Evid 04
Evid 04
Evid 04
FACTS
One evening while, while the spouses were sleeping inside their house, they were awakened by the loud knocks on their door;
the husband opened the door and saw their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the accused, who appeared
to be very drunk, to come inside their house; once inside their house, accused sat down and the two (accused and victim)
exchanged pleasantries; she even saw the accused showing a gun to her husband and the latter even toyed with it; she got
irritated by her husband's playing with the gun, so she took a few steps away from the two, however, when she looked back to the
place where her husband and the accused was, she found out that the two had already left; five minutes later and/or after she
had heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he
accidentally shoot her husband she got scared by the appearance of the accused who was full of bloodstains so she pushed him
away from her; she immediately went to her sister-in-law Marilyn Bolima and both of them proceeded to the house of the
accused; thereat, they saw the victim lying with his face up; she took her husband's pulse and when she still felt some warmth on
his body, she sought help that her husband be brought to the hospital; accused extended his help by helping them in carrying the
victim towards the main road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put down the victim; accused reasoned out
that the victim was already dead; she pushed the accused and even without the latter's help, they were able to reach the main
road; afterwhich, some of her neighbors arrived bringing with them lights; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she
caused the arrest of the accused.
In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a quo relied on circumstantial evidence because the
prosecution failed to present an eyewitness who could give an account as to the actual shooting incident.
The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty reasonable doubt of the crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery.
The Solicitor General maintains that the prosecution was able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and prays that
subject decision be affirmed in toto.
PROSECUTION
6) The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the shooting incident took place admitted to her having accidentally
shoot (sic) the victim is admissible evidence against the accused declarant since this is covered by the rule on res gestae or one
of an exception to the hearsay rule.
Part of the res gestae Statement made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior tor
(sic) subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstance thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of res gestae . . .
(Sec. 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, as amended)
ISSUE
WON THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL
POSSESSION WITH MURDER AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 1 OF P.D. 1866. THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES
RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
HELD
The Court agree with the findings and conclusion of the court a quo that more than one circumstantial evidence were duly proved
and that these circumstances point, beyond reasonable doubt, to the accused-appellant as the one who shot and killed the
deceased Leonardo Bolima y Mesia. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to convict an accused, it is necessary that the
following requisites must be satisfied: (a) there must be more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute "an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that
of guilty.
The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly established and constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else, shot and killed the victim. We do not,
however, agree with the additional observation of the trial court, in respect to the sixth circumstance, that the statement made by
the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is
covered by the rule on res gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements as part of the res gestae are
among the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness "can testify only to those facts which he knows of or his own
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perceptions.17 Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what he heard
other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however, exceptions
to this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay; but it is to be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section
36, statements may be deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue and giving it a legal significance may also be received as part of the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-
appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-appellant's statement was an
"oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he did in this case.
In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that a statement allegedly made by one of the accused to Natalia
Macaraeg that "we killed him" (referring to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated in her testimony in open court
was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the res gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged statement of the accused-appellant is
hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time the testimony was given.
The records and the evidence fail to disclose that the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant
was not authorized to possess the firearm alleged in the information. And, contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no
sufficient evidence to prove the presence of treachery. It must be stated, however, that had illegal possession of firearms been
duly proven as alleged, it would not have mattered whether the killing was simple homicide.
The prosecution did not offer any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant had no license to possess or carry the firearm in
question; it however, threw the burden on the accused-appellant to prove that he has that authority. It ruled that:
Where accused relies as a matter of defense on an exception in a statute which is not in the enacting clause by which the
offense is described and forbidden, he has the burden of proving that he is within the exception.
Where the subject matter of a negative averment in the information, or a fact relied upon by defendant as a justification or
excuse, relates to him personally or otherwise lie peculiarly within his knowledge, the general rule is that the burden of proof of
such averment or fact is on him.
In cases of illegal possession of firearms, the burden of proof as to the negative averments in the information to the effect that the
accused possesses the firearms without the corresponding license is on the defense. It is the accused who is called upon to
prove that he possesses the license. In other words, the fact relied upon by the accused as a justification or excuse being one
that is related to him personally or otherwise within his peculiar knowledge, "the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such
averment or fact is on the accused".
There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the firearm in question, he could not be convicted for
illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court then committed an error in holding the accused-appellant guilty thereof.
Accordingly, accused-appellant could only be liable for HOMICIDE since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances had
been proved.
There is no eyewitness for the prosecution. To establish the case against the accused, the prosecution relied mainly on the extra-
judicial confessions of Tujon and Parola. The confessions were signed by police detective and by the accused.
During trial, Tujon denied the charges against him. He testified that he came from the province and looked for a job in Manila. He
was arrested for unknown reasons. He also testified that he did not know his other co-accused. The policemen asked him to sign
a paper the contents of which he did not know.
Issue:
Held:
No. It is a matter of record that the interrogation was made in the absence of counsel de parte or de oficio and the waiver of
counsel, if made at all, was not made with the assistance of counsel as required.
