Policy Position Study 23: Review of Current Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy
Policy Position Study 23: Review of Current Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy
Policy Position Study 23: Review of Current Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy
A historical document that I have been looking for off and on for a while...
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)2 to the Secretary of State and the
Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
TOP SECRET
PPS/23
[Washington,] February 24, 1948.
When Mr. Acheson3 first spoke to me about the Planning Staff, he said that he thought its most
important function would be to try to trace the lines of development of our foreign policy as they
emerged from our actions in the past, and to project them into the future, so that we could see where we
were going.
During the first months of the operation of the Staff, I hesitated to undertake any such effort, because I
did not feel that any of us had a broad enough view of the problems involved to lend real value to our
estimate.
I have now made an effort toward a general view of the main problems of our foreign policy, and I
enclose it as a Staff paper. It is far from comprehensive and doubtless contains many defects; but it is a
first step toward the unified concept of foreign policy which I hope this Staff can some day help to
evolve.
The paper is submitted merely for information, and does not call for approval. I made no effort to clear
it around the Department, since this would have changed its whole character. For this reason, I feel that
if any of the views expressed should be made the basis for action in the Department, the views of the
offices concerned should first be consulted.
This document should properly have included a chapter on Latin America. I have not included such a
chapter because I am not familiar with the problems of the area, and the Staff has not yet studied them.
Butler,4 who is taking over for me in my absence,5 has had long experience with these problems and I
hope that while I am away he and the Staff will be able to work up some recommendations for basic
policy objectives with regard to the Latin American countries.
GEORGE F. KENNAN
[Annex]
Report by the Policy Planning Staff
TOP SECRET
PPS/23
[Washington,] February 24, 1948.
III. Germany9
The coming changes with respect to the responsibility for military government in Germany provide a
suitable occasion for us to evolve new long-term concepts of our objectives with respect to that
country. We cannot rely on the concepts of the existing policy directives. Not only were these designed
to meet another situation, but it is questionable, in many instances, whether they were sound in
themselves.
The planning to be done in this connection will necessarily have to be many-sided and voluminous. But
it is possible to see today the main outlines of the problem we will face and, I think, of the solutions we
must seek.
In the long run there can be only three possibilities for the future of western and central Europe. One is
German domination. Another is Russian domination. The third is a federated Europe, into which the
parts of Germany are absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries is sufficient to hold
Germany in her place.
If there is no real European federation and if Germany is restored as a strong and independent country,
we must expect another attempt at German domination. If there is no real European federation and if
Germany is not restored as a strong and independent country, we invite Russian domination, for an
unorganized Western Europe cannot indefinitely oppose an organized Eastern Europe. The only
reasonably hopeful possibility for avoiding one of these two evils is some form of federation in western
and central Europe.
Our dilemma today lies in the fact that whereas a European federation would be by all odds the best
solution from the standpoint of U.S. interests, the Germans are poorly prepared for it. To achieve such a
federation would be much easier if Germany were partitioned, or drastically decentralized, and if the
component parts could be brought separately into the European union. To bring a unified Germany, or
even a unified western Germany, into such a union would be much more difficult: for it would still
over-weigh the other components, in many respects.
Now a partition of the Reich might have been possible if it had been carried out resolutely and
promptly in the immediate aftermath of defeat. But that moment is now past, and we have today
another situation to deal with. As things stand today, the Germans are psychologically not only
unprepared for any breakup of the Reich but in a frame of mind which is distinctly unfavorable thereto.
In any planning we now do for the future of Germany we will have to take account of the unpleasant
fact that our occupation up to this time has been unfortunate from the standpoint of the psychology of
the German people. They are emerging from this phase of the post-hostilities period in a state of mind
which can only be described as sullen, bitter, unregenerate, and pathologically attached to the old
chimera of German unity. Our moral and political influence over them has not made headway since the
surrender. They have been impressed neither by our precepts nor by our example. They are not going to
look to us for leadership. Their political life is probably going to proceed along the lines of a
polarization inro extreme right and extreme left, both of which elements will be, from our standpoint,
unfriendly, ugly to deal with, and contemptuous of the things we value.
