The Purva-Mimamsa

Concept of Prama

Mimamsa is also an orthodox (iistika) system and emphasises

on liberation (mok!ja). Liberation, in this system, is attained by the
joint effort of valid cognition of the self or self realization
(iitmiijfiana) and moral action (karma). Self-realization (iitmiijfiana)
is possible only if the subject can distinguish it from the valid
cognition of not-self (aniitmiijfiana). The concept of valid cognition,
thus has an important role. The Bhatta concept of valid cognition
finds its room in discussion in explaining Nyiiya concept of valid
cognition, because both the theories believe that cognition itself is

.
apprehended extrinsically (paratah prakiisa) and yet they differ each
other regarding the apprehension of truth of cognition. The Bhatta' s
advocate that the truth of cognition is ascertained intrinsically
(svatal;z pramii1Jya), whereas the N aiyayikas advocate that the truth
of cognition is apprehended extrinsically (parataf} prtimiil}ya).
Narayana Bhatta cites the N aiyayikas first as opponent and holds
that the concept of jus~ification (pramiil)a) in both the systems are
alike but the concept of valid cognition (pramii) is different. Both
the systems define justification (pramiilJ.a) as the instrument of valid
cognition (pramiikara7Jameviitra pramiiQam tarkapak!javat). But the
N aiyayikas define valid cognition (pramii) as immediate experience
(anubhava) of object having some property as its content where this
property actually exist, whereas Narayana Bhatta defines it as 'the
prior unacquired cognition of object having some property as its

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content where this property actually exists' (pramii ca aj fiat a
tattvartha jfiiinamevatra vidyate). For example, when a prior
unacquired conchcell Is cognized as having the property of
conchcellness is called valid cognition. Thus, the N aiyayikas
emphasise on immediate experience (anubhava) of object as it is and
the Mimamsakas emphasise on prior unacquired cognition of object
as it is.

The word 'unacquired' (ajfiata) excludes meinory (smrti) and

repeated version (anuviida) from the purview of valid cognition
(pramii). Memory is excluded from the purview of valid cognition
because m memory the content of cognition is identical with the
content of that past immediate experience (piirviinubhava) whose
impression is the cause of the present memory cognition. Hence,
memory cognition only repeats the content of past experiences.
Repeated version (anuviida) is also excluded from the purview of
valid cognition (pramii} for the same reason. By repeated version
(anuviida), here, means either previously uttered word or the
cognition of previously uttered word. Such cognitions of previously
uttered words don't convey any novelty to the content of its
meaning. So, repeated version (anuviida) is unable to yeild any new
result apart from the cognition of the original utterence of the word
I words. What fails to yield any new result has been discarded, by
the Mimamsakas, from the purview of valid cognition (pramii). The
N aiyayikas only exclude memory from the purview of valid
cognition (pramii) but consider the validity of repeated version
(anuviida). The Mimamsakas hold, on the other hand, that if memory
is excluded from the purview of valid cognition (pramii} since there
is no novelty in the content of memory cognitions, the repeated
version (anuviida) also has to be excluded from the purview of valid
cognition since such cognitions also don't convey any new content

85
to the meaning of the word or sentence (anuviido hyarthaparicchede
vyavahare va na purvajnanat kancid vise~amadhatte. ata~

phalavise~abhaviit phalartham ca pramiiniinam svikarat

smrtyiidiviidanuviidhohapi vahi~kCirya eveti).

Now the opponents may argue that the subsequent moments of

persistent cognition (dhiiriiviihika jniina) also repeats the same
content of object and yet persistent cognition (dhiirtivtihika jniifia)
is considered as valid cognition (pramii). It is argued that the time
moments (kiilamsa) make the content of cognition novel. So, what is
grasped at the first moment is not the same as what is grasped at the
second moment and subsequent moments.

The oppnents, now, may argue that time (kala), both for the
Mimamsakas and the N aiyayikas, is one in number and the so called
different time moments are imposed properties made out of
extraneous adjunct (upiidhi) and what is limited by the extraneous
adjunct (upiidhi) could not be taken as real. So, what is grasped in
the so called different time moments could not be different or novel
from what is grasped earlier.

Narayana Bhatta, here, answers that the Mimamsakas believe

tn three apex of reality (triput1) for the cognition of object in
epistemology, viz., cognition (jnana), the object (vi~aya) and the
condition for the manifestation of the object (priikatya). Though,
i
cognition is cognized by inference and not by direct perception i.e.
it is cognized by subsequent moment only, the manifestation
(priikatya) is cognized by direct perception and is intrinsically valid
(svatah pramiinya), because the manifestation (prtikatya) originates
in the object (vi~aya) which is perceptible. So, the manifestation
(prtikatya), in Bhatta theory, is different in each moment. And, as
these manifestations (prtikatya) are perceptible in different time

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moments (kiiliimsa) which are limited (avacchinna) by these
manifestations (priika!ya) are also perceptible. Therefore, the time
moments limited by that manifestation only containing in the object,
viz., pot, is the content of cognition. The manifestation (priikafYa)
is unacquired (anadhigata) to previous time moments. Hence, we
percteve a new content ln each time moment
(piirvapiirvaj fianajanitaniim
priikafyanumu ttaro tt a raj fiiinaparyan tamavas t hiina t
tadavacchinnaniim kiiliimsanam tatra tatravagama iti).

The opponents, once again, may argue that the manifestations

(priikatya) are too subtle (suk~ma) to percieve and so also the time
moments limited ( avacchinna) by these manifestations (priika{ya)
are also too subtle to percieve. Narayana Bhatta, here, argues that
the manifestations (priika{ya) as well as time moments (kiiliimsa)
limited by these manifestations are not too subtle to percieve (na ca
priika{yabhediiniim sub;matvat tadavacchinnanam kiilabhedfinamapi
suk~mataya durvajamatvamiti viicyam). If this is the case then the
object viz., the pot, in the case of persistent cognition would be
illumined to us just once as if we are percieving hundred subtle
lotus leaves simultaneously incarnated by the needle (suk~matve

kamaladalasatam sucya yugapadbhinnamitivat sakl;davavuddhvo

ghata iti yougapadyabhimiinaprasajfiiit). In the case of persistent
cognition (dhiiriiviihika jfiiina), rather, we percieve the pot in the
first moment and in Subsequent moments distinctly. Therefore,
manifestations (priikaJya) and time moments (kii/amsa) limited
(avacchinna) by corresponding manifestations are not too subtle to
perc1eve (tasmat priikat,yabhediinam kiilabhedaniim ca na
suk~matvam).

The second term 'real' (tattva) of the definition of valid

cognition is used to exclude invalid cognitions like error (bhrama),

87
doubt (samsaya), reductio-ad-absurdum (tarka), etc. The erroneous
cognition of 'rope as snake' is not real (tattva), because here the
determinant (snake) does not actually exist to the determinandum
(rope). So, we do not the object as it 1s m erroneous cognitions
(bhrama/ viparyaya). Again, there are two contradictory
determinans in the case of doubt cognitions (samsaya) of which one
cognition might be false (atattva). Here also we don't cognize the
object as it is. The same holds good in the case of reductio-ad-
absurdum method (tarka). The reductio-ad-absurdum method
proceeds by the counter hypothetical proposition which is nothing
but imaginary (liharyaj fiana) and subsequently shows the
contradiction in accepting the hypothetical proposition which
indirectly proofs the validity (prlimtilJya) of the proposition in
question. As the hypothetical argument by which the reductio-ad-
absurdum method (tarka) proceeds are imaginary (aharya) are not
real (tattva). So the term 'real' (tattva) excludes error (viparyaya),
doubt (sarhsaya), reductio-ad-absurdum method (tarka), etc. from
the purview of valid cognition (pramti).

Now, Prabhakara Mimamsakas argue that the term 'real'

(tattva) does not serve any purpose. Because, all cognitions by
virtue are real (tattva). There is no erroneous cognition at all. So the
. term 'real' (tattva) is only a tautology of the term 'valid cognition'
(pramti). Cognition, for them, is self-manifested (svaprakasa) and
illumined its object. As each and every cognition illuminates its
object, it is valid. So, there is no scope of invalid cognition in this
system. Immediate experiencehood (anubhutitva) is the mark or
defining charecterstic (lak!jm:za) of valid cognition (pramti).
Immediate experience (anubhuti) is defined as other than memory
(smrtibhinna). Even the so called erroneous cognitions are valid.
Because, the so called erroneous cognition, like 'rope as snake' is

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expressed in the form of 'this is snake'. We have, for them, two
cognitions in such cases. The one is 'this' (idmn) which is directly
percieved and does not refer to individual property of ropeness but
refers to the universal property of 'thisness' {idantva). The other
cognition is the 'snake' which we get from the memory-cognition of
'this is snake' (ayam sarpa~). But we fail to recognise it as a
memory-cognition (smrti janya jniina) because the memory is not
fully recollected i.e. 'this' (idam) of the recollected cognition is not
recognised. The content of the erroneous cognition like 'rope as
snake' is the perceptual cognition of 'this' {idam) along with its
property ropeness and the memory cognition 'snake' along with its
property snakeness. So the hybrid illusory cognition which emerges
due to the absence of grasping the difference of the perceptual
cognition and the memory-cognition. As both cognition can illumine
the part of its own content seperately, hence, both cognitions are
valid.

