Global Climate Change: Hearings Committee On Environment and Public Works United States Senate
Global Climate Change: Hearings Committee On Environment and Public Works United States Senate
Global Climate Change: Hearings Committee On Environment and Public Works United States Senate
105304
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
(
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
45112 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
(II)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
Allard, Hon. Wayne, U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado ............................ 9
Baucus, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from the State of Montana .............................. 3
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri ................. 5
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 16
Chafee, Hon. John H., U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ................. 1
Hutchinson, Hon. Tim, U.S. Senator from the State of Arkansas ....................... 6
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 9
Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ........... 13
Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut ........... 14
Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada .................................. 11
Thomas, Hon. Craig, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming .......................... 4
Wyden, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon .................................. 8
WITNESSES
Barron, Eric, professor, Department of Geosciences, and director, Earth Sys-
tem Sciences Center, Pennsylvania State University ....................................... 17
Articles:
Consequences: Nature and Implications of Environmental Change ..... 69
Evaluating Policy Decisions Based on Climate Model Predictions ....... 81
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Baucus .......................................................................................... 90
Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 93
Senator Reid .............................................................................................. 92
Christy, John R., associate professor, Department of Atmospheric Science,
University of Alabama at Huntsville .................................................................. 19
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 94
Responses to addition questions from:
Senator Baucus .......................................................................................... 104
Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 108
Jorgenson, Dale, professor, Economics Department, Harvard University .......... 28
Article, Economic Effects of a Carbon Tax ..................................................... 172
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 158
Lindzen, Richard S., Alfred P. Sloane Professor of Meteorology, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology ........................................................................................ 22
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 110
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Baucus .......................................................................................... 118
Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 119
Schneider, Stephen H., professor, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford
University ............................................................................................................. 25
Article, Achieving Carbon Dioxide Targets Cost-Effectively: What Needs
To Be Done Now? 141
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 120
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Baucus .......................................................................................... 150
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Page
Schneider, Stephen H., professor, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford
UniversityContinued
Responses to additional questions fromContinued
Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 155
OPENING STATEMENTS
Baucus, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from the State of Montana .............................. 199
Chafee, Hon. John H., U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ................. 197
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 199
Kempthorne, Hon. Dirk, U.S. Senator from the State of Idaho ........................... 201
Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada .................................. 205
WITNESSES
Fay, Kevin J., executive director, International Climate Change Partnership .. 227
Letters to:
President William Clinton ........................................................................ 249
Under Secretary of State Wirth ............................................................... 247
Membership list, International Climate Change Partnership ...................... 261
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 246
Proposal, Issues in the Climate Change Protocol Negotiations .................... 250
OKeefe, William F., chairman, Global Climate Coalition .................................... 229
Letter, response to comments by Under Secretary of State Wirth .............. 265
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 255
Responses to additional questions from Senator Chafee ............................... 267
Wirth, Hon. Timothy E., Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Depart-
ment of State ........................................................................................................ 206
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 243
Yellen, Janet, chair, Council of Economic Advisers, National Economic Coun-
cil, Executive Office of the President .................................................................. 202
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 236
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Chafee .......................................................................................... 239
Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 241
Senator Lieberman .................................................................................... 242
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Article, Greenhouse Forecasting Still Cloudy, Science magazine ........................ 262
Letter, Association of American Railroad .............................................................. 273
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS,
Washington, DC.
REVIEW OF THE SCIENCE
I think thats very good and I hope all of us and the panel today
do focus on the science because its important to get the facts before
we then proceed to making policy determinations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Thomas.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CRAIG THOMAS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING
Senator THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a statement I wish to put in the record if I may and just
let me say that I think its very important that we do talk about
this as we prepare for the negotiations that will take place both in
the next month and then in December.
I happen to be a member of the Energy Committee as well as
Foreign Relations, as well as this committee, and weve had hear-
ings of this nature in all three committees. So far, weve focused
on the science, weve focused on the policy, but I guess its impor-
tant to continue to do that again.
What are the issues? Of course, what should be done; whats the
United States role vis-a-vis other countries; do we put controls on
our country and not on others; and what impact does that have?
I think those are very important issues.
I am an original cosponsor of Senate Resolution 98 with Senator
Byrd calling basically that if we have these binding commitments
that they also apply to others. I also hope that those testifying
today might give some thought and some consideration to what the
EPA regulations that have recently been announced might, in com-
bination, mean as we move on to this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ill submit my statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thomas follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CRAIG THOMAS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF WYOMING
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for taking the time to schedule this hearing to discuss
the Clinton Administrations policy on global climate change. As world negotiators
prepare for meetings in Bonn later this month, with an eye toward Kyoto, Japan,
in December, it is critical that we do all we can to make sure the scientific facts
are available and credible. Using good science, rather than emotional rhetoric, en-
sures we will be spending our limited resources on actual problems.
As some of my colleagues may know, both the Energy and Natural Resources and
the Foreign Relations Committees have had hearings on this topic. I am a member
of both and, if there is one thing I can report, its that the science at this point is
not clear and compelling. Furthermore, there is currently no consensus that would
compel us to rush into an agreement that will hurt Americas economic competitive-
ness for questionable benefits. Nevertheless, the Administration already seems to
have its mind made up by stating that the science is over.
Before the United States enters into any formal binding agreement, we must first
be sure that the effects of global warming are real and the economic consequences
are better understood. Unfortunately, the Administration is withholding the fine
print details of its proposal from the American people. To the extent that there is
a global warming problem, all countries must participate and play by the same
rules. If this does not happen, the result is a diminished American economy and a
worse worldwide environment. Everyone ought to contribute to the cause. Asking all
nations to contribute will help the environment, help U.S. industries stay competi-
tive, and help build new exports as we send our environmental technology and ex-
pertise around the globe.
I have repeatedly stated my opposition to legally binding targets and timetables
on the U.S. and other developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while
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at the same time exempting heavy polluters like China, India, Mexico, South Korea
and Brazil from those identical requirements. It doesnt take a genius to figure out
that they will not have to meet the uncompromising restrictions that will be placed
on our industries. Mr. Chairman, by the product of government regulation, we could
potentially drive the relatively cleaner U.S. industries out of business, thus increas-
ing emissions of dirtier plants in undeveloped nations. That just doesnt make sense.
I am an original cosponsor of Senate Resolution 98, introduced by Senators Byrd
and Hagel, calling on the Clinton Administration not to agree to any measure which
would commit the U.S. to a binding international treaty for developed countries, but
exclude those standards on China, India, Mexico and others. Although we should
constantly work to reduce air pollution around the world, this must be done in a
manner that does not threaten jobs or our international competitiveness. I am
pleased to report that 62 of my Senate colleagues share this same view and have
cosponsored this important initiative.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, we have some expert witnesses and I look forward to
their testimony. I would hope that they expand their comments and touch on the
Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) particulate matter and ozone rule which
President Clinton recently endorsed. Although 250 Members of Congress, 27 Gov-
ernors, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and many State and local officials and busi-
ness leaders alike have expressed disapproval and opposition to the new standards,
the president turned a deaf ear. I, for one, believe the impacts of a binding global
climate treaty, coupled with the EPAs new air regulations could prove devastating
to Americas energy-intensive businesses, our Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Amer-
ican jobs and our global environment. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator CHAFEE. Fine.
Senator Bond.
hearing on the science dealing with the proposed clean air stand-
ards. Its like deja vu and I really applaud the chairman for looking
at the science.
If theres one thing I learned from the clean air hearings, it is
that oftentimes scientists are not in agreement as to what the sta-
tus of true science is regarding any particular subject and I suspect
thats what we will be hearing today as well.
I, like Senator Bond, am a cosponsor with over 60 other Sen-
ators, of the Byrd Resolution opposing the United States agreeing
to any terms in Japan in December that unfairly harms the United
States.
If the developed countries alone are responsible for reducing the
worlds emissions, these nations could face serious economic dis-
advantages. In Arkansas, where agriculture is the leading industry
and is so very important to the economic status of our State and
to the livelihood of tens of thousands of Arkansans, we cannot af-
ford to give such a competitive advantage to these developing coun-
tries such as China.
We, in Arkansas, are the leading producer of rice40 percent of
the States rice is exported out of the country. The States economy
relies heavily on rice productions and yet, China produces 24 times
the rice of the United States. So if we limit rice production or
hinder it in any way, it will not deal effectively with global warm-
ing but will put States like Arkansas, and particularly the Mis-
sissippi Delta area, which is already an impoverished area, at a
tremendous disadvantage and would truly be devastating.
I want to thank the chairman for calling this hearing and for the
witnesses who will testify today. I look forward to hearing that tes-
timony and hopefully establishing some factual basis for the deci-
sions that will be made.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchinson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TIM HUTCHINSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to hear testimony regarding the sci-
entific basis behind the Global Climate. This is kind of a deja vu experience, because
one of my first hearings in the Senate and the first hearing in this committee was
a science hearing on the EPAs clean air proposal.
Today we have a similar hearing, this time focusing on the science of the green-
house effect on the United States. If there is anything I have learned from the Clean
Air hearings is that many times scientists do not agree on the science. Despite the
fact that it seems to be the common assertion that humans are causing the green-
house effect, in reality there is some disagreement regarding our actual effect.
There is agreement that humans are adding some greenhouse gases, the disagree-
ment, however is whether these additions are causing significant changes in the
Earths temperature. I have an Associated Press article, that if we have time I
might ask the panel to comment on, which states that it is possible that North
Americas ecological systems have always been in flux.
According to the article, not long ago ice sheets two miles thick covered the entire
northern half of the continent. The article goes on to say that as recently as 1850,
temperatures were few degrees cooler than they are today and that any warming
we may be experiencing now this is merely the continuation of a natural warming
trend that began 150 years ago.
These scientific uncertainties are disturbing, especially when considering we are
faced with the administrations support for legally binding reductions of greenhouse
emissions. Even more frightening, perhaps, than the U.S. being legally bound to re-
8
ducing emissions, is the prospect that developing nations, such as China and Mex-
ico will not be required to implement similar reductions.
I question whether this will do any good at all for the reduction of greenhouse
emissions. If humans are causing a great warming of the earth, then all humans
must be concerned with this trend, not just the countries that are developed.
This December in Kyoto, Japan, the world will decide what needs to be done to
reduce the threat of global warming. I, along with 58 other Senators, cosponsored
the Byrd resolution opposing the United States agreeing to any terms in Kyoto that
unfairly harms the United States.
If the developed countries alone are responsible for reducing the worlds emis-
sions, these nations could face serious economic disadvantages. In Arkansas, where
agriculture is the leading industry, we cannot afford to give such a competitive ad-
vantage to these developing countries, such as China.
Arkansas is the leading producer of rice in the United States. Forty percent of
the States rice is exported out of the country. The States economy relies heavily
on rice productions, yet China produces 24 times the rice of the U.S. If we limit rice
production, or hinder it in any way, the Mississippi Delta, an already impoverished
area would be devastated.
Again, I want to thank the chairman for calling this hearing and for the witnesses
who will testify today. I hope we can establish some facts today.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.
Senator Wyden.
California is the No. 1 agricultural State in the Union, contributing more than
$22 billion per year to our nations economy while employing more than 1.4 million
people. Farmers in my State are concerned that global climate changes will cause
highly unpredictable weather and changes in water availability resulting in reduced
crop yields.
EFFECTS ON WATER SUPPLIES
Californians depend upon reliable sources of water for their livelihood and quality
of life. Warmer temperatures due to increased greenhouse gases could cause more
precipitation to fall in the form of rain instead of snow. A reduced snowpack, espe-
cially in the Sierra Nevada, could lead to a change in the timing of runoff and po-
tentially greater flooding during the winter and dryer conditions in the summer.
EFFECTS ON HEALTH
me about your presence and were very glad youre here. I know
that Senator Sessions regrets that he cant be present.
We will start with Dr. Barron.
Gentlemen, if you will note, here is the green light, then the yel-
low will come on after 6 minutes and then the red light. So youll
get about 7 minutes apiece.
Go to it and there will be questions for all of you. What were
going to do is have each of you give your statements and then we
will have questions from here.
Senator INHOFE. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?
Senator CHAFEE. Sure.
Senator INHOFE. I notice we have five witnesses and I think we
only received information from four. Was one added at the last mo-
ment?
Senator CHAFEE. Dr. Barrons testimony apparently came in late.
Well get it for you.
Dr. Barron, go to it.
STATEMENT OF ERIC BARRON, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF
GEOSCIENCES, AND DIRECTOR, EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCES
CENTER, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
Dr. BARRON. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators, members of
the Senate staff and public participants, I believe that the prospect
of future human-induced climate change is one of the most complex
and serious science and societal issues that we have to face in this
century and going into the next century.
We know that humans are altering the environment; we know
that they are altering the land surface; we know the composition
of our atmosphere has changed. If we look at the very best sci-
entific assessment of these changes, it appears as if the climate re-
sponse will be something that is large and something that is sig-
nificant.
At the very same time we say that, we also have to recognize
that the air of ours or the uncertainties about those predictions are
very large. So really, the major question comes down to the fact of
what do you do when the scientific community, and the best sci-
entific assessments we have, suggest that the change is going to be
large and that in a sense, we need to look out because the future
climate is going to be dramatically different than the present cli-
mate.
At the same time, the scientific community is hotly debating the
size of the warning label that should be applied to this particular
problem.
We have two lines of evidence on which we have to focus. One
of them is observations and one of them is the development of pre-
dictive models. If we look at the observational record, what we see
is that instrumental record is extremely short and at the same
time, it was never designed to take the temperature of the planet
or the pulse of this earth.
Instead, it was designed to provide weather safety information
and weather forecasting information. This means its use in some
ways, in terms of climate, has become limited.
At the same time, when we do look at this record, were begin-
ning to see the signs that the latter half of the century is distinctly
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that would have the effect of reducing the growth of carbon dioxide
emissions, not the most important greenhouse gas to be sure, but
the one for which atmospheric concentrations are changing.
Now we come to Mr. Samuelson. Mr. Samuelson says, thinking
were going to crush the world economy, that to have an appro-
priate effect, the appropriate carbon tax would be $100 per ton of
carbon. The appropriate tax discussed in my testimony is, in fact,
$10 a ton. In fact, that $10 figure is for the year 2025. If we
wanted to think about an appropriate tax at present, what would
be the tax that we should implement immediately, the answer is
about $5.29 a ton, in other words, a totally different order of mag-
nitude than what has been suggested.
The conclusion is then that we have to think of this as a three-
step process. The first is determining an appropriate target for an
international agreement. Unfortunately, the Rio Summit of 1992
got off on the wrong foot. What is required is slowing the growth
of emissions, not capping emissions at something like 1990 levels.
The second point is that once weve agreed, hopefully in Kyoto,
but if not, then at some subsequent meeting, on an appropriate tar-
get that is justified in terms of the costs and the benefits that are
associated with slowing climate change, we then have to arrive at
a means of international implementation.
For that purpose, I think the Administrations position involving
a system of internationally tradable permits is certainly an appro-
priate point of departure, but its important to combine that with
the key feature that has been the subject of the Byrd resolution
which is bringing in all the parties, in other words having an inter-
national agreement that is truly comprehensive.
Now we come to the nub of the matter. We have a climate
change policy. It is, in fact, embodied in the U.S. Climate Change
Action Plan. If you look at the final exhibit in my handout, youll
see the effect of the Climate Change Action Plan.
There was an objective of trying to achieve by voluntary methods
a reduction in emissions by the year 2000 to 1990 levels. That was
what was called for in the Rio Summit. That has been, unfortu-
nately, a total failure.
What we have found is that the emissions have grown very, very
substantially. Even by 1996, the last year for which the most re-
cent data are available, these have grown far beyond what the Ad-
ministration at that timeSenator Chafee alluded to the Senate
ratification of the Administration agreement by President Bush at
Riothat there would be a growth of emissions without this Global
Climate Action plan that would go far beyond stabilizing emissions.
In fact, the growth of emissions has been far beyond what was an-
ticipated at the time.
Nonetheless, we come back to the basic point that the goal of cli-
mate change has to be reconsidered and that economics is really
the key to understanding that issue.
Thank you very much.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Doctor.
What we will do is each of us will have 8 minutes to ask some
questions. I understand there is going to be a vote at 11:05 a.m.,
so Id like to start off. Sometimes votes are scheduled and dont
occur.
32
what happens to the surface because thats where we and the bulk
of living things are.
Senator CHAFEE. Could you put a figure on that?
Dr. SCHNEIDER. Remember, these probabilities are subjective be-
cause there are many factors involved but so are the opinions often
of generals, doctors and others, so my subjective opinion on this
would be 95 percent likely that there is a global warming trend,
probably even higher than that because it isnt just thermometers
of the world which average out to show this 1 degree Fahrenheit
warming in a century, but mountain glaciers have been largely re-
ceding around the world and sea levels have risen. There is a con-
sistent pattern.
The issue isnt so much whether the Earth is warming, its why.
Senator CHAFEE. Its also important how much, isnt it?
Dr. SCHNEIDER. Yes.
Senator CHAFEE. Could you set a figure on that, how much?
Dr. SCHNEIDER. How much is a little tougher even at the surface
because you cant just stick a thermometer in somewhere and get
out the number. Thats why many of us are pleased that the sat-
ellite measurements have come along to provide a supplement, yet
there is a lot more adjusting that needs to take place in coordinat-
ing the instruments.
Unfortunately, satellites were only flying in 1979, so we have to
try to guess about where there were inaccuracies and so forth.
I think what the IPCC said and the National Research Council
said before, is that the standard best guess is something like a half
degree warming over the past century, plus or minus a couple
tenths of a degree, and there are four groups around the world that
continuously reanalyze this data to try to take out biases and cor-
rect errors.
Senator CHAFEE. Senator Baucus.
Senator BAUCUS. Id like to see if there is any agreement among
the panel first as to whether or not theres been an increase in CO2
caused by man over the last 100 years? Does everybody agree there
has been a significant increase in CO2 caused not by natural
causes, but by man?
The figure I have is that 250 ppm to about 360 ppm over the last
100 years.
Dr. LINDZEN. Its closer to 280 ppm.
Senator BAUCUS. The range is from 280 ppm to
Dr. LINDZEN. To 360 ppm.
Senator BAUCUS. OK. The primary causes of that are what, fossil
fuels?
Dr. SCHNEIDER. Fossil fuels and deforestation. The initial defor-
estation was in the now-developed countries. If we had a balloon
and we could have flown from the East to the West Coast of the
United States before the settlers were here, we largely would have
seen trees more so than farms and that carbon that those trees
then represented is now in the air. The same thing is true in Eu-
rope.
Now weve been regrowing our forests and the bulk of the net de-
forestation is taking place elsewhere.
Senator BAUCUS. So there is agreement that CO2 caused by man
is increasing?
35
Dr. SCHNEIDER. More than half is probably from CO2 due to in-
dustrial emission.
Senator BAUCUS. More than half due to industrial.
Is there also agreement that the surface is warming, has over the
last 150 years? Im not getting into the cause but whether the sur-
face has been warming?
Dr. LINDZEN. I think the IPCC limit is 13 to 23 of a degree. There
is uncertainty in that. While there is widespread agreement, for in-
stance, its been mentioned that theres urbanization, I had to work
with these records a few months ago and I suddenly realized the
IPCC listed Capetown, Johannesburg, and Buenos Aires as rural
stations.
Senator BAUCUS. But there is general agreement?
Dr. SCHNEIDER. Theres general agreement, its got a large error
bar and nobody knows why.
Dr. JORGENSON. Let me chime in at this point. if you look at Fig-
ure 5.4 of my testimony, you can see what appears to be the con-
sensus about global mean temperature changing from 1865. Its in-
creased by a little over a degree (Farenheit).
Senator BAUCUS. The next question I want to ask you scientists
is to rate the probability of individual causes. The cause of todays
hearing basically is CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Dr. Lindzen,
you say water vapors is much more.
Before we get into that, I just want to ask each of the panelists
to give his view of whats caused this warming, two or three can-
didates and the best you can give a probability to each of the two
or three candidates.
Ill start with you, Dr. Barron, and answer very quickly because
I dont have a lot of time left.
Dr. BARRON. I think theres a significant probability that a good
portion of that has to do with human activity.
Senator BAUCUS. With what?
Dr. BARRON. With human activity.
Senator BAUCUS. Which human activity?
Dr. BARRON. Emissions of CO2.
Senator BAUCUS. Emissions of CO2. You think there is a signifi-
cant probability?
Dr. BARRON. I think theres a significant probability.
Senator BAUCUS. OK. Dr. Lindzen.
Dr. LINDZEN. I would say at this point, the most likely candidate
is natural variability. As I point out, this is the system that vacil-
lates with no forcing, even according to models and theory.
Senator BAUCUS. Dr. Schneider.
Dr. SCHNEIDER. If you consider the surface warming together
with the cooling of the stratosphere, which actually I think is due
not just to depletion of ozone but increased greenhouse gases, they
actually cause the stratosphere to cool and the lower atmosphere
to warm, I would say that it is maybe only a 10 or 20 percent
change, in my opinion, that the warming trend is a natural event.
There is an equal probability it could have been a cooling event
in nature. I dont know which it is, so I would rate it more like 80
or 90 percent likely that were part of the story and that the bulk
of that is probably emission of carbon dioxide.
Senator BAUCUS. Dr. Jorgenson.
36
the system to change, the more likely it is that there will be sur-
prises like the ozone hole. I think thats a relatively safe forecast.
Senator BAUCUS. Id like to follow up very briefly on the question
the chairman asked, namely how do we go about getting more data,
either baseline data, more research, more facts so that we can be
a little more certain that our decisions are better founded than
they otherwise might be? Where is the deficiency in either research
or data gathering? What do we do?
Obviously this is a big problemglobal warming, climate
changeand I think intuitively most people think something bad
is going on here, but we also want to make sure, as much as pos-
sible, that we handle it the right way and make the right decisions.
It seems to me that the best way to address that is, as you all
suggested one way or another, to get more data, do more research
and so forth. I dont know what it is. What do we do to make sure
were getting better information, more facts? Any of you?
Dr. BARRON. Id just add that I think there are some things like,
for instance, making sure when youre collecting weather data that
its suitable for climate. A few simple rules and policies and a little
bit of investment would go a long way.
I think its clear just by the debate where deficiencies are in
models.
Senator BAUCUS. If we could spend more money, where should
we spend?
Dr. JORGENSON. Could I check in on that? I think the thing to
focus on, Senator Baucus, is that we are spending $2 billion a year
on this problem. Its not as if our efforts are insignificant in eco-
nomic terms. Were putting a lot of money into research and were
getting the benefits of that research as you see before this panel.
I dont think its a question of spending more money. Its a ques-
tion of absorbing the information that we have and maintaining, as
Dr. Barron suggested earlier, the observational system that weve
put up, making sure it continues.
Senator BAUCUS. But I understand that Japan, Germany, and
other countries are doing more.
Dr. JORGENSON. Thats simply not true. If you look at our effort
by comparison with these other countries, its very large by com-
parison with our R&D effort and by comparison with the size and
scope of our economic activities. We are the leaders in this field by
a substantial margin.
Senator BAUCUS. Thank you.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.
Were in the last part of the vote. This is what Id like to do.
Well take a little recess now and well go over and I think a lot
of us want to hear these answers and well come right back.