It is not clear that the accused were actually offered the services of a lawyer and they refused. In any event, it is undisputed that
the waiver of the accused of their right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to counsel to be valid, must be in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Extra-judicial confessions taken without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence
2. Records show that the accused herein are part of the group arrested by Caloocan police in a crackdown with the
rampant robbery and hold-up.
3. In his extra-judicial confession, Ponseca revealed that he and his other co-accused escaped [custody] and held up a
passenger jeepney driven by the victim in this case. Posecas testimony detailed how the crime was committed, including
his participation of being the one who collected the passengers belongings and the one who dumped the victim into the
estero.
a. The extrajudicial confession also details how the accused was assisted by Atty. Crisostomo, and was properly
apprised of their rights.
4. Prosecution also presented witnesses, one of which is the passenger and the other is the widow of the jeepney driver.
a. The passenger positively identified the accused as the persons who robbed them
b. The widow testified that her husband is missing and upon reporting it to the police, her husbands cadaver was
found in an estero, an autopsy of which revealed that the cause of death is drowning.
5. On the basis of the foregoing, RTC found them GUILTY of robbery with homicide.
6. Hence, this petition by Ponseca, alleging primarily that the trial court erred in considering the validity of the extrajudicial
statement, claiming that he was tortured into it.
HELD: Yes.
Settled is the rule that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-
interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the one who claims that it is not has the burden of proof to
show that the confession as involuntary and untrue.
To this end, Petitioner claims that rarely is a man compelled to admit his liability and even if he does so, he would try to limit his
liability.
SC does not agree with Petitioner. The language of the confession and the details thereof could only come from a participant in
the commission of a crime. Every aspect of his confession is corroborated by the testimony of the other accused, and even
describes the manner in which the jeepney driver was thrown away.
It is also shown that the Petitioner even tried to limit his liability by saying that he did not know that the estero was filled with
water, that he did not know that the jeepney driver would drown.
Further, the confession was supported by the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. They were positively identified by the
passenger, and the passenger even supported the confession in its details. Further, the testimony of the widow finding the
cadaver of her husband in an estero further corroborates the testimony. WHEREFORE, the finding of guilt is AFFIRMED.
Asali-bomb maker
Facts:
On feb 14 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to Alabang. Two men got on the bus. Both seemed suspicious according to Elmer
Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala Ave. and the bus exploded. After the explosion, the spokesperson for abu
sayyaff announced over radio that the explosion was a valentines gift.
Accused Asali, member of abu sayaff, gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that
they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. Accused
contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Held: It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made
during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in
court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.[27]
Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession
may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused
since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party
adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes admission
implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant
Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-
accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.[28]
Moreover, when Ceferino Velasco made a sworn statement on February 25, 1969 or three (3) days after the poisoning of his
children, he declared that he did not know who gave the poisoned bread to his children.
But when he took the witness stand on July 23, 1975 or six years later, he declared that on that very morning of February 22,
1969, he learned from Pipe, when the latter was in the act of delivering the bread to the children, that the source of the bread was
the defendant Lucila Valero. 30
When confronted during the cross-examination with the previous affidavit (Exhibit "1-d"), Ceferino Velasco admitted that he made
the answers in the affidavit. This answer prompted the Court to remark: "There seems to be inconsistency". 32 We may add that
the inconsistency is on the very fact in issue, namely, the guilty participation of Lucila Valero.
When further repeatedly asked by the defense counsel why Ceferino did not state in his affidavit (Exh. 1-d) that he learned that
Lucila was the source of the poisoned bread, he gave irresponsive and evasive answers. 33
When a witness makes two sworn statements and these two statements incur in the gravest contradictions, the
Court cannot accept either statements as proof. 34
A witness who changes his name and statements, like a Chameleon changes color, does not inspire
confidence. 35
Obviously, Ceferino Velasco is a lying witness. If Ceferino Velasco really learned from Pipe that Lucila Valero poisoned his three
children, he might have become violent. Surprisingly, he kept quiet. He did not confront Lucila Valero. 36
The reason is that the first suspicion of Ceferino Velasco when his three children were still suffering from the effects of the poison
was that his children were "nausog" (victim of witchcraft).
Aside from the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution, there are other considerations which negate the guilt of the
defendant.
There was no motive for Pipe and Lucila Valero to poison the three children. Both Pipe and Lucila Valero loved the children.
Ceferino Velasco admitted that even when Pipe was only a small boy, the latter frequented his house to visit his
children. 39 When the children were dying because of the poison, Pipe alternately fanned Michael and Annabel.
