3/2/2017 NalavsBarrosoJr:153087:August7,2003:J.

YnaresSantiago:FirstDivision

FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.153087.August7,2003]

BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding

DECISION
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:

In determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the
examining magistrate must make probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma
examination of the applicant and the witnesses.[1] Probable cause must be shown by the best
evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is
necessaryespeciallywheretheissueistheexistenceofanegativeingredientoftheoffensecharged,
e.g.,theabsenceofalicenserequiredbylaw.[2]
ThisisapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt,seekingtoannultheOctober
18,2001[3]andFebruary15,2002[4]Orders[5]oftheRegionalTrialCourtofMalaybalayCity,Branch
10,whichdeniedpetitionersOmnibusMotiontoQuash[6]SearchandSeizureWarrantNo.3001.[7]
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the
person and residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was referred to in the application as
Rumolo[8]NalaaliasLong[9]ofPurok4,Poblacion,Kitaotao,Bukidnon.[10]Theapplicationwasfiledin
connectionwithpetitionersallegedillegalpossessionofonecaliber.22magnumandone9mm.pistol
in violation of Republic Act No. 8294, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, or the law on
Illegal Possession of Firearms. On the same day, after examining Alcoser and his witness Ruel
Nalagon, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, issued Search and
SeizureWarrantNo.3001,againstRomuloNalaaliasLolongNalawhoissaidtoberesidingatPurok
4,Poblacion,Kitaotao,Bukidnon.
At around 6:30 in the morning of July 4, 2001, Alcoser and other police officers searched
petitionershouseandallegedlyseizedthefollowingarticles,towit
1onepiececaliber.38revolver(snubnose)withSerialNumber1125609
1onepc.fragmentationgrenade(cacaotype)
1onepc..22longbarrel
5pcsliveammunitionforcaliber.38revolver
4fourpcs.ofdisposablelighterandunestimatednumbersofcellophaneusedforpackingof
shabu[11]
OnJuly5,2001,CriminalCasesNos.109432001Pand109442001Pforillegalpossessionof
firearms,ammunitionsandexplosiveswerefiledagainstthepetitionerbeforethe5thMunicipalCircuit
TrialCourtofKitaotao,Bukidnon.[12]
On August 8, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[13] seeking to (1) quash Search and
SeizureWarrantNo.3001(2)declareinadmissibleforanypurposetheitemsallegedlyseizedunder
thesaidwarrantand(3)directthereleaseoftheairrifleseizedbythepoliceofficers.
RespondentjudgedeniedtheOmnibusMotiontoQuashbutorderedthereturnoftheairrifleto
petitioner. As to the validity of the search warrant, respondent found that probable cause was duly
establishedfromthedepositionandexaminationofwitnessRuelNalagonandthetestimonyofPO3
Macrino L. Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance to confirm the information given by
Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were not exactly the items listed in the warrant does not
invalidatethesamebecausetheitemsseizedbearadirectrelationtothecrimeofillegalpossession
of firearms. Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant
althoughhisfirstnamewaserroneouslystatedthereinasRomuloandnotBernard,consideringthat
thewarrantwascouchedintermsthatwouldmakeitenforceableagainstthepersonandresidenceof
petitionerandnoother.ThedispositiveportionofthequestionedOrderreads:
WHEREFORE, finding the Omnibus Motion to be without merit, the same is hereby DENIED.
However,astothequestionedAirRifle,thesameisallowedtobewithdrawnandorderedreturnedto
hereinmovant.
SOORDERED.[14]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/153087.htm 1/7
3/2/2017 NalavsBarrosoJr:153087:August7,2003:J.YnaresSantiago:FirstDivision