This is interesting to all of us. Why dont we all go and vote and
I personally am going to come back very quickly and then well
start again. I hope everybody will be here because were all inter-
ested in what you have to say.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator CHAFEE. In our order of appearance, we had Senator
Thomas who is not here, Senator Bond is not here.
Senator Hutchinson.
38
Weigh the costs against the benefitsas you have with your ex-
ample based on rice culture in Arkansasbut I think is appro-
priate. Farming is the industry that is going to be most affected by
this policy. Whatever we do, we need to think about very moderate
measures.
Instead of Samuelsons $100 tax, what we need to think of by the
year 2025 is something like a $10 tax per ton of carbon. Thats a
difference of order of magnitude. That is where the economics of
this boils down to. We need to take very moderate measures, but
we need to start now.
As far as the developing countries are concerned, the important
thing to focus on there is that at the present time, developing coun-
tries are not going to be very substantial emitters. However, we
can anticipate the growth of emissions from countries like China is
going to be substantial. Therefore, we need to bring them into the
discussion.
Senator HUTCHINSON. Dr. Jorgenson, if China produces 24 times
the rice that the United States produces and if it is only a modest
tax as youre advocating that would be imposed, even a small dif-
ferential between a developed nation like the United States and
China which is producing 24 times, its hard for me to imagine
thats not going to have a dramatic impact in markets and costs on
American agriculture.
It also seems to me to argue that China is not a significant emit-
ter if its producing 24 times the rice. That doesnt equate with me.
Dr. JORGENSON. No, at the present time, China certainly is a sig-
nificant emitter. My point is that if you take developing countries
as a whole, they are far less significant than the developed coun-
tries.
Focusing on the role of China, China, like the United States, will
have opportunities to participate in an international agreement.
They will benefit from looking at the costs on the one side and the
benefits on the other and what we should try to achieve is an inter-
national consensus based on the idea that we minimize the cost of
whatever we do. We want to minimize the cost of climate policy,
whatever that policy turns out to be.
For that purpose, I think the Administrations proposal of inter-
nationally tradable permits, when expanded in due course, to the
developing countries, would be an appropriate market-based instru-
ment.
Senator HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has ex-
pired but Dr. Schneider was wanting to respond and I would like
to ask permission.
Senator CHAFEE. Go ahead.
Dr. SCHNEIDER. I just wanted to clarify something. In the charts
that Dale Jorgenson showed with economic justification for certain
actions, including figures with three and four decimal places of pre-
cision, although I agree in principle with what hes trying to say,
I have to remind us that these are based upon economic models
which assume what cost profiles will be because they assume what
the cost of technology will be. They also assume what the damages
to the economic system will be from various levels of climate
change.
41
lots of sulfate aerosols that would offset some of the global warm-
ing.
Now the current assumptions are that they will not allow that
on health grounds and therefore, those combined global warming
numbers will probably, in the next assessment, creep right back
up. It was the difference in the assumptions as to what people will
do, not a difference in the sensitivity of the models that caused the
change in projections.
Senator ALLARD. Ive been called to order by the chairman, but
hopefully we can come back and maybe continue some of this dis-
cussion later.
Senator CHAFEE. Senator Inhofe.
Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Im going to cut
mine down to only 4 minutes because Im running out of time. If
you can keep your answers short, Id appreciate it.
Dr. Barron, I didnt see your testimony before the meeting, but
you said we maintain a sophisticated observation system. We have
the satellite but not the continuity. I dont know what you mean
by not the continuity.
Dr. BARRON. You can take, for instance, the MSU records.
Theres a paper that just appeared in Nature which basically looks
at other techniques and thought there was an issue about the
trends because its not a single satellite.
I have a great deal of faith that John Christy knows that data
inside and out, but here it becomes a matter of some debate be-
cause its multiple satellites. Now weve set about in this Nation to
create an earth-observing system with which we can address issues
like that and make sure that we can begin to have this long-term
record.
That system has gone through a tremendous amount of debate
and we dont want to launch the same thing over again. Weve fi-
nally come down to the point where were going to launch a couple
of these satellites. Weve got about 9 months to decide on what the
next set of satellites are like and were not ready.
Senator INHOFE. Dr. Christy, do you have any response to that?
Dr. CHRISTY. Just that, yes, we used nine satellites to piece the
record together but as I showed by the independent validation, it
was done correctly.
Senator INHOFE. Dr. Barron, you are predicating a lot of these
predictions on the computer models and I think last April there
was an article in the Washington Post, if you can help me through
this, where the National Weather Service was trying to predict the
cresting of the river in North Dakota. In a 2-week period, they
went from 49 feet to 50 feet to 52.5 and 54 and so forth.
I guess the question I would ask is arent there more variables
in predicting, as in your discussion, than there would be in some-
thing like this? When you talk about a timeframe of 2 weeks,
wouldnt the incidence of accuracy be damaged a little by looking
at 100 years versus 2 weeks?
Dr. BARRON. Its true, except you also have to realize that
weather prediction is quite different than climate prediction. In
weather prediction, youre basically starting at an initial stage
which is observed and youre carrying that forward based on laws
45
of physics into the future and youre updating it with the new ob-
servations as you go along.
What that means is the error grows the farther you go into the
future and so thats basically weather prediction. To predict some-
thing 2 weeks in advance is a very challenging issue.
In climate prediction, youre basically looking at a set of factors
that forced the system to change and youre attempting to see what
is in equilibrium or balance with those particular forcing factors.
It has a completely different set of problems and errors. We dont
want to just accept what it says, it has a completely different set
but the two issues are quite distinct.
Senator INHOFE. Dr. Jorgenson, I have a quote from your book.
You submitted kind of an outline as opposed to the test of your re-
marks, so one of my staff read your book, The Economic Effect of
Carbon Tax. It says, Stabilizing the atmosphere and concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide which would lead to an eventual stabilization
of temperature would require reducing emissions by 50 percent rel-
ative to 1990, a very costly policy.
My question would be, a minute ago you said were not talking
about capping, were talking about reducing the growth. When I
read this, my interpretation was capping. Was my interpretation
wrong?
Dr. JORGENSON. What I did in that paper was to look at the con-
sequences of various policies. I considered stabilizing the climate,
which is what youre referring to; I considered stabilizing emis-
sions, which is the objective of the Rio Summit Agreement; and
what I put in my written testimony and in the outline you referred
to is the economists best policy defined by the one that produces
the most benefits relative to the cost.
That doesnt involve capping the climate or capping emissions.
What it involves is reducing the growth of emissions very, very
modestly. That means that the climate is going to continue to
change and that were going to have to learn to adapt to that.
Senator INHOFE. But the treaty that were going to be looking at
is talking about capping, isnt it?
Dr. JORGENSON. I think that its to be determined because at the
moment, there are a number of proposals on the table. The small
island states needless to say, a relatively insignificant group from
the political point of view, is talking about reducing emissions by
20 percent. The Europeansthey dont agree on this, in particular
the British dont agree with thishave talked about reducing emis-
sions by 15 percent.
The goal that is to be advocated by our Administration in the
Kyoto meetings and the meetings that lead up to it is to be deter-
mined. They dont actually say what the goal is. What Im saying
is it is up to you to determine that. That is what I suggest you do.
Ive laid out what I believe that should be, namely a very, very
modest reduction.
Senator INHOFE. I am out of time. I have one last question Id
like to ask. I know scientists cannot answer questions yes or no,
but Im going to ask you to do that or not answer it at all, starting
with Dr. Barron.
Its a yes or no question. You mentioned, Dr. Barron, in your tes-
timony that the models have limitations causing uncertainties. The
46
trated when he was trying to do exactly the same thing many years
ago as a pioneer of this kind of workto try to balance in an opti-
mizing framework, the mitigation costs and damages due to cli-
mate.
What you want to reduce first is the cost of abatement, trying
to mitigate CO2 by increasing the price of energy, which might hurt
the economy. He was attacked from all sides because he picked 1
percent loss of GDP for his climate damage function.
He was attacked by environmentalists because this value under-
estimated, in their opinions, damage to nature and it neglected
health effects. He was attacked by others for the point about resil-
ience, that his 1 percent GDP damage estimate neglected CO2 fer-
tilization effectswhich could be benefits.
So he asked a number of people, about 18 or 19 peopleI was
one of themand he conducted a survey and said what do you be-
lieve climate change damages would be? We recognize you cant cal-
culate it precisely, but you study the fields, so give your best guess-
es.
In my testimony Figure 3 shows the two different scenarios of
change, 3 and 6 degrees, and what he found is that the economists
as a group tended to have lower climate damage estimates but they
were not negligible. They would assign a 10 percent chance of a
benefit. Their 50th percentile estimate was about half of a percent
loss of GDP and then their 10th percentile radical number on the
high side was several percent loss of GDP. So again, its a risk
question. They viewed climate damage across a wide range.
When Nordhaus asked the natural scientists, they gave a factor
of 20 higher in their estimates of climate damages, to which Bill
quipped that, those who know the most about the economy arent
so worried. I counter-quipped, those who know the most about
nature are.
Part of the difference is that the natural scientists were less opti-
mistic about the resilience of nature than the economists. But you
cant know for certain. Were not going to have the uncertainties
resolved in time either. The sword of uncertainty has two edges
and one edge is we might be lucky and things will come down. The
other edge is we might not be so lucky and its back to risk man-
agement again.
To me, the best way to manage risk is to have flexible manage-
ment, because in a state of large uncertainty, you dont want to
make irreversible decisions. You dont want to make irreversible
decisions that damage the economy, nor do you want to make irre-
versible decisions that damage the ecology.
My support for Dale Jorgensons call for a modest tax is not be-
cause I think that over the long term, I want to see only a small
percentage of climate change be mitigated, but Id like to get the
experiment started of finding out how that tax would induce tech-
nological change, how the prices of alternatives would come down
so there isnt an economic catastrophe from a big change being
needed later on.
If we dont start that process now, well be building power plants
which have 40-year life times that will emit a lot.
Senator BAUCUS. Thank you.
Senator CHAFEE. Senator Sessions.
52
tage of the benefits of having those countries play. Who pays re-
mains to be determined by the negotiations.
Its not something that is a matter of great urgency and its not
a reason that we ought not to take action now. We will sacrifice
some efficiency but that is going to be very, very modest. What we
ought to focus on is setting in course a process that will bring those
countries into the negotiating arena and get them to be players at
the appropriate time.
Senator WARNER. Dr. Lindzen.
Dr. LINDZEN. Yes. Could I answer it briefly? If you do not bring
in China, no matter what you believe about climate
Senator WARNER. You say if we do not bring China in?
Dr. LINDZEN. If you do not bring in China and India, no matter
what you believe about climate, the impact on climate will be very
little.
I guess I hear underneath what youre saying is, the reason you
want to do something is to see how people would respond to such
regulations to get a better idea. That may be an advantage, but the
advantage will not be for climate due to these actions.
Senator WARNER. I thank the chair.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.
Senator Sessions, do you have any other questions?
Senator SESSIONS. Again, Im troubled by the thought youre will-
ing to sacrifice some efficiency but Ive learned in the 6 months or
so that Ive been here that group after group after group comes be-
fore the U.S. Government and ask, it only cost a little bit to do this
program or this regulation only increases costs a minimal amount,
so incrementally pretty soon you have hampered this Nations abil-
ity to be competitive in the world.
We already are losing large numbers of jobs around the world.
I think, I for one, want to know that there is identifiable sound
science that indicates to a significant degree we can improve this
global climate before we take action.
Would anybody like to comment on that and correct me if Im
wrong in my thoughts?
Dr. Schneider.
Dr. SCHNEIDER. I certainly agree with you that we need to base
all judgments on sound science, but we have a definition problem.
Sound science does not necessarily mean certain science. To me
what sound science means is the best judgment of the state-of-the-
art of the community of the range of possible outcomes.
That is what these reports (e.g., IDCC) try to do and in that com-
munication, there is always a fair degree of uncertainty. As I said
earlier, that uncertainty includes mild and catastrophic outcomes
as relatively low probability possibilities and almost everything
else in between more likely.
As we continue to do more research, hopefully well be narrowing
those ranges of uncertainties but everybody agrees they wont nar-
row that rapidly. Therefore, the question is whether we fear more
investing present resources as you said, which have many good
competitive uses, as a hedge against some potential risk in the fu-
ture or whether we fear more the investment or whether we fear
more having those risks unfold.
55
Karls analysis also indicates (figure 2) that there has been an increase in the
amount of precipitation from extreme precipitation events (daily events at or above
2 inches of rainfall).
Figure 2. Percent area of the USA with a much above normal proportion of total an-
nual precipitation from extreme precipitation events [daily events at or above 2 inches
(50.8mm)]
Combined land and ocean surface temperatures (figure 3) provide the basis for ex-
amining global trends in temperature, and are the basis for speculation on the im-
portance of anthropogenic greenhouse gas increases as an explanation of the warm-
ing. These analyses indicate that global-mean surface temperatures have increased
by .4 to .60C during the 20 Century.
66
Figure 3.
However, our observations of climate change from instrumented records are very
short, and they rely on systems designed for weather predictionnot one designed
for taking the temperature or pulse of the earth. We lack continuity of satellite ob-
servations, surface instruments are subject to change and the level of accuracy is
based on weather safety and forecasting needs and not global temperature analysis.
Geologic records from ice cores, tree rings, corals and other sources of data suggest
that the Earths climate is naturally highly variable. The record of snowfalls on
Greenland (figure 4) illustrate this variation during the last 18,000 years. Changes
in snow accumulation rate are often abrupt, suggesting remarkably large climate
changes over periods of decades.
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Figure 5. Ring widths for the last 450 years from Mongolia illustrating a unique
20th century record indicative of warming.
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The recent record appears to be unique, but the simple fact is that modern hu-
mans havent experienced the range of variations which occur naturally, nor do we
have a real sense of their character or spatial distribution. The record describes
change, but without clear attribution as to the causes. Significant natural variability
should be expected during the coming decades.
RESULTS FROM MODEL PREDICTIONS
The results from model predictions also have limitations. In large measure, sci-
entists agree when the topic is global and the predicted changes are given as a
range (e.g., a doubling of CO2 will yield 1 to 4.5C globally averaged temperature
warming), but we have greater and greater uncertainty when we look at specific re-
gions, specific decades or specific phenomena, such as changes in hurricane intensity
or numbers. Yet it is at these scales that human systems intersect and interact with
climate.
The reprint that follows is a summary of predictions from climate models with a
ranking of the uncertainty associated with the predictions. The rankings are based
not on some specific criteria, but rather the considered opinions of a large group of
climate experts who have sought to place model predictions in an ordered context
which would readily be understood by the educated United States citizen. Within
the text are two figures which illustrate results from comprehensive climate models.
Figure 1 in the reprint illustrates the range in predicted changes in global-mean
surface temperature, in degrees Celsius, for the next 80 years based on results from
seven different General Circulation Models (the most comprehensive climate models
to date) with carbon dioxide increases included at the rate of 1 percent per year
(IPCC 1995 assessment). All seven models suggest an additional 1 degree global-
mean increase in temperature by the year 2050. Figure 2 in the attached reprint
gives the predicted geographic distribution of an increase in mean-annual surface
temperature that would result from a doubling of carbon dioxide based on the GCM
simulation of Manabe and Stouffer (1994; Journal of Climate). Increases for the
United States range from 3 to more than 5C. The predicted changes are substantial
given that the 1988 heat wave and drought in the Ohio River Basin was on average
less than 1C above normal.
Climate model experiments designed to predict past climates, which are very dif-
ferent from today also yield valuable insights. During the last decade, hundreds of
GCM simulations have been completed by a wide variety of models in an attempt
to predict climates both substantially warmer and substantially cooler than at
present. In no case did a GCM overpredict the warming or the cooling in the geo-
logic record. This suggests that the GCMs may have a sensitivity to factors such
as carbon dioxide which is less than that required to explain past climates. Other
factors may also be important (e.g., identification of all the factors which may have
influenced past climates and difficulty in extracting correct climate information from
fossils), but the fact that the models always have underpredicted the changes in the
past may be telling. It is also interesting to note that the major warm episodes dur-
ing the past are also associated with geochemical evidence for higher atmospheric
carbon dioxide levels.
The reprint which follows details the strengths and weaknesses of current model-
ing programs nationally and internationally. It also notes that progress on both ob-
servational and modeling fronts over the last decade have been clear, but it is a mis-
take to promise quick answers. Solution of many of the remaining issues will
undoubtably take decades. I suspect that for many years to come, newspapers will
continue to explain topics like global warming by quoting scientists who are poles
apart on specific points. Yet in the midst of the public confusion that this approach
promotes, we cant ignore the fact that even within the range of climate model pre-
dictions, the consequences have significance for our economic vitality and national
security.
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EVALUATING POLICY DECISIONS BASED ON CLIMATE MODEL PREDICTIONS
Policy decisions about climate change are particularly challenging given that (1)
the results from comprehensive climate models suggest significant changes over the
coming decades, but the uncertainties are also largeparticularly when examining
the aspects of climate model predictions which are most significant for human ac-
tivities and (2) the increased surface temperatures and changes in precipitation pat-
terns recorded from surface instruments may be a result of human-induced climate
change, but may also be a product of natural climate variations. Two types of ac-
tions address this conundrum.
(1) We must ensure that we have a healthy observing system and modeling effort
in this nation. Obtaining useful climate records is a secondary priority of our cur-
rent observing systems which has been designed for weather safety and prediction.
Relatively modest increases in funding could address this issue. Programs designed
to provide continuity of satellite observations (e.g., NASA Earth Observing System)
are subject to annual review and budget reductions, increasing the risk that con-
tinuity of critical measurements will be lost. Interestingly, European countries and
Japan are promoting strong space-based observation programs as they recognize the
value of these data sets for decision-making and scientific advancement.
The U.S. climate modeling community has expressed strong concerns about the
effectiveness of our efforts in climate modeling, with particular emphasis on the fact
that IPCC assessments are increasingly being based on long-term simulations com-
pleted by other nations. Interestingly, countries like Japan, the United Kingdom
and Germany are promoting strong observation and modeling programs with less
robust economies than the U.S. The simple fact is that advanced knowledge has eco-
nomic and societal value.
There is also considerable prospect for advances in knowledge, and at scales
which allow us to examine more closely the potential impact of climate change on
societies. For example, recent techniques have been applied to produce high resolu-
tion climate simulations by embedding or nesting high resolution, limited area cli-
mate models within global models. Global models provide the coarse spatial resolu-
tion predictions of the large-scale atmospheric circulation, while the high resolution
model allows the incorporation of more realistic elevations and model physics. Fig-
ure 3 in the reprint illustrates the improvement in the prediction of precipitation
for the United States comparing (a) observations for spring 1980, (b) a GCM pre-
diction for spring 1980 showing a relatively poor simulation of this important vari-
able, and (c) the results for the same period from a high resolution model embedded
within the same GCM shown in figure 3b. The improvement is dramatic, giving con-
fidence that higher resolution models may provide more useful predictions. Figure
6 illustrates the results from this technique for a doubled concentration of carbon
dioxide. The results suggest substantial differences in precipitation (figure 7). Win-
ter precipitation is predicted to increase in the Northwest and Northeast with mod-
est increases across the northern states. California and Arizona show significant de-
creases in winter precipitation. In summer, the model simulation suggests the larg-
est increases in precipitation occur from Louisiana-Mississippi-Alabama across the
across the central U.S. to South Dakota. Again, California has significant decreases.
Such results must be viewed with cautionthey are a preliminary analysis using
a new, and not thoroughly tested technique to achieve high resolution predictions
for specific regions.
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(2) We need to develop and apply a litmus test to action which is practical and
most likely to achieve positive results. Risk and vulnerability to natural variability
and climate change must be a key aspect of this test. For example, if a region is al-
ready historically and economically vulnerable to droughts or floods, and predictions
of fixture climate change also exhibit such tendencies, or even enhanced tendencies,
then this should be a call to action. Water and water resources provide a key exam-
ple of potential vulnerabilities. Two figures follow which describe vulnerability asso-
ciated with water availability and water quality. Figure 8 illustrates regions with
water demand problems in 1980. Each dot or shaded area indicates a problem where
water demand approached or exceeded supply during the period of analysis. This
suggests a vulnerability to natural variability and to climate change (see figure 1
and 7, for comparisons). Figure 9 illustrates water withdrawals by industry. Note
that the industrial withdrawal of water is basically a percentage of the available
resource (near 25 percent). This suggests that water is a critical resource to industry
and that industry is co-located with water, using far more in regions where water
is abundant. Many regions are susceptible to water quality problems as a result of
climate variability or change. Interestingly, decreased river flow, or increased ex-
treme events with decreased median rainfall events, has the potential to dramati-
cally change the dilution power of rivers for pollutants. Water quality may be an
unheralded global change issue.
Economic and societal risk should also be a key aspect of decision-making. For ex-
ample, the emergence or re-emergence of infectious diseases, which are closely relat-
ed to climate, have become an issue of growing concern in the health community.
Human health issues have potential for tremendous costs associated with human
life. Human health risks are governed by a large number of factors, ranging from
socio-economic status, to the availability of clean water and nutrition, to the quality
of the health care infrastructurefactors which generally serve to limit U.S. risks.
However, over the last decade, climate and climate change have become recognized
as one of the significant factors influencing health risk within the U.S. Climate
change and variability can effect health directly, through extreme thermal events
like heat waves and cold episodes, and through severe weather such as hurricanes
and tornadoes. Climate change can also influence human health indirectly. The ma-
jority of the indirect influences involve (1) changes in the range and activity of vec-
tors and infective agents, (2) changes in water and food-borne infective agents, and
(3) altered food (especially crop) productivity. A number of examples of human
health vulnerability in the United States serves to illustrate the nature of this prob-
lem.
The increases in average temperatures associated with global warming or with ex-
tremes in natural climate variability will probably be accompanied by an increase
in the number of heat waves. The deaths of 726 people in Chicago during the sum-
mer of 1995 heat wave is an example of the potential direct impact of thermal ex-
tremes. Mid-latitude cities, already characterized by large urban heat island effects,
appear to be the most susceptible to heat waves. The heat-related mortality that has
occurred in cities such as Chicago, St. Louis, Washington D.C., and New York City
disproportionally affect the young, elderly, the economically disadvantaged, and the
ill.
Phenomena, such as El Nino, are associated with changes in rainfall, producing
flooding and droughts in different regions. Based on climate model predictions, cli-
matologists have speculated about whether anthropogenic warming will produce in-
creased intensity or an increased number of severe hurricanes along the east coast
of the U.S. Severe weather has well-known potential to increase the number of
deaths and injuries.
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Vector-borne diseases are a major cause of illness and death across the world.
These disease vectors (e.g., mosquitoes and rodents) are strongly influenced by cli-
mate. For example, Dengue fever is transmitted by the bite of a mosquito (Aedes
aegypti and Aedes albopictus). Both mosquitoes are currently present in Florida and
Texas (an outbreak of Dengue occurred in south Texas in 1986) but U.S. cases are
uncommon, most probably because of high standards of housing, adequate water,
sewer and waste management systems. However, the mosquitoes that transmit Den-
gue are strongly controlled by winter temperatures. Warming, particularly in terms
of minimum winter temperatures could substantially increase the range of this Den-
gue vector, including regions north of the mid-Atlantic states. Figures 10 and 11
show regions of potential outbreak, and the association of the Dengue vector with
warm winter temperatures. Malaria, caused by the protozoan parasites of the genus
Plasmodium and transmitted by Anopheles mosquitoes, would also substantially ex-
tend its range and activity under conditions of global warming.
