Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v.

[2006] 8 CLJ Nandex Development Sdn Bhd 657

A TERRA DAMANSARA SDN BHD

v.

NANDEX DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD

B HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR

ABDUL MALIK ISHAK J
[ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: S1-24-1091-2005]
8 MAY 2006

CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction - Order of injunction - Principles

C
applicable - Whether damages an adequate remedy - Whether damages could
be assessed and ascertained - Balance of convenience - Whether injunction ought
to be granted - Whether defendants conduct such as to disentitle itself from
asking that damages be assessed in substitution for injunctive reliefs - Whether
prejudice claimed by defendant was self induced
D
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Injunction - Mandatory injunction - Whether court
should grant injunction to stop trespass - Mandatory injunction to remove
ground anchors placed on plaintiffs land - Principles to be applied - Whether
case must be exceptional and extremely rare - Whether case must be unusually
E strong and clear - Whether just and equitable to protect plaintiffs interest by
granting injunction - Court to take course that appears to carry lower risk of an
injustice - Whether balance of convenience favours granting of injunction

TORT: Trespass to land - Continuing trespass - Three significant factors -

Entering upon land in possession of another; trespasser continues to remain on
F land; and trespasser placing or projecting any object upon such land - Whether
trespasser must have knowledge of trespass - Whether actionable where entry
made under a mistake - Whether actionable per se without any proof of damage
- Strict liability - Whether inserting ground anchors into plaintiffs land
constitutes trespass - Whether entry beneath surface of plaintiffs land constitutes
G trespass

The plaintiff was the registered and beneficial owner of Lot 55482
(plaintiffs land) on which the plaintiff was developing a residential
project. The defendant was the owner of plots of land adjoining the
plaintiffs land and the defendant was developing service apartments on
H
the defendants land. The defendant admitted that in carrying out its
development, the defendant had caused to be inserted ground anchors
into the plaintiffs land without consent from the plaintiff thereby
constituting an act of trespass. However, the defendant said that it did
not wilfully trespass onto the plaintiffs land. Since the defendant had
I failed to remove the ground anchors, the plaintiff sought a mandatory
injunction requiring the defendant to remove the ground anchors from
the plaintiffs land and a perpetual injunction to prevent the defendant
658 Current Law Journal [2006] 8 CLJ

from further encroaching and trespassing onto the plaintiffs land. The A
defendant claimed that the plaintiff would suffer no loss or inconvenience
by the refusal to grant the injunction as compared to the risk of serious
and substantial loss and injury to property and life if the defendant were
ordered to remove the ground anchors. It was claimed that damages
would be more than an adequate remedy for the plaintiff and that the B
plaintiff should instead file an action for damages arising from the
trespass.

Held (allowing the plaintiffs application with costs):

(1) Mandatory injunctions are never granted before trial save in C

exceptional and extremely rare cases. The plaintiffs case must be
unusually strong and clear and the court must be assured that it
would be just and equitable that the plaintiffs interest be protected
by the immediate issue of an injunction otherwise irreparable injury
and inconvenience would result. The court should take whichever D
course that appears to carry the lower risk of an injustice if it
should turn out that it was wrong to grant the injunction. The
overriding question remains one of the balance of convenience in all
the circumstances of the case. (para 6)

(2) The tort of trespass to land consists of three significant factors. E

Firstly, it is the act of entering upon land in the possession of
another. Secondly, having entered upon such land the trespasser
continues to remain on the land. Thirdly, the trespasser placing or
projecting any object upon such land. In each case, the entry is
without lawful justification. (para 9) F

(3) Trespass to land is actionable per se without any proof of damage

and liability is strict. It is not the law that a man cannot be a
trespasser unless he knows he is one. If the entry is intentional, it
is actionable even though that entry was made under a mistake or
G
the defendant honestly believed that the land was his own or, like
the present case, the land was unoccupied and unalienated or that
the defendant believed that he had a right of entry on the land.
(para 11)

