FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000.]

Spouses LEONARDO DARACAN and MA. TERESA DARACAN ,

petitioners, vs . JUDGE ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, RTC, Branch 48, San
Fernando, Pampanga , respondent.

Atty. Antonio S. Yumul for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

An administrative complaint was filed by complainants against respondent judge for gross
ignorance of the law, oppression, gross partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust order
for having issued a writ of preliminary attachment against properties of complainants-
spouses relative to a guardianship case pending before the respondent judge although
they were not parties in the guardianship case.
Respondent judge explained that he was prompted to issue the assailed writ of preliminary
attachment because complainants-spouses failed to appear despite due notice to oppose
the issuance of said writ in the light of a sworn assertion of the guardian that complainants
were indebted to her wards, who were already senile, to the tune of P5 million.
The Supreme Court agreed with the recommendation of the Court of Appeals Justice, to
whom the case was referred for investigation, to dismiss the complaint against the
respondent judge. For administrative liability to attach, it must be established that
respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive.
Complainants have not adduced proof to show that bad faith attended the issuance of the
assailed order.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST

JUDGES; ACTS OF A JUDGE IN HIS JUDICIAL CAPACITY ARE GENERALLY NOT SUBJECT
TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION, EVEN THOUGH ERRONEOUS; EXCEPTIONS; CASE AT BAR.
Anent the charges of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order, the Court in Canson v. Garchitorena restated the oft-quoted dictum
that: "[A]s a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous. . . . Stated succinctly, for administrative liability to attach
it must be established that respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or
some other motive. . . . The record is devoid of any showing that respondent judge was
moved by ill-will or bad faith in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment. Complainants
have not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that bad faith attended the issuance of the
assailed order. IHTaCE

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF FACTUAL SUPPORT TO SUBSTANTIATE CHARGES; CASE AT

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 BAR. Concededly, administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on
evidence. It needs be pointed out, however, that the liberality of procedure in
administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental
requirement of due process. Indeed, "[T]he Rules even in an administrative case, demand
that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver
offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge. The judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of
its members could be faulted, it should only be after the presentation of competent
evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character." To hold a judge liable for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that the judgment or order is unjust and that it was made with a conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. . . . In short, this Court can not give credence to charges
based on mere suspicion or speculation. For the foregoing considerations, the allegations
of oppression and gross partiality must likewise fall in the absence of factual support to
substantiate the charges.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

On December 18, 1998, the Of ce of the Chief Justice received from the Spouses Ma.
Teresa Daracan and Leonardo Daracan a letter-complaint 1 against Judge Eli G.C.
Natividad, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch
48 for gross ignorance of the law, oppression, gross partiality and knowingly rendering an
unjust order for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment 2 relative to Special
Proceedings No. 4183 entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Guardianship of the
Spouses Lorenzo G. Francisco and Lorenza D. Francisco." 3
The complaint was indorsed to the Of ce of the Court Administrator (OCA) which required
respondent to comment within ten (10) days from receipt. 4
In compliance with the OCA directive, respondent led his comment on May 28, 1998 5
praying for the dismissal of the complaint. Respondent Judge alleges that the writ is the
subject of a petition for certiorari led in the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 46169. Respondent Judge also claims that contrary to the allegations of
complainants-spouses, they were made involuntary parties of the proceedings prior to the
issuance of the writ of attachment by the ling of the Motion to Cite Spouses Daracan for
Examination dated November 21, 1997. 6
The records disclose that in a decision dated March 4, 1998 7 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46169, the
Court of Appeals held that the lower court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the
writ of preliminary attachment since the case pending with the respondent court was for
guardianship and not an action falling under any of the grounds enumerated in Section 1,
Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Court. 8
A petition for review was subsequently led with the Court docketed as G.R. No. 134027
entitled "Ma. Elissa Velez, et al. vs. CA, et al." However, the same was thereafter dismissed
and the decision therein became final and executory on January 13, 1999.
In its evaluation and report dated April 12, 1999 9 the OCA recommended that
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 1.] the case be docketed as a regular administrative case;

