted to be done under this provision cannot be challenged in the courts after the
end of emergency.
In the case of M M Pathak vs Union of India AIR 1978, SC held that the rights rights granted by 14 to 19 are not
suspended during emergency but only their operation is suspended. This means that as soon as emergency is over,
rights transgressed by a law will revive and can be enforced. In this case, a settlement that was reached before
emergency between LIC and its employees was rendered ineffective by a law during emergency. After emergency
was over, SC held that the previous settlement will revive. This is because the emergency law only suspended the
operation of the existing laws. It cannot completely wash away the liabilities that preexisted the emergency.
Under this article, president can also make such incidental and consequential provisions which are necessary to give
effect to the objectives of the proclamation. This includes suspension of any provision of this constitution relating to
any body or authority in the state.
However, this article does not authorize the president to assume the powers vested in the High Courts.
Art 357 provides that in the case of proclamation under art 356
parliament can confer upon the president the power of legislature of the state to make laws or the power to
delegate the power to make laws to anybody else.
the parliament or the president can confer power or impose duties on the Union or Union officers or Union
authorities.
president can authorize the expenditure from the consolidated fund of the stat pending sanction of such
expenditure by the parliament.
The President can issue directions for the reduction of salaries and allowances of Judges of the Supreme Court and
the High Courts.
Services under the State (the Doctrine of Pleasure) Arts. 308 314
The Doctrine of Pleasure
The doctrine of pleasure owes its origin to common law. The rule in England was that a civil servant can hold his
office during the pleasure of the crown and the service will be terminated any time the crown wishes the same rule is
applied in India. The member of Defence services or civil services of the union or All-India services hold their office
during the pleasure of president. Similarly member of state services holds the office during the pleasure of governor.
the provisions related to services under union and state is contained under part XIV of the Indian constitution.
Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the Union or a State holds office during the pleasure of the
President or, as the case may be of the Governor of the State, any contract under which a person, not being a
member of a Defence service or of an All-India service or of a civil service of the Union or a State, is appointed under
this Constitution to hold such a post may, if the President or the Governor, as the case may be, deems it necessary in
order to secure the services of a person having special qualifications, provide for the payment to him of
compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected
with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate the post.
Now if such powers are given to president of India and the governor of states than it would be really difficult to
exercise power on them so there are certain offices which are outside the purview of article 310 and article 311 was
put as a restriction to doctrine of pleasure.
(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or
holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by
which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he
has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those
charges: Provided that where, it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty
may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such
person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not
apply
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State
it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such
inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such
person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.
The procedure laid down in Article 311 is intended to assure, first, a measure of security of tenure to Government
servants, who are covered by the Article and secondly to provide certain safeguards against arbitrary dismissal or
removal of a Government servant or reduction to a lower rank. These provisions are enforceable in a court of law.
Where there is an infringement of Article 311, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority are void ab-initio and in
the eye of law no more than a piece of waste paper and the Government servant will be deemed to have continued
in service or in the case of reduction in rank, in his previous post throughout. Article 311 is of the nature of a proviso
to Article 310. The exercise of pleasure by the President under Article 310 is thus controlled and regulated by the
provisions of Article 311.
2. If the Government servant is a temporary on and has no right to hold the post, dismissal or removal will amount to
punishment if such a Government servant has been visited with certain evil consequences.
in case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra Vs Union of India. The supreme court laid down 2 tests to determine when
termination is by way of punishment
Whether the servant had a right to hold the post or the rank;
Whether he has been visited with evil consequences.
If a government servant had a right to hold the post or rank under the terms of any contract of service, or under any
rule, governing the service, then the termination of his service or reduction in rank amounts to a punishment and he
will be entitled to protection under Article 311. Articles 310 and 311 apply to Government servants, whether
permanent, temporary, officiating or on probation.
1. Conviction on a criminal charge. One of the circumstances excepted by clause (a) of the provision is when a
person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has laid to his conviction on a
criminal charge. The rationale behind this exception is that a formal inquiry is not necessary in a case in which a court
of law has already given a verdict. However, if a conviction is set aside or quashed by a higher court on appeal, the
Government servant will be deemed not to have been convicted at all. Then the Government servant will be treated
as if he had not been convicted at all and as if the order of dismissal was never in existence. In such a case the
Government servant will also be entitled to claim salary for the intervening period during which the dismissal order
was in force. The claim for such arrears of salary will arise only on reinstatement and therefore the period of limitation
under clause 102 of the Limitation Act would apply only with reference to that date . The grounds of conduct for which
action could be taken under this proviso could relate to a conviction on a criminal charge before appointment to
Government service of the person concerned. If the appointing authority were aware of the conviction before he was
appointed, it might well be expected to refuse to appoint such a person but if for some reason the fact of conviction
did not become known till after his appointment, the person concerned could be discharged from service on the basis
of his conviction under clause (a) of the proviso without following the normal procedure envisaged in Article 311.