The prosecution, however, claims that the motive of the poisoning was the quarrel in the morning of February 21, 1969 between
Demetria Manalastas, mother of the victims, and the defendant Lucila Valero. The cause of the quarrel was the interference of
the defendant to protect the children from the scolding and maltreatment to their own mother. The interference was resented by
Manalastas prompting her to say to the defendant "Don't interfere in the matter because I am scolding these children of
mine." 40 The defendant is not a relative of the Velasco children. Her intervention in their behalf only shows her affectionate
concern for them. The defendant quarrelled with Demetria Manalastas, not with the Velasco children. There is no motive
whatsoever for the defendant to poison the children. Even Ceferino Velasco, father of the victims, stated that the cause of the
quarrel was "Wala pong kabagay-bagay" meaning, "very trivial". 41 The quarrel was not a sufficient cause to commit a heinous
crime.
This leaves Us speculating as to the source of the poisoned bread. Rodolfo Quilang stated that he saw the defendant give Pipe
"something wrapped in a piece of paper." According to Ceferino Velasco in his Affidavit of February 25, 1969, Pipe gave to his
children "isa pong pandesal". 42 He practically reiterated this statement during his testimony on July 23, 1975 when he described
what Pipe allegedly brought as "just one piece of wrapped bread". 43
But when the police investigated the premises of the house of Ceferino Velasco in the morning of February 22, 1969, they found
not only one pandesal but "several sliced pan" scatterred in the sala, near the balcony, and under the balcony. 44 According to
the defendant, in her testimony not rebutted by the prosecution, Ceferino Velasco, who was her tenant, dipped sliced pieces of
bread in endrin dried them up and used them as bait in his barn. As a matter of fact, at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of February
22, 1969, Ceferino Velasco threw into a nearby river a long string of poisoned rats. Three puppies died of poisoning under the
balcony. The rats, the dogs, or maybe even his minor children must have found the poisoned slices of bread somewhere in the
barn or in the house, scattered them, and the children, not knowing the danger of the poison, ate them.
The thought that he might have poisoned his own children must have caused Ceferino Velasco some kind of trauma. So galling
to a father is the thought that he, himself, might have caused the death of his two children and the near death of a third child,
albeit unintentionally, that his natural reaction is to escape from it by throwing the blame to someone else not only to appease his
own conscience but also to avoid embarassment before his relatives, friends and neighbors.
The tragic poisoning of the three children is unfortunate. The tragedy was compounded when the trial Court imposed the death
penalty on the accused although the evidence against her does not justify a conviction. Inspite of the self-contradictions of
Rodolfo Quilang on very material points noticed by the trial Judge, himself, Quilang's obvious tendency to prevaricate and the fact
that he is what the appellant's counsel calls an "eleventh-hour witness", which is true, and inspite of the incompetence of the
testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco whose testimonies are hearsay evidence, and the practical impossibility of
interpreting correctly the sign language of Pipe, the trial Judge readily accepted their testimonies as basis for imposing the death
penalty in gross violation of the hearsay rule and the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witness face to face (in the
instant case, the deaf-mute, Pipe), and to cross-examine Pipe in order to determine his ability to communicate with the outside
world.
Realizing that there is completely no motive for the defendant to commit the heinous crime, the trial Judge conjured up something
as the probable cause that might have impelled the defendant to commit the crime. The conjecture of the Judge is stated, thus:
There is something disquieting about those seemingly unfading smiles on the face of the accused; with her
sharp, penetrating look, her unsolicited smiles are clues to her real personality; they forebode some out-of-the
ordinary dispositions in the inner recesses of her mind; perhaps, only a trained psychiatrist or an experienced
psychologist could fathom or decipher the meaning of this characteristic of the accused; it is unfortunate that the
prosecution and the defense have chosen not to delve into the personality of the accused; however, because of
these queer manifestations on the facial expressions of the accused, could she have intended to produce the
gravity of her felonious act; had she a fore-knowledge that the poisons used to kill rats or insects would also
cause death to the children. Was her intention merely to cause some malady or discomfort to the children to
shout and vent her hatred on the mother of the children. These are some questions that find no definite answer
from the records of these cases; these questions notwithstanding, the court strongly feels that it is not entirely
improbable for the accused to possess a violent or cruel disposition ... 45
In effect, motive was not necessary to compel the defendant to commit the crime because according to the observation of the
Judge, she was suffering from some kind of psychiatric abnormality or mental disorder that can make her violent.
It is most unfair for the trial Judge to unexpectedly spring the aforementioned observation in his decision without having
mentioned it in the course of the trial. Such a procedure is unfair to the accused, for she is thereby deprived of her chance to
either deny or affirm the truth of such a very material finding which has important bearing in the judgment. This procedure of the
trial Judge practically denies the accused the right to due process.
The surprising finding of the trial Judge goes far beyond mere observation on the manner a witness testified, which admittedly
may be considered subjectively by the Judge in evaluating the credibility of the witness. The surprising finding of the Judge
relates not only to the credibility of a witness but to the sanity of the defendant. Its aim is not only to weigh the testimony of the
witness but to establish a motive for the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution has not established the guilt of the defendant, We hereby reverse the decision of the
trial Court and instead render judgment of acquittal without cost.