We cannot rely on any such Germany to fit constructively into a pattern of European union of its own
volition. Yet without the Germans, no real European federation is thinkable. And without federation,
the other countries of Europe ran have no protection against a new attempt at foreign domination.
If we did not have the Russians and the German communists prepared to take advantage politically of
any movement on our part toward partition we could proceed to partition Germany regardless of the
will of the inhabitants, and to force the respective segments to take their place in a federated Europe.
But in the circumstances prevailing today, we cannot do this without throwing the German people
politically into the arms of the communists. And if that happens, the fruits of our victory in Europe will
have been substantially destroyed.
Our possibilities are therefore reduced, bv the process of exclusion, to a policy which, without pressing
the question of partition in Germany, would attempt to bring Germany, or western Germany, into a
European federation, but do it in such a wav as not. to permit her to dominate that federation or
jeopardize the security interests of the other western European countries. And this would have to be
accomplished in the face of the fact that we cannot rely on the German people to exercise any self-
restraint of their own volition, to feel any adequate sense of responsibility vis-a-vis the other western
nations, or to concern themselves for the preservation of western values in their own country and
elsewhere in Europe.
I have no confidence in any of the old-fashioned concepts of collective security as a means of meeting
this problem. European history has shown only too clearly the weakness of multilateral defensive
alliances between complete sovereign nations as a means of opposing desperate and determined bids
for domination of the European scene. Some mutual defense arrangements will no doubt be necessary
as a concession to the prejudices of the other Western European peoples, whose thinking is still old
fashioned and unrealistic on this subject. But we can place no reliance on them as a deterrent to
renewed troublemaking on the part of the Germans.
This being the case, it is evident that the relationship of Germany to the other countries of western
Europe must be so arranged as to provide mechanical and automatic safeguards against any
unscrupulous exploitation of Germany's preeminence in population and in military-industrial potential.
The first task of our planning will be to find such safeguards.
In this connection, primary consideration must be given to the problem of the Ruhr. Some form of
international ownership or control of the Ruhr industries would indeed be one of the best means of
automatic protection against the future misuse of Germany's industrial resources for aggressive
purposes. There may be otner devices which would also be worth exploring.
A second line of our planning will have to be in the direction of the maximum interweaving of German
economy with that of the remainder of Europe. This may mean that we will nave to reverse our present
policies, in certain respects. One of the most grievous mistakes, in my opinion, of our post-hostilities
policy was the renewed extreme segregation of the Gennans and their compression into an even smaller
territory than before, in virtual isolation from the remaining peoples of Europe. This sort of segregation
and compression invariably arouses precisely the worst reactions in the German character. What the
Germans need is not to be thrust violently in upon themselves, which only heightens their congenital
irrealism and self-pity and defiant nationalism, but to be led out of their collective egocentrism and
encouraged to see things in larger terms, to have interests elsewhere in Europe and elsewhere in the
world, and to learn to think of themselves as world citizens and not just as Germans.
Next, we must recognize the bankruptcy of our moral influence on the Germans, and we must make
plans for the earliest possible termination of those actions and policies on our part which have been
psychologically unfortunate. First of all, we must reduce as far as possible our establishment in
Germany; for the residence of large numbers of representatives of a victor nation in a devastated
conquered area is never a helpful factor, particularly when their living standards are as conspicuously
different as are those of Americans in Germany. Secondly, we must terminate as rapidly as possible
those forms of activity (denazification, re-education, and above all the Nuremberg Trials) which tend to
set up as mentors and judges over internal German problems. Thirdly, we must have the courage to
dispense with military government as soon as possible and to force the Germans to accept
responsibility once more for their own affairs. They will never begin to do this as long as we will
accept that responsibility for them.
The military occupation of western Germany may have to go on for a long time. We may even have to
be prepared to see it become a quasi-permanent feature of the European scene. But military
government is a different thing. Until it is removed, we cannot really make progress in the direction of
a more stable Europe.
Finally, we must do everything possible from now on to coordinate our policy toward Germany with
the views of Germany's immediate western neighbors. This applies particularly to the Benelux
countries, who could probably easily be induced to render valuable collaboration in the implementation
of our own views. It is these neighboring countries who in the long run must live with any solution we
may evolve; and it is absolutely essential to any successful ordering of western Europe that they make
their full contribution and bear their full measure of responsibility. It would be better for us in many
instances to temper our own policies in order to win their support than to try to act unilaterally in
defiance of their feelings.