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on February 15, 2002.[15]
Hence,hefiledtheinstantpetitionallegingthatrespondentjudgecommittedgraveabuseofdiscretion
inissuingthequestionedorders.
Theissuesforresolutionareasfollows:(1)Waspetitionersufficientlydescribedinthesearchand
seizure warrant? (2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant
against petitioner? and (3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioners
residence are admissible in evidence against him even though said firearms were not listed in the
searchandseizurewarrant.
At the outset, it must be noted that the instant petition for certiorari was filed directly with this
Courtindisregardoftheruleonhierarchyofcourts.Intheinterestofsubstantialjusticeandspeedy
disposition of cases, however, we opt to take cognizance of this petition in order to address the
urgency and seriousness of the constitutional issues raised.[16] In rendering decisions, courts have
alwaysbeenconscientiouslyguidedbythenormthatonthebalance,technicalitiestakeabackseat
againstsubstantiverights,andnottheotherwayaround.Thus,iftheapplicationoftheRuleswould
tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or
exceptaparticularcasefromitsoperation.[17]
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal liberty
andsecurityofhomesagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures,viz:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolable,and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesseshemayproduce,andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthepersonsor
thingstobeseized.
Thepurposeoftheconstitutionalprovisionagainstunlawfulsearchesandseizuresistoprevent
violationsofprivatesecurityinpersonandproperty,andunlawfulinvasionofthesanctityofthehome,
by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such
usurpationswhenattempted.[18]
Corollarily,Rule126,Sections4and5ofthe2000RulesonCriminalProcedureprovideforthe
requisitesfortheissuanceofasearchwarrant,towit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probablecauseinconnectionwithonespecificoffensetobedeterminedpersonallybythejudgeafter
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and
particularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthethingstobeseizedwhichmaybeanywhere
inthePhilippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainantandthewitnesseshemayproduceonfactspersonallyknowntothemandattachtothe
recordtheirswornstatements,togetherwiththeaffidavitssubmitted.
Moresimplystated,therequisitesofavalidsearchwarrantare:(1)probablecauseispresent(2)
such presence is determined personally by the judge (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or
shemayproducearepersonallyexaminedbythejudge,inwritingandunderoathoraffirmation(4)
the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them and (5) the warrant
specificallydescribesthepersonandplacetobesearchedandthethingstobeseized.[19]
Onthefirstissue,thefailuretocorrectlystateinthesearchandseizurewarrantthefirstnameof
petitioner,whichisBernardandnotRomuloorRumolo,doesnotinvalidatethewarrantbecausethe
additional description alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnonsufficientlyenabledthepoliceofficerstolocateandidentifythepetitioner.Whatisprohibited
is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a
descriptiopersonaethatwillenabletheofficertoidentifytheaccusedwithoutdifficulty.[20]
Theprobablecauseforavalidsearchwarranthasbeendefinedassuchfactsandcircumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainantorthewitnesseshemayproduceandnotbasedonmerehearsay.[21]Indeterminingits
existence,theexaminingmagistratemustmakeaprobingandexhaustive,notmerelyroutineorpro
formaexaminationoftheapplicantandthewitnesses.[22]Probablecausemustbeshownbythebest
evidencethatcouldbeobtainedunderthecircumstances.Onthepartoftheapplicantandwitnesses,
the introduction of such evidence is necessary especially where the issue is the existence of a
negativeingredientoftheoffensecharged,e.g.,theabsenceofalicenserequiredbylaw.[23]On the
other hand, the judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavits but must make his own
extensive inquiry on the existence of such license, as well as on whether the applicant and the
witnesseshavepersonalknowledgethereof.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/153087.htm 2/7
3/2/2017 NalavsBarrosoJr:153087:August7,2003:J.YnaresSantiago:FirstDivision