(4) The defendant had caused to be inserted ground anchors into the H
plaintiffs land and that constituted trespass. The trespass will last
so long as the ground anchors are inserted into the plaintiffs land.
Any entry beneath the surface of the plaintiffs land, at whatever
depth, constitutes an actionable trespass. (paras 13 & 14)
I
 Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v.
[2006] 8 CLJ Nandex Development Sdn Bhd 659

A (5) The defendant, through its reckless disregard of the plaintiffs rights
and the subsequent conduct in insisting that it has a better right
over that of the plaintiff as the registered landowner, had disentitled
itself from asking that damages be assessed in substitution for the
injunctive reliefs sought. This was not a case where damages may
B be said to be easily assessed and ascertainable. The ramifications of
the defendants trespass were numerous. In such a situation, the
court has no discretion to award damages in lieu of the injunctions
sought. (para 18)

(6) Any prejudice or oppression contended by the defendant had been

C
brought about entirely by its own negligence. The defendant had
failed to show any special circumstances to establish why the
injunctive reliefs sought by the plaintiff ought not to be granted.
(paras 19 & 20)

D Case(s) referred to:

Ashby v. White [1703] 2 Ld Raym 938 (refd)
Barker v. The Queen [1983] 153 CLR 338 (refd)
Conway v. Wimpey & Co (No 2) [1951] 2 KB 266 (refd)
Entick v. Carrington [1765] 19 St Tr 1029 (refd)
Gregory v. Piper [1829] 9 B&C 591 (refd)
E Heysek & Anor v. Boyden World Corp [1989] 1 MLJ 219 (refd)
Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Co (Of Great Britian And Ireland) Ltd [1957] QBD
334 (refd)
Konskier v. B. Goodman & Co Ltd [1928] 1 KB 421 (refd)
League Against Cruel Sports v. Scott [1986] QB 240 (refd)
Masters v. Brent BC [1978] QB 841 (refd)
F McDonald v. Associated Fuels [1954] 3 DLR 775 (refd)
Morris v. Beardmore [1981] AC 446 (refd)
Ng Yee Fong & Anor v. EW Talalla [1986] 1 MLJ 25 (refd)
R v. Khan [1994] 3 WLR 899 (refd)
Redland Bricks Ltd v. Morris & Anor [1970] AC 652 (refd)
Simpson v. Weber [1925] 41 TLR 302 (refd)
G Sivaperuman v. Heah Seok Yeong Realty Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 150 FC (refd)
Tay Tuan Kiat & Anor v. Pritam Singh Brar [1987] 1 MLJ 276 (refd)
Timbermaster Timber Complex (Sabah) Sdn Bhd v. Top Origin Sdn Bhd [2002] 1
CLJ 566 CA (refd)
Tinta Press Sdn Bhd v. Bank Islam (M) Bhd [1987] 1 CLJ 474; [1987] CLJ (Rep)
396 SC (refd)
H
Turner v. Thorne [1960] 21 DLR (2d) 29 (refd)
Wah Loong (Jelapang) Tin Min Sdn Bhd v. Chia Ngen Yiok [1975] 2 MLJ 109
(refd)
Westripp v. Baldock [1939] 1 All ER 279 (refd)
Willcox v. Kettel [1937] 1 All ER 222 (refd)
I
Winterbourne v. Morgan [1809] 11 East 395 (refd)

Legislation referred to:

National Land Code, ss. 44(1)(a), 384, 385
660 Current Law Journal [2006] 8 CLJ

Other source(s) referred: A

Halsburys Laws of England, vol 24, 4th edn, para 936

For the plaintiff - Maidzuara Mohammed; M/s Logan Sabapathy & Co

For the defendant - Ong Ming Suan; M/s Simon Hue & Assocs

Reported by Amutha Suppayah B

JUDGMENT
Abdul Malik Ishak J:

Introduction C

[1] The plaintiff is essentially seeking in encl. one (1) a mandatory

injunction requiring the defendant to remove from the plaintiffs land all
permanent and/or temporary structures, be it in the form of ground
anchors or otherwise, and a perpetual injunction to prevent the defendant
and/or its agent from further encroaching and trespassing onto the D
plaintiffs land.

