10/1/2016 G.R.No.

112182

TodayisSaturday,October01,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

THIRDDIVISION

G.R.No.112182December12,1994

BRICKTOWNDEVELOPMENTCORP.(itsnewcorporatenameMULTINATIONALREALTYDEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION)andMARIANOZ.VERALDE,petitioners,
vs.
AMORTIERRADEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONandtheHON.COURTOFAPPEALS,respondents.

Tabaquero,DelaTorre,Simando&Associatesforpetitioners.

Robles,Ricafrente&AguirreLawFirmforprivaterespondent.

VITUG,J.:

Acontract,onceperfected,hastheforceoflawbetweenthepartieswithwhichtheyareboundtocomplyingood
faithandfromwhichneitheronemayrenegewithouttheconsentoftheother.Theautonomyofcontractsallows
thepartiestoestablishsuchstipulations,clauses,termsandconditionsastheymaydeemappropriateprovided
onlythattheyarenotcontrarytolaw,morals,goodcustoms,publicorderorpublicpolicy.Thestandardnormin
theperformanceoftheirrespectivecovenantsinthecontract,aswellasintheexerciseoftheirrightsthereunder,
is expressed in the cardinal principle that the parties in that juridical relation must act with justice, honesty and
goodfaith.

Thesebasictenets,onceagain,taketheleadintheinstantcontroversy.

Privaterespondentremindsusthatthefactualfindingsofthetrialcourt,sustainedbytheCourtofAppeals,should
beconsideredbindingonthisCourtinthispetition.Weconcedetothisremindersince,indeed,thereappearsto
be no valid justification in the case at bench for us to take an exception from the rule. We shall, therefore,
momentarilyparaphrasethesefindings.

On 31 March 1981, Bricktown Development Corporation (herein petitioner corporation), represented by its
President and copetitioner Mariano Z. Velarde, executed two Contracts to Sell (Exhs. "A" and "B") in favor of
Amor Tierra Development Corporation (herein private respondent), represented in these acts by its Vice
President,MoisesG.Petilla,coveringatotalof96residentiallots,situatedattheMultinationalVillageSubdivision,
La Huerta, Paraaque, Metro Manila, with an aggregate area of 82,888 square meters. The total price of
P21,639,875.00wasstipulatedtobepaidbyprivaterespondentinsuchamountsandmaturitydates,asfollows:
P2,200,000.00on31March1981P3,209,968.75on30June1981P4,729,906.25on31December1981and
the balance of P11,500,000.00 to be paid by means of an assumption by private respondent of petitioner
corporation's mortgage liability to the Philippine Savings Bank or, alternatively, to be made payable in cash. On
even date, 31 March 1981, the parties executed a Supplemental Agreement (Exh. "C"), providing that private
respondent would additionally pay to petitioner corporation the amounts of P55,364.68, or 21% interest on the
balanceofdownpaymentfortheperiodfrom31Marchto30June1981,andofP390,369.37representinginterest
paid by petitioner corporation to the Philippine Savings Bank in updating the bank loan for the period from 01
Februaryto31March1981.

PrivaterespondentwasonlyabletopaypetitionercorporationthesumofP1,334,443.21(Exhs."A"to"K").Inthe
meanwhile,however,thepartiescontinuedtonegotiateforapossiblemodificationoftheiragreement,although
nothingconclusivewouldappeartohaveultimatelybeenarrivedat.

Finally,on12October1981,petitionercorporation,throughitslegalcounsel,sentprivaterespondenta"Noticeof
CancellationofContract"(Exh."D")onaccountofthelatter'scontinuedfailuretopaytheinstallmentdue30June

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1981 and the interest on the unpaid balance of the stipulated initial payment. Petitioner corporation advised
private respondent, however, that it (private respondent) still had the right to pay its arrearages within 30 days
fromreceiptofthenotice"otherwisetheactualcancellationofthecontract(would)takeplace."

Severalmonthslater,oron26September1983,privaterespondent,throughcounsel,demanded(Exh."E")the
refund of private respondent's various payments to petitioner corporation, allegedly "amounting to
P2,455,497.71,"withinterestwithinfifteendaysfromreceiptofsaidletter,or,inlieuofacashpayment,toassign
toprivaterespondentanequivalentnumberofunencumberedlotsatthesamepricefixedinthecontracts.The
demand, not having been heeded, private respondent commenced, on 18 November 1983, its action with the
courtaquo.1

Followingthereceptionofevidence,thetrialcourtrendereditsdecision,thedispositiveportionofwhichread:

Inviewofalltheforegoing,judgmentisherebyrenderedasfollows:

1. Declaring the Contracts to Sell and the Supplemental Agreement (Exhibits "A", "B" and "C")
rescinded

2. Ordering the [petitioner] corporation, Bricktown Development Corporation, also known as

3. Ordering the [petitioner] corporation to pay the [private respondent] the amount of Twentyfive
Thousand(P25,000.00)Pesos,representingattorney'sfees

4.Dismissing[petitioner's]counterclaimforlackofmeritand

5.Withcostsagainstthe[petitioner]corporation.

