Kurtz, J. H. - Sacrificial Worship of The OT (1863) PDF

SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP
OF
THE OLD TESTAMENT
BY
J. H. KURTZ, D. D.
PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AT DORPAT.

AUTHOR OF HISTORY OF THE OLD COVENANT."
TRANSLATED BY
JAMES MARTIN, B.A.,
NOTTINGHAM.
EDINBURGH:
T & T. CLARK. 38 GEORGE STREET
LONDON: HAMILTON, ADAMS, & CO. DUBLIN: J. ROBERTSON & CO.
MDCCCLXIII.
Digitally prepared and posted on the web by Ted Hildebrandt (2004)

Public Domain.
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PREFACE.
TWENTY years have passed since I was prompted by the appear-

ance of Bahr's Symbolik to publish my work on Das Mosaische
Opfer, Mitau 1842." As this work was sold off in the course of
a few years, I cherished the desire and intention of meeting the
questions that were continually arising, by preparing a new edition,
as soon as I should have finished another work which I had then
in hand. But the longer this task was postponed, the greater the
obstacles to its execution appeared. For year after year writings
upon this subject were constantly accumulating, which for the most
part were strongly opposed to the standpoint and results of my
own work, both in their fundamental view and in their interpretation
of various details. These writings had also shown me much that
was weak and unsatisfactory in my own work, particularly in the
elaboration of the separate parts; though opposition had only con-
vinced me more and more of the entire correctness of my earlier
opinions, which were no other than the traditional and orthodox
views. But this did not render me insensible to the fact, that if
the work was to be taken up again, it must be in the form of a
thoroughly new book. On the former occasion I had simply to
overthrow the views of one single opponent, which were as unscrip-
tural as they were unorthodox, and to raise by the side a new
edifice upon the old, firm foundation of the Church. Now, on the
contrary, not only is there a whole forest of opposing standpoints
and opinions to be dealt with, that differ quite as much from one
another, as they do from the view which I have advocated; but
8 PREFACE.
so many breaches have been made in the edifice erected by me,

that simply repairing the injured and untenable posts is quite out
of the question, and it is much better to pull down the old building
altogether and erect a new one in its place. The foundation,
indeed, still remains the same, and many of the stones formerly
employed prove themselves still sound; but even these require
fresh chiselling, and such as are not usable have to be laid aside
for new ones.
For so extensive a work, however, I could find neither time nor
leisure, especially as my studies lay in other directions, in conse-
quence of a change that had taken place in the meantime in my
official post and duties. It was not till a year and a half ago,
when my academical labours led once more in the direction of Bibli-
cal Antiquities, that I had to enter ex professo into the Sacrificial
Worship of the Old Testament. With this there arose so strong a
desire to work once more at the subject with a view to publication,
and thus, so to speak, to wipe off old debts, that I could not refrain
any longer. Hence the present volume, which has assumed a
totally different form from the earlier one, and therefore is to be
regarded as an entirely new and independent work.
Thomasius, when speaking of the Old Testament Sacrifices in
his well-known work on Scripture Doctrines (III. 1, p. 39), says:
It ought, indeed, to be possible to appeal in this case to the con-
sensus of expositors; but how widely do the views of modern writers
differ from one another as to the meaning of this institution! It
seems to me, however, that there are but a few prominent points of
Biblical Theology in which such a demand can possibly be made,
and in this point perhaps least of all. Yet there is certainly hardly
any other case, in which the complaints that are made as to the con-
fusion of contradictory views are so perfectly warranted as they are
here. How widely, for example, are theologians separated, who
PREFACE. 9
generally stand closest together when questions relating to the

Church, the Bible, or Theology are concerned, e.g., Hofmann and
Baumgarten, Delitzsch and Kliefoth, Oehler and Keil! To what an
extent doctrinal standpoints, that are in other respects the most op-
posed, may be associated here, is evident from the fact, that in an-
swering the most essential and fundamental question of all, viz.,
whether the slaughtering of the expiatory sacrifice had the signifi-
cation of a poena vicaria, it is possible for me to stand by the side,
not of Hofrnann, Keil, Oehler, and Delitzsch, but of Gesenius, De
Wette, and Knobel.
In this state of affairs, a monograph upon this subject would not
be complete, without examining the theories of opponents, however
great their confusion may frequently be, as well as building up one's
own. Even where there is so little agreement, so little common
ground, and on the other hand, so much opposition in details and
in general principles, in the foundation as well as in the superstruc-
ture, it appears to me to be the duty of an author towards his
readers, not only to tell them his own views and to defend them by
rebutting unwarrantable and unsuccessful attacks, but to give them
a full explanation of the opposite views, and his reason for not adopt-
ing ing them, in order that they may be placed in circumstances to
survey the whole ground of the questions in dispute, and to form
their own independent judgment, even though they may be led to
differ from the views and conclusions of the author himself.
My reason for giving a secondary title to this book,1 by which
1
The present volume is published in the original with two separate title-
pages. One is the title prefixed to this Translation; the other, "History of the
Old Covenant; Supplement to the second volume: The Giving of the Law; Part
I. The Law of Worship." As the author expressly states that he has written this
as an independent work, there was no necessity to publish the second title-page
in the English Translation. The reader will be able to assign it to its proper
connection with the " History of the Old Covenant."--TR.
10 PREFACE.
I connect it with my History of the Old Covenant, is the follow-

ing:--According to the original plan of that work, the second
volume, which describes the historical circumstances of the Mosaic
age, was to be followed by a systematic account of the Mosaic laws.1
But I had not the time to carry out the present work on so exten-
sive a scale. Moreover, as I have already stated, it has not arisen
from the necessity for going on with the work just mentioned (a
necessity which unquestionably does press most powerfully upon
me), but from the necessity for returning to a subject upon which
I had already written twenty years ago, and which had been taken
up since from so many different points of view, in order that I
might remove such faults and imperfections in my former work as
I had been able to discover, and avail myself of new materials for
establishing and elaborating my views. At the same time, by the
publication of this volume, the substance of which was to have
formed an integral part of my larger work, I have precluded the
possibility of carrying out the latter upon the plan originally pro-
posed. I have thought it desirable, therefore, that the third volume
of that work should continue the history itself (as far as the estab-
lishment of the kingdom); and that the present volume should
appear as the first part of a supplementary work, embracing the
various parts of the Mosaic legislation.
1
This plan is referred to at vol. ii. p. 328 of the original, vol. iii. p. 102 of
the English Translation.--TR.
`
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
BOOK I.
GENERAL BASIS OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP OF THE

OLD TESTAMENT.
Page
CHAPTER I. The Persons Sacrificing, 18
A. 1-5. The People, 18
B. 6-9. The Priests, 33
,, II. 10-16. The Place of Sacrifice, 39
III. 17-25. The Various Kinds of Sacrifice, 51
BOOK II.
THE BLEEDING SACRIFICE.
PART I.
THE RITUAL OF THE SACRIFICE.
CHAPTER I. 27-30. The Notion of Expiation, 66
II. 31-34. The Objects used in Sacrifice, 75
III. 35-47. The Presentation and Laying on of Hands, 82
IV. 48-71. Slaughtering, and Sprinkling of the Blood, 101
V. 72-84. Burning of the Sacrifice, and the Sacrificial Meal, 150

12 TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PART II.
VARIETIES OF THE BLEEDING SACRIFICE.

Page
CHAPTER I. Distinguishing Characteristics of the Bleeding Sacrifice, 174
A. 85-88. The Sin-Offering, Burnt-Offering, and Peace-

Offering, 174
B. 89-92. The Common Basis of the Sin-Offering and

Trespass-Offering, 182
C. 93-105. The Difference between the Sin-Offering and

the Trespass-Offering, 189
II. 106-122. Ritual of the Sin-Offering and Trespass-Offering, 213
,, III. 123-139. Ritual of the Burnt-Offering and Peace-Offer-

ing, 249
BOOK III.
THE BLOODLESS SACRIFICE.
CHAPTER I. 140-146. Material of the Bloodless Sacrifice, 281
II. 147-157. The Minchah of the Fore-Court, 296
,, III. 158-161. The Minchah of the Holy Place, 315
BOOK IV.
MODIFICATION OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP IN CONNECTION

WITH SPECIAL SEASONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.
CHAPTER I. The Consecration of the People, the Priests, and the Levites, 322
A. 162-164. Covenant Consecration of the People, 322
B. 165-172. Consecration of the Priests and the Sanc-

tuary, 328
C. 173. Consecration of the Levites, 340

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 13
Page
CHAPTER II. Adaptation of the Sacrificial Worship to Special Seasons
and Feasts, 341
A. 174-176. Mosaic Idea of a Feast, 341
B. 177-179. Daily, Weekly, and Monthly Service, 348
C. 180-189. The Feast of Passover, 355
D. 190-193. The Feast of Pentecost. 376
E. 194-196. The Feast of Tabernacles, 381
F. 197-212. The Day of Atonement, 385
,, III. Adaptation of the Sacrificial Worship to the Levitical and

Priestly Purifications, 415
A. 213-216. Nature and Idea of Uncleanness in connec-

tion with Worship, 415
B. 217-223. Removal of Uncleanness caused by Touch-

ing a Corpse, 422
C. 224-228. Cleansing of a Leper when Cured, 432
IV. Adaptation of the Sacrificial Worship to certain Peculiar

Circumstances, 440
A. 229-230. Presentation of the First-Born of Cattle, 440
B. 231-233. The Nazarite's Offering, 443
C. 234-237. The Jealousy Offering, 447

LIST OF WORKS
MOST FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO.
BAEHR, K. CHR. W. F., Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus. 2 Bde. Heidelb.

1837, 39.
----- Der salomonische Tempel. Karlsruhe 1848.
BAUMGARTEN, M., Theologischer Commentar zum Pentateuch. Zweiter Bd.
Kiel 1844.
BUNSEN, CHR. C. J., Vollstandiges Bibelwerk. Erster Bd. Leipzig 1858.
DELITZSCH, FR., Commentar zum Hebraerbrief. Leipzig 1857.
----- System der biblischen Psychologie. Leipzig 1855.
DIESTEL, Set-Typhon, Asahel and Satan. In Niedner's Zeitschrift fur histor.
Theologie. 1860. Heft ii.
EBRARD, J. H. A., Die Lehre von der stellvertretenden Genugthuung. Konigsb.
1857.
EWALD, H., Die Alterthumer des Volkes Israel. 2. Aufl. Gottingen 1854.
FUERST, J., Hebraisches and Chaldaisches Handworterbuch. Leipzig 1857 ff.
GESENIUS, Thesaurus philol. crit. lingua Hebr. et Chald. Lipsiae 1835 sqq.
HAEVERNICK, Vorlesungen uber die Theologie des A. T., herausg. von H. A.
Hahn. Erlangen 1848.
HENGSTENBERG, E. W., Die Opfer der heil. Schrift. Ein Vortrag. Berlin 1852.
----- Das Passa. Evangel. Kirchenzeitung. Jahrg. 1852. No. 16-18.
----- Das Ceremonialgesetz. In his Beitrage zur Einleit. ins A. Test. Bd. iii.
Berlin 1839. (Dissertations on the Pentateuch, 2 vols. Translated
by Ryland. Clark 1847.)
-----Die Bucher Mose's and Aegypten. Berlin 1841. (Egypt and the Books
of Moses. Clark 1845.)
HOFMANN, J. CAR. K. VON, Der Schriftbeweis. Zweite Halfte, erste Abth. 2
Aufl. Nordlingen 1859.
----- Weissagung and Erfullung. Nordlingen 1841.
KAHNIS, K. F. A., Lutheriscbe Dogmatik. Bd. i. Leipzig 1862.
16 LIST OF WORKS MOST FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO.
KARCH, G., Die mosaischen Opfer als vorbildliche Grundlage der Bitten im
Vaterunser. 2 Theile. Wurzburg 1856 f.
KEIL, K. FR., Handbuch der bibl. Archaologie. Erste Halfte: Die gottesdienst-
lichen Verhaltnisse der Israeliten. Frankfurt 1858.
----- Die Opfer des A. Bundes nach ihrer symbolischen and typischen Bedeu-
tung. Luth. Zeitscbrift 1856, iv., 1857, i. ii. iii.
----- Biblischer Commentar uber die Bucher Mose's. Bd. i. Gen. and Exod.
Leipzig 1861.
KLIEFOTH, TH., Liturgische Abhandlungen. Bd. iv. Auch u.. d. Titel: Die
ursprungl. Gottesdienstordnung u. s. w. Bd. i. 2 Aufl. Schwerin
1858.
KNOBEL, A., Die Bucher Exodus and Leviticus erklart. Leipzig 1857.
----- Die Bucher Numeri, Deuteron. and Josua erklart. Leipzig 1861.
NEUMANN, W., Die Opfer des alten Bundes. Deutsche Zeitschr. fur christl.
Wissenschaft von Schneider. Jahrg. 1852, 1853. r i
-----Sacra V. T. Salutaria. Lipsae 1854.
OEHLER, Der Opfercultus des Alten Test. In Herzog's theolog. Realencyclop.
Bd. x. Gotha 1858.
----- Priesterthum im A. Test. Bd: xii. Gotha 1860.
OUTRAM, G., De sacrificiis 11. 2. Amstelod. 1678.
RIEHM, E., Ueber das Schuldopfer. Theol. Studien and Kritiken. 1854.
RINCK, S. W Ueber das Schuldopfer. Theol. Studien and Kritiken. 1855.
SCHOLL, G. H. F., Ueber die Opferidee der Alten, insbesondere der Juden. In
the Studien der evangel. Geistlichkeit Wurtembergs. Bd. iv. Heft
1-3. Stuttgart 1832.
SCHULTZ, FR. W., Das Deuteronomium erklart. Berlin 1859.
SOMMER, J. G., Biblische Abhandlungen. Bd. i. Bonn 1846. Vierte Abbandl.:
Rein and Unrein nach dem mosaisch. Gesetze S. 183 ff.
STEUDEL, J. CHR. FR., Vorlesungen uber die Theologie des A. Test. herausg.
von G. Fr. Oehler. Berlin 1840.
STOECKL, A., Das Opfer, each seinem Wesen and seiner Geschichte. Mainz
1860.
THALHOFER, V., Die unblutigen Opfer des mosaischen Cultus. Regensburg
1848.
THOLUCK, A., Das alte Testament im neuen Testament. 5 Aufl. Gotha 1861.
THOMASIUS, G., Christi Person and Werk. Bd. iii. Erlangen 1859.
WELTE, B., Mosaische Opfer. Kirchenlexicon von Wetzer und Welte. Bd. x.
Freiburg 1851.
WINER, G. B., Biblisches Realworterbuch. 2 Bde. Leipzig 1847 f.
SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP
OF
THE OLD TESTAMENT.
BOOK I.
GENERAL BASIS OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP OF THE

OLD TESTAMENT.
AS the subject in hand is the sacrificial worship of the Old

Testament, that is to say, of the Israelites before Christ,
we have no need to raise the question: To whom were
the sacrifices presented? By worship (cultus) we mean
the worship of GOD; and from the very fact that the sacrifices of
which we are speaking formed an essential ingredient in the Old
Testament worship, they also formed a part of that service which
Israel was required to render to its GOD.--A general answer is also
thus obtained to the further question: By whom were the sacrifices
presented? At the same time, we must inquire somewhat minutely
into the peculiar position and organization of the Israelitish nation,
so far as they affected the worship offered, in order to secure the ne-
cessary basis for our investigation of the precise nature of the sacri-
ficial worship of the Old Testament. With this we shall also have
to connect an inquiry into the nature and importance of the place
in which the sacrifices were presented, since this affected the sacri-
ficial worship in various ways. And, lastly, we shall also have to
discuss the questions: What was sacrifice, and what were the dif-
ferent modes of sacrificing?--In this introductory part, therefore,
we shall have to treat: 1. Of the persons sacrificing; 2. Of the
place of sacrifice; and 3. Of the different varieties of sacrifice.
We shall take them in the order thus given, for the simple reason
18 THE PERSONS SACRIFICING.
that the arrangement of the place of sacrifice was affected by the

organization of the persons sacrificing, and the varieties of sacrifice
were affected by them both.
CHAPTER I.
THE PERSONS SACRIFICING.
A. THE PEOPLE.
1. When Jehovah had delivered His chosen people Israel (His

first-born, Ex. iv. 22) out of the bondage of Egypt, and brought
them as on eagles' wings to Sinai--the eternal altar erected for that
purpose at the creation of the world, where He was about to renew
the covenant, which He had made with the fathers of this people,
with their descendants who were now a great nation, and to estab-
lish them on a firm and immovable foundation by giving them His
law,--He first directed His servant Moses (Ex. xix. 4-6) to lay be-
fore the people the preliminaries of that law, in which the future
calling of Israel was declared to be this: to be Jehovah's possession
before all nations, and as such to be a kingdom of priests and a holy
nation.
This expressed, on the negative side, the selection and separation
of Israel from all other nations, and its obligation to be unlike them;
and on the positive side, its obligation to belong to Jehovah alone,
to be holy, because and as He Himself is holy (Lev. xix. 2), and
in all it did and left undone throughout its entire history, to act in
subservience to the saving designs of Jehovah, as the only way by
which it could become the medium of salvation to all nations (Gen.
xii. 3, xxviii. 14).1
In the destination of Israel to be peculiarly a kingdom of
priests, so that the whole nation was to consist of nothing but
priests, it was distinctly taught that every Israelite was to bear a
priestly character, and to possess and exercise the specific privileges
and duties of the priesthood. But was soon manifest that Israel,
as then constituted, and in the existing stage of the history of sal-
1
For a thorough and careful examination of the contents of these prelimi-
naries of the covenant, see History of the Old Covenant, vol. iii. pp. 102 sqq.
(translation).
THE PEOPLE. 19
vation, was not in a condition to enter at once upon its priestly

vocation, and fulfil its priestly work of conveying salvation to the
rest of the nations. For it speedily furnished a practical proof of
its unfitness even for the first and most essential preliminary to this
vocation, viz., that it should draw near to Jehovah, and hold per-
sonal and immediate intercourse with Him (Num. xvi. 5), by turn-
ing round and hurrying away in terror and alarm when it was led
up to the sacred mountain, and Jehovah descended amidst thunder
and lightning, and proclaimed to the assembled congregation out of
the fire and blackness of the mountain the ten fundamental words
of the covenant law. On that occasion they said to Moses (Ex. xx.
19); Speak thou with us, and we will hear; but let not God speak
with us, lest we die (cf. Deut. v. 22 sqq.). By these words they
renounced the great privilege of the priesthood, that of drawing
near to God, and holding personal and immediate intercourse with
Him. With their consciousness of unholiness, they felt that they
were not ripe or qualified for entering upon the fulness of their
priestly vocation. They felt rather that they needed a mediator
themselves to carry on their intercourse with God. The designs of
God Himself with reference to the covenant had from the very
first contemplated this (Ex. xx. 20); but it was necessary that the
people themselves should discover and clearly discern, that for the
time it could not be otherwise. Jehovah therefore expressed His
approval of the people's words (Dent. v. 28, They have well said
all that they have spoken); and from that time forth Moses was
formally appointed on both sides as the mediator of the covenant
for the period of its first establishment and early development in
the giving of the law, and at a later period the family of his
brother Aaron was called and set apart by the law itself as a per-
manent priesthood for the priestly nation.
But even after thus declining the specific work of the priest-
hood, Israel still remained the holy, chosen nation, which was not
to be like other nations, but holy, as Jehovah is holy. It continued
to be the possession of Jehovah above all nations; and it still stood
out as a priest of God, distinct from them in life and conduct, in
the possession of divine revelation, of divine institutions, and of the
means of salvation, as well as in the calling to become the vehicle
of salvation to all mankind. The qualifications for this calling it
first truly received through the conclusion of the covenant and its
consecration at Sinai. And even the idea of the universal priest-
hood of the whole nation, however much ground it had lost by the
temporary demands of a separate priesthood, retained enough to