The Undisputed Facts

[2] From the relevant affidavits, the following objective and undisputed
E
facts giving rise to the plaintiffs claim may be stated accordingly:

(a) that the plaintiff is the registered and beneficial owner of Lot 55482,
Geran 50059 in the Mukim and District of Kuala Lumpur
(hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs land) on which the
plaintiff is undertaking the development of a residential project (see F
para 4 of the plaintiffs first affidavit in encl. 2);

(b) that the defendant is the owner of plots of land adjoining the
plaintiffs land and the defendant is similarly undertaking the
development of service apartments on the defendants land (see para
5 of the plaintiffs first affidavit in encl. 2); G

(c) that the defendant admits that in carrying out its development, the
defendant had caused to be inserted ground anchors into the
plaintiffs land without consent from the plaintiff thereby constituting
an act of trespass (see para 7 of the plaintiffs first affidavit in encl. H
2 read together with para 8 of the defendants affidavit in reply in
encl. 5); and

(d) despite numerous requests by the plaintiff, the defendant has to date
failed and/or refused to remove the ground anchors (see paras 8-12
of the plaintiffs first affidavit in encl. 2). I
 Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v.
[2006] 8 CLJ Nandex Development Sdn Bhd 661

A The Plaintiffs Entitlement To The Reliefs Sought

[3] As the registered proprietor of Lot 55482, the plaintiff is

statutorily entitled by virtue of s. 44(1)(a) of the National Land Code
1965 to the exclusive use and enjoyment of Lot 55482 including so
B
much of the land below the surface. Without a doubt, the protection of
such a right is beyond dispute. The plaintiffs land is the legal domain
of the plaintiff and no one else. As the registered proprietor, the plaintiff
stands in a better position than others. In Ng Yee Fong & Anor v. EW
Talalla [1986] 1 MLJ 25, Mohamad Azmi SCJ delivering the judgment
of the then Supreme Court aptly said at pp 25-26 of the report:
C
As a matter of law, it cannot be disputed that a proprietor who
establishes a proprietary right is ex-debito justitiae entitled to an
injunction unless it can be said against him that he has raised such an
equity that it is no longer open to him to assert his legal or proprietary
title. Further as stated at p 30 in Kerr on Injunctions (6th edition):
D
After the establishment of his legal right and of the fact of its
violation, a plaintiff is in general entitled as of course to a
perpetual injunction to prevent the recurrence of the wrong
unless there be something special in the circumstances of the
case, such as laches or where the interference with the plaintiffs
E right is trivial.

The onus is therefore on the appellants to establish that there is

something special in the circumstances of the present case why the
learned trial judge ought not to have granted the injunction in favour
of the respondent.
F
[4] So, the onus squarely falls on the defendant to establish why the
injunctive reliefs sought by the plaintiff ought not to be granted. The
defendant advanced the following reasons:

4.1 the defendants ground anchors are below the ground, and start
G
from a depth of 10 metres (approximately more than 30 feet) - see
the averment at para 9 of encl. 8;

4.2 the only building which is to be built on the plaintiffs land in the
area where the ground anchors are would be a water tank pump
H house (see exh. CS2 of encl. 5 and this has not been denied by
the plaintiff);

4.3 to build the water tank pump house, the ground beams would only
need to be at a depth of not more than two metres (approximately
between 6 to 7 feet) below the ground level (see para 8 of encl. 8
I
and this has not been denied by the plaintiff);
662 Current Law Journal [2006] 8 CLJ

4.4 the presence of the defendants ground anchors do not inhibit or A

prevent the building of the water tank pump house by the plaintiff
in accordance to the plaintiffs development plans (see para 9 of
encl. 8 and this has not been denied by the plaintiff);

4.5 the defendant did not wilfully trespass onto the plaintiffs land and B
that the defendant was advised by its project consultants at that
relevant point of time that what is now known to be the plaintiffs
land was unoccupied and unalienated land;

4.6 the utilisation of the ground anchors was borne out of necessity as
the plaintiffs land bordering the defendants land is in the nature C
of a steep downward slope and that the ground anchors are
required to support the contiguous bore-piled wall during
construction (see para 7 of encl. 5);

