INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS IN

BALOCHISTAN CONFLICT
Abdul Rauf Iqbal
Abstract
Five times since independence of Pakistan, Balochistan
has caught with insurgency by nationalist forces. Some
Balochs are demanding autonomy and some are raising
slogans of independence. The province is in turmoil and
dissenter elements are targeting non Baloch population
along with governmental installations. The insurgents
appear expert in military tactics as well as appear to be
heavily armed. An insurgency of this magnitude cannot be
continued without assistance of internal and external actors.
This essay tends to explore internal and external actors in
Balochistan crises.
Introduction
Balochistan, after an uneasy peace of almost three decades,
is constantly witnessing the violent insurgency. The province
has been in turmoil for the past several years and has
conventionally been a difficult province to govern and the
province seems to be on the brink as the simmering
insurgency has escalated.1 Target killing, bomb blasts, attacks
on law enforcement agencies (LEAs), acts of sabotage and
kidnapping have become routine matter. Complaints relate to
self rule, ownership of resources, political participation and
control over the economy.2 Baloch insurgents are firing
rockets, exploding bombs and even targeting common masses.

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Five times since independence of Pakistan, Balochistan has

caught with insurgency by the dissident Baloch, demanding
greater autonomy or even an independent state, which would
reunite the Baloch population of Pakistan, Iran and
Afghanistan under one flag.3
The central government has always used ham handed
approach to curb Balochistan situation while setting aside the
fact that use of force always grants most awful implications
and in some cases it also paves the way of disintegration. The
successor rulers of Pakistan have ignored the rights of
different communities and regions, and the worst example of
such discrimination is Balochistan. Although rich in mineral
resources, yet the province is suffering lots of problems and
the common Balochs are living in very shabby and poor
conditions. The Baloch, who are by nature nationalist, started
a political movement against this discrimination. But, with the
passage of time, hatred emerged against central government
and it changed their demands and methods. Most of political
and nationalist parties, which earlier were demanding
provincial autonomy, are now raising the slogans of total
independence. Nationalist turned militants started an
insurgency by targeting non Baloch civilian population along
with attacking governmental installations. Media has reported
many times that there is foreign involvement in deteriorating
Balochistan situation, but no concrete steps have been taken
so far. Balochistan has been simmering for years now, and it
seems that successive governments lack of action and apathy

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has pushed the situation to the tipping point.4 Pakistani flags

are being taken down, schools are being threatened against
singing the national anthem and non Baloch residents are
scared for their lives. Walls of Quetta are full with anti state
slogans and militants are attacking LEAs. In the wake of such
bitter situation, the central government has to consider the
seriousness of the issue and should take bold political,
economic and social policy measures instead of only
employing force. In this premise, this essay explores the major
fault lines which are directly or indirectly surfacing violence in
Balochistan. The paper also highlights both internal and
external factors behind these fault lines along with suggesting
some suitable policy measures.
Literature Review
Scholars interpret current violent protest mobilization by
applying different academic explanations. Alok Bansal
considers the Baloch movement as a result of perceived
Punjabi hegemony.5 Adeel Khan argues that Baloch
nationalism results from the struggle for power between the
Pakistani state and the Baloch people.6 Robert G. Wirsing
concludes the context of todays Baloch insurgency in terms of
energy resource developments.7 Frederic Grare relates the
uprising to revival of nationalistic sentiments whereas Mir
Ghaus Bizenjo attributes the current violent outburst as an
outcome of military operations of 1973.8 Feyyaz defines the
insurgency as greed phenomena9 while Surendra discusses it
in terms of opportunity based motives.10 Notwithstanding

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significance of other scholarly explanations, this paper

discusses the internal factors which have given space to the
external actors.
Historical Background
Balochistan, the largest province of the country, is sparsely
populated. With an area of 347190 kilometres, it covers 43.6
percent of the total area of Pakistan. Extraordinary verities of
climate can be witnessed in different parts of the province.11
According to 1998 census, its population was 6.51 million, but
now, the estimated population is 7.914 million with 76.1
percent rural population12. Strategically important
Balochistan covers nearly the countrys entire coast 756
kilometres of coastline.13 Balochistan is blessed with gold,
copper, coal, natural gas, oil and other mineral resources and
also possess underdeveloped coastline with an abundance of
ocean resources.14 It has also been proposed as a transit site
for the natural gas pipelines that would carry gas from either
Iran or Turkmenistan to Pakistan and from there, potentially,
to India.15 Despite of all these natural resources, the province
is still less industrialized and underdeveloped. Its social
system revolves around the traditional tribal system in which
Nawabs and Sardars enjoy autocratic powers. Theoretically
speaking, the province is Pakistani rule, but in reality the real
power resides in the hands of local tribal leaders, who most
often have their own laws, armies, and jails. Therefore, one
can blame central government for marginalizing Balochistan,
but equal responsibility lies with the Sardars who enjoy