Wet-Dry cycles also influence human health risks because of its influence on pred-
ator-prey relationships. Historically, moving into a wet period following a few years
of severe drought, provides advantages to rodent populations which can reproduce
faster that their predators (e.g., owls, etc). Population explosions of rodents eventu-
ally leads to invasions into human habitats and human food stocks, increasing the
risk of disease. This is the primary explanation for the outbreak of the deadly Hanta
virus in the Four-Corners region of the U.S. (figure 12).
Lyme disease, which is caused by a bacterium, has a strong climatic association
as well. Lyme disease is transmitted by the bite of a tick (Ixodes scapularis) which
feeds on the white-footed mouse, the white-tailed deer and other mammals. The
number of Lyme disease cases is strongly correlated with the size of the deer popu-
lation, and in turn, the size of the deer population is correlated with the severity
of winter conditions in the northeastern U.S. (figure 13).
The U.S. is less susceptible to problems of malnutrition and crop productivity
compared to much of the world because of the breadth of food production and our
capability for technological adaptations. None-the-less, climate change and varia-
bility may result in the need to change crops and planting practices, and may also
influence the activity or emergence of crop diseases.
Health risks associated with climate change and variability have implications for
policy. Such policy should involve (1) surveillance efforts, (2) increased research on
changes in range and activity of vectors associated with climate change, (3) disease
prevention programs, (4) education for medical and public health communities, and
(5) public outreach.
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SUMMARY
Two examples are given where action makes sense because of the level of risk and
the level of our vulnerability to natural variability as well as the potential for future
climate change. In the face of uncertainties associated with the observed record and
model predictions, we must adopt practical strategies for dealing with the potential
impact of climate variability and change. These strategies should be based on two
elements: (1) a strong observation and modeling research program within the U.S.
designed to enhance economic vitality and national security, and (2) a litmus test
for decision makers based on the level of risk and vulnerability to natural variability
as well as future climate change. These two elements provide the most logical basis
for policy decisions.
In the 1980s, Global Warming due to the enhanced greenhouse effect came to be
perceived as a serious threat to the planets ecological and societal sustainability.
This concern was based primarily on estimates of global warming and other climate
changes from numerical models of the Earths climate system. (This perception was
reinforced by a few hot, dry summers in the eastern U.S. which constituted for some
people the smoking gun of climate change.) While the development of models is
critical to our future ability to examine what we may be doing to alter the climate
of the Earth, many scientists acknowledge that models are still rather simple rep-
resentations of the complex processes that control the Earths climate.
The observational evidence for enhanced greenhouse global warming is also less
than clearly defined. While all surface-based global temperature data sets indicated
warming of 0.3 to 0.6C since the last century, the complete source of this warming
is still unknown. First, the Earth was evidently coming out of a relatively cold pe-
riod in the 1800s so that warming in the past century may be part of this natural
recovery. Data sparseness and reliability are somewhat suspect in the early years
of the thermometer climate record and remain a concern even today when the
shrinking network of stations is attempting to capture relatively small variations.
Local land use changes may also have added additional warming not connected with
greenhouse gases.
With this background, scientists recognized that we did not have an observing
system in place with adequate means to truly monitor the health of the planet or
to provide the data needed to validate and improve the models of the Earth System.
One obvious limitation of information about the atmosphere was the lack of true
global coverage.
2. THE MICROWAVE SOUNDING UNIT DATA SET
I am here to report a success storya story that involves U.S. Government sci-
entists and managers who collaborated closely and productively with university sci-
entists. In 1989, to test the ability of satellites to monitor the Earth, Dr. Roy Spen-
cer, a NASA scientist, and I began investigating temperatures measured by the ex-
isting TIROSN family of weather satellites (average life span was only 4 years
each). These satellites were designed to provide information for daily weather fore-
casts, not for answering questions about global climate change.
The instrument of interest to us was the Microwave Sounding Unit (MSU), iden-
tical copies of which were flown on all of NOAAs operational polar orbiters since
1979. The MSU measures the intensity of weak microwave radiation emitted to
space by oxygen in the air. The magnitude of this intensity is proportional to air
temperature, so with global coverage by the satellites we could compute the true
globally averaged air temperature. Two specific layers have lent themselves to accu-
rate measurements: (1) the lower troposphere, or the lowest 7 km of air next to the
surface, and (2) the layer at 1721 km, or lower stratosphere.
95
Putting together a climate record from multiple satellites involved collecting a
huge volume of data and was a remarkable achievement in and of itself. It is a trib-
ute to the current government system and the vision of scientists at the National
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) that those data (with little perceived mar-
ket value at the time) were saved and archived. The MSU data products are now
almost priceless in the global warming debate in having established a precise histor-
ical record of the Earths temperature over the last 18+ years.
It was our good fortune that my call to NCAR asking about the possibility of ob-
taining the MSU data came 1 week before a previously scheduled, major NCAR
project was to begin to copy all satellite data from an old, outdated storage system
to a newer one. Thus, forewarned that Spencer and I believed the MSU data were
of some unique value, NCAR kindly extracted the necessary data (only 2 percent
of the total) for us at only the marginal cost of the extraction process. This relatively
free and open attitude concerning data availability was the key to our success in
creating the MSU data set, since obtaining the data from a cost-recovering data cen-
ter would have been prohibitive (the quote was over $1 million) for the speculative
value of the MSU data for climate monitoring.
The computing facilities for our own massive processing task were provided by
NASAs Marshall Space Flight Center, and we had the enthusiastic support of the
Earth Science and Applications Division. After several months of tedious data analy-
sis, we were able to construct various data sets with exceptional precision and con-
tinuity. The particular technique we eventually developed allowed the MSU data to
be independently validated. In Fig. 1, I show the comparison between MSU tem-
peratures and those measured by radiosondes (balloons) in which a weather instru-
ment package is carried aloft. These two systems (satellite and radiosonde) are com-
pletely independent in every way. In Fig. 1 it is clear that both systems are measur-
ing the same variations in temperature to high precision.
For long term variations, I include in the table below comparisons between large
numbers of radiosondes and MSU measurements. It is again clear that both systems
are telling us the same story on temperature variations since 1979. Note that none
of the long-term trends differ by more than 0.03C/decade.
Comparisons of trends since 1979 for MSU lower troposphere vs. various radiosonde-based tro-
pospheric datasets which, except for the 850300 hPa layer temperature, are weighted to
match the MSU weighting function.
Balloon Tr end MSU Trend for Difference (Balloon
No. stations used Years
C/dec. same region minus MSU)
Our datasets begin with January 1979 and continue to this day. We have been
fortunate that two of the four MSU channels have performed exceptionally well on
each of the nine satellites that were launched at intervals of about 2 years. It was
critical that at least one satellite in functioning condition was orbiting when a new
satellite was launched, because we required a period of overlap for precise inter-
calibration. (Only two satellites are operational at a given time).
3. THE TEMPERATURE OF THE LOWER ATMOSPHERE
The temperature of the global atmosphere is shown for the lower troposphere and
lower stratosphere in Figure 2 (courtesy R. Spencer). Since we live in the lower tro-
posphere, that time series has received the most attention. You will notice that
there are large variations, both month-to-month and year-to-year. Because these
variations are independently observed by two satellites, we know they are real. The
trend in the time series is slightly downward (0.05C/decade or 0.09F/decade).
It is this relatively flat trend when compared to surface data (which show warming
trends since 1979 of +0.09C to +0.14C/decade, depending on which dataset is cited)
that has attracted attention to the Spencer/Christy MSU dataset.
96
Though the MSU temperature record has demonstrated high precision, there is
also an element of ambiguity in the measurement. The layers measured by the MSU
are several kilometers deep. Any intra-layer variability, therefore, would be masked
by the vertical average. For example, a warming trend at upper levels and a cooling
trend at low levels of one layer would be seen as no trend in the MSU vertical aver-
age.
One of the reasons the surface thermometer data have shown greater warming
in the past 18 years is due to the fact that in continental regions the surface tem-
perature responds with greater variation than the deep layer of air above. Over
oceans (and in the global average), the opposite occurs. In the past 18 years there
has been a tendency for the atmosphere over land areas to show warming (which
is greater in the surface air response) while the atmosphere over oceans has exhib-
ited cooling (greater effect in the MSU record). This pattern is thought to be due
to natural variations. The net effect in the global average is a relative difference
in the trends between surface air and the deep atmosphere. Thus, the uneven
warming/cooling distribution of the past 18 years accounts for part of the difference.
Other differences are due to areas poorly sampled or not sampled at all by the
surface network, as well as to some urban warming or land-use changes around
many of the thermometers. It is a monumental achievement to construct a record
of surface air temperatures, and most of these data sets have been subjected to
many careful corrections to account for these non-natural temperature impacts.
Because of its precision and true global coverage, we believe that the MSU
dataset is the most robust measurement we have of the Earths bulk atmospheric
temperature. At the same time, it is still a relatively short data set for climate stud-
ies. As indicated in Figure 2, the data contain both long and short period fluctua-
tions. To be useful in the global warming debate one must understand and carefully
account for fluctuations in the data that may be masking or dominating the antici-
pated enhanced greenhouse signal.
Recently, two colleagues have questioned the precision of the MSU data. They be-
lieve the data have spurious jumps in 1981 and 1991 which caused the overall trend
to be downward rather than upward as they believe it should be. Their basis for
this allegation utilized no observed data from the atmosphere. Since the time their
allegations were made public I have shown that the MSU data are indeed precise
with independent and direct observations of the troposphere (i.e. I used real data).
For example, in the most serious allegation, my two colleagues speculated that the
merging of one satellite, NOAA7, into the time series caused a spurious 0.25C
jump in late 1981 in the tropical time series. I show in Fig. 3 the temperature
anomalies of two satellites NOAA6 and7 for the tropics during that time. It is
important to note that these are completely independently calculated. One can read-
ily see that whether NOAA7 was included or not, the time series is still the same.
Therefore, the addition of NOAA7 into the dataset did not cause a problem and
the claim of my colleagues is clearly in error.
4. THE CAUSES OF THE TEMPERATURE VARIATIONS
The record of the lower stratosphere is fascinating in its own right. Clearly, here
is an example of global change on the scale of years to decades (Figure 2). The two
conspicuous warming events were due to explosive volcanic eruptionsEl Chichon
(1982) and Mt. Pinatubo (1991). The aerosols injected by these explosions high into
the stratosphere caused the warming through radiative interactions. Notice, how-
ever, that once the aerosols settled out, the global stratospheric temperature fell to
levels below those observed at pre-eruption. It is widely thought that the loss of
stratospheric ozone, both naturally from volcanic events and from human-generated
chemicals, has caused this overall cooling. The increase in greenhouse gases, which
will cause stratospheric cooling, is probably a factor as well, though smaller.
The 1996 annual stratospheric temperature was the lowest annual value ever
measured by satellite, and March 1997, was the coldest single month on record for
the North Polar region. (Globally, the temperatures have rebounded a bit for the
first half of 1997.) Something is changing in the lower stratospherethe tempera-
ture tells us that much, but cannot specifically indicate the cause. (Others have
much more experience here.) The extent of the stratospheric cooling trend points to
the need to fully understand its cause.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Angell, J.K., 1988: Variations and trends in tropospheric and stratospheric global
temperatures 195887. J. Climate, 1, 12961313.
Christy, J.R., 1995: Temperature above the surface layer. Climatic Change, 31, 455
474.
Christy, J.R. and J.D. Goodridge, 1995: Precision global temperatures from satellites
and urban warming effects of non-satellite data. Atmospheric Environment, 29,
19571995.
Christy, J.R. and R.T. McNider, 1994: Satellite greenhouse signal, Nature, 367, 325
(27 January 1994). (Fig. 4 of testimony, updated, taken from this article.)
Parker, D.E., M. Gordon, D.P.N. Cullum, D.M.H. Sexton, C.K. Folland and N.
Rayner, 1997. A new global gridded radiosonde temperature data base and recent
temperature trends. Geophys. Res. Lett., in press.
Spencer, R.W. and J.R. Christy, 1990: Precise monitoring of global temperature
trends from satellites. Science, 247, 15581562 (30 March 1990).
Spencer, R.W. and J.R. Christy, 1992: Precision and radiosonde validation of sat-
ellite gridpoint temperature anomalies. Part I: MSU channel 2. Journal of Cli-
mate, 5, 847857.
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RESPONSES BY JOHN R. CHRISTY TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BAUCUS
Question 1. During the hearing, Dr. Barron stated that our strategies to address
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gasses should be adaptive in nature. In
your opinion, what would be the most important adaptation strategies to pursue?
Response. In my opinion, preparing an economy to cope with the full range of nat-
ural weather variations (that will always occur) would position society to accommo-
date any future climate change better than simply adapting to a change after it oc-
curs. For example, building a typical structure on beach front property along the
Gulf and Atlantic coasts is not preparing for the full range of natural weather ex-
tremes because eventually a powerful hurricane will come along and devastate the
region. However, development of cereal crops that can withstand greater extremes
while enjoying higher CO2 concentrations is an obvious avenue to pursue. (I use the
term extremes not to imply that the future climate will have greater extremes, but
that the crop could withstand whatever might come along.) We are a most adaptive
and clever species, for example, being able to grow a single food (corn) in climates
ranging from North Dakota to Alabama.
In an odd sort of way, conservation of carbon is actually one adaptive strategy
because it is possible that the climate may cool in the next century or so. A colder
climate is probably far more devastating than a warmer climate. Thus having car-
bon available for energy production in such a climate would be wise. An adaptive
strategy is one that decreases our vulnerability to extreme events of all types.
As the IPCC has shown we still cannot identify regional weather changes due to
CO2 increases after over 100 years. And, in my view, it will be many more decades
before the regional signal may (if ever) be extracted from the noise of natural varia-
bility. If present infrastructures could be designed to cope with 99.9 percent of the
extremes on both sides (hottest, coldest, wettest, driest, etc.) rather than the 90
95 percent as is done now, we will be in much better position to handle what may
happen in terms of climate change.
Question 2. Dr. Schneider stated in his testimony that it was difficult for plants
and animals to adapt to a temperature increase of 50C over the 10,000 year period
following the last Ice Age and that many species would likely go extinct with a kind
of rapid temperature increase projected for the next century. Assuming, for this
question, that the Earth experiences a temperature increase of greater than 1.50C
over the coming 100 years, what is the likelihood that species will successfully
adapt? If, in your opinion, this represents a threat to preserving biological diversity,
to your knowledge has there every been a period in the paleoclimate record where
climate change has resulted in significant loss of species.
Response. The significant loss of species has always been a feature of the history
of the planet. I understand that approximately 99 percent of all species which have
inhabited the Earth are extinct. Nature has been unmercifully severe for the vast
majority of life forms. It is difficult to separate out the role of climate as a cause
for extinction in comparison with other factors such as the evolution of competing
and opportunistic species or something as exotic but as realistic as an asteroid colli-
sion.
Changes in global average temperature do not cause the loss of species, rather
it is the local change of climate. The greatest rise in temperature due to the en-
hanced greenhouse effect (whatever its magnitude) is predicted to occur for those
regions which already experience significant year to year and decade to decade vari-
ations (midlatitude and polar regions). I think we shall find that nature is rather
resilient, though no one would expect the exact geographic distribution of popu-
lations of various species to remain identical to the present day. Perfect stability has
never happened before. For example, the Southeastern quad rant of the U.S. has
experienced cooling temperatures over the past 100 years with an associated south-
ward displacement of plant species. am told that citrus crops were harvested as far
north as southern Georgia around the turn of the century, yet today they are found
commercially only from central Florida southward. This is due to the significant cold
weather that the region has experienced in the last few decades.
Rapid, natural changes have occurred in the past. Let me quote from an issue of
PAGES (Past Global Changes Programme, IGBP, 4, #3 Nov. 1996).
Climate variability at both a regional and a global scale has, even within the
boundary conditions prevailing during the Late-Holocene [last 5,000 years],
been significantly greater than has been recorded during the short, recent pe-
riod for which instrumental records of climate variation exist. This is conclu-
sively demonstrated by recent research, is of crucial significance for predicting
future climate change and is not recognized in the recent IPCC Report.
105
Since rapid changes have occurred in the past, we may assume that not every spe-
cies survived the change. However, the species we see today must have survived
some combination of past rapid changes. One wonders how many of todays species
are actually here because a particular rapid change altered the balance between
competing species in the favor of the present-day survivor. The system of life is ex-
ceedingly complex, and attributing climate changes to particular species survival is
beyond my expertise.
I believe Dr. Schneider would agree that the number of species which might expe-
rience extinction due to possible global warming is much smaller than those we are
losing today due to land-use changes, poaching, human encroachment, etc. Just as
the evolution and redistribution of opportunistic species forced vulnerable species
into extinction in the past, we are seeing human-induced extinction happening quite
apart from climate change. We as a species are now one of those very opportunistic
species that is dangerous to many others. If extinction is a concern, (and I believe
it is) one should assess the major causes and then address those with action that
has the best chance for producing results. However, I understand, having lived in
a Third World country, that it is a difficult problem to advise other countries on
this topic because (1) our own past haunts us and (2) the idea of loss of sovereignty
is keenly felt in any nation.
I lived in Kenya, East Africa for 2 years and lived among people who were making
decisions to destroy forests so they could raise food to feed their families. I could
understand their motivation for survival as I witnessed people dying simply because
they had no food. The population growth in that region, believe, is the cause of tre-
mendous suffering and is the primary issue that must be dealt with ahead of the
issue of climate change (if there is a choice on where to concentrate efforts). Of
course, controlling population will probably have an eventual benefit of lower fossil
fuel consumption.
I suspect I agree with Dr. Schneider in this limited sense: a significant fraction
of the biosystem, relying only on evolution and redistribution, would find it difficult
to adapt to a changing environment if the change occurred over time scales of cen-
turies when research indicates biosystem changes normally take millennia to adapt.
Question 3. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to a natural mechanism that
would be employed by the Earth to counteract the predicted climatic changes due
to the effect of increased water vapor in the atmosphere. Are you aware of any his-
toric reference or specific research that would support a theory of the existence of
such a mechanism?
Response. Global climate models produce most of their warming because they
cause the troposphere (surface to 10 km altitude) to become more moist than is pres-
ently observed. In other words, global warming in the models is due more to addi-
tional water vapor than additional CO2 in the atmosphere. This additional water
vapor enhances the natural greenhouse gas, trapping more radiant energy in the
lower atmosphere thus causing the surface temperature to rise even further. Models
are quite primitive in the rules or equations they require the atmosphere to obey.
In the case of greenhouse warming, the models require that as soon as the tempera-
ture rises a little due to CO2 radiative forcing, more water vapor is forced into the
troposphere, thus causing a positive feedback process: higher temperatures lead to
more evaporation which leads to more water vapor in the atmosphere which leads
to higher temperatures which leads to more evaporation, etc.
The real atmosphere does not appear to be so inflexible. Current research carried
out by my colleague Dr. Roy Spencer of NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center (Hunts-
ville, AL), points to the possibility that as the tropical system warms, the amount
of vapor might actually decrease (or at least not increase much) in the troposphere.
There are certainly periods (months or so, see Sun and Held, J. Climate 1996, pp.
665675) in which warming is not accompanied by the presence of more water vapor
as inflexible models require. The current warm El Nino event in the Pacific will be
an excellent test case to check whether the tropical troposphere actually moistens
or dries as the temperature rises. Currently, models give one result: the atmosphere
always moistens when it is warmed.
The key mechanism to understand on this issue is that the heat that is naturally
lost to space is highly proportional to the amount of vapor in the troposphere. Thus,
the amount of water vapor in the troposphere regulates the amount of heat that es-
capes and which therefore would be unavailable to warm the surface. In fact, the
vapor in the troposphere is more important for this energy balance than the vapor
at the surface. A slight reduction of the vapor in the troposphere (i.e. a drying) leads
to a significant increase in the outgoing energy. So, if there is a slight drying of the
troposphere as the world warms a little, the drier troposphere would act as an open
window to let more energy escape, thus reducing any feedback-warming of the sur-
106
face. Only slight changes in the tropical tropospheric humidity are necessary to re-
duce the warming due to the enhanced greenhouse effect. (The drying results from
the fact warmer rain-clouds tend to lose more moisture to rainfall than cooler cloud
systems, thus expelling less vapor to the troposphere.)
Considerable work is ahead of us on this area of research as theory is only now
being given observations that may help solve this issue of tropospheric water vapor
feedback. What we lack at this point is high vertical resolution observations of tem-
perature, winds, precipitation and humidity of the extensive tropical atmosphere
where so many questions remain.
Question 4. Dr. Lindzen stated in his testimony that the one specific feature that
led to the IPCC conclusion of a discernible human influence on global climate,
. . . disappears when additional data is considered. Are you aware of specific ad-
ditional data that was not considered or erroneously applied that would cause the
IPCC to read a different conclusion? Are you aware of a specific research result or
model that supports Dr. Lindzens claim? If so, did you know whether the IPCC con-
sidered it? Are you aware of other factors that the IPCC relied upon to conclude
that human activities were impacting global climate?
Response. A paper had been submitted just before the final IPCC science authors
meeting in Asheville, NC (Aug. 1995) which compared upper air balloon data for
1964 to 1987 and climate model results for the same period. The point of the paper
was to show that the warming in the observations of the troposphere was matched
by model results, thus the model was in some sense verified. I read the pre-publica-
tion paper at this meeting.
I discussed a bit of this paper with one of the authors at the meeting, pointing
out that the early years were relatively cool in this 24-year period and the hottest
year observed happened to be the last year, 1987. Thus, the period selected for the
model comparison did not represent the actual climate variations for the longer pe-
riod using pre-1964 and post-1987 data, and for which the model results had less
agreement. The post-1987 data, showing cooling, were available to some researchers
as I had submitted a paper 2 years before (1993) using data from this dataset which
at that time were available through 1989. However, it could be the case that these
post-1987 data may not have been in a form usable to the authors.
In Asheville, the author told me that he did not have available to him the post-
1987 data and that a follow-up study would be completed in which such data would
be utilized. I did not feel the author had deliberately stopped at 1987 to produce
a politically correct result and in my other dealings with the author found him
to be highly objective and credible. Utilizing the more recent data, however, the
model in question apparently does not reproduce the observations nearly so well, es-
pecially the tropospheric non-warming that has occurred in the past 18 years (see
Michaels, P.J. and P.C. Knappenberger, 1996: Sensitivity to the greenhouse finger-
print to data selection. Nature, 383, 12 December). Thus, the discernible human
influence phrase may be viewed as only slightly less strong.
The main lines of evidence used to substantiate the discernible human influence
statement as outlined in the policymakers summary were:
1. The 20th century appears to be the warmest of the past 600 years.
2. Several models, using only natural factors, could not explain all of the 20th cen-
tury warming, thus implying that some fraction of the warming was probably due
to human factors.
3. The vertical patterns of change produced by models which include human-fac-
tors match observed patterns of change for 196487.