With these tasks and problems before us it is important that we should do nothing in this intervening
period which would prejudice our later policies. The appropriate offices of the Department of State
should be instructed to bear this in mind in their own work. We should also see to it that it is borne in
mind by our military authorities in the prosecution of their policies in Germany. These considerations
should be observed in any discussions we hold with representatives of other governments. This applies
particularly to the forthcoming discussions with the French and the British.
IV. Mediterranean
As the situation has developed in the past year, the Soviet chances for disrupting the unity of western
Europe and forcing a political entry into that area have been deteriorating in northern Europe, where
the greater political maturity of the peoples is gradually asserting itself, but holding their own, if not
actually increasing, in the south along the shores of the Mediterranean. Here the Russians have as
assets not only the violent chauvinism of their Balkan satellites but also the desperate weakness and
weariness of the Greek and Italian peoples.10 Conditions in Greece and Italy today are peculiarly
favorable to the use of fear as a weapon for political action, and hence to the tactics which are basic and
familiar to the communist movement.
It cannot be too often reiterated that this Government does not possess the weapons which would be
needed to enable it to meet head-on the threat to national independence presented by the communist
elements in foreign countries. This poses an extremely difficult problem as to the measures which our
Government can take to prevent the communists from achieving success in the countries where
resistance is lowest.
The Planning Staff has given more attention to this than to any single problem which has come under
its examination. Its conclusions may be summed up as follows:
(1) The use of U S. regular armed force to oppose the efforts of indigenous communist elements within
foreign countries must generally be considered as a risky and profitless undertaking, apt to do more
harm than good.
(2) If, however, it can be shown that the continuation of communist activities has a tendency to attract
U.S. armed power to the vicinity of the affected areas, and if these areas are ones from which the
Kremlin would definitely wish U.S. power excluded, there is a possibility that this may bring into play
the defensive security interests of the Soviet Union and cause the Russians to exert a restraining
influence on local communist forces.
The Staff has therefore felt that the wisest policy for us to follow would be to make it evident to the
Russians by our actions that the further the communists go in Greece and Italy the more surely will this
Government be forced to extend the deployment of its peacetime military establishment in the
Mediterranean area.
There is no doubt in our minds but thnt if the Russians knew that the establishment of a communist
government in Greece would mean the establishment of U.S. air bases in Libya and Crete, or that a
communist uprising in northern Italy would lead to the renewed occupation by this country of the
Foggia field, a conflict would be produced in the Kremlin councils between the interests of the Third
Internationale, on the one hand, and those of the sheer military security of the Soviet Union, on the
other. In conflicts of this sort, the interests of narrow Soviet nationalism usually win. If they were to
win in this instance, a restraining hand would certainly be placed on the Greek and Italian communists.
This has already been, to some extent, the case. I think there is little doubt that the activity of our naval
forces in the Mediterranean (including the stationing of further Marines with those forces), plus the talk
of the possibility of our sending U.S. forces to Greece, has had something to do with the failure of the
satellites, up to this time, to recognize the Markos Government, and possibly also with the Kremlin's
reprimand to Dimitrov. Similarly, I think the statement we made at the time of the final departure of our
troops from Italy was probably the decisive factor in bringing about the abandonment of the plans
which evidently existed for a communist uprising in Italy prior to the spring elections.
For this reason, I think that our policy with respect to Greece ar Italy, and the Mediterranean area in
general, should be based upon the objective of demonstration to the Russians that:
(a) the reduction of the communist threat will lead to our military withdrawal from the area; but that
(b) further communist pressure will only have the effect of involving us more deeply in a military
sense.
VI. U.S.S.R.
If the Russians have further success in the coming months in their efforts at penetration and seizure of
political control of the key countries outside the iron curtain (Germany, France, Italy, and Greece), they
will continue, in my opinion, to be impossible to deal with at the council table. For they will see no
reason to settle with us at this time over Germany when they hope that their bargaining position will
soon be improved.