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immense powers in their tribes, and in central and provincial

governments. The ethnic composition of Balochistan is mixed,
with 45% Baloch, about 38% Pashtun, and 17% of the
population composed of other ethnic groups. Earlier to the
partition of British India in 1947, the region was divided into
four major states: Makran, Kharan, Lasbela, and Kalat.16
Resurgence of Uprising
The present wave of violent uprising has been surfaced
after an interval of almost three decades. Fuelled by a long list
of grievances, it has long faced acute discrimination and
neglect at the hands of the central government.17 Among the
grievances is the perceived exploitation of gas and mineral
resources by the central government, development of mega
projects and military presence within the province.
So far the province has witnessed five insurgencies during
1948, 1958, 1962, 1973-77 and 2002 to date.18 The current
Baloch-Islamabad conflict started during the efforts of
developing Balochistan. The Gwadar port proved as a bone of
contention between the Islamabad and the Baloch
nationalists. This upsurge intensified in March 2005 when the
then president General Pervez Musharraf declared an all-out
war on Balochistan.19 In the wake of these developments, chief
of the Bugti tribe, Nawab Akbar Bugti along with other
tribesmen led an insurgent movement against the central
government. Nawab Akbar, ex Chief Minister and ex Governor
of Balochistan, was killed on 26 August 2006 in a military
operation. Afterward, Nawabzada Balach Marri, leader of the

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banned Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), was killed in an

ambush while crossing Afghanistan to Pakistan in November
2007.
The Balochistan crises took a new shape in early 2009
when UNHCR representative, John Solecki was abducted
from Quetta. Soon after, three Baloch nationalist leaders were
found brutally murdered in Turbat in April 2009. Afterward, a
new wave of violence touched urban areas of province. The
insurgents started attacking developmental activities and
hatred against non Baloch residents of province took the
shape of target killings. This violent situation of target killing
has taken lives of more than 200 civilians in the first half of
2009.20 Academicians are also being targeted and so far six
academicians have become victims of target killings during
the last couple of months. Besides targeting non Baloch
population, some religious extremists are also spreading
sectarian violence through target killing. The former Capital
City Police Officer (CCPO) of Quetta has alleged Lashkir-i-
Jhangvi for sectarian target killings.21 Brutal abduction and
target killings have become a routine matter and former
Senator Habib Jalib Baloch, secretary general of Balochistan
National Party (BNP), has also lost his life in July 2010,
sparking violent protests in different parts of the volatile
province.22 According to a former Senator, Sanaullah Baloch,
systematic and slow motion genocide is taking place in the
province.23

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Violence has become a routine matter in Balochistan.

Various groups of dissident Balochs are fighting guerrilla war
against the state. Numerous groups have been surfaced in the
province which claim for the attacks and blasts on the LEAs
and the common masses. Among these groups, the
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is supposed to be the
main force behind present crises in Balochistan. The name
BLA first became public in summer 2000, after the
organization claimed credit for a series of bomb attacks in
markets and railways lines.24 Ex Chief Minister of Balochistan
Jam Muhammad Yousaf formally accepted the existence of
BLA after the bomb blast in Quetta in December 2004.25
Previously it was allegedly headed by late Nawabzada Balaach
Marri, but now it is alleged that Nawab Brahamdagh Khan
Bugti is heading it while Marri and Bugti tribesmen are
believed to comprise its backbone.
Causes of Insurgency
The government of Pakistan attributes the ongoing wave of
violence in Balochistan to the trepidation of the areas feudal
lords; mega developmental projects would expose the
submissive local population to the outside world and would
weaken their hold on them. It is also alleged that the political
elites contrive to capture rents from the extraction of gold,
minerals, and other developmental projects by seceding the
province from Pakistan and establishing hegemony in the
province. However, a careful analysis of the history of the
conflict reveals that ethnicity, intertwined with a sense of