Narayana Bhatta argues that each and every cognition has the
inclination towards its own object. When a thirsty man who has the
cognition 'it is water' leads him to get the water so that he could
quench his thirst. When one has illusory cognition of 'the reflection
of sunlight on the sands in the desert' as 'it is water', it would not
be wise to say that in such cases we have two cognitions of which
both are seperately true. Because, if it would be so, then we should
have, in that case, two: distinct inclinations of getting two distinct
objects, as a rule, corresponding to two cognitions. As illusory
cognitions originate only one inclination of getting one object,
hence, it follows that in the case of illusory cognition there is only
one cognition and not two.

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 Finally, the word 'cognition' (jnana) is justified. The word
'cognition' (j nana) has been used to exclude 'the prior absence of
cognition' (jniina pragbhava) and non-cognition (ajnana).

Though, both Nytiya and Bhatta Mimamsakas hold that the

same concept of the instrument of cognition (pramar;a), they differ
in each other regarding the concept of valid cognition (pramti). The
Bhatta, as mentioned earlier, considers three apex of epistemic
realirty (triputi). The word 'valid cognition' (pram a) is used to
denote both the cognition (j niina) as well as manifestation
(prtikatya). They further hold that sense-object-contact (indriyartha
sannikar~a) is the instrumental condition (pramtirza) of cognition
(j nana), and, again, cognition itself (j iiana) is the instrumental
condition (karaiJa) of manifestation (prtikaJya). Thus, cognition
itself is the effect (phala) of sense-object-contact (indriyartha
sannikar~a), which, agam, Is also the instrumental condition
(pramtina /karana) for the origination of manifestation (prtikaJya).
The Bhatta, for this reason, is also called effect-instrumentalist
(phala pramtil}avtidi).

Narayana Bhatta, after showing the justification of each term

of his definition of valid cognition (pramti), also establishes his own
theory by showing either some paradox or self-stultifying statements
to other systems.

The definition of valid cognition (pramti) of the N aiyayikas,

for him, is suffering from the fallacy of over-coverage ( ativyapti),
because the N aiyayikas have not put any term to exclude repeated
versiOn (anuvtida) in the definition. Recollection (smrti), in Nytiya
system, has been excluded from the purview of valid cognition
(pramti) because memory-cognition (smrti) only repeats the content
of immediate experience (anubhuti). Repeated-version (anuvtida)

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also repeats the content of the original-version and yet its validity
(pramiif}ya) is considered by the Naiyayikas. Hence, either the
definition of the N aiyayikas is affected by the fallacy of over-
coverage (ativyapti), or, the theory is self-stultifying.

The Prabhakar Mimamsaka also excludes recollection (smrti)

from the purview of valid cognition (pramii). Valid cognition
(pramii) is defined, in this system, as the cognition other than
recollection (smrtibhinna). The view of Prabhakara is unacceptable
to Narayana Bhatta for two reasons :-

(a) It can't be denied that erroneous cognitions (viparyaya)

and doubtful cognitions (smnsaya) are invalid cognitios
(which are established earlier). But the definition of vallid
cognition (pramii) of Prabhakara includes erroneous
cognitions (viparyaya) and doubtful cognition (samsaya) with
in the purview of valid cognition (prdmii). Hence, the
definition of valid cognition (pramii) of Prabhakara is affected
by the fallacy of overc-overage ( ativyapti).

(b) Although, Prabhakara hold 'immediate experiencehood'

(anubhutitva) as the defining mark (lak~m;za), the criterion of
valid cognition is given as the capacity of illuminating the
object (vi~aya), the cognition (sviitmii) and the self (iitmii)
(ki fica sarvaj fianesvapi iitmii j fianasvarii.pam vi~aya iti
trtiyamapt pfakasati). Immediate experiencehood
(anubhutitva) means other than memory (smrtibhinna). But,
memory-cognition (smrti) also illuminates the self (titmti) and
the cognition (sviitmii). Now, if memory-cognitions (smrti) are
invalid, the self (iitmii) and the cognition (sviitmii) illumined
by memory-cognition (smrti) would also be invalid. But, the
illumination of the self (iitmii) and the cognition (sviitmii)

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 through memory-cognition (smrti) Is considered by the
Prabhakara Mimamsakas as valid and perceptible. Hence, the
definition of valid cognition is affected by the fallacy of
under-coverage ( avyapti) in terms of the recollective cognition
of the self (atma) and the cognition (sviitmii).

Lastly, the Buddhists hold that the concept of valid cognition

(pramii) and its instrument (pramiina) is identical. Because, the real
umque momentary particulars (svalak~ana) are momentary
(k~anika). Valid cognition (pramii) graspes these unique momentary
particulars (svalakaJJa). As the objects of valid cognition are
momentary, the corresponding cognition, for being real, might be
momentary also. Generally, it is concieved that corresponding to the
valid cognition (pramii) there might be some instrumental condition
(pramiina) also. But this concept of instrumentality (karanatva)
would not fit in the Buddhist system, since, for being an
instrumental condition (kara7Ja) a prior moment of origination of the
effect is needed. Hence, the Buddhist concieve that the concept of
instrumentality (karal)atva) is imaginary (kalpana). Thus, the
Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that the objective equiformity
(meya rupata) is the defining charecterstics of valid cognition-cum-
instrument (pramii = pramiif}a). this part will be explained later on.

Again, the Buddhist logicians hold that the nature of cognition

Is intrinsically reveated (svatal} prakasa), but the validity
(pramiilJya) of the cognition is revealed by subsequent cognition
(paratah pramii1Jya). Hence, the criterion for determining the
validity of cognition IS :- it is non-contradicted by subsequent
cognition and has the causal efficacy to produce something
(aviidhita ca arthakriyiikiiritvam). For example, a thirsty man
cognize something as 'it is water'. The validity of the cognition is
determined on the ground that it is not contradicted by subsequent

92
moment and has the capacity to quench his thirst. But, Narayana
Bhatta wrongly treats it as a defining charecterstics (lak~ana) of
valid cognition and proceeded criticizing it. But, his points have
some value for critical study. Let us suppose that Bhatta treats it as
a criterion for determining the validity of cognition. And, if it is
taken as a criterion for determining the validity of cognition then
the Buddhist theory, from the point of view of Bhatta, has the
following shortcomings :-

(a) The Buddhist logicians consider two sources of valid

cognition, VIZ., perception (pratyak~a) and inference
(anumtina). There are some inferential cognitions (anumtina)
regarding past facts and future possibilities which are valid
since they are under the ken of inference (anumtina). But, the
Buddhist logicians criterion for determining these cognitions
cann 't be applied in such cognitions, since the causal efficacy
either already perishes or it is yet to occur. Dinanath Tripathi
cites an example, suppose a man infers the existence of fire, of
a remote past fact, beneath a tree from the black smoky spots
on the leaves of that tree. Here, the inferential cognition of
fire is valid, though, the causal efficacy of fire in no way be
proved at present. Hence, the criterion for determining the
validity of cognition suffers from the fallacy of under
coverage (avyapti).
i
(b) Sec0ndly, recollection (smrti) Is excluded from the
purview of valid cognition in Buddhist system also. But, there
are at least some recollective cognitions (smrti) which have
the efficacy to produce something and yet these cognitions, in
Buddhist system, are regarded as invalid. For example, the
recollection of spiritual experiences (bhagvat vi~ayaka smrti)
produces pleasure to the cognizer (j nata). Hence, the criterion

93
 for determining the validity of cognition of the Buddhist
logician suffers from the fallacy of over coverage (ativyapti).
So, the Buddhist criterion for determining the validity of
cognition (pramii7Jya) is uncceptable to Bhatta.

The Buddhist logicians, again, may argue that all determinate

cognitions (savikalpaka j fiiina) are thought constructed (kalpita) and
hence unreal. Determinate cognitions (savikalpaka j fiana)
apparently seems to be having the property of causal efficacy
(arthakriyiikiiritva) due to the close proximity (naikafya) with the
objective equiformity (meyarilpatii). Thus, the causal efficacy
( arthakriyiikiiritva) 1s the accidental property (agantuka dharma) to
any determinate cognition (savikalpaka jfiiina). (nanu
arthakriyiikiiritvamasya arthatohtiviprakarsabhavat daivagatameva,
na svabhavikam). Causal efficacy (arthakriyakaritva) may be the
criterion of determining the validity of cognition only to those cases
where it is the essential property of the cognition in question. For
example, seeing the reflection of light on a diamond a man runs to
get the diamond and eventually he gets the diamond. Again, seeing
the diamond another man runs to get it and he gets it. Now, in the
first instance, the causal efficacy (arthakriyiikiiritva) 1s the
accidental property of the first person's cognition, whereas the
causal efficacy ( arthakriyakiiritva) is the essential property of the
second person's cognition. Hence the criterion of the Buddhist for
determining the validit\y does not suffer from the fallacy of over-
coverage (ativyapti).