The first statement is not as convincing as it seems because the data we examined
(I was a key contributor to the IPCC)and which were then used by the authors
of the Policymakers Summarywere quite sparse before 1400. We all knew, and
stated such in the scientific text, that the warming of the 20th century could largely
be related to the natural recovery from the Little Ice Age, a cold period which ex-
isted, more or less, in the 15th19th centuries. Had we used the sparse data prior
to 1400, we would have reported that in many places on the planet, the decades
around 1000 A.D. were warmer than even today. In the next IPCC report, this issue
will probably be addressed in greater detail. What caused the earth to cool in the
last six centuries is a topic of intense scientific research and it highlights the lack
of understanding we now posses in explaining natural variations in the global cli-
mate.
The second statement comes from several model simulations of the last 100 years.
These particular models could not reproduce all of the 0.40C temperature rise of
the last century unless they included the human factor of CO2 forcing. We know,
however, that the models are primitive and are essentially unable to reproduce
other natural variations (e.g., Barnett et al., 1996; Estimates of low frequency natu-
107
ral variability in near-surface air temperature. Holocene, 6, 255263). Barnett et al.
concluded:
. . . our results should serve as a warning to those anxious rigorously to pur-
sue the detection of anthropogenic effects in observed climate data: the spec-
trum of natural variability against which detection claims, positive or negative,
are made is not well known and apparently not well represented in early CGCM
[coupled global climate model] control runs.
As I testified before the committee I agree with this second statement that some
fraction of the observed 0.40C warming is probably due to human factors.
The third statement relates to the paper I discussed earlier. I should add that a
source of the relatively high correlation between the model and the observations was
due to the strong cooling of the stratosphere found in the model results and in the
observations. The main cause of this cooling is most likely ozone depletion, not CO2.
Thus, the CO2 effects were less involved in the match with observations than was
generally perceived by the public.
Question 5. Do you believe there is sufficient evidence of a problem with human-
induced climate change for us to keep pursuing some kind of policy to limit CO2
emissions? If not, should we stop funding research that would tend to prove or dis-
prove the theories that human activities are impacting global climate. If there is
sufficient evidence, what more, if anything, should we be doing.
Response. There are many severe human-induced environmental issues that I be-
lieve strongly overshadow the potential effects of global warming. Dealing with
these serious issues would, I believe, lead to an associated reduction in CO2 emis-
sions. Population increases, habitat destruction, uncontrolled pollution of air and
water by toxic emissions and effluent (not CO2) are problematic now.
I believe we should continue supporting observations and research of the global
system. Some observations are now being scaled back, and this reduces the base
from which detection of any changes may be substantiated. Better observations com-
bined with more research has the added advantage that forecasts, particularly ex-
tended-range forecasts, would likely be more accurate. This would allow the public
to plan for weather impacts thus increasing their economic viability.
I can only comment as a non-expert in the realm of economic and social con-
sequences of legislative actions intended to deal with climate change. What should
we do? An idea I would put forth is to let the U.S. Government take the lead in
generating reductions of CO2. The government owns thousands of vehicles, elec-
tricity-intensive appliances, heavy equipment, inefficient buildings etc. By setting
for itself more stringent standards, and purchasing new equipment and services
within the free market, the government in effect sponsors the R&D for these new
products, allowing future costs for these more efficient technologies to be lower to
the public and therefore more acceptable in the long run.
Such a large government program must begin with accurate data on current emis-
sions against which future reductions could be precisely assessed. I would think
every aspect of government use of CO2 would be measured (i.e. field tested) and doc-
umented. Then, a program to upgrade current vehicles, appliances, building envi-
ronments, and even military maneuvers, to reduce carbon emissions could be insti-
gated. The monitoring program would then be in place to prove to the interested
parties (i.e. international monitoring agencies and the American public) that reduc-
tion in emissions is occurring. The government then would become the laboratory
out of which proven technologies could be made available for the public, though
some form of incentives would likely be required to replace cheap but inefficient
equipment.
How would this program be paid for? My personal opinion is that a nickel tax per
gallon of gasoline (i.e. A Nickel for Nature?) would not cause great hardship for
the vast majority of Americans and would raise quite a bit of revenue for the gov-
ernment to proceed. Such a tax might even be politically acceptable if promoted as
a way for everyone to help the environment and which is used entirely for its in-
tended purpose.
It is important to remember that modest reductions in CO2 will have an indis-
cernible effect on climate no matter what scenario of warming one may believe. Yet,
I suspect modest controls are all that the public will accept.
Question 6. In your professional opinion, what is the probability that there will
be a doubling of CO2 concentrations since pre-industrial times by the year 2100? A
tripling? What are the impacts of a doubling? What are the impacts of a tripling?
Response. Thank you for asking this question as an opinion as I do not perform
research specifically related to the magnitude of CO2 concentrations. I can only read
the information available, and the IPCC reports are my main source of information.
108
The rise in CO2 since 1958 has been slightly more than 1 ppmv per year, and most
recently growth has been at a rate of 0.4 percent per year. The preindustrial con-
centration was about 280 ppmv, with todays value about 360 ppmv. By 2100, at
this rate, the concentration would be between two and three times the preindustrial
level. I believe there are factors yet unmodeled that will produce only a doubling
by 2100. This is strictly an opinion based on my view that uncertainties are consid-
erable in the present models and the economic and industrial future is rarely pre-
dicted with accuracy.
My opinion (and that is all it is) on the climate effects of doubling or tripling is
that the effects will be fairly benign overall. If warming occurs, it will occur slowly
and modestly. I will mention again that the effects of natural variability will con-
tinue to cause the havoc we have always known.
I would be remiss if I did not address a major aspect of this entire debate that
has been basically ignored. It is popular today to think that burning carbon is an
evil and destructive activity. Ive lived in a Third World country, teaching physics
and chemistry and sometimes distributing food and medicine to people in great
need. These Africans were not nameless images on a TV screen to me, I knew them
as fellow human beings with names, families, friends and hope. We provided for
them that which they could not provide for themselves. What we gave came from
an American nation whose economic engine has fueled the discoveries that have
given our country a standard of living envied throughout the world and whose bene-
fits have lifted many millions of non-Americans to a better life. I had a small part
in that enterprise because American people, who burn carbon, were generous in fi-
nancing experiences such as mine in Africa.
Today, the worlds one and only superpower is dedicated to, among other noble
pursuits, free and open scientific inquiry, freedom of faith and freedom of associa-
tion. Such noble ideas are not expressed in the economic models out of which var-
ious scenarios of future policy are determined. What is their value? say they are in-
valuable. To be sure, we have spent considerable amounts of carbon to achieve
what we have, but I believe it has largely been well-spent when one looks at the
entire picture.
I realize that reductions of CO2 are eventually going to affect us, yet I wonder
if those who advocate draconian measures truly understand how the world as a
whole would be affected. Ive lived in a part of the world for which a loss of Amer-
ican economic strength and world leadership would probably cause greater suffer-
ing. As poorly as we model the global climate, even these physical results are more
realistic than predictions of economic and social impacts which buildupon the imper-
fect climate model output. In short, the impacts to human existence of a doubling
or tripling of CO2 are almost impossible to predict when one considers our present
level of ignorance in these matters.
Question 7. Dr. Christy, if you add balloon temperature measurement records to
the 18 years of satellite temperature records, is there an observable warming trend?
How does that compare with the surface temperature records.
Response. As I reported in the Hearing, the global balloon and satellite record
both show that the lower tropospheric temperature has declined by0.040C/decade
since 1979. Two years ago I wrote a paper which specifically addressed the compari-
son of various records of upper air temperatures for the period since 1958 when bal-
loon datasets began: Temperature above the surface layer, Climatic Change, 31,
455474, (1995). I found that Beginning in earlier years, (relying only on radio-
sonde data before 1979) the estimated warming trend since the late 1950s is +0.07
to +0.110C per decade. One surface dataset (GISS) shows a trend for the same pe-
riod of +0.090C/decade, which indicates that over this particular time period (1958
96), the surface and troposphere experienced the same trend. It is important to note
that climate models project greater warming in the troposphere on all time scales,
a feature which has apparently not appeared in the actual observations, and cer-
tainly is not verified in the observations since 1979.
The issue of global warming is one of the more contentious issues in science today.
Superficially, it is frequently portrayed as a simple issue. Gases which absorb in-
frared radiation (known as greenhouse gases) inhibit radiative cooling of the earths
111
surface and hence increasing greenhouse gases must lead to warming. The issue is
rendered more complex by the fact that the surface of the earth does not cool pri-
marily by means of radiation, but rather cools by evaporation and convection. More-
over, the main greenhouse gas is water vapor which is both natural in origin and
highly variable in its distribution. In the absence of good records of water vapor we
arent even in a position to say how much total greenhouse gases have increased.
If this werent bad enough, it isnt even the total amount of greenhouse gas which
matters; for example, a molecule of water vapor at 12 km altitude is more effective
than a thousand molecules near the surface. All of this might not be relevant if
models were trustworthy, but satellite measurements of upper level water vapor
show profound discrepancies in model results. Under the circumstances, it is sur-
prising that there is any agreement among scientists, but, in fact, most scientists
working on climate dynamics would agree that increasing levels of carbon dioxide
should have some impact on climate. The real argument is over whether the impact
will be significant. The word significant, in this context, has a rather specific mean-
ing. The climate is a naturally variable system. That is to say, it varies without any
external forcing. Human society already has to deal with this degree of variability
over which it has no control. For anthropogenic climate change to be significant,
it must be as large or larger than natural variability. For smaller changes, the his-
torical record demonstrates our capacity to adapt. It is in this context that the state-
ment frequently drawn from the 1995 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change) report assumes some relevance. It is important, therefore, to know pre-
cisely what this statement does and doesnt say. Although it is likely that the state-
ment is also incorrect, that turns out to be less important.
DISCERNABLE INFLUENCE
Let us begin by quoting this statement (which, in contrast to earlier IPCC reports,
gives considerable more attention to important caveats):
Our ability to quantify the human influence on global climate is currently
limited because the expected signal is still emerging from the noise of natural
variability, and because there are uncertainties in key factors. These include
the magnitude and patterns of long-term natural variability and the time-evolv-
ing pattern of forcing by, and response to, changes in concentrations of green-
house and aerosols, and land-surface changes. Nevertheless, the balance of evi-
dence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate.
What it says is that the climates behavior over the past century appears unlikely
to be due entirely to natural variability (IPCC 1995, p. 412). As Chapter 8 of IPCC
95 points out, even this trivial assertion, which, as I have noted, seems totally com-
patible with our theoretical understanding and makes no claims concerning the
magnitude of global warming, is dependent on the assumption that natural varia-
bility is replicated in models (IPCC 95 p. 430) an assumption which is clearly un-
true since major observed components of natural variability like the quasi-biennial
oscillation and El-Nino are either not replicated at all or replicated very poorly. In-
deed the very structure of the circulation in models is different from what is ob-
served in the data (Polyak and North, 1997). The specific feature which led Santer
(the lead author of Chapter 8 of IPCC 95) to claim discovery of the discernible im-
pact of anthropogenic forcing fails the most elementary test of statistical robustness:
namely, it disappears when additional data is considered. Chapter 8 concludes that
our ability to quantify the magnitude of global warming is currently limited by un-
certainties in key factors, including the magnitude and patterns of longer-term nat-
ural variability and the time-evolving patterns of forcing by (and response to) green-
house gases and aerosols. In brief, a decade of focus on global warming and billions
of dollars of research funds have still failed to establish that global warming is a
significant problem. Normally, this would lead one to conclude that the problem is
less serious than originally suggested. While the IPCC 1995 report does not go so
far as to state this explicitly, it is certainly the most subdued and reserved of the
numerous IPCC reports issued since 1990.
It has been a remarkable example of semantic distortion that this weak and
unsupportable statement has encouraged environmental advocates to claim that this
report endorses various catastrophic scenarios. An appeal issued a few days ago by
one such organization, The Union of Concerned Scientists, illustrates the general
procedure. The statement begins with a clear misrepresentation of the IPCC state-
ment: Predictions of global climatic change are becoming more confident. A broad
consensus among the worlds climatologists is that there is now a discernible
human influence on global climate. The UCS immediately continues: Climate
change is projected to raise sea levels, threatening populations and ecosystems in
112
coastal regions. Warmer temperatures will lead to a more vigorous hydrological
cycle, increasing the prospects for more intense rainfall, floods, and droughts in
some regions. Human health may be damaged by greater exposure to heat waves
and droughts, and by encroachment of tropical diseases to higher latitudes. The
UCS proceeds to then associate climate change with forest depletion, water scarcity,
food security, and species destruction. It concludes that scientists must endorse a
strong climate treaty at Kyoto. The implication is that the so-called IPCC consensus
extends to these claims as well. This is clearly a misrepresentation of the IPCC..
I use the phrase so-called advisedly. The IPCC went to great lengths to include as
many names as possible among its contributors. Against my expressed wishes, even
my name was included. I can assure the committee that I (and the vast majority
of contributors and reviewers) were never asked whether we even agreed with the
small sections we commented on. Nevertheless, the usual comment is that 2,500 sci-
entists all agree with whatever it is that the environmental advocates are claiming.
To the credit of the IPCC, it extensively documented the shortcomings of various
projections, and made few claims for any confidence. The document was deeply bi-
ased insofar as it took as its task the finding of global warming rather than the
more objective approach of determining whether it is indeed a significant problem.
Such an approach could be rationalized on the basis of sincere concern. However,
even this document puts forward comments which are misleading. For example, on
page 45 which deals with potential surprises, the possibility of an instability of the
West Antarctic ice sheet is mentioned without any reference to the fact that such
an unlikely instability is largely unrelated to climate (Bentley, 1997).
Genuinely Misleading Statement
One of the common claims in support of the reality and seriousness of global
warming is that we have had a large portion of record breaking warm years during
the last decade or so. This is not a claim used by the IPCC, and its presence in
any discussion is a rather clear piece of evidence of the intent to deceive (especially
when the claim is made by a scientist). As noted by Solow and Broadus (1989) and
Bassett (1992), this is an inevitable occurrence when one has a single record breaker
in a time series characterized by interannual variability, interdecadal variability
and an underlying trend or longer period variability. Solow and Broadus show the
clustered nature of record breakers. For those who can follow some mathematics,
the situation is easily synthesized as follows.
113
Let us represent the time series for temperature by the following expression:
where the first term corresponds to interannual variability, the second term to
interdecadal variability, and third to longer term trends or variability. This series
is shown in Figure 1.
Not surprisingly, record breakers cluster in exactly the manner found by Solow
and Broadus (1989) in the observed temperature record. The occurrence of such
record breakers contributes no additional information. Our prime concern remains
with the determination of trend and the identification of such trends with emissions
of carbon dioxide, and this remains a difficult and contested issue as the IPCC free-
ly acknowledges.
Scientific Waffling
S. Fred Singer has recently reported that the former head of the IPCC, Bert
Bolin, has denied claims by Vice President Gore and environmental activists that
any floods, droughts, hurricanes, or other extreme weather patterns are the result
of rising global temperatures. Bolin is quoted as saying There has been no effect
on countries from any current change, adding that efforts by activists to establish
such a link is why I do not trust the Greens. Although I was not present at the
debate where Bolin is alleged to have made this remark, my personal experience
suggests that it may be true. In 1993 at a mock trial of global warming held by
the BBC in which both Bolin and I participated, Bolin made similar admissions.
Nevertheless, in response to Singers claims, Bolin has issued a formal denial. It
may be of interest to look at this denial in some detail.
Observations show that some extreme events are becoming more intense (heavy
rainfall events in some regions), some are becoming less intense (cold spells), while
others show no statistically significant changes (hurricanes). These changes are con-
sistent with the kind of changes that would be associated with a warmer climate.
While it cannot yet be concluded that these changes are caused by human-induced
changes of climate, neither can this association be excluded. To state that these
sorts of changes that are consistent with the predicted effects of climate change,
as Vice-President Gore is quoted to have stated, is a scientifically accurate state-
ment and no cause for criticism.
In saying this, Bolin parts company with normative science which recognizes the
virtual impossibility of disproving unverifiable assertions and sticks to statements
that are capable of falsification. Consistency, in this context merely means that
the situation is so unclear that virtually anything is will be consistent. In the long
run, the replacement of the precise and disciplined language of science by the mis-
leading language of litigation and advocacy may be one of the more important
sources of damage to society incurred in the current debate over global warming.
114
models, and assumes, somewhat illogically, that the correct answer must be in the
output of at least one model. However, as frequently noted by the IPCC, the correct
answer depends on correctly simulating feedbacks which, at present, are only poorly
known and modeled. Despite this uncertainty,there are some aspects of the problem
that are somewhat better known. In general, the response to doubled carbon dioxide
(or equivalent carbon dioxide where the effect of other anthropogenic greenhouse
gases is expressed in terms of equivalent carbon dioxide) in the absence of
feedbacks is taken to be the response when all other atmospheric parameters are
held constant. The changes due to concomitant changes in other parameters are
called feedbacks. There is some disagreement over whether one should consider the
distribution of temperature change as a feedback. If one does, then the no-feedback
equilibrium response to doubled carbon dioxide is about 0.312C (Lindzen, 1995a); if
one does not, then the no-feedback response is about 1.212C. The latter is much
larger than the former because it includes the warming effect at the surface of cool-
ing in the stratosphere. If one takes the latter approach, then the most important
feedback is due to upper level (above about 2 km) water vapor. In all existing mod-
els (in the original models by explicit assumption), water vapor, the most important
greenhouse gas, increases at all levels as surface temperature increases, doubling
the no-feedback response to doubled carbon dioxide. The presence of the positive
water vapor feedback in current models also increases the sensitivity of these mod-
els to other smaller feedbacks such as those due to clouds and snow reflectivity. The
trouble with current models is that they generally lack the physics to deal with the
upper level water vapor budget, and they are generally unable, for computational
reasons, to properly calculate a quantity like water vapor which varies sharply both
vertically and horizontally (Sun and Lindzen, 1993, Lindzen, 1995). Indicative of
these problems is the recent work of J.J. Bates and D.L. Jackson at NOAA who
found, using satellite data from infrared sounders, that, on the average, current
models underestimate zonally averaged (averaged around a latitude circle) water
vapor by about 20 percent. This is illustrated in Figure 2. It should be noted that
this represents an error in radiative forcing of about 20 Watts per square meter,
as compared with the forcing of 4 Watts per square meter due to a doubling of car-
bon dioxide (Thompson and Warren, 1982, Lindzen, 1995). More recent observa-
tional analyses by Spencer and Braswell (1997), using satellite microwave data, sug-
gest that even Bates and Jackson have overestimated water vapor, and that the dis-
crepancy with models is still greater. Under the circumstances, there seems to be
little actual basis for the most important positive feedback in models. Given our in-
115
ability to detect expected warming in the temperature data, one might reasonably
conclude that models have overestimated the problem.
In some ways, we are driven to a philosophical consideration: namely, do we think
that a long-lived natural system, like the earth, acts to amplify any perturbations,
or is it more likely that it will act to counteract such perturbations? It appears that
we are currently committed to the former rather vindictive view of nature.
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118
RESPONSES BY RICHARD LINDZEN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BAUCUS
Response 1. Dr. Barrons suggestion was intentionally generic rather than specific.
Moreover, adaptive policies require something to adapt to, and in the words of Bert
Bolin, the former head of the IPCC, There has been no effect on countries from any
current change. The increases in temperature have been so small as to be barely
detectible. Thus, at the moment, there is nothing special to adapt to. In the longer
term, we can plausibly expect many things to change over the next century includ-
ing the climate (even without any influence from man) in almost totally unantici-
pated ways. It thus behooves us to continue to develop a society that can success-
fully deal with and exploit change. The obvious tools for this are wealth and capital,
information and education, as well as flexibility, freedom and intelligence.
Response 2. Frankly, I do not know the basis for Dr. Schneiders remark. How-
ever, it is obvious that species respond to local rather than global conditions, and
locally, changes on the order of 1.5C and more have occurred over the past century
or even less. This has led to some modest species migration and changes in agri-
culture, but not, to the best of my knowledge, to extinctions. What I suspect Dr.
Schneider may be referring to is the fact that climate change in the past, forced by
changing patterns of heating, among other things, rather than gross global heating,
has been characterized by large changes in the temperature difference between the
tropics and the poles rather than changes in global mean temperature. Thus, by
some reckonings during the last major glaciation global mean temperature may only
have been about 8C colder than at present. Indeed, both glaciation and deglaciation
led to species extinctions for creatures that had specifically adapted to the earlier
climate and terrain. Even so, these were not among the major periods of species
loss.
Response 3. First, let me state that predictions of large climate change already
require that these mechanisms act to amplify the changes due to increasing anthro-
pogenic greenhouse gases. There is no credible evidence for this. The warming ex-
pected from a doubling of CO2 even in the absence of any natural thermostatic con-
trol would only be about 1C (and about 1.5C for a tripling; the effect is not linear).
This low level of warming calls for no mechanism whatever to counteract the effect
of increased anthropogenic greenhouse gases. Predictions of greater warming actu-
ally require that water vapor act in such a way as to increase the warming by a
factor of two and more. I intentionally refer to the action of water vapor rather than
to the amount of water vapor. Water vapor in the atmosphere is extremely hetero-
geneous. There are regions that are very dry and regions that are very moist. Most
water vapor resides in the lowest 23 km of the atmosphere, but it is water vapor
above this level that is most important to the greenhouse effect (E. Schneider et al,
1997, Shine and Sinha, 1991). Moreover, most radiative cooling occurs in dry re-
gions, and cooling would increase if the dry regions increased in area even if the
net water vapor increased. Understanding the water vapor feedback in dry regions
is central to determining the feedback. Here, the budget of water vapor consists in
drying due to subsiding air and moisturizing from the evaporation of ice thrown off
by clouds rather than directly falling as rain (Sun and Lindzen, 1993, describe the
water vapor budget in detail). If claims of an intensified hydrological cycle in a
warmer climate prove correct, then the drying term will increase. Moreover, the
amount of ice thrown off depends on the precipitation efficiency of clouds. The more
efficient the clouds, the less ice there is to throw off According to every text on cloud
physics written over the past half century, precipitation efficiency increases with in-
creasing temperature (Fletcher, 1962, Mason, 1971, Rogers and Yau, 1989 for exam-
ple). Thus we expect the moisturizing to decrease. Both effects should lead to an
expansion of the dry regions which would counteract the effect of increasing CO2.
This is the opposite of what current models display, which is not surprising since
current models completely fail to produce dry regions of the sort observed in sat-
ellite data (Spencer and Braswell, 1997).
Response 4. The IPCC conclusion was based on the then unpublished work of
Santer et al (1996). This work used radiosonde (balloon) data from sometime in the
70s until 1987. As shown by Michaels and Knappenberger (1996) when the avail-
able radiosonde data until 1995 was used, the effect that Santer et al claimed to
have found (a correlation between observations and model predictions) disappeared.