InPaperIndustriesCorporationofthePhilippines(PICOP)v.Asuncion,[24]wedeclaredasvoidthe
searchwarrantissuedbythetrialcourtinconnectionwiththeoffenseofillegalpossessionoffirearms,
ammunitionsandexplosives,ontheground,interalia,offailuretoprovetherequisiteprobablecause.
The applicant and the witness presented for the issuance of the warrant were found to be without
personalknowledgeofthelackoflicensetopossessfirearmsofthemanagementofPICOPandits
securityagency.Theylikewisedidnottestifyastotheabsenceoflicenseandfailedtoattachtothe
applicationanolicensecertificationfromtheFirearmsandExplosivesOfficeofthePhilippineNational
Police.Thus
Bacolodappearedduringthehearingandwasextensivelyexaminedbythejudge.Buthistestimony
showedthathedidnothavepersonalknowledgethatthepetitioners,inviolationofPD1866,werenot
licensedtopossessfirearms,ammunitionsorexplosives
xxxxxxxxx
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security
guardshadnolicensetopossessthesubjectfirearms.This,however,doesnotmeettherequirement
thatawitnessmusttestifyonhispersonalknowledge,notbelief.
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was
licensed.Bacolodmerelydeclaredthatthesecurityagencyanditsguardswerenotlicensed.Healso
saidthatsomeofthefirearmswereownedbyPICOP.Yet,hemadenostatementbeforethetrialcourt
that PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the
applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the
aforementionednolicensecertificationfromtheFirearmsandExplosivesOffice(FEO)ofthePNP,or
topresentitduringthehearing.Suchcertificationcouldhavebeeneasilyobtained,consideringthat
theFEOwaslocatedinCampCramewheretheunitofBacolodwasalsobased.[25]
Inthecaseatbar,thesearchandseizurewarrantwasissuedinconnectionwiththeoffenseof
illegalpossessionoffirearms,theelementsofwhichare(1)theexistenceofthesubjectfirearmand
(2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to
possessthesame.[26]Probablecauseasappliedtoillegalpossessionoffirearmswouldthereforebe
suchfactsandcircumstanceswhichwouldleadareasonablydiscreetandprudentmantobelievethat
apersonisinpossessionofafirearmandthathedoesnothavethelicenseorpermittopossessthe
same.Nowhere,however,intheaffidavitandtestimonyofwitnessRuelNalagonnorinPO3Macrino
L.Alcosersapplicationfortheissuanceofasearchwarrantwasitmentionedthatpetitionerhadno
licensetopossessafirearm.WhileAlcosertestifiedbeforetherespondentjudgethatthefirearmsin
the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as personal knowledge but only
personalbeliefbecauseneitherhenorNalagonverified,muchmoresecured,acertificationfromthe
appropriategovernmentagencythatpetitionerwasnotlicensedtopossessafirearm.Thiscouldhave
been the best evidence obtainable to prove that petitioner had no license to possess firearms and
ammunitions,butthepoliceofficersfailedtopresentthesame.
Regrettably, even the examination conducted by the respondent judge on Nalagon and Alcoser
fell short of the required probing and exhaustive inquiry for the determination of the existence of
probablecause.Thus
COURT:[TowitnessRuelNalagon]
Q I am showing you this document/sworn statement of Ruel Nala[gon] given to PO3 Rodrigo Delfin,
Investigator, SCOT/PDEU Bukidnon Police Provincial Office, Camp Ramon Onahon, Malaybalay
Cityonorabout12:30intheafternoonofJune25,2001,inthepresenceofPO3MacrinoAlcoser,
Operative of Special Case Operation Team. Are you the same Ruel Nalagon who has given a
statementbeforetheabovenamedpoliceofficer?
AYes,Sir.
Q You have given a statement before the abovenamed police officer or Investigator that you have
personalknowledgethatacertainRomuloNalainPurok4,Poblacion,Kitaotao,Bukidnonhasinhis
possessiona.22magnumpistoland9MMpistol[?]Whyandhowdoyouknowthathehasinhis
possessionsuchpistols?
ABecauseIpersonallysawandwitnessedhimbringingorcarryingsaidpistols.
QWheredidyouseehimbringingorcarryingsaidpistols?
AIsawhimpersonallyinthepublicmarketofKitaotao,Bukidnon.Ialsowitnessedhimfiringsaidpistol
especiallywhenheisdrunk.
QHowoftendidyouseehimcarryingandfiringsaidpistols?
AManytimes.
QDoyouknowRomuloNala?Areyoufriendswithsaidperson?
AYes,sirbecauseweareneighborsinPurok4,Poblacion,Kitaotao,Bukidnon.
QThisRomuloNala,ishebringingthesetwo(2)pistolsatthesametime?
ANosir,heisbringingoftentimesthe.22magnumandIsawhimonlytwicebringing9MMpistol.
QDoyouhavesomethingmoretoaddorsayinthisinvestigation?
ANoneasofthismoment.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/153087.htm 3/7
3/2/2017 NalavsBarrosoJr:153087:August7,2003:J.YnaresSantiago:FirstDivision

