Making Growth Inclusive: Some Lessons From Countries and The Literature

Oxfam Research Reports
Making Growth Inclusive:

Some lessons from countries and the
literature
Elizabeth Stuart
Senior policy advisor, Oxfam International

April, 2011
Growth is back on the development agenda, promoted by bilateral and

multilateral donors, and the G20, as the most effective way to lift people
out of poverty. Economic growth has reduced poverty in developing
countries in the past, but by ignoring the issue of equality, donors and poor
country governments have failed to maximise the benefits of that growth
and in some cases, people have become worse off. This paper extracts
lessons from case studies of Brazil, Viet Nam, and Ghana to suggest three
key areas where action by governments is likely to deliver: a proper
redistributive agenda; appropriate macroeconomic prudence; and a policy
environment that fosters a pro-poor private sector.
www.oxfam.org
Contents
Contents ............................................................................................................................ 2
Executive summary ......................................................................................................... 3
Introduction...................................................................................................................... 6
1. Inclusive growth defined........................................................................................... 8
2. Three case studies ..................................................................................................... 15
3. What can we learn from the case studies? ............................................................ 22
4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 32
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 33
Notes ................................................................................................................................ 40
2 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Executive summary
Economic growth in developing countries is desirable and necessary, but it is the
distribution of that growth that matters for poverty reduction, rather than the
pursuit of growth for its own sake.
Policy makers have often promoted economic expansion as the panacea for
poverty reduction in the developing and emerging world. But there has been a
failure to recognise that growth is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself
(The Growth Report).1
Growth can be an unpredictable weapon in the fight against poverty. It has been
more effective in delivering poverty reduction in some countries than in others,
and at differing rates. In countries as diverse as Cambodia, Honduras, Uganda,
and South Africa, inequalities have risen as they have grown (Kanbur and
Spence 2010; Ramcharan 2010). Poverty reduction is twice as responsive to
economic growth in East Asia as in sub-Saharan Africa, because structural
inequalities matter in translating growth into poverty reduction (Draper, el al.
2010). Economist Bill Easterly has found that the rate of improvement of almost
all quality of life indicators is only weakly related to the rate of economic growth
(Easterly 1999).
In the wake of the global economic and food and fuel crises, as the deadline to
meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approaches, and with the
emergence of the G20, the international community is again focusing on growth,
although this time apparently recognising that the type of growth that is aimed
for matters: that there is a need for it to be inclusive and sustainable.
These are welcome aims, but to date the challenge has yet to be taken on in a
clear-eyed way, and policy makers do not appear to have shifted their approach
to meet the manifold challenges of development in the 21st century.
In many respects, there have been important successes in development in the
past half-century. There has been global progress in health, education, and civil
and political rights. Since 1960, global average infant mortality has halved;
between 1970 and 2000 the global average ratio of female to male literacy
improved from 59 to 80 per cent; the overwhelming majority of people now live
in countries that have signed the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Kenny 2011); and the African continent as a whole has seen a rise of more
democratic and accountable governments (Radelet 2010). Progress has been seen
even in countries where prospects appeared to be the least promising: in
landlocked Mali, for example, since the mid-1990s infant mortality has declined
by a quarter, the primary school completion rate has doubled, and poverty has
fallen by one-third. And in the wake of the global economic crisis, at least
moderate growth is set to continue in both emerging economies and low-income
countries (LICs), unlike in the advanced economies.2
But in many other respects, the challenges of development and in particular,
the risks are arguably more difficult than in the past, in part due to our
increasing interdependence: countries and people are more vulnerable to
economic and climactic shocks, and are having to fight for access to scarce
resources such as land, food, and water.
Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 3

Without the correct complementary policies in place, economic growth may be
even less able to meet these challenges than previously: in particular, because it
has a very imperfect relationship to risk. In many cases economic growth can
entail increased risk to poor people.
Central to the response to these new challenges, studies suggest, should be a real
shift to battling inequality. This means inequality of income, and also of assets,
both financial and human, such as education and good health; inequalities of
opportunity and also a genuinely level playing-field for poor people; inequalities
based on gender, and also on where in a country people live, on what race they
are, and what they believe. Such inequalities are not only morally repugnant, but
they are holding back people from benefiting from the progress that has taken
place in their countries.
As a senior economist at the IMF writes: In sum, when economic growth is
positive, society might be better off when compared with the past. But economic
policies that simply focus on average growth rates could be dangerously nave,
especially in countries with high existing levels of inequality (Ramcharan 2010).
Using secondary research, this paper suggests that one key element in reducing
intra-country inequalities is redistribution that is, aligning more opportunity
towards those at the bottom. Investments in education and labour-intensive
livelihoods are examples. But creating opportunity may not be enough to ensure
inclusiveness in growth: an actual redistributive mechanism for income
progressive taxation may be necessary.
Moreover, while Kraay (2006) stated that sustained poverty reduction is
impossible without sustained growth, other academics have shown that
distribution can play as strong a role as growth or an even stronger one in
increasing income for poor people (White and Anderson 2001; Bourguignon
2004). The Growth Report surmises that, while growth is the main route to
poverty reduction, as a country develops, redistribution becomes more important
as a way to reduce poverty.
This need not be massive or confiscatory to create large benefits for poverty and
society as a whole, but it will entail something of a redistribution of power. In
Oxfams experience, political and economic transformation are inseparable, so
any discussion of redistribution of assets should include the redistribution of
power and voice that is required for such changes to take place. These issues are
covered in detail in other Oxfam research (Green 2008) and so, for reasons of
space, will not be covered here.
This paper is not an attempt to examine what causes growth, which is a vast and
controversial research landscape. Also beyond its scope is an examination of the
environmental and ecological impacts of increased growth, and whether growth
will need to be limited to counter those impacts. As part of a new agenda for
development, we will have to change our production and consumption patterns,
our ways of generating energy, and deal with the issue of inter-generational
inequalities. This is a very important subject which will be tackled by future
Oxfam papers.
Instead this paper focuses on the inclusive element of inclusive and sustainable
growth, at the national level. It starts by asking why growth needs to be

inclusive, the new word used by the international community for what was
previously termed equitable.
It then briefly summarises the experiences of three countries which span
geographical regions and different levels of economic and other development:
Brazil, an example of inclusive growth that seems likely to be enduring, provided
deeper social issues are also confronted; Viet Nam, where one of the most
significant cuts in poverty reduction took place with strong progress towards the
MDGs, but more recently inequality is undermining that poverty reduction ; and
Ghana, where growth has reduced poverty but has increased inequality.
Finally, it will draw out the conclusions from these case studies, together with
evidence from a representative selection of recent, relevant literature, to suggest
an agenda that has in the past delivered growth that is not captured by elites, but
whose benefits are instead shared widely throughout countries.
The message from the literature to policy makers in donor and developing
countries is clear: there is no simple prescription for delivering inclusive growth,
nor should they behave as if there were one (in G20 negotiations, for example).
Instead, there is a menu of options. As Michael Spence, chair of the Commission
on Growth and Development, has said, there is no recipe, only ingredients. But
evidence at least suggests which of these ingredients appear to have been the
most relevant to producing inclusive growth:
A redistributive agenda: This would include cash transfers, redistributive
public expenditure on health, education, and agricultural services, and a
progressive taxation system. This package should serve to arm poor and
marginalised people with the skills to allow them to participate in the
benefits of economic growth, and limit their exposure to the downside
risks of that growth;
Macroeconomic prudence: This means sustainable, moderate levels of
inflation, deficits, and debt; and counter-cyclical policies, but at the same
time governments must ensure that pro-poor elements of public spending
are protected;
A policy environment conducive to pro-poor private investment, and in
particular, the domestically owned, labour-intensive private sector,
especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
The eventual selection and balance of policies will need to be based on a close
analysis of the specific circumstances of a particular country or region. And it is
important to note that creating truly inclusive growth may require tough new
policies that challenge established interests. Economic inclusion need not be
painful or traumatic, but it certainly requires deliberate political action.

Introduction
The shifting international agenda on inclusive growth and

poverty reduction
Growth and its interaction with poverty have been the focus of much debate
among academic and policy circles for decades. From the 1950s to the 1970s,
scholars emphasised probable trade-offs between growth and income
distribution. In the 1970s, the emphasis was on identifying redistribution
mechanisms for poverty reduction without hampering growth. Then in the 1980s
the so-called Washington Consensus, a set of policies promoted by the
international financial institutions, stated that the benefits of growth (achieved
through privatisation, liberalisation, and stabilisation) would trickle down to
all, without the need for many complementary policies.
This vision was challenged by the outcome on the ground in developing
countries in the 1990s, where economic growth did not occur in a consistent
manner (Easterly 2002; Rodrik 2004).
Next the research and following just behind it, the political agenda moved to
human development indicators and the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), in an admission that previous reforms had failed sufficiently to improve
the lives of poor people across the range of different ways that poverty is
experienced (Dagdeviren et al. 2002). At the same time, bilateral donors such as
the UK governments Department for International Development (DFID)
championed pro-poor growth, while the World Bank called it shared growth.
Now in the wake of the global economic crisis, the donors emphasis is once
again on growth, but this time on sustainable, inclusive growth. Much of this is
due to the emergence of the G20. At its September 2009 summit in Pittsburgh, the
G20 committed itself to a Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced
Growth.3 By the Korean summit in 2010, this had become the Seoul Development
Consensus for Shared Growth, and included language on strong, sustainable,
inclusive and resilient growth.4 The European Commission and USAID are
using similar language as they revaluate their overall approach to development.
Similarly, the IMF and the World Bank are engaging on issues such as jobless
growth and inequality.
Some possible explanations for the resurgence of interest in economic growth
among donors are aid fatigue and their own domestic fiscal difficulties, both of
which mean that they are looking to self-sustaining economic growth as a
possible alternative to development finance. What is clear is that donors have not
yet accepted the full implications of what that growth would need to look like (or
how to promote it) for it to be better able to reduce poverty across the board in a
new era of development challenges, where the poorest people are increasingly
vulnerable to climate change, resource scarcity, and new economic crises.
There is still an unwillingness to talk about redistribution as a necessary
component of a policy mix. For instance, the latest DFID business plan talks
about sustainable growth in its one-page vision statement, but the goal of
making British international development policy more focused on boosting

economic growth and wealth creation makes no mention of either equality or
sustainability.5
Similarly, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has a new
strategy on sustainable economic growth. It does reference the importance of
equality between men and women, as well as employment generation, a skilled
workforce, and agriculture, but again fails to mention redistribution as a way to
achieve this.6
Economist and development policy expert Owen Barder contends that donors
are explicitly delinking growth from the policies needed to ensure that it is
inclusive. Because donors focus on just one dimension of poverty reduction
[growth] they marginalise other legitimate objectives such as reducing chronic
poverty or providing social services in countries that cannot otherwise afford
them, he argues (Barder 2009).
The World Banks chief economist, Justin Lin, says that development economics
has so far been unable to provide a convincing intellectual agenda for generating
and distributing wealth in poor countries. But he adds: The global crisis is an
opportunity not only to identify new areas of research on how to help the
developed and developing countries cope with the challenges of the crisis and
prevent similar crises in the future, but also on how to achieve sustainable,
inclusive growth in developing countries (Lin 2009).
There is a large body of literature on the interaction between growth, poverty
reduction, and inequality, some of it bewilderingly contradictory. There is also a
problem with finding empirical evidence on inequality because of a lack of data.
However, a consensus is emerging among academics on some key points, which
are set out in the following chapter.

