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Alexiou Vs Us

1) Mr. Alexiou, an attorney, received a counterfeit $100 bill from a client. The Secret Service subpoenaed Alexiou to disclose the identity of the client. 2) Alexiou moved to quash the subpoena, arguing attorney-client privilege. The district court denied the motion. 3) On appeal, the court held that disclosing the client's identity and payment details was not protected by attorney-client privilege because it did not reveal confidential communications related to the legal matter for which Alexiou represented the client.

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Ariel Mark Pilotin
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170 views

Alexiou Vs Us

1) Mr. Alexiou, an attorney, received a counterfeit $100 bill from a client. The Secret Service subpoenaed Alexiou to disclose the identity of the client. 2) Alexiou moved to quash the subpoena, arguing attorney-client privilege. The district court denied the motion. 3) On appeal, the court held that disclosing the client's identity and payment details was not protected by attorney-client privilege because it did not reveal confidential communications related to the legal matter for which Alexiou represented the client.

Uploaded by

Ariel Mark Pilotin
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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39 F.

3d 973
30 Fed.R.Serv.3d 14, 40 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1024
In re SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE the GRAND JURY,
Thomas J. ALEXIOU, Witness-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

1. Mr. Alexiou, an attorney, deposited money in his law firm bank account. The deposit
included a $100 bill which turned out to be counterfeit. The Secret Service eventually
contacted him, asking for the identity of the person who passed the bill.
2. Mr. Alexiou consulted the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys and
decided that he could not ethically respond to the inquiry. His concern, based on his
own examination and consultation with staff counsel for the Washington State Bar
Association, was that the identity of a client was secret and could not be disclosed
without a court order.
3. Mr. Alexiou was subpoenaed to testify, but he filed a motion to quash such subpoena on
account that revealing where he got such bills would violate atty-client privilege.
4. In a letter to the Assistant United States Attorney on the case, The subpoenaed
attorney's Motion to Quash the Subpoena to Testify before the Grand Jury is DENIED.
The information sought by the subpoena does not represent a confidential professional
communication.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT TESTIFYING TO WHERE ATTY GOT FORFEITED100 DOLLAR BILLS,
WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM A CLIENT, VIOLATE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE? NO
HELD.
The subpoena duces tecum and the order of the district court require that Mr. Alexiou
provide the name, address, date and amount of money received from the client who used
the counterfeit $100 bill. He argues that this information is privileged. The district court's
denial of Alexiou's motion to quash the subpoena is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Hirsch), 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir.1986). Whether an attorney-
client privilege exists is a mixed question of fact and law which is reviewed de novo. Tornay
v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir.1988).

Generally, the attorney client privilege does not protect against disclosure of the identity
of the client and the fee arrangements between lawyer and client. In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Goodman), 33 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct.
187, 130 L.Ed.2d 120 (1994); Tornay, 840 F.2d at 1426. There is an exception where
identification of the client conveys information which is itself privileged. Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 630 (9th Cir.1960). For example, if revealing the client's identity
would constitute an acknowledgment of guilt of the offense which led the client to seek
legal assistance, then the identity of the client would be privileged. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena (Horn), 976 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir.1992).

This exception to the no-privilege rule does not operate in every instance where disclosure
of the client's identity would incriminate the client or lead to indictment. "In order to
qualify for the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege, information regarding
client identity or legal fees must be 'in substance a disclosure of the confidential
communication in the professional relationship between the client and the attorney.' " In re
Grand Jury Subpoena (Horn), 976 F.2d at 1317 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Osterhoudt), 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir.1983)). The exception might operate to prevent the
disclosure here if the disclosure were the last link in the chain of testimony necessary to
convict the client. Baird, 279 F.2d 623, 633. But as the government explained in its
argument, the client's identity would not suffice in this case; knowledge and intent would
still have to be proved. No doubt many innocent people pass counterfeit bills without
realizing it. In all likelihood, Mr. Alexiou was the victim of a counterfeiter, and lost $100
which he was entitled to for his services because of the crime. His client who paid it to him
may be in the same position.

In this case, the communication of the client's name and payment were entirely distinct
from the matter in which the client sought the lawyer's services. It was therefore
unprotected by the privilege. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Osterhoudt), 722 F.2d 591, 595
(9th Cir.1983). Evidently the client retained Mr. Alexiou to represent him in traffic matters
and an assault, not anything having to do with counterfeiting. If the client knew the bill
was counterfeit, then Mr. Alexiou was the victim of a crime by his client entirely distinct
from the matter in which Mr. Alexiou was retained. If the client did not know, then both of
them were victims, and the disclosure would not implicate the client at all. Either way, the
disclosure would not be the last link in a chain of evidence which would lead to conviction,
and it was not error for the district court to deny the motion to quash.

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