The Buddhist logicians denied the validity of determinate

cognition (savikalpaka jficma) on the ground that they are thought
constructed. If thought construction (kalpana) is the only ground for
canceling the validity, then inference (anumiina) can't be taken as a
valid source .of cognition (pramii~J-a) sinc.e inferntial cognitions are

94
derived mainly by thought construction. But the Buddhist logicians
have taken inference as a valid source of cognition. Hence the
Buddhist theory is in a self-stultifying position. Moreover, the
Buddhist logician denied the validity of determinate cognition, sirice
they think that determinate cognition or judgmental cognition
(savikalpaka jfiana) is a qualified cognition (visi~!a jfiana) and the
qualified elements of a determinate cognition is either a universal
(jati), name (nama), definition (samjfia), action (kriyii) or quality
(gul}a) of which none is real. But the Bhattas argue that the reality
of these elements can't be denied. To show that all these elements
are real the Bhattas refute the arguments the arguments of the
Buddhist logicians. The Buddhist logicians denied the reality (sattli)
of universal (jati) on the following grounds: If universal (jati) is a
real entity then it might exist either each of the individual (vyakti)
separately or its existence is all-pervading (vibhu) so that each and
every individual can participate to that universal. It can not be said
that the existence of universal (jati) is all-pervading. If that is the
case then we would percieve it even other than the induviduals of
that class also. But, we do not percieve the universal everywhere.
We only percieve it to a individual of that class only. For example,
we percieve the cowness to individual cows only, but not to a goat
or any other creature. It can not even be said that it exists to each
individual (vyakti) of that class only. Because, if it is the case, then
we have to say that a new burn individual of that class acquires the
i
property of universal from another individual i.e. the property of
universal is transferred from one individual to another. Hence, we
have to consider that the universal has an active role. But, those
thinkers who maintain that universal (jati) as a real entity think it to
be inactive (ni~kriya). Again, it can not be said that the universal
(jati) and individual (vyakti) emerges simultaneously, because they
consider universal as eternal (nitya) and individual (vyakti) as a

95
time binding entity (anitya). Hence, the concept of existence of
universal is inconcievable.

Now the Bhatta Mimamsakas advocate that there IS no

contradiction in holding that the existence of universal IS all-
pervading as well as it exists to the individuals of that class only.
Because, the relation between universal Uati) and individual
(vyakti), according to them, is in relation of illumined (abhivyanja)
and illuminetor (abhivyanjaka). An illumined entity (abhivyafi}a)
can not be felt without a illuninator (abhivyanjaka). Now, the
Buddhist logicians may argue that if the universal Uati) exists to
individuals of that class only, then it can not be eternal (nitya)
because individual s (vyakti) exist only for a period of time. So,
when individual or individuals will perish, it might hamper that
existence of universal also. The Bhattas argue that the perishability
of individuals will not affect the existence of the universal. It is
already mentioned that the existence of universal is all pervading
and eternal and the relation between the individual and universal is
the relation of illuminator (abhivyanjaka) and illumined
(abhivyanja). Thus, when an individual of that universal emerges
and illumines the universal, it indicates that the illumination of the
universal takes place through some conditions. So, the emergence of
a new-born individual and the emergence of the conditions for the
illumination of the universal is simultaneous. It is not the case that
the emergence of ~ new-born individual and universal Is
simultaneous. "Likewise when an undividual perishes, it only
indicates that the condition or conditions of illumination of the
universal through that individual also perishes not that the universal
also perishes. And, the question of transferability of universal from
one individual to another does not arise because the Mimamsakas
believe that the relation between universal and individual is

96
identity-cum-difference {tiidtitmya). The question of transferability
of a certain property arises only to those cases where the two
entities were distinct at the time of their emergence and then comes
in relation. Moreover, though the Buddhist logicians don't consider
the reality of universal, yet they maintain that we construct the
concept of universal out of imagination by the method of exclussion
(apoha). But the question is: how the method of exclussion (apoha)
takes place? The method of exclussion (apoha) can take place only
if the cognition of some positive entity takes place. I can exclude
some creatures from the class of cow only if I actually cognized
cowness. Thus the Buddhist logicians indirectly accept the universal
as real. Likewise, all the components of determinate cognition are
also real. Therefore, the determinate cognition (savikalpaka jfiiina)
might be taken as a valid one.

***

97
 The Buddhist
Concept of Prama

Valid cognition (prama), in Indian system, has been explained

mainly by two ways, viz., (a) either having a causal explanation, or,
(b) having a non-causal explanation. The causal explanation derives
its root from the common sense view that every effect or product
must have some instrumental condition. Valid cognition (prama)
being an effect must have some instrumental condition (prami11Ja).
The instrumental condition (prami11Ja) must preceed the effect
(prama) and is most predominant condition (atisayatva) among
other conditions as well and which being present the effect
immediately follows. The Naiyayikas are the main upholders of such
explanation of valid cognition (prama) and the Mimamsakas also
explicitly support such explanation of instrumental condition of
cognition (prami17Ja) although they differ regarding the definition of
valid cognition (prama). The Buddhists, on the other hand, explain
the notion of valid cognition in a non-causal manner, because the
notion of causality entails the notion of sequence, so that the subject
I doer (karta) or the itistrument (karana) could function (vyapara)
for the origination of the effect. But, the Buddhists consider only
the momentary unique particulars (svalak~ana) to be real (sat). A
momentary unique particular (svalak~ana) could not intermediate
between the subject (kartii) and the instrument (karaiJa) and aiso
produce the effect (phala) within a moment. So, the classical notion
of causality is considered by the buddhist logicians as imaginary

98
and hence, unreal (kalpita~ karmakartradi~ paramftrtho na vidyate).
To have some causal relation between two realities (sattli)
remam1ng at least for two moments - one moment for its origination
and the next moment is for its relation to other is a pre-condition.
So, the Buddhist logicians don't stick to the etymological meanmg
of instrumental condition of valid cognition (pramtil}a) 1.e. with the
grammatical derivation of the word 'pramtilJa' (pra + ma + GYJa!J.
Even if one would like to stick to the concept of valid cognition
(prama) along with the concept of its instrument (pramtilJa), the
Buddhist logicians would suggest that they are in relation of identity
(ttidatmya).

"dhiyo 'msayor ...

kintu vyavasthapya vyavasthapakabhavah, sa ca tadatmye 'pi

aviruddha ". 16

Dinnaga points out that 'a cognition Is metaphorically called

pramana 16 a'. Nandita Bandopadhyaya observes that the trend
towards the relation of identity between valid cognition (prama) and
its instrument (pramtilJa) prevails even in Sarhkhya-Yoga, the
Advaita, the Mimarhsakas and the Jaina theories 16 b. But, before
going to have such a big claim, let us examine the Buddhist theory
of valid cognition (pramii) and its instrument (pramiiiJa).

Each and every cpgnition, for the Buddhist logicians, has an

intentionality t'owards some object (vi~ayonmukhatli) and thus
illuminates a momentary particular (svalakw;za). The object being
cognized means the illumination of consciousness with a certain
form having some content. In such a situation we may only
metaphorically concieve that when we cogn1ze an object, v1z.,
'blue', our consciousness takes the form of the object blue

99
(vi~aytiktira). When we percieve blue a corresponding form of the
object 'blue' is stamped upon our cognition. It is this objective
equiformity (arthastiriipya !meyariipata) that determines or
measures the limit of the perceptual judgment -- 'this is blue', and
thus eliminates the objects other than 'blue' from the ken of
perception. The cognition of blue which is thus measured is called
paricchedya, and the objective equiformity ( arthastiriipya
/meyariipata) of that cognition which acts as the . measure or
determinant is called paricchedaka. When one makes a distinct
judgment 'it is blue', the cognition is l:lt once withdrawn from all
that is non-blue and is fixed to a particular object 'blue' alone. This
act of determination (to a particular object) is called vyavasthapana
by the Buddhists. The cognition which is thus fixed is described as
vyavasthapya. Now the question is --which does fix the cognition to
a particular object (vyavasthtipaka) ? The Buddhists establishes that
the objective equiformity (arthastiriipya lmeyariipatti) is the fixer
(vyavasthtipaka) or instrumental condition (pramtil)a).

Buddhists, specially Dharmakirti and his followers, establish

the instrumentality (karaf}aiva) of objective equiformity
(meyariipatal vi~ayasarupya) by showing the opponents view,
specially the Naiyayikas and their followers the Bhatta
Mimamsakas, of instrumentality (karaf}atva) as unacceptable. The
N aiyayikas define and explain instrument (karana) as either (a)
"phalayogavyavacchinn'r:lin asrdharanam karal}am kara11am" 1. e. an
instrument is that condition which being present the effect
immediately originates. Sense-object-contact (indriyartha
sannikar~a), for example, is that condition which being present the
effect perception (pratyak~a) takes place. Or, (b) "vyaparavat
asiidharanam karm:zam karal}am" I.e. an instrument Is that
uncommon condition (aslidharana karalJ.a) which is the locus of of

100
the intermediary condition (vyapiira). The sense-organ (indrTya), in
this sense, is the instrument (karatza} for perception. Or, (c)
"sadhkatamam kiiralJam karal}am" i.e. an instrument 1s that
condition which is most pre-dominant or most effective for the
origination of the effect. Sumtotal of conditions except the subject
and object is the instrumental condition (kararza) in this sense. But,
none of these definitions of instrument (karal}a), from the Buddhists
point of view, is acceptable.

Although, Dharmakirti and his commentator Prajfiakara refute

the instrumentality (karar;wtva) of sense-organ (indr1ya) only by
showing some self-stultifying arguments of the N aiyayikas, the same
hold good the other two definitions also. The term 'uncommon
condition' (asadh7uana karana) is the general feature of all the
three mentioned definitions of instrumentality (karal}atva) of the
Naiyayikas. How can the uncommonness (asiidharanatva) be
determined ? The uncommonness is determined by the method . of
agreement and difference (anvaya-vyatireki). The sense-organ
(indrfya), for the Neo-Naiyayikas, is the uncommon condition which
being present the uniqueness of perceptible objects is illumined and
this sense-organ (indrzya) is present to all cases of perception and if
the sense-organ does not present then such cognitions are excluded
from the ken of perceptual cognition. But, the Buddhist logicians
hold that although visual- sense-organ (caku-indrlya), tactual sense
organ (sparsendrfya), auditory sense organ (sravanendriya), to some
extent, sizes up or fix only the visible perceptible objects, tactual
objects, audible objects respectively and so on and so forth, yet the
sense-organ fails to size up or fix the respective object in. a very
specific way.
"sarvasamlinyahetuvad akavam asti nedrsam

tadbhede 'py abhinnasya tasyedam iti tat kutal). " 17

101
The eye, for example, is present to all visual perceptions, so to say,
for the perception of blue patch, yellow patch, red patch etc. The
eye can't be called the differentiator (vyavasthapaka) of the
different perceptual cognitions 1n relation to the different
perceptible objects (sarvasya hi nilap1tadivi~ayasya samanyena
hetuvad ak~arh na bhedakam/ 8 . It is, rather, the objective
equiformity (meyariipata) which size up or fix the object and 1s
capable of individuating and illumining that particular cognition.