1. Inclusive growth defined
This section will answer the questions of what is meant by inequality and why
policy makers who are thinking about growth should care about it.
While the term inclusive is being widely used by policy makers, there is not a
clear definition of the word. It would appear that it is a synonym for equitable
antonymous for inequitable but with an emphasis on job creation and creating
an enabling environment for the private sector. This paper uses the term
interchangeably with equitable.
In public debate there is frequently a distinction made between equality of
opportunity (the idea that individuals should have the same chance of
developing and being economically rewarded for their talents, regardless of their
background) and equality of outcome (i.e. that people will achieve the same
levels of income, health status, educational achievement, etc.). However, this
would appear to be a false distinction: the promotion of equal opportunity will in
fact require greater material equality. For individuals to realise their potential,
they will have to enjoy more similar economic and social starting points (Jackson
and Segal 2004). In other words, todays outcomes shape tomorrows
opportunities. And poor people need both cargo nets to help them get onto the
economic ladder, and safety nets to protect them when they fall off. For a more
complete discussion of this issue, see The Growth Report by the Commission on
Growth and Development (2008).
What is meant by inequality?

Inequality concerns variations in living standards across a whole population.
(McKay 2002).7 By far the most tracked and discussed form of inequality is that of
income or wealth, using the Gini co-efficient.8
There are also other aspects of inequality, including of health, education, assets,
and political participation. Inequalities exist between gender, race, and ethnic
groups indigenous people account for one in three of those living in extreme
poverty, for example (Melamed 2010) and between people living in different
parts of a country (e.g. rural vs. urban areas, mountainous vs. cultivable areas
often known as spatial or horizontal inequalities). While income inequality is
closely related to these other forms of inequality, the links are not automatic.
Gender equality, embedded in the behaviour of the family, the market, and
society, affects prospects for poverty reduction and growth by stimulating
productivity and earnings and improving child development outcomes (Buvinic
et al. 2010). There are also inequalities inside the household (closely aligned to
gender inequalities).
But in spite of its importance, gender inequality has frequently been given
insufficient consideration by policy makers, perhaps because as womens work is
frequently unpaid it is therefore not captured by traditional measures of either
growth or inequality (i.e. GDP or the Gini co-efficient), and intra-household level
data is rarely available (see Box 1).9 Yet Kanbur and Spence (2010) cite a study
showing that to ignore intra-household inequality understates the true extent of
inequality and poverty by as much as 30 per cent.

Box 1: Measuring growth and poverty as if inequality mattered
There are more and more initiatives looking at alternative measurements of well-being other
than simple GDP indicators. The Commission on the Measurement of Economic
Performance and Social Progress, established by French president Nicolas Sarkozy and led
by Joseph Stiglitz, has issued its report. This not only critiques the limitations of GDP,
proposing, for instance, that consumption and wealth should be captured and at the
household as well as the national level and not just production. It also proposes that
inequalities in quality of life, including health, education, and political voice, be measured and
included in official data.
In 2010, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) was launched. This complements income-
based poverty measures by reflecting the multiple deprivations that people face at the same
time, namely in health, education, and living standards. It allows users to see where the
poorest people are within countries, by ethnic group and urban/rural location. It also uses
household-level, rather than national-level, data. The MPI provides a counterpoint to GDP
measures: for instance, in Yemen 53 per cent of the population are poor, according to the
MPI, but only 18 per cent live on less than the $1.25 a day standard. In Ethiopia the disparity
is even more extreme: 90 per cent of people are MPI poor, while just 39 per cent live on less
than $1.25 a day.10
Sources: Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress;11
D. Green http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=875; Alkire and Santos 2010
The effects of these inequalities are pervasive, as the next section will explore.
And they are often exacerbated because there is frequently an interaction
between differing forms of inequality: for instance, asset inequality may be a
consequence of, and may contribute to, inequality in political power (McKay
2002). A woman from an ethnic minority living in a rural area would experience
multiple inequalities, which would reinforce each other.
There is currently no index that considers all elements of inequality, including
elements such as powerlessness (McKay 2002). This will continue to be a
problem, as what is not measured is not counted.
Does inequality matter in the growth and poverty reduction

debate?
Following the global economic crisis, in advanced economies there is a growing
public focus on controlling rising income inequality as well as the reduced
economic opportunities for the most disadvantaged people.12 In the USA, recent
analysis shows that, between 2007 and 2009, real GDP per capita in the five
richest states rose by an average of 2 per cent, but in the five poorest it fell by 3
per cent. In France, the income gap has also widened: during the recession, real
GDP per capita fell by twice as much in the five poorest regions in the area
around Paris.13 Pew Research, a survey organisation, has been tracking the
percentage of people in the USA who agree with the statement, Our society
should do what is necessary to make sure everyone has an equal opportunity to
succeed for the past two decades, and the figure has remained constant at
around 90 per cent.14
There is some indication that developed country politicians are starting to
respond to these concerns, by their efforts to curb bankers pay and bonuses, for
instance. The book The Spirit Level, by two epidemiologists (Wilkinson and
Pickett 2009), has contributed to the debate in the UK and more widely. It sets
out a case that unequal societies are bad for everyone in them, not just the
poorest people, and that increased levels of inequality are correlated with a wide

range of ills including obesity, large prison populations, and teenage pregnancy
rates.
However, the issue of equality continues to be under-served by policy makers in
the developing world, other than in Latin America, where there have been
unprecedented falls in rates of inequality15 and where governments have actively
pursued redistributive measures such as cash transfers. An important new report
from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
Time for Equality, makes a strong, rights-based, case that the continents
governments need to take even stronger actions to pursue equality (ECLAC
2010).
There are several reasons why inclusiveness is important when targeting
economic growth and poverty reduction, particularly in the new environment of
enhanced risk and vulnerability that is being experienced by poor people in the
wake of the multifaceted crises that have occurred in the past three years. Not
least of these is that many aspects of development appear to happen in spite of,
and not because of, economic growth. A survey by economist Bill Easterly found
that for almost all the quality of life indicators that studies of poor people
indicate matter to them (such as the World Banks 2000 survey Voices of the
Poor), only in the case of three indicators was there any suggestion that income
changes (i.e. growth of income) were a driving factor behind improvements
(these were protein intake, calorie intake, and number of fixed-line telephones
per capita) (Easterly 1999).
Although there are still disagreements in the literature on some aspects of the
intersection between growth, poverty reduction, and inequality, there appears to
be a degree of convergence among academics on the following:
Extremes of income inequality are bad for growth, as are other aspects
of inequality, such as inequality of education: Medium-term efficiency
and greater equality can be complementary. Poor people remain poor
partly because they cannot borrow against future earnings to invest in
production, the education of their children, or assets to reduce their
vulnerability. Insecure land rights and limited access to justice can create
further barriers to investment and pro-poor growth (Human
Development Report 2005). More equitable income distribution would
have the effect of raising savings and investment levels, thereby fuelling
economic growth (Watkins 1998). Kanbur and Spence (2010) argue that,
while it is difficult to make a statistical argument that income inequality
inhibits growth, there is stronger evidence that broader senses of
inequality (such as gender inequality) are bad for growth. Vandemoortele
says that rising inequality may decrease aggregate demand
(Vandemoortele forthcoming).
Conversely, measures to address inequality are often growth-promoting:
for instance, greater gender equality can help promote economic growth
by boosting womens participation in the labour market (Buvinic et al.
2010).
Inequality is bad for poverty reduction even in the presence of growth:
Higher levels of inequality in the first instance mean that growth is less
effective in reducing poverty (Killick 2002; ODI 2004). High-inequality
countries may need as much as three times the amount of growth to