2. Impracticability Clause (b) of the proviso provides that where the appropriate disciplinary authority is satisfied,
for reasons to be recorded by that authority in writing that it does not consider it reasonably practicable to give to the
person an opportunity of showing cause, no such opportunity need be given. The satisfaction under this clause has to
be of the disciplinary authority who has the power to dismiss, remove or reduce the Government servant in rank. As a
check against an arbitrary use of this exception, it has been provided that the reasons for which the competent
authority decides to do away with the prescribed procedures must be recorded in writing setting out why it would not
be practicable to give the accused an opportunity. The use of this exception could be made in case, where, for
example a person concerned has absconded or where, for other reasons, it is impracticable to communicate with him.
3.Reasons of security Under proviso (c) to Article 311 (2), where the President is satisfied that the retention of a
person in public service is prejudicial to the security of the State, his services can be terminated without recourse to
the normal procedure prescribed in Article 311 (2).The satisfaction referred to in the proviso is the subjective
satisfaction of the President about the expediency of not giving an opportunity to the employee concerned in the
interest of the security of the State. This clause does not require that reasons for the satisfaction should be recorded
in writing. That indicates that the power given to the President is unfettered and cannot be made a justifiable issue, as
that would amount to substituting the satisfaction of the court in place of the satisfaction of the President.
Supreme court in case of such Bansh singh Vs State of Punjab clearly held that suspension from service is neither
dismissal nor removal nor reduction in rank, therefore, if a Government servant is suspended he cannot claim the
constitutional guarantee of Article 311[2].
In Shyam Lal Vs State of U.P, Supreme Court held that compulsory retirement differ from dismissal and removal as
it involves no penal consequences and also a government servant who is compulsory retired does not loose any part
of benefit earned during the service so it doesnt attract the provisions of Article 311.
Article 311(2): It says that a civil servant cannot be removed or dismissed or reduced in rank unless he has been
given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against action proposed to be taken against him.
In many cases like in Khem Chand vs. Union of India, and in Union of India and another vs. Tlusiram Patel, the
Supreme Court gave an exhaustive interpretation of the various aspects involved and they provide the administrative
authorities authoritative guidelines in dealing with disciplinary cases.
Is article 310 and 311 contrary to article 20(2) of Indian constitution or to the principle
of natural justice?
When a government servant is is punished for the same misconduct under the army act and also under central civil
services (classification and control and appeal) rules 1965 then the question arises that can it be brought under the
ambit of double jeopardy. The answer was given by supreme court in the case of Union of India Vs Sunil Kumar
Sarkar . held that the court martial proceeding is different from that of central rules , the former deals with the
personal aspect of misconduct and latter deals with disciplinary aspect of misconduct.
Ordinarily , natural justice does not postulate a right to be represented or assisted by a lawyer, in departmental
Inquiries but in extreme or particular situation the rules of natural justice or fairness may require that the person
should be given professional help.
299. Contracts.(1) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be
expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, and all such contracts
and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the
Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise.
(2) Neither the President nor the Governor shall be personally liable in respect of
any contract or assurance made or executed for the purposes of this Constitution, or for the purposes of any
enactment relating to the Government of India heretofore in force, nor shall any person making or executing any such
contract or assurance on behalf of any of them be personally liable in respect thereof.
The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v Sipani Singh and others
Promissory Estoppel
The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel has been variously called Promissory Estoppel, Requisite Estoppel, Quasi-
Estoppel and New Estoppel. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named
Promissory Estoppel, it is neither in the realm of Contract nor in the realm of Estoppel. The true principle of
Promissory Estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and
unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future,
knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so
acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go
back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place
between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the
parties or not.
The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of
the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be
given only a limited application by way of defence.
U.P. Rajkya Nirman Nigam Lt.d v Indure Pvt. Ltd. and others
(1) The Government of India may sue or be sued by the name of the Union of India and the Government of a State
may sue or be sued by the name of the State and may, subject to any provisions which may be made by Act of
Parliament or of the Legislature of such State enacted by virtue of powers conferred by this Constitution, sue or be
sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases as the Dominion of India and the corresponding Provinces
or the corresponding Indian States might have sued or been sued if this Constitution had not been enacted.
(a) any legal proceedings are pending to which the Dominion of India is a party, the Union of India shall be
deemed to be substituted for the Dominion in those proceedings; and
(b) any legal proceedings are pending to which a Province or an Indian State is a party, the corresponding
State shall be deemed to be substituted for the Province or the Indian State in those proceedings.
Buron v Denman
Respondeat Superior principle was not adopted in the case of the King. The Courts in various decisions criticized
this exemption given to the King, opining that it was against the principles of equity, good conscience and justice. As a
result of long discussions in the Courts and in the Parliament, at last, the Britain Parliament passed The Crown
Proceedings Act, 1947. Now, the Crown can also be sued for his servants tortious acts committed in their course of
employment under the principle of Respondeat Superior.
Position in India
Vidyawati v Lokumal
Kasturilal v State of U.P.
Credits: Source for the notes have been taken from various online websites as well as other guides and books such
as www.hanumant.com, www.legalserviceindia.com, etc.