preserve its hold upon the consciousness of the people, and to point
their longing hopes to the time of fulfilment, when they should enter
upon the full (active) possession of all the privileges and blessings
of the universal priesthood (1 Pet. ii. 5, 9).
2. Birth from Israelitish parents secured to the new-born
child a claim to be received into the membership of the covenant
nation, but did not confer, or even guarantee, membership itself.
On the contrary, a special act of initiation was necessary, viz., the
rite of CIRCUMCISION (hlAUm), which was also performed upon every
stranger who desired to forsake heathenism and to be incorporated
into the covenant nation (Gen. xvii. 27, xxxiv. 14 sqq. ; Ex. xii. 43,
44). Circumcision had been instituted as a sign and seal of that
covenant which God concluded with Abraham (Gen. xvii. 10--14).
But as the Sinaitic covenant was neither an absolutely new one,
nor essentially different from the one which God had previously
concluded with the father of the nation, but was simply the renewal
of that covenant as the basis of their national existence, the same
covenant initiation and covenant seal was still retained for every
individual, as that by which Abraham first entered into the cove-
nant when he was called alone (Isa. li. 2).
As circumcision comes only so far into consideration in connec-
tion with the sphere of religious worship, that it attested the fact of
membership in the covenant nation, and on that account was the
conditio sine qua non of participation in certain sacrificial acts; an
inquiry into the origin, essence, and significance of this institution
would lead us too far away from our present object; and there is
the less necessity for it here on account of what we have already
written on the question (Hist. of the Old Covenant, vol. i. pp. 231
sqq. translation).1
But there were many NON-ISRAELITES (MyriGe) living in the land
of Israel, for whose condition care was taken to make provision even
in the earliest code of laws (viz., that contained in the middle books
1
Keil's objections to my remarks, in his Bibl. Archaologie i. 311, do not
really touch them; and they are the more surprising, since his own explanation
("Its significance lay in the religious idea, that the corruption of sin brought
into human nature by the fall was concentrated in the organ of generation,
inasmuch as it is generally in the sexual life that it comes out most strongly;
and, therefore, the first thing necessary for the sanctification of life is the puri-
fication or sanctification of the organ by which life is propagated") coincides so
exactly with the first part of the results of my inquiry, that it might be called
a brief summary of them.
THE PEOPLE. 21
of the Pentateuch). If they would allow themselves to be formally

and fully incorporated into the covenant nation by receiving circum-
cision, a perfect equality with the Israelite by birth was guaranteed
to them by the law in both religious and political privileges (Ex. xii.
48). They then ceased to be foreigners. At any rate, there can be
no doubt that when we read in the Thorah of "the stranger that is
within thy gates," or "in the midst of thee," etc., we have invariably
to think of uncircumcised settlers, or foreigners who had not been
naturalized. The rule with respect to their civil position is laid
down in the fundamental principle, "One law shall be to him that
is home-born, and unto the stranger that sojourneth among you"
(Ex. xii. 49, cf. Lev. xxiv. 22 and Num. xv. 15, 16). And since
they had, as strangers, no relations to fall back upon, they were ur-
gently commended in Deuteronomy to the especial protection of
the authorities, in common with widows and orphans; and because
they had no inheritance in the holy land, and could not even
acquire landed property, they were to be admitted to the festal and
tithing meals along with the poor of the nation (Ex. xii. 48; Num.
ix. 14; Deut. xiv. 28, 29, xvi. 10 sqq., xxvi. 11 sqq.), and were to
share with them in the gleaning of the vintage, the fruit-gathering,
and the harvest, and in the produce of the sabbatical year (Lev.
xix. 10, xxiii. 22, xxv. 6; Dent. xxiv. 19 sqq.).
In return for these privileges, they were required, on the other
hand, to submit to certain restrictions. For example, they were to
abstain from everything which was an abomination to the Israelites,
and consequently to renounce all idolatry, the eating of blood, etc.
(Ex. xii. 19, xx. 10; Lev. xvi. 29, xvii. 8 sqq., xviii. 20, xx. 2,
xxiv. 16 sqq.; Num. xv. 13 sqq.; Dent. v. 14); they were also to
fast along with the Israelites on the great day of atonement (Lev.
xvi. 29), and to keep the Sabbath as strictly as they (Ex. xx. 10,
xxiii. 12). Their relation to the sacrificial worship was restricted
to this, that they were allowed to offer all kinds of sacrifice to
Jehovah (burnt-offerings, and peace- (or thank-) offerings, according
to Lev. xvii. 8, xxii. 18, 25; and, according to Num. xv. 29, even
sin-offerings also, as circumstances required), and to participate in
the blessings which the sacrifice secured. They could take no part
in the Passover without previous circumcision (Ex. xii. 48). But
admission to the ordinary sacrificial worship at the tabernacle, was
a necessary correlative to the unconditional law against serving and
sacrificing to their former gods whilst in Jehovah's land.
3. While the Israelite was thus marked and sealed in his own
body as belonging to the covenant nation, the principle of separation

from heathenism,1 or the duty not to be as the heathen, was also
symbolically manifested in other departments, chiefly in his daily
food, but also to some extent in his CLOTHING (Num. xv. 38-40, cf.
Lev. xix. 19 and Dent. xxii. 11). But as there is not the slightest
connection between the latter and the sacrificial worship, it would
be out of place to enter into any closer examination of the laws
relating to that subject. There is all the more reason, however,
why we should carefully examine the restrictions placed upon the
Israelites in relation to their FOOD, inasmuch as they lay, on the
one hand, at the foundation of the legal enactments with reference
to the sacrificial worship, and were, on the other hand, the necessary
result of the fundamental idea of that worship.
The former applies to the division of the animal kingdom into
CLEAN and UNCLEAN; the Israelites being allowed to eat of the
clean, whilst the unclean was prohibited (cf. Lev. xi.; Dent. xiv.).
On the basis of the old Hebrew division of the animal kingdom into
four parts, the law selects from the class of land animals, as clean
or edible, none but those which ruminate and have also cloven
feet, and pronounces all the rest unclean. The principal animals
selected as clean are the ox, the sheep, the goat, and the various
species of stags, and gazelles or antelopes; and as unclean, the
camel, the hare, the badger, and the swine. Among fishes, the
distinguishing characteristic of the clean is, that they have fins and
scales; so that all smooth, eel-like fishes are excluded. In the case
of the birds, there is no general rule laid down, but the unclean are
mentioned by name,--nineteen kinds in Leviticus, and twenty-one
(3 X 7) in Deuteronomy. The first heptad embraces the carni-
vorous and carrion birds,--eagles, vultures, ravens, etc.; the second,
the ostrich and the different species of owls; the third, nothing but
marsh-birds, and the bat. Of the fourth class, or the so-called
1
Since circumcision was a sign and attestation of membership in the cove-
nant nation, the importance of separation and distinction from heathenism was
eo ipso expressed by it. It is true, this seems at variance with the fact that,
according to Herodotus, the Colchians, Egyptians, and Ethiopians also practised
circumcision. But among these nations circumcision was not a universal or
national custom; for, according to Origen, it was only the priests in, Egypt
who submitted to it, and, according to Clemens Alex., only the priests and
those who were initiated into the mysteries. In any case, the distinction be-
tween circumcised and uncircumcised in the Old Testament is uniformly equi-
valent to that between Israelites and non-Israelites (see instar omnium, Jer. ix.
25, 26).
THE PEOPLE. 23
swarming animals (Cr,w,), four species of locusts are the only excep-
tions to the universal sentence of uncleanness.
The distinction between clean and unclean animals, with the
command to abstain from eating the flesh of the latter, was never
merely a civil or medical arrangement, based upon sanitary consi-
derations, in any of the nations in which it prevailed, and least of
all among the Hebrews. Such measures as these would have been
altogether foreign to the spirit of ancient legislation. Moreover,
the obligation to observe them was invariably enforced as a religious
duty, and never upon civil grounds. But to smuggle in laws of a
purely material and utilitarian tendency under the hypocritical
name of religious duties, for the mere purpose of facilitating their
entrance and securing a more spirited observance, would have
been a course altogether opposed to the spirit of antiquity, which
was far too naif, too reckless and unreserved, to do anything of the
kind;--whilst the opposite course, of upholding religious duties by
political commands, is met with on every hand.
But the question as to the reason why certain animals were pro-
nounced clean, and certain others unclean, is a somewhat different
one. This may undoubtedly be traceable to sanitary or other similar
considerations, lying outside the sphere of religion. The actual or
supposed discovery, that the flesh of certain animals was uneatable
or prejudicial to health, and a natural repugnance to many animals,
which sometimes could, and at other times could not, be explained,
may no doubt have been the original reason for abhorring or refusing
them as food. And if, either subsequently or at the same time,
some religious motive led to the establishment of a distinction among
animals between clean and unclean, i.e., between eatable and not
eatable, nothing would be more natural than that all those animals,
whose flesh was avoided for the physical or psychical reasons
assigned, should be placed in the category of unclean, and that the
eating of them, which from the one point of view appeared to be
merely prejudicial to health, or repulsive and disgusting to natural
feelings, should, from the other point of view, be prohibited as sinful
and displeasing to God.
In heathenism there were two ways, varying according to the
different starting points, by which a distinction of a religious charac-
ter might have been established in the animal world between clean
and unclean. Dualism, the characteristic peculiarity of which was
to trace the origin of one portion of creation to an evil principle,
whether passing by the name of Ahriman, Typhon, or anything
else, necessarily included in this category all noxious animals, and

such as excited horror or disgust, and prohibited the eating of them
as bringing the eater into association with the evil principle; and
Pantheism, which regards all life in nature as the progressive
development and externalization of the absolute Deity, necessa-
rily regarded all noxious and repulsive objects in the animal crea-
tion as a deterioration of the divine life, and avoided them in
consequence.
But both these views are far removed from the Monotheism of
Israel, which recognised neither a dualism of world-creating prin-
ciples, nor a self-development of God assuming shape in noxious or
disgusting forms of life, but only one holy God, who, by virtue of
His omnipotence, and in accordance with His wisdom, created the
world, and all that is therein, both good and holy. Yet even the
Monotheist could not deny the dualism of good and evil, noxious
and salutary, repulsive and attractive, ugly and beautiful, which
actually exists in the world. Moreover, his revelation taught him,
that degradation and corruption had penetrated, through the curse
of sin, into the world which God created good and holy (Gen. iii.
17, v. 29, ix. 5); and he could discern therein, not only the conse-
quence and the curse, but also the image and reflection, of his own
sinful condition.
When the Israelites were commanded, by their own revealed
law, not to eat of the flesh of certain animals, but to avoid it as
unclean, the supposition is certainly a very natural one, that the
animals designated as unclean were those in which the consequences
or the reflection of human sinfulness and degradation were most
evidently and sharply defined, and that the command to avoid eat-
ing their flesh as an unclean and abominable thing, was intended to
remind and warn them of their own sin, and their own moral and
natural corruption; so that the real tendency of the laws of food
was so far a moral and religious one, resting upon a symbolical
foundation. And this is the most generally received opinion in
relation to the Mosaic laws of food.1
1
The latest writer on Biblical Antiquities, Dr Keil, has nevertheless con-
founded the realist with the symbolical points of view. He says (vol. ii. p. 20),
This distinction was based upon a certain intuitive feeling, awakened by the
insight of man into the nature of animals, and their appointment for him, before
that intuition had been disturbed by unnatural and ungodly culture. For as
the innate consciousness of God was changed, in consequence of sin, into a voice
of God in the conscience, warning and convicting him of sin and unrighteous-
ness; so this voice of God operated in such a way upon his relation to the earthly
THE PEOPLE. 25
But these ideas, which generally and naturally suggest them-

selves, are not borne out, either by the specific marks of cleanness
and uncleanness mentioned in the law, or by the nature and character
of the animals specially designated as clean or unclean, or, lastly,
by the explanations of the lawgiver himself. To give only one or
two examples: Why should so useful, patient, obedient, and endur-
ing an animal as the camel be better fitted to serve as a symbolical
representation of human sinfulness than the stubborn ox, or the
lustful, stinking goat? why the timid hare, more than the timid
antelope? or why the terribly destructive locusts less than so
many other kinds of the great mass of insects (Sherez)? And why
should the want of rumination and of a thoroughly cloven hoof-
the marks by which the uncleanness of the land animals was to be
recognised--exhibit so decided a picture of human sin, that every
animal not possessing these two marks was at once to be pronounced
unclean?
Moreover--and this is the most important fact--we never find
any such reason brought forward in one law, nor even remotely
creation, and especially to the animal creation, that many animals stood before
his eyes as types of sin and corruption, and filled his mind with repugnance and
disgust. It was not till after the further degradation and obscuration of his
consciousness of God that this repugnance became distorted in various ways
among many tribes, and along with this distortion the ability to select animals
as food, in a manner befitting the vocation of man, became lost as well. But,
for the purpose of bringing the human race back to God, the Mosaic law sought
to sharpen the perception of the nature of sin, and of that disorder which sin
had introduced into nature universally; and to that end it brought out the dis-
tinction between clean and unclean animals, partly according to general signs,
and partly by special enumeration . . . , but without our being able by means
of our own reflection to discern and point out, in each particular instance, either
the reason for the prohibition, or the exact feature in which the ancients dis-
covered a symbol of sin and abomination."--But to this it may be replied, that
if it was "the innate consciousness of God," the "voice of God" within him,
which first of all filled "the mind of man with repugnance and disgust" at the
unclean animals; and if "this repugnance became distorted in various ways
among many tribes, in consequence of the further degradation and obscuration
of their consciousness of God;" and if, "through unnatural and ungodly cul-
ture," the "intuition into the nature of animals and their appointment for man
was disturbed;" or if, on the other hand, the original "selection of the clean
animals," which was restored by the Mosaic law "for the purpose of bringing
the human race back to God," was actually the "proper" one, in fact the one
"befitting man's vocation;" it is difficult to understand how the Apostles could
feel themselves warranted in entirely abolishing the distinction between clean
and unclean animals,--not to mention any of the other objections to this mis-
taken view.
hinted at as the determining cause; whilst, on the contrary, a

totally different reason is given in Lev. xx. 24-26 in clear and un-
mistakeable words. Thus in ver. 25 we read: "I am Jehovah
your God, which have separated you from the nations. Ye shall
therefore distinguish between clean beasts and unclean, and be-
tween unclean birds and clean; and ye shall not make your souls
abominable by beast, or by bird, or by any manner of living thing
that creepeth on the ground, which I have separated for you as
unclean."--The leading thought in these laws of food, therefore,
was this: because, and as, Jehovah had separated Israel from the
nations; therefore, and so, Israel was to separate the clean animals
from the unclean. Israel was thus to be reminded by its daily food,
of the goodness of God in choosing it from among the nations, of
its peculiar calling and destination, and of its consequent obligation
not to be as the heathen were. The choice of clean animals for
the sustenance of the natural life, was to typify in the sphere of
nature, what had taken place among men through the selection and
vocation of Israel: the heathen nations being represented by the
unclean animals, and Israel by the clean. The fundamental idea of
the Mosaic laws of food, therefore, was not ethical, but historical,
having regard to the history of salvation.
The strongest confirmation is given to this view by the vision
which Peter saw (Acts x. 10 sqq.), and which was intended to set
before his mind the fact, that in Christianity the difference and
opposition between heathen and Jews was entirely removed; so
that the Apostle Paul was able to write to the Colossians (chap.
ii. 16) 17): "Let no man therefore judge you in meat or in drink
which are a shadow of things to come; but the body is of
Christ."
The circumstance that in the Mosaic law the vegetable kingdom
is not divided into clean and unclean, as it is among other nations,
but the animal kingdom alone, is to be explained on the ground
that the sphere of animal life is the higher of the two, the one
nearer to that of humanity, and therefore better adapted to exhibit
relations and contrasts in the world of men; whereas in heathen-
ism the distinction rested upon totally different (viz., physico-theo-
logical) principles, and therefore analogies could be found in the
vegetable as well as in the animal world.
4. But the discovery of the fundamental idea upon which the
general symbolism of this question rests, by no means solves all the
problems presented by the particular details. The question still
THE PEOPLE. 27
remains to be answered, in cases where general signs are laid down