Thatisall.[27]
COURT:
Nextwitness[PO3MacrinoL.Alcoser]
xxxxxxxxx
QRegardingthisapplicationfiledbyyouroffice,whatisyourbasisinarrivingintoaconclusionthatthis
certain Romulo Nala of Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon has in his possession illegal
firearms?
ABasedonthereportofourreliableasset,acivilianagentwhowasabletopersonallywitnessthisMr.
RomuloNalawhohasinhispossessionone(1).22magnumandone(1)9MMpistolswhichare
unlicensed.
QWhataction[was]commencedbyyourofficeifanyastothereportmadebyyourassetregardingthe
allegedpossessionofMr.RomuloNalaofunlicensedfirearms?
AOurofficerthroughauthorizedpersonnel,conductedsurveillanceoperationonthespot,headedbythis
affiant.
QWhatwastheresultofthesurveillanceconductedbyyouroffice?
ATheresultturnedouttobepositiveandwehave[concrete]evidencethatindeedthisRomuloNalais
engagedwiththeaboveillegalact.
QAretheremoreinformationyouwishtoinformthisCourt.
ANone,asofthemoment.
QDoyouaffirmthetruthfulnessoftheabovestatementmadebyyouand[willyou]voluntarilysignthe
same?
AYes,sir.
Thatisall.[28]
Itdidnotevenoccurtotheexaminingjudgetoclarifyhowdidthepoliceofficersconductanonthe
spot surveillance on June 25, 2001 on a 2hour interval between 12:30 p.m.,[29] when Nalagon
executedtheaffidavit,and2:30p.m.,[30]whenPO3MacrinoL.Alcosertestifiedbeforetherespondent
judgethattheyconductedsurveillanceoperationonthespotrightafterNalagonexecutedhisaffidavit.
Evenifweapplythepresumptionofregularityintheperformanceofduty,theonthespotsurveillance
claimed by Alcoser contradicts his statement in the application for the issuance of warrant that he
conducted long range surveillance of petitioner. At any rate, regardless of the nature of the
surveillanceandverificationoftheinformationcarriedoutbythepoliceofficers,thefactremainsthat
both the applicant, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser, and his witness Ruel Nalagon did not have personal
knowledgeofpetitionerslackoflicensetopossessfirearms,ammunitionsandexplosiveanddidnot
adducetheevidencerequiredtoprovetheexistenceofprobablecausethatpetitionerhadnolicense
to possess a firearm. Hence, the search and seizure warrant issued on the basis of the evidence
presentedisvoid.
Canpetitionerbechargedwithillegalpossessionoffirearmsandexplosiveallegedlyseizedfrom
his house? Petitioner contends that said articles are inadmissible as evidence against him because
theywerenotthesameitemsspecificallylistedinthewarrant.TheOfficeoftheProvincialProsecutor,
ontheotherhand,claimsthatpetitionershouldbeheldliablebecausetheitemsseizedbearadirect
relation to the offense of illegal possession of firearms. These arguments, however, become
immaterial in view of the nullity of the search warrant which made possible the seizure of the
questionedarticles.
The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by virtue of a
voidsearchwarrant,prohibitedarticlesseizedinthecourseofthesearchareinadmissibleagainstthe
accused. In Roan v. Gonzales,[31] the prosecution sought to charge the accused with illegal
possessionoffirearmsonthebasisoftheitemsseizedinasearchthroughawarrantwhichtheCourt
declaredasvoidforlackofprobablecause.Inrulingagainsttheadmissibilityoftheitemsseized,the
Courtsaid
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because:1)therewasnovalidsearchwarrantand2)absentsuchawarrant,therighttheretowas
notvalidlywaivedbythepetitioner.Inshort,themilitaryofficerswhoenteredthepetitionerspremises
hadnorighttobethereandthereforehadnorighteithertoseizethepistolandbullets.[32]
Conformably,thearticlesallegedlyseizedinthehouseofpetitionercannotbeusedasevidence
againsthimbecauseaccessthereinwasgainedbythepoliceofficerusingavoidsearchandseizure
warrant.Itisasiftheyenteredpetitionershousewithoutawarrant,makingtheirentrythereinillegal,
andtheitemsseized,inadmissible.
Moreover,itdoesnotfollowthatbecauseanoffenseismalumprohibitum,thesubjectthereofis
necessarilyillegalperse.Motiveisimmaterialinmalaprohibita,butthesubjectsofthiskindofoffense
may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A warrant is still necessary, [33]
becausepossessionofanyfirearmbecomesunlawfulonlyiftherequiredpermitorlicensethereforis
notfirstobtained.[34]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/153087.htm 4/7
3/2/2017 NalavsBarrosoJr:153087:August7,2003:J.YnaresSantiago:FirstDivision