2.] the parties be required to manifest if they are willing to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings already led; and thereafter, should
they express their willingness that the same be done;

3.] respondent Judge Eli C. Natividad be declared guilty of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and that he be fined in the amount of P3,000.00; and

4.] respondent be enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the

performance of his duties as a judge with a warning that a repetition of a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

In a Resolution dated June 23, 1999, 1 0 the Court resolved to: a] docket the case as a
regular administrative matter; and b] require the parties to manifest if they are willing to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already led within ten (10)
days from notice.
In a Manifestation dated October 12, 1999, 1 1 respondent judge manifested his willingness
to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already led. However, earlier
in a Resolution dated October 6, 1999, 1 2 the Court considered its Resolution dated June
23, 1999 served upon complainants when the same was returned unserved by the
postmaster with a notation "moved."
In a Resolution dated November 29, 1999, 1 3 the Court noted respondent's manifestation
of October 12, 1999 and referred the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Salvador
J. Valdez, Jr. for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
notice.
Thereafter, Justice Valdez submitted a Report and Recommendation dated April 12, 2000
summing the facts thus:
The spouses Ma. Teresa and Leonardo Daracan charged Judge Eli G.C.
Natividad, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga, with gross partiality and knowingly rendering [an] unjust order, all for
issuing a writ of preliminary attachment in Sp. Proc. No. 4183, entitled "In the
Matter of the Petition for Guardianship of the Spouses Lorenzo G. Francisco and
Lorenza D. Francisco."

The complainants alleged that on November 21, 1997, upon motion of the court-
appointed guardian, Lina Francisco-Velez, the respondent Judge issued the
subject writ of preliminary attachment against their properties even as they are
not parties to the guardianship proceedings. In pursuance of the writ, an order to
break open was issued and, thus, Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of RTC, San
Fernando, Pampanga, forced open their department store at midnight on
November 26, 1997 and once inside, ransacked, looted and appropriated the
merchandise found therein with a value of not less than P6 million without
making an inventory. The complainants furthermore averred that "rumors had it
that the issuance of the writ of attachment was . . . for a consideration." 1 4
Subsequently, on March 4, 1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46169,
entitled: "Spouses Leonardo Daracan and Ma. Teresa Daracan, Petitioners vs.
Hon. Ely (sic) G. C. Natividad, etc., et al., Respondents" declared null and void the
writ of preliminary attachment on the nding that the respondent judge "clearly
exceeded (his) jurisdiction" in issuing it. 1 5 A petition for review on certiorari was
thereafter filed with the Supreme Court but the same was dismissed. 1 6
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 Explaining his side in the instant administrative case, the respondent judge
pleaded 1 7 that he thought all along that under Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised
Rules of Court, he could issue the questioned writ to protect and preserve the
rights of the wards in the light of the sworn assertion of the guardian, Lina
Francisco-Velez, that the complainants were indebted to her wards, who were
already senile, to the tune of P5 million; that even as the complainants had priorly
been cited by the guardian in a motion to require them to appear for examination
as debtors of her wards and against whom she (guardian) had initiated the ling
of six (6) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, they (complainants) did not
appear to oppose the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment; that the
department store of the complainants that the sheriff opened, because the former
had abandoned the same, 1 8 was located at the Franda Mall, a building owned by
the wards; and that the opening of the store and the attachment of the items
found therein, which were all inventoried, contrary to the claim of the
complainants, were done in the presence of a senior police inspector and a
kagawad of the barangay. 1 9 Respondent judge vehemently denied having
committed any fraud, dishonesty or corruption. He put forward the submission
that, if at all, he merely committed an error of judgment and set forth the prayer
that:

WHEREFORE, it is respectively prayed, and considering that the

Respondent Judge will be retiring on November 28, 1999 and who has
reached the age of walking under the shadow of death and has no other
means in life to support his remaining years of his life except the bene ts
he may be given by the government for his duties or services, and for
humanitarian reasons, the case be dismissed." 2 0
At the ensuing investigation, the complainants never appeared despite substituted
service 2 1 and service by mail 2 2 on them of the notices of investigation. Only the
respondent judge appeared and after his oral motion to dismiss 2 3 had been
denied, 2 4 he adduced evidence as heretofore recapped.