reduce poverty as low-inequality countries (Naschold 2009). In some
cases, ignoring inequality can lead to growth that is accompanied by
worsening poverty: Melamed (2010) cites the example of Uganda between
2000 and 2003, where GDP grew at 2.5 per cent a year but, because of
worsening inequality, poverty increased by 3.8 per cent. Conversely, a
relatively small reduction in inequality can have a significant effect on the
poverty headcount (Naschold 2009).
It also matters for peoples ability to cope with risk. In highly unequal
societies, when an adverse shock such as illness or business failure strikes,
a large chunk of the population may not have either the access to credit or
the personal wealth to replace lost income or smooth the impact of the
shock on consumption. So even when per capita income is growing, the
well-being of most people could be little changed or worse, even during a
boom (Ramcharan 2010).
There are also other, less instrumental, reasons why inequalities matter.
Inequality is morally repugnant: While people are generally willing to
accept some inequality, this has limits and there is a very strong ethical
and rights-based imperative for ensuring a reasonable degree of equality
between people (ODI 2004). Surveys show strong opinions in many
countries that the gap between rich and poor is too large, thus indicating
an underlying perception of social justice. This means putting poor
people first: more weight should be given to improvements in the well-
being of poor and disadvantaged groups than to the rich and privileged
(Human Development Report 2005).
Political legitimacy: Extreme inequalities weaken political legitimacy and
corrode institutions. Inequalities in income and human capabilities often
reflect inequalities in political power. Poor people (especially women),
rural populations, and indigenous communities are disadvantaged partly
because they have a weak political voice, and vice versa, while the rich
have an outsized voice in the political process, which can lead to
economic policies that benefit a few at the expense of the majority. Where
political institutions are seen as perpetuating unjust inequalities or
advancing the interests of elites, democracy and stability can be
undermined (Human Development Report 2005; Ramcharan 2010).
Political stability: Related to the point above, a paper summarising the
findings of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and
Ethnicity at the University of Oxford concludes: the presence of large
horizontal inequalities increases the risk of violent conflict, adding
that for the most part, international development policy has neglected
horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2010). The managing director of the IMF
said in a recent speech that inequitable distribution of wealth can wear
down the social fabric, and that in poorer countries inequality can
dampen economic opportunity it can divert people towards
unproductive activities. It can make countries more prone to adverse
shocks with fewer people able to dip into savings during bad times
and it can lead to instability, a breakdown in democracy, and even war.16
Kanbur and Spence (2010) say: Persistent inequality in its various

dimensions leads to political and social instability or very harsh
repression.
Public policy goals: Extreme disparities in health and education reduce
the scope of disadvantaged groups to take advantage of opportunities for
improving welfare (Human Development Report 2005). In a country with
a highly unequal income distribution, the population at large is likely to
be less healthy than would be predicted for countries with the same
average income (Jack and Lewis 2009). The British Medical Journal has
written: what matters in determining mortality and health in a society
is less the overall wealth of that society and more how evenly wealth is
distributed.17
Where there is still disagreement

While several theoretical papers conclude that income inequality is detrimental
to growth, other models predict that inequality is likely to be growth-enhancing,
drawing mainly on the greater ability and propensity of rich people to invest and
the need for unequal wage structures to provide incentives for outstanding
achievement (Besley and Cord 2007).
The growthpovertyinequality nexus

What sort of growth is needed to reduce poverty across the board?
Growth can be good for poverty reduction. A major study conducted by the
World Bank, based on evidence from 14 countries, showed that the pace of
overall economic growth is the main factor that determines how quickly poverty
declines (Besley and Cord 2007). The Growth Report states that in the past 30
years, absolute poverty has fallen substantially, and this is almost entirely due to
sustained growth. As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen wrote recently: Economic
growth, properly supplemented, can be a huge contributor to making things
better for people.18
But growth can also be an unpredictable weapon in the fight against poverty. It
has been more effective in delivering poverty reduction in some countries than in
others, and at differing rates (the so-called growth elasticity of poverty). In
countries as diverse as Cambodia, Honduras, and Uganda, inequalities have
risen as economies have grown (Kanbur and Spence 2010). South Africa enjoyed
robust growth from 2000 to 2005, but inequality worsened dramatically. During
those five years, the countrys Gini co-efficient increased by around 12 per cent to
0.58, making it one of the most unequal countries in the world. Poverty reduction
is twice as responsive to economic growth in East Asia as in sub-Saharan Africa,
because structural inequalities matter in translating growth into poverty
reduction (Draper et al. 2010).
As the above-mentioned World Bank study confirms: Greater poverty reduction
was observed where policies were in place to enhance the capacity of poor
people to participate in growth (Besley and Cord 2007).
In addition, growth is even less sure to reduce non-income poverty. When wider
definitions of poverty are considered, along with what is increasingly being
termed well-being, but could also be called human development i.e. the

multifaceted, multi-dimensional way that poverty is experienced in real life the
efficacy of growth has been much less clear. For example, improved nutrition is
not nearly as well correlated to GDP growth as to reduced income poverty
(Headey 2010). A study by the former chief economist for the World Bank,
Francois Bourguignon, found that there is practically zero correlation between
GDP growth and achievement of the non-income poverty-related MDGs
(Bourguignon et al. 2008).19
What is needed is the right sort of growth that reaches poor people. But what
makes some growth processes more pro-poor (and therefore more inclusive) than
others? Recent research suggests at least four reasons for the variation:
1. The sector composition of growth. In countries where the majority of the poor
live in rural areas, growth in the agricultural sector is generally more pro-
poor than growth in services or manufacturing (Killick 2002).20 However, in
rapidly urbanising societies, including in sub-Saharan Africa, services and
manufacturing are also important for pro-poor growth (Besley and Cord
2007; Kapsos 2005; Loayza and Raddatz 2010; Ravallion 2009);
2. The levels of human capital, assets, technology, and infrastructure available
in the economy (Besley and Cord 2007). This is particularly the case for
education (including literacy rates), lower levels of landlessness, and lower
infant mortality;
3. Macroeconomic prudence (The Growth Report) combined with the
introduction of progressive taxation and social spending policies;
4. The importance of countries experiencing growth with resilience in other
words, that people do not fall back into poverty. This means that growth
should be steady, rather than volatile with frequent periods of negative
growth (Draper et al. 2010). The Growth Report says that all cases of
inclusive development have sustained high growth rates for at least three
decades. However, as Winters et al. (2010) point out, a notable feature of
developing country growth is volatility. Fortunately, many of the policies that
promote equity also promote resilience and increase predictability at the
household and macro levels.
Box 2: Inequality, the MDGs, and growth

Jan Vandemoortele, one of the architects of the MDGs, argues that a key reason why
several of the goals will not be achieved is because they have not targeted and monitored
progress towards equity.21 While most countries have seen improvements in human
development overall, the disadvantaged segments in society have seen little or no
improvement meaning that progress has been concentrated in the better-off groups, while
the poorest and most disadvantaged people have found it increasingly difficult to participate
in national progress.
Perversely, progress towards some MDGs could be achieved by improving services to
higher-income groups, while actually leaving the poorest at times worse off. For example,
Burkina Faso reduced child mortality rates at the aggregate level, but this masked an
increase in child mortality among the poorest 20 per cent of the population (Save the
Children 2010). Conversely, equitable progress towards the MDGs has often happened in
very poor countries even during periods of low economic growth. For example, Mozambique
and Bolivia have reduced child mortality during periods of relatively low growth (Save the
Children 2010).22

The failure to include equity targets in the goals may have increased inequality, as using
national averages to measure progress encourages policy makers to target the low-hanging
fruit, i.e. to help those who will find it easiest to get out of poverty (Kabeer 2010).
More positively, some top MDG performers such as Malawi, Mali, and Niger have
achieved progress on child nutrition and mortality while also improving equality in those
areas (ODI 2010).
The Overseas Development Institute in London has developed an MDG scorecard which
provides insights into how the gains are being shared across income, ruralurban, and
gender gaps (ODI 2010). Watkins (2010) suggests that introducing equity targets into the
MDGs themselves focusing on wealth, gender, and other disparities rather than just
reporting on national averages would make them more effective.
Moreover, policy makers target precise growth figures as if they were key to unlocking the
MDGs. But Vandemoortele says: Estimating a price tag or setting a specific rate of
economic growth is symptomatic of the misconception that the MDGs can be achieved
through a scientific, apolitical and rational process that can be manipulated from the outside
and accelerated by external actors. In reality the MDGs call for fundamental changes and
transformations in society and the economy that must be endogenous. They will seldom be
rapid, rational or linear because they will have to address complex political, cultural and
ecological constraints (Vandemoortele 2009).

2. Three case studies
These three case studies were chosen because they are geographically diverse
(Latin America, Asia, and Africa); cover countries at differing stages of
development (a low-income country (LIC), a country that graduated from being
an LIC to a middle-income country (MIC) over the period under discussion, and
an MIC); and they are countries whose governments have actively attempted to
address inequalities as they have grown, with greater or lesser success.
Case study one: Brazil an example of inclusive growth?23

Between 2003 and 2010 (including the year of the global economic crisis in
2009), Brazil saw an average annual GDP growth rate of 4.1 per cent. At the
same time, it also witnessed an impressive reduction in its Gini co-efficient of 8
per cent, while the number of extremely poor people was reduced by half.24 In
other words, Brazil seems to have achieved inclusive growth, at least in terms of
income inequality. This is even more impressive considering the countrys
recent history. It had been economically stagnant, and had had one of the worst
personal income distributions in the world.
So what happened? In the previous decade, a stabilisation plan had addressed
the countrys hyper-inflation. In addition, the government took measures to
track the poor, the old, and people with disabilities, meaning that it understood
who they were and how they could be reached.
The government also made sure that it was able to collect taxes, and to fine-tune
revenue collection during a crisis. This increase in tax collection allowed it to
significantly increase transfers to the vulnerable (which could be efficiently
targeted due to the data collection), while financial innovations meant that
credit could be extended to people receiving those transfers, which in turn
brought millions more people into the marketplace (although that tax system is
still highly regressive).
The largest transfer scheme has been the pension, which has accounted for
around 85 per cent of total cash transfers to households (ILO 2008). This was
originally designed to cater only for those in formal employment, but has since
been reformed to include low-income households, and rural workers do not have
to contribute, which according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) is
one of the most redistributive aspects of the scheme. Poverty levels are now
lower among elderly people a typically marginalised group than the general
population.
The Bolsa Familia (Family Purse) programme, created in 2003, has been a very
important transfer scheme, bringing together pre-existing programmes on
education, health, and energy. By 2009 it was reaching 12.5 million families, or
around a quarter of the population. It targets households based on self-reported
income, and pays out up to $112 a month to families, provided they send their
children to school and use health-care services (Holmes et al. 2010). Almost 95
per cent of the recipients are women intending to compensate them for their
traditional domestic role as care-givers, and in recognition of the fact that they
are most likely to use the money in a way that benefits children. There are,