The Nyaya logicians, now, may argue that the sense-organ

(indr1ya) is not sufficient condition of cognition. Apart from the
sense-organ there are other conditions also, so the uniqueness of a
particular cognition may be explained by revealing the nature of
other conditions. The same sense-organ as an instrument contacts
with different types of objects with six types of relations. So, the
uniqueness of a particular cognition may be individuated either by
the different object or by the different types of relations or by both.

The Buddhist logicians, here, argue that. even the reality

(satta) of different objects as well as the reality of different types
of relations (sambandha) are cognized through the objective
equiformity (meyariipata). Different forms of objects figuring in
cognition lead one to ascertain that there is contact with different
objects (arthasannikarso 'pi nakaram anabhipatya jfiayate).
Objective equiformity (meyariipata) is more basic than the different
types of extern~! objec~s (including relations). So, the consideration
of objective equiformity (meyariipata) as instrument is more
reasonable and economy of thought which can size up or fix the
object of cognition accordingly and thus illumines the object. Sense-
organs (indriya) or sense-object-contact (indriyartha sannikar~a), on
the other hand, has only secondary significance in epistemology.

102
 "sarvtitmtinapi sambandham kascid evagamyate

dharmaiJ., sa niyamo na syat sambandhyasyavisesata!J ". 19

The N aiyayikas may argue that the Buddhist concept of

.
instrumentality (karanatva) goes against the common usage as well
as the grammatical notion (pra + m'Q + aYJaJ) of instrumentality.
Sense-ordan (indriya) is usally taken as instrument of perceptual
cognition in common usage. The Buddhist logicians, on this regard,
may hold that their usage of instrumentality has its root to the
famous grammarian Panini. By 'instrument' (karw:za) Panini means
that condition which is most effective or most predominant for the
origination of the effect (stidhakatamam karalJam karalJam) and
which being present the effect follows immediately. Objective
equiformity (meya riipata) is most effective than the sense.,.organ
(indriya) or the sense-object-contact (indriyartha sannikar~a).

Because, sometimes the sense-organ being present the effect

perceptual cognition does not take place. But, if there is objective
equiformity (meya riipata) then the cognition is bound to manifest
immediately. So, the objective equiformity (meya riipata), for
Dharmakirti, is the last differentiator (antya bhedaka) .

"sarve~tim upayoge 'pi karakanam kriyiim prati

yadantya bhedakam tasyas tat sadhakatamain

matam. " 20

Common peoples speak like 'I see with the eyes' (cak$USG ruparh
pasyami), because they fail to distinguish between a cognition
(jfitina) and the objective equiformity (meya rflpata).

"Yii kriya yata}J padarthiid avyavadhcmena

bhavati sa tasyah karal}amucyate,

103
 tatas'cendriytideh pramitim pratyavyavahite

sadhakatvabhavan na pramii~cim " 21

Objective equiformity (meyarupatii), in Buddhist logic, IS the

instrument of cognition of object and sense-organ, etc. are the
instrument only in the secondary sense i.e.they are the instrument
for the origination of objective equiformity. Instrumentality
(karanatva), for Dharmakirti, is only imposed to sense-organ as a
transfered epithet.

"katham tanhi cakusii pasyati iti,

karane k"Gryopacliriid evamucyate " 22

Kumarila Bhatta, now, raises a serious objection showing a

self-stultifying position m Buddhist explanation regarding the
relation between valid cognition (pramii) and its instrument
(pramt:a;a). The Buddhist logicians, in one hand, consider the
objective equiformity (arthyasariipya) as the last differentiator
(antya-bhedaka lantya-paricchedaka) which is nothing but cognition
itself, and eliminates the instrumentality of sense-organ in the prime
sense which is in a distance from the point of view of time.t~e

differentiator (paricchedaka), in. Buddhist system, is itself the .

effect.

"paric'chedaphalatvena vrttasyanantarasya naiJ

pramii1Jatvam bhavej, jfiiinepramiine tu param

phalam ". 23

But, this so called last differentia tor ( antya bhedaka) which is

identical with the cognition itself is caused by the senses. This view
is also accepted by Dharmakirti. The so called last differentiator

104
(antya bhedaka) IS an imposed reality (kalpita). Hence, even in
Buddhist system the senses (indr1yadi) are the real differentiator
(paricchedaka). The Budedhist logicians, in this situation, have two
options -- either (a) they may consider objective equiformity
(meyariipatti) as the last differentiator (antyabhedaka) only in the
sense that there is a real time gap between the differentiator
(paricchedaka lvyavasthtipaka) and the differentiated (paricchedya
lvyavasthapya), or, (b) that the sense organs are the real
differentiator (vyavasthtipaka) for perceptual cognition. If the
Buddhists hold that there is time gap between objective equiformity
(meyariipatti) and bare cognition (jiltinamatra) and the objective
equiformity (meyariipatti) is caused by the senses (indriyadi), then
the view is not different from the Mimamsaka's concept of three
epistemic apex of reality (triputf), viz., sense-organ (indrzya),
cognition (jntina) and manifestation (prtikafya). But, then the view
would contradict the basic ontology of momentariness (k~anikavtida)

of the Buddhists. Therefore, they have to accept the second option

I.e. the reality of the senses as instrumental condition or
differentiator (vyavasthtipaka). Thus, Kumarila establishes the
causal relation between the senses (indrTyadi) and perceptual
cognition (pratyak~a). This view is also supported by common
people (vi~ayaikatvavat
.
kriyakarakayoh svarupabhedo 'pi lokasiddha
~

The Buddhist m~y argue that they have established that the
concept of instrumentality (karaf]atva) of objective equiformity
(meya "rfipatli) which is the prime sense to fit in the Buddhist
ontology is taken only as a conceptual construction or as an
imposition (kalpita). The imposed distinction between an effect and
its corresponding instrument is made so that using the analysis as a
ladder or stepping stone common people could realize that although

105
the said two notions are different from the pragmatic point of view
but they are identical by virtue. If the instrumentality of the
objective equiformity (arthasiirupya), which is the prime sense of
instrument in Buddhist system, IS also virtually refuted, the
instrumentality of the senses (indrTyiidi) where the instrumentality
(karaJJatva) is only imposed as a case of transferred epithet could
easily be refuted. Even if one would like to stick to the
instrumentality of the sense-organ for perceptual cognition, the
Buddhist logicians would argue that the instrumentality of sense-
organ could be refuted even from the significance of the experi~nces

of common people. For example, when one cuts a mango tree with
the help of an 'axe', thereby he is excluding the possibility of
cutting a gueva tree at the same time with the same 'axe'. Hence, it
follows that 'the cutting (of a tree)' is an essential and intrinsic
feature of that 'axe'. Thus, the so called effect and its corresponding
instrument are necessarily identical.

"prasuna ca vrk~ades'cchida niriipyamiil}a

chedyadravyanupravesa/ak~aflaivavati~!hate,

sa ciinupravesab paralor iitmiigata eva dharma iti.

paramarthatas'chidaya sahaikatvam iti niisti viroda!J " 25

Kumarila raises another objection against the Buddhist

logicians that the apprehension of cognition (sa-samvedana) and
objective equiformity (meya rupata /vi~ayiikiira) as instrument
cannot go simultaneously.

"sasmnvittaphalatvam tu tanni~edhan na yujyate

pramii'le vi~ayakare bhinnarthatvam prasajyate " 26

106
 Cognition, for the Buddhist, is apprenhended intrinsically
(sasamvedana), because the socalled instrumental condition on
which the origination of the effect depends m 1s intrinsic and
essential feature of cognition. Kamalasila explains 1n detail
Kumarila' s position that cognition can't be apprehended
intrinsically, because objective equiformity (arthastiriipya
lvi~aytiktira), for the Buddhiist, is an object of direct perception.
This objective equiformity (vi~ayakara) solely depends upon the
external object (vi~ayakaro vahyavi~aya~). It is also mentioned
earlier that consciOusness has an intention towards object
(visayonmukhatii) and Kumarila thinks that this object might be an
external object having some content. If this is the case then the
cognition manifesting the object as its content (vyavasthCipya) is not
the essential feature of cognition itself, because it 1s not
independent of external objects. Intrinsic apprehension
(sasamvedana), on the other hand, means that cognition reveals
itself. But, this intrinsic apprehension of cognition, however, is not
like the second order cognition (anuvyavastiya) of the Naiyayikas
which reveals the nature of antecedent cognition. So the momentary
unique cognition having some content as its object can't reveal
itself intrinsically.