Justice Valdez differed with the ndings of the OCA that respondent judge be ned and
warned that similar transgressions in the future would be dealt with more severely and
instead recommended that the charges against him be dismissed for lack of merit,
reasoning thus: IHCSET

Re: The charges for gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering unjust
order or judgment.
Section 6, Rule 96 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court under which the respondent
judge issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction provides:
Sec. 6. Proceeding when persons suspected of embezzling or concealing
property of ward. Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any
person having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as
creditor, heir or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed away any money, goods or interest or a written
instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the
suspected person to appear for examination, touching such money, goods,
interest or instrument and make such orders as will secure the estate
against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
In the leading case of Cui vs. Piccio, 25 the foregoing rule was construed as
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 follows:
. . . its purpose is merely to elicit information or secure evidence
from the person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or
conveyed away any personal property of the ward. In such
proceeding the court has no authority to determine the right of
property or to order delivery thereof. If after the examination the
court nds suf cient evidence showing ownership on the part of the
ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper action.
xxx xxx xxx 2 6
. . . the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to
cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed
property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information
which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to
protect the right of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where property
clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been
judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. 2 7

On the other hand, the respondent judge justi ed the disputed writ of preliminary
injunction he issued in this wise:
The legal guardian led a veri ed Motion To Cite Spouses Leonardo and
Teresa Daracan To Appear For Examination and Manifestation With
Supplemental Motion praying that upon ling of these pleadings a writ of
preliminary attachment be issued.
It appears from the veri ed motion that the spouses Leonardo and Maria
Teresa Daracan is (sic) indebted to the wards amounting to Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00).

That when the said spouses was (sic) was (sic) charged by the ward[s]
through the legal guardian of Violation of B.P. 22, said spouses started
concealing and taking away all the assets real and personal in order to
prejudice the wards and considering that the obligation or indebtedness
was incurred through fraud, they have been concealing and disposing the
property in order to avoid and frustrate the intention of the ward[s] to
attach preliminarily their petition.

It was also alleged that Spouses Daracan are leasing a place located at the
Franda Mall Building owned by the Franda Corporation of which the wards
are the majority stockholders. However, they have been deliberately and by
stealth removing all the wares and goods in the said Samut Sari
Department Store in order to prejudice the said wards, their creditors.

WHEREFORE, a writ of preliminary attachment is hereby issued in this case

in order to stop the further concealment or disposal of the assets of [the]
Spouses Daracan in order to prejudice the wards herein as their creditors
upon [the] ling of a bond in the amount of three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00), let a writ of preliminary attachment be issued in this case
directing and ordering the Deputy Sheriff of this Court to seize all the
personal properties of the Spouses Daracan and/or real estate within the
Province of Pampanga, for safekeeping not to exceed FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P5,000,000.00) until further orders from this Court.

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 SO ORDERED. 2 8

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that, as found by the Court of Appeals, the respondent
judge "clearly exceeded [his] jurisdiction" in issuing the writ. Inarguably, a
guardianship court exercises but a limited jurisdiction that cannot extend to the
determination of questions of ownership. Apart from that, the B.P. Blg. 22 cases
led by the wards against the herein complainants can not be utilized by the
respondent judge as basis for the issuance of the writ simply because the cases
are not before the guardianship court over which he was then presiding. Similarly,
the fact that herein complainants were deliberately and by stealth removing all
their wares and goods from their store to the prejudice of the wards to whom they
(complainants) were indebted to the tune of P5 million is entirely foreign to the
guardianship proceedings; and the guardian's remedy was to institute a collection
suit against the complainants in the proper court and therein apply for a writ of
attachment.