however, criticisms of the equality impact of the Bolsa Familia programme (see
below).
The introduction of the minimum wage may also have been a factor in the
reduction of inequality. As Hailu and Soares (2009) observe, this has had a spill-
over effect because the minimum wage is linked to social security benefits.
However, a study for UNDP found that Bolsa Familia was more effective in
reducing inequalities, despite the fact that between 2001 and 2007 the real value
of the minimum wage increased by 35 per cent (Barros et al. 2009).
One interesting finding is that the growth elasticity of poverty has been
significantly higher in states with higher initial health conditions in other
words, growth has translated better into poverty reduction. This was also the
case for states with higher levels of political participation, such as union
membership (Ferreira et al. 2009).
Lustig and Lopez-Calva (2010) argue that education has been key to reducing
inequality in Brazil. Similarly, Hailu and Soares (2009) say that, while much
remains unknown about why inequality has fallen, two sets of causes stand out.
The first is education (universal admission to primary schooling and lower
repetition rates): they estimate that one-third of the reduction in inequality is due
to this. The second is the cash transfer programmes and other direct cash
transfers from the state to families and individuals, which account for another
third of the reduction. The final third is less clear, but is possibly due to a
multiplier effect caused by an increase in domestic demand stimulated by the
cash transfers.
So can this inclusive growth last? Matos dos Santos (2010) argues that with
better targeting of cash transfers, and a reform of the tax and public expenditure
systems, the answer is broadly, yes. He says that half of the tax burden consists
of consumption taxes, which are regressive, and that personal income and
property taxes are still low. Brazil will need to capture more of higher incomes if
it is to keep this trend moving forward. The country also needs more and better
investment in quality public health and education services.
In addition, it is questionable to what extent the deeper social fabric in the
country has been changed by these improvements: issues such as violence,
which disproportionately affects poor, black, urban women, will also need to be
addressed. In other words, the country still needs to make substantial progress
in tackling wider such as gender and ethnic inequalities.
Case study two: Viet Nam some of the fastest poverty

reduction ever, with strong progress towards the MDGs,
but inequality now increasing to a worrying extent
Just 20 years ago, Viet Nam was among the poorest countries in the world.
Over the years 1995-2001, GDP grew at close to 7 per cent (UNDP 2004). Today
it is a middle-income country. Between 1993 and 2002, poverty fell by almost 8
per cent year, primarily in areas where the vast majority of poor people were
living. This is one of the fastest reductions in poverty ever documented (Rama
2008).

Viet Nam has also made unprecedented progress in terms of MDG attainment,
and features in the top ten on several indicators. The country has more than
halved the proportion of underweight children. Under-five mortality rates
declined from 56 to 15 per 1,000 live births between 1990 and 2007. Viet Nam
also features in the top ten with regard to access to improved drinking water
sources (ODI 2010).
However, while initially this growth did not lead to increases in inequality,
more recently this trend has been reversed and inequalities are on the rise to a
concerning extent.
The extraordinary initial turnaround came as a result of the Doi Moi
(renovation) reform process, which started in 1986. This saw the country move
from a centrally planned economy to a partial market economy,25 for which the
government adopted the phrase market economy with a socialist orientation
(Rama 2008).26 Policies focused on three areas: creating good-quality jobs;
macroeconomic reform; and public expenditure, allowing for the provision of
public goods as well as targeted transfers. Features included:
A conscious decision taken by the government to sequence reforms so
that economic growth was kick-started in the countryside, where there
was more poverty. In the 1990s at least 50 per cent of poor people lived in
rural areas and depended upon agriculture for a living (Klump 2007).
Food markets were deregulated.
Land reform was undertaken: in 1988 individual land use rights were
granted and between 1986 and 1993 a large proportion of Viet Nams
agricultural land was distributed to rural households (Rama 2008). By
2000, almost 11m land titles had been issued, making this one of the
largest and fastest titling programmes in the developing world. This
reform also led to the creation of jobs accessible to the poorest people.
Commodity trade barriers were reduced, with great care and attention
paid to sequencing, thereby minimising the negative impact on domestic
producers. Rice production increased, and the average value of rice
exports rose by 9.2 per cent a year (Klump 2007). However, it should be
noted that higher rice prices had ambiguous effects on poor families: it
raised income for producers, but increased the cost of the main food
consumed by poor people; therefore, the net benefits were concentrated
in the south of Viet Nam, as this is where rice growing predominated.
Meanwhile other sectors of the market namely key industries were
protected. This meant that management and manufacturing skills were
retained within the country (Vandemoortele and Bird 2010). The
manufacturing sector increased its share of GDP from 15.5 per cent in
1995 to close to 20 per cent in 2001 (UNDP 2004).
Agricultural yields increased due to targeted investment in agriculture,
although it should be noted that this was in part accomplished by the
wide-scale use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides, which may not be
sustainable. The number of borrowers from the Vietnam Bank of
Agriculture increased seven-fold in the first half of the 1990s, as rural
producers responded to the opportunities created by market reforms
(Watkins 1998).

Economic and institutional reforms created a viable private sector, which
meant that people moved from the informal to the formal sector,
although this led to a rise in inequality due to growing wage differentials
between the two (Klump 2007). In addition, private companies were
allowed to enter an increased number of sectors, and foreign direct
investment (FDI) was permitted and sought in labour-intensive sectors.
However, increases in industrial productivity brought about only modest
job growth because important sub-sectors were capital-intensive, or
import-substituting.
Public financial management systems were strengthened. Transparency
was increased and decisions on almost half of public expenditures were
moved to sub-national levels of government.
Macroeconomic reform saw rampant inflation constrained, devaluation
of the Vietnamese dong, and financial sector reform.
However, inequalities are becoming increasingly problematic. Between 1993
and 1998, poverty fell across all regions of the country, though at differing
speeds (UNDP 2004). The south of the country is still more prosperous than the
north (unsurprising, as it started from a higher level of development, but the
gap is narrowing). A system of transfers has been put in place to redistribute
resources from richer to poorer provinces, and some of the poorest provinces
receive the equivalent of half their GDP in transfers.27 In addition, there are
targeted programmes to provide benefits to specific groups of people.
In addition, safety nets were targeted at the poor. These included the Public
Investment Programme and the National Programme for Hunger Eradication
and Poverty Reduction. These have been effective in reducing poverty, but
perversely have been most successful in the richest quarter of provinces (Klump
2007).
Given the scarcity of land, Viet Nam has had to rely on other complements to
unskilled labour namely investments in human capital. An expanding budget
has allowed equitable investment in services to improve access to health,
education, water, and sanitation. Health and education user fees are waived for
poor people. Secondary school enrolment levels have quadrupled for the
poorest groups, although illiteracy has increased among poor women. Viet
Nams relatively highly-skilled and trained labour force has been able to take
advantage of new economic opportunities. However, despite these investments,
there remain large discrepancies in the health status of rich and poor people
particularly among children (Klump 2007), and the quality of services remains
inadequate.
In the years between 1993 and 1998 inequality was already negating the
poverty-reducing potential of growth. According to a report by UNDP (UNDP
2004), despite the fact that the Gini coefficient did not show much change in
these years (it moved from .33 to .35), more than a third of potential poverty
reduction was cancelled by the increase in inequality.
Today, as the country has moved past MIC status, inequality is becoming even
more problematic. Indeed UNDP says that: in Viet Nam increased inequality
is the single most important constraint to sustainable poverty reduction, and
perhaps political and social stability (UNDP 2004).

In particular, there are concerns that ethnic minorities may not be able to catch
up with other parts of the population. Disparities in poverty levels between
ethnic minorities and the rest of the population widened from a factor of 1.6 in
1993 to 5.1 in 2006 (Vandemoortele and Bird 2010). Viet Nam has recently
developed new gauge of poverty based on essential needs, including education,
health, and nutrition, and based on this almost one-third of children under the
age of 16 are poor. The same study shows that 62 per cent of ethnic minority
children are poor, compared with 22 per cent of the majority Kinh and ethnic
Chinese.28
UNDP ascribes the slowdown in poverty reduction and the increase in
inequality to growing differentials amount various income groups in access to
employment, land, capital and education (UNDP 2004).
The government has pursued an active policy of urbanisation, but this has
resulted in an increase in urban poverty, due to an influx of poor migrants from
rural areas. Moreover, the governments efforts to discourage migration by
denying permanent registration have meant that more and more migrants work
in the informal sector (Klump 2007).
In addition, the country has relied on economic expansion that is carbon-
intensive and degrading of its natural resources, including land, water, and
forests. This is unsustainable and is likely to undermine future growth, and the
costs of this are often borne by poor people (Vandemoortele and Bird 2010).
Case study three: Ghana growth built on agriculture has

reduced poverty, but inequalities have been exacerbated, in
spite of government efforts
In the 1990s, moderate growth of around 56 per cent lifted more than one
million Ghanaians out of extreme poverty, and Ghana is on-track to achieve
MDG1 well before 2015 (OECD 2007). Child malnutrition has almost halved
since the end of the 1980s (Leturque and Wiggins 2010). Although a poor
performer on the Human Development Index, at 152 out of 182 countries,
Ghana scores relatively well on the Gender-related Development Index. For a
sub-Saharan African country, this is a success story.
A major explanatory factor for the reduction in poverty has been that growth
has occurred in the agricultural sector. Over the past 25 years, Ghana has
ranked among the top five performers in the world in terms of agricultural
growth. Cocoa production, which had slumped in the 1970s and 1980s, has
recovered, surpassing its previous levels. Farm incomes, albeit lower than the
national average, have been rising, particularly in the 2000s, and poverty among
cocoa farmers has fallen faster than both the national and rural rates (Leturque
and Wiggins 2010).
However, in spite of these gains, inequalities in income and other indicators
have worsened. In particular, regional disparities have widened as urban
coastal areas have grown faster than rural, savannah areas of the country.
This is because the pattern of growth has been highly uneven across economic
sectors and population groups. Regions outside the rural forest zone where
many of Ghanas key exports are produced have seen far lower levels of