4.7 the defendant did not deny or disregard the plaintiffs rights when
D
they were told of the trespass nor did the defendant behave
unreasonably or wantonly;

4.8 upon receipt of the plaintiffs solicitors letter, the defendant sought
to meet up with the plaintiff for a resolution of the matter (see
paras 15-17 of encl. 5); E

4.9 the defendant also gave the plaintiff written assurance that it would
remove the ground anchors which were said to be of a temporary
nature;

4.10 the defendant did not insist that the plaintiff has to prove that there F
has been trespass committed by the defendant and this would be
difficult and expensive for the plaintiff to prove because the ground
anchors were imbedded deep into the ground;

4.11 the defendant is unable to remove the ground anchors at this point G
in time because the defendant may run the risk of the contiguous
bore-piled wall collapsing and causing injury and damage (see para
7 of encl. 8) and, consequently, the defendants refusal is not wilful
but rather it is to prevent further damage; and

4.12 the defendant expects to be able to destress all the ground anchors H
in the plaintiffs land by the middle of August 2005 (see para 14
of encl. 5).

[5] Bluntly put, the defendant is saying that the plaintiff would suffer
no loss or inconvenience by the refusal to grant the injunction as
I
compared to the risk of serious and substantial loss and injury to
property and life if the defendant were ordered to remove the ground
anchors now. In any event, the defendant says that it expects to destress
 Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v.
[2006] 8 CLJ Nandex Development Sdn Bhd 663

A the ground anchors in less than two weeks time. For these reasons,
the stand of the defendant is that the plaintiffs application for a
mandatory injunction should be disallowed. At this juncture, it is ideal
to refer to the case of Tay Tuan Kiat & Anor v. Pritam Singh Brar
[1987] 1 MLJ 276. There, at p 279 of the report, Thean J narrated
B the facts and alluded to the law in this way:
The back of the defendants house is less than 10 feet from the
common boundary, and if the retaining wall is to be demolished and
rebuilt, then it will have to be a vertical retaining wall all along the
common boundary with a length of about 100 feet and the cost of
C such works would be considerable. Dr. Lau (PW5) estimated that the
cost would be about $60,000. That seems to me to be a conservative
estimate and probably it would be or could be more than that
depending of course on how the works are to be carried out and the
materials to be used. Even at $60,000 it is a large sum of money to
be expended. The area of the plaintiffs property encroached upon by
D the retaining wall is a narrow strip of land of about 11.8 sq.m. and
even if the existing retaining wall is demolished and rebuilt all along
the boundary but standing on the defendants property the plaintiffs
would gain effectively only this narrow strip of land. The defendant,
on the other hand, would have to incur a considerable amount of
money, and, in addition, because of the close proximity of the
E defendants house to the common boundary, great care would have to
be taken by his engineer, contractor and workers in the demolition of
the existing wall and construction of the new wall; otherwise his land
might slip and his house collapse. In my view, if the mandatory
injunction asked for by the plaintiffs is granted the obligation imposed
on the defendant is extremely onerous and is out of all proportion to
F
the benefit to be gained by the plaintiffs. In my view, it will not
produce a fair result. In Charrington v. Simons & Co Ltd [1970] 1 WLR
725 the plaintiff complained that the defendants in breach of a
negative covenant re-surfaced a tract and raised the level thereof
above that of the surrounding land belonging to the plaintiff who was
cultivating an orchard on his land. The difference in levels of the track
G
and the surrounding land interfered with or impeded the plaintiffs
cultivation on the surrounding land and he brought the action against
the defendant seeking, inter alia, a mandatory injunction requiring the
defendant to remove any part of the track above the level of the
surrounding land. Buckley J who heard the case granted the mandatory
H injunction but suspending it for 3 years, which suspension, however,
was lifted by the Court of Appeal: see [1971] 1 WLR 599. Buckley J
in considering the grant of a mandatory injunction said, at p 730:

Where a mandatory order is sought the court must consider

whether in the circumstances as they exist after the breach a
I mandatory order, and, if so, what kind of mandatory order, will
produce a fair result. In this connection the court must, in my
judgment, take into consideration amongst other relevant
circumstances the benefit which the order will confer on the
664 Current Law Journal [2006] 8 CLJ

plaintiff and the detriment which it will cause the defendant. A A

plaintiff should not, of course, be deprived of relief to which he
is justly entitled merely because it will be disadvantageous to the
defendant. On the other hand, he should not be permitted to
insist on a form of relief which will confer no appreciable benefit
on himself and will be materially detrimental to the defendant.
B
The concept of fair result as one of the criteria in determining the
grant of a mandatory injunction was accepted by Megarry J in Shepherd
Homes Ltd v. Sandham [1971] Ch D 340 where he said, at p 351:

Second, although it may not be possible to state in any

comprehensive way the grounds upon which the court will C
refuse to grant a mandatory injunction in such cases at the trial,
they at least include the triviality of the damage to the plaintiff
and the existence of a disproportion between the detriment that
the injunction would inflict on the defendant and the benefit
that it would confer on the plaintiff. The basic concept is that
of producing a fair result, and this involves the exercise of a D
judicial discretion.

And using that case as a leverage, the defendant argues that where the
plaintiff would suffer absolutely no injustice in the event the injunction is
not granted, damages would be more than an adequate remedy for the
E
plaintiff. For this proposition of the law, the defendant relies on the case
of Timbermaster Timber Complex (Sabah) Sdn Bhd v. Top Origin Sdn Bhd
[2002] 1 CLJ 566 CA. It is further argued that the plaintiff is not
without remedy if it feels that it has suffered a loss as a result of the
presence of the defendants ground anchors in the plaintiffs land. It is
suggested that the proper thing for the plaintiff to do would be to file F
an action for damages arising from the trespass. It is also argued that
the plaintiff merely elects to file an action for an injunction only and that
the plaintiff has not asked for an order for damages in lieu of the
injunctions sought for by the plaintiff in the originating summons in encl.
one (1). It is said that the balance of convenience is not in the plaintiffs G
favour and that encl. one (1) should be dismissed with costs.

[6] Speaking generally, mandatory injunctions are never granted before

trial save in exceptional and extremely rare cases (per Abdoolcader J in
Wah Loong (Jelapang) Tin Min Sdn Bhd v. Chia Ngen Yiok [1975] 2
H
MLJ 109 which was applied by the Federal Court in Sivaperuman v.
Heah Seok Yeong Realty Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 150 FC). The plaintiffs
case too must be unusually strong and clear and the court must be
assured that it would be just and equitable that the plaintiffs interest be
protected by the immediate issue of an injunction otherwise irreparable
injury and inconvenience would result (Tinta Press Sdn Bhd v. Bank Islam I
(M) Bhd [1987] 1 CLJ 474; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 396 SC). It has been
advised that the court should take whichever course that appears to
 Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v.
[2006] 8 CLJ Nandex Development Sdn Bhd 665

A carry the lower risk of an injustice if it should turn out that it was
wrong to grant the injunction (per Chan Sek Keong J, in Heysek & Anor
v. Boyden World Corp [1989] 1 MLJ 219). In other words, the overriding
question remains one of the balance of convenience in all the
circumstances of the case (per Abdoolcader J in Wah Loong (Jelapang)
B Tin Mine Sdn Bhd v. Chia Ngen Yiok (supra)).

[7] The reasons advanced by the defendant to establish as to why the

injunctive reliefs sought by the plaintiff ought not to be granted can
easily be rebutted.
C [8] The defendant makes the claim and claims that it did not wilfully
trespass onto the plaintiffs land. Quite apart from the fact that this is a
clear admission of trespass, the defendants explanation that it had
proceeded in good faith based on the information relayed by its project
consultants that Lot 55482 was unoccupied and unalienated is to be
D doubted when it would have been simple enough to conduct a land
search on Lot 55482 which would have revealed the fact that the
plaintiff is the registered owner of Lot 55482. Surely, it is not that
difficult to conduct a land search. Private and official searches are
permitted under s. 384 and 385 of the National Land Code 1965.
E [9] The tort of trespass to land or what is known as trespass quare
clausum fregit consists of three significant factors. Firstly, it is the act of
entering upon land in the possession of another here it would be the
plaintiff as against the defendant who is the trespasser. Secondly, having
entered upon such land the trespasser continues to remain on the land.
F Thirdly, the trespasser placing or projecting any object upon such land.
It must be emphasised that in each case, the entry is without lawful
justification (Barker v. The Queen [1983] 153 CLR 338, 356).

