HT of CO2 Fire Extinguisher
HT of CO2 Fire Extinguisher
HT of CO2 Fire Extinguisher
Testing
by
Back to Basics
There occasionally comes a time when the value of old practices and procedures comes
under question. It then becomes useful to 'go back to basics,' to examine the reasons that
underlay the old assumptions, and to re-examine things with a fresh perspective. The
requirement to hydrostatically test Carbon Dioxide (CO2) fire extinguishers affords a
good example of such a basic re-thinking.
With this in mind NAFED in the fall of 1993 conducted a statistical survey of CO2
hydrostatic tests conducted by a number of different distributors located in various parts
of the United States. The intent was to determine what is really going on in the world
of CO2 hydrotesting. The results are interesting.
The data were gleaned from hydrostatic testing logs maintained by all the participating
companies.
Failures come in three categories. Some fail by rupture of the cylinder wall; others
exhibit excessive permanent expansion; still other cylinders exhibit sufficient internal or
external corrosion to warrant a visual failure. Not all participants in the NAFED survey
recorded visual failures in all testing years. Hence the failure rate for CO2 cylinders is
understated in this survey. It is not possible to estimate the degree of understatement, only
to note that it did occur. We will leave to others the task of speculating on the degree of
understatement. <>
Visual Failures
Of those cylinders failing hydrostatic re-test, the largest single cause of failure is visual
rejection (73%). See chart 2. A cylinder fails visual examination when the re-tester,
applying his professional judgment, deems the cylinder condition likely to fail pressure
test, or whose safety in irretrievably compromised. The causes of visual failure include
excessive rust or corrosion, evidence of external welding, cutting, or brazing on the
cylinder shell, or mechanical damage to the cylinder wall. Standard 10 of the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA 10), and pamphlet C-6 of the Compressed Gas
Association (CGA,C-6), indicate a more complete list of qualifying conditions warranting
visual rejection. <>
The second greatest cause of failure is by excessive permanent expansion. When a high
pressure cylinder is subjected to pressure, the interior volume of the cylinder expands.
When the pressure is released, the volume contracts. The difference between the total
volume (under pressure) minus the final volume (no pressure) is the amount of permanent
expansion caused by the hydrostatic testing pressure. Without going into a lot of
exceptions and qualifiers, let us say that this permanent expansion in most cases cannot
exceed 10% of the total expansion. Cylinders with a permanent expansion exceeding
10% fail hydrostatic test. For additional detail on testing, see CGA,C-1.
About 26% of all cylinders failing hydrostatic test did so because of excessive permanent
expansion. Chart 3 indicates the distribution of failure.
Cylinder Rupture
When a cylinder ruptures the cylinder is propelled at high velocity along a destructive
path that often destroys property and life. Shrapnel can sever limps, cause blinding
injuries, and even death. The prevention of cylinder rupture is one of the basic
justifications for hydrostatic testing.
The hydrostatic testing method used during the NAFED survey was the water-jacket
method of testing. Cylinders subjected to test are immersed in a sub-surface water-
jacketed enclosure to minimize danger in the event of a catastrophic breakdown under
pressure.
Fortunately, such failures are relatively few. Only 9 of 86,096 tested cylinders, or
0.00116% ruptured during testing. The survey indicates that 1.06% of the 566 cylinders
failing hydrostatic test did so because of cylinder rupture. <>
The data are clear: steel cylinders are 5 times more likely to fail hydrostatic test than
aluminum cylinders. Chart 4 presents the data in graphical format. <>
If we project from our statistical sample of 86,096 hydrostatic restests we could assume
the following experience nationwide:
But how would such a change alter the number of annual cylinder failures circulating
among the public at large? The answer is not reassuring.
<>In the event the testing interval is changed from 5 to 12 years, no extinguisher tested in
the previous 5 years would require testing for an additional 7 years. We know, however,
that annual testing removes approximately 6,574 cylinders per million from circulation.
For 7 years this figure would increase by approximately 6,574 per million of such
potential failures per year, until we could expect there to be some 46,019 cylinders per
million of potential failures in circulation among the public. Chart 6 provides such
projections for all types of failures.
The inescapable conclusion is that the number of potential cylinder failures would
increase by approximately 700%. The number of cylinders subject to possible rupture
would increase by some 488 per million of circulating extinguishers. Increasing the
testing interval from 5 to 12 years seems hardly in the public interest.
Final Remarks
Hydrostatic testing of carbon dioxide fire extinguishers removes thousands of potential
safety hazards from circulation annually. The effects of mechanical damage, corrosion,
and metal fatigue become cumulative without some process to cull them from service.
Hydrostatic testing at 5 year intervals seems to have served the purpose well.
``1`