poverty reduction or even some increase (Aryeetey and McKay 2007). Poor
people are mostly concentrated in the north, while most of the growth and
future business and economic opportunities are in the south. Rural poverty is
four times higher than urban poverty. According to the OECD, These gaps
might have an effect on the political stability and social cohesion needed to
sustain the growth process, although in Ghana pro-poor growth issues tend not
to be priority vote catchers (OECD 2007).
In addition, other aspects of agricultural development, such as land ownership,
have seen little improvement. While large export crops have received much
attention, much less has been invested in small food crop operations (Aryeetey
and McKay 2007) and householders not producing export crops have
experienced lower rates of participation in growth. Access to credit and
extension services remains very difficult for women.
Trade reforms have resulted in faster growth in imports compared with exports,
adversely affecting local production in, for example, rice growing, chicken
rearing, and manufacturing. And limited access to key inputs, especially since
the removal of subsidies on inputs, has kept levels of mechanisation and
fertiliser use low (Aryeetey and McKay 2007).
Employment in other sectors has failed to take off to the same extent,
particularly in the formal sector. One key reason for this is that manufacturing
has been hit by trade liberalisation (Aryeetey and McKay 2007). In addition,
financial institutions have been unwilling to lend to the private sector.
The government has, however, made efforts at redistribution and social
protection. The tax base has been broadened, and this helped to increase
government revenues from 12 per cent of GDP in 1990 to almost 24 per cent in
2004.
The government made a clear commitment to social protection in the Ghana
Poverty Reduction Strategy Versions 1 and II, as well as in its National Social
Protection Strategy. The latter identifies a number of areas in which women are
particularly vulnerable, including their over-representation in food crop
production (a sector with some of the highest poverty rates), lower education
enrolment and retention, and insufficient access to credit markets. It also adopts
an explicitly gender-sensitive approach to reducing poverty and empowering
socially disadvantaged groups.
Social protection programmes for the poorest and most vulnerable sections of
society have been expanded, notably the Livelihood Empowerment Against
Poverty (LEAP) programme of cash transfers. LEAP was launched in 2008, and
a year later was reaching around 26,000 households and 131,000 individuals. It
gives cash conditionally on sending children to school, registering births, taking
up post-natal care, and immunising children although, as a recent review of the
programme points out, there is no way of checking that these obligations have
actually been carried out (Gbedemah et al. 2010). In addition, the money is not
necessarily given to women. However, there is a provision that women should
be included in the Community LEAP Implementation Committees.29
The government has increased spending in education (heavily supported by
donors) and on roads, electricity, and water. Access to education has increased,
but pupil performance has declined30 and the overall level of public expenditure

on health was low by West African standards, and health outcomes have in
some cases deteriorated. Part of the problem has been a weakness of public
sector management systems. By one estimation, deviations between budget
estimates and actual spending in education and health are plus or minus 42 per
cent and 68 per cent respectively (Aryeetey and McKay 2007).
More recently, oil has been discovered offshore from Ghana (at Jubilee Fields, in
2007), and the way that oil companies are taxed and that money is spent will
be a test of the governments real commitment to redistribution.

3. What can we learn from the case studies?
While there are no blueprints for generating inclusive growth, these three case
studies suggest some lessons for policy makers. This section draws lessons from
the case studies, and discusses them with reference to the broader literature.
Redistribution
Brazil, Viet Nam, and Ghana have all, to varying degrees, and with varying
degrees of success, made use of explicitly redistributive policies. In the case of
Brazil, this was cash transfers and expanding education; in Viet Nam it was land
reform plus transfers from poorer to richer regions; and in Ghana it took the form
of cash transfers and a broadening of the tax base.
While Kraay (2006) stated that sustained poverty reduction is impossible
without sustained growth, other academics have shown that distribution can
play as strong a role as growth or an even stronger one in increasing income
for poor people (White and Anderson 2001; Bourguignon 2004). The Commission
on Growth and Development surmises that, while growth is the main route to
poverty reduction, as a country develops, redistribution becomes more important
as a way to reduce poverty.
Achieving redistribution is challenging. Inequality is, in Fentons words, often
the product of deep-rooted institutions, processes and power relations (Fenton
2008) and highly politically sensitive.
But all three case studies show that political realities need not sound the death
knell for redistribution. They describe varying levels and kinds of redistribution.
And when it happens, redistribution in this wide sense can be a very powerful
force to reduce poverty, as well as inequality. It is estimated that the Brazilian
government could completely eradicate poverty by transferring a mere 3 per cent
of GDP, for instance (Ravallion 2010).
Box 3: Global redistribution

Branko Milanovic of the World Bank says that there is also a strong argument for global (as
well as national) redistribution. He argues that, from an ethical perspective, distributional
justice within a nation and in the world as a whole is the same thing. And pragmatically,
globalisation increases the awareness of other peoples incomes and thus the perception of
inequalities among both poor and rich people.
Milanovic finds that three basic rules should guide global income redistribution. Funds should
flow from:
1) Rich to poor countries;
2) Taxpayers who are richer than the beneficiaries of the transfer;
3) Taxpayers who are relatively rich within their own countries to relatively poor people in
recipient countries, so that inequality decreases in both donor and recipient countries.
This would, he says, call for the creation of a global agency to be financed by rich people in
rich countries, which would transfer funds to poor people in poor countries.
Adapted from Branko Milanovic (2006) Global Income Inequality: A Review, World
Economics, Vol. 7, No 1, JanuaryMarch, 2006

Taxation
Brazil and Ghana both attempted to widen their tax bases: Brazil by collecting
better data and therefore knowing who to tax; while in Ghana attempts were
made, with reasonable success, to formalise the informal sector and to tax it, in a
fair way. In addition, in Ghana the largest component of the tax system is direct
taxes on personal income and business activity again, generally both
progressive forms of taxation (Tax Justice Network 2009). However, policy
reforms are still needed to lessen the burden of taxation on poor households that
have more children (Aryeetey 2010). More recently, Viet Nam has improved its
tax administration (for instance all tax offices are now connected via a computer
network, and tax revenues have risen as a share of GDP from an average of 19.6
per cent over 2001-4, to an average of 23.7 per cent over 2005-8 (IMF 2011).
Historically, there have been few examples of developing countries (either MICs
or LICs) successfully using personal income taxation policy to redistribute
income to result in greater levels of income equality. A survey of tax incidence
studies in transition (and developing) economies found that tax systems were
progressive in just over a third of cases, and around a fifth were regressive
(Killick 2002). Indeed, Ravallion (2010) finds that in most low-income countries, it
would currently not be possible for personal taxation to fill poverty gaps, because
the rate of tax that would need to be levied on the wealthiest in that country
would be prohibitive (in excess of 100 per cent).
However, he finds that there appear to be feasible options in developing country
settings and that in many middle-income countries, the marginal tax rates
needed for substantial pro-poor distribution are very small less than 1 per cent
on average, and less than 6 per cent in all cases (Ravallion 2010).
Yet in several MICs tax systems are in fact regressive, not progressive. For
example, income inequality has actually increased in Latin America as a whole
once indirect taxes such as VAT, excise tax, and import tariffs are considered
(ILO 2008) these tend to be more regressive.31 As shown above, the Brazilian tax
system is still deeply regressive, even if the tax base has been expanded. This
may be in part because, recently, taxation has mostly been seen as a way to raise
revenue (with varying degrees of efficiency), rather than to redistribute wealth
(Grown and Valodia 2010).32 There may also be considerations of political
economy: Di John (2006) says that the capacity of states to collect direct taxes
provides an important window into their power and legitimacy vis--vis upper
income and middle-class groups.
But there is some evidence of progress in this area. In South Africa, progressive
taxation has reduced the Gini co-efficient from 0.68 to 0.64 and once the
subsidised, or free, receipt of state benefits is taken into account, that number
falls to 0.44 (ODI 2004).
And even in some low-income countries, attempts have been made to introduce
progressive taxation, even if not to a degree that would completely meet
countries poverty needs. In Cameroon, income taxes, indirect taxes, and other
individual taxes (such as gasoline tax) tend to be progressive.
As well as primarily using direct, rather than indirect, taxes, studies show that it
is important for governments to increase the tax base and to strengthen the tax

administration, for example by establishing autonomous revenue authorities
(Killick 2002 who adds that, as it will be difficult for developing countries to
achieve major reductions in inequality through taxation, they should focus on
broadening the tax base). And of course, for a tax to be properly redistributed, it
depends on governments spending the money raised in a pro-poor (ILO 2008)
and gender-sensitive (Grown and Valodia 2010) way.33
It is also vital for governments to ensure that the private sector bears its fair fiscal
burden. In Ghana, drilling for oil started in 2010 and this will generate billions of
dollars in new government revenue, which should be spent on public investment
rather than private consumption (the IMF agrees: according to a recent paper, the
revenue generated from corporate taxation should be reinvested in additional
productive capacity, including education, training, health, and infrastructure34).
Sadly, an oil revenue management law (passed in March 2011) does not require
disclosure of contracts, which would allow civil society and others to monitor the
amount of money the government receives.35
Adequately taxing businesses including natural resource industries, which tend
to benefit from unduly long tax holidays and other forms of exemptions (in
Burkina Faso, for example, most gold mining companies have a ten-year
concession, seven years of which are covered by a tax holiday36) is vital for the
redistribution of income in developing countries. Issues such as tax evasion, tax
havens, and transfer pricing should be dealt with.
Public expenditure
Basic public services: health and education
All three case study countries have tried to increase access to education and
health. The literature finds that these are both important factors in ensuring that
any growth that happens is equitable. Access to basic social services should be
universal and free at the point of use because, as well as being a right, such
services build human capital and support economic growth, while at the same
time limiting excessive income inequality (ILO 2008; Killick 2002; Lin 2009; Jack
and Lewis 2009).
Naschold (2009) reports that the distribution of assets primarily of education
(and land) has an even stronger effect on poverty elasticity than the distribution
of income. Universal provision of these services is also inherently redistributive
as, at least in the first instance, it will be middle-class taxpayers who finance this
access. Killick (2002) says that the provisions of health and education are among
the strongest instruments available to governments for achieving progressive
growth.
The Growth Report says that, far from crowding out private investment, as is
frequently argued, this spending crowds it in. Vandemoortele makes the point
that social services serve a counter-cyclical function too, increasing resilience
(Vandemoortele forthcoming).37
Melamed (2010) adds that achieving the MDGs requires services that are free at
the point of use and funded through taxation and aid revenues, although she
warns that the use of public money to provide services has to be handled very
carefully if it is to reach poor people and to some extent compensate for existing
inequalities. In Ghana, for example, the government has implemented a social
health insurance system rather than one that allows universal access: recent

research indicates that just 18 per cent of the population are currently covered
(Oxfam 2011) and, as the case study indicates, health outcomes have in some
cases deteriorated.
Support for agriculture and land reform