Another study by some of the same authors who participated in Santer et al also
reached the conclusion that the earlier study was not statistically robust (Tett et
al, 1996). In fact, studies examining the results in Santer et al were not possible
until after the publication of IPCC 95, since the Santer et al paper had not yet ap-
peared when IPCC 95 was published. This, of course, is counter to the claimed pol-
icy of the IPCC. That said, the Santer et al paper never claimed to quantify the
119
impact of human activities. The paper, moreover, acknowledged that even the mea-
ger result claimed was absolutely dependent on the assumption that natural varia-
bility was well replicated by model variabilitya dubious assumption at best. Fi-
nally, the paper failed to consider whether the observed behavior could be due to
other factors. The Santer et al paper and IPCC use of it are excellent examples of
how virtually meaningless statements by scientists can be found by non-scientists
to have dire import. In many cases, the scientists are by no means innocent of ex-
ploiting this difference in perception.
Response 5. No, I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to continue pursuing
some kind of policy to limit CO2 emissions. If the only reason you can imagine
for supporting climate research is the likelihood of catastrophe, then by all means
stop funding research. However, in the light of my answer to your first question,
this would seem short sighted indeed. Regardless of the current evidence or lack
thereof, it seems to me that it would be unwise to make support of any science con-
tingent on the projection of catastrophe.
Response 6. Predicting industrial trajectories is as difficult as any other kind of
long term prediction. However, I personally think that it is entirely possible, in the
light of our present imperfect knowledge, that atmospheric CO2 levels in 2100 will
be double present values. About the only effect of this that we are presently reason-
ably sure of is that plant growth will increase, and plant susceptibility to water
stress will decrease. As concerns climate, we have already had a 50 percent increase
in effective CO2 since the last century, and hardly anyone has noticed. There is no
compelling evidence that matters will change dramatically with further increases.
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RESPONSES BY DR. STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM
SENATOR BAUCUS
Question 1. During the hearing, Dr. Barron stated that our strategies to address
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases should be adaptive in nature. In your
opinion, what would be the most important adaptation strategies to pursue?
Response. I agree with Dr. Barron that adaptive strategies are the most sensible.
The reason I feel that they are sensible, as I also pointed out in written and oral
testimoneys, is that it is very likely that further information on both climatic effects
and impacts is likely to change our perceptions of the damages that climate could
cause to environment and society, as well as the costs of mitigating those damages
as new technologies are invented and implemented. Therefore, whatever policy in-
struments we adopt should have the maximum flexibility to be able to take advan-
tage of, what I called in my written testimony, rolling re-assessment. That is,
every five or so years some groups (like the IPCC) will produce the assessments,
and the state of knowledge so assessed might indicate more serious (or less serious)
concern over climate change than previous assessments. Therefore, policy instru-
ments that are most flexible will allow the highest degree of adaptive management.
In my personal view, although I recognize that political realities (currently in the
United States at least) stand in its way, a carbon tax is probably the most flexible
instrument (see the Appendix to my written testimony, which contains the com-
mentary, now accepted, for Nature magazine by Professor Larry Goulder and myself
defending the flexibility and economic efficiency aspects of a carbon tax as opposed
to other carbon policy instruments). But regardless of whether a carbon tax, cap and
trade arrangements, R&D subsidies or other instruments are the ultimate policies
of choice, minimizing hardwiring would seem to me the best strategy.
There are other areas where I think adaptive measures should also be considered.
I have long advocated anticipatory adaptation as one of the responses to the possi-
bility of negative effects of climatic changes. For example, a new water project could
well increase the height of a dam, the width of a channel, or the amount of free
coastline before expensive infrastructure would be allowed to be built, all in antici-
pation of the not unlikely possibility of increased extremes of drought and flood or
sea levels. Building extra margins of safety into currently planned or future infra-
structure is usually very inexpensive relative to the cost of retrofit. Thus, such an-
ticipatory adaptation can substantially reduce the overall lifetime cost of the project,
particularly if currently foreseeable but not certain impacts like sea level rise or ex-
treme floods were to occur. Likewise, it is well-known that building more efficient
houses and cars at the outset is much less costly than trying to retrofit them once
they have been built.
Another way in which anticipatory adaptation can take place is to make invest-
ments in agricultural research. For example, we know that if there is an increase
in the probability of droughts and floods, as it is appearing to be increasingly likely,
then agronomic research in which crop varieties or farming techniques that are
more resilient to large climatic variations would provide a measure of security
against those variations as they unfold. And even if they did not unfold, such resil-
ience would help us deal with the ordinary climate variability, which already causes
substantial year-to-year variations in agricultural productivity, even in techno-
logically advanced countries like the United States.
Finally, a form of adaptive strategy is simply the development of alternative en-
ergy technologies. That is, should the world decide in the next decade or so that it
really does wish to avert the potential for dangerous interference in the climate
system as the FCCC words it, it would be much more expensive to replace these
conventional energy systems if there were no previous enhanced research and devel-
opment efforts to experiment with nonconventional alternatives in advance of their
urgent need. Therefore, investment in alternative energy systems to conventional
fossil energy provides a measure of anticipatory adaptation that would make future
adjustments much less expensive than if we simply pretend that business is usual
is the safest and best path, and luck turns against us as new studies prove climate
change to be in the mid-to-upper range of currently projected damages.
Question 2. You stated in your testimony that it was difficult for plants and ani-
mals to adapt to a temperature increase of 5C over the 10,000 year period following
the last Ice Age and that many species would likely go extinct with a kind of rapid
temperature increase projected for the next century. Assuming, for the purpose of
this question, that the Earth experiences a temperature increase of greater than
1.5C over the coming 100 years, what is the likelihood that species will successfully
adapt? If, in your opinion, this represents a threat to preserving biological diversity,
to your knowledge has there ever been a period in the paleoclimate record where
climate change has resulted in significant loss of species?
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Response. Let me answer the last part of Senator Baucuss question first. There
are a number of periods in paleoclimatic records where rapid climate change re-
sulted in dramatic loss of species. The obvious example is the famous Cretaceous/
Tertiary boundary, in which temperature changes on the order of 10 degrees per
year likely accompanied an asteroid collision with the earth. Half the existing spe-
cies in the world disappeared, including dinosaurs. Fortunately, no one envisions
such a catastrophic rate of change! However, climate change is not the only factor
by which humans disturb nature. It has long been argued by ecologists that the
fragmentation of habitats, forcing wild species into smaller and smaller refuges with
fewer resources and higher competition than they would normally experience, is a
threat to preserving biodiversity. Indeed this conventional ecological wisdom has
led such luminaries as E.O. Wilson at Harvard to predict a mini-extinction crisis,
which, viewed from the perspective of hundreds of years, might look in some future
geological record almost as if an asteroid had hit the earth today.
But, if we combine the fragmentation of habitats, the introduction of thousands
of chemicals for which most creatures have no evolutionary experience and which
are often toxic, the transport across natural biogeographic barriers of so-called ex-
otic species, and combine these stresses on natural systems with climate change
at rates of degrees per century (as opposed to degrees per thousand years that are
more typical in the past 10,000 years), then I am confident that it would be very
difficult for many species to survive such a combination of human pressures without
an unnaturally large number of extinctions. Whether such extinctions would be
counted only in the several percent range or the tens of percent range, as many
ecologists predict, is of course impossible to know now. But, it would seem to me
almost certain that a dramatic increase of unnatural extinction rates would occur
from this combination of fragmented habitats and rapidly changing climate. Even
if we were to substantially expand our network of reserves and to interconnect them
to allow migration corridors, actions that would certainly reduce somewhat our dam-
ages to nature, I still doubt we could prevent substantial loss of biodiversity. How-
ever, careful conservation practice, maintaining conservation areas, ecosystem res-
toration, maintenance of adequate wetlands, and cost-effective priorities for con-
servation investments, probably could go a long ways toward offsetting a significant
fraction of the damages that we would likely otherwise inflict on nature.
Finally, without requiring an asteroid collision and its unbelievably rapid, large
climate change, we do know that extinctions occurred at the end of the last ice-age,
in which the charismatic metafauna such as mammoths and saber-toothed tigers
disappeared. This is a time in which there were many no analog habitats, brought
about by natures typical sustained rates of climate change: on the order of degrees
per millennium. I am virtually certain that degrees per century of climate change
sustained over a century or more and combined with fragmented habitats would, as
stated earlier, substantially increase the extinction rates of species all around the
world.
Question 3. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to a natural mechanism that
would be employed by the Earth to counteract the predicted climatic changes due
to the effect of increased water vapor in the atmosphere. Are you aware of any his-
toric reference or specific research that would support a theory of the existence of
such a mechanism?
Response. Dr. Lindzen referred in his testimony to natural mechanisms that could
counteract the rate of climate change, as he has done many times in the past and
in different contexts. A number of years ago, he asserted, without proof, that in-
creasing surface temperatures would decrease the amount of moisture in the upper
troposphere (between about 5 and 10 miles up). However, a number of observational
studies show that when the North Pacific region warmed, the moisture content of
the upper troposphere actually increased, as the computer models suggest, not as
Dr. Lindzen speculated. He later recanted his position (at least temporarily) when
pressed by then Senator Gore at a Senate hearing.
Dr. Lindzen frequently points to physical processes that are known to occur on
small-scales, and asserts that since they are not explicitly treated in computer mod-
els, that the models necessarily are inaccurate, and, furthermore, he implies this in-
accuracy is only in one directionan overestimate of climate sensitivity. He has
never demonstrated that the neglect of such small-scale processes makes any dif-
ference at the scale at which these models operate (hundreds of kilometers across).
A scientist must demonstrate how small-scale processes matter to events at large
scales, and then demonstrate that the poor treatment of such processes will change
the climate sensitivity in a given direction. Neither Dr. Lindzen nor anyone else has
demonstrated that poor treatment of each of these small scale processes necessarily
matters at large scales, let alone in what direction a better representation of them
152
would alter our predictions. Quite simply, these are theoretical speculations and Dr.
Lindzen has asked the world to wait until these complex, technical issues are thor-
oughly resolved before paying attention to the current state-of-the-artimperfect as
it isin modeling.
To me, what is essential is the validation of existing tools, not their theoretical
completeness (see my written testimony on this). Validation studies produce mixed
results, of course, but, generally support the basic predictions of the magnitude of
change in the climate models, not a tenth of that magnitude that Dr. Lindzen re-
peatedly asserts is the most likely outcome.
Furthermore, in his written testimony, Dr. Lindzen said that satellites suggested
that the computer models underestimated the amount of water vapor in the upper
troposphere sufficiently to cause an error of about 20 watts per square meter in the
models natural greenhouse effect calculations. He compared this 20 to the 4 watts
per square meter that a doubling of CO2 would add in terms of trapped infrared
heat and implied we somehow cant detect a consequence from about 4 watts per
square meter heat trapping when the absolute error in the models is 20 watts? Dr.
Lindzen knows, as we have personally debated this issue before, that this is a mis-
leading comparison. Since any error a model may make in the absolute amount of
energy that it calculates the natural atmosphere traps is also an error that would
take place both in the models control experiment, and in the experiment in which
carbon dioxide were increased. In other words, the error would subtract out from
these two experiments, leaving no difference at all unless the processes involved are
what we call nonlinear. Indeed, processes are nonlinear in the climate system, but
Dr. Lindzen has never shown that any such nonlinearity would reduce the sensitiv-
ity of the climate, as it could increase in sensitivity. The scientific community is well
aware of these issues, tries to test them as best as possible, and would never con-
fuse relative and absolute accuracy. By way of analogy, if I normally weighed 180
pounds, got on my scale and it said 190 pounds, I would be angry at the absolute
error in my scale, but would get used to it over time. If a month later, after over-
indulging in too many desserts, I step on the scale and it read 193, I would be re-
miss to say that because the 3-pound relative increase is less than the absolute
error of 10 pounds in the scale, that therefore the 3-pound increase cant be taken
seriously. Obviously, had the scale been properly calibrated to 180, it still would
have come out at 183, or perhaps 182 or 184 if the scale were slightly nonlinear.
But by and large, the absolute error would make very little difference in the sen-
sitivity of the scale to measuring change. That is the fallacy in Dr. Lindzens com-
parison of the 4 watts per square meter CO2 doubling heating effect with the 20
watt per square meter absolute error in the baseline calibration of the models he
claims exists. I apologize for the technical complexity of this answer, but I feel that
it is important to focus on that statement so as to emphasize the very little credibil-
ity that it deserves.
Question 4. Dr. Lindzen stated in his testimony that the one specific feature that
led to the IPCC conclusion of a discernible human influence on global climate,
. . . disappears when additional data is considered. Are you aware of specific ad-
ditional data that was not considered or erroneously applied that would cause the
IPCC to reach a different conclusion? Are you aware of a specific research result
or model that supports Dr. Lindzens claim? If so, did you know whether the IPCC
considered it? Are you aware of other factors that the IPCC relied upon to conclude
that human activities were impacting global climate.
Response. This is a very complicated issue, which I will try to answer as briefly
as possible, but still will take several paragraphs. In short, IPCC in 1995 had not
considered the additional data that Dr. Lindzen refers to, because it was not avail-
able to the analysis team at the time the analysis was performed. However, the very
same authors who performed the analysis have not only considered such data re-
cently, but they have incorporated it into subsequent analyses and their conclusions
remain the same, in fact, they are strengthened. I strongly urge that you contact
Dr. Ben Santer from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who will be able
to explain this further. There is a debate in Nature magazine (12 December 1996
issue) in which you can find further technical details. In short, the argument is sim-
ply this. The first analysis that the IPCC debated was based on a calculation at
Lawrence Livermore National Lab, in which carbon dioxide increases and aerosol
increases from pre-industrial values to present were used and compared to carbon
dioxide increases alone. The agreement between the models and observations was
much better when the aerosols were included, which is what one might expect since
aerosols also are part of the human impact on climate in the real world. However,
the real world did not experience a fixed increase in either carbon dioxide or
153
aerosols, but rather these radiative forcings changed with timewhat we call
transient experiments (see my written testimony).
The first studies which Dr. Santer and his colleagues performed involved equi-
librium experiments. It turns out, and government officials should be proud of this,
that environmental controls on air pollution that generates sulphate particles (be-
cause of their potential hazards to human health) caused a reduction in the emis-
sions of such sulphates from the mid-seventies through the 1990s in North America
and Europe. Therefore, a better way to perform the climate experiment would not
be to put in a fixed amount of sulphate, as was done in the initial Santer et al.
experiments, but to allow Northern Hemispheric sulphate to increase rapidly from
post-World War II to the mid1970s, then allow it to reduce due to air pollution
controls, and then start to increase again in the 1990s because of Chinese emis-
sions. Since the IPCC 1995 report, additional transient experiments with such time-
varying sulphate forcing patterns have been performed, and that Dr. Santer and col-
leagues (as reported briefly in the previously cited Nature debate) have shown that
when this more correct sulphate forcing is applied to climate models, it gives a par-
ticular shape of response, which is similar to the shape that is observed when the
additional data, to which Dr. Lindzen refers, is included. So the reason Dr.
Lindzen asserts that the additional data invalidates the original conclusion is be-
cause Dr. Lindzen is applying the additional data to the equilibrium experiment
and the agreement becomes worse. But when this new data is applied to the tran-
sient experiment, the agreement between model and observations becomes even bet-
ter. Since the transient experiment is the better representation of reality, the addi-
tional data, in my opinion, would improve ones confidence that a discernible
human influence on climate has occurred.
Finally, let me say that it is absolutely incorrect to assert (as Dr. Lindzen does
in his written testimony) that the IPCC lead authors, and I was one of them, used
the discernible phrase because of this one additional specific feature that Dr.
Santer and 11 other colleagues presented. Indeed, there were many lines of evi-
dence, of which this specific feature was one, and if any one of them collapsed,
it would not eliminate the preponderance associated with the others. These other
factors include (1) a well validated theory of heat trapping, (2) a well established
century-long 1/2C warming trend of the earth, (3) geographic patterns of climate
change with CO2 and aerosols which begin to match observed patterns, (4) mountain
glacier retreats, (5) rising sea level, (6) ability of the models to reproduce the dif-
ferent seasonal cycles of surface temperature in the Northern and Southern Hemi-
spheres, and (7) the capacities of models to reproduce cooling of the lower atmos-
phere following volcanic eruptions in roughly the same amount as was observed.
The discernible statement was clearly not based on one line of evidence.
Question 5. Do you believe there is sufficient evidence of a problem with human-
induced climate change for us to keep pursuing some kind of policy to limit CO2
emissions? If not, should we stop funding research that would tend to prove or dis-
prove the theories that human activities are impacting global climate? If there is
sufficient evidence, what more, if anything, should we be doing?
Response. With due respect to Senator Baucus, asking the question about suffi-
cient evidence to keep pursuing some kind of policy to limit CO2 emissions is
clearly asking me for a value judgment. However, since I have been asked for my
values many times, and they are well documented on the record through many con-
gressional testimoneys and four published popular books (most recent being Labora-
tory Earth: A Planetary Gamble We Cant Afford to Lose, Basic Books, 1997), I will
not hesitate to restate that opinion here.
Indeed, as I said in my oral testimony on July 10, I have believed that there has
been sufficient evidence for the past 20 years to limit CO2 emissions, not because
I was certain of the precise nature, timing, and distribution of consequent damages,
but simply because I am a risk-averse person who doesnt believe in taking irrevers-
ible chancesespecially with the life-support systems of the planet, particularly
when alternative energy systems already exist, and modest research development
programs, along with incentive programs that could be spurred through more realis-
tic energy pricing, could very well reduce substantially our impacts on the atmos-
phere. This, to me, is fundamental planetary insurance against the first decimal
place odds chance of substantial damages, particularly in areas such as biodiversity
loss.
With regard to whether we should stop funding research that would prove or dis-
prove the theories, I have two reasons to disagree. The first is plain self-interest:
as a scientific researcher interested in understanding how nature works, it would
be hard for me not to advocate pursuing further knowledge for its own sake. With
that self-interest aside, the second reason may prove more compelling to some in
154
the Congress. That is, we need to understand how the system works, and how it
changes, and how we might or might not be damaging it not only to help us decide
how much carbon emissions to mitigatethe adaptive management issue referred
to in question 1but simply to help us learn how to adapt more effectively to what-
ever change might occur. Suppose we chose as a matter of policy to take the risk
that climate change will not be serious and allow the earth to perform the experi-
ment for us. Let us also suppose, that some damages unfold (both not unlikely as-
sumptions, Im afraid). In that case, the amount of damages that would eventually
occur would depend upon on our capacity to forecast accurately what further
changes would take place. For example, it is much easier for farmers to adapt to
changes that are known in advance, for water supply planners or health officials
to make contingency planning to deal with known changes than random or
unforecasted changes. Likewise, wildlife managers could deal with artificial wet-
lands or migration corridors or other more cost-effective planning activities if they
knew precisely what changes would unfold than if changes simply occurred unantici-
pated. Therefore, even if we choose to do nothing now to abate carbonbelieving
that any amount of uncertainty is sufficient grounds to do nothing (which I think
is inconsistent with most personal and business investment practices)we still
would need the kinds of scientific information that the research community can pro-
vide in order to make adaptations more efficient and ultimate damages to incur
lower costs.
Since I argue that more research is important, you ask what more should we
be doing. First, I think we need to integrate work in physical, biological, and social
areas. I think that most areas of physical climate research are already in relatively
good shape, and the most important thing in this area to watch is some continuity
in funding, so that research groups arent always spending so much time fighting
for new grants. The amount of effort scientists put into grant writing these days
because of unreliable funding often starts to equal the amount of effort they put into
their own research. So, continuity and stability would strike me as more important
than any particular increase in overall effort in physical science or climatology. With
regard to biological research, I think there needs to be more coordination so that
interdisciplinary activities across biological and physical research groups could con-
tinue to expand. The rewards systems in science dont often provide incentives to
interdisciplinary researchers, and I think that universities and government labs
could use some encouragement from Congress and funding agencies to support such
applied, but fundamentally interesting, interdisciplinary work. Finally, I think we
have put too little relative effort into asking the question, So what if the climate
changes? I think more coordinated efforts to perform integrated assessment of the
human activities which threaten to create climate change, which affect how we
could adapt should such changes occur, and which evaluates the distribution of
damages need a boost. Even more than for physical scientists, funding is spotty and
unreliable, and impact assessment researchers spend a large fraction of their time
in defensive posture pursuing grants rather than basic work. Furthermore, aca-
demic institutions are less likely to employ such people as they are not always val-
ued as highly as basic researchers.
Finally, I think the economics community has taken major strides toward study-
ing the potential costs of carbon abatement as well as the benefits of such abate-
ment. Although all that work has accelerated, it is still at a relatively early stage
of development, and not only does more of such work need to be done, but it needs
to be better coordinated with those who study climate damages and the community
that produces climate systems research. In a nutshell, it would be nice if we had,
as the now defunct National Climate Program Office was supposed to do when it
was first mandated by Congress in 1978, some central tracking office to make sure
that wasted overlaps do not occur, and that serious research gaps do not also occur.
Some office needs to help provide some continuity of funding for observations and
modeling so that the research community can spend most of its time working, rather
than frantically pursuing the next grant dollar for survival.
Question 6. In your professional opinion, what is the probability that there will
be a doubling of CO2 concentrations since pre-industrial times by the year 2100? A
tripling? What are the impacts of a doubling? What are the impacts of a tripling?
Response. The probability that there will be a doubling of CO2 concentrations
since pre-industrial times by the year 2100 is very high. If we include the combined
effects of carbon dioxide, methane, and fluorocarbons, I think the probability is very
close to one. It will be exceedingly difficult to turn off the population growth, eco-
nomic growth and fossil fuel growth engines of this planet before the equivalent car-
bon dioxide concentration (i.e., CO2 plus methane, fluorocarbons, etc.) reaches the
heat trapping equivalent of 550 parts per million CO2probably before the middle
155
of the next century. However, if we begin to invest in alternative technologies, and
turn lose the impressive capacity of our industries to invent and deploy more effi-
cient systems, I think there is no justification to go beyond that equivalent doubling
of CO2. Indeed, we could hold heat trapping from CO2 well below a doubling if we
were to aggressively pursue all no-regrets energy-efficiency options now, as well
as perform the needed research to enhance efficiency and lower the costs of less car-
bon-intense alternative energy systems. I also believe we would have to engage in
planetary bargains with countries like China and India, especially if the differen-
tial cost of their building more efficient, less polluting power plants were borne by
richer countries. In this way, the Chinese would not lock in inefficient, high CO2-
producing coal burning power plants now whose operating lifetime could be near
five decades. Since I do not believe it is likely that such an international effort will
get very far in the near future, I give a fairly high probability to the equivalent dou-
bling of CO2. I believe also that the equivalent tripling of CO2 by 2100 is quite likely
if the world pays no attention to the alternative pathways for energy development,
and the continuation of international non-cooperation on energy and protection of
global commons is maintained. I am hopeful that will not be the case, although I
am fearful this may only happen if environmental disasters motivate attention
something I recall Senator Baucus said in his oral remarks during the hearing and
that I unhappily, but professionally, agree with.