as distinguishing clean from unclean, why the animals in which
such signs were observed should be selected as clean, and all the
rest pronounced unclean. W. Schultz, in his Commentary on Deu-
teronomy, expresses the opinion, that it is easy to see that these
signs were not in themselves the decisive marks of clean and unclean,
but were abstracted after the distinction had been settled on other
grounds;--in other words, that in themselves they had no signi-
ficance whatever. But how it is easy to see this, he has not in-
formed us. There can be no question, indeed, that when the
Israelitish lawgiver selected these signs, the custom already existed
of avoiding the eating of the flesh of certain animals as injurious,
repulsive, or disgusting; and from this he no doubt abstracted the
common marks, that were henceforth to be the distinguishing signs
of clean and unclean. But even then it may be asked, on the one
hand, why he chose these particular marks as the criterion, rather
than others which could be detected just as easily, and even pre-
sented themselves unsought;--why, for example, in the case of
quadrupeds, he merely fixed upon rumination and cloven feet, and
not also, or indeed primarily, upon the possession of horns, which
would be the very first thing to strike the eye. There is the less
reason for setting aside the omission of this sign as merely accidental
and unimportant, from the fact, that the ancient Egyptians, among
whom Moses had grown up and received his education, selected the
want of horns as the leading sign of uncleanness in the case of
quadrupeds (Porphyr. de abst. 4, 7). The circumstance, therefore,
that Moses fixed upon rumination and a thoroughly divided hoof as
the signs of cleanness, and not the possession of horns, is an evident
proof that he must have had his own special reasons for doing so;
and, with the wide-spread predominance of symbolism in all that
concerned the worship of God, these reasons must be sought for
in their symbolical significance: consequently, rumination and a
thoroughly cloven foot must have possessed a symbolical worth
which horns did not possess, in relation to the fundamental idea of
the distinction to be made. But, on the other hand, it is quite con-
ceivable, and even probable, that through the adoption of these
marks of cleanness, which were taken from the leading representa-
tives of the different classes of animals ordinarily used for food, cer-
tain animals may have been excluded, which would not have been
placed in the category of the unclean, if sanitary, physical, or
psychical considerations alone had prevailed. Thus, for example,
pork and the flesh of the camel were eaten by other Eastern nations
with great relish, and without the least hesitation.
If we examine the distinctive marks pointed out by the lawgiver,
we shall see at once, that they all relate either to the food eaten by the
animals, or to their mode of locomotion, or to both together. In the
case of the land animals, as being the most perfect, this is particularly
obvious; and here the two signs coincide. With the water animals,
the question of food, which is brought less under the notice of man,
is passed over, and that of locomotion is the only distinction referred
to. Even in the case of the other two classes of animals, which are
not indicated by any general signs, the questions of food and motion
are evidently taken into consideration. With the birds, the food is
clearly the decisive point, except that here it was impossible to
point out any peculiarities in the organs of nutriment, which would
be at the same time both universally applicable and symbolically
significant. For similar reasons, the movements of the birds
could not be adduced as furnishing marks of universal distinction.
In the case of the fourth class, the infinite variety of species in-
cluded, made it impossible to discover distinctive marks that should
be universally applicable. At the same time, the name Cr,w,, i.e.,
swarmers, leads to the conclusion, that their general movements
were taken into consideration, as furnishing a common ground of
exclusion.
The selection of food and locomotion as the leading grounds of
separation in case of every class, is by no means difficult to ex-
plain. For it is precisely in these two functions that the stage of
animal life is most obviously and completely distinguished from
that of vegetable life, and approaches or is homogeneous with that
of man.
If, then, as Lev. xx. 24 sqq. unquestionably shows, the separa-
tion of the clean animals from the unclean was a type of the selec-
tion of Israel from among the nations; and if, therefore, the clean
animals represented the chosen, holy nation, and the unclean the
heathen world, as the figurative language of the prophets so often
implies; the marks and signs by which the clean and unclean
animals were to be distinguished, must also be looked at from a
symbolical point of view;--in other words, the marks which distin-
guished the clean animals from the unclean, and characterized the
former as clean, must have been a corporeal type of that by which
Israel was distinguished, or at least ought, to have been distinguished,
spiritually from the heathen world. The allusion, therefore, was to
THE PEOPLE. 29
the spiritual food and spiritual walk of Israel, which were to be con-
secrated and sanctified, and separated from all that was displeasing
and hostile to God in the conduct of the heathen.
What we are to understand by spiritual walk, needs no demon-
stration: it is walking before the face of God--a firm, sure step
in the pilgrim road of life. Spiritual food is just as undoubtedly
the reception of that which sustains and strengthens the spiritual
life, i.e., of divine revelation, of which Christ says (John iv. 34),
My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me. The two func-
tions stand to one another in the relation of receptivity and spon-
taneity.
Let us apply this to the land animals. The first thing men-
tioned is their chewing the cud. Now, if this is to be regarded as a
figurative representation of a spiritual function if, for example, it is
symbolical of spiritual sustenance through the word of God; the
meaning cannot be better described than it is . Josh. i. 8: "This
book of the law shall not depart out of thy mouth, but thou shalt
meditate therein day and night, that thou mayest observe to do
according to all that is written therein."--In the importance attached
to the cloven hoof, this fact must have been taken into considera-
tion, that the tread of animals so provided is surer and firmer than
that of animals with the hoof whole. And no proof need be given of
the frequency with which reference is made in the Scriptures to the
slipping of the feet, or to a firm, sure step in a spiritual sense (e.g.,
Ps. xxxvii. 31; Prov. v. 6 ; Heb. xii. 13, etc.).--For the birds no
general marks of cleanness or uncleanness are given. But the deter-
mining point of view is nevertheless perfectly obvious. For example,
all birds of prey are excluded, and generally all birds that devour
living animals or carrion, or any other kind of unclean and dis-
gusting food, as being fit representatives of the heathen world. In
the case of the animals in the third and fourth classes, the common
point which is placed in the foreground as distinguishing the un-
clean, is the singularity--so to speak, the abnormal and unnatural
character--of their motion: their disagreeable velocity, their terrible
habit of swarming, etc.
5. The other prohibitions of food contained in the Mosaic law
are based upon different principles, and are to be explained on the
ground that the food forbidden was regarded, either as too holy, or
as too unholy, to be eaten;--the former on account of its relation to
the sacrificial worship, the latter on account of its association with
the defilement of death and corruption. The former alone comes
under notice here. To this category belong the blood and the fat
of animals. But so far as the fat is concerned, it must be remarked
at the outset, that only the actual lobes or nets of fat, which enve-
lope the intestines, the kidneys, and the liver (Lev. iii. 3, 4, 9, 10,
14, 15), are intended, not the fat which intersects the flesh; and
also, that, according to Lev. vii. 23, this prohibition relates exclu-
sively to the portions of fat alluded to in oxen, sheep, and goats,
not to that of any other edible animals.
For the prohibition of the EATING OF BLOOD, Lev. xvii. 10 sqq.
is the locus classicus. In ver. 11, a triple reason is assigned for the
prohibition: (1.) "For the soul of the flesh is in the blood;"
(2.) "And I have given it upon the altar to make an atonement for
your souls;" (3.) "For the blood, it maketh atonement by means
of the soul." According to Delitzsch (Bibl. Psychol. 196), the pro-
hibition has a double ground here: "The blood has the soul in it,
and through the gracious appointment of God it is the means of
atonement for human souls, by virtue of the soul contained within
it. One reason lies in the nature of the blood, and the other in the
consecration of it to a holy purpose, by which, even apart from the
other ground, it was removed from common use." But Keil opposes
this. "It is not to the soul of animals as such," he says, "as the
seat of a principle of animal life, that the prohibition applies, but to
the soul as the means of atonement set apart by God" (Biblische
Archaologie 1, 23). But if Keil were correct in saying (p. 24) that
"in Lev. xvii. 11 the first two clauses do not assign two indepen-
dent reasons for the prohibition, but merely the two factors of the
foundation for the third clause, which contains the one sole ground
upon which the prohibition is based" (which I do not admit, how-
ever); and if in Gen. ix. 4 ("but flesh in (with) the soul thereof,
the blood thereof, ye shall not eat") the one sole reason for the
prohibition were not the fact that the blood itself is animated, but
its fitness as a means of atonement (which I am still less able to
allow); even then the correctness of Delitzsch's opinion would be
beyond all doubt, and that for the very reason which has led Keil
to oppose it. For example, he adds (p. 23): "This is clearly evi-
dent from the parallel command in relation to the fat of oxen,
sheep, and goats, or the cattle of which men offer an offering by
fire unto the Lord (Lev. vii. 23, 25). This fat was not to be
eaten any more than the blood, on pain of extermination (Lev. vii.
25, 27, xvii. 10, 13), either by the Israelites or by the strangers
living with Israel." But Keil would not have spoken with such
THE PEOPLE. 31
confidence if he had placed the relation between these two prohibi-

tions (the eating of blood and of fat) clearly before his mind.
Even in the law of Leviticus (chap. vii. 23 sqq.) we find a very
significant distinction between the prohibition of the eating of blood
on the one hand, and that of fat on the other, which Keil has quite
overlooked. According to Lev. vii. 23, it is only the fat of oxen,
sheep, and goats that may not be eaten; the fat of other edible
animals, therefore, such as stags, antelopes, etc., is not forbidden.
But the prohibition of blood, instead of being restricted to that of
oxen, sheep, and goats, extends to the blood of all animals without
exception (ver. 26). Whence this distinction? The answer is to
be found in ver. 25: the fat of the oxen, sheep, and goats was not
to be eaten, because it was to be offered as a fire-offering to Jeho-
vah, i.e., was to be burnt, upon the altar. To understand this, it
must be borne in mind that, according to the law of Leviticus,
which was drawn up primarily with regard to the sojourn in the
desert, the slaughter of every ox, sheep, or goat, even if it were only
slain for domestic consumption, was to be looked at in the light of
a peace- (or thank-) offering (Lev. xvii. 3-5): hence every such
slaughter was to take place at the sanctuary, the blood of the animal
slain was to be sprinkled upon the altar, and the fat to be burned
there also. The eating of fat, consequently, was prohibited only
because and so far as it was to be offered to Jehovah; so that the
fat of stags, antelopes, etc., might be eaten without hesitation.--It
was altogether different with the law against eating blood. In this
case there was no restriction or exception at all: no blood whatever
was to be eaten, whether the animal from which it flowed were
sacrificed or not sacrificed, sacrificial or not sacrificial. From this
it necessarily follows, that the reason for prohibiting blood cannot
have been the same as that for prohibiting fat. Had the prohibition
of blood rested merely upon the importance of blood as a means of
atonement; then, according to the analogy of the prohibition of fat,
the blood of those animals only should have been forbidden, which
really were offered as atoning sacrifices. But as it related to the
blood of all animals, even to those that were neither sacrificed nor
sacrificial, the principal reason for this prohibition must have been
one entirely unconnected with the sacrificial worship. What it was,
is clearly shown in Gen. ix. 4 and Lev. xvii. 11: "For the soul of
the flesh is in the blood."
That this is the correct view, is also evident from the parallel
commands in the second law contained in Deuteronomy (Deut. xii.).
According to the law of Leviticus, the slaughter of an ox, sheep, or

goat was to be carried out in every case like a sacrificial slaughter,
and for that reason the eating of the fat of such animals was
unconditionally forbidden.1 The law in Deuteronomy, however,
abrogated this command, as being unsuitable and impracticable in
the Holy Land, especially for those who dwelt at a distance from the
tabernacle, and allowed them at their pleasure to slay and eat oxen,
sheep, and goats at their own homes, as well as antelopes or stags
(Deut. xii. 15, 16, 20-24). But in the case of such private slaugh-
tering, the blood was not sprinkled on the altar, nor was the fat
burned upon the altar. As a matter of course, therefore, the com-
mand not to eat of the fat of the slaughtered animals was abrogated
also;--and this is indicated with even superfluous emphasis by the
repetition of the statement, that they might eat them like the hart
and the roebuck (vers. 15, 22), of which they were never forbidden
to eat the fat. But the eating of blood, whether the blood of oxen,
sheep, and goats, or that of the roebuck and stag, remained as un-
conditionally forbidden as ever. Twice is it emphatically stated
(vers. 16 and 24), that even in private slaughterings the blood was
not to be eaten, but poured upon the earth like water. What Keil
regards as the only reason for the prohibition, namely, the appoint-
ment of the blood as the means of expiation, was as much wanting
here in the slaughtering of such animals as it had formerly been
in that of the roebuck and stag. If, then, for all that, the law
against eating blood still remained in its utmost stringency even in
the case of private slaughterings, whether the animals in question
1
Keil gives a different explanation (pp. 24, 25). "From the fact," he says,
"that the general command in Lev. vii. 23, Ye shall eat no manner of fat of
ox, of sheep, or of goat, is more minutely expounded in ver. 25, Whosoever
eateth the fat of the beast of which men offer an offering made by fire unto the
Lord, it seems pretty evidently to follow, that the fat of the ox, sheep, and
goat, which was burned upon the altar when they were sacrificed, might be
eaten in those cases in which the animal was merely slaughtered as food." But
Keil has overlooked what he himself has stated two lines before; namely, that
according to Lev. xvii. 3 sqq., the slaughter of such animals was to be regarded
in every case as a sacrificial slaughter, and therefore, that instead of his view
following "pretty evidently" from Lev. vii. 25, it is perfectly evident that the
very opposite follows. So that, when Keil adds, that "in any case the inference
drawn by Knobel from Lev. vii. 24 is untenable, viz., that in the case of oxen,
sheep, and goats, slaughtered in the ordinary way, this (the application of the
fat to ordinary use) was evidently not allowable;" it is obvious that it is not
Knobel's inference, but Keil's condemnation of that inference, which is in any
case untenable.
THE PRIESTS. 33
were adapted for sacrifice or not, it is evident that any reason for
such a law, based upon the appointment of blood as a means of
expiation, can only have been a partial and secondary one. There
must have been some other reason, and that a primary one, of
universal applicability; and this is indicated again in the second
giving of the law, viz., the nature of the blood as the seat of the
soul (ver. 23): "For the blood, it is the soul; and thou mayest not
eat the soul with the flesh." There is not the slightest allusion
here, any more than in Gen. ix. 4, to any connection between the
prohibition in question and the appointment of the blood as the
means of expiation, which was applicable only to animals actually
sacrificed, and to them simply as sacrificed.
We must maintain therefore, in direct opposition to Keil, that
it was to the soul of the animals expressly, as the seat or principle
of animal life, that the prohibition applied as a universal rule. In
the case of the blood of the sacrifices, it was merely enforced with
greater stringency, but had still the same reference to the soul as
a means of expiation sanctified by God. In Lev. xvii. 11, both
reasons are given; because, as the context shows, it is to the sacri-
ficial blood that allusion is primarily made. But in what follows,
from ver. 13 onwards, the prohibition is extended from sacrificial
blood to blood of every kind, even that of animals that could not be
offered in sacrifice; and this extension of the prohibition is based
solely upon the nature of the blood as the seat of the soul (ver. 14),
and not upon the fact of its having been appointed as the means of
expiation.
B. THE PRIESTS.
6. Previous to the giving of the law, the priesthood in the

chosen family, just as in other kindred tribes, was not confined to
particular individuals; but the head of the family discharged the
priestly functions connected with the service of God, for himself
and his family (Gen. viii. 20 sqq.; Job i. 5). For this purpose,
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob built altars in the different places
where they sojourned, and chiefly upon those spots in which Jehovah
had appeared to them; and there they offered sacrifices, and cleansed
and consecrated their households (Gen. xii. 7, xiii. 18, xxvi. 25,
xxxiii. 20, xxxv. 1, 2). On the institution of the paschal sacrifice
in Egypt, the father of every family discharged the priestly func-
tions connected with that sacrifice (Ex. xii. 7, 22). After the
exodus from Egypt, all the priestly as well as princely authority

culminated in the person of Moses. The hereditary priesthood of
the heads of families was not abolished in consequence, any more
than their princely rank (Ex. xix. 22, 24); but in Moses they
both culminated in one individual head. It was in consequence of
the request made by the people themselves to Moses (Ex. xx. 19),
"Speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with
us, lest we die," and the divine approval of that request, that the
priestly qualifications and duties were transferred from the people,
and their representatives the elders, to Moses alone. At the com-
pletion of the covenant, therefore, we find Moses alone officiating
as priest (Ex. xxiv. 6, cf. 162 sqq.). But Moses could not
possibly discharge all the priestly functions required by the congre-
gation. On the contrary, his other duties already engrossed his
whole time and strength; consequently he was allowed to divest
himself of the priestly office as soon as the covenant was concluded,
and to transfer it to his brother Aaron, who was then ordained,
along with his sons Nadab and Abihu, Eleazar and Ithamar, as an
hereditary priesthood. After the erection of the tabernacle they
were duly consecrated and installed (Ex. xxviii. cf. 165 sqq.).
But when preparation was made for removing from Sinai, the
necessity was immediately felt for a considerable increase in the
number of persons officiating in the worship of God. The taber-
nacle had to be taken down; all the different parts, as well as the
various articles of furniture, had to be carried from place to place
at every fresh encampment it had to be set up again: and for all
this a very large number of chosen and consecrated hands were
required. To this service, therefore, all the other members of the
tribe to which Aaron belonged were set apart, viz., the tribe of Levi,
--comprising the three families of the Kohathites, the Gershonites,
and the Merarites. Henceforth, therefore, this tribe was removed
from its co-ordinate position by the side of the other tribes, and was
appointed and consecrated to the service of the sanctuary, that is
to say, to the performance of all such duties connected with the
tabernacle as were not included in the peculiar province of the
priestly office, which still continued to be the exclusive prerogative
of the family of Aaron (Num. i. 49-51, iii. 6-10, viii. 5-22).
After the sparing of the first-born in the night of the exodus
from Egypt, they became the peculiar possession of Jehovah; and
consequently they ought properly to have been the persons selected
for life-long service in the sanctuary. But for the purpose of giving
THE PRIESTS. 35
greater compactness and unity to the personnel employed, the

Levites and their descendants took their place (Num. iii. 12) 13,
viii. 16-19). It was necessary, however, before this was done, that
all the first-born should be redeemed by means of certain specially
appointed sacrifices, and gifts to the tabernacle (cf. 229).
In this way the persons officially engaged in the worship were
divided into three stages. The lowest stage was occupied by such
of the LEVITES as were not priests, who acted merely as attendants
and menial servants. On a higher stage stood the Aaronites, as
the true PRIESTS. And lastly, Aaron himself, and subsequently
the successive heads of the family (according to the right of primo-
geniture), represented as HIGH PRIEST, lOdGAha NheKoha, the point of unity
and the culminating point of all the priestly duties and privileges.
7. What notion the Hebrew formed of the priesthood, cannot
be determined with any certainty from the name NheKo, since the
primary meaning of the root Nhk is doubtful and disputed. On the
other hand, Moses clearly describes the nature of the priesthood in
Num. xvi. 5. On the occasion of the rebellion of the Korahites
against the restriction of the priestly prerogatives to the family of
Aaron, he announces to them, To-morrow Jehovah will show
who is His, and who is holy, that He may suffer him to come near
unto Him; and whom He shall choose, him will He suffer to come
near unto Him. There are four characteristics of the priesthood
indicated here. The first is election by Jehovah, as distinguished
both from wilful self-appointment, and also from election by human
authority of any kind whatever. The second is the result of this
election, viz., belonging to Jehovah; which means, that the priest, as
such, with all his life and powers, was not his own, or the world's,
but had given himself entirely up to the service of Jehovah. The
third is, that as the property of Jehovah, the priest, like everything
belonging to Jehovah, was holy. And this involved the qualification
for the fourth, viz., drawing near to Jehovah, as the true and ex-
elusive prerogative and duty of the priest.
All that is indicated here as composing the nature and purpose
of the Levitical priesthood, has been already mentioned in Ex.
xix. 5, 6, as characterizing the whole covenant nation when regarded
in the light of its priestly vocation. As a kingdom of priests, Israel
was Jehovah's possession out of, or before, all nations, and as such,
a holy nation; whilst the basis of its election is seen in the deliver-
ance from Egypt (ver. 4), and the design, that they might draw
near, in the approach to the holy mountain (ver. 17). From this
resemblance it follows, that the priesthood of the Aaronites in

relation to Israel, was similar to that of Israel in relation to the
heathen. The Aaronites were the priests of the nation, which had
been called and appointed to a universal priesthood, but which was
not yet ripe for such a call, and therefore still stood in need of
priestly mediation itself.
What we are to understand by coming near to Jehovah, which
was the true calling of the Aaronic priesthood, according to Num.
xvi. 5, may easily be gathered from what goes before. The design
and purpose of this priesthood was mediatorial communion with
God, mediation between the holy God and His chosen people, which
had drawn back in the consciousness of its sinfulness from direct
communion with God (Ex. xx. 19). Like all communion, this
also was reciprocal. Priestly approach to God involved both
bringing to God, and bringing back from God. The priests brought
into the presence of God the sacrifices and gifts of the people, and
brought from God His gifts for the people, viz., reconciliation and
His blessing.
8. But from the very nature of such a mediatorial office, two
things were essential to its true and perfect performance; and these
the Aaronic priest no more possessed than any one else in the nation
which stood in need of mediation.
If it was the consciousness of their own sinfulness which,
according to Ex. xx. 19, prevented the people from drawing near to
God, and holding direct intercourse with Him; the question arises,
how Aaron and his sons, who belonged to the same nation, and
were involved in the same sinfulness, could possibly venture to come
into the presence of Jehovah. The first and immediate demand
for a perfect priesthood, appointed to mediate between the holy God
and the sinful nation, would be perfect sinlessness; but how little
did the family of Aaron, involved as it was in the general sinful-
ness, answer to this demand
Secondly, and this was no less essential, true and all-sufficient
mediation required that the mediator himself should possess a
doublesidedness; and in this the Aaronic priest was quite as defi-
cient as in the first thing demanded, namely, perfect sinlessness. To
represent the people in the presence of Jehovah, and Jehovah in
the presence of the people, and to be able to set forth in his own
person the mediation between the two, he ought to stand in essential
union on the one hand with the people, and on the other with God
and in order fully to satisfy this demand, he ought to be as much
THE PRIESTS. 37
divine as human. But the Aaronic priesthood partook of human