Soalso,admissibilityoftheitemsseizedcannotbejustifiedundertheplainviewdoctrine.Itistrue
that,asanexception,thepoliceofficermayseizewithoutwarrantillegallypossessedfirearm,orany
contrabandforthatmatter,inadvertentlyfoundinplainview.However,saidofficermusthaveaprior
righttobeinthepositiontohavethatviewoftheobjectstobeseized.Theplainviewdoctrineapplies
whenthefollowingrequisitesconcur:(a)thelawenforcementofficerinsearchoftheevidencehasa
priorjustificationforanintrusionorisinapositionfromwhichhecanviewaparticulararea(b)the
discoveryoftheevidenceinplainviewisinadvertent(c)itisimmediatelyapparenttotheofficerthat
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
lawenforcementofficermustlawfullymakeaninitialintrusionorproperlybeinapositionfromwhich
hecanparticularlyviewthearea.Inthecourseofsuchlawfulintrusion,hecameinadvertentlyacross
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discoveryinadvertent.[35]
Nopresumptionofregularitymaybeinvokedinaidoftheprocesswhentheofficerundertakesto
justifyanencroachmentofrightssecuredbytheConstitution.Inthiscase,thefirearmsandexplosive
werefoundattherearportionofpetitionershouse[36]buttherecordsdonotshowhowexactlywere
theseitemsdiscovered.Clearly, therefore, the plain view doctrine finds no application here not only
becausethepoliceofficershadnojustificationtosearchthehouseofpetitioner(theirsearchwarrant
beingvoidforlackofprobablecause),butalsobecausesaidofficersfailedtodischargetheburdenof
provingthatsubjectarticleswereinadvertentlyfoundinpetitionershouse.
The issue of the reasonableness of the implementation of the search and seizure warrant, i.e.,
whetherthesearchwasconductedinthepresenceofwitnessesandwhethertheairriflewhichthe
trialcourtorderedtobereturnedtopetitionerwasindeedamongtheitemsseizedduringthesearch,
are matters that would be best determined in the pending administrative case for grave misconduct
andirregularityintheperformanceofdutyagainstthepoliceofficerswhoconductedthesearch.
Considering that the search and seizure warrant in this case was procured in violation of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the items seized in petitioners house, being fruits of the
poisonoustree,areinadmissibleforanypurposeinanyproceeding.Theexclusionoftheseunlawfully
seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[37] Hence, the complaints filed against petitioner for illegal
possessionoffirearmsandexplosivebasedonillegallyobtainedevidencehavenomorelegtostand
on.[38]Pendingresolutionofsaidcases,however,thearticlesseizedaretoremainincustodialegis.[39]
Finally,theCourtnotesthatamongtheitemsseizedbytheofficerswerefourpcs.ofdisposable
lighter and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu. These items are not
contraband per se, nor objects in connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms for
which the warrant was issued.Moreover, it is highly preposterous to assume that these items were
usedinconnectionwithoffensesinvolvingillegaldrugs.Evengrantingthattheywere,theywouldstill
be inadmissible against the petitioner for being products of an illegal search. Hence, the subject
articlesshouldbereturnedtopetitioner.[40]
WHEREFORE,inviewofalltheforegoing,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheOctober18,2001and
February15,2002OrdersoftheRegionalTrialCourtofMalaybalayCity,Branch10,areREVERSED
andSETASIDEinsofarasitdeniedpetitionersomnibusmotiontoquashthesearchwarrant.Search
and Seizure Warrant No. 3001 dated June 25, 2001 is declared VOID and the articles seized by
virtuethereofaredeclaredinadmissibleinevidence.PendingresolutionofCriminalCaseNos.10943
2001P and 109442001P for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosive against
petitioner,theitems(caliber.38revolverwithSerialNumber1125609and5piecesliveammunitions
fragmentationgrenadeand.22longbarrel)subjectthereof,mustremainincustodialegis. The four
piecesofdisposablelighterandcellophaneseizedshouldbereturnedtopetitioner.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),Vitug,Carpio,andAzcuna,JJ.,concur.

[1] People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 14054647, 20 January 2003, citing the Constitution, Article III, Section 2 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5. See also Pendon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84873, 16
November 1990, 191 SCRA 429, 438, citing Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA
687Matav.Bayona,G.R.No.L50720,26March1984,128SCRA388.
[2]PaperIndustriesCorporationofthePhilippinesv.Asuncion,366Phil.717,736737(1999),citingPeoplev.Estrada,357
Phil.377(1998).
[3]Rollo,p.91.

[4]Rollo,p.130.

[5]PennedbyJudgeJesusM.Barroso,Jr.

[6]Records,p.8.

[7]Records,p.6.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/153087.htm 5/7
3/2/2017 NalavsBarrosoJr:153087:August7,2003:J.YnaresSantiago:FirstDivision

[8] Spelled as Rumolo in the application for search and seizure warrant and spelled as Romulo in the issued search and
seizurewarrant.
[9]Records,p.1.