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political isolation and relative economic deprivation, has been

a potent force in inducing the Baloch mobilization.26 This
feeling of deprivation is more intense amongst the Baloch as
compared to any other ethnic group in Pakistan for various
historical and economic reasons. In this premise, some major
internal and external factors are appended below:
Economic Development and Resource Exploitation
The Balochistan province in general provides an excellent
example of poor governance in almost every sphere of life. The
years of internal unrest and ill-conceived development policies
and priorities on the part of the federal and provincial
governments have resulted in backwardness of the province.
According to the Balochistan Economic Report, Balochistan
has the weakest long-term growth performance of all
provinces in the country. From 19723 to 20056 the
provinces economy grew by 2.7 times in Balochistan, 3.6
times in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and Sindh, and 4 times
in Punjab.27 At present, 90% of the Baloch towns and villages
are underdeveloped, where people are living in absolute
poverty and experience the worst possible inequality.
Balochistan also scores lowest in the 10 key indicators for
health, water, and sanitation, and education for 20078.28
The province has a maternal mortality rate as high as 600 per
100,000, compared to Pakistans overall maternal mortality
rate of 350 per 100,000. Balochistan also has the lowest
literacy rate. Seventy-six percent of primary schools in the
province are without shelter, and 60% of primary schools have

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only one untrained and unqualified teacher.29 The systematic

denial of basic education and education-related facilities to
the lower classes of Balochistan has caused anger and
frustration among the Baloch youth.30 Due to a lack of basic
facilities and infrastructure, the Balochistan province
contributes just one-fifth to the national mining GDP and
leads only in the production of coal. At present, 70% of the
population of the province lives without gas facilities, 78%
without electricity, and 62% without safe drinking water.
Gwadar Deep Sea Port
During the last decade the government of Pakistan started
developing a deep sea port at the coastal town of Gwadar on
the Arabian Sea with Chinese collaboration. Development of
the Gwadar district will provide a port, a warehousing facility,
and industry to more than 20 countries. Its completion is
expected in 2011, when the port will be able to receive oil
tankers of over 200,000 tones.31 Along with an associated
industrial development and free-trade zone, Gwadar will be
linked to Central Asia by a road and rail network which is
currently under construction. China has also discussed with
Pakistan the possibility of building an oil refinery of 60,000
barrels per day at the Gwadar port. The development of the
Gwadar port has opened the possibility of an emerging free
port in Balochistan, which is expected to create a massive
economic windfall for the province.
The Baloch nationalists allege that the contract between
the government of Pakistan and the Chinese company for the

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development of the port is classic evidence of misuse of Baloch

wealth. Islamabad and the Chinese company are taking 50%
and 48%, respectively, leaving only 2% profit for the
Balochistan province. Additionally, all construction contracts
for developing the basic infrastructure have been made with
non-Baloch firms. Consequently, the majority of the technical
positions on the port were filled largely by Punjabis and other
non-Baloch workers. In this regard no effort has been made by
the central government to train the local population for jobs at
the Gwadar port. The Baloch also fear that once the
governments plans for the port are complete, the population
of Gwadar and the surrounding districts is expected to rise
from 70,000 to approximately two million, overwhelmingly
transforming the ethnic makeup of the region as more and
more Punjabis, Sindhis, and other workers will move into the
area. The anger of Baloch nationalists has sometimes been
directed against China. A number of Chinese nationals have
been the target of violent attacks in the province during the
last eight years, some of which resulted in fatalities.
In essence, the following have worsened the situation in
the province: displacement of a large number of poor Baloch
by the construction of the Gwadar deep sea port without
adequate compensation from the government; the lack of
preference to the sons of the soil for work in the
developmental projects; violation of the labour rights of the
people employed by the Chinese construction company that is
building the port; and the setting up of three new

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cantonments by the army in Balochistan.32 Baloch nationalist

leaders insist that they are not opposed to development but
are against the exploitation of natural resources that do not
benefit the local communities. They also insist that the
province, not the Sardars or the centre, should be the main
beneficiary of the income from Balochistans natural gas and
oil reserves and other mineral resources.
The federal government of Pakistan, however, blames the
current unrest in Balochistan on vested tribal and political
interests aimed at creating instability and drawing benefits. It
asserts that the Baloch nationalist Sardars and the tiny middle
class of the province want to gain maximum economic
benefits from the development projects, instead of losing all
benefits to investors from other parts of Pakistan. Moreover,
Balochis are fragmented by tribal loyalties and it cannot be
assumed that they will function as a coherent identity, even if
they acquire greater autonomy in controlling the resource
base.
The Baloch in Gwadar fear that they will become a
minority in their own land. The Sardars follow the contention
that these projects will change the demography of the
province33. When Gwadar port will become full fledge
functional, it will raise the population of Gwadar and it is
likely to hasten the arrival of two million people34. The Baloch
are convinced that the majority will be of non Balochs and
hence they will become a minority.