With regard to the impacts of doubling of CO2, I think that there is a 5 or 10
percent chance that that doubling could be relatively modest in its effect on climate
(on the order of 1C or less temperature rise), and I think that there is probably
a 10 percent chance that it could be potentially catastrophic (something like 46C
or more). I think it is most likely that 23C will occur as a result of that doubling,
but that alone occurring over a century, would, as I said in answer to question 2,
likely cause serious damages to nature in the form of biodiversity loss and dramati-
cally altered habitats, as well as increases in the frequency of hydrological extremes,
such as droughts, floods, and sea level rises, and other disruptions to our normal
activities that depend on climate. I feel the impacts of a tripling would be substan-
tially worse than those of the doubling, for a tripling could well cause climate
changes of 5C or more, and in such instances major surprises, such as a flip-flop
in North Atlantic ocean currents, large releases of stored carbon compounds in soils
and bogs, and other currently imaginable surprises would be much more likely to
occur. I think that virtually any currently imaginable definition of dangerous cli-
mate change would insist on holding the future amount of carbon dioxide for dou-
bling or less, and indeed a cogent case could be made for holding the increase to
no more than 450 parts per million, although I recognize that to do that would re-
quire significant policy actions right away.
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT ANDPUBLIC WORKS,
Washington, DC.
INTERNATIONAL POLICY REVIEW
What are the facts? First, energy from the sun warms the Earth.
Second, greenhouse gases in the atmosphere trap heat from the
Earth that would otherwise radiate out into space. Third, green-
house gases make the Earth warmer than it otherwise would be.
Fourth, water vapor is the most abundant, natural greenhouse
gas. Fifth, greenhouse gases emitted by human activities are alter-
ing the pre-industrial composition of the atmosphere. Indeed, the
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased
from about 280 parts per million 200 years ago to about 360 ppm
today.
Importantly, the concentrations will not absolutely halt at 360
ppm. We will observe a doubling of pre-industrial concentrations
sometime in the early part of the next century unless we take ac-
tion.
Sixth, all nations are contributing to this buildup of greenhouse
gases. No one Nation acting alone can effectively address this mat-
ter. Seventh, the United States is the largest greenhouse gas emit-
ter in absolute and in per capita terms. China is the second largest
greenhouse gas emitter in absolute, but on a per capita basis, emits
one-tenth of U.S. emissions. Eighth, we have measured one degree
of Fahrenheit temperature increase globally over the past 100 year.
Finally, on the economic side, it is a fact that limiting carbon di-
oxide emissions will mean significant changes in energy use and
energy sources.
The question is, has science provided enough information on the
relationship between these facts and actual changes in the climate
to warrant further action? Obviously, the Administration has made
its conclusion.
The United States and 160 other nations are negotiating changes
to the existing 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change. These changes, if agreed to, could require specific, le-
gally binding, greenhouse gas emission reductions commitments for
the post-2000 period. These international negotiations are to cul-
minate at the third conference of the parties in Kyoto in December
of this year.
Should we be signatories to a Kyoto agreement? What role
should the developing countries play? What kind of emission reduc-
tion requirements are appropriate? What are the likely economic
trade, competitiveness and job impacts? What are the likely envi-
ronmental impacts of acting or not acting? How will such an inter-
national agreement be implemented domestically?
Finally, is it possible to embark upon a low regrets, or no re-
grets strategy which would minimize economic damage or even
improve our economic performance while responsibly reducing the
threat of climate change? Can we do some things that are cost-ef-
fective, regardless of whether we believe in reducing the treat of
climate change, but indeed, will reduce the threat of climate
change? For instance, we talked the other day about a certain type
of bulb in our lights.
These are other topics will be our focus today.
Senator Baucus.
199
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAX BAUCUS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MONTANA
Senator BAUCUS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have just a few brief remarks and observations from last week.
No. 1, the scientists last week presented what I thought was
quite solid evidence and a thoughtful argument that future changes
in our climate caused by human activity is a potentially serious, if
not absolutely certain, outcome.
To me, that means the potential consequences are too serious to
ignore and if we begin to make modest steps now to curtail green-
house gas emissions, we may start making progress toward that
goal without encountering serious economic disruptions.
As with many issues around here, our task is to find the right
balance between maximizing the benefits of a policy and minimiz-
ing any adverse consequences from it. As we were told last week,
the sooner we start, the better this country will be able to achieve
that result.
My second point is that if we are to succeed in limiting world-
wide emissions and CO2 and other greenhouse gases, we must have
greater participation by at least the major developing countries.
After all, this is called global climate change. If the major global
players are not part of the solution, the prospects for success will
be slim.
Perhaps this is an area in which we need to broaden our think-
ing. Ive spent a good deal of time looking at Chinas role in the
world, particularly from the trade standpoint. The United States
has a lot of issues to deal with China on, some issues on which we
have fundamental disagreements, but there are many others with
China on which we share mutual interest. Climate surely is one of
them.
China has more people potentially at risk from rising sea levels
and violent weather than any other nation. It also has a desperate
need to increase its domestic energy supplies. If there is no change,
China will be contributing a full one-third of the additional green-
house gas emissions in the world over the next 20 years, one-third.
Looking at the broad array of issues on the United States-China
table, we should be able to find ways to gain their support on this
issue. As Ive said many times, our disagreements with China
should not stop us from engaging with them on issues where we
can both make some progress.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, whatever our ultimate policy on climate
change will be, it needs the support of the American people. I be-
lieve there is a compelling case to be made and its why I welcome
the Presidents decision to become more personally involved.
The toughest issues for democracies to handle are those in which
the threat to society builds gradually but inexorably over time. We
deal well with immediate crises and I hope it will not take such
an event to spur action on this one.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
200
global climate change are real and that sensible, preventive steps
are justified.
This assessment accords with the views of more than 2,300
economists, including 8 Noble laureates, who signed the statement
supporting measures to reduce the threat of climate change.
At this time, the Administration has not settled on a particular
set of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, the
President indicated in his U.N. speech that he intends to engage
in a discussion with all interested parties, Members of Congress
and other elected officials, scientists, economists, business and
labor leaders, about the problems posed by greenhouse gas accumu-
lations and the costs and benefits of corrective action.
This discussion is intended to inform the Administrations deci-
sionmaking process which will culminate in a U.S. policy position
in the international negotiations in Kyoto in December of this year.
An important step in this, in any policy process, is determining
the impact a policy will have on the American economy. President
Clintons top priority since his first days in office has been revital-
izing the U.S. economy, creating jobs and investing in people and
technology to enhance long-term growth, and we have made tre-
mendous progress.
Any policy the President ultimately endorses on climate change
will be informed by his commitment to sustaining a healthy and ro-
bust economy. In my testimony today, Id like to describe some of
the principle lessons that emerged from the voluminous literature,
much of it relatively recent, on the economic impacts of policies to
address global climate change.
Before I begin my discussion of the economic literature, however,
Id like first to emphasize the uncertainties that are associated
with estimating both the costs and the benefits of reducing green-
house gas emissions.
Just to provide some perspective, as you all know, it is quite dif-
ficult to gauge exactly what impact, for example, the balanced
budget agreement will have on the U.S. economys growth rate, lev-
els of employment, interest rates and consumption over a period as
long as the next 5 years.
With global climate change, its orders of magnitude more dif-
ficult to gauge the effects of policies on the economy. Were con-
cerned with not just the next 5 years and not just the American
economy, but rather, with economic and physical processes that op-
erate globally and over decades, if not centuries.
Both the costs and the benefits of climate protection are very dif-
ficult to quantify or predict with any certainty. So, in short, if any-
body tells you that he or she has the definitive answer as to the
costs and benefits of particular climate change policies, I would
suggest that you raise your collective eyebrows.
Let me now turn to the economic literature and try to summarize
what I think we know so far about this difficult topic.
The economic literature includes estimates using many different
models to evaluate numerous alternative emission reduction strate-
gies. In fact, because there are so many different models, econo-
mists initially faced difficulties in comparing results.
To solve this problem, thereby enabling meaningful comparisons,
many economists have calibrated the various models by performing
204
tries will not act either. We must lead the way and we must move
soon.
If not, a doubling of concentrations becomes certain and we put
ourselves on the road to a tripling or even higher levels of con-
centrations, the consequences of which are uncertain but likely to
be catastrophic.
The United States has put forward a number of proposals which
are outlined in my testimony and the attachments. Perhaps most
controversial is Article 16, our proposal which calls for developing
country parties to adopt by the year 2005, binding provisions so
that all parties have quantitative greenhouse gas emission obliga-
tions and so that there is a mechanism or trigger for automatic ap-
plication of those obligations based on agreed criteria.
In urging this policy of what we call evolution, the United States
is far out in front of almost all other countries and were being
criticized accordingly. For example, several developed countries be-
lieve that our proposal imposes unfair burdens on developing coun-
tries. Most countries in the developing world believe that evolution
goes beyond the scope of the Climate Convention and the Berlin
Mandate. We think we have the concept about right. No one should
be exempt. We emit the most, so we have to act first, but others
have to phase in over time.
The overall negotiation on climate change is extremely complex,
the most complex Ive seen in 25 years of public life. The evolution
aspect is perhaps the most important of all. We have put forward
some proposals, some in Congress have as well. Now we have to
hammer out a final proposal and negotiating position. We welcome
your input, support and creativity as we work to solve this problem
and I look forward to hearing your ideas, questions and comments
today.
The issue is not whether developing countries, especially the big
and rapidly developing ones, take on quantified commitments to
limit or reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. Clearly, it will
be impossible to abate the threat of climate change unless they do.
The issue is when such commitment should begin and what criteria
should be used to establish them and to whom they would apply.
The Framework Convention, which President Bush signed and to
which the Senate overwhelmingly gave its approval, established
the principle that with respect to climate change, the worlds na-
tions have common but differentiated responsibilities and varying
capabilities. Insisting the developing nations immediately accept
binding emissions targets that industrialized nations are seeking to
negotiate is neither realistic, nor consistent with the Convention
approved by the Senate, but insisting that those developing nations
now responsible for a growing share of global greenhouse gas emis-
sions should have no further obligations to act until they cross
some threshold of national income or emissions per capita, is equal-
ly unrealistic and inconsistent with the Conventions ultimate ob-
jective.
The agreement reached in Kyoto will not solve the problem of
global climate change. No matter how ambitious, it will represent
only a second step along the much longer path toward achieving
the Climate Conventions ultimate objective. As we prepare for
Kyoto, we must also prepare for further steps beyond it. In particu-
209
Senator BAUCUS. Why not follow that step a little further and
have not only Annex 1 but Annex B, C, D and E and all countries
commit but at different rates?
Secretary WIRTH. Thats generally the idea, that there will be dif-
ferent rates.
Senator BAUCUS. But the point is they all commit to certain tar-
gets?
Secretary WIRTH. We would like to see that kind of commitment
from all countries. Were dealing with 150-some signatories of the
Climate Treaty, but were really talking about maybe 35 countries
that make major contributions. If we could get those 35 under the
tent, as suggested by Senator Kempthornes questions, we would
have made an enormous difference.
Senator BAUCUS. Am I correct in assuming that some other de-
veloped countries are not as interested as the United States?
Secretary WIRTH. Thats true. Were far out front.
Senator BAUCUS. Why is that? Why would the European Unions
not be as interested, including developing countries as quickly as
the United States?
Secretary WIRTH. I dont want to get into the politics of what
may go on in Germany or wherever. I think they are a little skep-
tical of our engagement in that because we havent put up numbers
yet. I think some of that is their way of saying to us, why havent
you put up your targets and timetables yet, were not going to
agree with what youre saying until you come forward with your
targets and timetables.
Well do so later this fall and then I think it will be easier for
us to bring them on board.
There are also some suggestions that they dont want to get far
out front in placing demands on the developing world, that maybe
they can gain some economic advantage by having us out front as
being the guy really pushing on the developing countries and they
come back and say, were the good guys.
Senator BAUCUS. If you had to guess, whats the main reason?
Secretary WIRTH. The main reason is that we havent yet put out
our targets and timetables, so theyre not going to pick up our pro-
posals until we put out clear indications of what we believe were
going to do.
Senator BAUCUS. So you think if we do put out our targets and
timetables, then they too will then come in and suggest that devel-
oping countries step up more quickly?
Secretary WIRTH. Yes, I believe thats the case. We take the lead,
were the key area in all of this. We do a reasonable targets and
timetables approach in Kyoto. We have that on the table mid to
late October, thats part of that negotiation; then I think its much,
much more likely that were going to get our proposals on economic
flexibility that Dr. Yellen was outlining and its much more likely
then that they go along with us in pushing for developing country
participation.
We have then the opportunity and the Annex 1 countries or the
developed countries to begin then to make a much clearer and co-
herent case to the developing countries to get on board. As the
chairman pointed out, getting the developing countries on board is
going to be the toughest part of this whole negotiation.
215
our size. Those are rough numbers. There are great significant effi-
ciencies.
Second, there are real opportunities for us to create very, very
productive partnerships with large parts of American industry. You
might have seen the piece this morning in the Washington Post by
the chairman or president of Chrysler talking about the partner-
ship for a new generation of vehicles. Thats the kind of thing we
think we can embark upon.
There are real opportunities. We look at deregulation in the util-
ity world. Think about the factor in the climate issue which can be
very helpful in coming to the right kinds of economic decisions
there. Getting the prices right is, of course, a very important one,
to remove subsidies from key areas.
These are some of the items that we can do over a relatively
short period of time that can have a significant impact. The auto-
mobile example is a longer term one but again, the kind of promis-
ing steps that we might make.
A final note, and I would ask Dr. Yellen to comment, this prob-
lem is not going to be solved, as you know, by these kinds of short-
term measures. This is a long-term pull over 40, 50, or 60 years.
The long-term solution is going to come from major technological
improvements, changes and innovations. That is where the payoff
is going to be.
The sooner we start to get the framework right for developing
those long-term technological solutions, the better chance we have
of meeting our obligations to our children, grandchildren and great
grandchildren.
Senator WYDEN. Is it your sense that energy efficiency, weve
seen appraisals that would be in the vicinity of $2 a ton plus tree
planting and forest management strategies where modest costs per
ton would be sensible kinds of approaches that we ought to look to
first.
Secretary WIRTH. Weve already embarked upon a number of
joint implementation projects with some 17 or 20 of those around
the world today. Wed be happy to send you a list of those. Many
of those do relate to forestry practices and very progressive forestry
practices.
The sequestration of carbon is a very, very important part of any-
thing that we might want to do. Again, here is a good example of
where the opportunities for us to develop partnerships with the ag-
ricultural community, with the forest product community, are very
significant. Theres a lot of carbon stored out there in sound agri-
cultural practices.
Senator WYDEN. I appreciate your saying that because there is
no question in our minds that looking at sensible forest manage-
ment strategies is the winner all around. Youre going to get more
and higher value. Wood products are going to get better habit for
species, water quality and as you said, its a cost-effective way to
sequester carbon.
Given that, can the Administration make a special push to en-
sure that forest management and reforestation programs are a sig-
nificant component of a global climate treaty?
Secretary WIRTH. We have made that point over and over again
and I would commit that to you here, that the commitment and en-
224
ties must first get the treaty structure right. We have a long way
to go before that will happen.
In closing, I believe it is useful to look at previous examples for
guidance that may provide a better perspective than the intense
pre-Kyoto focus.
More than 12 years ago, negotiators were struggling to complete
the Vienna Convention for protection of the ozone layer after more
than 5 years of negotiation. These negotiations had taken on a bit-
ter tone as parties, including the United States and the European
Union tried to
Senator CHAFEE. When you say these negotiations, you mean the
ozone layer, the Vienna ones?
Mr. FAY. Yes. The United States and European Union tried to
push for adoption of their own preferred policy approach to dealing
with those depleting compounds. Instead, the parties agreed to that
convention without the regulatory protocol and also agreed to es-
tablish a series of workshops and information-gathering devices to
better understand each others views.
When negotiations resumed, approximately 2 years later, the
parties were much better informed and a treaty structure was
adopted that has since proven very durable. The Montreal Protocol
which was signed in 1987 has proven much more effective than
most of us thought possible at the time.
We raise this as an example not because we believe the issues
are identical. They are not and climate change is certainly far more
complex. We raise it because as we reach this fevered pitch prior
to Kyoto, we want to stress that an effective framework is what
counts, not an expedient framework.
The climate treaty needs to be durable for the next 100 years.
Our companies have determined that the current State of scientific
understanding requires a prudent, long-term approach to address
this issue. This view is equally applicable to the climate negotia-
tions themselves.
We appreciate the opportunity to be here today.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Fay.
Now, Mr. OKeefe, chairman, Global Climate Coalition here in
Washington.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM OKEEFE, CHAIRMAN, GLOBAL
CLIMATE COALITION
Mr. OKEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am William OKeefe,
chairman of the Global Climate Coalition. Our members form the
backbone of the U.S. economy and encompass companies from man-
ufacturing, agriculture, transportation, energy utilities and mining.
The GCC commends this committee for holding these hearings to
discuss the scientific and economic realities of climate change and
the implications of the Administrations negotiating strategy in a
rational, logical, and open forum.
Recent Senate hearings have put a much needed spotlight on the
compelling scientific uncertainties that should permeate every cli-
mate change policy discussion. A May 16 article in the respected
journal, Science, demonstrated convincingly that based on our cur-
rent State of knowledge, we do not face an imminent crisis and so
230
Senator CHAFEE. Even though that might be more than the 1990
level?
Mr. OKEEFE. Oh, it will be. We dont have the technology to
make that kind of reduction in that short a time period13 years.
I think that Mr. Fay has made the same point.
We need a process that is predictable, that is realistic. The Ad-
ministration analysis is based on a trading program and some new
technology. The technology hasnt been identified and other coun-
tries have rejected the trading scheme and many economists be-
lieve that its not feasible. Quite simply, other nations will not
agree to it.
Certainly, if it was going to be in place, its going to take a long
time to get an agreement. So it might be better in Kyoto to try and
agree on a framework that all nations would embrace and then, at
a future conference, decide what the target is and the time period
for achieving it.
Senator CHAFEE. As I understand what both of you are saying,
both of you recognize that there is a problem there and its what
to do about it where the contention comes. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. OKEEFE. I think that there is a risk. I think there is legiti-
mate scientific dispute over the problem and the hearing you had
last week demonstrated that. The last page in Chapter 8 of the
IPCC report, around page 439, makes it clear that there is not a
scientific consensus that we have a problem. But thats not an ex-
cuse for inaction.
There is a potential risk and there is uncertainty and the uncer-
tainty goes both ways. Given the uncertainty and the potential risk
if we guess wrong, there is certainly a need for prudent action, but
the people who have also studied this say we do have time to do
it right. We do not face an imminent catastrophe that justifies the
kind of crash program to reduce energy use thats being considered
by the negotiators.
Senator CHAFEE. The problem we have with that is, and we en-
counter this all the time. Im on the Finance Committee and were
dealing there with Medicare and we have come up with a proposal
that eligibility age for Medicare be increased to 67 to correspond
with the eligibility age for social security.
There is great objection to that from many saying no, no, no and
were doing it because there is a real problem out there with the
future of Medicare. So those like myself who are proponents for
doing something say theres always an excuse to wait and delay
things and its always attractive to postpone it. It seems to me
there is a similar situation here.
I hardly think weve rushed into this, but your feeling is, I think
you just said, lets wait and do it right. Who knows what right is?
Mr. OKEEFE. Let me be clear. Im not saying we should do noth-
ing. There are hundreds of companies that are participating in the
voluntary programs. The petroleum industry, which I also rep-
resent, is spending over $10 billion a year on achieving environ-
mental objectives. There is a lot of progress being made. Its not
whether we act; its the rate at which we force actions to be taken
and the consequences of those.
By taking the time to do it right, and by that I mean the time
to turn over the capital stock, get new plants and equipment in op-
236
In his speech to the United Nations Special Session on Environment and Develop-
ment in June, President Clinton emphasized that the risks posed by global climate
change are real and that sensible preventive steps are justified. This assessment ac-
cords with the views of the more than 2,300 economists, including 8 Nobel laure-
ates, who signed a statement supporting measures to reduce the threat of climate
change. The economists endorsed the conclusions from last years report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which said that governments
should take steps to reduce the threat of damage from global warming, and went
on to argue that market-based policies can slow climate change without harming the
American economy.
237
At this time the Administration has not settled on a particular set of new policies
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, the President indicated in his U.N.
speech that he intends to engage in a discussion with all interested parties about
the problems posed by greenhouse gas accumulations and the costs and benefits of
corrective action. To this end, the President will hold a White House conference on
climate change later this year, and members of his Cabinet and other senior Admin-
istration officials will meet with Members of Congress, scientific and economic ex-
perts, environmentalists, local government officials, and business and labor leaders
on a regular basis over the next several months to discuss issues related to climate
change. This process is intended to inform the Administrations decisionmaking
process, which will culminate in a U.S. policy position in the international negotia-
tions in Kyoto in December of this year.
An important step in thisand anypolicy process is determining the impact it
will have on the American economy. President Clintons top priority, since his first
days in office, has been revitalizing the U.S. economy, creating jobs and investing
in people and technology to enhance long-term growth. And, we have made tremen-
dous progress. The President is not going to jeopardize that progress. Any policy he
ultimately endorses on climate change will be informed by his commitment to sus-
taining a healthy and robust economy.
In my testimony today, I would like to describe some of the principal lessons that
emerge from the voluminous literature, much of it relatively recent, on the economic
impacts of policies to address global climate change.
UNDERLYING UNCERTAINTIES
Before I begin my discussion of the economic literature, I would like first to ac-
knowledge the uncertainties associated with estimating both the costs and benefits
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. To provide some perspective: as you all know,
it is difficult to gauge exactly what impact the balanced budget agreement will have
on the U.S. economys growth rate, levels of employment, interest rates and con-
sumption over the next 5 years. But with global climate change, it is orders of mag-
nitude more difficult to gauge the effects on the economy: we are concerned with
not just the next 5 years and not just the American economy, but, rather, we are
dealing with economic and physical processes that operate globally and over dec-
ades, if not centuries.
Although a great many scientists believe that global climate change is already un-
derway, the more serious potential damages associated with increasing concentra-
tions of greenhouse gases are not predicted to occur for decades. This means that
the benefits of climate protection are very difficult to quantify. And, while the poten-
tial costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions may be more immediate, they too,
as I will discuss below, are difficult to predict with any certainty. Many unanswered
questions exist about the biophysical systems, potential thresholds, and economic
impacts. In short, if anybody tells you that he or she has the definitive answer as
to the costs and benefits of particular climate change policies, I would suggest that
you raise your collective eyebrows.
LESSONS FROM THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE
Let me now turn to the economic literature and try to summarize what I think
we know so far about this difficult topic. Most economists have not addressed the
benefits of climate protection, but rather have focused on the costs associated with
alternative paths for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The economic literature in-
cludes estimates using many different models to evaluate numerous alternative
emission reduction strategies. In fact, because there are so many different models,
economists initially faced difficulties in comparing results: they could not sort out
the extent to which differences in results stemmed from differences in models and
assumptions versus differences in baseline emission paths and policies. To solve this
problem, thereby enabling meaningful comparisons, many economists have cali-
brated the various models by performing a standardized simulation. Specifically,
they have assessed the consequences of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990
levels by 2010 or 2020.
Within the Administration, a staff level working groupthe Interagency Analysis
Team (IAT)has attempted to estimate some of the economic implications of cli-
mate change policies. They took the emissions scenario most often used in academic
literaturethat is, stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by 2010as the starting
point for their own analysis. I would emphasize that this scenario is not Administra-
tion policy; instead, it was picked to make comparisons with other models easier.
The staff group employed 3 different modelsthe DRI model, the Second Generation
Model (SGM) and Markal-Macro model, all commonly available in the public sphere.