Support for investment in the agricultural sector was a major factor in translating
growth into poverty reduction in both Viet Nam and Ghana, although in the
latter more explicit targeting of non-export-led production would have been
needed to reduce inequality. In Brazil, meanwhile, it was growth in the services
sector that was more consistently pro-poor than agriculture (Ravallion 2009).
Agriculture can be a significant driver of inclusive growth which benefits both
producers and the wide economy. But ensuring that small-scale producers
participate and benefit relies on deliberate inclusion policies and programmes. If
investment in this sector focuses only on the biggest farmers and areas and fails
to consider sustainability it will bypass the poorest and more remote
participants.
Research indicates that government policies should support a move up the value
chain, along with investment in rural enterprises, access to credit (as was the case
in Viet Nam) and extension services, and access to technology and transport
infrastructure to allow access to markets.
This applies particularly to women. Women comprise, on average, 43 per cent of
the agricultural labour force in developing countries (FAO 2011). They have less
access than men to productive resources and opportunities, including land,
labour, education, extension and financial services, and technology. In its recent
synthesis of the literature on gender and agriculture, the FAO estimates that if
women had access to the same productive resources as men, they could increase
yields on their farms by up to 30 per cent, which would raise total agricultural
output in developing countries by up to 4 per cent (which could in turn reduce
the number of hungry people in the world by up to 17 per cent).
In addition, it will be important for governments to ensure that there is growth in
non-agricultural employment, or a policy that links manufacturing to agriculture.
As a UNDP report on Viet Nam says: If one found that most poor households
derived their incomes from street trading, one would not automatically conclude
that the policy response should be to build market stalls and provide training in
accountancy. More effective might be to foster employment growth in other
sectors, where incomes would be higher, (UNDP 2004).
Box 4: Growth, access to natural resources, and equity

It is outside the scope of this paper to look at issues of environmental sustainability in an
extensive fashion. However, there are clear examples of instances where poverty reduction
following a period of economic growth has shown up in the data but not on the ground in the
most disadvantaged communities, due to issues connected with resource scarcity.
Since 1992, the countries along the Mekong River Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand,
Burma, and China have been part of a borderless regional economy, known as the Greater
Mekong Subregion (GMS). A key aim of the GMS was to lift people from poverty and
promote sustainable development for all through economic growth. Between 1994 and 2004
the region grew at 6 per cent a year, and the proportion of people living in poverty has fallen
dramatically in all the countries, using the measure of the number of people living on less

than $1 a day. The Asian Development Bank attributes the decline in poverty directly to the
economic growth in GMS countries.
However, this figure masks the reality for poor and ethnic minorities living in the region. The
transition to modern and commercialised forms of agriculture has made them worse off, due
to their lack of knowledge of new agricultural techniques and their lack of familiarity with
managing credit. New opportunities for commercial agriculture or trading have tended to be
dominated by outsiders.
In Cambodia, there has been a rapid shift from a remarkably equal distribution of wealth in
1989, when land rights were formally granted, to a highly unequal distribution, particularly in
rural areas, and particularly in areas of rapid exploitation of natural resources. The Gini co-
efficient for landholdings increased from almost zero (perfect equality) to 0.63 in 2004, one of
the highest levels of inequality in the Asian region. Since 2004, continued expropriation of
rural land and violent mass evictions, as well as a continued fostering of agro-industry
through the award of large economic land concessions to companies, has widened the gap
still further. In 2007, it was estimated that one-fifth of Cambodians were landless, and the
poorest 40 per cent of the population occupied just 10 per cent of the land.
In the Sekong province of southern Laos, the average annual income in 2003 was just $120,
well below the $1 a day mark. But a study by the World Conservation Union has shown that
the value of the goods that households in Sekong sourced from forests, had they been
bought at market, was equivalent to $525 per household per year. This shows that if people
lose access to forests in Sekong (as is happening), then even if they experience a doubling
or trebling of income they will still have experienced an increase in poverty.
Source: Hughes 2010; Oxfam Australia 2007
Land reform is seemingly another example of a win-win policy for both growth
and reducing poverty and inequality. Transferring the control of land from large
landowners to small farmers can reduce inequalities, while at the same time
promoting improved utilisation and higher productivity through more intensive
cultivation. Watkins (1998) says that access to land has enabled households to
provide their own social protection, reducing dependence on transfers in cash or
kind from the state. Land reform was key to Viet Nams (initially) equitable
transformation, and in provinces where land rights were most effectively
allocated farmers invested more heavily in long-term, multi-year crops and
devoted more labour to non-farm activities.
Besley and Cord (2007) also cite Kenya, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and
Colombia as positive examples of similar kinds of reform.
However, land reform has been a much less successful tool for fighting inequality
in other situations, and it is politically contentious. The FAO says that women
have not always benefited from general land distribution and titling efforts, and
in some cases have seen their customary rights eroded as formal rights have been
extended to male heads of household, thereby increasing gender inequality. In
some instances, the failings have been merely bureaucratic: in the case of Brazil,
for instance, women were guaranteed equal rights to land distributed through
agrarian reform in 1988, but few women were registered as beneficiaries because
the registration forms mentioned them only as dependants (FAO 2011).
According to Kenny (2011), surveys suggest that in Africa evidence of the impact
of formal land titling on perceived land rights of farmers, credit use, or land
yields is often weak, in part because indigenous land systems frequently have
greater legitimacy even after formal titling has been introduced.

Social protection
Conditional cash transfers, pensions, and the minimum wage
It is important that countries combine growth with resilience in other words,
that people do not fall back into poverty following shocks and setbacks, whether
individual (such as sickness) or collective (such as natural disasters or conflicts).
This means that growth should be steady, rather than volatile with frequent
periods of negative growth (Draper et al. 2010). Well-designed social protection
is a key element to ensuring that poor people are more resilient in times of
negative growth.
Cash transfers have been used by Brazil, Viet Nam, and Ghana, as well as many
other developing country governments, to reduce not only volatility but also the
inequality that makes people vulnerable to that volatility. Such transfers have the
advantage of being highly progressive around 75 per cent of the spending goes
to the bottom two quintiles (ILO 2008).
There are a range of other social protection options open to governments wanting
to foster equitable outcomes, including the social pension used to such success in
Brazil, as well as the minimum wage (ECLAC 2010).38 Of particular value when a
crisis hits are automatic stabilisers such as unemployment insurance, which are
already in place, as these can be used to respond immediately rather than
requiring hard-pressed governments to implement new schemes quickly (Oxfam
2010b).
These transfers have been proven to have a powerful impact on poverty
reduction and inequality: according to ECLAC, using data based on household
surveys, a guaranteed partial income, such as a cash transfer or basic insurance,
has moved the Gini co-efficient from 0.58 to 0.0 in the Dominican Republic; from
0.54 to 0.45 in Paraguay; and from 0.59 to 0.5 in Guatemala.39
However, there is a debate as to the gender implications of cash transfers. Some
argue that handing over money to women enhances their economic
empowerment and their decision-making power, both inside and outside the
home. But other analysts warn that this just reinforces womens traditional role
as care-givers, and that cash alone is not enough to empower them (Holmes et al.
2010).
For instance, while one evaluation of the Brazilian Bolsa Familia programme
showed that women receiving money were more likely to participate in the
labour market, another showed that they also tended to reduce their working
hours (Holmes et al. 2010). A separate study did, however, show that women
were more likely to increase their bargaining power outside the household.
Macroeconomic prudence
A theme common to all three case studies, and much of the wider literature, is
that countries stabilised before they grew, and that this stabilisation contributed
to equitable outcomes. This was particularly important in the case study
countries, as all three had been experiencing high rates of inflation (Brazil
experienced hyper-inflation from 1980 to 1994, with rates peaking at around
5,000 per cent;40 in Viet Nam inflation peaked at almost 500 per cent in 1986;41
and in Ghana the peak was in 1983 at 123 per cent42). Instability and volatility

invariably hurt poor people (Vandemoortele 2004), and high levels of inflation
curb growth (Khan and Senhadji 2001).
But what is an appropriate macro-economically prudent policy today? Since the
economic crisis, the IMF has defined the elements of macroeconomic stability
necessary for economic growth as:
Moderate fiscal and current account deficits;
Low debt to GDP ratio;
Low and stable inflation; and
Adequate levels of reserves43.
However, this is not necessarily the same as a macro framework for inclusive
economic growth. While this definition may not be as stringent as the
stabilisation measures contained in IMF conditions in the 1980s and 1990s, these
IMF targets may still be overly rigid and cautious.44
Most LICs do not today display the same rates of high inflation as in the case
study countries (Kenny 2011), meaning that there is not the urgent need to
decrease it. Indeed, research shows that moderate inflation and deficits are not at
odds with growth. A paper from the IMF shows that, for developing countries,
inflation can be as high as 1112 per cent before it starts to significantly impact
growth (Khan and Senhadji 2001).
Similarly, while running a very high fiscal deficit is not sustainable, countries
need moderate fiscal space to increase social sector spending, and in particular
counter-cyclical spending, which in itself reduces vulnerabilities. Justin Lin says
that counter-cyclical policy is the appropriate fiscal strategy for a developing
country (Lin 2009). Research from Oxfam supports this, and indicates that
countries should implement counter-cyclical policies in both good times and bad:
countries that build up enough fiscal space during booms are better able to
maintain or increase spending when a shock hits, and this may imply greater
restraint in public spending during boom periods but this is a delicate balance
and a decision that should be made by the government (Oxfam 2010b).
Even within the IMF there is debate on what constitutes an adequate level of
reserves: if too low, it means that a country is vulnerable in an economic crisis
and may need to seek economically or politically expensive outside help. But if
reserves are too high, money that should be spent on expanding basic public
services and infrastructure is instead diverted, which will in turn restrict growth.
Again, what is needed is a balancing act.
Similarly, debt sustainability is important, but provided countries are spending
money on productive sectors of the economy (including basic public services)
and provided borrowing is transparent, and where possible concessional, in
many countries some increase in debt levels is not a cause for concern (Oxfam
2010a; Radelet 2010).
In other words, once we are no longer talking about a situation of hyper-inflation
or runaway debt, the end goal of macroeconomic prudence is to allow
governments the fiscal space to allow investments in sectors including social
sectors which promote productive investment, innovation, and the creation of
decent work (ECLAC 2010).