If, on the other hand, their situation outside the iron curtain does not improve—if the ERP aid arrives in
time and in a form to do some good and if there is a general revival of confidence in western Europe,
then a new situation will arise and the Russians will be prepared, for the first time since the surrender,
to do business seriously with us about Germany and about Europe in general. They are conscious of
this and are making allowance for this possibility in their plans. I think, in fact, that they regard it as the
more probable of the two contingencies.
When that day comes, i.e. when the Russians will be prepared to talk realistically with us, we will be
faced with a reat test of American statesmanship, nnd it will not be easy to find the right solution. For
what the Russians will want us to do will be to conclude with them a sphere-of-influence agreement
similar to the one they concluded with the Germans in 1939. It will be our job to explain to them that
we cannot do this and why. But we must also be able to demonstrate to them that it will still be worth
their while:
(a) to reduce communist pressures elsewhere in Europe and the Middle East to a point where we ran
afford to withdraw all our armed forces from the continent and the Mediterranean; and
(b) to acquiesce thereafter in a prolonged period of stability in Europe.
I doubt that this task will be successfully accomplished if we try to tackle it head-on in the CFM or at
any other public meeting. Our public dealings with the Russians can hardly lead to any clear and
satisfactory results unless they are preceded by preparatory discussions of the most secret and delicate
nature with Stalin.12 I think that those discussions can be successfully conducted only by someone
who:
(a) has absolutely no personal axe to grind in the discussions, even along the lines of getting public
credit for their success, and is prepared to observe strictest silence about the whole proceeding; and
(b) is thoroughly acquainted not only with the background of our policies but with Soviet philosophy
and strategy and with the dialectics used by Soviet statesmen in such discussions.
(It would be highly desirable that this person be able to conduct conversations in the Russians'
language. In my opinion, this is important with Stalin.)
These discussions should not be directed toward arriving at any sort of secret protocol or any other
written understanding. They should be designed to clarify the background of any written understanding
that we may hope to reach at the CFM table or elsewhere. For we know now that the words of
international agreements mean different things to the Russians than they mean to us; and it is desirable
that in this instance we should thresh out some common understanding of what would really be meant
by any further written agreements we might arrive at.
The Russians will probably not be prepared to “talk turkey” with us until after the elections. But it
would be much easier to talk to them at that time if the discussions did not have to be inaugurated too
abruptly and if the ground had been prepared beforehand.
The Russians recently made an interesting approach to Murphy in Berlin, obviously with a view to
drawing us out and to testing our interest in talking with tbom frankly and realistically on the informal
plane. I do not think Berlin a desirable place for the pursuit of further discussions of this sort. On the
other hand, I do not think that we should give them a complete cold shoulder. We must always be
careful not to give discouragement to people in the Kremlin who may urge the desirability of better
understanding with us.
I think, in the light of the above, we should give careful attention to the personnel arrangements which
we make with relation to the Russian field in the next few months, and that we should play our cards
throughout with a view to the possibility of arriving eventually at some sort of a background
understanding with the Kremlin. But we must bear in mind that this understanding would necessarily
have to be limited and coldly realistic, could not be reduced to paper, and could not be expected to
outlast the general international situation which had given rise to it.
I mav add that I think such an understanding would have to be restricted pretty much to the European
and western Mediterranean area. I doubt that it could be extended to apply to the Middle East and Far
East. The situation in these latter areas is too unsettled, the prospects for the future too confusing, the
possibilities of one sort or another too vast and unforeseeable, to admit of such discussions. The
economic exchanges between Japan and Manchuria might be revived in a guarded and modified form,
by some sort of barter arrangement. This is an objective well worth holding in mind, from our
standpoint. Rut we should meanwhile have to frame our policies in Japan with a view to creating better
bargaining power for such discussions than we now possess.
X. Conclusions
An attempt to survey the whole panorama of U.S. policy and to sketch the lines of direction along
which this country is moving in its relations with the rest of the world yields little cause for
complacency.
We are still faced with an extremely serious threat to our whole security in the form of the men in the
Kremlin. These men are an able, shrewd and utterly ruthless group, absolutely devoid of respect for us
or our institutions. They wish for nothing more than the destruction of our national strength. They
operate through a political organization of unparalleled flexibility, discipline, cynicism and toughness.