nature only, and not at all of divine.
Both demands were satisfied in an absolutely perfect way in
that High Priest alone (Heb. vii. 26, 27), to whose coming and
manifestation the entire history of salvation pointed, who, uniting
in His own person both deity and humanity, was sent in the ful-
ness of time to the chosen people, and through their instrumen-
tality (Gen. xii. 3, xxviii. 14) to the whole human race, and through
whom, just as Aaron's sons attained to the priesthood by virtue of
their lineal descent from Aaron, so, by means of spiritual regenera-
tion and sonship (1 Pet. ii. 5, 9), the universal spiritual priesthood
and "kingdom of priests" have been actually realized, the members
of which are redeemed from sin, and partakers of the divine nature
(2 Pet. i. 4), and of which, according to Ex. xix. 4-6, Israel was
called and appointed to be the first-born possessor (Ex. iv. 22).
But as the manifestation of this priesthood could not be, and
was not intended to be, the commencement and starting point, but
only the goal and fruit, of the whole of the Old Testament history
of salvation; and yet, in order that this goal might be reached, it
was indispensably necessary that intercourse with God through the
mediation of a priest should be secured to the chosen nation of the old
covenant; the priesthood of that time could only typically prefigure
the priesthood of the future, and could only possess in a symbolical
and typical manner the two essential prerequisites, sinlessness and
a divine nature. The former it acquired through washing and a
sacrificial atonement, the latter by investiture and anointing on
the occasion of its institution and consecration (Ex. xxix. cf. 165
sqq.); and these were renewed previous to the discharge of every
priestly function by repeated washings, and by the assumption of
the official dress, which had already been anointed (Ex. xxix. 21).
The sacrificial atonement, which was made at the first dedication,
had to be repeated, not only on every occasion on which a priest
was conscious of any sin or uncleanness, but also once a year (on
the great day of atonement, cf. 199), for the cancelling of all the
sin and uncleanness of the entire priesthood which might have re-
mained unnoticed; and this must be effected before any further
priestly acts could be performed. Moreover, the demand for sin-
lessne.ss had its fixed symbolical expression in the demand for phy-
sical perfection, as the indispensable prerequisite to any active
participation in the service of the priesthood (Lev. xxi. 16-24).
9. As the Levites and priests were separated by their voca-
tion, and by their appointment to the service of the sanctuary, from

the rest of the tribes, and did not receive, as the rest had done, a
special allotment of territory in the Holy Land, where they could
provide for their own wants by the cultivation of the soil, their
maintenance had to be provided for in a different way. The tribe
of Levi was to have no inheritance in the promised land, for, said
Jehovah, I am thy part and thine inheritance (Num xviii. 20;
Deut. x. 9, etc.). At the same time forty-eight cities were assigned
to them as dwelling-places, distributed among all the tribes (that by
their knowledge of the law they might be of service to all as teach-
ers, preceptors, judges, and mediators: cf. Lev. x. 11); and thir-
teen of these cities were specially designated a cities of the priests"
(Num. xxxv. 1-8; Josh. xxi.; 1 Chron. vi. 54-66).1 But for their
actual maintenance they were referred to Jehovah, in whose service
they were to be entirely employed; so that it was only right that
Jehovah should provide for their remuneration. This was done,
by His assigning to them all the revenues and dues which the people
bad to pay to Him as the Divine King and feudal Lord of all.
These included the first-fruits and tenths of all the produce of the
1
As the priesthood was limited, after the death of Aaron's eldest sons,
Nadab and Abihu, to the families of his other two sons, and therefore cannot
have embraced more than from ten to twenty persons at the time of the entrance
into the Holy Land, there is apparently a great disproportion between the number
of priests' cities and the actual need,--on the supposition, that is to say, that
these thirteen cities were intended to be occupied exclusively by priests. But
for that very reason such a supposition is obviously a mistake. Even the so-
called priests' cities were undoubtedly, for the most part, inhabited by Levites,
and only distinguished from the rest of their cities by the fact, that one or more
of the families of the priests resided there. Just as Jerusalem was called the
king's city, though it was not inhabited by the court alone, so might these thir-
teen cities be called priests' cities, even if there were only one priestly family
residing there. When we consider that the number of priests' cities was not
fixed by the law, but was determined in Joshua's time (chap. xxi. 4), and that
the number 13, which admits of no symbolical interpretation whatever, can only
have been decided upon because of some existing necessity, it is more than proba-
ble that the number of priests at that time was exactly 13, and that at first there
was only one priestly family in every priests' city. It is true, that if we deduct
the home of the high priest, the one head of the entire priesthood, who dwelt,
no doubt, wherever the tabernacle was, the number 12 remains, answering to the
number of the tribes, which may be significant as a contingency, but was not
determined on account of that significance, since the 24 orders of priests, which
were afterwards appointed, do not appear to have been connected at all with the
number of the tribes; nor was one priests' city taken from each tribe, but the
selection was confined to the three tribes nearest to the sanctuary, Judah, Simeon,
and Benjamin.
THE PLACE OF SACRIFICE. 39
land, as well as the first-born of men and cattle, which were partly
presented in kind, and had partly to be redeemed with money. Of
all the sacrificial animals, too, which the people offered to Jehovah
spontaneously, and for some reason of their own, certain portions
were the perquisites of the officiating priest, unless they were
entirely consumed upon the altar; and this was only the case with
the so-called burnt-offerings.
All the first-fruits and first-born came directly to the priests.
In these the Levies did not participate, because they had them-
selves been appointed as menial servants to the priests, in the place
of the first-born who were sanctified in Egypt. On the other hand,
the tithes fell to the share of the Levites, who handed a tenth of
them over to the priests.
CHAPTER II.
THE PLACE OF SACRIFICE.
10. The patriarchs had erected simple altars for the worship
of God in every place at which they sojourned (Gen. viii. 20, xii. 7,
xiii. 18, etc.). Even the house of God, which Jacob vowed that
he would erect at Luz (= Bethel: Gen. xxviii. 22), was nothing
more than an altar, as the execution of the vow in Gen. xxxv. 1, 7,
clearly proves. When the unity of the patriarchal family had been
expanded into a plurality of tribes, houses, and families, and these
again were formed by the covenant at Sinai into the unity of the
priestly covenant nation, a corresponding unity in the place of
worship became also necessary. The idea of the theocracy, accord-
ing to which the God of Israel was also the King of Israel, and
dwelt in the midst of Israel; the appointment and vocation of the
people to be a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation (Ex. xix.
6); the temporary refusal to enter upon the duties of that vocation
(Ex. xx. 19); the consequent postponement of it till a future time;
and the transference of it to a special priesthood belonging to the
tribe of Levi;--all this was to have its symbolical expression in the
new house of God. At the same time, it was necessary to create a
fitting substratum for the incomparably richer ceremonial appointed
by the law.
Moses therefore caused a sanctuary to be erected, answering to
40 THE PLACE OF SACRIFICE.
these wants and demands, according to the pattern which Jehovah

had shown him on the holy mount (Ex. xxv. 9, 40), and by the
builders expressly appointed by God, Bezaleel and Aholiab (Ex.
xxxi. 2, xxxvi. 1, 2). To meet the necessities of the journey
through the desert, it was constructed in the form of a portable
tent, and consisted of the dwelling (NKAw;miha) and a court surrounding
it on every side (rceHAha, Ex. xxv.-xxxi. and xxxv.-xl.).
The DWELLING itself was an oblong of thirty yards in length,
and ten yards in breadth and height, built on the southern, northern,
and western sides of upright planks of acacia-wood overlaid with
gold. Over the whole there were placed four coverings. The inner
one, consisting of costly woven materials (byssus woven in different
colours, with figures of cherubim upon it), was so arranged as to
form the drapery of the interior of the dwelling, whilst the other
three were placed outside. In the front of the building, towards the
east, there were five gilded pillars of acacia-wood; and on these a
curtain was suspended, which closed the entrance to the dwelling,
and bore the name of j`sAmA.
The interior of the dwelling was divided into two parts by a
second curtain, sustained by four pillars, and made of the same
costly fabric and texture as the innermost covering. Of these
two parts the further (or westerly) was called the MOST HOLY,
MywidAQA wd,qo and was a perfect cube of ten cubits in length, breadth,
and height; so that the other part, or the HOLY, wd,qo.ha, was of the
same height and breadth, but twice as long. This inner curtain was
called tk,roPA.
The COURT was an uncovered space completely surrounding
the dwelling, 100 cubits long and 50 cubits broad, bounded by 60
wooden pillars of 5 cubits in height. The pillars stood 5 cubits
apart, and the spaces between were closed by drapery of twined
byssus. In the front, however, i.e., on the eastern side, there was
no drapery between the five middle pillars, so that an open space
was left as an entrance of 20 cubits broad; and this was closed by a
curtain of the same material and texture as the curtain at the door
of the tabernacle, and, like the latter, was called j`sAmA.
The position of the dwelling within the court is not mentioned.
It probably stood, however, so as to meet at the same time the
necessities of the case and the demands of symmetry, 20 cubits
from the pillars on the north, south, and west, leaving a space of 50
cubits square in front of the entrance to the tabernacle.
11. The ALTAR OF BURNT-OFFERING, hlAOfhA HBaz;mi, stood in the
COURT. It was a square case, made of acacia-wood, lined within

and without with copper, and filled with earth. It was five cubits in
lengthand breadth, but only three cubits high. At the four corners
there were four copper horns. About half-way up the chest there ran
a bank, bKor;Ka, all round the outside, evidently that the officiating
priests might stand upon it, and so be able to perform their duties at
the altar with greater convenience. From the outer edge of this bank
a network of copper sloped off to the ground. The space underneath
this grating was probably intended to receive the blood which re-
mained over from the sacrifices.--There was also a LAVER, rOy.Ki in
the court, in which the priests washed their hands and feet,--a pro-
cess that had to be repeated, according to Ex. xxx. 20, 21, every
time they entered the Holy Place or officiated at the altar.
In the HOLY PLACE there were three articles of furniture:--
1. The ALTAR. tr,Foq; rFaq;mi HBaz;mi or tr,Fo;q HBaz;mi, made of
acacia-wood overlaid with gold. It was one cubit in length, one in
breadth, and two in height, and stood in the centre, before the entrance
to the Holy of Holies. The upper surface, which was surrounded
by a rim, and had gilt horns at the four corners, was called gGA, a
term suggestive of the flat roofs of oriental houses. The principal
purpose to which it was applied was that of burning incense ; but
there were certain sacrificial animals whose blood was sprinkled
upon the horns.--2. The TABLE OF SHEW-BREAD, NHAl;wu.ha, also con-
structed of acacia-wood overlaid with gold, a cubit and a half in
height, two cubits long, and one cubit broad. Upon this was placed
the so-called shew-bread ( 1.59), which had to be changed every
week.--3. The SEVEN-BRANCHED CANDLESTICK, of pure
gold, and beaten work. From the upright stem there branched out,
at regular intervals, three arms on each side, which curved upwards
and reached as high as the top of the central stern. Each of these
was provided with one oil lamp, so that there were seven lamps in
a straight line, and probably at equal distances from one another.
The height of the candelabrum is not given.
In the MOST HOLY PLACE there was only one article of furni-
ture, viz., the ARK OF THE COVENANT or the ARK OF TESTIMONY,
tyriB;ha NOrxE, tUdfehA NOrxE. It consisted of two parts. The ark itself was a
chest of acacia-wood, covered within and without with gold plates,
two cubits and a half long, and one cubit and a half in breadth and
height. In the ark there was the testimony, tUdfehA; i.e., the two
tables of stone, which Moses had brought down from the holy mount,
containing the ten words of the fundamental law, written by the
finger of God. A plate of beaten gold, tr,PoKa, served as the lid of the
ark; and at each end of this lid stood a cherub of beaten gold. The
cherubim stood facing each other, and looking down upon the Cap-
poreth, which they overshadowed with their outspread wings. With
regard to the form of these cherubim, the figures of which were
also worked in the Parocheth, the curtain before the Most Holy,
and the inner covering of the tabernacle, all that we can gather
from the description is, that they were probably of human shape,
and that they had one face and two wings.
12. On the DESIGN OF THE SANCTUARY,1 the names them-
selves furnish some information. It was called the TENT OF
MEETING, dfeOm lh,xo and we may learn from Ex. xxv. 22, xxix.
43, what that name signifies. Jehovah says, that He will there
meet with the children of Israel, and talk with them, and sanctify
them through His glory. It is also called the DWELLING-PLACE,
NKAw;mi, as in Ex. xxv. 8, and xxix. 45, 46, Jehovah promises that
He will not merely meet with Israel there from time to time, but
dwell there constantly in the midst of them, and there make Himself
known to them as their God. Lastly, it is also called the TENT OF
WITNESS, tUdfehA lh,xo, where Jehovah bears witness through His
covenant and law that He is what He is, viz., the Holy One of
Israel, who will have Israel also to be holy as He is holy (Lev. xix.
2), and who qualifies Israel for it by His blessing and atoning grace
(Ex. xx. 24). In accordance with this design, as soon as it
was finished, the glory of Jehovah filled the tabernacle (Ex. xl.
34 sqq.).
The tabernacle, then, must represent an institution, in connection
with which Jehovah dwelt perpetually in Israel, to sanctify it--
an an institution, to establish which He had led them out of Egypt
(Ex. xxix. 46); which was not established, therefore, till after the
Exodus. This institution as is self-evident could be no other than
the theocracy founded at Sinai, or the kingdom of God in Israel,
the nature and design of which is described in Ex. xix. 4-6.
From this fundamental idea we may easily gather what was
involved in the distinction between the court and the tabernacle.
If the latter was the dwelling-place of Jehovah in the midst of
Israel, the former could only be the dwelling-place of that people
whose God was in the midst of it, just as the tabernacle was in the
1
A more elaborate and thorough discussion of the meaning of the
tabernacle and its furniture, is to be found in my Beitrage zur Symbolik des alttest.
Cultus (Leipzig 1851).
midst of the court. And the fact that the people were not allowed
to enter the dwelling of God, but could only approach the door-
permission to enter being restricted to their consecrated representa-
tives and mediators, the priests-irresistibly reminds us of Ex. xx.
19, and shows that the court was the abode of that people, which,
notwithstanding its priestly calling, was not yet able to come directly
to God, but still needed specially appointed priestly mediators to
enter the dwelling-place, to hold communion with God in their
stead, to offer the gifts of the people, and to bring back the proofs
of the favour of God.
But the dwelling-place of God was also divided into two parts
the HOLY PLACE, and the MOST HOLY. These were two apart-
ments in one dwelling. Now, since the relation between the
dwelling-place and the court presented the same antithesis as that
between the unpriestly nation and the Aaronic priesthood--and
since the ordinary priests were only allowed to enter the Holy Place,
whilst the high priest alone could enter the Most Holy,--it is evident
that the distinction between the Holy and Most Holy answered
essentially to that between the ordinary priest and the high priest;
and therefore, that the abode of God in the Most Holy set forth the
highest culmination of the abode of God in Israel, which, for that
very reason, exhibited in its strongest form the fact that He was
then unapproachable to Israel. A comparison between the name
Holy of Holies, and the corresponding "heaven of heavens," in
Deut. x. 14, 1 Kings viii. 27, also leads to the conclusion, not that
the Most Holy was a type of heaven in its highest form, but that it
contained the same emphatic expression of the Jehovistic (saving)
presence and operations of God in. the kingdom of grace, as the
name "heaven of heavens" of the Elohistic presence and operations
of God in the kingdom of nature.
The division of the dwelling-place into Holy and Most Holy was
an indication of the fact, therefore, that in the relation in which
the priests stood to God, and consequently also in that in which the
people would stand when they were ripe for their priestly vocation,
there are two different stages of approachability. The constant
seat and throne of God was the Capporeth, where His glory was
enthroned between the wings of the cherubim (Num. vii. 89; Ex.
xxv. 22). But as the room in which all this took place was hidden
by the Parocheth from the sight of those who entered and officiated
in the Holy Place, the latter represents the standpoint of that
faith which has not yet attained to the sight of the glory of God,
and the Most Holy the standpoint of the faith which has already
attained to sight (vide 1 Cor. xiii. 12).
The threefold division of the tabernacle contained a figurative
and typical representation of the three progressive stages, by which
the kingdom of God on earth arrives at its visible manifestation and
ultimate completion. In the COURT there was displayed the existing
stage, when Israel, as the possessor of the kingdom of God, still stood
in need of priestly mediators; in the HOLY PLACE, the next stage,
when the atonement exhibited in type in the court, would be com-
pleted, and the people themselves would be able in consequence to
exercise their priestly calling and draw near to God; in the MOST
HOLY, the last stage of all, when the people of God will have
attained to the immediate vision of His glory. This triple stage of
approach to God, which was set forth simultaneously in space in the
symbolism of the tabernacle, is realized successively in time through
the historical development of the kingdom of God. The first stage
was the Israelitish theocracy; the second is the Christian Church;
the third and last will be the heavenly Jerusalem of the Apocalypse.
Each of the two earlier stages contains potentially within itself all
that has still to come; but it contains it only as an ideal in faith
and hope. For the first stage, therefore, it was requisite that
representations and types of the two succeeding stages should be
visibly displayed in the place appointed for worship.
13. The principal object in the court, and that in which its
whole significance culminated, was the ALTAR OF BURNT-OFFERING.
The first thing which strikes the eye in connection with an altar is,
that it represents an ascent from the earth towards heaven ( hmABA =
altare), a lifting of the earth above its ordinary and natural level.
From the time that Jehovah ceased to walk with man upon the
earth, and hold intercourse with him there, as He had done before
the fall (Gen. iii. 8), and the earth was cursed for man's sin in
consequence of the fall (Gen. iii. 17), and heaven and earth became
so separated, the one from the other, that God came down from
heaven to reveal Himself to man (Gen. xi. 5, xviii. 21), and then
went up again to heaven (Gen. xvii. 22),--the natural level of the
earth was no longer adapted to the purpose of such intercourse. It
was necessary, therefore, to raise the spot where man desired to
hold communion with God, and present to Him his offerings, into
an altar rising above the curse. Whilst the name hmABA expressed
what an altar was, viz., an elevation of the earth, the other and
ordinary name of the altar indicated the purpose which it served
it was a place of sacrifice, on which sinful man presented his slain

offering for the atonement and sanctification of his soul before God.
But the altar which JEHOVAH caused to be built, was not merely
the raising of the earth towards the heaven where God had dwelt
since sin drove Him from the earth, but also the place where heaven
itself, or rather He who fills heaven with His glory, came down to
meet the rising earth;--not only the spot where man offered his gifts
to Jehovah, but also the spot where God came to meet the gifts of
man and gave His blessing in return. For Jehovah promised this
in Ex. xx. 24: "In all places where I record My name, I will
come unto thee and bless thee." But an altar, however high it may
be built, does not reach to the heaven where God dwells. In itself,
therefore, it merely expresses the upward desires of man. And
these desires are not realized and satisfied, till God Himself comes
down from heaven upon the altar.
According to Ex. xx. 24, 25, it was a general rule for an altar
to be built of earth or unhewn stones, as still retaining their
original form and component elements. It is true that this very
composition of earth and stone represented the curse, which adhered
to them in their existing natural condition. But man, with all his
art and diligence, is unable to remove this curse. Consequently, no
tooling or chiselling of his was to be allowed at all. Whatever he
might do, he could not sanctify the altar which was formed from
the earth that had been cursed. That could be done by none but
God, who had promised "to record His name there" (Ex. xx.
24),--"to give the atoning blood upon the altar, to make an atone-
ment for their souls" (Lev. xvii. 11). Jehovah appointed and
consecrated the place where the altar was to be built; He gave to
the blood of the sacrifice, that was sprinkled upon it, the atoning
worth which it possessed; and He caused the smoke of the sacrifice
which was consumed upon the altar to become a sweet smelling
savour, as representing the self-surrender of man (Gen. viii. 21).
The elevated earth, which formed the altar in the court, was
surrounded by a wooden chest covered with copper, to give it a
firm cohesion and fixed form. By the square shape of the surround-
ing walls the seal of the kingdom of God was impressed upon it.
The altar, therefore, was the evident representative of the Old
Testament institution of atonement and sanctification, by which
the expiation of sinful man and the sanctifying self-surrender of
the expiated sinner were effected before God. This being its mean-
ing, it could only stand in the court, the abode of the sinful, though
reconcilable nation, which could not yet draw near directly to