"idarh aparam uktam kumarilenaiva :- sasamvedanasya

ni~edhiit tasya prqmti1Japhalatvam ayuktam, vi~ayakarasya

l

ca priimtir]ye sati pramtirJaphalayor bhinnavi~ayatvam

prasajyate, tatha hi -- vi~ayakiiro vahyavi~ayal],

svasamvedcmam tu jfitinasvarupavi~ayam iti " 21

107
So it follows that if objective equiformity (vi~ayakara) is taken as
an instrument, the intrinsic apprehension (svasamvedana) could not
be established to the same cognition because the object having some
content in objective equiformity (vi~aytiktira) is different from the
required content of cognition for intrinsic apprehension
(svasamvedana).

The Buddhist logicians, agam, advocate that cognition which

illumines other objects is by law necessarily illumines itself also.
Because, a real (satta) being itself non-illumined could not illumine
other objects. So a cognition which illumines other objects at the
same time it 1s bound to illumine itself also
(apratyok~opalambhasya narthadrstih prasiddhati)
28
They also hold
that the Mimamsakas have misunderstood the Buddhist concept of
instrument of cognition (pramtif}a). The 'form of an object'
(vi~ayakara) which is supposed to be different from cognition itself,
as the Mimamsakas understood, is not instrument of cognition
(pr.amana), but it is the form of an object as being stamped upon
cognition is taken, though metaphorically only, to be the instrument
of cognition (pramtina) which 1s not different by virtue from
cognition itself and is said to be originate by the same content
(svavidapyarthavin mata). Hence both objective equiformity
(meyarilpatti) as the instrument of cognition (pramti1Ja) and intrinsic
apprehension of cognition (svasamvedana) could go
simultaneously.

The Mimamsakas, agam, argue that cognition, for the

Buddhist logicians, illumines in a distinct or specific way such that
the object in question is revealed to us differentiating it from other
objects. An indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka jfiiina) can't
illumine an object distinctly. Hence, valid cognition (prama}, in
Buddhist system, is determinate or judgmental (savikalpaka) and

108
indeterminate cognition (alocanajfiana) 1s the instrumental
condition (pramii1Ja). Because, determinate or judgmental cognition
logically entails the existence of indeterminate cognition
(visitt!aJficinam vise~anajfianapiirvakam). For example, when one
cognizes 'this is blue' the adjective 'blue' can be predicated only if
the cognition of 'blueness' preceeds that cognition. If such basic
indeterminate cognition ( a/ocanaj fiiina) does not preceed then one
can't ascribe something as blue.

The Buddhist logicians refuted valid cognition (prama) as

judgmental first and then they refuted the instrumentality of
indeterminate cognition also. The determinate judgment (vikalpa-
adhyavasaya), in Buddhist system, can't be valid cognition since it
contradicts with the concept of momentariness (k~anikatvaviida).

Determinate cognition (vikalpa-adhyavastiya) are thought

constructed, hence need subsequent moment for its construction. But
the unique real particulars (svalak~ana) exist only for one moment.
Therefore, the unique real particular no more exists at the time of
judgmental construction. Hence, judgmental cognition (vikalpa-
adhyavasaya) can't grasp the unique real particulars (svalak~m;w).

Could indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka /alocanajfiana)

be instrument-cum-valid cognition ? Dharmakirti answers in a
negative way. Usually it is believed that a determinate cognition
must be preceeded by a:Jil indeterminate cognition where cognition of
pure adjective is directly revealed. But Dharmakirti and his
commentator Prajniikara advocates that there is no need of the
cognition of the pure adjective at indeterminate level. Because,
cognition of adjective (vis"e~a1J.a) is a relative fact in the sense that
its cognition would be meaningless if it is not related with the
substantive (vise~ya).

109
 .
"na hi visesyoparudharupmn antarena visesanatvamnama, .
napi taduparudhatvagraham vina vise~anatvagrahaJJam

tadakaragrahane ca vise.Jyam api grihitam eveti katham

tato viseyadhir apara siidhya syat ? " 29

Moreover, indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka j fiiina) can't

illumine the object in a specific way. The objective difference of
different cognitions can't be ascertained at the stage of
indeterminate cognition (alocanajfiana). It 1s the objective
equiformity (meyarupata) which can only illumine the object
without delay in a distinct way. Thus objective equiformity
(meyarftpata) stands as the basis of determining the objective
difference of cognition.

The Buddhist logicians finally establishes that objective

equiformity (meyarilpata) is the instrumental condition-cum-valid
cognition which IS capable of making a cognition specific.
Indeterminate cognition is incapable of making a cognition specific.
Judgmental cognition, on the other hand, has been denied as valid
cognition. Thus, the status of objective eqauiformity (meyarilpata)
is kept equidistant from both indeterminate and determinate
cognition. This is an inconcievable position. Yet, some Buddhist
loyalists argue that indtrterminate cognition said to be instrumental
'
condition (pramtiJJa) only in the sense that the real source of the
power of makin,g a cognition specific resides in the original pure
sensation. The argument is not tenable, because it presupposes that
the power of making a cognition specific begins at the first moment
and it only explicitly makes a cognition specific in the second
moment which goes against the ontological presuppositions of
momentariness.

110
 One point deserves mention here that the concept of valid
cognition (prama) or its instrument (pramtiiJ.a) are niether the
fundamental category to achieve (nirv'CzJ]a), nor even the
fundamental categories for theorisation, whereas the N aiyayikas
take the instrumental condition for cognition (pramti1Ja) as a
fundamental category for theorisation, but valid cognition (pramii)
is not taken as a fundamental category even for theorisation. Thus
the distinction between instrumental condition (pramii~Ja) and its
result (phala), in Buddhist system, holds good only from the
analytical and logical point of view. It is also advocated that
momentary unique cognition IS of the nature of self-revealing
(sasmnvedanal svaprakasa). Again, as the cognition reveals some
external object (visayonmukhata), hence, the validity or truth of the
cognition is extrinsic (parataJ; pramanya). The validity or truth, for
the Buddhists logicians, can be ascertained only if it leads to
succesful activity (saphalapravrttipravartaka). Thus, the origination
of a cognition can reveal its own bare content which is not vitiated
with mental ascription (kalpana) without depending upon another
subsequent cognition, but whether the content of cognition really
corresponds with the external object has to be determined by another
subsequent cognition.

There are, for the Buddhists, two sources of valid cognition,

viz., perception (pratyak~a) and inference (anumiina). There IS,

agam, a controversy among the Buddhist logicians regarding the

level or status of these two sources of valid cognition. Some
thinkers, like Stchebatsky, hold that the level or status of perception
is higher than inference. Perception, for Stchebatsky, is the source
of valid cognition from the transcendental level and inference is the
source of valid cognition only from the phenomenal level. This
claim arises because Dharmakirti' s definition of perception as that

111
cogmtton which is non-erroneous and free from imagination (tatra
kalpanapocfham abhrlintaml 0 , whereas inference is defined as that
cognition, which is erroneous, and grapes the object through the
mental ascriptions (bhrantam hyanumiinam.
svapratibhiise 'narthe 'dhyavasayena pravrttvatl 1 The Buddhist
logicians, unlike the N aiyayikas who differentiate between
perception and inference mainly in terms of sense.-object-contact
(indriyartha sannikar~a), differentiate between perception and
inference m terms of non-erroneous (abhranta) and erroneous
(bhranta) respectively. Perception, for them, 1s non-erroneous
because it alone can directly graspes the momentary un1que
particular (svalak~aJ}a). Inference, on the other hand, can't directly
graspes the momentary umque particular (svalak~af}a). The
immediate object of inference 1s a concept which is imaginary
(kalpana) and hence, illusory. Concepts correspond to universal
charecterstics. But, this universal is not like the N aiyayikas concept
of Universal which is taken as real, rather, it is imaginarily
constructed by the method of exclusion (apoha). Thus, inference, fot
Stchebatsky, is the source if valid cognition only in the phenomenal
level.

But, Stchebatsky' s claim can't be accepted, because the object

of perception i.e. the momentary unique particulars (svalak~a1Ja) are
not transcendental reality. These particulars are also reals of the
phenomenal level. Liberation (nirVZiJJa) is the only transcendental
reality. Epistemology (pramiiiJasiistra), not only in Buddhist system
but to any system of Indian philosophy, has nothing to do directly
with the Transcendental Reality. So some recent thinkers think that
both perception and inference belong to the same level of the
phenomenal world. The seed of such claim is found in Nyabindu
itself 'samyagjfiiinapurvikii sarvapurusarthasiddhirti tad

112
vyutpadyate az i.e. valid cognition atms at fulfilling all human
purpose. Rita Gupta, therefore, observes that 'objective equiformity'
(meyarilpatii) is the instrumental condition of both perceptual and
inferential cognition . "Both perception and inference", m her
optmon, "acquaint us with the real svalak~ana. Perception does it
directly; inference does it indirectly, through conceptual
constructs" 33 . But this explanation is not satisfactory also. Because,
if it is accepted that both perception and inference acquaint us with
the momentary particulars (svalak~ana), then it goes against the
Buddhist theory of pramiina-vyavasthii. According to this theory,
each and every instrumental condition has its own object which can
be cognized exclussively by that instrumental condition only. The
object of perception can't be cognized by inference and vice-versa.