[10] The personal entry into the land of another constitutes the most
common form of trespass. That unlawful entry may be made by a
G
person or an animal (League Against Cruel Sports v. Scott [1986] QB 240).
Even the slightest crossing of the boundary is sufficient to constitute
trespass. There may be cases where physical contact with the plaintiffs
property would constitute trespass just like the case of Gregory v. Piper
[1829] 9 B&C 591 where a single stone had been put against the wall
H it would have been sufficient. Trespass would also occur when a
surveillance device is affixed to the wall of the house (R v. Khan [1994]
3 WLR 899, 905).

[11] Trespass to land is actionable per se without any proof of damage

I (Ashby v. White [1703] 2 Ld. Raym 938). And liability is certainly strict.
According to the case of Entick v. Carrington [1765] 19 St. Tr. 1029,
1066: Every invasion of property, be it so minute, is a trespass. It is
not the law that a man cannot be a trespasser unless he knows he is
666 Current Law Journal [2006] 8 CLJ

one (Conway v. Wimpey & Co. (No: 2) [1951] 2 KB 266, 273). If the A
entry is intentional, it is actionable even though that entry was made
under a mistake or the defendant honestly believed that the land was
his own or, like the present case, the land was unoccupied and
unalienated or that the defendant believed that he had a right of entry
on the land. In Morris v. Beardmore [1981] AC 446, the House of Lords B
re-asserted the fundamental right of privacy of the home.

[12] Examples of trespass are abound. Thus, it would be trespass to

place any thing upon the plaintiffs land like the case of Turner v. Thorne
[1960] 21 DLR (2d) 29 where parcels were delivered in error. It would
C
also be trespass to cause any physical object or noxious substance into
the house of another like the case of McDonald v. Associated Fuels [1954]
3 DLR 775 where the court held that blowing carbon monoxide into a
house constituted trespass. Just to cross the boundary of another
persons land constitutes trespass. It is also trespass to cause a Virginia
creeper to grow upon on the boundary as found by the court in Simpson D
v. Weber [1925] 41 TLR 302. Likewise, it is also trespass if one were
to lean a ladder at the boundary or place planks at the boundary or put
up a shed at the boundary or even to pile rubbish against the boundary
as exemplified in the case of Westripp v. Baldock [1939] 1 All ER 279.
E
[13] Here, the defendant had caused to be inserted ground anchors into
the plaintiffs land and that constitutes trespass. It is a trespass that will
last so long as the ground anchors are inserted into the plaintiffs land
and it gives rise to actions de die in diem - for so long as it lasts, and
it is sufficiently obvious (Winterbourne v. Morgan [1809] 11 East 395,
F
405). A trespass of this nature will only abate once the defendant
removes the ground anchors. It is a continuing trespass and successive
actions will lie from day to day until the ground anchors are removed
and in each action damages (unless awarded in lieu of an injunction:
Masters v. Brent BC [1978] QB 841) are assessed up to the date of the
action. But it must be borne in mind that more than one action will not G
lie on the same cause of action. Consequently, all damages resulting
from the same cause of action must be recovered at one and the same
time. This is a simple rule and it is designed to prevent the oppressive
and vexatious litigation that might arise, if say, an injured person were
at liberty to divide his claim and sue for successive actions for different H
portions of the loss sustained from a single cause of action. It seems
that if things are placed on the land with leave and under licence and
are not removed within a reasonable time after the licence is withdrawn,
a continuing trespass is said to be committed (Konskier v. B Goodman &
Co Ltd [1928] 1 KB 421). I
 Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v.
[2006] 8 CLJ Nandex Development Sdn Bhd 667