SOORDERED.2

Onappeal,theappellatecourtaffirmedintotothetrialcourt'sfindingsandjudgment.

Intheirinstantpetition,petitionerscontendthattheCourtofAppealshaserredinrulingthat

(1) By petitioners' acts, conduct and representation, they themselves delayed or prevented the
performanceofthecontractstosellandthesupplementalagreementandwerethusestoppedfrom
cancellingthesame.

(2)Petitionerswerenojustifiedinresolvingthecontractstosellandthesupplementalagreement.

(3) The cancellation of the contract required a positive act on the part of petitioners giving private
respondentthesixty(60)daygraceperiodprovidedinthecontractstoselland

(4) In not holding that the forfeiture of the P1,378,197.48 was warranted under the liquidated
damagesprovisionsofthecontractstosellandthesupplementalagreementandwasnotiniquitous
norunconscionable.

The core issues would really come down to (a) whether or not the contracts to sell were validly rescinded or
cancelled by petitioner corporation and, in the affirmative, (b) whether or not the amounts already remitted by
privaterespondentundersaidcontractswererightlyforfeitedbypetitionercorporation.

Admittedly, the terms of payment agreed upon by the parties were not met by private respondent. Of a total
sellingpriceofP21,639,875.00,privaterespondentwasonlyabletoremitthesumofP1,334,443.21whichwas
evenshortofthestipulatedinitialpaymentofP2,200,000.00.Noadditionalpayments,itwouldseem,weremade.
Anoticeofcancellationwasultimatelymademonthsafterthelapseofthecontractedgraceperiod.Paragraph15
oftheContractstoSellprovidedthusly:

15.ShouldthePURCHASERfailtopaywhendueanyoftheinstallmentsmentionedinstipulationNo.
1above,theOWNERshallgrantthepurchaserasixty(60)daygraceperiodwithinwhichtopaythe
amount/sdue,andshouldthePURCHASERstillfailtopaythedueamount/swithinthe60daygrace
period, the PURCHASER shall have the right to exparte cancel or rescind this contract, provided,
however,thattheactualcancellationorrescissionshalltakeeffectonlyafterthelapseofthirty(30)
daysfromthedateofreceiptbythePURCHASERofthenoticeofcancellationofthiscontractorthe
demandforitsrescissionbyanotarialact,andthereafter,theOWNERshallhavetherighttoresell
the lot/s subject hereof to another buyer and all payments made, together with all improvements
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introduced on the aforementioned lot/s shall be forfeited in favor of the OWNER as liquidated
damages,andinthisconnection,thePURCHASERobligatesitselftopeacefullyvacatetheaforesaid
lot/swithoutnecessityofnoticeordemandbytheOWNER.3

Agraceperiodisaright,notanobligation,ofthedebtor.Whenunconditionallyconferred,suchasinthiscase,
thegraceperiodiseffectivewithoutfurtherneedofdemandeithercallingforthepaymentoftheobligationorfor
honoringtheright.Thegraceperiodmustnotbelikenedtoanobligation,thenonpaymentofwhich,underArticle
1169oftheCivilCode,wouldgenerallystillrequirejudicialorextrajudicialdemandbefore"default"canbesaidto
arise.4

Verily,inthecaseatbench,thesixtydaygraceperiodunderthetermsofthecontractstosellbecameipsofacto
operative from the moment the due payments were not met at their stated maturities. On this score, the
provisionsofArticle1169oftheCivilCodewouldfindnorelevancewhatsoever.

The cancellation of the contracts to sell by petitioner corporation accords with the contractual covenants of the
parties,andsuchcancellationmustberespected.Itmaybenoteworthytoaddthatinacontracttosell,the
nonpaymentofthepurchaseprice(whichisnormallytheconditionforthefinalsale)canpreventtheobligationto
convey title from acquiring any obligatory force (Roque vs. Lapuz, 96 SCRA 741Agustin vs. Court ofAppeals,
186SCRA375).

The forfeiture of the payments thus far remitted under the cancelled contracts in question, given the factual
findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, must be viewed differently. While clearly insufficient to
justifyaforeclosureoftherightofpetitionercorporationtorescindorcancelitscontractswithprivaterespondent,
the series of events and circumstances described by said courts to have prevailed in the interim between the
parties,however,warrantsomefavorableconsiderationbythisCourt.