Jehovah, but still needed the mediation of the Levitical priesthood
for the presentation of its sacrifices and gifts.
In our interpretation of the HORNS, which rose from the altar at
its four corners, we need not refer, as Bahr (Symbolik 1, 472) and
Keil (Arch. 1, 104) do, to passages in which the horn of the ani-
mal is mentioned as indicative of strength, or as its glory and orna-
ment; nor to those in which the horn is used as the symbol of the
fulness and superabundance of blessing and salvation; but, as
Hofmann and Kliefoth have done, to such passages as Isa. v. 1,
where the term horn is applied to an eminence running up to a point.
For the idea of height is the predominant one in connection with
the altar; and the only thing, therefore, that comes into considera-
tion is, what the horn is in relation to the height of the animal,
viz., its loftiest point,--and not what it is as an ornament or
weapon. Still farther from the mark, however, is the allusion to
the horn as a symbol of fulness; for the horn acquires this signifi-
cance merely as something separated from the animal, or as a vessel
shaped like a horn that has been taken of. The horns on the altar
increased its height. Consequently, the blood sprinkled on the
horns of the altar was brought nearer to God, than that which was
merely sprinkled on the sides.
14. Since the Holy Place, as we saw, was a part of the abode
of God which the priests alone could enter, as the mediators of a
nation which, notwithstanding its priestly calling, was still unpriestly,
the three articles of furniture in the Holy Place, together with the
offerings connected with them, foreshadowed typically what the
nation, regarded as a priestly nation, was to offer to its God in
gifts and sacrifices, and what qualities and powers it was to unfold
before Him. And as the way to the Holy Place necessarily lay
through the court, where atonement was made for the sinful
nation, and where it dedicated and consecrated itself afresh to its
God, and entered anew into fellowship with Him; the offerings in
the Holy Place are to be regarded as symbols of such gifts and ser-
vices, as none but a nation reconciled, sanctified, and in fellowship
with God, could possibly present.
Of the three articles of furniture in the Holy Place, the ALTAR
OF INCENSE was unquestionably the most significant and important.
This is indicated not only by its position between the other two,
and immediately in front of the entrance to the Most Holy, but
also by its appointment and designation as an altar, on the horns of
which the blood of atonement, that was brought into the Holy
Place ( 107), was sprinkled; inasmuch as this established an
essential and necessary relation between it and the altar of the
court on the one hand, and the Capporeth of the Most Holy on the
other. It is true, the sacrifices which were offered upon this altar,
and ascended to God in fire, were not the bleeding sacrifices of
atonement, but the bloodless sacrifices of incense, which, as our
subsequent investigation will show ( 146), represented the prayers
of the congregation, that had just before been, reconciled, sanctified,
and restored to fellowship with God, by the bleeding sacrifice of
the court. The altar of incense stood in the same relation to the
altar of burnt-offering, as the Holy Place to the court, as the
priestly nation to the unpriestly, as the prayer of thanksgiving and
praise from those already reconciled and sanctified to the desire and
craving for reconciliation and sanctification, and as the splendour
of the gold seven times purified, in which it was enclosed, to the
dull, dead colour of the copper which surrounded the altar in the
court. It was a repetition of the altar that stood in the court, but
a repetition in a higher form.
The two other articles of furniture, the TABLE OF SREW-BREAD
and the CANDLESTICK, were offshoots, as it were, of the altar of
incense, as their position on either side indicates; and the peculiar
form of each was determined by the offerings which it held; for
the bread required a table, and the lights a candelabrum. What
was combined together in one article of furniture in the altar of
burnt-offering in the court, was here resolved into three, which
served to set forth the ideas in question in a much more complete
and many-sided manner (cf. 158 sqq.).
15. In the MOST HOLY, as the abode of God in the fullest
sense of the word, and in the most thorough unapproachableness,
there was but one article of furniture, though one consisting of
is several parts, viz., the ARK OF THE COVENANT, with the CAPPORETH.
Hengstenberg's view, expressed in his Dissertations on the Penta-
teuch (vol. ii. 525, translation), which may perhaps look plausible at
first sight,--viz., that the covering of the ark, or of the law contained
in it, by the Capporeth, was intended to express the idea, that the
grace of God had covered or silenced the accusing and condemning
voice of the law,--will be found, on closer and more careful investiga-
tion, to be defective and inadmissible on every account (see my Bei-
trage zur Symbolik der Alttest. Cultus-statte, pp. 28 sqq.). I have
the greater reason for still regarding the course of argument adopted
as satisfactory, because Keil has been induced by it to give up

Hengstenberg's view, and in all essential points to adopt my own. I
will repeat the leading points of my argument here.
First of all, it must be borne in mind, that the ark of the cove-
nant answered a double purpose: (1) to preserve the tables of the
law, and (2) to serve as a support and basis to the Capporeth. Let
us commence with the former. As the receptacle for the two tables
of the law, it was called the "ark of the testimony," or "ark of the
covenant." The tables of the law were named the testimony, tUdfehA,
because in them God furnished the people with a testimony to His
own nature and will. This attestation was the preliminary, the
foundation and the soul of the covenant which He concluded with
His people. Hence the ark of the testimony was also called the
"ark of the covenant," tyriB;ha NOrxE. In like manner, the tables of the
law are also called "the tables of, the covenant" (Dent. ix. 9, 11,
15), and the words engraved upon them the words of the cove-
nant" (Ex. xxxiv. 28). And, in certain cases, the former are de-
signated in simple terms as "the covenant" (tyriB;ha, equivalent to
the record of the covenant: 1 Kings viii. 21; 2 Chron. vi. 11).
There can be no doubt, therefore, that the tables of the law lying in
the ark were looked upon as an attestation of the covenant con-
cluded with Israel, and as that alone. But this record of the cove-
nant did not lie naked and open; on the contrary, it was enclosed
in an ark or chest,--the place of the lid being taken by the Cap-
poreth. This showed that it was not only a treasure, but the most
costly jewel, the dearest possession of Israel. And it was worthy of
such estimation; for, having been written by the finger of God, it
was a divine testimony, a pledge of the continuance and perpetuity
of the covenant made with God, and a guarantee of the eventual
fulfilment of all the promises attached to this covenant, and of all
the purposes of salvation which it was designed to subserve.
The ark, with the testimony within it, was also a support to the
Capporeth. For the Capporeth was not merely intended as a lid
for the ark, but had an independent purpose of its own. This is
evident from the name itself, which is derived from the Piel rPeKi
and is to be rendered, not covering, but "seat of atonement," ;
i[lasth<rion, propitiatorum ("mercy-seat," Luther, etc.). rPeKi denotes
not a local material covering, but a spiritual one; and the object of
this covering is always and everywhere the sin of man. For this
reason, the name Capporeth cannot possibly be understood as de-
noting the fact that it covered the tables of the law. For the object
to be covered by the Capporeth, i.e., to be atoned for, could not be

anything that came from God, and least of all God's holy law.
Moreover, the law of God was to be anything but covered up, that
is to say, covered up in any sense that would represent its voice as
silenced.
The Capporeth, therefore, apart from the fact that it closed up
the ark, must have been something in itself, must have had its own
significance and purpose within itself. And though it did un-
doubtedly form a material, local covering to the ark, this can only
have been of subordinate, collateral, and secondary importance.
16. But what was this real, independent, primary, and princi-
pal significance of the Capporeth? Keil's interpretation (Archao-
logie i. 114) falls back into Bahr's error, of confounding the king-
dom of nature with that of grace, or natural revelation with the
revelation of salvation, and is altogether beside the mark. Accord-
ing to his view, "the Capporeth resembled the firmament, and bore
the name Capporeth or mercy-seat, because the highest and most
perfect act of atonement in the Old Testament economy was per-
fected upon it, and God, who betrothed Himself to His people in
grace and mercy by an everlasting covenant, sate enthroned there-
on." The latter part,--namely, that the Capporeth was the highest
medium of atonement in the old covenant, and at the same time
was the throne of Jehovah, which, though for the time unapproach-
able by the people, was nevertheless erected upon earth and in the
midst of Israel,--is unquestionably perfectly correct; but for that
very reason the Capporeth could not possibly represent the firma-
ment. Or are we to suppose, that the highest and most perfect act
of atonement in the old covenant ought properly to have been per-
formed upon the firmament of heaven, but that, as this could not
well be accomplished, a representation of it was placed as its sub-
stitute in the Holy of Holies? And was the true act of expiation
in the fulness of time, of which this was only a shadow and type
( 56), really performed above the firmament, i.e., in heaven?
Was it not rather accomplished on earth, in the land of Judaea?
No doubt "that God, who betrothed Himself to His people in grace
and mercy by an everlasting covenant," was enthroned upon the
Capporeth. But this betrothal took place, not above the firma-
ment, i.e., in heaven, but on the earth, at Sinai. Jehovah came
down for the purpose (Ex. xix. 20); and the glory of Jehovah
entered the sanctuary, and took up its permanent place upon the
Capporeth (Ex. xl. 34 sqq. ; Num. vii. 89; Ex. xxv. 22). Un-
questionably there is also a throne of God in the heaven of heavens,

which stands upon the firmament; but the throne of God in the
Most Holy Place on earth was so far from being a copy or repre-
sentative of that heavenly throne, that it rather presented a contrast,
and one as sharp as that between heaven and earth, nature and
grace, Elohim and Jehovah.
This confusion of ideas, which Keil himself has generally kept
distinct enough elsewhere (Arch. i. 94 sqq.), has evidently arisen
from his being misled by the connection between the Capporeth
and the figures of the two cherubim and the fact that the latter
are often represented as surrounding the throne of God in heaven.
But if Jehovah, in addition to the throne in heaven, established one
also for Himself upon earth, could He not surround the latter with
cherubim also? Moreover, Keil has involved himself, without per-
ceiving it, in the most striking self-contradictions. Figures of
cherubim, precisely similar to those which stood upon the Cappo-
reth, were also woven into the inner covering of the tabernacle, and
into the curtain which separated the Holy Place from the Most
Holy. Now if the Capporeth must represent the firmament of
heaven because of the cherubim standing upon it, simple consis-
tency requires that the entire space of the Holy and Most Holy
should be regarded as a figurative representation of heaven. And
this Bahr actually maintains, though Keil rejects such a view as
thoroughly unscriptural, and decides correctly that the tabernacle
was a figure of the kingdom of God in Israel (p. 95).
What the Capporeth was really intended to represent, is evident
from its name, and practically exhibited in the fact that the
highest and most perfect expiation was effected upon it. It was
called, and was primarily, a means of atonement (i[lasth<rion, propi-
tiatorium). By the circumstance that on the great day of atone-
ment (Lev. xvi.) the blood of the holiest sin-offering was sprinkled
upon it, just as the blood of the ordinary sacrifices on ordinary days
was sprinkled upon the horns of the altar of burnt-offering in
the court, or upon the altar of incense in the Holy Place, it was
shown to be an altar,--but an altar that was as much higher and
holier than the other two altars, as the Most Holy Place was higher
and holier than the Holy Place and the court of the tabernacle.
But there were two other peculiarities connected with this altar.
As the Capporeth acquired the form of an altar simply from its
connection with the ark, inasmuch as without this support it
would have been merely an altar-plate, and the essential charac-
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF SACRIFICE. 51
teristic, viz., that of elevation, would have been wanting; so this

altar acquired its higher sanctity and worth, in part at least, from
the fact that it contained within it the "testimony," the covenant,
--that is to say, the record of the covenant, the costliest treasure in
the possession of Israel. But in a still higher degree did its incom-
parable sanctity grow out of the fact, that the glory of Jehovah
rested between the wings of the cherubim that overshadowed it,
whereby the altar became the throne of God--the throne of grace.
Now, since the support of the throne, together with the Capporeth
as an altar-plate, enclosed the record of the covenant, or the cove-
nant testimony and covenant pledge; the idea expressed was this,
that Jehovah's being enthroned in this place was based upon, and
rendered possible by, the covenant which God had concluded
with Israel, and the institution of atonement which He had given
(Lev. xvii. 11). With reference to the altar of burnt-offering, the
promise had also been given (Ex. xx. 24), that Jehovah would
come down to Israel there to receive their offerings, and recompense
them by His blessing. But there He came invisibly, in a manner
that could only be grasped by faith, not by sight; whereas upon
the throne-altar in the Most Holy Place He descended, or rather
was enthroned, in a visible (symbolical) form, viz., in the cloud,
which represented the glory of Jehovah, and was visible to the eyes
of those who were permitted to pass within the veil (Lev. xvi. 2,
cf. 199).
CHAPTER III.
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF SACRIFICE.
17. The term offering,1 when used in a general sense in

connection with divine worship, usually denotes, according to its
derivation from of erre, the dedication of any suitable possession
to God, or to divine purposes. So far as etymology and the usage
of the language are concerned, this idea is distinctly expressed in
the Hebrew term NbAr;qA, Corban, i.e., presentation (equivalent to tOnT;ma
wd,qo, "holy gifts," in Ex. xxviii. 38; vid. Mark vii. 11, "Corban,
that is to say, a gift"). Such presents, which had all to be brought
1
The German Opfer corresponds rather to our word sacrifice; but it was
necessary to substitute the word offering here.--TR.
52 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF SACRIFICE
to the dwelling-place of God and delivered up in the court, inas-

much as they were gifts for God, might either be offered to God
and to His sanctuary for a permanent possession or use--as was the
case, for example, and chiefly, with all the offerings devoted to the
erection, furnishing, and maintenance of the sanctuary (cf. Num.
vii. 3, 11, 12, 13, 77, xxxi. 50), as well as with such objects of
vows as became Corban in consequence of the vow (Mark vii. 11)
--or the thing presented might be appropriated to and consumed
in the service of God, or for His glory. The offerings of the latter
kind were divided again into two classes, which differed essentially,
according as they were laid upon the altar and offered directly to
God, either in whole or in part, by being consumed in the fire or
else applied at once and entirely to the remuneration and mainten-
ance of the priests and Levites as the servants of Jehovah ( 69),
The latter were regarded as the taxes, which the people had to pay
to the God-King Jehovah, the true Owner of the land. They in-
cluded the first fruits and tithes of all the produce of the land, as
well as the male first-born of man and beast. But the first-born of
men and of the unclean animals--i.e., of such as were not edible,
and therefore not fit for sacrifice--had to be redeemed, whilst the
first-born of clean animals, or those fit for sacrifice, were partly
consumed upon the altar; so that, to a certain extent, they belonged
to both classes (Num. xviii. 17, 18, cf. 229). Thus, we find, there
were three classes of offerings: (1) Corbanim for the sanctuary of.
Jehovah, or DEDICATION GIFTS; (2) Corbanim for the maintenance
of the servants of Jehovah, or FEUDAL TAXES (first-fruits, tithes,
and first-born); and (3) Corbanim for Jehovah Himself, or ALTAR-
SACRIFICES. Of the last, some were called most holy (MywidAqA wd,qo),
viz., such as were either consumed entirely upon the altar, or, so far
as they were not consumed, were eaten by the priests, and by
them alone. Cf. Knobel on Lev. xxi. 22.
In the present work we have to do with the gifts of the third
class alone, i e., with the Corbanim which were placed either in
whole or in part upon the altar. Even in the Thorah the name
Corban is applied pre-eminently to these.
18. Hengstenberg (Opfer, p. 4) very properly blames Bahr,
and others who have followed him, for commencing their attempt to
determine the nature and meaning of sacrifice, in the stricter sense
of the term, with Lev. xvii. 11, where, as we have already seen
( 11), the prohibition to eat blood is based upon the fact, that
the soul of the flesh is in the blood, and Jehovah gave the blood
to His people upon the altar, to make atonement therewith for their
souls. In this passage they imagined that they had found "the
key to the whole of the Mosaic theory of sacrifice." It is perfectly
obvious, however, that Lev. xvii. 11 merely furnishes the key to
the sprinkling of the blood in the case of the sacrifice of animals.
But the question, whether, as has been maintained on that side, an
explanation of the sprinkling of the blood prepares the way for
understanding the other functions connected with the sacrifice of
animals, or whether the animal sacrifices alone could lay claim to the
character of independent offerings, whilst the bloodless (vegetable)
gifts were merely to be regarded as accompaniments to the bleeding
(animal) sacrifices, must be determined, even if it could be proved
at all, from the special inquiry which follows afterwards, and there-
fore, even if correct, ought not to be laid down as an a priori axiom.
But what both Hengstenberg and Keil have adopted as the basis
and key to the altar-sacrifices, both bleeding and bloodless, is cer-
tainly quite as inadmissible as that laid down by Bahr. The true
basis is said to be found in Ex. xxiii. 15, "My face shall not be
seen empty," or as it reads in Deut. xvi. 16, "Appear not empty
before the face of Jehovah;" to which is added by way of expla-
nation in ver. 17, "Every one according to the gift of his hand,
according to the blessing which Jehovah thy God has given." It is
really incomprehensible how these two theologians could fall into
the mistake of regarding the passages quoted as the basis of the
whole sacrificial worship; for, according to both the context and the
true meaning of the words, they have nothing to do with it, or
rather, are directly at variance with its provisions. The amount of
the sacrifices to be offered upon the altar (whether bleeding or
bloodless) was not determined, in the majority of cases, as it is in
Deut. xvi. 17, by the possessions or income of the person sacrificing.
The command of the law of sacrifice was not "according to the
gift of his hand, according to the blessing which Jehovah thy God
hath given thee." The exact amount was prescribed in every case
by the law; and the difference in the worth of the offerings was
regulated, not by the wealth and income of the sacrificer, but partly
by his position in the theocracy (i.e., by the question, whether he
was priest, prince, or private individual), and partly by differences
in the occasion for the sacrifice.1 But apart from this, how can our
1
It is to be hoped that no one will be sufficiently wanting in perspicacity
to bring forward as an objection to my statement the fact, that a poor man, who
was not in a condition to bring the sheep which was normally required, was
54 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF SACRIFICE.
opponents have overlooked the fact, that these passages do not refer
to the altar-sacrifices in particular, which they ought to do to war-
rant such an application, and not even to the Corbanim in general,
or as a whole. They apply exclusively and expressly to the first-
fruits and tenths to be offered on the three harvest festivals; and
they could not refer to anything else, even if no such statement
had been made. How complete a mistake this quid pro quo is, is
also evident from the fact, that if, instead of restricting the demand
there expressed to the harvest festivals and the harvest gifts, we
extend it, as Hengstenberg and Keil have done, to the sacrificial
worship generally; then to enter the Holy Place, where the name
of Jehovah dwelt, without offering sacrifice,--say even for the pur-
pose of praying, or of beholding the beautiful service of the Lord
(Ps. xxvii. 4, ciii. 4, and lxxxiv.; Luke ii. 27, 37, etc.),--would
necessarily have been regarded as an act of wickedness and pre-
sumption.
19. Since, therefore, neither the passages adduced by Bahr,
nor those which Hengstenberg cites as containing the key to the
nature and meaning of sacrifice, are available for the purpose, and
since no others offer themselves, the only course left open is to
take as our starting point the connection between the sacrifices in
the more restricted sense of the word and all the rest of the offer-
ings. We have to examine, therefore, (1) what they had in cour-
mon with the other Corbanim, and O 2 in what they differed from
them.
The three classes of Corbanim ( 17) were all holy gifts. They
were called holy, because they were all related to Jehovah, whether
they were offered and appropriated to Him directly and personally,
or whether they fell to the portion of His servants the Levites and
priests, or to His dwelling-place the sanctuary. In the case of all
of them, those prescribed by the law (gifts of duty), as well as
free-will offerings presented without constraint or necessity (spon-
taneous gifts), the real foundation of the offering was the conscious-
ness of entire dependence upon God and entire obligation towards
Him--a consciousness which is always attended by the desire to
embody itself in such gifts as these. The main point was never the
material, pecuniary worth of the gifts themselves, either in connec-
tion with their presentation on the part of man, or their acceptance
on the part of God. The God whom the Israelite had recognised
allowed to offer a pigeon instead, and if this were impossible, to offer the tenth
part of an ephah of wheaten flour. Lev. v. 11.
as the Creator of heaven and earth, could not possibly desire the
offering of earthly blessings for their own sake; He could not care
about the gift, but only about the giver, that is to say, about the
feelings, of which the gift was the expression and embodiment.
Hence the possession, which the worshipper gave up, was the repre-
sentative of his person, his heart, his emotions. In these gifts,
which were his justly acquired property, gained by the sweat of his
face and the exercise of his earthly calling, he offered, in a certain
sense, an objective portion of himself, since the sweat of his own
labour adhered to it, and he had expended his own vital energy
upon it, and thereby, as it were, really given it life. In this way
he gave expression to his consciousness of the absolute dependence
of his whole life and activity upon the grace and blessing of God,
and to his obligation to devote it entirely to God and to divine pur-
poses in praise, thanksgiving, and prayer. He gave partially back
to God, what he had received entirely from God, and had wrought
out and acquired through the blessing of God. And in the part, he
sanctified and consecrated the whole, or all that he retained and
applied to the maintenance of his own life and strength, and with
this his own life also, to the maintenance of which he had devoted
it. "It is true (says Oehler, Reallex. x. 614), the impulse from
within, which urges a man to the utterance of praise, thanksgiving,
and prayer to God, finds its expression in the words of devotion;
but it is fully satisfied only when those words are embodied, when
they acquire, as it were, an objective existence in some appropriate
act, in which the man incurs some expense by self-denial and self-
renunciation, and thus gives a practical proof of the earnestness of
his self-dedication to God."
20. If we proceed now to examine what it was, that constituted
the essential difference between the Corbanim of the third class and
those of the other two, we shall find it in the peculiar relation in
which the former stood to the altar. For this reason we have de-
signated the offerings of the third class altar-offerings. In material
substance, it is true, they were essentially the same as those of the
second class (the feudal payments). The objects presented were in
both instances the produce of agriculture and grazing; in both
there were animal and vegetable, bleeding and bloodless, offerings;
and they were both alike the fruit and produce of the life and work
connected with the ordinary occupation, or the means by which life
was invigorated and sustained. But the difference was this: some
went directly to the priests and Levites, whilst the others were given
directly and personally to Jehovah, through the relation in which