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The Political Situation

The weak political government in Balochistan is unable to
establish writ over the province due to friction between
various parties included in the coalition government. The
nationalists have been left out of the power game after
boycotting the 2008 elections and worried about their future
in politics. Hence, they are trying to portray certain issues as
anti Baloch, mainly to gather public support. Absence of
mature and enterprising local media also helps these
nationalist forces to increase frustration and exploitation in
the common masses. Moreover, absence of genuine federalism
and the lack of any worthwhile decision making powers with
the provincial government have also accentuated the
alienation of the population.
External Factors
History reveals that an insurgency of this magnitude
cannot be continued long without foreign assistance. Pakistani
media has time and again reported of foreign involvement in
the insurgency. Many of the Pakistani media reports have
mainly accused India and Iran of being behind the violence.
The reports are based on the fact that the two countries do not
want Gwadar to emerge as a rival to Chabahar port, which the
Indians are developing in Iran as a gateway to Central Asia.
However, most of the Indian writers deny these facts and
argue that Iran with a substantial Baloch population is
unlikely to stroke Baloch nationalism. They also highlight that
India does not have a rationale to support an insurgency in

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Balochistan at a time when the relations with Pakistan are

moving forward and such a support would undermine Indias
interest in the gas pipeline project from Iran to India.
Contrary to Indian involvement, they allegedly overemphasize
US as the only country with a capability and reach to
influence local politics35. One can question the share of India,
Iran, Afghanistan, the US and Russia but, the fact is that all
these foreign actors are behind the ongoing violence in
Balochistan.
In fact, some of the regional countries have developed
interest in Balochistan due to changing geopolitical and geo-
economics environments. And a new dirty game of geopolitics
has started in Balochistan. To understand the recent wave of
violence in Balochistan, one must understand the vested
interests of the foreign actors. The root cause of violence in
Balochistan is not internal poverty or lack of development but
the covert operations of foreign intelligence agencies36.
Internal issues might act as catalysts to inflame the situation
but the root cause is foreign interference in internal affairs of
Balochistan. Covert operations by CIA and RAW in
Balochistan began in January 2002 and the interior province
was badly subverted in three years. Necessary infrastructure
put in place in the form of contacts, 58 training camps,
provision of all sorts of arms and ammunition, sophisticated
communication system and huge funds37.

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Recommendations
Present crises can be settled through dialogue based an
open mind and heart. There must be a surety that the policy
measures will be enforced honestly and completely so that
lack of distrust may be removed.
For Internal Issues
Although some Balochs are waging armed struggle,
yet some regional parties still seek provincial
autonomy. They give little support for secession but
militant sentiments could grow if Islamabad does
not reverse its policies of exploitation of natural
resources, construction of military garrisons and
centrally controlled economic projects, such as the
Gwadar deep sea port. These policies do not benefit
locals but raise fears that the resulting influx of
economic migrants could make the Baloch a
minority in their homeland.
The unemployment in Balochistan has taken a very
horrible shape and it must be coped immediately
and effectively. The federal government should treat
Balochistan as 95% instead of 5% for some time. It
is suggested that five hundred to one thousand
Baloch youths selected on merit basis may be
recruited and posted in Islamabad and Lahore. Such
a step will ensure the participation of the Balochs in
federation and Punjab. Due to this step, their

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relatives and friends will visit them and their

exposure will open up the gates for Baloch youth.
All federal departments may be directed to provide
acute representation to Baloch youth immediately.
The Baloch population must be given a huge
representation in Gwadar project through jobs.
Total reliance on mega projects is not the solution.
Instead of it, due attention must be paid to resolving
day to day concerns of people such as their need for
employment, a decent wage, facilities of safe
movement, satisfaction of basic needs and
guarantees of security of life and due protection of
law.
Employment in province is totally dependent on
public sector and it is impossible to adjust everyone
in government sector. The province is blessed with
numerous mineral resources but scarcely any work
has been done to use them, which can house huge
masses. Hence, immediate and proper attention
must be paid to create employment in these areas.
A special emergency cell for education may be
established at Federal and Provincial level for
ensuring quality education. Also, there is no worth
mentioning degree college in the province.
Therefore, attention must be paid to degree level