Finally, the Buddhist logicians may argue that objective

equiformity (meyarilpatii) is the defining charecterstics (lak~al}a) of
valid cognition (pramii = pramiiiJa) arid non-contradicton and causal
efficacy is the criterion for determining the truth of cognition. So, it
would not be right to determine the validity of a particular conition
merely from its non-contradictory charecter and causal efficacy.
Rather, when both the criteria are fulfilled then the cognition in
question could be said to be valid. Even this explanation can't save
the theory from the fallacy of over-coverage (ativyapti). For
example, seeing the reflection of light on a diamond a man runs to
get the diamond and hei gets it. Here both the criteria are fulfilled,
because though he misunderstood 'the reflection of light on the
diamond as diamond', the cognition assumes the form of that
diamond (meyarilpatii) and luckily get the diamond also. On the
other hand, seeing the diamond the other man runs to get the
diamond and gets it. Here, also both the criteria are fulfilled. Hence,
the explanation fails to distinguish between error atid valid

113
cognition. So the Buddhist logicians definition of valid cognition
along with the criterion of determining the truth of cognition can't
distinguish between error and valid cognition. It is the "tadvati
tatprakiiraka anubhava" which alone can distinguish between error
and valid cognition.

***

114
 The Jaina
Concept of
Samyagjnana

The J aina is a haterodox liberation oriented system. The J aina

logicians developed their epistemology extracting different concepts
from different systems and adjusted them with their own ontological
set up. The Jaina logicians, like the Nyiiya logicians, hold that
consciousness is the attribute of the self, but the difference is that
the Nyiiya logicians accept consciousness as the accidental attribute,
whereas the J aina logicians accept the self as a variable constant
through and is of the nature of continuoum running through the
succession of modes in which the cessation of the predecessor is
synchronous with the origination of the successor. Advaitins, on the
otherhand, accept the self (iitman) as the permanent static substance
and the Buddhist logicians denied the existence of self
( aniitmiiviida) and hold that the unique momentary particulars
(svalak~alJa) are the only reality. But, the Jainas hold that the
permanent static substance cannot explain the causal relation of the
changing world. Simil~rly, the Buddhist logicians also fail to
I
explain the causal efficiency, since all the unique particulars
(svalak~ana) are absolutely momentary. So, the J aina logicians
established that the entity where the causal efficiency as a causal
characterstic could exercise would be such that that admits both
sequence and non-sequence (arthakriy5 na yujyaie
nityak~anikapak~ayoh I karmlikramavyarii bhavanam sa lak~a71ataya

mata 34). Though, both the Nyiiya logicians and J aina logicians

115
explain cognition in terms of causal relation, yet the J aina logicians
do not accept the concept of instrumental condition (pramal}a) of
the Nyaya logicians. They argues, on the contrary, like the Buddhist
logicians that it is the cognition itself which is the instrumental
condition (pramaiJa) in its true sense and yet the nature of the
instrumental condition (pramal}a) is not indeterminate (alocana
jlflfiana), rather it is the determinate cognition (savikalpaka j fiana)
which can lay claim as an instrumental condition (pramar;za). Again,
the J aina logicians, specially Hemchandra, agrees with Ganges a that
most of the cognitions are extrinsically valid (parataiJ-pramalJa),
and some cognitions such as habit etc. (abhyffsadasapannajfiana)
are intrinsically valid (svatal;l-pramal}a). Hence, the discussion on
the Jaina view of authentic cognition (samyak;jfiiina) is necessary for
the critical study of valid cognition (prama) in Nyaya. We shall try
to explain the J aina view of authentic cognition (samyakjj fiiina) with
special reference to Hemchandra in this regard.

Valid cognition, in Jaina terminology, is called 'samyal1)niina'

(authentic cognition). The term 'samyak' derives from the root 'a fie'
with the prefix 'sam' (sam + afic). The term 'samyak' means what is
not contrary to fact and 1s indeclinable (samyag
ityaviparTtarthavyam samaccaterva riipam/ 5 . The adjective
'authentic' (samyak) excludes doubt, indecission and error from the
purview of authentic cognition. doubt is not authentic because it
fully touches b.oth thej opposite characters with reference to an
obj~ct which does not actually possess such a dual character. For
example, when someone cognizes 'whether it is a stem of a tree or a
man ?' (sthanurvii puru~o va ?) -- is called doubt. Indecission is
excluded from yhe purview of authentic cognition (samyakJj fiiina)
since it fails to grasp the specific characterstics of its object owing
to distance, darkness and the like. Indeterminate cognition

116
(nirvikalpaka j ncma), the J aina logicians unlike the Buddhist
logicians hold, is a case of indecission since it also lack
consideration of specific characterstics. Error is excluded from the
purview of authentic cognition (samyakpfiana) since in this case one
who cognizes something as having some character which actually
does not exist. Thus authentic cognition is defined as "prakarena
samsayadi vyavacchedena miyate paricchidyate vastutattvam yena
tat pramarzam pramayam slidhakatamaih" 36

Now, the question is : how the authentic cognition is acquired

? The Jaina logicians are of the opinion that it is acquired through
the instrumental condition (samyak artha nirf}ayam pramli7Jam) 37 We
have shown, in our earlier discussion, that there are mainly two
opposite views regarding. the origination of valid cognition I
authentic cognition (prama!samyalyj fiana). Hemchandra, The J aina
logician, partially rejected and partially accepted both the views.
The Nyaya logicians define means of valid cognition (pramar.za) as
causal condition in general (arthopalabdhi hetub pramlil)am). The
Sanskrit word 'hetu' means the causal condition in general. But,
causal condition in general (hetu), for Hemchandra, is the common
attribute of all conditions. Consequently, if this definition is
accepted, besides the sense-organ or sense-object-contact -- the
subject, object, etc. would also lay claim as the causal condition.
But, the subject or object is not the instrument of authentic
cognition (pramlil}a). Moreover, if this definition is accepted then
even a remotely conducive condition lay claim to the recognition of
causal condition. Thus the definition of instrumental condition
(pramlil)a) of the Naiyayikas suffers from the fallacy of over-
coverage ( ativyapti).

The J aina logicians accept the instrumental condition

(pramli7Ja) to avoid any remotely conducive condition as 'the most

117
efficient condition' (sadhakatama) which being present the effect
immediately follows. Now, one may claim that the J aina logicians
accept the Buddhists notion of instrumental condition (pramtilJa).
The Jaina logicians explicitly argue that their notion of means of
authentic cognition (pramtil}a) Is entirely different from the
Buddhist notion of means of valid cognition (pramtilJa) .. The
Buddhist logicians hold that valid cognition (pramti) and means of
valid cognition (pramtiJJa) is absolutely identical. Hence, the
Buddhists explain the origin of valid cognition in a non-causal
manner. The Jaina logicians, on the other hand, endevour to explain
the origin of authentic cognition (samyaf} nana) in terms of causal
relation -- but the causality is not efficient causality and hence it is
not temporal. The determinate (vyavasthapaka) and the
determinatum (vyavasthapya) are not numerically different, but they
are different m respect of function. There IS no logical
incompatibility m the samething being its own determinant
(vyavasthtipaka) and determinatum (vyavasth5pya). Realisation of
the illumination of the object (artha) means 'the determination of it
as the resultant.' Thus, the relation of means of authentic cognition
(pramtil}a) and resultant authentic cognition (samya'9} nana) partakes
of the dual character of identity and difference, and as such it is
consistent with the theory of non-absolutism (syadvada).

Again, the Buddh;ist logicians definition of valid cognition

cum its instrument is ~elf-stultifying. They define means of valid
cognition as that condition which is non-contradicted by subsequent
cognition (pramti7Jamavisamvadi jnfinam) 38 . They also claim that
this instrumental condition (pramarza) is indeterminate in nature
(lilocana jfiana mtitra). But an indeterminate cognition (filocana
j fiana) cannot assert whether the cognition is contradicted by
subsequent cognition or not. It would not be capable of generating

118
 pragmatic consequences. That the indeterminate cognition IS valid
could be cognized only by a subsequent determinate cognition
(savikalpaka jfiZina). Thus, the justification given to prove the
validity of indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka jfiiina), m
Buddhism, is a borrowed one (ylicitakammJdana Nyaya). Again, the
role of determinate cognition for stipulating the validity of a
cognition cannot be denied even by a Buddhist logician. Hence, the
Jaina logicians accept the determinate cognition (savikalpaka j fiana)
as instrumental condition (pramti7Ja).

The aim of authentic cognition (samyak j fiiina) is to determine

authentic object (samyak artha nirl'}ayam pramtilJam -- PM.Siitra
. 2.). Object of authentic cognition (samyak artha), in J ainaism like
Nyaya, is classified under three heads -- viz. what is to be avoided
(heya), what is to be accepted (upiideya) and what is to be ignored
(upek.Janiya). olgnorable (upek.Janfya) in Nyaya, Prof.R.N.Ghosh
observes, could be subsumed under the avoidable (heya) on the
ground of its being unfit for acceptance (upiideya) 39 . But,
Hemchandra, the J aina logician, observes that the ignorable
(upek.JanTya), iil Jainaism, cannot be subsumed under the avoidable
(heya). Because, if the ignorable is subsumed under the avoidable
since it is not acceptable, by the same reason one may subsume it
under the acceptable on the ground that it Is not avoidable.
Moreover, the catego,ry of ignorable has its overwhelming
importance so far as thie ascetics are concerned. Ignorable objects
(upek.JanTya vi.Jaya), for the ascetics, are far greater thanthe
desirable or avoidable objects (na ciinupiideyatvadupek.JanTya heya
evantarbhavati; aheyatvadupadeya eviintarbhavaprasaktel] I
Upek.JanTya eva ca miirdhiibhi:jikto 'rthal],
yogibhiHasyaivaryamiil}atvat II asmcidadinZlmapi heyopadeyabhycdh
bhiiyonevopek.Janfyo 'rthal]; tannayamupek.Jitum k,Jama}J) 40 . But,