they were placed to the altar. For the altar was the spot upon
which men presented their gifts to Jehovah who dwelt on high, and
to which Jehovah came down to receive the gifts and bless the
giver (Ex. xx. 24). All the Corbanim of the third class, whether
animal or vegetable, were burned upon the altar in whole or part,
and on that account are designated in the Thorah either hw,xi (firing,
from wxe fire), or hOAhy; ywe.xi (Jehovah's firing). What the purpose of
this burning upon the altar was, is evident from the almost universal
formula: hOAhyl; hw,.xi HaOHyni Hayrel; (i.e., firing to the savour of peace, of
satisfaction, of good pleasure for Jehovah), Ex. xxix. 41; Lev. viii. 21,
etc. (see also Gen. viii. 21). Jehovah smelt the vapour as it ascended
from the burning,--i.e., the essence of the sacrificial gift purified by
a fire from the merely earthly elements,--and found peace, satisfaction,
good pleasure therein. The gift was intended for Him personally,
and He accepted it personally, and that with good-will; and, ac-
cording to Ex. xx. 24, He blessed the giver in consequence. But if,
as we have seen, it was not the gift as such that Jehovah desired,
but the gift as the vehicle of the feelings of the giver, as the repre-
sentative sentative of his self-surrender, the cordial acceptance of the gift on
the part of God, expressed in the words HaOHyni Hayre, applies not to the
gift in itself, but to the gift as the representative of the person pre-
senting the sacrifice. The distinguishing feature which belonged
exclusively and universally to the Corbanim of the third class, viz.,
that of burning upon the altar, was an expression therefore of the
self-surrender of the worshipper, which was well-pleasing to God
and accepted by Him, and which He repaid by His blessing.
But the Corbanim of the third class were placed in another re-
lation to the altar so far as their nature permitted, and one that
was equally essential (in the case, that is, of the animal sacrifices),
viz., by the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar before the sacri-
fice was consumed. The design of this we may settle now, without
forestalling any subsequent inquiry, from the passage which has
already been referred to in. various ways, viz., Lev. xvii. 11; though
how that design was, or could be, accomplished by such means, we
must leave for a future section. This design is expressed in Lev.
xvii. 11, in the words Mk,ytewop;na-lfa rPekal; i. e. "to expiate (= to cover
the sins of) your souls." The blood was the means of expiation, the
sprinkling of the blood the act of expiation ; and Jehovah Himself,
who appointed this as the mode of expiation for Israel ("And I
have given it you"), acknowledged thereby its validity and force.
It is very apparent that the two acts--the sprinkling of the blood

upon the altar, and the burning of the sacrifice upon the altar were
essentially and necessarily connected. The sprinkling of the blood,
or expiation, was the means; the burning, or dedication to Jehovah,
the end. In order that the second should be a savour of satisfac-
tion to the Lord," it was necessary that the first should precede it;
the first, therefore, was the basis or prerequisite of the second.
It was entirely different with the Corbanim of the second class.
It is true, they were also presented as feudal payments due to
Jehovah; but instead of being retained, or personally appropriated
by Him, they were handed over at once and without reserve to the
priests or Levites. Even in their case the primary consideration
was subjectively (so far as the act of offering was concerned), not
the material gift in itself, but the consciousness of dependence upon
God, and the sense of obligation towards Him, of which the gift
was an expression; but objectively (so far as their application to
the payment and maintenance of the priests and Levites was con-
cerned) the material aspect once more presents itself. This dis-
tinction (viz., that they were not intended for Jehovah personally)
then reacted upon the mode of presentation, so that there was no
apparent necessity for either the burning as a symbol of direct per-
sonal appropriation on the part of Jehovah, or the sprinkling of
blood as a symbol of the covering of sin preparatory to such appro-
priation. But with the altar-sacrifices, at least so far as they were
personally appropriated by Jehovah, the loftier, ideal aspect of self-
surrender was firmly retained to the end. For that reason they
were holier than the others, requiring as a basis the sprinkling of
blood, and as a consummation the burning upon the altar. They
possessed and retained, from every point of view, a purely personal
character: on the objective side, because they were to be set apart
for Jehovah personally, and also because Jehovah desired a per-
sonal surrender, and not the mere material gift; on the subjective
side, because in them the worshipper presented himself before
Jehovah, with all his life and deeds, his hopes and longings, his
thanksgiving and praise, his prayers and supplications.
Through this exclusively spiritual character the altar-sacrifices,
as may easily be conceived, stand in a much closer relation to the
equally spiritual character of prayer. They were indispensable to
one another. For, on the one hand a sacrifice offered without
prayer, at least without the spirit of prayer, was a body without
soul, an empty, lifeless, powerless opus operaturm; and, on the other
hand, prayer could not dispense with the accompaniment of sacri-

fice. Prayer in itself is merely an ideal expression of the need and
longing for expiation and fellowship with God, and does not really
set these forth; but in the sacrificial worship there is an embodi-
ment, a visible and palpable expression, not merely of the subjective
desire of the worshipper, but also of the objective satisfaction of
that desire. I cannot help regarding it as a mistaken and mislead-
ing statement of Hengstenberg's, therefore, that sacrifice "was in the
main an embodiment of prayer (Hos. xiv. 2 ; Heb. xiii. 15)." On
the contrary, sacrifice was something different from and something
more than prayer. It did not correspond to prayer, as the symbol
to the idea; but it ran parallel to it, and required it as an accom-
paniment throughout its entire course. Moreover, "the main point
in the sacrifice" was not, what prayer could have exhibited equally
well, a subjective longing for the blessings of salvation but an ob-
jective assurance of them. Keil's explanation, in which Hengsten-
berg's idea is adopted, but without the essential, though still not
sufficient limitation, in the main, is still more inadmissible.
Sacrifice, he says, "is the visible utterance of prayer as the most
direct self-dedication of a man to God."1 (Arch. i. 192.) But if
sacrifice itself was in the main an embodiment of prayer, what ne-
cessity could there be for a special symbol of prayer to be associated
with most of the sacrifices? For both Hengstenberg and Keil have
thus correctly interpreted the incense which had to be added to every
meat-offering, and thereby to every burnt-offering and peace-offer-
ing also, but which was not allowed to be added to the sin-offering.
21. If we turn now to what was actually offered, to the mate-
rial substance of the Corbanim, it is self-evident that the first and
most important consideration was this, that the offering to be pre-
sented should be the property of the person presenting it, and should
be properly acquired or earned.2 How essential this demand was
with reference to all the Corbanim, is evident from the nature of
the case, and requires no proof. For instance, whereas in the first
class the notion of property was without restriction, and embraced
valuables of every kind (gold, silver, furniture, houses, fields, vine-
1
Vid. Delitzsch on the Epistle to the Hebrews (p. 739): "The sacrifice,
when offered in a right state of mind, had the self-dedication of the worship-
per as its background, and his prayer as its accompaniment (Job xiii. 8 ; 1 Sam.
vii. 9; 1 Chron. xxi. 26; 2 Chron. xxix. 26-30); but it was not the symbol of
either self-dedication or prayer."
2
Thus, for example, the gains of prostitution and the merces scorti virilis
are forbidden to be offered (Dent. xxiii. 18).
yards, etc.), in the second it was restricted to the produce of agri-

culture and grazing, and in the third class was limited still further,
--all garden produce, all fruits except wine and oil and all unclean
animals being excluded, so that the only things left for this class of
offerings were oxen, sheep, goats, and pigeons, as well as wine, oil,
and corn (either in natura, or in the form of flour, dough, bread,
cakes, etc.).
The fact that the Corbanim of the second class were limited to
the produce of agriculture and grazing, but embraced all such pro-
duce, may be explained from their character as feudal payments.
Agriculture and grazing were to be the peculiar and sole occupation
of the Israelites in the land which their God had given them in fief
hence their feudal payments were to be restricted to the produce of
these.
But, in the case of strict altar-sacrifices, two other limitations
were introduced. All kinds of property which could not serve the
Israelite as food (e.g., houses, clothes, furniture, etc.) were to be ex-
cluded, as well as every kind which ought not to be so used (viz., all
unclean animals--the ass, the camel, etc.). In addition to these,
every kind of property was to be excluded which had not been ac-
quired by the worshipper himself in the sweat of his face, i.e., by his
own diligence and toil, and in the exercise of his own proper calling:
for example, all edible game, such as stags, gazelles, and antelopes,
and fruit which had grown ready to his hand, and could be eaten
without the bestowal of any special labour or care (such as almonds,
dates, pomegranates, etc.). Oil and wine were not included in them,
because in their case it was not the grape and olive that were offered,
but juice which had been procured in the sweat of the face.1
From what has been already said, it follows that both Bahr
(Symb. ii. 316-17) and Neumann are in error, when the former
1
It is true this last point could not be carried out in all its stringency and
literality; for a man who bad no field or flock of his own (a labouring man, for
example) could not offer bread that he had reaped, or cattle that he had reared.
It was necessary, therefore, that he should be allowed to offer a sacrifice that he
had bought (the purchase, at any rate, was made in such a case with money
acquired by the sweat of his own face); and in the Holy Land this exception
afterwards grew to be the rule whenever the person lived at such a distance
from the sanctuary as rendered it difficult to bring the sacrifice with him.
This exception was a compromise of a similar kind to that which allowed the
poor man, who could not procure an expensive animal, to offer as a substitute
an incomparably cheaper pigeon, or if that were impossible, the tenth part of
an ephah of flour.
looks at the material of the altar-sacrifices exclusively in the light

of a collection of the principal productions of the country, and a
representation of the whole of the national property, whilst the
latter merely regards it in the light of food. It is a sufficient reply
to Bahr, that very many of the productions that were characteristic
of the country, and much that represented the national wealth,
could not be offered at all (e.g., the ass, the grape, the fig, the
pomegranate, milk and honey, etc.: Num. xiii. 23; Deut. viii. 7-9,
xi. 7-9). And Neumann's assertion is no less inconsiderate; for
if that had been the only regulating principle, stags, gazelles, and
antelopes, as well as the numerous kinds of clean birds, together
with vegetables, figs, dates, pomegranates, honey, etc., ought to have
been offered as well.
To obtain a correct view of the material selected for the sacri-
fices, we ought to do as Oehler has done viz, to combine the three
aspects referred to, and to regard this as the principle of selection,
that nothing was suitable to the purpose but personal property
justly acquired, which was, on the one hand, the fruit of Israel's
proper avocation (agriculture and the rearing of cattle), and on the
other hand, the natural and legal means of sustenance, that is to
say, of maintaining that avocation.
22. From the rule thus laid down for the choice of the materials
for the altar-sacrifices, it is perfectly obvious that in these offerings
it was not the gift itself, but the giver, that was the primary object
of consideration; in other words, that they represented a personal
self-surrender to the person of Jehovah Himself. If this self-sur-
render to God was to be expressed, not merely ideally in thought,
or verbally in prayer, but in a visible and tangible act; and if,
moreover, as had been unalterably established since the occurrence
related in Gen. xxii, this act was not to assume the form of a real
human sacrifice; nothing remained but to select as a symbolical re-
presentation or substitute some other thing, which was evidently
suitable for the purpose on account of the close and essential con-
nection existing between it and the worshipper. But for this pur-
pose it was not sufficient that the sacrifice should be merely the
property of the person offering it; on the contrary, it was requisite
that it should stand in a close, inward, essential relation, a psychical
rapport, to the person of the worshipper. This was the case, on
the one hand, whenever the material of the sacrifice was the result
and fruit of his life-work, his true avocation, and thus in a certain
sense was inoculated and impregnated with his own vis vitalis; and,
on the other hand, whenever it was appointed as the means of main-

taining and strengthening his vital energy, that is to say, when it
impregnated him with its own vis vitalis. But, as the rule laid
down above evidently shows, both points of view were combined in
the material selected for the Mosaic sacrifices. To the cattle which
the Israelite had reared, to the corn which he had reaped, to the
wine and oil which he had pressed, there still adhered the sweat of
his toil. The acquisition and maturing of them had been dependent
upon his own unwearied care, his toil and exertion; and thus, in a
certain sense, one element of his own life had been transferred to
them, and penetrated into them. He had devoted a portion of his
life to the task of acquiring them; and they were consequently, as
it were, an objective portion of his own life. To recognise the full
importance of this connection, it must again be borne in mind, that
according to the law itself the whole of the earthly life-work and
vocation of the Israelite was restricted to agriculture and the rear-
ing of cattle, and consequently that he devoted himself to it with
his whole heart, with undivided interest.
But wine, oil, corn, and cattle were not merely the result of
his toil and care, they were also and chiefly the fruit of the blessing
of GOD, a gift of God; and by virtue of what God had done, they
were appointed and suited to nourish and preserve his bodily life,
and to enable him to carry out his true vocation.
Keil disputes the correctness of this view of a biotic rapport be-
tween the sacrificer and his sacrifice; Oehler, on the contrary, admits
its truth. But when Keil argues, (1) that in that case the ass could
not have been excluded, and (2) that this principle is perfectly inap-
plicable to the vegetable portion of the materials of sacrifice,--it is a
sufficient reply to the former, that the ass was an unclean animal,
and therefore could not be used as food by the Israelites; and we
have already shown that there is no force whatever in the latter.
Neumann (p. 332), on the other hand, will not admit that the
question of property had anything to do with the choice of materials
for the altar-sacrifices; (1) because dogs, asses, camels, houses,
and even wives, formed part of the property of an Israelite, and yet
were not offered in sacrifice;" (2) because the ram, which Abra-
ham sacrificed instead of his son, was hardly his own property;" and
(3) because in the later period of the Jewish history the instances
were numerous enough, in which the people offered to their God
what had been contributed by foreign kings" (Ezra vi. 9; 1 Macc. x.
39; 2 Mace. iii. 3, ix. 16). Keil, who agrees with Neumann in his
rejection of our view, lays stress upon the last point only. The
first needs no refutation on our part. To the second we reply, that
this was before the standpoint of the sacrificial worship of the law
had been reached; and the case in itself was so singular and extra-
ordinary, that it cannot be regarded as supplying the rule for the
rest. And to the third Oehler (p. 625) has already replied, that
in Ezra's time this was the necessary consequence of the poverty
of the people (Ezra vii. 17, 22); but Nehemiah's directions (Neh.
x. 33, 34) show how strong was the feeling even then, that it was
the duty of the people themselves to provide for the expenses of
their own worship." With regard to the later times of the Syrians
and Romans, the custom at that time proves nothing; for many
things were practised then, which were totally at variance with the
spirit of the Mosaic legislation.
23. The altar-sacrifices were presented under the aspect of
food, not only subjectively, but objectively also; that is to say, they
not only consisted of the materials which constituted the food of
Israel, but they were also to be regarded as food for Jehovah. The
latter would follow from the former as a matter of course, even if it
had not been expressly stated. But it is expressly indicated, inas-
much as these sacrifices are spoken of as a whole, as the bread, the
food, of Jehovah (Lev. iii. 11, 16, xxi. 6, 8, 17, xxii. 25; Num.
xxviii. 2). Not, of course, that flesh, bread, and wine, as such,
could be offered to the God of Israel for food (Ps. 1. 12 sqq.).
They were not to pass for what they were, but for what they sig-
nified; and only in that light were they food for Jehovah. That
which served as the daily food of Israel was adopted as the symbol
of those spiritual gifts, which were offered to Jehovah as food.
We have no hesitation whatever in understanding the expression
bread of Jehovah" in the strict sense of the words; but we must
keep well in mind, that in the case of the God of Israel the allusion
could only have been to spiritual, and not at all to material food.
Jehovah, who, as the God of salvation, had entered into the
history of the world, and moved forward in it and with it, stood in
need of food in that capacity, but of spiritual food, the complete
failure of which would be followed by His also ceasing to be Je-
hovah. That food Israel was to offer Him in its own faithful self-
surrender; and the symbol of that self-surrender was to be seen in
the sacrifices consumed upon the altar, and ascending as a "savour
of satisfaction to Jehovah." If Israel had failed to fulfil its cove-
nant obliation of self-surrender to Jehovah, it would have broken
away from the covenant, and the covenant itself would have ceased;
and had the covenant been once abolished, God would also have
ceased to be the covenant-God, i.e., to be Jehovah.1
24. Our remarks, thus far, apply equally to all the materials
of sacrifice, whether animal or vegetable. But there is one import-
ant point of view, from which there was an essential distinction
between them, and which is adapted to throw light upon the ques-
tion, why they stood side by side in the sacrificial worship; that is
to say, why bloodless as well as bleeding sacrifices were required.
Animals of the higher class, more especially domestic animals and
cattle, stand incomparably nearer to man than plants do: their life
rests upon the same psychico-corporeal basis, they are subject to
the same conditions of life, they have the same bodily organs and
functions, and need the same corporeal food as man. All this is
wanting in the case of the plant; or rather, everything in it is
precisely the opposite. An animal, therefore, is far better adapted
to represent the person of, a man, his vital organs, powers, and
actions, than plants can ever be. On the other hand, the cultiva-
tion of plants, more especially the growing of corn, requires far
more of the preparatory, continuous, and subsequent labour of man,
and is more dependent upon him than the rearing of cattle. It was
not upon the latter, but upon the former, that the curse was really
pronounced in Gen. iii. 17-19 (cf. v. 29). The material acquired
by agriculture, therefore, was far more suitable than the flocks to
represent the fruit, or result of the life-work of man. And this
distinction, as we shall afterwards show, was undoubtedly the prin-
ciple by which the addition of the vegetable to the animal materials
of sacrifice was regulated.
25. The altar-sacrifices are thus divisible into bleeding (animal)
and bloodless (vegetable) sacrifices.2 The former may be grouped
1
Compare with this what Hengstenberg says with reference to the shew-
bread: "This was really the food which Israel presented to its King; but that
King was a spiritual heavenly one; and therefore the food offered to Him under
a material form must be spiritual also . . . The prayer to God, 'Give us this
day our daily bread,' is accompanied by the demand on the part of God, Give
Me to-day My daily bread;' and this demand is satisfied by the Church, when
it offers diligently to God in good works that for which God has endowed it
with strength, benediction, and prosperity." (Diss. on the Pentateuch, vol. ii.
pp. 531, 532, translation.)
2
This distinction, however, is by no means coincident, as Kliefoth
supposes, with that between the expiatory sacrifices ("by which forgiveness of sins
and the favour and fellowship of God were secured ") and eucharistic offerings
("in which, after reconciliation has taken place, God and man hold intercourse
with
again in three classes : (1) SIN-OFFERINGS (txFA.Ha) and TRESPASS-

OFFERINGS (MwAxA), the latter of which was merely one peculiar de-
scription of the former; (2) BURNT-OFFERINGS ( hlAfo ) and (3)
PEACE-OFFERINGS (MymilAw;; Luther, "thank-offerings "). In the
first, the sprinkling of the blood appears to have been the principal
thing; in the second, the burning upon the altar; and in the last a
new feature is introduced, which is wanting in both the others,
namely, the sacrificial meal. In the different kinds of bloodless
offerings we have to include, not only those which were burned
upon the altar in the court, but those which were offered upon the
altar, table, and candlestick of the Holy Place. The former were
designated as meat-offerings and drink-offerings (j`s,n,vA hHAn;mi) and
consisted of corn (meal, bread, cake, etc.) and wine, with the addi-
tion of oil, incense, and salt. We find the same essential elements
in the Holy Place, but distributed upon the three different articles
of furniture--the incense upon the altar, bread and wine (meat-
and drink-offerings) upon the table of shew-bread, and oil (light-
offering) upon the candlestick.
Thus the whole of the Mosaic Corbanim may be classified as
follows:-
OFFERINGS.
II. FEUDAL PAYMENTS, I. SACRED OFFERINGS, III. ALTAR- SACRIFICES,
for the maintenance of for the endowment of the for personal appropria-
the priests and Levites sanctuary. tion on the part of Je-
(first -fruits and tenths). hovah.
1. Fruits. 2. Cattle. 3. Men. A. Bleeding. B. Bloodless.