To achieve this, the literature suggests that flexibility will be required: while
broadly moderate levels of inflation, debt, and reserves are likely to be the correct
policies, governments need to decide what moderate means in their own
domestic economic and political circumstances.
Here then is a competing vision for macroeconomic policy conducive to equitable
growth, from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC 2010):
To achieve less volatile economies closer to their growth potential,
oversight of the capital account must be improved by using capital
controls.
Central banks should target job creation, with better co-ordination
between central banks and ministries of planning, finance, agriculture etc.
The countrys fiscal capacity should be expanded by increasing taxes.
Counter-cyclical fiscal rules should be introduced, aimed at reducing
volatility and expanding the fiscal base to increase spending.
A finance system is needed that supports small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) as well as large businesses.
A policy environment conducive to pro-poor private

investment
In all three case studies countries, it was private sector development that led
growth. This is unsurprising, as the private sector is the most significant force for
economic growth in almost all developing countries, particularly when informal,
small, and medium-scale enterprises are included (Jeppesen 1995) in other
words, the part of the private sector that is more likely to deliver poverty
reduction as it is more labour- than capital-intensive, and because it has more
local linkages than transnational corporations (Green, 2008).
Markets are imperfect often not taking account of social costs and benefits, and
operating in a world of risk, uncertainty, and imperfect information. Growth
derived from private sector businesses operating in unregulated markets will
frequently not promote inclusive, poverty-reducing growth, or lead to open,
contestable markets with full and fair access for small-scale and poor traders. In
addition, in most contexts, the existing business environment is biased towards
larger, formal enterprises, to the disadvantage of smaller firms (Chen 2005).
The World Banks Justin Lin believes that, in addition to an effective market
mechanism, governments should play an active, facilitating role in industrial
diversification (as was the case in Viet Nam) and in the improvement of
infrastructure.
There is also an important role for the state to play in ensuring that the right kind
of private sector is encouraged. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Job
Pact, which has been endorsed by the G20 as a cornerstone of its economic
recovery plan, calls for special support to small businesses (Cafod 2011). In
addition, small businesses can provide an important safety net during an
economic downturn, providing a source of income for workers who have been
laid off elsewhere, and their capacity respond quickly to new market conditions

is recognised as important for the economy in general (Liedholm and Mead
1999).
While there may be concerns that SMEs contribute to widespread informality
and low productivity, there are historical examples of them driving economic
development.
In Taiwan, for instance, when labour costs rose in the 1980s, the government
actively pushed SMEs to upgrade into ever higher-technology products such as
computers, particularly for export. Unlike in mainland China, SMEs enabled
Taiwan to grow rapidly without driving up inequality. In 2006, almost 98 per
cent of its 1.3m enterprises were classified as SMEs: they realised 30 per cent of
total sales and employed 77 per cent of the Taiwanese workforce (Green 2008).
The government may also need to intervene to ensure access to credit to allow
these smaller firms to thrive. Justin Lin adds that small firms often lack standard
financial documents and a longer financial history, which inhibits their ability to
raise capital on financial markets. A survey of larger firms in Ghana (of 133
medium-/large-scale enterprises) found that inadequate finance turned out to be
the most significant constraint for 53 per cent of them. Finance became more of a
problem the smaller the enterprise (Aryeetey 2008).
One institution that is tasked with addressing the issue of access to capital is the
International Financial Corporation (IFC), a part of the World Bank. However,
research by Eurodad indicates that the majority of its loans are directed towards
large-scale telecoms and mining companies sectors that tend to be large and
therefore more able to access credit elsewhere, and that are not particularly job-
creating.
Similarly, while FDI can be important as a provider of capital, it is often less
labour-intensive, producing fewer jobs than domestic investment in similar
sectors (Draper et al. 2010). This suggests that the state will need to intervene and
manage the process of attracting and regulating FDI, to ensure that it is more
labour-intensive, and also that it provides technology transfer.
Fairer trade rules

Much of the growth that has taken place in developing countries has been
generated by increased exports. However, this has often served to exacerbate
inequalities (Kremer 2007),45 with those who have greater access to markets often
benefiting from export opportunities and cheaper imports, while others,
especially small-scale farmers, find domestic prices for their produce depressed.
A study of the differentiated impacts on women and men of Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) found that the majority of women in the three
developing countries examined (Tanzania, Mozambique, and Jamaica) were
highly unlikely to be able to take advantage of any new economic opportunities
offered by the trade deals, as they have such limited access to assets, credit,
markets, and information (One World Action 2009). And even in export-driven
sectors that are likely to expand with a trade-driven growth increase, women are
likely to be trapped in relatively low-paid jobs with little job security. However,
the FAO (2011) cites evidence that while export-intensive sectors often do not
employ men and women on the same terms, they often provide better
opportunities for women than exist within the confines of traditional agriculture.

The literature and case studies show that countries that have been able to
carefully control the terms of trade liberalisation, such as Viet Nam, have been
able to ensure more equitable outcomes. This suggests that fair trade rules, which
allow for sequenced liberalisation at the timing decided by the country itself, are
important to ensuring that growth delivers for all. Historically, liberalisation is
better seen as an outcome of development, rather than an initial condition, and
attempts at opening markets prematurely often end in tears. Rodrik says that as
we move forward with a new model of capitalism after the global economic
crisis, it will need to be recognised that developing countries may be required to
use some subsidies and other practices currently prohibited by trade rules
(Rodrik 2009).46
Labour
Employment is the main source of income for most poor people because most
poor households have few other assets to rely on other than their labour, and as
such it is an essential component of equitable growth. Viet Nam, for instance, has
a clear government policy to urbanise, including creating employment
opportunities in cities.
Conversely, jobless growth a problem currently afflicting the USA and other
advanced economies creates a major impediment to poverty reduction. Many
developing countries have also experienced their growth as jobless growth. In
some cases, growth has been accompanied by increased unemployment,
particularly among young people, and the under-employment of large numbers
of people in low-productivity jobs (Bird 2008). The revolutions in Egypt and
Tunisia were both, in part, sparked by discontent among young people unable to
find work.
On the other hand, East Asian countries have, at various times and in various
places, been able to reduce inequalities through a combination of economic
growth and employment generation the so-called productivist model (ILO
2008).
The literature indicates that in developing countries the main aim should be to
raise productivity in activities that will continue to engage large proportions of
the workforce, i.e. agriculture, and to foster the creation of non-agricultural wage
jobs in the services and manufacturing sectors on a massive scale, particularly at
the level of the small (even household) and medium-sized enterprise.
Of equal importance is that new jobs are created under the decent work model,
i.e. with a fair wage, security of employment, and good working conditions. This
has a strong gender dimension in that women are often located in marginal,
insecure, and poorly-paid jobs. As The Growth Report says, labour rights
should not be sacrificed to achieve economic objectives, including growth.
Growth in labour-intensive manufacturing can also raise the incomes of the poor.
However, the expansion of capital-intensive mining industries can result in
jobless growth (The Growth Report) in addition, these jobs can often entail
harsh working environments and low pay, aggravating inequality.
Finally, employment creation schemes such as Indias Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme, which ensures that one member of every rural household has
100 days of paid labour every year can act as an important form of social
protection.47

4. Conclusion
This paper is not intended to be the final word on the subject of inclusive growth
or indeed of inequality: there is still much research to be done on this area. But
while there is no prescription as to how to bring about equitable growth, there
are some policy areas which have been shown in the past to translate economic
growth into inclusive growth:
A redistributive agenda: This would include cash transfers, redistributive
public expenditure on health, education, and agricultural services and a
progressive taxation system. This package should serve to arm poor and
marginalised people with the skills to allow them to participate in the
benefits of economic growth, and limit their exposure to the downside
risks of that growth;
Macroeconomic prudence: This means sustainable, moderate levels of
inflation, deficits, and debt; and counter-cyclical policies, but at the same
time governments must ensure that pro-poor elements of public spending
are protected;
A policy environment conducive to pro-poor private investment, and in
particular the domestically owned, labour-intensive private sector,
especially SMEs.
Historically, different countries have followed different paths depending on their
starting circumstances. Countries may be best off starting with an analysis of
their economic and political situations and thereby identifying the binding
constraints on inclusive growth (Rodrik 2006). As Winters et al. (2010) say, the
international community can play a supportive role in this.
Moreover, the evidence in this paper suggests that donors should heed the
lessons of the past, and ensure that they aim to secure inclusive growth by
addressing measures designed nationally and where necessary, globally to do
so, rather than assuming that growth alone will be sufficient to deliver poverty
reduction.