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education by establishing federal colleges at Tehsil

level ensuring qualified faculty and full monitoring.
The very important areas of Sibi and Naseerabad
Divisions, which are abode of famous Baloch tribes
Marri and Bugti, and are at present the hub of
tribalism, have no college and university. This area
is breeding violence against the federal government
and only education can stop the youth of these area
to not to go to violence. Therefore, it is need of time
to establish their cadet colleges, degree colleges and
a university.
Mega projects are important for economic
development but the central government should
also accommodate the provincial demands.
Whatever step is taken, it must be strictly in
accordance with the wishes and priorities of the
local people that are ultimate prospective
beneficiaries.
Successive government used to deviate from their
mandate and instead of imparting the civil rights;
they brutally use force to curb the Baloch demands.
Hence, there is a need for partnership between the
civil society and the media to grow pressure on
rulers not to depart from their mandate and also to
act as counter pressure to those external forces who
try to influence the government policies.

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Negotiation and Reconciliation can be used as

guiding principles for ending the problems of the
Baloch. There must be created a conducive
environment for reconciliation and after creating an
enabling environment, efforts should be made to
restore the confidence of the people and then we
can negotiate with the local people.
Balochistan is now facing intensive law and order
situations as well as sectarian violence. Its causes
may be located and very effective system may be
adopted to improve this grave situation.
Majority of the feudal chiefs of Pakistan have
damaged the interests of Pakistan. Generally, they
have shown little commitment or sense of
nationalism with their homeland. For the said
reason, Pakistan needs to immediately abolish the
Sardari System in the province. The government
should also register cases against terrorist tribal
leaders. They should be charged for murdering the
poor Pakistani citizens.
Balochistans political system led by feudal
politicians has been failed and the issue of
Balochistan is part of this wider problem. This
system needs to be changed and new system should
focus on economic development and providing
opportunities to the Baloch citizens.

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Pakistani politics should be localized to prevent the

destabilization of state. Hence ethnic based
provinces need to be abolished.
Imparting democracy to Balochistan, which remains
an alien concept there, is the only way forward that
can liberate the common masses of the province
from their economic miseries and help in
determining their future.
The writ of the government cannot be established
with gunship helicopters when there is actually no
writ of a civilian government. The former
government had made a mistake by killing tribal
chief Nawab Akbar Bugti. Indeed his killing and
military operations in the province have widened
the gap between Balochistan and the centre.
Therefore, use of force is not a solution.
All political activists who were detained by the
government should be released and if there are any
cases against these activists, they should be tried in
a court of law. But it is very important that extra
judicial arrests should be stopped.
The construction of cantonments in Balochistan
should be halted for some time and after convincing
the Baloch population central government can
construct it.

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The local youths should be given first priority in job

opportunities in development projects. It is also
important to fill the vacant seats of Balochistans
quota in the federal services in order to eliminate
the sense of deprivation among the people of this
province.
And the decision to merge the Levies force with
police should be withdrawn.
The Concurrent List from the 1973 Constitution
should be abolished and there must be greater
autonomy for all provinces. The matter of gas
royalty is an old Baloch grievance and it should be
reviewed after a debate on the matter.
For External Issues
The U.S. is undoubtedly functioning against
Pakistans vital security and economic interests in
the region. Islamabad should demand from the U.S.
to cease the usage of Afghan soil to destabilize
Pakistan.
Islamabad should also face up to the Americans and
the Indians with the evidence that both are
exporting terrorism into Pakistan and fostering
insurgencies using the Afghan soil. Pakistan should
let the world know what the Americans and their
Indian partners are doing in the region.

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Islamabad should contact the British government

not to hold one sided cheap propaganda based
seminars. An official complaint must be logged in
this regard.
Effective measures should be taken to counter RAM
and RAW involvement in Balochistan.
Media should also act as a pressure tactic to those
external forces that are influencing the present
crises. Media men should portray the true picture of
external powers.
Conclusion
Insurgency in Balochistan is neither a new phenomenon
nor any single central or provincial government can be blamed
for creating reasons of violent uprising. Rather, it is the failure
of successive political and military governments which did not
respond to the real grievances of the Baloch people. This
continuous process of marginalisation and under development
of the province had resulted in creating internal and external
fault lines which were further exploited by the dissident
nationalists as well as external powers. Theoretically speaking,
development can reduce the common peoples grievances, but
in Balochistan the practical implications of starting mega
projects is very much different. The Baloch nationalists are
very much against to the development of Gwadar Sea Port
which is considered as a catalyst for peace and development in
the region. This negative inclination about the mega projects

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reflects the mistrust between the Islamabad and the Baloch

nationalists. There is an immense need to bridge this trust gap
so that the fault lines of the province can be removed.
Furthermore, the volatile situation of the province is being
exploited by the foreign powers. But before putting blame to
the other states, the Pakistani government (both provincial
and central) has to think that they themselves have provided
opportunities to the outsiders for exploitation. Hence, sincere
and consistent efforts are needed to overcome this serious
problem.