1 Clean. 2. Unclean. 1. Sin-offerings and tres- (1). In the (2). In the
pass-offerings. Court. Holy Place.
2. Burnt-offerings. Meat and 1. Incense-
3. Peace-offerings. drink-of- offerings
ferings. 2. Light-of-
ferings.
3. Meat-of-
ferings.
one another in mutual fellowship of life" ). Still less is he right in denying to

the bleeding (expiatory) sacrifice the character of an offering altogether. This
view is overthrown at once by the fact that all the sacrifices are called by the
same name, Corbanim. Even the bleeding, expiatory, animal sacrifices were
primarily offerings, or gifts; and this character of an offering was expressed in
the burning (of their fleshy parts), to which they were subjected in the same
way as the bloodless altar-gifts. Even in the case of those bleeding sacrifices
in which the expiation reached its highest point, and everything else gave place
to it (viz., in the case of the sin-offerings), the essential characteristic of an
offering was invariably preserved through the burning of the fat (cf. 142).
BOOK II.
THE BLEEDING SACRIFICE.
PART I.
RITUAL OF THE SACRIFICE.
26. The ritual of the bleeding sacrifice may be arranged

according to its salient points in the following manner:--
When circumstances demanded, or inclination prompted, the
person presenting the sacrifice, having selected an animal in accord-
ance with the legal directions as to both kind and mode brought it
before the door of the tabernacle, i.e., to the altar of burnt-offering
in the court, where he laid his hand upon it, and then slaughtered
it on the north side of the altar. The sacrificer had now performed
his part, and all the rest belonged to the province of the priest.
The latter began by receiving the blood of the animal in a vessel,
and applying it, either in whole or in part, and in various ways
according to the nature and importance of the sacrifice, to the altar
of the court (in certain cases also to the altar of the Holy Place, or
the Capporeth of the Most Holy). He then flayed the animal, and
having cut it in pieces, and washed the entrails and lower part of the
thigh in water, burned either the whole of it except the skin, which
belonged to himself, or only the fat, upon the altar of the court.
It was only in the case of the burnt-offerings that the former was
done; whilst the latter was the case with all the other kinds of
sacrifice. But in the case of the peace-offerings, after the burning
of the fat and the removal of certain portions, which fell to the lot
of the officiating priest, the remainder was eaten at a sacrificial
meal by the sacrificer himself and his family; and in that of the
sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, the flesh was either burned
without the camp, or (in certain cases) eaten by the priests in the
Holy Place. With the burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, there
66 THE NOTION OF EXPIATION.
were also associated meat-offerings and drink-offerings; but never

with the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings.
Of the different points referred to here, we shall look, in the
first place, simply at those which mark the progressive steps of the
sacrificial ceremony as a whole, and only so far as they do this.
All the rest we shall defer till we come to our examination of the
various kinds of sacrifice.
CHAPTER I.
THE NOTION OF EXPIATION.
27. The EXPIATION (Rabbinical: h.rAPAKa) of the person sacri-

ficing is what we meet with everywhere, not only as the first
intention, but to a certain extent as the chief and most important
end of the bleeding sacrifices in general. When the sacrifice of
animals is mentioned in the law, making atonement (vylAfA rPekal;) is
nearly always expressly mentioned, and for the most part this
alone, as being the purpose, end, and fruit of the sacrifice. It is
perfectly obvious, indeed, that there were other ends to be attained,--
such, for example, as the self-surrender of the sacrifice to Jehovah
in the burning of the sacrificial gift, and the enjoyment of fellow
ship with Jehovah in the sacrificial meal; but the fact that these
ends could not possibly be attained in any other way than by means
of expiation, and on the basis of expiation, gave to the latter its
incomparable, all-surpassing importance, and its central place in
the plan of salvation, the progressive stages of which were sym-
bolically represented in the sacrificial worship. The highest and
most difficult, in fact the only real enigma, which the saving
counsel of God had to solve in the whole history of salvation, was
the expiation of sinful man. Let this difficulty be overcome, and
every other difficulty falls with it to the ground, so that the way is
fully opened for the attainment of all the other blessings of salvation.
The question was not, how could man, who had been created by and
for God, attain to fellowship with God, and continue therein as so
created (there would have been no difficulty in this; in fact, it would
have followed, so to speak, as a matter of course); the question
was, whether, and how, sinful man, notwithstanding his sin, which
had severed all the bonds of fellowship with God, and rendered
THE NOTION OF EXPIATION. 67
their reunion impossible, could nevertheless attain to that fellow-

ship again. Nothing but expiation, i.e., the extermination of his sin,
could render this impossibility possible. Consequently, the expiation
of his sin was the Alpha and Omega for the wants and longings of
a sinner desirous of fellowship with God; and for that reason, the
law of sacrifice, which meets these wants and this longing with its
institutions of salvation, reiterates again and again, and more than
anything besides, its vylAfA rPekal; or NheKoha vylAfA rP,kiv; ("to make atonement
for him," or "the priest shall make atonement for him").
28. Although the root rpk does not occur in Kal (for the rpaKA
in Gen. vi. 14 is probably a denominative verb from rp,Ko = pitch or
resin, cf. Furst, Lex. i. 621), the correctness of the generally accepted
radical signification, "to cover," "to cover up," is fully established
from the cognate dialects. This radical meaning has been retained
in the Piel, only the notion of covering up has passed from the
literal into a figurative sense. rP,Ki and rPaKu are never used to denote
any other than an ideal covering. In this sense it is chiefly em-
ployed in religious phraseology, i.e., in connection with divine
worship. That which is covered up is never God, or anything
godly,1 but always something ungodly, displeasing to God, hostile
to Him, provocative of His wrath and punishment; that is to say,
sin, guilt, and uncleanness ("for sin," Lev. iv. 35, v. 13, etc.;
"iniquity," Jer. xviii. 23 ; Ps. lxxviii. 38, etc. ; "his ignorance,"
Lev. v. 18). If we find a number of other objects appended to
rP,Ki (e.g., "for the soul," or "for the souls," Ex. xxx. 15; Lev.
xvii. 11, etc. , "for the children of Israel," Num. viii. 19 , "for the
house," Lev. xiv. 53, and many others), it is only in appearance that
this is opposed to our assertion. All these objects come into con-
sideration only so far as sin or uncleanness adheres to them; and it
is not to them, but to the uncleanness adhering to them that the
term rP,Ki applies. In such a case the covering becomes eo ipso an
expiation, and the covered sin no longer exists as sin, but is an
exterminated or expiated sin.
1
It is incorrect, and likely to mislead, therefore, to speak of atoning the
wrath of God, as Delitzsch, for example, does (Heb. p. 741): "it is the wrath of
God excited by sin which is atoned, i.e., appeased by the punishment of sin." On
the contrary, we must distinguish between expiation and reconciliation. Accord-
ing to the analogy of the ordinary expression, "to reconcile an enemy," we may
also speak of reconciling the angry God, but never of atoning (expiating) God,
or the wrath of God. The reconciliation of the angry person is effected through
the expiation of that by which he has been offended, and his anger has been
aroused.
We must here inquire, in the first place, however, by what

process of thought the covered sins were regarded as exterminated
or expiated. According to the general opinion, the covering removed
the sins from the sight of Jehovah; Jehovah saw them no more
they no longer provoked His anger and His punishment; and thus
they might be regarded as no longer existing, as exterminated, and
altogether removed from the wrath of God (vid. Bahr, ii. 204;
Ebrard, p. 42; Kliefoth, p. 31; Oehler, p. 630). In confirmation of
this view appeal is made to the expression in Lev. vi. 7, rP,kiv;
hOAhy; ynep;li NheKoha vylAfA, where the sins are represented as being covered
up before the face of Jehovah. But MyniPA is not the face in the
sense of that which sees, but rather in the sense of that which is
seen, or is to be seen; the expression employed to denote the
former is hvhy ynyfl. And when we find the forgiveness of sins
designated in Micah vii. 19 as a casting of the sins into the depths
the sea, and in Jer. xviii. 23, washing away (yHim;T,) the sins
before the face of Jehovah," answering as a parallelism to rP,Ki
MnAOfE-lfa; these are simply different figures for the same thing, from
which nothing at all can be inferred as to the meaning of rP,Ki,
although Oelhler appeals to both these points. And when Oehler
goes on to remark, that the immediate consequence is, that by
virtue of such a covering, the sinful man is protected from the
punishing judge," no objection can be made to this, unless, as is
done by Delitzsch (Heb. p. 387, 740), there is given to rpk itself
the meaning or force of a protective covering, or of a covering from
danger, namely, from the manifestation of the wrath of God. The
meaning of rpk, in the sacrificial terminology, cannot possibly be
that what is covered is to be protected, delivered, preserved. Such
a meaning would be perfectly inadmissible in connection with
the common expressions txFH-lf, Nvf-lf (for their sin, for their
iniquity), etc.; for sin, iniquity, guilt, or uncleanness, is just what
is not to be protected, but, on the contrary, to be exterminated, set
aside, annihilated. No doubt the object of the verb rpk in the
sacrificial language, is for the most part the person of the sacrificer
himself; in which case, the notion of protection, deliverance, pre-
servation, and so forth, before the wrath of God would be perfectly
applicable. But the frequency with which the verb is connected
with sin, iniquity, etc., compels us to assume, that even where a
person is mentioned as the object, it is not the person himself, or in
himself, that is to be regarded as the object to be covered, but the
sin and uncleanness adhering to him. Moreover, when we observe
that very frequently, where the person of the sacrificer is mentioned

as the object, there is added, as an explanatory apposition, either
OtxF.AHa-lfa ("concerning his sin"), Lev. iv. 35, v. 13; or OtgAg;wi-lfa
(concerning his ignorance), Lev. v. 18; or OtxF.AHame (" from his
sin"), Lev. iv. 26, v. 6, 10, xvi. 34; or tOxm;F.umi ("from the unclean-
nesses"), Lev. xvi. 16; or, lastly, xFAHA rw,xEme (Eng. Ver., "for that"
he sinned") Num. vi. 11; we must admit the correctness of the "
conclusion to which Rosenmiiller and Bahr both came that "the
formula vylf rpk) (Eng. Ver., "make atonement for him"), which
occurs most frequently in the sacrificial ritual, is abbreviated from the
more complete form Owp;na-lfa rP,Ki (make atonement for his soul"),
and that this again stands for Owp;na txF.aHa-lfa rP,Ki ("make atonement
for the sin of his soul").
But whether the word rP,Ki be understood as denoting a cover-
ing in the sense of withdrawing from view, or of protecting from
danger, the use of the word in other connections--viz., in Gen.
xxxii. 20; Prov. xvi. 14; Isa. xxviii. 18, xlvii. 11--seems to show
that neither of these interpretations can be sustained. When Isaiah
says, for example, tv,mA-tx, Mk,t;yriB; rPakuv; ("your covenant with death
shall be covered"), the meaning is not that the covenant with death
shall be rendered invisible, for even as an invisible (secret) covenant
it might answer its purpose quite as well; still less that it shall be
protected from danger, for, on the contrary, it is to be rendered
powerless and nugatory. But covering would only render it power-
less and nugatory, provided it was a covering of a kind to suppress,
restrain, and destroy the ability and effort to assist the ally. In the
same way it would be opposed both to the meaning and the context,
to imagine the words employed by Jacob, "I will cover his face
with a present," as signifying either that he would protect Esau's
face from danger, or that he would hide it from view by means of
his present; on the contrary, Jacob's intention was to protect himself
from the wrath of Esau, of which his face was the vehicle, and then
to follow this "covering of his face" by actually "seeing his face.
Nor can we interpret this passage, according to the analogy of the
"covering of the eyes" in Gen. xx. 16, as indicating that it was
Jacob's intention to "hold something before Esau's face which
would prevent him from looking any longer at the wrong that had
been done him" (Hofmann, Schriftbeweis ii. 1, p. 233); for in that
case he would have followed the analogy of Gen. xx. 16, and said,
vynyf hrpkx (I will cover his eyes), to say nothing of the fact that
the meaning thus obtained could not possibly be applied to the sacri-
ficial rpk. Jacob determines to cover Esau's face, not that he may
no longer see the wrong that Jacob has done, but that the anger
depicted in Esau's face may be broken, that is to say, rendered
altogether powerless. And when it is stated in Prov. xvi. 14, that
"a wise man covers (rP,Ki) the wrath of the king," the word is to be
understood in the same sense as Jacob's hrpkx. With this interpre-
tation of the word rP,Ki, "a transition to the phrase hOAh rP,Ki (to cover
mischief) in Isa. xlvii. 11" is undoubtedly a possible," and a mean-
ing may be obtained which shall be perfectly appropriate to the
parallel hfArA rHawi ("the dawning of evil").
In this way, then, we also understand the covering of sin in
the sacrificial worship as a covering by which the accusatory and
damnatory power of sin--its power to excite the anger and wrath
of God--is broken, by which, in fact, it is rendered both harmless
and impotent. And, understood in this sense, the sacrificial covering
was not merely an apparent, conventional, expiation of sin (which
would have been the case if it had been merely removed from the
sight of Jehovah), but a process by which it was actually rendered
harmless, which is equivalent to cancelling and utterly annihilat-
ing. Among other passages which show that the word rP,Ki must
be understood in this sense, we may cite Deut. xxi. 9, where the
rPeKani in ver. 8 is followed by an explanatory rfebaT; (thou shalt put
away).1
With this view the intensive force of the Piel, as determining or
modifying this signification, is firmly retained: it is so complete,
effectual, and overpowering a covering, that all real and active force
in that which is covered up is thereby rendered impossible, or slain.
Hofmann has a very peculiar notion with regard to rP,Ki. In his
opinion, it is a denominative from rp,Ko (a redemption fee), and sig-
nifies to give a covering, or payment; so that the means by which
the sin is expiated assumes the appearance of a compensation,
without which the sinner could not be set free from the captivity
of sin; in just the same sense in which payment is made as a re-
demption fee for deliverance from bodily captivity. But notwith-
standing the amazing acuteness, and minute, hair-splitting cleverness,
1
Since writing the above, I have found essentially the same view expressed
by Kahnis (i. 271), who says, "To expiate, literally to cover up, does not mean
to cause a sin not to have been committed, for that is impossible; nor to repre-
sent it as having no existence, for that would be opposed to the earnestness of
the law; nor to pay or compensate it by any performance; but to cover it before
God, i.e., to deprive it of its power to come between us and God."
with which Hofmann has endeavoured once more to establish this