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Notes
1 The Commission on Growth and Development, headed by Nobel-prize winning economist Michael
Spence, brought together 21 high-level policy makers and academics, to evaluate the evidence on
this issue. Their synthesis report, The Growth Report: Strategies for sustained growth and inclusive
development, was published in 2008. Throughout this paper it is referred to simply as The Growth
Report.
2The IMF predicted that Ethopias growth in 2010 would be 7 per cent, Tanzanias 6.2 per cent, and
Ugandas 5.6 per cent, for example. IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2010, IMF, Washington
DC.
3http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html#growth, accessed 15 February
2011.
4 http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-consensus.pdf, accessed 15 February 2011.
5 DFID, Business Plan 20112015, November 2010.
6 Stimulating Sustainable Economic Growth: CIDAs sustainable economic growth strategy,

Canadian International Development Agency, November 2010. http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/EconomicGrowth/$file/Sustainable-Economic-Growth-
e.pdf, accessed 17 March 2011.
7 While there are also inequalities between countries and indeed this is the rationale for rich
countries attempting to promote development in poorer ones this paper specifically considers
intra-country inequality only.
8 The Gini coefficient is a number between zero and one that is a measure of inequality. As
Vandemoortele (2009) points out, the Gini co-efficient is in itself problematic. For instance, it misses
the way in which income is distributed across society it failed to highlight the phenomenon of the
disappreaing middle class in the USA, for example. Instead, she proposes that policy makers look
at polarisation, i.e. the clustering of members of society around more than one income level. See
Vandemoortele M. (2009) Growth Without Development: Looking Beyond Inequaltiy, ODI Briefing
Paper No 47, February 2009, Overseas Development Institute, London.
9The Human Development Report 1995 introduced two new measures of human development that
highlight the status of women. The first, Gender-related Development Index (GDI), measures
achievement in the same basic capabilities as the Human Development Index (HDI) does, but takes
note of inequality in achievement between women and men. The second measure, Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM), is a measure of agency. It evaluates progress in advancing
women's standing in political and economic forums. It examines the extent to which women and
men are able to actively participate in economic and political life and to take part in decision making.
However, there is no composite index taking in all elements of inequalities, including elements such
as powerlessness (McKay 2002).
10 For a critique of the MPI, see http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=3070, and for a response to this
critique see http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=3092 (both accessed 15 March 2011).
11 http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en/index.htm
12See the work by Isabel Sawhill and Ron Haskins at the Brookings Insitution for an example of this
type of discussion.
13 The Economist, Internal Affairs: the gap between many rich and poor regions widened because
of the recession, 12 March 2011.

14 http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1925/elusive-90-percent-solution-gas-prices, accessed 14 March
2011. However, there is still a strong political backlash against measures to reduce inequality. As
Robert Reich observes in his foreword to The Spirit Level, President Obamas modest porposal to
limit the income tax deductions of the wealthy in order to pay for health care for all met fierce
resistance from a Democratic-controlled Congress.

15Since 2000, there has been a fall in income inequality in Latin America that is both significant and
widespread (Gasparini et al. 2009).
16 Human Development and Wealth Distribution, speech made by Dominique Strauss-Kahn,
Agadir, 2 November 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/110110.htm, accessed 9

February 2011.
17 Editors Choice,The Big Idea, British Medical Journal (1996) 312 (70037).
18http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article1451973.ece?homepage=true, accessed 14
February 2011.
19Of course, a country that is growing will be able to spend more on policies that explicitly target
those other non-income-related goals, such as health and education, but it has to take the decision
to do so. Winters et al. (2010) say that experience of recession or stagnation in developing
countries has shown that, without economic growth, the levels of public and private investment and
spending needed to attain better education and health outcomes and better housing cannot be
maintained. Note that this paper was commissioned by the Presidential Committee for the G20 of
Korea.
20Although it should be noted that donor support (aid) to agriculture fell away during the 1990s.
According to OECD data, between 1980 and 1984, 17 per cent of donor aid was committed to
agriculture. By 19951999 that figure had fallen to just 8 per cent.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/43/2094403.pdf, accessed 28 March 2011.
21 For instance, just two of the MDGs explicitly target gender: MDG3 on gender equity and MDG5
on maternal mortality and reproductive health.

22 Rodrik (2004) points out that growth has happened in low-income countries, and the problem is
not that African countries have failed to grow, but that they cannot maintain that growth. He says:
This suggests a different remedy [from pushing for major growth spurts], one that focuses in the
short run on selectively removing binding constraints on growth and in the medium- to longer-run on
enhancing resiliance to external shocks.
23 Much of this section has been adapted from a presentation, Notes on the Relatively Recent
Brazilian Experience of Economic Growth with (Government-Led) Income Redistribution, made by

Claudio Hamilton Matos dos Santos of IPEA, Brazil at the UNDP International Policy Center for
Inclusive Growth Seminar on Inclusive Growth, 810 December 2010. http://www.ipc-
undp.org/PageNewSiteb.do?id=235&active=1, accessed 1 March 2011.
24 From close to 18 million people living on less than $40 a month to 9.5 million.
25 Although in the south of the country pre-unification, a market-based economy had been in place
in the past.
26 For example, private property was reintroduced, but the state continued to own property.
27Rama (2008) points out that this redistribution is larger, in relative terms, than similar transfers in
the European Union.
28Vietnams children face rising inequalities, AFP, 31 August 2010. http://www.un.org.vn/en/un-in-
the-news/193-general/1522-vietnams-children-face-rising-inequalities-un-.html, accessed 28 March
2011.
29 A recent assessment of LEAP concludes that, while the programme is subsidising expenses (of
the kind that are normally paid by women (such as buying school supplies), it is not noticeably
reshaping household dynamics, whereby decisions lie with men and boys. This is because the
amount of money transferred is low, and there is weak civil society engagement with the process,
so there is no feedback loop.
30 As Kenny (2011) notes, decline in quality is frequently the initial impact of a rapid increase in
enrolments. However, this can be reversed over time if governments increase investments in the
sector.
31 For taxes to be a tool in improving equity, it is important that they are direct taxes, which are more
progressive than indirect ones.

32However, the objective of equality did feature in tax policies in the past. Tax policies throughout
the world until the mid-1970s were seen as powerful ways of mitigating income inequality (Grown
and Valodia 2010).
33Of course, raising sufficient revenue to fund public services and social protection is another
redistritutive aspect of taxation. Diane Elson, quoted in Grown and Valodia (2010), shows that
countries that are unable to raise sufficient revenues are likely to under-provide social services,
thereby increasing the burden of unpaid care and social provision shouldered by women. Grown
and Valodia also make the point that taxation policies impact not just on income inequalities but
also on gender inequality, and policy makers need to take this into account, considering, for
example, that increasing VAT on childrens clothing may reduce the disposable income of women
more than that of men. Therefore, to rectify inequalities in the tax system itself, policy makers will
need to improve the distributional impact of the tax system by reducing the gender inequalities it
fosters among and within households.
34 Presentation made by Victor Lledo and Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu at UNDP International Policy
Center for Inclusive Growth Seminar on Inclusive Growth, see above.

35http://www.oxfamamerica.org/articles/countdown-to-oil-drilling-in-ghana, accessed 24 March
2011.
36http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/economic_crisis/downloads/dp_crisis_multiplied_burkina
_faso_en_220610.pdf, accessed 24 March 2011.

37 For a review of the literature on health/education and growth, see Baldacci et al. 2008.
38 A 2009 paper by the ILO stated that minimum wages are particularly important, as previous crises
have shown that recovery to pre-crisis wage levels can take much longer than restoring economic
growth. In addition, while it is often assumed that miniumum wages will reduce employment,
empirical evidence is mixed. Indeed, recent surveys show that the employment effects of minimum
wages tend to be small or even negative
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/GB/304/GB.304_ESP_3_engl.pdf, accessed 21 March 2011.
39 ECLAC, p.38.
40 http://www.thecsem.org/content/hyperinflation-brazil, accessed 17 March 2011.
41 http://webh01.ua.ac.be/cas/PDF/CAS22.pdf, accessed 17 March 2011.
42http://www.aercafrica.org/documents/RP169.pdf, accessed 17 March 2011. This paper states that
stablisation efforts were mostly unsuccessful in bringing down inflation in Ghana.
43
43 Presentation made by Victor Lledo and Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu at UNDP International Policy
Center for Inclusive Growth Seminar on Inclusive Growth, see above.

44See David Goldsboroughs paper for the Center for Global Development for an analysis of more
recent IMF targeting, which makes the case that it continues to be applied in an overly cautious
manner (Goldsborough 2007). However, recent research conducted by Development Finance
International and commissioned by Oxfam shows that, during the recent economic crisis itself, the
Fund has not on the whole been overly restrictive and that countries have been able to have
sufficient fiscal space to maintain social sector expenditures (Oxfam 2010a).
45 Kremer (2007) says that most recent research either finds that trade liberalisation is associated
with increased inequality in poor countries or finds no strong association. The relationship between
openness and inequality appears positive for low-income countries and negative for high-income
countries, with the turning points in the $6,000$13,000 per capita GDP range.
46 Trade experts will recognise this as the re-emergence of the concept of the development box.
47 The Government of India allocated a massive $8.4bn for the NREGS programme for 2010,
although there are fears that this may be contributing to the rise in food prices in the country. The
Economist, India work scheme puts pressure on food prices, 25 Feburary 2010.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/30ca4a94-2151-11df-a6b2-00144feab49a.html#axzz1EoEFXYfY,
accessed 23 February 2011.

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debate and to invite feedback on development and humanitarian policy and practice.
They do not necessarily reflect Oxfam policy positions. The views expressed are those of
the author and not necessarily those of Oxfam.
Oxfam International April 2011

This report was written by Elizabeth Stuart, a senior policy advisor for Oxfam International based
in Washington DC. Oxfam acknowledges the assistance of Raquel Gomes, Duncan Green, Ravi
Kanbur, Pedro Martins, Claire Melamed, Mick Moore, Kimberly Pfeifer, Kate Raworth, and Jan
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Oxfam Research Reports

Making Growth Inclusive:

Senior policy advisor, Oxfam International

Growth is back on the development agenda, promoted by bilateral and

Executive summary ......................................................................................................... 3

1. Inclusive growth defined........................................................................................... 8

2. Three case studies ..................................................................................................... 15

3. What can we learn from the case studies? ............................................................ 22

2 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 3

4 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 5

The shifting international agenda on inclusive growth and

6 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 7

What is meant by inequality?

8 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Does inequality matter in the growth and poverty reduction

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 9

10 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 11

Where there is still disagreement

The growthpovertyinequality nexus

12 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Box 2: Inequality, the MDGs, and growth

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 13

14 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Case study one: Brazil an example of inclusive growth?23

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 15

Case study two: Viet Nam some of the fastest poverty

16 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 17

18 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Case study three: Ghana growth built on agriculture has

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 19

20 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 21

Box 3: Global redistribution

22 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 23

24 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Support for agriculture and land reform

Box 4: Growth, access to natural resources, and equity

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 25

26 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 27

28 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

A policy environment conducive to pro-poor private

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 29

Fairer trade rules

30 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 31

32 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 33

34 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 35

36 Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011

Making Growth Inclusive:, Oxfam Research Report, April 2011 37