End Notes

1 Baloch Warnings, Dawn, May 04, 2009.

2 Sanaullah Baloch, A Lesson to be Learnt, August 05, 2008.

3 Wikipedia, Balochistan Liberation Army, available at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_ Liberation_ Army, accessed on
27 April 2012.

4Kaiser Bakhtiar, Balochistan Burning, Letters to the Editor, The Daily

Times, July 10, 2009.

5 Alok Bansal, Balochistan: Continuing Violence and Its Implications,

Strategic Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2006, pp. 264.

6 Adeel Khan, Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerilla War

to Nowhere? Asian Ethnicity 2, 2003.

7 Robert G. Wirsing, Baloch nationalism and the geopolitics of energy

resources: the changing context of separatism in Pakistan, Strategic
Studies Institute, April 2008, pp. 41.

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8 Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, In Search of Solutions, ed. B.M. Kutty,

(Karachi: Pakistan Labour Trust and University of Karachis Pakistan
Study Centre, 2009).

9 Feyyaz M. Pasha, If Greed Theory has Visited Nuclear South Asia,

unpublished, National Defence University Islamabad.

10Shanna Dietz Surendra, Explaining Social Mobilization in Pakistan: A

Comparative Case Study of Baluchistan and Azad Kashmir, Comparative
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2009.

11Naser Askari, Moghadamahi Bar Shenakht-e Sistan wa Balochistan,

(Tehran: Donya-e Danesh, 1979), pp. 3-14.

12 Population Welfare Department, Demographic Profile of Balochistan,

available at
http://apnabalochistan.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=categ
ory&sectionid=4&id=42&Itemid=486, accessed on July 22, 2011.
13 Sanaullah Baloch, Genesis of Baloch-Islamabad Conflict, Daily Times,

September 05, 2011.

14 Rabia Aslam, Greed, creed, and governance in civil conflicts: a case

study of Balochistan, Contemporary South Asia, 19:2, 2011, 189.

15 Ibid.

16Mansoor A. Kundi, Balochistan: A Socio Cultural and Political Analysis,

(Quetta: Qasim Printers, 1994).

17Khuram Iqbal, Pakistan's Gwadar Port and Singapore: Why Peace in

Balochistan is Crucial?, RSIS Commentaries, 136/2007, 1.

18Sanaullah Baloch, Justice Delayed, not Denied, DAWN, January 17,

2011.

19Sanaullah Baloch, Remembering Habib Jalib Baloch, Daily Times, July

14, 2011.

20 Muhammad Sabir, Target Killing: 200 Persons Die in Six Months,

Jung Sunday Magazine, 19 July 2009.
21 Rafi Ahmed Pervaiz Bhatti, Balochistan Insurgency: An Insider Speaks,

Letters to the Editor, Dawn, 6 July 2009.

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22Shahzad Baloch, Balochistan protests Habib Jalibs killing, The

Express Tribune, July 15, 2010.

23 Sanaullah Baloch, Op.Cit.

24Wikipedia, Balochistan Liberation Army, available at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_ Liberation_ Army, accessed on
17 June 2009.

25Malik Siraj Akbar, Who Leads the Baloch, The Nation, 29 December
2004.

26 Rabia Aslam, Op. Cit., 190.

27World Bank, Pakistan: Balochistan Economic Report, (Islamabad:

World Bank, 2008).

28 Federal Bureau of Statistics Islamabad.

29Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,

2008), 219-240.

30Senator Sanaullah Baloch, The Balochistan Conflict: Towards a Lasting

Peace, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief Number 7, March
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33Sardar Akbar Khan Bughti, interview by Dr. Shahid Masood, @

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35 Alok Bansal, Balochistan: Continuing Violence and Its Implications,

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 Internal and External Factors in Balochistan Conflict

36Talha Mujaddidi, The Destabilization of Pakistan: Finding Clarity in the

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37Asif Haroon Raja, Simmering Cauldron of Balochistan, The Pakistan

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102 ISSRA Papers 2012