Be that as it may, the mind feels ill at ease to conclude that respondent judge is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law or of knowingly rendering an unjust order. For
it has been held that:
. . . if every error of the judge should be punished, then perhaps no judge,
however good, competent, honest and dedicated he may be, can ever hope
to retire from the judiciary without a blemished record and a tarnished
image. 2 9

I n Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, 3 0 later reiterated in Wingarts v. Judge

Servillano M. Mejia, 3 1 this Court had the occasion to expound on the
nature and the wisdom behind the twin charges of gross ignorance of the
law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. There we declared
thus:
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order
or actuation of the judge in the performance of his of cial duties
must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but,
most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty
or corruption. In the case before us, the administrative complaint
does not even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was
thus motivated.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an
administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under Art. 204 of
the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are: (a) the offender
is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for
decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and (d) the judge knows that his
judgment is unjust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an
unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is,
knowing it to be unjust.

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not

supported by evidence or both. The source of an unjust judgment
may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is
well-settled that a judicial of cer, when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he
commits, provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the
ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that
the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted
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 maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by
hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive. As
interpreted by Spanish courts, the term "knowingly" means sure
knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice.
Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law
does not constitute the crime. cEHITA

The nature of the administrative charge of knowingly rendering an

unjust judgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, in this
particular administrative charge, it must be established that
respondent Judge rendered a judgment or decision not supported by
law and/or evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy,
revenge, greed or some other similar motive. 3 2
True it is that subsequently, the far stricter norm of allowing only permissible
margins of error has been adopted, thus:
We need not belabor jurisprudence to accommodate respondent's
argument which in effect posits that not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction. So we have ruled and so we have acted, but only
in cases within the parameters of tolerable judgment. Where, however, the
issues are so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible
margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which,
hopefully, was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy purpose. 3 3
Only recently, however, the doctrine of bad faith as the ground for accountability
has again come to fore. Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing wrote:
. . . To establish her guilt, it is indispensable that the checks she issued for
which she was subsequently charged, be offered in evidence because the
gravamen of the offense charged is the act of knowingly issuing a check
with insuf cient funds. Clearly, it was error to convict the complainant on
the basis of her letter alone.

Nevertheless, despite this incorrect interpretation of a rule of evidence, we

do not nd the same as suf ciently constitutive of the charges of gross
ignorance of the law and of knowingly rendering an unjust decision.
Rather, it is at most an error in judgment, for which, as a general rule, he
cannot be held administratively liable. In this regard, we reiterate the
prevailing rule in our jurisdiction as established by current Jurisprudence:
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To
unjusti ably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly
unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or
in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge
acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative
sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his of cial
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 capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are suf cient defenses in which
a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.

And in a later case, Mr. Justice Quisumbing was even more trenchant when he
said:
The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing an unjust
judgment, deserve consideration since the direct contempt order of
respondent judge, under the attending circumstances it was issued,
appears to be clearly erroneous. The supposedly contemptuous language
used in a pleading was not submitted to respondent but led in another
court presided by another judge stationed in Cebu literally miles away from
where respondent holds court in Leyte. As this Court ruled in Ang vs.
Castro:
Use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular
judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is
indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the administration of justice.
However, administrative liability for ignorance of the law and/or knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment does not immediately arise from the bare
fact of a judge issuing a decision/resolution/order later adjudged to be
erroneous. Otherwise, perhaps no judge, however competent, honest or
dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an
unblemished record.