119
people other than ascetics have the attitude towards any object
either to accept it or to avoid it. So, whether the objects of authentic
or valid cognition are classified under three or two heads depends
upon the desirability or undesirability of asceticism. Modern
psychological studies reveal that asceticism ultimatly cannot yeild
good result. The suppression of senses or desires in a rigorous way
may cultivate ill mental health and thus it may be a hindrence for
cognizing the true nature of an object (artha). Manikyanandin,
another J aina logician, has not entered to the problem whether
asceticism should be allowed or not. He classified objects under two
headings -- good (hita) and bad (ahita). This classification, in our
opinion, is broader than the earlier one since it can accomodate both
the attitude of ascetic peoples as well as people other than ascetics
towards any object. If this classification is accepted then both the
objects of desirable (upadeya) and objects of avoidable (heya), for
the ascetics, are bad objects (ahita) and the ignorable objects are the
only good objects (hita). Thus, the classification of objects of
cognition under the headings of good and bad is more acceptable
than the other classification. Manikyanandin thus rightly defines
authentic cognition (samyalyiii.iina) as
((hitahitapriiptipariharasamartham, tato jfi.iinam eva tad iti " 41 , 1. e.

an authentic cognition can guide us to do something which is good

and to avoid something which is bad. Good and evil come from the
objects of the world. );,uthentic cognition (samyak;jfi.ana) identifies
I
an object (artha) in its true nature. This revelatory identification
helps the cognizer to accept what is good and reject what is bad.

Now, the question is : how the authenticity of cognition Is

revealed ? Those thinkers who believe that the condition of
origination and the condition of authenticity is the same hold that
the authenticity of cognition is revealed intrinsically (svatafz) and

120
those thinkers who believe that the condition of origination and the
condition of authenticity of cognition are different hold that the
authenticity of cognition is revealed extrinsically (paratal;). The
Jaina logicians hold that cognition itself is self-revelatory. Because
if it is not self-revelatory, it would not be capable of illumining
external objects. But the condition of authenticity is external and
yet there are some cases where the authenticity of cognition is
revealed intrinsically.

On some occasiOns the authenticity is revealed through

external senses such as primal perceptual cognition
( anabhyasadasapannaj fiiina) and in the case of Verbal Testimony
(sabdaj fiiina). The authenticity in the case of primal perceptual
cognition (anabhylisadasapannajfiiina) has not been ascertained at
the time of its origination. Whether such primal perceptual
cognition (anabhyasadasiipannajfiana) corresponds with the
external relevant object or not is ascertained only by subsequent
cognition. The same holds good in the case of Verbal Testimony
(sabdajfiiina). Its unfailing correspondence with the relevant object
is not realisable by itself. Its authenticity is only determined by the
external evidence furnished by verification.

The J aina logician, Hemchandra like Ganges a, again, holds

that although the authenticity of cognition in most cases is
determined extrinsically-, yet there are some cases where the
authenticity of cognition is self-validated. Such for instance is the
case of habitual cognition (abhylisadasapannajfilina) of ones own
palm induced by a repeated course of experience; or the direct
intuition of results by verification offered by such tests as the acts
of bathing, drinking, quench of thirst and like processes. The same
holds good in some cases of inference when all the possibility of

121
doubt of the universal concommitance has been entirely
eliminated. (p ramiil)yanis cay a f:l svata~ yathabhyasadasapanne
svakarataladij fiane,
sniinapanavagahanodanyopasamadavarthakriy1inirbhase va
pratyak~ajfiane na hi tatra parikCikankasti prekavatam, tathahi --
jalajfianam, tato diihapfp1islirtasya tatra pravrtti~, tatastatprlipti~,
tataJ:l snanapiiniidini, tato dahodanyopasama ityetavataiva bhavati
krti pramata, na punardiihodnyopasamajnanamapi parikate ityasya
svata!J pramiil}yam I anumane tu sarvasminnapi sarvathli
nirastasamasta vyabhicarasa1nke svate eva pramal}yam,
avyabhicari/i-ngasamuthatvat; na lingakiiram jfianamlifzgarh vfna, na
ca lifiga /inginam vineti 42

***

122
 REFERENCES

I) "Pramakaraf}amevatra Pramii7Jam tarkapak~avat/ Pram a

cajnatatattvarthajfianamevatra bhidyate/1"-
Mii7Jamayadaya~Pramii1Japa~icchedaft Siitra -3.
Ma7Jameyodaya~-(Prathama Khanda) Sri Dinanath
Tripathi N avatirtha, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research
Series No. CXXXVIII , Published under the anspices of the
Government of West Bengal, Published by the Principal,
Sanskrit College; 1, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Cal-700073.

2) "Ajnatapadenatva jnatavi~ayo~ .
smrtyiinuvadayornirasah.
.
Tatra anuvadanamaPramiiJJyam tarkikadinlim nanumatam.
Vayam tu bruma[l-anuvado hyasthaparicchede vyavahlire
va na purvajinanat kaft;cid vi{e~amadhatte. Ata!z
phalavise~abhavat phaltirtham ca Pramii1Jiiniim svfkiiriit
/.>
sm_rtyiidivadanuvadohapi vah~karya eveti. "-Pramiina~

Paricheda, Sutra -4, P-6. Ibid.

3) "Nanu ajniitavagamasyaiva Pramiitve 'ghatohayam

ghatohayami' iti dharaviihikajnanesu dvitfyadinarfz
a~ramatvam syat. Maivam. Tatrapyayamayam iti
uttarottare~arh kiifiimsaniimajfiataniimavajamiit uttare
k~ane ghatiidisadbhavasya ca purva fniinena anadhi
gatatvat" - Sutra 5 -P. 7. Ibid.

4) "Nanu kiilabhedasyaupadhikatvat
kenopadhinavacchinnanafn kafJiiriisa na matravagama iti
vaktavyam uccyate ... .... "- Siitra -6. P.8.

123
5) " purvvapiirva-jfltinajanitanam
prtikatyanamuttarottarajntinaparyantamavasthanat
6

tadavacchinncmiim kdfams'linam tatratatravagama iti ... " -

Sutra -6. Ibid.

6) ~ .
"Na ca prtikatyabhediinam suksatvat tadavacchinnanaih
katabhedaniimapi suk~a taya duravagamatvamiti vacyam.
Suk~atve kamaladalasatam suchya yugapadabNnnamitivat
sakrdavavuddho ghata iti yougapadyabhimdnapraslimgat.
Iha tzyayam ayam iti punaf} puna~ kramiinaiva
pratiterdhtirtivtihikasvabhavasiddhatvat
,..

yougpadyabhimCinasya virodha eva. Tasmat

prtikafyiibhedaniim kalabhedanam ca na suks.,atvam ". -Siitra
-6. Ibid.

7) But it should be clearly borne in mind that all icchajanya

inferences or knowledge-are not ahiirya. The icchajanya-
jntina as found in the case of riipaka and tarka are the
instances of aharyajfltina. From the above mentioned cases
it is proved that desire may act as the instrument of
knowledge which is called icchajanya jfztina "-The concept
of Aharyajntina in Navya-Nytiya: Some Reflections, Dr
Raghunath Ghosh, JICPR, Vol.XV Number 1. Editor Baya
Krishna. P-89, Sept-Dec. 1997.

8) "Tattvapadena bhramasamlayiidinamayatiJ:arthajnaniinam
nirasah. Tatra ayathcnthajfztiniibhavat
"
tattvapadaJhanarthakamiti prabhakaral] P[iihu'!. Evam hi
teliin matam, idam rajatamityatra idamiti agJ;hitavis~.Jiim
luktisakalam gr.hyate. Rajatamiitram smiiryate. Tayolca
bhedagrah7ll pfir~vartini rajatarthinah pravrtti~. Na tu

124
 iuktisakalasya rajatattvena bhiinamasti iti. Tattujjnanasya
svavi.Jaya eva pravrttikaratva niyamadrajatejnanasyapi

idam vi.Jayatvabhave tatra pravrttirjna sidhyet. Tathli
idameva rajatanjiti samanCidhikarm;zyam tayorbhedapratitim
vTna na sidhyet, ityadidisa nirakaraniyam "-
Manameyodaya.- Sutra -8. Ibid.

9) "tasmiidanyathligrahanarfipabhramiidijniinasadbhavat
tannirasartham . tattvapadam.
Tadevamajnatatattvavagamarilpayab Pram ayah
"
.
karanatvena indriyasannikar1lidinfim .
Pramanatvam
stildham ". Ibid.

1 0) "Iha ca Pramaiabdena lak~m;wj;a tatkJryabhutasya

p raka,tyasyap i pratipadanat
praka_tyarupaPramakaraf}atvena 1nanasyap1
Pramtil}atvain(ahul].. Etiivata ca vayam phalaPramtil}aviidfna
iti giyamahe "- Siitra -9. Ibid.

11) "Tarkikiistu Pramakaral}ani Pramtil}ani,

yatharathlinubhavah Pramii, anubhavas"ca smritivyatiriktam
jnanam iti lak~ayanti. TadanuvadasyaPramarJyasadhanat
tadvyavaratakasya ca padasyatrabhavqbtivyaptam "-
MmJameyodaya'- Pramtlf!a pariccheda~ Sutra 10, Narayana
i
Bhatta .. Ibid.