238
In running these models, the staff adopted a common baseline and, to themaxi-
mum extent possible, similar economic assumptions. This modeling effort produced
some useful lessons, but as we found from the peer reviewers comments, it also suf-
fered from some serious shortcomings. Both the lessons and the shortcomings point
to one clear conclusion: the effort to develop a model or set of models that can give
us a definitive answer as to the economic impacts of a given climate change policy
is futile. Rather, we are left with a set of parameters and relationships that influ-
ence estimates of the impacts. In my view, it is more productive to employ a broad
set of economic tools to analyze policy options than to seek to develop a single defini-
tive model.
I understand that a draft of the staff analysis was given to the committee earlier
this week, along with the reviewers comments. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have about this modeling effort.
The Lessons
Modeling efforts both inside and outside the Administration clearly indicate that
economic analysis can do no more than estimate a range of potential impacts from
particular policies and highlight how outcomes depend on underlying assumptions
about how the economy works and the ways in which policy is implemented. How-
ever, the economics literature on climate change does point to several important les-
sons:
How the economy works
First, the magnitude of the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the var-
ious models depends crucially on a number of key assumptions about how the econ-
omy works. For instance:
If firms in the economy can shift from high-carbon to low-carbon energy sources
quickly, the costs of climate protection will be lower.
If the economy has significant opportunities, even now, to employ energy-saving
technology at low costs, the costs of climate protection will be lower.
If technological change occurs at a rapid rate, or is highly responsive to in-
creases in the price of carbon emissions, the costs of climate protection will be re-
duced.
If the Federal Reserve pursues a monetary policy oriented toward keeping the
economy at full employment, transitional output costs will be lower.
In short, the greater the substitution possibilities and the faster the economy can
adapt, the lower the costs.
How the plan is implemented
Second, costs depend critically on how emission reduction policies are imple-
mented. It boils down to this: if we do it dumb, it could cost a lot, but if we do it
smart, it will cost much less and indeed could produce net benefits in the long run.
The over 2,300 signatories of the economists statement argued that any global cli-
mate change policy should be rely on market-based mechanisms. Such mechanisms
allow for flexibility in both the timing and location of emission reductions, thereby
minimizing the costs to the U.S. economy. The economists concluded that there are
policy options that would slow climate change without harming American living
standards, and these measures may in fact improve U.S. productivity in the longer
run.
The speed at which emissions reductions are required can have large effects on
the estimated costs. It is important to allow sufficient lead-time for orderly invest-
ment in new equipment and technology. Alternatively, if emission reduction require-
ments are too far off in the future, the incentives to adopt energy efficient tech-
nologies are weakened because people may not view the policy as credible.
A cap and trade system in which emission permits are issued and then traded
among firms can substantially reduce the cost of meeting an emissions target by
creating incentives for emissions to be reduced by those firms and in those activities
where costs are lowest.
International emission permit trading substantially lowers costs by applying the
same cost-minimizing principle globally.
So-called banking and borrowing of permits increases flexibility and lowers
costs by allowing firms to change the timing of their emission reductions.
Joint implementation, whereby U.S. firms would receive credit for undertaking
emission reductions in countries with low abatement costs, would also lower the do-
mestic burden.
An additional aspect of implementation that profoundly affects the costs of reduc-
ing emissions concerns revenue recycling. In many model simulations, emissions
are reduced by using various market mechanisms. For many of these scenarios, the
Federal Government realizes an increase in revenues. Economic growth can receive
239
a long-term boost if these revenues are used to reduce distortionary taxes that di-
minish the incentives to invest, save or work, or if the revenues are channeled into
deficit reduction, thereby lowering interest rates and boosting investment. In fact,
in some models and scenarios, emissions reduction generates a net economic benefit
when the revenues are recycled in a growth-promoting fashion.
Which countries participate
The third lesson that emerges from a study of the economics of climate protection
is that developing, as well as developed, countries must be part of the process. While
developed countries are responsible for most of the greenhouse gas currently in the
atmosphere, developing countries are starting to catch up. By 2040, the largest frac-
tion of emissions is estimated to come from developing countries. Thus, any com-
prehensive plan to deal with this global problem must include a mechanism to bring
developing countries into the process.
The timetable for the inclusion of developing countries is also important. The
sooner that developing countries face incentives to move away from carbon intensive
energy sources, the less likely it is that they will become dependent on those types
of fuels to spur their economic growth. In short, global problems require global solu-
tions. We must find the technologies and solutions to lead the way.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude. Policies to promote economic growth, create jobs, and improve
the living standards and opportunities of all Americans have been and always will
remain the top priority of the President and his Administration. In his remarks to
the Business Roundtable on global climate change, the President said [l]ets find
a way to preserve the environment, to meet our international responsibilities, to
meet our responsibilities to our children, and grow the economy at the same time.
Some of the key economic lessons we have learned that will help us achieve the
Presidents goal include:
Inherent uncertainty dictates that models should be expected to generate only
a range of economic impacts, not definitive answers.
Key assumptions about how the economy works directly influence the estimated
costs of climate protection.
Implementation of any policy needs to be market-based and flexible over time
and space to achieve the lowest cost reductions.
All nations, both developed and developing, need to participate.
Thank you I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
The United States has outlined a specific proposal for dealing with the developing
country role as part of the Kyoto agreement, including definition of obligations
under Article 4.1 of the Framework Convention, establishment of an Annex B of
countries which would voluntarily adopt emissions budgets, and a date certain by
which all parties would have emissions budgets.
As stated by Bert Bolin, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) at the March 1997 meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Science and
Technological Advice (SBSTA) in Bonn, [I]t is obvious from this graph that no rea-
sonable future reductions by Annex I countries would stabilize global emissions.
Therefore, it is imperative that developing countries be part of this agreement. Fur-
thermore, as stated in the Administrations recent economic work, a significant per-
centage of infrastructure and industry investment by developed countries is occur-
ring in developing countries. Finally, because of the strong linkages between popu-
lation growth and greenhouse gas emissions, it is important that we recognize that
seven of the current non-Annex I countries represent two-thirds of the worlds popu-
lation.
The Administration has been forthright in its insistence that the developing coun-
try role be defined. ICCP recognizes the potential limits of the current Berlin Man-
date with respect to new commitments for non-Annex I Parties. It is clear, however,
that the Berlin Mandate contemplates definition and elaboration of Article 4.1 com-
mitments for all Parties, including the developing countries.
Additionally, it is imperative that additional developing country participation, in-
cluding emission budgets, must be defined prior to the start of the first binding
budget period for the current Annex I parties. It is only through such definition that
governments and the private sector can ensure that investment flows are not dis-
torted.
ENTRY INTO FORCE
ICCP has noted that six countries, including India and China, currently account
for 55 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. In order for the treaty to enter into
force, it is imperative that a significant percentage of greenhouse gas emissions be
represented by ratifying countries. In addition, a significant percentage of Annex I
countries and developing countries should ratify the treaty before it enters into
force.
We also believe that it is inappropriate for a regional economic organization to
be allowed to represent both itself and the voting rights of its individual members.
The EU has argued that it should be allowed to bubble its emissions and is propos-
ing to allocate emissions internally. It is unfair that the EU be granted this conces-
sion to bubble its emissions when it declines to support similar flexibility for other
Parties. Therefore, the EU should have to decide to either bubble and count as one
vote, or to not bubble and to be counted individually.
GREENHOUSE GAS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
ICCP has urged the negotiators to provide for a long-term focus or objective. We
believe such an objective provides clarity to negotiators, as well as to those charged
with implementation of commitments. It is our understanding that the United
States has performed some analysis of this issue, and that such analysis could be
useful to the negotiators currently. Furthermore, we applaud the article in the U.S.
protocol proposals which contemplates a long-term objective.
251
This objective will be an important guide to future decisionmaking, including pri-
vate sector investment planning. We note that several participants, including the
EU, and certain environmental organizations have suggested certain objectives
characterized as atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and that the IPCC
documents present their analysis according to atmospheric loading of greenhouse
gases measured in parts per million (ppm) of CO2 equivalent.
ICCP has not advocated a greenhouse gas concentration as the appropriate meas-
ure for the long term objective. A long-term objective could be defined as a combina-
tion of adaptation, impacts, and concentration measures.
Recent analysis of the economics of climate change controls have indicated that
the long-term objective is not as relevant as the path charted for the emission reduc-
tion. In our view, it is impossible to develop a meaningful path without knowing
the point of departure and the intended goal.
We recognize that the current State of science does not provide a precise correct
answer. Science does provide a basis for making an informed political judgment on
the objective, and scientific assessment through the IPCC and elsewhere is critical
to future reassessment of any potential long-term objective.
POLICIES AND MEASURES
It is imperative that each Nation maintains maximum national flexibility with re-
spect to implementation of its climate commitments. It is neither appropriate nor
productive for the negotiators to determine the manner in which each country
should achieve its commitments. ICCP is opposed to any listing of specific annexes
of policies and measures in any manner, i.e., mandatory, regional coordination, vol-
untary, or exemplary.
TARGET/BUDGET/ACCOUNTABILITY PERIOD
There have been several proposals for specific point targets and/or budget periods
as part of the protocol proposals that are currently before the Parties. ICCP has not
endorsed the notion of a binding target. We do, however, recognize that all of the
government proposals to be considered in Kyoto do contemplate such a step as a
starting point.
The lesson from the non-binding commitment of the 1992 FCCC agreement is
that, despite the best of intentions, a specific point target is very difficult to admin-
ister due to fluctuations in economic conditions, weather conditions, etc. Therefore,
we believe it is imperative that the long-term objectives be utilized to examine a
reasonable path that minimizes short-term economic disruption and stimulates the
longer-term technological innovation necessary to significantly reduce worldwide
greenhouse gas emissions.
The United States has indicated a preference for an emissions budget period and
a binding commitment to achieve that budget. In our view, the practical timetable
for ratification and implementation of a Kyoto climate agreement, including subse-
quent definition of a developing country role, suggests that meaningful program im-
plementation steps could not be up and running with confidence any time soon after
a Kyoto agreement. There has been a great deal of focus on the beginning of such
a so-called budget period.
In our view, the beginning of the budget period is not as important as the end
of the budget period, i.e., the point at which the principle of binding commitment
actually has the potential to impose penalty or sanction. In light of the uncertainties
stated above, ratification, implementation, developing country role, and some level
of experience with the implementation process, we believe that it would be inappro-
priate to end the first binding budget period before the year 2020. This timeframe
will allow industry to develop its programs, and gain confidence in their perform-
ance.
ICCP also believes this timeframe is consistent with its previous position that
policies at the outset of this effort must take into account a reasonable period for
capital stock turnover. This will provide a period for industry to ramp up its cli-
mate change responses.
If the budget period is to be adopted, we believe that it should be long enough
to encompass weather and economic cycles, but not so long as to present an impos-
sible horizon to provide both industry and policymakers with some certainty. There-
fore, it appears that a 10-year budget period is better than a 3- or 5-year period.
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Although not specifically included as part of the current protocol proposals, ICCP
continues to believe that the FCCC must be grounded in sound scientific and tech-
252
nological assessment processes. This function, as currently served primarily through
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), is inadequate.
The IPCC is currently considering restructuring proposals including the adoption
of working group outlines that incorporate an effective role for private sector expert
participation. We encourage support for these proposals.
Finally, it is also important that we de-politicize the IPCC process to the maxi-
mum extent possible. Its credibility can be sustained only if it is truly seen to be
the work of scientific and technical experts, and not subject to the whims of the dip-
lomatic and political process or other special interests.
TRADING, BANKING AND JOINT IMPLEMENTATION (JI)
1 For a more complete listing of scares, see: Adam J. Lieberman, Facts Versus Fears: A Review
of the 20 Greatest Unfounded Health Scares of Recent Times, prepared for the American Council
on Science and Health, May 1997.
2 For instance, the president of the World Resources Institute wrote: Climate change isnt just
any environmental issue. Its bigger . . . its tied to almost every facet of contemporary economic
life. How we travel, manufacture and ship goods, build buildings, farm, and spend our leisure
time all influences the tempo of climate change. [emphasis in original] See: Gus Speth, forward
to The Greenhouse Trap (World Resources Institute, 1990).
3 Aaron Wildavsky, Global Warming as a Means Of Achieving an Egalitarian Society: An In-
troduction, introduction to Robert C. Balling, Jr., The Heated Debate (1992), xv.
4 Richard S. Lindzen, Global Warming: The Origin and Nature of the Alleged Scientific Con-
sensus, Regulation, Vol. 15, No 2, (Spring 1992).
5 Worldwatch Institute, Beyond the Petroleum Age: Designing a Solar Economy (December
1990), 48.
256
That human numbers must be drastically reduced.6
Obviously, evidence that climate change may not be an imminent catastrophe un-
dermines such visions of America in the 21st Century. Indeed, unwavering alle-
giance to such agendas may explain why advocates of precipitous action deny with
vehemence the logical implications of obvious scientific uncertainties.
True concern for the economic and environmental well-being of people in this and
other countries would surely lead negotiators to balance their policy prescriptions
with the state of scientific evidence. After all, carbon dioxide (CO2) is not a pollutant
but a natural element necessary for survival, with man-made emissions directly re-
lated to prosperity and economic progress. Curbing those emissions unnecessarily
would mean fewer jobs and less incomeand therefore less money for other health
and environmental protection measures. A less prosperous United States means a
nation less able to promote technological development which is essential to environ-
mental progress and to our continued ability to adapt in a changing world.
THE SCIENCE IS NOT SETTLED
The hearings of this committee a week agoand those of the Senate Subcommit-
tee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion chaired by Sen-
ator Hagel in Junehave put a much-needed public spotlight on the compelling sci-
entific uncertainties that should permeate every climate change discussion and ne-
gotiation. Climate scientists and modelers simply do not know enough about pos-
sible human impacts on the global climate system to justify taking near-term ac-
tions being considered by international negotiators that would require us to sup-
press energy use by at least 25 percent in little over a decade.
That opinion is shared by scientists who participated in the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and wrote the 1995 Second Assessment Report,
along with many other members of the scientific community. That report does state
that the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global cli-
mate and the Administration repeatedly quotes that sentimentout of contextin
its statements that the science is settled. The May 16 issue of the journal Science
pointed out that Dr. Benjamin Santer, a lead IPCC author, warned against such
over-simplification when he stated that, Its unfortunate that many people read the
media hype before they read the [IPCC] chapter [on greenhouse warming] . . . We
say quite clearly that few scientists would say that the attribution issue was a done
deal. That same Science article also notes that [s]ome scientists assert that devel-
opments since the IPCC completed its report have, if anything, magnified the uncer-
tainties, and quotes a noted scientist as saying, There really isnt a persuasive
case being made for detection of greenhouse warming. At the articles end, the au-
thor refers to a climatologist and IPCC contributor who concluded that while re-
searchers are firming up the science, policy-makers could inaugurate some cautious
things to moderate any warming.
Unquestionably, the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has increased. It has
gone from about 280 parts per million two centuries ago to about 360 parts per mil-
lion today. It is generally agreed that this increase is due to human activity, espe-
cially combustion of fossil fuels. CO2 like several other gases in the atmosphere, es-
pecially water vapor, traps heat. Without this greenhouse effect, the average global
temperature would be about zero degrees and life as we know it would not be pos-
sible. In theory, if CO2 is increasing, more heat might get trapped and the tempera-
ture might rise.
But theory is not fact until subjected to the acid test of scientific rigor to confirm
or reject it. To date, no confirming evidence has withstood tough scrutinyas the
May 16 Science article explains. While it is a fact that there has been some warming
over the past century, it is within the range of normal variability. Furthermore,
most of it occurred before 1940, which was before any significant increase in CO2
emissions. In particular, over the past 20 years, when high-quality satellite meas-
urements of temperature began, no warming has been observed; and, in fact, there
has been a slight downward trend.
Moreover, Dr. Bert Bolin, the chairman of the IPCC, has repeatedly said science
has not established a link between human greenhouse gas emissions and particular
severe weather events. Yet, Vice President Gore and other Administration officials
made such an overstatement when they associated the flooding in North Dakota
earlier this year with global warming. President Clinton made a similar overstate-
ment when he said on June 30 in New York City that greenhouse gases have led
to the most disruptive weather patterns anybody can remember over the last 4 or
5 years. Members of the GCC and of the business community are only being accu-
Dr. Bolin has also cautioned against expecting global temperature benefits from
emission reductions by developed countries alone. Yet, the Berlin Mandate agreed
to by international negotiators in 1995 exempts developing countries from any new
commitments to curb emissions. Dr. Bolin, during his February 25, 1997 presen-
tation in Bonn to international negotiators, said that the proposals applicable only
to the industrialized nations would not be detectable on projected temperature in-
creases.
The 2,000 economists who signed a petition on climate changeand the 65 U.S.
Senators who have signed Senate Resolution 98emphasize that all countries must
participate in any program to address global emissions. China, India and other de-
veloping countries will account for most of the future growth in carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions in the next century but will be exempt from any meaningful treaty obliga-
tions. This will create powerful incentives to attract manufacturing investments and
the jobs they create from the industrialized countriesand also create powerful eco-
nomic and political constituencies for never curbing emissions. As Representative
John Dingell asked rhetorically in his testimony of June 19 before the Senate Sub-
committee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion: Does
anyone seriously believe China, or any other country for that matter, will act on al-
truistic motives? Without the active involvement of developing countries, the
growth in global CO2 emissions will not be reduced in any meaningful way.
THE ECONOMIC COSTS WOULD BE HIGH
The Administration suggests that curbing energy use will impose little economic
sacrifice. Everett M. Ehrlich, former undersecretary of commerce for economic af-
fairs, wrote in The Washington Post of June 15, 1997 that the economic literature
suggests that we could roll back our CO2 emissions to their 1990 levels by 2010 for
the equivalent of a 25 cent gas tax. Its not free, but its not the end of the world.
Few consumers would share this benign view of such a hike in their energy bills.
Some authors of the IPCC report even suggest that curbing greenhouse gas emis-
sions could be freethe environmental equivalent of a free lunchor even be eco-
nomically beneficial!7
In fact, however, every credible, independent economic analysis confirms what
common sense suggests: a substantial curb on the use of a key economic resource
will impose substantial costs. From an Administration draft analysis circulated last
May, one could reasonably conclude that U.S. negotiators want to cut CO2 emissions
back to 1990 levels by sometime around 2010, and hold them there. This would re-
quire more than a 25 percent reduction in projected fossil fuel use. The Administra-
tion is placing its blind faith in unidentified technological breakthroughs and an
unprovenand probably unworkabletrading scheme to counterbalance the eco-
nomic damage of self-imposed energy rationing.
However, economic studies more realistic about the probable contributions of ex-
isting and new technologies paint a more sobering picture. Studies by Charles River
Associates, DRI, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration indicate that en-
ergy taxes of $125 to $200 per metric ton of carbon would be needed to return emis-
sions to 1990 levels by 2010 ($200 per ton is equivalent to an increase in the excise
tax on gasoline of about 60 cents a gallon). The annual impact of a tax this size
includes the following losses:
$100 billion to $275 billion in gross domestic product (GDP).
$200,000 to $500,000 U.S. jobs.
$65 billion to $100 billion in fixed business investment.
$50 billion to $110 billion in consumer purchases.
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN SLOW TO RELEASE ITS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
DOE released on July 11, 1997 a study contracted with Argonne National Labora-
tory early in 1996 to investigate the potential effects (which may be either bene-
ficial or adverse) on energy-intensive industries in the United States of alternative
7 These authors wrote: Despite significant differences in views, there is agreement that en-
ergy efficiency gains of perhaps 10 to 30% over baseline trends over the next two or three dec-
ades can be realized at negative or zero net cost (negative net cost means an economic benefit).
See: International Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Di-
mensions of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Re-
port of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1996), 16.
258
scenarios for changes in world patterns of industrial energy prices that might result
from new climate commitments. Six industries were selected and the study results
show that the impact on each industry would range from significantly adverse to
devastating and produce little, if any, environmental benefit.8
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has attempted to put these results in a
favorable light by claiming that the study examines energy price scenarios based on
other countries proposals of large hypothetical energy price increases rather than
the Administrations basic approach. However, the Administration has not ex-
plained how its own goals for curbing emissions could possibly avoid either high en-
ergy prices or highly restrictive regulatory curbs on energy use. At the very least,
the DOEs claim that the Argonne study results apply only to the climate change
proposals of other countries is an open admission that this study lacks a direct anal-
ysis of the Administrations own proposals. Hence, DOEs claim that the study con-
firms the wisdom of the Administrations basic approach to climate change is with-
out foundation.
The delay in releasing this study and the release two days ago by the Administra-
tion of its long-promised analysis and assessment of its own post-2000 climate
change proposals raises questions about its negotiating objectives.
In March 1995, as the Berlin Mandate began to take shape, President Clinton
characterized U.S. objectives this way in a letter to Representative John Dingell:
We have said this process must include thoughtful analysis and reflect the
fact that global problems require global solutions. Furthermore, I assure you
the U.S. delegation will not accept any outcome or agree to any process that
adversely affects the United States and its industrial competitiveness.
DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) jointly held a workshop in
Springfield, Virginia to unveil the Administrations initial analysis. At a June 19,
1996 hearing before the House Commerce Committee, the DOEs Acting Assistant
Secretary for PolicyMarc Chupkatestified that the U.S. strongly believes that
analysis and assessment is central to the development of further commitments by
Annex I Parties and to the furtherance of existing commitments of other parties to
the Framework Convention on Climate Change. When it was announced last sum-
mer that Dr. Everett Ehrlich would assume the role of directing and coordinating
this analytic effort, he assured everyone that the results would be available this
past January. Over the next several months, Under Secretary of State Tim Wirth
repeatedly stated that the Administrations analysis would be released soon. This
did not occur and yet negotiations proceeded.
This state of affairs led Representative Dingell in his Senate testimony of June
19, 1997 to ask:
Why are we [proceeding with negotiations] before we have the most basic in-
formation about how climate change policies will affect our economy? In short,
has the Administration bothered to do its homework? We were supposed to have
the vaunted analysis and assessment of the impact of climate change policies
on the U.S. economy by the end of last year. It has not been completed yet, de-
spite repeated promises to Congress and industry that it would be available be-
fore important policy decisions are made. But the State Department formally
proposed a cap-and-trade negotiating position in January. In short, the analysis
is self-evidently too late to inform the process, and likely will be used to justify
what the Administration has already decided to do. Just as clearly, public par-
ticipation and comment on the analysis and assessment is irrelevant.
Representative Dingells remarks were insightful. Only two days ago did the Ad-
ministration release a draft copy of its baseline economic analysis. While the GCC
has not had time to examine this document thoroughlyand we would ask the com-
mittee for the opportunity to submit comments laterit is clear that the Adminis-
tration still has not provided its assessment of specific policies now under consider-
ation. It also has not explained how those policies would be implemented domesti-
cally and internationally nor has it quantified the impact of these policies on the
U.S. economy, labor, industry and trade.
This slow and partial release of the Administrations analysis and assessment has
meant that the United States Senate has so far been unable to fulfill its Constitu-
tional responsibility of Advice and Consent. Senate Resolution 98, introduced by
Senators Byrd and Hageland now co-sponsored by 65 Senators reflects growing
frustration with the Administrations failure to consult and alarm over the con-
8 The six industries studied were: aluminum; chemicals and allied products; petroleum refin-
ing; cement; paper and allied products; and steel.