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision
or actuation of the judge in the performance of of cial duties must not
only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established
that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like
motive. Similarly, a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering
an unjust judgment one which is contrary to law or jurisprudence or is
not supported by evidence when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or
some other similar motive. Is ne, bad faith is the ground for liability in
either or both offenses.
Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering as unjust
judgment will not prosper against a judge acting in good faith. Absent the
element of bad faith, as erroneous judgment cannot be the basis of a
charge for any said offenses, mere error of judgment not being a ground
for disciplinary proceedings. 3 4
In the case on hand, there is not a scintilla of evidence, not even any remote
indication, that the respondent judge, in issuing his erroneous writ of preliminary
attachment, was impelled by ill-will, malice, revenge, personal animosity, impulse
to do an injustice, greed, corrupt consideration or any other similar motive. On the
contrary, the testimony of the respondent stands out unrebutted because of the
failure of the complainants to appear despite due notice. He declared that he does
not know and had never seen the complainants before. 3 5 He was prompted to
issue the assailed writ of attachment only
Because these spouses Daracan were renting a big store in the Franda
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 Mall owned and operated by the ward[s] who are now senile. That is the
reason why I granted the petition for judicial guardianship. And when they
learned that the wards who are the spouses are no longer handling the
business in the mall, and there's already a legal guardian, they took away
the most valuable items of their big store dealing in dry goods and the
store was then Samu't Sari and they left without paying any rentals,
without paying their obligation amounting to several millions of pesos
padlocked the store and they only left old stocks which are almost
valueless and, in fact, the items seized by the sheriff is (sic) intact in the
of ce of the sheriff and despite the notice issued by the sheriff for them to
retrieve the same in view of the fact that the preliminary writ of attachment
was dissolved, they failed to do so. 3 6
and that
. . . I have been very careful in dealing with this matter as I was on the
verge of retiring at that time. In fact, my last working day fell on November
26, 1999. And on that very day when I attended the last day of my public
service, that was the time that I suffered the heart attack and I was
hospitalized at the Heart Center for two months and until now, I am still
under observation and medication and convalescing from my complicated
disease, because my disease were pulmonary disease (sic). I suffer
pleurisy of the lungs. However, my kidney again functioned so the dialysis
stopped and the only disease now that I am suffering is the lung disease
and the pulmonary disease. That is all, Your Honor. 3 7
The respondent judge furthermore explained that he was of the impression that
the portion of Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court reading "make such
orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment or
conveyance" authorized him to issue the writ of attachment to preserve the status
quo and the real rights of the wards. 3 8
Under the obtaining circumstances, it is apropos to quote Justice Quisumbing
once more: "It ought to be remembered that bad faith is not presumed and he who
alleges the same has the onus of proving it. In this regard, the complainants have
not discharged that burden of proof . . ." 3 9

Re: The charges of oppression and gross partiality .

Similarly, there is no factual support to the charges of oppression and partiality.
And again, this is for the reason that the complainants, instead of presenting
evidence, had played truant from the investigation.

The Court finds the recommendation of Justice Valdez well-taken.

Anent the charges of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order, the Court in Canson v. Garchitorena 4 0 restated the oft-quoted dictum
that: "[A]s a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous." 4 1 In the recent case of Santos v. Judge Orlino , 4 2 we
held:
The fundamental propositions governing responsibility for judicial error were
more recently summarized in In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo . 4 3 There the Court
stressed, inter alia, that given the nature of judicial function and the power vested
in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, administrative or
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 criminal complaints are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial remedies
where such are available, and must wait on the result thereof. Existing doctrine is
that judges are not liable for what they do in the exercise of their judicial
functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. 4 4 Certain it is
that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous
order or decision he renders. 4 5 To hold otherwise would render judicial of ce
untenable for no one called upon to try the fact or interpret the law in the process
of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 4 6 The error must be
gross or patent, deliberate and malicious or incurred with evident bad faith. 4 7

Stated succinctly, for administrative liability to attach it must be established that

respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive 4 8 and as
defined
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud. 4 9 It contemplates a state of mind af rmatively operating with
furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. 5 0
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused
to do wrong or cause damage. 5 1

The record is devoid of any showing that respondent judge was moved by ill-will or bad
faith in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment. Complainants have not, in fact, adduced
any proof to show that bad faith attended the issuance of the assailed order. To reiterate,
bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. 5 2
Viewed vis-a-vis the fact that complainants "played truant to the investigation" instead of
presenting evidence to substantiate their charges, the complaint becomes reduced into a
bare indictment or mere speculation.
Concededly, administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence.
It needs be pointed out, however, that the liberality of procedure in administrative actions
is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process.
Indeed, "[T]he Rules even in an administrative case, demand that, if the respondent judge
should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him
should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. 5 3 The judiciary to
which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be
faulted, it should only be after the presentation of competent evidence, especially since the
charge is penal in character." 5 4

To hold a judge liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment or order is unjust and that it was made
with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. 5 5 In this regard, it is useful to
reiterate the ruling in Raquiza v. Castaeda, Jr. 5 6 which stressed that
The ground for the removal of a judicial of cer should be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is
sought is misconduct in of ce, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. the
general rule in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials apply.