Petitionersdonotdenythefactthattherehasindeedbeenaconstantdialoguebetweenthepartiesduringthe
periodoftheirjuridicalrelation.Concededly,thenegotiationsthattheyhavepursuedstrictlydidnotresultinthe
novation,eitherextinctiveormodificatory,ofthecontractstosellnevertheless,thisCourtisunabletocompletely
disregardthefollowingfindingsofboththetrialcourtandtheappellatecourt.Saidthetrialcourt:

It has been duly established through the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses Marcosa Sanchez and
Vicente Casas that there were negotiations to enter into another agreement between the parties,
afterMarch31,1981.ThefirstnegotiationtookplacebeforeJune30,1981,whenMoisesPetillaand
RenatoDragon,VicePresidentandpresident,respectively,oftheplaintiffcorporation,togetherwith
MarcosaSanchez,wenttotheofficeofthedefendantcorporationandmadesomeproposalstothe
latter, thru its president, the defendant Mariano Velarde. They told the defendant Velarde of the
plaintiff'srequestforthedivisionofthelotstobepurchasedintosmallerlotsandthebuildingoftown
housesorsmallerhousesthereinasthesekindsofhousescanbesoldeasilythanbigones.Velarde
replied that subdivision owners would not consent to the building of small houses. He, however,
made two counterproposals, to wit: that the defendant corporation would assign to the plaintiff a
number of lots corresponding to the amounts the latter had already paid, or that the defendant
corporationmaysellthecorporationitself,togetherwiththeMultinationalVillageSubdivision,andits
otherproperties,totheplaintiffandthelatter'ssistercompaniesengagedintherealestatebusiness.
Thenegotiationsbetweenthepartieswentonforsometimebutnothingdefinitewasaccomplished.5

Foritspart,theCourtofAppealsobserved:

Weagreewiththecourtaquothatthereis,therefore,reasonablegroundtobelievethatbecauseof
the negotiations between the parties, coupled with the fact that the plaintiff never took actual
possession of the properties and the defendants did not also dispose of the same during the
pendency of said negotiations, the plaintiff was led to believe that the parties may ultimately enter
intoanotheragreementinplaceofthe"contractstosell."Therewas,evidently,nomaliceorbadfaith
on the part of the plaintiff in suspending payments. On the contrary, the defendants not only
contributed,buthadconsentedtothedelayorsuspensionofpayments.Theydidnotgivetheplaintiff
acategoricalanswerthattheircounterproposalswillnotmaterialize.6

Infine,whilewemustconcludethatpetitionercorporationstillactedwithinitslegalrighttodeclarethecontractsto
sellrescindedorcancelled,considering,nevertheless,thepeculiarcircumstancesfoundtobeextantbythetrial
court, confirmed by the Court of Appeals, it would be unconscionable, in our view, to likewise sanction the
forfeiture by petitioner corporation of payments made to it by private respondent. Indeed, in the opening
statementofthisponencia,wehaveintimatedthattherelationshipbetweenpartiesinanycontractmustalways
becharacterizedandpunctuatedbygoodfaithandfairdealing.Judgingfromwhatthecourtsbelowhavesaid,
petitionersdidfallwellbehindthatstandard.Wedonotfinditequitable,however,toadjudgeanyinterestpayment
bypetitionersontheamounttobethusrefunded,computedfromjudicialdemand,for,indeed,privaterespondent
shouldnotbeallowedtototallyfreeitselffromitsownbreach.

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WHEREFORE,theappealeddecisionisAFFIRMEDinsofarasitdeclaresvalidthecancellationofthecontractsin
questionbutMODIFIEDbyorderingtherefundbypetitionercorporationofP1,334,443.21with12%interest per
annumtocommenceonly,however,fromthedateoffinalityofthisdecisionuntilsuchrefundiseffected.Nocosts.

SOORDERED.

Bidin,RomeroandMelo,JJ.,concur.

Feliciano,J.,isonleave.

#Footnotes

1Rollo,pp.3941.

2Rollo,p.41.

3Rollo,p.82.

4Art.1169.Thoseobligedtodeliverortodosomethingincurindelayfromthetimetheobligee
judiciallyorextrajudiciallydemandsfromthemthefulfillmentoftheirobligation.

However,thedemandbythecreditorshallnotbenecessaryinorderthatdelaymayexist:

(1)Whentheobligationorthelawexpresslysodeclaresor

(2)Whenfromthenatureandthecircumstancesoftheobligationitappearsthatthedesignationof
thetimewhenthethingistobedeliveredortheserviceistoberenderedwasacontrollingmotivefor
theestablishmentofthecontractor

(3)Whendemandwouldbeuseless,aswhentheobligorhasrendereditbeyondhispowerto
perform.

Inreciprocalobligations,neitherpartyincursindelayiftheotherdoesnotcomplyorisnotreadyto
complyinapropermannerwithwhatisincumbentuponhim.Fromthemomentoneoftheparties
fulfillshisobligation,delaybytheotherbegins.

5Rollo,pp.4344.

6Rollo,p.44.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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