A [14] In my judgment, the defendants conduct leaves much to be

desired. While recognising that the plaintiff is the registered owner of
Lot 55482, the defendant seeks to assert as a matter of right that the
ground anchors should remain. The defendant must be advised that any
entry beneath the surface of the plaintiffs land, at whatever depth,
B constitutes an actionable trespass. In Willcox v. Kettel [1937] 1 All ER
222, an intrusion of concrete foundation by twenty (20) inches was held
to constitute trespass. The defendant adopts a nonchalant attitude and
seeks to trivialise the plaintiffs plans of constructing a water tank pump
house on the border of Lot 55482 where the defendant had trespassed
C
by inserting the offending ground anchors. In short, the defendant seeks
to claim a higher right, qua trespasser, over that of the plaintiff as the
registered land owner. That cannot certainly be right. This is not the
case where it can be objectively said that the defendant had accidentally
invaded the plaintiffs rights. Now, putting the defendants case at its
highest point, the failure of the defendant to carry out a land search is
D
indicative of a reckless disregard, and not merely an accidental invasion,
of the rights of the plaintiff as the registered owner of Lot 55482. And
at its lowest end, the defendants stand would be this. That
notwithstanding its claims of innocent trespass, nevertheless the
defendant proceeds to make a calculated decision to remain in trespass
E by weighing its benefits of continuing in trespass against the rights of
the plaintiff to exclusive use and enjoyment of Lot 55482. Without a
doubt, the defendant recognises that it has committed trespass on the
plaintiffs land. And instead of picking the correct remedial action by
removing the ground anchors, the defendant seeks to justify and entrench
F its position by insisting that it has a better right over Lot 55482 than
the plaintiff. In such a situation, it is not open to the defendant to
trivialise the harm suffered by the plaintiff in an attempt to avoid the
grant of the mandatory and perpetual injunctions by this court. In this
regard and towards this end, the following authorities are certainly
G instructive.

[15] In Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris And Another [1970] AC 652, HL,
Lord Upjohn writing for the House of Lords aptly said at p 666 of the
report:

H (a) where the defendant has acted without regard to his neighbours
rights, or has tried to steal a march on him or has tried to evade the
jurisdiction of the court or, to sum it up, has acted wantonly and quite
unreasonably in relation to his neighbour he may be ordered to repair
his wanton and unreasonable acts by doing positive work to restore
the status quo even if the expense to him is out of all proportion to
I the advantage thereby accruing to the plaintiff. As illustrative of this
see Woodhouse v. Newry Navigation Co. [1898] 1 IR 161.
668 Current Law Journal [2006] 8 CLJ

[16] In Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Co. (Of Great Britian And Ireland) Ltd. A
[1957] QBD 334, McNair J, succinctly said at pp 346-347 of the
report:
There may also be cases in which, though the four above-mentioned
requirements exist, the defendant by his conduct, as, for instance,
hurrying up his buildings so as if possible to avoid an injunction, or B
otherwise acting with a reckless disregard to the plaintiffs rights, has
disentitled himself from asking that damages may be assessed in
substitution for an injunction.

I have no doubt at all that I have a discretion here which I have to

exercise judicially to award damages in lieu of an injunction if I see fit. C
It is true that the injury to the plaintiffs legal rights in this case is
small. It has already been stated that this sign in his airspace does him
no harm and does not diminish his enjoyment. I doubt whether it is a
case in which one can estimate the damage in terms of money,
because the damages really, if estimated at all, would have to be stated
D
to be nominal. But I cannot find that it would be in any way oppressive
to the defendants to grant an injunction. It is true that considerable
expense, stated to be some 220, was incurred some seven years ago
in erecting this sign, but I have no evidence at all as to whether the
defendant company have not had good value for that expenditure. I
do know that another cigarette manufacturing company are apparently E
prepared to pay the plaintiff 75 a year for a smaller advertisement in
a less prominent position. Furthermore, I think it is relevant here that
the defendants throughout the case have been insisting upon the right
to display this advertisement as a matter of right. I think that is a
circumstance which the court is entitled to take into account in
determining whether a small money payment with a declaration of F
right should be sufficient or whether an injunction should be granted.
Cases in which an injunction has not been granted on the ground of
hardship have, I believe, been mostly cases in which there has been
some accidental invasion of the plaintiffs rights. I was referred by Mr.
Lawson to Goodson v. Richardson [1874] LR 9 Ch 221, where a strong
Court of Appeal certainly held that the mere fact that the invasion of G
the highway in that case did not cause any serious damage to the
owner of the highway did not disentitle him from an injunction. I am
further impressed by this fact, that if I refuse to grant an injunction in
this case there is nothing to prevent the defendant company from
continuing to display this sign and leave it to the plaintiff again to put
forward a subsequent claim for damages in a further action. If I were H
to decide that an appropriate remedy would be a small money payment
of nominal damages, I would be, in effect, saying that although such
implied licence, if any, as the defendants have has been determined,
nevertheless the defendants are entitled to continue to display their
sign.
I
 Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v.
[2006] 8 CLJ Nandex Development Sdn Bhd 669