12) "Anubhuti~ PramtiYJam, smrti vyatirikta ca

sarfividanubhuti~. lti prabhiikara[l. Tadiipi bhramadi[larh
siidhaniit te~amapi smrtivyatiriktatvat tesvativyliptam, kinca
sarvajffanesvapi atma jnanasvariipam vi.Jayath vi.Jaya iti
trittayiimapi praklisate. Sarvatra catmasvatmamsayoh

125
 PramiiJ;Ztvam pratyak~atvamapyastite te~arh matam. Tataca
smrtivyati- -riktajniinasyaiva .
Pramiinatve
smrteratmiisviitmiimsayoraPramanyam,

. Paricchedah- Siitra
syadityavyaptimpyasti iti. "- Pramiina .
11. Ibid.

13) "Avisamvcidi vijnii7Jam pramii~Jam. Avisamvaditvam ca

arthakriyiikiiritvam itL Bouddhah. Tatra
bhutabhabisyadivi>$ayasyanumiinasya
arthakriyiikiiritvabhavat aprtimii1Jyam syat smrtesca
kvacidarthakriyiikiiritvat prtimiil')yam syaditi. " -Sutra12.
Ibid.

14) "Nanu arthakriyiikiiritvamasya arthatohafiviprakar~a

bhavat daivagatameva, na svabhCivikam. Yathiihhub-

'manipradfpaprabhayormanibuddhyabhidhiivatoh.
Mithyiijniinavise~'clwpi vise_oharthakriyiim prati. "
pratyaka-Pramiinamt- Sutra .15. Ibid.

15) " ... vastutastvayam vikalpo mithya

avastubhutasamiinyadivi>$ayatvat, iti cenmeivam.
Anumiinavikalpasyapi <Jl ~ramiil}yaprasangat,

samanyade rvas tu tvasya sadhayisyamanatvacca. A tal)

Pramii1Jeva savikalpakam. "- pratyaks._a-PramiilJ:am. Siitra
15. Ibid.

16) "dhiyo 'msayor ... kintu vyavas thapya vyavas thiipakabhavai:J,

sa ca tadatmye 'pi aviruddha ". Pramar.zuvtirttika of
Dharmakirti with commentary of Manorathanandi, P-194,
Dwarika Das Sastri, Benaras, 1968.
a) {fa cognition is metaphorically called pramiina '~- .J)iO'VI-O.Oo... &t-v
f""x.c..,W"l1 ..> "H,' }<IG<.tf"o-y i, f. 2~,

126
 b) " ......... the beasic identity of pramii and pramiina,
, on
close scrutiny, does not stand as an exclusive feature of the
Buddhist theory of cognition along. The Samkhya-yoga, the
Advaita- Vedanta and Mimiimsakas also despite their
possible disclaimer, finally cannot dispense with this
relation of identity in one way or other"- " The Buddhist
Theory of Relation Between Prama and Pami11Ja" Jurnal of
Indian Philosophy 7 (1979), P 43-78.

17) "sarvasamayahetuvad aka'}am asti nedrscmi I tadbhede 'py

abhinnasya tasyedam iti tat ku!a~. " Prama1Javartika of
Dharmakirti with Bhasya of Prajfiiikara, K.J.R.I., 1953.

18) "sarvasya hi n71ap7tadiviayasya siimcmyena hetuvad akam

na bhedakam" . ibid.

19) "sarviitmiinapi sambandham kascid evagamyate I dharma~,

sa niyamo na syat sambandhyasyavise~ata/;1"

Pramcn;zavarttika of Dharmakirti with commentary of

Manorathanandi, 2/316, Dwarika Das Sastri, Benaras, 1968.

20) sarve~iim upayoge'pi karakancnn kriyam prati I yadantya

bhedakam tasyas tat sadhakatamam mat am. , -
Pv.B.3/312K.J.R.I.

21) "Ya kriyZi yata!J padlirthad I avyavadhcmena bhavati sa

tasyah kCiral)amucyate, I tatascendriylidefz pramitim
pratyavyavahite I siidhakatvabhaviin na pramaram ". -
Prami11Jv'Czrtika of Dharmakarti; with commentary of
Manorathanandi, Tlka on Pv. 213 01, Dwarika Das Sastri,
Benaras, 1968.

127
22) "katham tanhi cak~usa pasyati iti, I karane karyopacarad
evamucyate" -- Pv.B.p.23 K.J.R.I

23) "paricchedaphalatvena vrttasyanantarasya na~ I

pramarzatvam bhavej, jniinepramG.IJe tu parmn phalam ".
Sv.Chow.ed. Pratyak~a p.118.

24) "vi~ayaikatvavat kriyiikarakayo~ svarupabhedo 'pi

lokasiddha eva" Parthasarathi 's commentary on
Sv.P.117, Chow. Ed.

25) "prasuna ca vrk~adeicchidli mrupyamiina I

chedyadravyanupravesalak~af}aivavatisthate,l sa
canupravesafz parasor atmagata eva dharma iti. I
paramiirthataichidayii sahaikatvarh iti nasti virodah" -
kamalasila 's commentary on Ts;P399,G.O.S. Ed.

26) "sasamvittaphalatvam tu tanni{edhG.n na yujyate lprama7Je

vi~ayakare bhinnarthatvam prasajyate ''- Sv. Chow. ed.
p .118.

27) "idam aparam uktam kumarilenaiva :- sasariivedanasya I

ni~edhiit tasya pramG.1Japhalatvam ayuktam, vi~ayakarasya I
ca prii,mal}ye 'sati pramG.YJ:aphaliiyor bhinnavi~ayatvam I
prasajyate, tathli hi vi~ayakaro viihyavi~ayal}, I
svasamvedanam tu jnanasvarupavi~ayam iti "-- commentary
on Ts;P400,G.O.S. Ed.

28) "apratyok~opalambhasya narthadt~!i/;l prasiddhati"

Pramal}aviniscaya, Dharmakartt;

128
29) "na hi vise.yyoparudharilpam antarena vise.sanatvarijnama ,I
nElpi taduparudhatvagraham v1nii vise~iinatvagrahancah I
tadakffragrahane ca viseyam api grihitwh eveti katham I
tato vise~yadhir apara sadhya syat ? " - PrajfHikara's
commentary on the verse of Pv.B.K.J.R.I.

30) "tatra kalpanlipoqham abhriintam "-Nyiiyabindutika, PP.

8-9.

31) "bhrantam hyanumanam.

svapratibhase 'n'Grthe 'dhyiivasiiyena prav,rttvat" -P. 9. Ibid.

32) "samyagjfianapiirvika sarvapuru~arthasiddhirti tad

vyutpadyate" -Nyiiyabindutika, Ch.l, vi.

33) "Both perception and inference, acquaint us with the real

svalak~a!Ja. Perception does it directly; inference does it
indirectly, through conceptual constructs" "Does
'
Dharmak/;lrti Embrace A Pragmatic Theory of Truth in His
Theory of Knowledge ?", JICPR, VOL. XVI, N0.1, Sept -
Dec 1998, P.95.

34) "arthakriyii na yujyate nityak~anikapak~ayol} I

karmakramavydm bhiivanam sa lak~af}atayii mata "-- LT. II.
l.)(XV)

35) "samyag ityaviparftarthavyam samaccaterva riipam"

Pramana Mimamsa Tika on Sutra -II.
~

129
36) "prakarfena samsayiidi vyavacchedena miyate
paricchidyate vastutattvam yena tat pramCI1Jam pramayarh
siidhakatamam" - Tika on Siitra -5. Ibid.

37) "samyak artha nirfJayam. pramaf}am ~ f>, fVL, ~ U-f-r-c>.. 2

38) "pramanamavisamvadi jfianam"- Pv.II.1.

39) "The sense in which upek~abuddhi is admitted by the

Naiyayikas cannot be taken into account fully and I beg to
differ from the Naiyayikas in this respect. An object, I
think is either accepted or rejected but there is no scope for
being indifferent. In my opinion the indifferent attitude
towards an object which is described as upek~a would fall
under the category of rejection (hana)" - 'Some Reflactions.
on the Nyaya Theory of Action', Dr. Raghunath Ghosh,
IPQ, Vol. XVIII. No . .4, October 1991.
\'
\
'
40) "na canupadeyatvadupek~anlya heya eviintarbhavati;
aheyatvadupadeya eviintarbhavaprasaktel] I Upek~anTya eva
ca miirdhabhisikto 'rthah, yogibhis.,~asyaivaryama'!atvat II
asmiidadinlimapi heyopadeyabhyarh
bhuyanevopek~antyo 'rthal}; tannayamupek~itum k~ama!J "--

Pramana Mlmamsa Tika on Siitra -10,

41) "hitiihitapraptipariharasamartham, tato j fianam eva tad

iti "-- ParikamukhaSutra -Siitra 2.

42) "p ramal)yani s cay a~ svatah. yathabhyasadasapanne

svakarataladij ficme,
snZmapanavagahanodanyopasamadavarthakriyanirbhiise . va

130
pratyakajfiline na hi tatra parikaklirikasti prekavatam,
tathahi jalaj fianam, tato dahapipasfirtasya tatra
pravrtti~, tatastatpraptih, latah snanapaniidini, tato
dahodanyopasama ityetffvataiva bhavati krti pramiitfi, na
punardahodnyopasamajficmamapi parikate ityasya svata~

pramiir,zyarh I anumane tu sarvasminnapi sarvathii

nirastasamasta vyabhicarasamke svate eva pramiilJyam,
avyabhicarilingasamuthatvat; na lingakCiram jfiiinamlirigam
vina, na ca /i-nga lingfham vineti "-Ibid Tika on Sutra -22.

*****

131