They command the resources of one of the world's greatest industrial and agricultural nations. Natural
force, independent of our policies, may go far to absorb and eventually defeat the efforts of this group.
But we cannot depend on this. Our own diplomacy has a decisive part to play in this connection. The
problems involved are new to us, and we are only beginning to adjust ourselves to them. We have made
some progress; but we are not yet nearly far enough advanced. Our operations in foreign affairs must
attain a far higher degree of purposefulness, of economy of effort, and of disciplined co-ordination if
we are to be sure of accomplishing our purposes.
In the western European area communism has suffered a momentary check; but the issue is still in the
balance. This Government has as yet evolved no firm plans for helping Britain meet her basic long-
term economic problem, or for fitting Germany into western Europe in a way that gives permanence of
assuring the continued independence and prosperity of the other nations of western Europe.
In the Mediterranean and Middle East, we have a situation where a vigorous and collective national
effort, utilizing both our political and military resources, could probably prevent the area from falling
under Soviet influence and preserve it as a highly important factor in our world strategic position. But
we are deeply involved, in that same area, in a situation which has no direct relation to our national
security, and where the motives our involvement lie solely in past commitments of dubious wisdom and
in our attachment to the UN itself. If we do not effect a fairly radical reversal of the trend of our policy
to date, we will end up either in the position of being ourselves militarily responsible for the protection
of the Jewish population in Palestine against the declared hostility of the Arab world, or of sharing that
responsibility with the Russians and thus assisting at their installation as one of the military powers of
the area. In either case, the clarity and efficiency of a sound national policy for that area will be
shattered.
In the Far East, our position is not bad; and we still have a reasonably firm grip on most of what is
strategically essential to us. But our present controls are temporary ones which cannot long endure, and
we have not yet worked out realistic plans for replacing them with a permanent structure. Meanwhile,
our own public has been grievously misled by the sentimentalists on the significance of the area to
ourselves; and we are only beginning with the long and contentious process of re-education which will
be necessary before a realistic Far Eastern policy can receive the popular understanding it deserves.
In all areas of the world, we still find ourselves the victims of many of the romantic and universalistic
concepts with which we emerged from the recent war. The initial build-up of the UN in U.S. public
opinion was so tremendous that it is possibly true, as is frequently alleged, that we have no choice but
to make it the cornerstone of our policy in this post-hostilities period. Occasionally, it has served a
useful purpose. But by and large it has created more problems than it has solved, and has led to a
considerable dispersal of our diplomatic effort. And in our efforts to use the UN majority for major
political purposes we are playing with a dangerous weapon which may some day turn against us. This
is a situation which warrants most careful study and foresight on our part.
1 Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, 1947-1953.
2 The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State was established on May 7, 1947, to consider the
development of long range policy and to draw together the views of the geographic and functional
offices of the Department. With the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the Policy
Planning Staf undertook responsibility for the preparation of the position of the Department of State on
matters before the National Security Council. For additional information on the activities of the Policy
Planning Staff and its Director, see George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1967), pp. 313-500.
3 Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, August 1945-June 1947.
4 George H. Butler, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
5On February 26, Kennan departed for Japan to consult with United States officials. Subsequent illness
prevented him from returning to the Department of State until April 19.
6 For documentation on United States policy with respect to the economic situation in Europe, see vol.
III, pp. 352.
7For documentation on United States policy with respect to the proposed International Trade
Organization, see pp. 802 ff.
8For text of Secretary Marshall's address at commencement exercises at Harvard University, June 5,
1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. III, p. 237, or Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1947, p.
1159.
9 For documentation on United States policy with respect to the occupation and control of Germany,
see vol. II, pp. 1285 ff.
10 For documentation on United States efforts in support of democratic forces in Italy, see vol. III, pp.
816 ff. Regarding United States economic and military support for Greece, see vol. IV, pp. 1 ff.
11For the views of thp Policy Planning Staff on this subject, see PPS 19, January 20, 1948, and PPS
21, February 11, 1948, in vol. V, Part 2, pp. 545 and 656 respectively.
12 Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.