In short, this Court can not give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or
speculation. 5 7 For the foregoing considerations, the allegations of oppression and gross
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 partiality must likewise fall in the absence of factual support to substantiate the charges.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the complaint led by the Spouses Leonardo
Daracan and Ma. Teresa Daracan against Judge Eli G.C. Natividad, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SATDHE

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, p. 1.
2. Ibid., p. 17.

3. Id., p. 2.
4. Id., p. 20.
5. Id., p. 21.
6. Id., p. 50.

7. Id., pp. 44-49.

8. SECTION. 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the
action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have
the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:

(a) In an action for the recovery of a speci ed amount of money or damages, other than moral
or exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or
quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to
defraud his creditors;

(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to

his own use by a public of cer, or an of cer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor,
broker, agent or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in
a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c) In an action to recover the possession of the property unjustly or fraudulently taken,
detained or converted, when the property or any part thereof, has been concealed,
removed or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an
authorized person;
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;

(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property or is about to do
so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or

(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on
whom summons may be served by publication.

9. Rollo, pp. 58-60.

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 10. Ibid., p. 61.

11. Id., p. 98.

12. Id., p. 96.

13. Id., p. 99.

14. Citing Rollo, p. 1.

15. Ibid., pp. 44-49; Exhibit 1-C.

16. Resolution, Velez v. CA, G.R. No. 134027, 24 August 1998.

17. Rollo, pp. 66-93; Exhibit 2.

18. Ibid., p. 84; Exhibit 4.

19. Id., pp. 85-92.

20. Id., p. 72.

21. Id., p. 107 (dorsal side), 113.

22. Id., p. 126 (dorsal side).

23. Id., p. 143; TSN, 23 February 2000, p. 143.

24. Cf. Presado v. Genova, 223 SCRA 489 [1993].

25. 91 Phil. 712 [1952].

26. Id., pp. 717-718, citing Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 478-479.

27. Id., p. 720.

28. Rollo, pp. 82-83; Exhibit 3.

29. Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597 [1994].

30. Ibid.

31. 242 SCRA 436 [1995].

32. Heirs of the Late Nasser D. Yasin v. Felix, 250 SCRA 545 [1995].
33. DBP v. Llanes, 266 SCRA 212 [1997].

34. Guerrero v. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88 [1998]; emphasis and italics supplied.
35. Rollo, p. 154; TSN, 23 February 2000, p. 14.

36. Ibid., p. 155.

37. Id., pp. 155-156.

38. Exhibit 2; Rollo, p. 69;

39. Guerrero v. Villamor, supra, p. 99.

40. SB-99-9-J, 28 July 1999, 311 SCRA 268.

41. Morada v. Judge Tayao, 229 SCRA 723 [1994], citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Judge Villanueva,
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 216 SCRA 121 [1992], citing Mendoza v. Villaluz , 106 SCRA 664 [1981] and Valdez v.
Valera, 81 SCRA 246 [1978].
42. 296 SCRA 101 [1998].

43. 241 SCRA 405 [1995].

44. Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308 [1912]; Act 190, Section 9.

45. Rodrigo v. Quijano, 79 SCRA 10 [1977].

46. See Lopez v. Corpus , 78 SCRA 374 [1977]; Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag , 190 SCRA 834
[1990].

47. Quizon v. Balthazar, 65 SCRA 239 [1975].

48. Guerrero v. Villamor, supra.

49. Spiegel v. Beacon Participation, 8 NE 2nd Series 895, 1007.

50. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966].

51. Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382 [1998], citing Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185
SCRA 346 [1990].

52. Ford, Philippines v. CA, 267 SCRA 320 [1997], citing Chua v. CA, 242 SCRA 341 [1995].
53. Raquiza v. Castaeda, 81 SCRA 235 [1978].

54. OCA v. Judge Filomeno Pascual, 259 SCRA 604 [1996].

55. Naval v. Panday , 275 SCRA 654 [1997].

56. 81 SCRA 235 [1978].

57. Lambino v. De Vera, 275 SCRA 60 [1997].

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