[10]Id.

[11]ReturnofSearchWarrantnotedatthebackofSearchandSeizureWarrantNo.3001,Records,p.6.

[12]Rollo,pp.161162.

[13]Rollo,p.46.

[14]Rollo,p.93.

[15]Rollo,p.130.

[16]Roanv.Gonzales,supra,note1,atp.698,citingBurgos,Sr.v.ChiefofStaff,218Phil.754(1984)PhilippineRural
ElectricCooperativesAssociation,Inc.v.SecretaryoftheDepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernment,G.R.No.
143076,10June2003.SeealsoFortichv.Corona,352Phil.461,480481(1998),citingPeoplev.Cuaresma,G.R.
No.67787,18April1989,172SCRA415.
[17] Coronel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 149022, 8 April 2003, citing People v. Flores, 336 Phil. 58 (1997) De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.103276,11April1996,256SCRA171ManilaRailroadCo.v.Atty.General,20Phil.523
(1911)ViudadeOrdovezav.Raymundo,63Phil.275(1936)Olacaov.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,G.R.
No.81390,29August1989,177SCRA38Legastov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.Nos.7685460,25April1989,172
SCRA722CityFairCorporationv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,313Phil.464(1995)Republicv.Court
ofAppeals,G.R.Nos.L3130304,31May1978,83SCRA453BankofAmerica,NT&SAv.Gerochi,Jr.,G.R.
No.73210,10February1994,230SCRA9.
[18] Silva v. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Negros, Oriental, Branch XXXIII, G.R. No. 81756, 21 October 1991,
203SCRA140,144,citingAlverov.Dizon,76Phil.637(1946).
[19]PaperIndustriesCorporationofthePhilippinesv.Asuncion,supra,note2atp.731,citingRepublicv.Sandiganbayan,
G.R.Nos.11270809,29March1996,255SCRA438.
[20]Peoplev.Veloso,48Phil.169,181(1925).

[21] Prudente v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, 14 December 1989, 180 SCRA 69, 76, citing Quintero v. National Bureau of
Investigation, G.R. No. L35149, 23 June 1988, 162 SCRA 467 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,G.R.Nos.L7664951,19August1988,164SCRA655Peoplev.SyJuco,64Phil.667(1937)Alvarezv.
CFI,64Phil.33(1937)UnitedStatesv.Addison,28Phil.566(1914).
[22]Peoplev.Tee,supra,note1Pendonv.CourtofAppeals,supra,note1.

[23]PaperIndustriesCorporationofthePhilippinesv.Asuncion,supra,note2.

[24]Id.

[25]Id.,atpp.733736.

[26]Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, 31 May 2001, 358 SCRA 373, 389, citing People v. Castillo, 382 Phil. 499
(2000) People v. Dorimon, 378 Phil. 660 (1999) People v. Cerveto, 374 Phil. 220 (1999) Cadua v. Court of
Appeals,371Phil.627(1999)Peoplev.Khor,366Phil.762(1999).
[27]Records,pp.45.

[28]Records,pp.5and5a.

[29]Records,p.2.

[30]Records,p.4.

[31]Supra,note1.

[32]Id.,atpp.696697.

[33]Id.,at697.

[34]DelRosariov.People,supra,note27.

[35]Peoplev.Doria,361Phil.595,633634(1999),citingHarrisv.UnitedStates,390U.S.234,19L.Ed.2d1067,1069
(1968)Bernas,TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,at174(1996)Coolidgev.NewHampshire,403
U.S.443,29L.Ed.2d564(1971)Texasv.Brown,460U.S.730,75L.Ed.2d502,510[1983]Peoplev.Musa,
G.R. No. 96177, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 597, 611 (1993) Roan v. Gonzales, supra, note 1 Cruz,
ConstitutionalLaw,p.151(1996).
[36]Petition,Rollo,pp.3031.

[37]PaperIndustriesCorporationofthePhilippinesv.Asuncion,supra,note2atp.740,citingTheConstitution,ArticleIII,
Section2Stonehillv.Diokno,126Phil.738(1967)Mappv.Ohio,367US643(1961).
[38]Id.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/153087.htm 6/7
3/2/2017 NalavsBarrosoJr:153087:August7,2003:J.YnaresSantiago:FirstDivision

[39]Roanv.Gonzales,supra,note1atp.698.

[40]DelRosariov.People,supra,note27,atpp.394395.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/153087.htm 7/7