A In my judgment, bearing in mind that both parties have in pursuance

of what they claimed to be their business interests attempted to bring
commercial pressure to bear one upon the other, this is a proper case
in which the court should direct that there should be a mandatory
injunction that this sign be removed forthwith.

B [17] Halsburys Laws of England, vol. 24, 4th edn, para 936 carries the
following write-ups:
The power of awarding damages in lieu of an injunction is discretionary
and must be exercised with an intimate knowledge of the facts and so
as to prevent people being compelled to sell property against their will
C at a valuation. Moreover, a defendant must not be encouraged to
believe that he may do a wrongful act on the payment of a given sum
in terms of money. Where a breach of an express covenant is
committed, either by the original covenantor or by an assignee who is
bound by it, and causes substantial damage, the court has no
discretion to award damages in lieu of an injunction. The question
D whether the defendant knew that he was wrong is of importance. His
conduct may be a determining factor in deciding whether to grant an
injunction or damages.

[18] It can be surmised that the defendant, through its reckless

disregard of the plaintiffs rights and the subsequent conduct in insisting
E
that it has a better right over that of the plaintiff as the registered
landowner, has disentitled itself from asking that damages be assessed
in substitution for the injunctive reliefs sought. In my judgment, this is
not a case where damages may be said to be easily assessed and
ascertainable without evidence being led. The ramifications of the
F defendants trespass are numerous including but not limited to delay
involved in re-planning and seeking the necessary approvals for the re-
location of the water pump house for which damages are not easily
ascertainable. Even if it were to be argued by the defendant that
damages are ascertainable, such damages would be substantial as it
G would involve the delay in the completion of the plaintiffs development
which may further lead to claims by disgruntled end purchasers. In such
a situation, the court clearly has no discretion to award damages in lieu
of the injunctions sought.

[19] An overriding factor that has to be taken into account is the fact
H
that any prejudice or oppression contended by the defendant has been
brought about entirely by its own reckless disregard and/or negligence
in failing to carry out the proper land searches to ascertain the lawful
ownership of Lot 55482. Had the defendant done so, the situation today
would be different as this court would not have to consider encl. one
I (1). The law should not encourage trespassers especially a reckless
trespasser like the defendant who believes that having entrenched its
position, it stands to gain a better right over that of the registered
landowner like the plaintiff here.
670 Current Law Journal [2006] 8 CLJ

Conclusion A

[20] The plaintiff is clearly entitled, as a matter of right, to the

injunctive reliefs as prayed for in encl. one (1). The defendant has failed
to show any special circumstances to establish why the injunctive reliefs
sought by the plaintiff ought not to be granted. B
[21] Indeed, it is quite apparent from the facts, that by its conduct the
defendant has disentitled itself from opposing the grant of the injunctions
on the ground that damages should be awarded in lieu thereof. This
court cannot remain idle. The law cannot and should not be seen to be
assisting the recalcitrant defendant, who notwithstanding its acceptance C
of the trespass committed by itself, proceeds to remain in trespass upon
a calculation of the benefits to be gained from that trespass against the
rights of the plaintiff as the registered landowner. I must, accordingly,
give an order in terms of encl. one (1) with costs to be paid by the
defendant to the plaintiff. D