259
sequences for the U.S. economy that will result from the current negotiating strat-
egy.
THE GCC SUPPORTS APPROPRIATE ACTION
Many uncertainties about the climate system, and the current and future impact
of human activities on it, have been well documented. Business has played a con-
structive role by drawing attention to these uncertainties and the serious ramifica-
tions they pose for the Administrations negotiating strategy.
Business agrees that action should be taken but rejects an unjustified rush to
judgment. The major difference between the business community and the Clinton
Administration is over approach, not the need for action. We support what can be
called Lewis and Clark planning, after the famous explorers who successfully
managed enormous uncertainty by gathering new information, taking a limited
number of steps, reassessing and then repeating the process. In 1803, Lewis and
Clark could not plan a detailed water route to the PacificPresident Jeffersons
main goal. No one knew that the Rocky Mountains were in the way. Lewis and
Clark were successful because they respected the limits of knowledge, anticipated
surprises and recognized the need to adapt.
The Clinton Administration supports an approach that discounts uncertainty.
Minimal uncertainty allows detailed planning comparable to an extended itinerary
what can be called Cookes Tour planning after the famous travel agency. The con-
ditions for this type of policy planning do not exist, and a Kyoto agreement that pre-
sumes they do will be playing Russian Roulette with our economy.
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
RESPONSES BY WILLIAM F. OKEEFE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR
CHAFEE
Question 1. Mr. OKeefe, you say in your testimony that you support appropriate
action. You want to encourage economic turnover of capital stock, spur the develop-
ment of new technologies, and expedite their diffusion in developing countries. You
also want to facilitate the investment of U.S. private capital in countries with high
emissions levels.
I assume by that last point you mean that you are interested in spurring invest-
ment that reduces these high emissions, is that right? (If yes,) now why would you
be interested in reducing these emissions?
Answer. As I responded at the hearing when asked if there is a climate change
problem, the GCC recognizes that there is a risk that deserves to be addressed.
Until the uncertainty surrounding this issue is reduced by expanding our State of
knowledge, we simply do not know whether there is a genuine and serious prob-
lem. We do know that there is a very real risk that precipitous action will cause
societys scarce resources to be wasted and our economic well being damaged. The
risk of human-induced climate change warrants current efforts to ensure that we
undertake emissions policies which are generally termed no or low regrets. Such
a policy, which calibrates our national response to the still uncertain and evolving
understanding of human impacts on the climate system, is what I meant when I
urged appropriate action to reduce emissions. Such actions include promoting re-
search leading to more energy-efficient technologies and their subsequent export to
developing countries. The expanded use of current and future energy-efficient tech-
nologies in developing countries will contribute to their productivity improvements
and economic strength and is therefore a desirable goal in itself. It also would limit
GHG emissions growth in those countries and therefore diminish the risk associated
with higher CO2 concentration levels.
I would like to stress, however, that today there is an entirely legitimate scientific
debate regarding the extent, if any, of human-induced climate change and of what
the impacts of change might bepast, present, and future. Most regrettably, as the
scientific community publicly acknowledges the uncertainty, and as warming pre-
dictions for the next century moderate substantially, the Administration has de-
clared the debate to be over and attacked the patriotism and integrity of those who
raise legitimate questions about their apocalyptic visions.
As your first hearing on July 11 amply demonstrated the utter lack of scientific
consensus regarding human-induced climate change, I will not address that fact fur-
ther. However, I would like to draw the committees attention to the efforts by the
Clinton Administration to stifle the important and legitimate debate about infer-
ences that can be drawn from the current State of scientific knowledge and about
policies that are consistent with those inferences. On June 25, Vice-President Gore
spoke at Vanderbilt University on the topic of global warming and stated:
There is a small group that likes to spread dissension and skepticism, just
like the big tobacco companies spent huge amounts of money telling tobacco
smokers smoking is not bad for you. . . . Thats ridiculous and unethical. The
Tennesseean (June 26, 1997).
On July 21, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt appeared on the Diane Rehm Show,
and stated:
[I]ts an unhappy fact that the oil companies and the coal companies in the
United States have joined in a conspiracy to hire pseudo scientists to deny the
facts, and then begin raising political arguments that are essentially fraudulent,
that we cant do this without damaging the economy . . . [T]he energy compa-
nies need to be called to account because what theyre doing is un-American in
the most basic sense.
This type of extreme statement makes it more difficult for the American people
to gain a better understanding of the issue and for the Senate to gain the type of
information necessary for it to discharge its constitutional responsibility. Very plain-
ly, efforts to suppress the free exchange of information, evidence, and opinion under-
mine efforts to formulate a responsible national policy on climate change. The pas-
sage of Senate Resolution 98 by a vote of 950 will hopefully dissuade the Adminis-
tration from continuing to pursue its rush to judgment, cutoff debate strategy. It
is now clear that an open policy dialogwhich necessarily includes an honest eval-
uation of the science of climate changewill occur and the Senate will independ-
ently distinguish the science from the pseudo-science.
268
Question 2. Since you support appropriate action, I assume that you would pre-
fer smart action to dumb action. By smart action I mean action that reduces emis-
sions at lower cost than action that is costly.
Well, the acid rain trading program under the 1990 Clean Air Act has proven
itself to be a smart kind of action, since it is reducing emissions fast and cheaply,
spurring innovation, and dramatically lowering the costs of technologies.
I am told that a recent M.I.T. study has demonstrated this. It sounds to me like
you are making an argument in favor of the cap-and-trade approach, with joint
implementation or trading with developing countries as a key component. That
would address, in a smart way, all of the concerns for appropriate action that you
have raised. Your thoughts?
Answer. Your assumption that my use of the term appropriate action implies
smart action [as opposed] to dumb action is correct. Let me clarify, however, that
determining appropriate action is a two-step, sequential process:
(1) identify and substantiate the problem you are trying to solve and what result
or target is necessary to solve it; and
(2) how to achieve that result or target most cost-effectively.
The Administration has emphasized being smart solely with respect to the sec-
ond step above, without being smart on the essential first step.1 Unfortunately,
being dumb with respect to the essential first step renders the entire two-step
process dumb. Thus, joint implementation and emissions trading are options to be
considered in the second step above. The GCC has long supported the concept of
joint implementation, but questions the practicability and enforceability of an inter-
national cap and trade system for curtailing global greenhouse gas emissions.
While cap and trade may seem like an attractive concept, a cap means rationing,
which is a failed concept. However, the use of smart, market-based tools to achieve
a result that is not, in fact, yet warranted by the evidence, is not smart. It is in-
stead merely a smart way to address a dumb conclusion.
Your reference to the acid rain trading program of the Clean Air Act of 1990 is
a useful one because it highlights the advantages of market mechanisms, the impor-
tance of serendipity, and the significant differences between the SO2 trading pro-
gram and an international tradable permits program for greenhouse gas emissions.
First, the acid rain trading program did allow companies flexibility in meeting a
performance goal, and that allowed cost savings compared to what would have oc-
curred with a one-size-fits-all command and control program. Second, while the cur-
rent market value of an SO2 emission permit is below levels projected while the pro-
gram was being devised, to a large extent this is the result of serendipity. For exam-
ple, energy prices are lower than projected and deregulation in the transportation
sector has allowed much greater use of low-sulfur coal. Third, there are immense
differences between the United States SO2 trading program and a program required
for international tradable permits in greenhouse gases. The SO2 program involved
one gas, in one industry, in one country and the application of readily available
technology. An international tradable permit program for greenhouse gases would
involve multiple gases, multiple nations, plus every industry and every citizen in
every country. Furthermore, short of suppressing energy use there is no practical
technology for significantly reducing or sequestering CO2 emissions. Obviously, an
international tradable permits system would require a tremendous, unprecedented
global monitoring and transactional infrastructure to ensure its integrity and en-
forceability. Whether political systems based upon national sovereignty could accom-
modate such an infrastructure is a serious question. Many, such as Dr. Richard Coo-
per (Harvard University) and Dr. Thomas Schelling (University of Maryland) have
carefully considered these issues and concluded that cap and trade as well as joint
implementation programs are simply not practical in any real sense. Cap and trade
programs require allocation of the cap, and there is no generally accepted basis for
such allocation. And to be cost-effective, both programs require major commitments
by developing nationscommitments that are clearly not forthcoming. For these
reasons, it is facile to suggest an easy parallel between the SO2 trading permits pro-
gram in the United States and a global emissions trading scheme for GHGs.
Question 3. You state in your testimony that, curbs on greenhouse gas emissions,
would be brutally expensive in terms of lost income, lost jobs and lost U.S. competi-
tiveness on world markets. Curbs of any kind?
1 Testimony of Dr. Janet Yellen before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, July
17, 1997, p. 6: [C]osts depend critically on how emission reduction policies are implemented.
It boils down to this: if we do it dumb it could cost a lot, but if we do it smart it will cost much
less . . . (emphasis added). The GCC is still curious as to what the it is, as well as the jus-
tification for it. [Step One Above].
269
Answer. The GCCs consistent promotion of no or low regrets measures to con-
strain the growth in greenhouse gas emissions obviously implies that there are op-
portunities to reduce emissions that would be benign economically and perhaps even
beneficial. Many such opportunities have been embraced by industry to support vol-
untary efforts to achieve the aim of returning 2000 greenhouse gas emissions to
1990 levels. The U.S. Climate Action Report, released in May, reveals that over
5,000 private sector organizations participate in voluntary Federal climate mitiga-
tion programs, which are projected to reduce emissions by an estimated 75 million
metric tons by the year 2000; consumer and business savings are projected at $10
billion by 2000 and $50 billion by 2010. Importantly, the Report documents that 94
percent of the U.S. primary aluminum production capacity has joined the Voluntary
Aluminum Industrial Partnership; electric utilities representing 69 percent of 1990
electric generation and utility carbon emissions have signed the Climate Wise agree-
ments; 2,300 companies now participate in the Green Lights program; and the Gas
Research Institute has pledged $4 million of its annual budget to projects that re-
duce methane emissions. Widespread voluntary efforts such as these are an effi-
cient, cost-effective way of speeding the adoption of economically viable energy effi-
cient technologies. Such programs should help strengthen the already strong trend
of increased U.S. energy efficiency.2 In fact, the Energy Information Administra-
tions 1997 reference case projection indicates annual decreases of 1 percent in en-
ergy consumption per dollar of GDP through 2015.
However, your quotation from my full Statement regarding brutally expensive
curbs on greenhouse gas emissions appears as point 3 in the introductory summary.
My detailed discussion of such costs relates to the Administrations intimation of
agreeing to a legally binding U.S. commitment to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels
in the next 12 years, by 2010.3 In that regard all credible, independent economic
analyses of the costs of dramatically curbing near term emissionsto 1990 levels
by 2010indicate the same result: brutal expense to our economy and people. Stud-
ies by Charles River Associates, DRI/McGraw Hill, the U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration and economists at our most prestigious universities indicate that en-
ergy taxes of $125 to $200 per metric ton of carbon would be needed to suppress
demand sufficiently to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 ($200 per ton is
equivalent to an increase in the excise tax on gasoline of about 60 cents per gallon).
A conservative estimate of the annual impact of a tax this size includes the follow-
ing losses:
$100 billion to $275 billion in GDP.
200,000 to 500,000 U.S. jobs.
$65 billion to $100 billion in fixed business investment.
$50 billion to $110 billion in consumer purchases.
On July 11, the Administration finally released a study by the Department of En-
ergy (contracted through the Argonne National Laboratory). The study focused on
the potential effects on energy-intensive industries in the United States of alter-
native scenarios for changes in world patterns of industrial energy prices that might
result from new climate commitments. The study results described the impacts on
six industries (steel, cement, aluminum, paper, chemicals, and petroleum refining)
as significantly adverse to devastating, producing little, if any, environmental
benefit.
In her testimony before the committee, Dr. Janet Yellen, Chair, Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, reported that the Administrations economic modeling efforts to pre-
dict the impacts of climate change policy were futile. She stated that the Adminis-
tration was left only with a set of parameters and relationships that influence esti-
mates of the impacts. It is, however, noteworthy that the May 30 Draft Report of
the Interagency Analytical Team revealed that [t]he starting point scenario [assum-
ing stabilized emissions at 1990 levels by 2010] would raise the implicit price of car-
bon in the economy by about $100 per ton of carbon. The Report then described
that [a] permit price of $100 per ton is the equivalent of a price increase of 26 cents
per gallon of refined petroleum product, $1.49 per thousand cubic feet of natural
2 Between 1973 and 1986, energy consumption per dollar of GDP declined 2.6 percent per
year. Between 1986 and 1996, energy consumption per dollar of GDP declined 0.4 percent per
year.
3 Dr. Everett M. Ehrlich, who recently resigned his position as Undersecretary of Commerce
for Economic Affairs, wrote in the Washington Post on June 15:
. . . the economic literature suggests that we could roll back our CO2 emissions to their
1990 levels by 2010 for the equivalent of a 25 cent gas tax. Its not free, but its not the
end of the world.
In addition, on July 15 the Administration released its May 30 draft interagency study on
the economic impacts of stabilizing CO2 emissions by 2010 at 1990 levels.
270
gas, $52.52 per ton of coal, and 2 cents per kilowatt hour of electricity produced.
Draft Report, Page 8.
This important effort, before it was abandoned by the Administration, was tend-
ing to confirm the severely negative economic costs of a policy to drastically curtail
emissions in the near term. In fact, Dr. Yellen emphasized in her testimony that
[t]he speed at which emissions reductions are required can have large effects on
the estimated costs. It is important to allow sufficient lead-time for orderly invest-
ment in new equipment and technology. This conclusion supports arguments made
by the GCC in its July 1995 paper by David Montgomery, Charles River Associates,
Toward an Economically Rational Response to the Berlin Mandate. Others, such
as Wigley, Richels and Edmonds in their January 18, 1996 article in Nature come
to similar conclusions, namely that [u]nanticipated changes will be costly. Time is
therefore needed to reoptimize the capital stock. The GCC agrees and re-empha-
sizes that a 12-year period to return emissions to 1990 levelsrequiring an approxi-
mate 25 percent reduction in projected fossil fuel usewould be brutally expensive.
Even using Dr. Yellens remaining tools, we are unaware of any parameters or
relationshipsor existing technology for that matterwhich avoids that result.
Question 4. Do you base your impacts assertions on the recent economic modeling
done by the Charles River and Associates group? (If yes,) please talk some about
the underlying assumptions in the Charles River Associate model, because a model
as you know only suggests potential impacts. Does that particular model, for exam-
ple, assume that the economy suffers persistent transitional inefficiencies (from ac-
tions to reduce emissions)?
Does it assume that there will be any energy source substitution? Does it assume
inclusion of joint implementation or emissions trading, or any other flexibility in-
struments? Does it assume any benefits from averting climate change or other pollu-
tion damages? Is it reasonable to assume any of these at some level?
Answer. My statements regarding the economic impacts of policies to drastically
limit greenhouse gas emissions and U.S. energy use are based on a broad spectrum
of economic modeling efforts. In addition to work done by Charles River Associates,
work by other groups such as MIT, the Energy Modeling Forum, DRI, and ABARE
(Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics) are also relevant and
provide useful insights into the large impacts that should be expected from the tar-
gets and timetables proposed in the Berlin Mandate negotiations.
The question states that, a model as you know only suggests potential impacts.
This applies to models that project climate and the impacts of a change in climate,
as well as to economic models that focus more on the impacts of climate policy.
There is an apparent inconsistency in the Administrations confidence in modeling:
why are economic models deemed futile in terms of projecting impacts in the next
20 years, while climate models predicting changes in the next 100 years are unques-
tioned? Thus, results of climate and climate impact models that are used to promote
climate policies of the type being negotiated concern suggested potential impacts
that might occur 100 or more years into the future. While some economic models
cover a similar time horizon, most of the policy impact analysis done by the groups
mentioned above focus on the next 20 or so years and evaluate the relatively near-
term economic impact of proposed climate policies. It is very hard to deny that cli-
mate and impact models 100 years out are, by orders of magnitude, more unreliable
than the economic models 10 or 20 years out. This is particularly true when you
realize that the climate and impact models, for 100 years out, require inputs from
economic models to even start their analysis. Assumptions regarding population,
economic activity, technology, and lifestyles are all required before estimates of
greenhouse gas emissions are generated for the next 100 years. Without that infor-
mation, the climate models either have no emissions baseline to work with or are
randomly picking scenarios that may have no relevance to the real world.
Regarding the CRA model, it assumes that market mechanisms would be used to
create incentives for reducing energy use, thereby reducing carbon emissions, below
baseline projected levels. These market mechanisms can be viewed either as carbon
taxes or auctioned tradable permits, which are viewed by economists as being the
least-cost way of reducing carbon emissions. Therefore, the model does not assume
that the economy suffers persistent transitional inefficiencies specifically from ac-
tions to reduce emissions.
Transitional inefficiencies are more likely to be induced by the use of various com-
mand and control policies. In fact, since the model is of the type referred to as gen-
eral equilibrium models, it arguably omits some transitional costs to the economy
of moving to a lower-carbon trajectory, and therefore its impact estimates may be
on the low side.
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The CRA model does allow for substitution among different fossil fuels, as well
as to non-carbon fuels. This substitution occurs depending on the relative prices of
the fuels, including carbon taxes or tradable permit market values that raise the
cost of carbon generating fuels. The CRA model, following the general structure of
the Framework Convention on Climate Change as well as the Berlin Mandate lan-
guage, assumes that each OECD country individually meets a proposed emission
target.
The model is designed to help identify the economic costs of alternative emission
reduction targets and timetables and does not attempt to address any possible bene-
fits of lower carbon emission trajectories. While all policies should at least be evalu-
ated with respect to likely costs and benefits, one difficulty with the climate change
issue is that there are large near-term economic costs to reducing emissions sub-
stantially over the next two decades while it is unlikely that there would be any
measurable benefits from reduced carbon emissions during that same timeframe, es-
pecially if developing countries are excluded from emission reduction requirements.
Returning to transitional inefficiencies, there is a recent tendency to mischar-
acterize how economic models address the issueare consumers efficient in their
energy use and how efficient are they in changing their energy use. The recent
World Resources Institute study, The Costs of Climate Protection: A Guide for the
Perplexed is a prime example. For example, one of the six criteria the WRI study
used to characterize model results was inefficient economic responses. More spe-
cifically, it asked: Is the model of the CGE type, which assumes that the economy
adjusts efficiently in the long-run, or it is a macro model that assumes that the
economy suffers persistent transitional inefficiencies? This is a clear mischar-
acterization of the difference between model types, especially when the CGE results
are labeled optimistic and the macromodel results are labeled pessimistic. In re-
ality the two types of models address different questions: the former asks what are
the economic consequences of different equilibrium conditions (one with large carbon
taxes and one without), and the latter asks what sort of costs arise during a policy-
induced transition from one equilibrium to another. The difference between the
models is sort of like moving from Washington, DC. to either Seattle or San Diego.
The CGE model asks what life is like after you moved, while the macromodel fo-
cuses more on how you get to either location. Its like a vacationgetting there is
at least half the fun, but if you cannot afford the travel portion, you do not take
the trip.
Question 5. You talk about actions being considered by negotiators that would re-
quire us to suppress energy use by at least 25 percent in little over a decade. What
actions or proposals, now being seriously considered by international negotiators,
would require this sort of response?
Answer. With less than 4 months before the Kyoto Conference of the Parties,
United States negotiators still have not revealed to Congress or the American people
the specific targets and timetables they intend to endorse. Apparently, the U.S. posi-
tion will not be settled until late in the Fall. However, U.S. Government officials
have consistently discussed and analyzed a commitment to return to 1990 emissions
levels by 2010.4 This past Spring, the European Union (EU) proposed a 15 percent
reduction in 1990 emissions by 2010.
Comparing such goals with official U.S. Government projections of emissions
clearly indicates that very large emissions reductions by the United States would
be required. For example, Table A9 of the Energy Information Administrations
International Energy Outlook 1997 reports that U.S. carbon emissions for 1990 were
1.34 billion metric tons. The reference case projection for 2010 is 1.72 billion metric
tons. Thus, to limit emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 would require a 22 percent
reduction in emissions from the baseline. To limit emissions to 15 percent below the
1990 level by 2010 would require a 34 percent reduction in emissions from the base-
line. As a practical matter, it is difficult to comprehend how emissions could be re-
duced by 13 off the baseline in little over a decade. Only very large carbon taxes,
very high tradable permit prices, and/or an exceptionally long list of highly onerous
command and control programs could suppress energy use sufficiently to achieve
such emission reductions within that timeframe.
Question 6. If a treaty were signed that called for . . . lets say, a return to 1990
emissions levels by the year 2015: is the only way to get to that goal (that your
group would support) a requirement that all countries, regardless of poverty level
or current emissions contribution, take identical action at the same time? That is,
should Togo, for example, be required to take the same actions as the United States
and other OECD nations, and China, at the same time?
4 See footnote 3 regarding statements by Dr. Ehrlich and the May 30 Draft Interagency Study.
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Answer. Any impact GHGs have on climate is independent of whether they come
from developed or developing countries, and developing countries emissions are pro-
jected to grow rapidly in the next century, outstripping those of the developed world
by 2015, according to the Energy Information Administration. The purposes of the
ongoing negotiations to amend the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) are ostensibly to limit emissions, thereby limiting the potential of climate
change. The Berlin Mandate of 1995, which exempts the developing world from as-
suming any treaty obligations, guarantees that total global GHG emissions will in-
crease in the next century. As of now, therefore, the Berlin Mandate guarantees fail-
ure in addressing the objective of the FCCC. In addition, the flight of capital, jobs,
and economic strength from participating developed countries to the exempted de-
veloping world would be an inevitable consequence of the Berlin Mandate.
In light of those realities, the relative burden of nations in addressing a global
environmental risk is a daunting challenge that was recognized in the Berlin Man-
date. Economic equity must be an essential part of any treaty negotiation, in spite
of the difficulty in pursuing it. Many Senators supporting the unanimous passage
of Senate Resolution 98 expressed the view that the Berlin Mandate, to which the
Administration agreed in 1995, was a fundamental error. President Clinton him-
self stated on August 4: I believe the [Kyoto] agreement has to be a global one.
I think all nations, developed and developing, should be a part of this. On this
point, the GCC agrees with the President and the 95 U.S. Senators who supported
Senate Resolution 98.
Question 7. You State that unnecessarily curbing carbon emissions will mean
fewer jobs and less income. Does this prediction include all the new jobs that will
be created by the shift to new technologies and industries?
Answer. Absent any identification of the new technologies that will enable, at
the least, a 22 percent reduction in our use of fossil fuels within 12 years, it would
be highly speculative to assume related new industries and jobs. If technology
does not emerge to accommodate an international commitment to reduce our use of
fossil fuels by at least 22 percent, then painful policies to ration that use would be
necessary. Prudent policymaking should prompt the question: What is the risk that
a technology will not emerge which will enable a 22 percent reduction in our fossil
fuel use in 12 years? Economist Robert Samuelson wrote in the July 9 Washington
Post:
Without a breakthrough in alternative energynuclear, solar, something
no one knows how to lower emissions adequately without ultimately crushing
the world economy.
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