derivation and meaning, and to defend it against the objections of
Ebrard (pp. 41, 42) and Delitzsch (Heb. 386, 740), in the second
edition of his Schriftbeweis (ii. 1, 232 sqq.), he has not succeeded
even in rendering it plausible. He cannot adduce a single passage
from which this signification of rP,Ki or its derivatives (MyriPuKi and
tr,PoKa) can be proved;1 and still less is he able to meet the important
fact, that the term rp,Ko, which is so common elsewhere, and which
is said to furnish the real key to the explanation of the sacrificial
worship, is not to be met with on one single occasion in connection
with the sacrificial worship, whereas the word rP,Ki which is said to
be derived from it, with its several derivatives, is perpetually em-
ployed, and occurs in connections of the most various kinds, which
would have furnished just as fitting an occasion for the use of rp,Ko
if the two words had really been synonymous.
29. The subject from whom the rPeKa proceeded in connection
with the sacrificial worship, was always represented as either GOD,
or His servant and representative the priest; and the fruit and
effect of it as being the forgiveness of those sins (Lev. iv. 20, rp,kov;
Mh,lA Hlas;niv; NheKoha Mh,ylefE; also Lev. iv. 26, 31, 35, v. 10, 13, 16, 18,
vi. 7; Num. xv. 28 or the removal of that uncleanness Lev xii.
7, 8, hrAhEFAv hAyl,fA rP,kiv; cf. Lev. xiv. 31, 53 xvi. 19), for which expia-
tion was to be made. The blood alone is mentioned as the means
of sacrificial expiation Ex. xxx. 10 Lev. vi. 30, viii. 15, xvi.
16, etc.); from which it follows, that it was the bleeding sacrifice
alone, and not the bloodless offerings also, which possessed an ex-
piatory value. But why, or in what way, the blood was adapted to
be a means of expiation we learn first of all in connection with the
publication of the command to abstain from eating blood in Lev.
xvii. 11: For the soul of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given
it to you upon the altar, to make an atonement for your souls: for
the blood, it makes atonement by means of the soul." We adopt this
rendering of rPekay; wp,n.,Ba, in common with Bahr, Keil, Delitzsch, etc.
1
The only passage which could be adduced as favouring this meaning, viz.,
Ex. xxx.--where the census-tax, which is called Owp;na rp,Ko in ver. 12, is de-
scribed in ver. 16 as MyriPuKiha Js,K, and in ver. 15 as serving Mk,ytewop;na-lfa rPekal;
only proves that on one occasion, under peculiar circumstances, and in a parti-
cular sense, the, hrAP;Ka, which, as a rule, was accomplished by the sacrificial
blood, was accomplished in a more literal sense by a money payment. But it by no
means follows from this, that on every occasion, whatever the means of expiation
might be, it must always be regarded in the light of a payment.
Ebrard (p. 44), on the other hand, adheres to the rendering adopted by the LXX.
(a]nti> yuxh?j), the Vulgate (pro animae piaculo), and Luther, viz., "for (or
concerning) the soul;" and assumes, in consequence, that according to the usual
phraseology employed in connection with purchase and exchange, the animal foul
is regarded as the purchase money paid for the redemption of the human soul.
But this rendering is inadmissible, since rpk (= to cover) is not one
of the verbs denoting purchase or barter, and there is no allusion
here to exchange. Hengstenberg's rendering, for the blood expiates
the soul, is still less admissible, as it has no analogy whatever in the
usage of the language. For rP,Ki is never construed with b objecti
(in wd,q.oBa Lev. vi. 30, xvi. 27, the 2 is to be regarded as local), but
only with lfa or dfaB;, and sometimes also with a simple accusative
Hofmann, Kliefoth, Bunsen, and others, prefer to regard the b as
b essentiae: "the blood expiates as (in the character of) the soul."
The objection made to this by Delitzsch (Psychol. p. 197), that the
b essentiae never stands before a noun determined by an article or
suffix, has been overthrown by Hofmann, who adduces several in-
stances, in which, at all events, it stands before a noun with a suffix
(Ex. xviii. 4; Ps. cxlvi. 5; Prov. iii. 26). I cannot admit that Ex.
vi. 3 is a case in point; for even if El Shaddai might be regarded
elsewhere as a proper name, the very use of b essentiae here would
in itself contain an allusion to its appellative meaning. But al-
though from this point of view also Hofmann's rendering appears
perfectly justifiable, the instrumental force of the b, as being the
more usual one in connection with rP,Ki) (Gen. xxxii. 20; Ex. xxix
33; Lev. vii. 7, xix. 22; Num. v. 8 ; 2 Sam. xxi. 3), and therefore,
at all events, the first to suggest itself, is certainly to be preferred.1
1
Even Hofmann admits that this view has very much to support it in the
frequent use of B; with rP,Ki, to denote the means employed in the process of
expiation; but in his opinion there may be adduced against it the unnatural
character of the fact, "that whilst on other occasions the sacrificial gift is the
medium of the atoning act of the sacrificer, here the blood offered was to be
rendered effective by something altogether different from him." Moreover, "in
other places the blood and the soul are regarded as one." (Thus in Gen. ix. 4
Deut. xii. 23; and in our passage, Lev. xvii. 11.) But the blood is not other
wise distinguished from the soul, nor otherwise identified with it, than as a full
purse is distinguished from and identified with the money that it contains.
Since it was only the soul contained in the blood which gave its worth and
significance to the blood itself, the latter might very well be called the soul,
although the lawgiver was perfectly aware, and in ver. 11 has really stated, that
the soul may be distinguished from the blood because the soul is in the blood
For it would be difficult for any one to persuade himself that the b is a Beth
30. There is something peculiar, however, in the slighting

way in which Hofmnn speaks of Lev. xvii. 11. "It has sometimes
happened," he says (p. 237), that the words of Lev. xvii. 11 have
been made the basis of the whole investigation with regard to the
nature of the bleeding sacrifice . . . . . When we read that 'the
blood it expiates by means of the soul,' we learn nothing more than
we have already learned elsewhere." Again, at p. 239 he says
"In this passage we neither find the blood and the soul of the ani-
mal treated as one; nor are we told how far the blood, when it was
applied to the altar, had an expiatory effect; nor is there anything
to lead to the conclusion, that every sacrifice, in connection with
which blood was applied to the altar, was intended as an expiation
or that the application of blood alone served as an expiation, to the
exclusion of all the rest of the sacrificial process."
But this is not a correct statement of the case. It is true that
we already know, from Ex. xxx. 10, Lev. vi. 30, viii. 15, xvi. 16,
that the blood was the medium of expiation; and from Gen. ix. 4,
that the blood stands in an immediate and essential relation to the
soul. But that the blood, as soul, i.e., as the vehicle of the soul,
was the medium of expiation, is stated first and alone in Lev. xvii.
11; and for that reason, this passage must be admitted to possess
an unparalleled and fundamental importance as a key to the mean-
ing of the bleeding sacrifice.
It also follows undoubtedly from this passage, that any blood
which was sprinkled upon the altar, and therefore every sacrifice
in which blood was applied to the altar, was intended as an expia-
tion; and also, that, as blood was applied to the altar in connection
with every animal sacrifice, expiation took place in connection with
them all; and, so far, every kind of animal sacrifice might be de-
signated as an expiatory sacrifice. But it does not follow from this,
that expiation was the sole object in every case; or an equally im-
essentiae and not a Beth locale in the clause xvhi MDABa rWABAha wp,n,. On the other
hand, I fully agree with Hofmann, in opposition to Delitzsch, Knobel, and Oehler,
that in ver 14, in the clause xvhi Owp;nab; OmDA rWABA-lKA wp,n,, the B is neither local
nor instrumental, since neither the one nor the other will give any tolerable
sense; and that it is to be understood as b essentiae, "the soul of all flesh is its
blood, as its soul," or, as Hofmann explains it, "it is true of the soul of all
flesh, that it is its blood, which constitutes its soul." But just as in this place
the context compels us to regard the Beth as essential, because this alone will
give any meaning; so the current phraseology requires that in the word wp,n.,Ba
in ver. 11 it should be regarded as instrumental, which gives a good meaning,
and is perfectly in harmony with the context.
portant object in them all. The words, "to make atonement for
him" (vylAfA rPekal; ) are expressly used, in fact, not only in connection
with the sin-offering (Lev. iv. 20, 26, 31, 35, etc.) and trespass-
offering (Lev. v. 16, 18, vi. 7, etc.), but in connection with the
burnt-offering also (Lev. i. 4). And if this is not the case with the
peace-offerings, we must not conclude from that, that the law did not
attribute to them any expiatory character at all. In proportion as
the expiatory character of the different kinds of sacrifice diminished
in importance, the eagerness of the law to give prominence to their
atoning virtue diminishes also. The sin- and trespass-offerings are
hardly referred to once, without an allusion to the atonement to be
made. In connection with the burnt-offering, it is expressly men-
tioned only once, viz., at the very commencement of the sacrificial
law (Lev. i. 4; compare, however, Lev. v. 10, xiv. 20, xvi. 24).
And in the sections relating to the peace-offering (Lev. iii., vii. 11-
21) it is not brought into prominence at all.
Thomasius (Christi Person and Werk iii. 1, p. 40) also adduces
Ezek. xlv. 15 (see also ver. 17) as a proof of the expiatory charac-
ter of the peace-offerings. But this passage cannot be accepted as
conclusive. For although the meat-offering, the burnt-offering, and
the peace-offering are classed together in ver. 15 (in ver. 17 the sin-
offering also is mentioned), and the expression, to make reconcilia-
tion for them ( Mh,ylefE rPekal; ) is applied in common to them all; the
introduction of the meat-offering renders this passage unservice-
able for the end supposed. But we do not require any express or
special proof passages. The question is settled already by Lev.
xvii. 11. If all blood placed upon the altar was atoning blood, this
must have applied to the blood of the peace-offerings also. And
a still more decisive proof is to be obtained per analogiam from the
entire ritual of sacrifice. If the sprinkling of blood in "connection
with the burnt-offering and trespass-offering served as an atonement
( vylAfA rPekal;), the sprinkling of the blood of the peace-offering, which
was performed in precisely the same way, must necessarily have had
the same significance.
On the other hand, it certainly cannot be directly inferred from
Lev. xvii. 11, that it was the sprinkling of blood alone which pos-
sessed an expiatory worth, to the entire exclusion of all the rest of the
sacrificial rites. Though this conclusion, which Hofmann disputes,
is perfectly correct; only it cannot be proved from Lev. xvii. 11.
It may be inferred, however, on the one hand, from the fact, that
the sprinkling of blood is frequently spoken of as making atone-
THE OBJECTS USED IN SACRIFICE. 75
ment, apart from any other portion of the sacrificial rite, whilst no
other portion of that rite is ever mentioned as possessing atoning
worth apart from the sprinkling of blood, and, on the other hand,
from the impossibility of deducing the idea of expiation from any
other part of the sacrificial ritual.
CHAPTER II.
THE OBJECTS USED IN SACRIFICE.
31. We have already seen, chiefly from the statement in Lev.

xvii. 11, that the soul of the sacrificial animal which was brought
to the altar in its blood according to divine direction, made expia-
tion for the sinful soul of the person sacrificing, and procured the
forgiveness of his sin. But neither this passage, nor any other,
explains to us how, why, and by what process the soul of the sacri-
ficial animal was adapted to serve as the means of expiation. The
only way that we have, therefore, of obtaining an answer to this
important question, is to ascertain what idea the Hebrew formed of
the soul of the sacrificial animal in itself, and in its relation to the
soul of man, and also through what process he imagined that soul
to pass, before and during its appropriation as the medium of atone-
ment.
A careful and thorough investigation into the Old Testament
view of the nature and essence of the soul in itself and in its rela-
tion to the other bases and powers of life in both the animal and
the human spheres, cannot of course be undertaken by us here.
We must be content to bring out those points which seem best
adapted to further our immediate purpose.
The whole of the animal and human world is repeatedly com-
prehended in the phrase, MYY.;ha (tmaw;ni ) HaUr OB rw,xE rWABA-lKA, all flesh,
in which is a (breath) spirit of life" (Gen. vi. 17, vii. 15, 22).
Consequently, the nature of man, like that of the animal, consists
of flesh (or body) and a life-spirit. But through the connection of
the life-spirit with the flesh, through the indwelling of the spirit in
the flesh, a third arises, viz., the living soul (Gen. ii. 7). Thus it is
expressly stated in Gen. ii. 7, that God breathed into the body of
the man which had been formed from the dust of the earth a
"breath of life," and the man became thereby a living soul. But,
76 THE OBJECTS USED IN SACRIFICE.
according to Gen. vi. 17, and vii. 15, 22, a spirit or breath of life
dwells in the animals also. Again, according to Gen. ii. 19, they
too were formed from earthly materials. And lastly, they also pro-
ceeded as "living souls" from the creating hand of God (Gen. ii.
19, i. 20, 24). So that we may conclude that they too became
"living souls," through the endowment of their material, earthly
bodies with a "breath of life" (vid. Ps. civ. 30, 31; Job xxxiv. 14,
15; Eccl. iii. 21). In both instances the nostrils are mentioned as
the seat of the spirit or breath (vid. Gen. vii. 22, ii. 7, vyPAxaB;). The
meaning, however, is of course, not that the spirit of life, either in
man or in the animal, is identical with the air which they breathe;
but the obvious intention is to point out the spirit as the power,
whose activity is manifested in breathing as the most striking evi-
dence of existing life. But through the diffusion of this spirit-power
throughout the flesh, there arises a third, viz., the living soul. The
soul, therefore, is not something essentially different from the life-
spirit, but merely a mode of existence which it assumes by pervading
and animating the flesh; and regarded in this light, it has its seat,
both in man and beast, in the blood (Lev. xvii. 11; Gen. ix. 4-6).
Since the soul, therefore, represents in itself the unity of flesh and
spirit, and as the incarnate life-spirit is the first principle, the seat
and source of all vital activity, the whole man, or the whole animal,
may of course be appropriately designated "a living soul," as is the
case in Gen. i. 20, 24, ii. 7, 19.
32. Now, if animals as well as men are "living souls," and in
both this is dependent in the same way upon the indwelling of a
"spirit of life" in the flesh, it might almost appear as though the
Old Testament view rendered any essential distinction between man
and beast impossible. But that is not the case. The essential dis-
tinction between man and beast, notwithstanding this apparent
levelling on the part of the Hebrews, is no less certain, and is main-
tamed with even greater sharpness, than was the case among other
nations.
A comparison of Gen. ii. 7 with Gen. ii. 19 will be sufficient to
show, that the author made an essential distinction between the
animal and the human creation. It is true he uses the same ex-
pression, "God formed," with reference to both, and the result in
both cases was a "living soul." But he makes a distinction even
in the substratum for the formation of the body. In the case of
the animals he says at once, "of the ground;" but in that of the
man he says, "dust of the ground." In the former he speaks of the
earthly material without selection; in the latter, of a nobler, finer,

and as it were sublimated, earthly material. In the case of the
former, too, there is no express reference made to the endowment of
the earthly figure with a "breath of life;" though he can hardly
have intended to deny that this was the case, since its result is
admitted, viz., that the animal also became a "living soul." But
he regarded it as too trivial and unimportant to be specially men-
tioned, and therefore embraced it in the one expression "formed;"
whereas, in ver. 7, the breathing in of the breath of life becomes
an independent act, and is described as the acme of the whole pro-
cedure.
In the first account of the creation, the formation of man is still
more expressly distinguished from that of the animal. A simple
command of God (i. 20, 24) calls the animals out of the earth as
their material womb (rendered fruitful by the Spirit of God, which
had moved upon the face of the primary chaotic matter); but in
the creation of man God holds a formal consultation with Himself,
and creates him in His own image. The creation ascends step by
step; its last work is man and he alone, of all creatures, bears in
himself the image of God (i. 26, 27). Now, if we compare with
this the two points in the creation of man in Gen. ii. 7, there can
be no question that the endowment with the image of God is to be
associated, not with the fact first named, "He formed," but with
the second, "He breathed." The endowment of man with a spirit
of life was at the same time an endowment with the image of God.
The animals were also endowed, like man, with a spirit of life, and
thus became a living soul; but man's spirit of life alone was im-
pregnated with an essentially divine potency, by which the image of
God was impressed upon his nature. And it is this potency which
we are accustomed to call spirit, in distinction from body and soul,
and because of the absence of which we deny that the animal is
possessed of a spirit; whereas the Hebrew phraseology, employing
the word spirit (HaUr) or breath (hmAwAn;) in a broader sense, attributes
a spirit to the animal also.
Whether and how far that divine potency, which belonged to
man alone, was obscured, weakened, suppressed, or even lost through
the fall, we are nowhere expressly informed, either in the Penta-
teuch or any other part of the Old Testament. But that this did
not take place without a considerable deterioration and alteration of
its original standing and worth, especially from an ethical point of
view, is presupposed by the whole of the Old Testament history and
doctrine of salvation. But it is equally certain that its inalienable,

so to speak its physical side--viz., self-consciousness, personality,
freedom of choice, self-determination, and consequent responsibility
for his actions--remained with man even after the fall (Gen. iv. 10;
Deut. xi. 26; Josh. xxiv. 15, etc.); whereas the actions of the
animal are determined by instinct, by the necessities of its nature,
and it cannot direct or unfold its powers in any other way than that
to which its nature impels, so that it is not, and cannot be, respon-
sible.1
33. Spirit or breath denotes the animal life (in man as well
as the animal), so far as its activity is shown in the process of respi-
ration. Soul, on the other hand, denotes the same, so far as it is
manifest in the circulation of the blood. As the spirit pervades the
body, and, so to speak, becomes incarnate in it by means of the pro-
cess of breathing, it becomes soul, which has its seat in the blood,
and, by means of the blood, penetrates and animates the whole
body in all its members, the whole flesh in all its muscles and
nerves. Hence the spirit is the potential, the soul the actual,
principle of life; and it is not the spirit but the soul which connects
the outer with the inner world (by its receptive activity), and the
inner with the outer world (by its spontaneous activity). It is the
sensitive principle, the seat of emotion, of liking and disliking, and
If the impelling power of motion and action. Through its mediation
the impressions and influences of the outer world assume the
form of perception. Through this the individual is affected agree-
ably or disagreeably from without, experiencing pleasure or pain.
Through this also the individual manifests its power outwardly in
movement and action. This impels it to do what yields it pleasure,
to avoid what causes pain. It is also the seat and source of desire,
both on its positive and its negative side, as affection or aversion,
sympathy or antipathy. Hence, in the New Testament, whenever
this is the only motive power by which any man's conduct is re-
gulated, he is called a soulish, or psychical (Eng. Ver. natural")
man.
This is the common basis of the human and the animal souls.
They have a common foundation--a common root and source.
And both were originally dependent upon the primary moving of
the Spirit of God, which moved upon the chaotic mass of earthly
1
Such passages as Gen. ix. 5, vi. 7 ; Ex. xxi. 28; Lev. xx. 15, 16; Deut.
xiii. 15, are not to be regarded in the light of punishment inflicted upon the ani-
mal. Gen. iii. 14 stands altogether by itself.
matter, out of which their corporeality was formed. But above this
common natural basis, there rises the essential difference between the
human and animal souls. Whereas the animal world was merely
endowed with a spirit of life by a general creative operation of the
Spirit of God upon the earthly material, out of which their bodies
were prepared; the breathing of the spirit of life into the human
form was the result of a direct, special, unique act of God, through
which the general, earthly spirit of life was imbued with specific
and divine powers; so that the spirit of life thus impregnated, ren-
dered man not merely a living soul (Gen. ii. 7), but also the
image of God (Gen. i. 27), and thereby stamped upon him on the
physical (essential) side, as a copy of the divine nature, the indelible
character of personality, with all its attributes, and on the ethical
(habitual) side, as a (potential) copy of the divine character, the
capacity to be holy as God is holy. For as man, by virtue of his
personality, was able to mould himself otherwise than God had in-
tended, and to will otherwise than God had willed; this side of his
likeness to God could only have been imparted to him at first as a
mere capacity, and not as a developed and inalienable reality. And
the fact is recorded in Gen. iii., that the man did not progress from
the potential holiness at first imparted, to an actual holiness of his
own choosing; but on the contrary, abused his freedom and fell
into unholiness and sin.
The following, therefore, we may regard as the result of our
discussion thus far. The soul of the animal, like that of man, is
the first principle, the seat and source, of the sensuous life in all
its functions; in this respect, both are alike. But the difference;
between them consists in this, that if we look at the absolute con-
dition of both, the soul of the animal is determined and sustained
by instinct and the necessities of its nature, and therefore is not
capable of accountability; whilst the soul of man, on the contrary,
by virtue of the likeness to God imparted at first, is possessed of
personality, freedom, and accountability; whereas, if we look at the
condition of both, as it appears before us in reality, and as the
practical result of that inequality, the soul of man appears laden
with sin and guilt, and exposed to the judgment of God (Gen. ii.
17, iii. 16 sqq.), whilst the animal soul, because not responsible
for its actions, may be regarded as perfectly sinless and free from
guilt. The soul is in both the seat of pleasure and displeasure, is
and, as such, the impulse to all that is done or left undone; but in
man alone can the pleasure or displeasure be regarded as sinful, and
the soul be designated as the birth-place and laboratory of sin;

since in it alone, and not in the animal soul, the element of per-
sonality, i.e., of free self-determination and inalienable accountability,
is to be found.
We are all the more warranted, or rather compelled, to bring
forward this contrast--on the one hand, freedom from sin and guilt,
on the other, sinfulness and guilt--as of essential importance to our
question; because, as rPekal; shows, in connection with every animal
sacrifice, though in different degrees, the point in question was the
expiation of the sin which clung to the soul of the person sacrific-
ing. The sinless and guiltless soul of the animal was the medium
of expiation for the sinful and guilty soul of the person by whom
the sacrifice was offered.
34. Before proceeding to the second question,--viz., what was
done to, and with, the soul of the sacrificial animal before and for
the sake of the expiation,--we must first of all consider the choice of
the materials of sacrifice, and what was requisite to fit them for the
purpose.
The material of sacrifice, so far as expiation was the object in
view, consisted of an animal. But all kinds of animals were not
admissible; nor was every individual belonging to such species as
were admissible necessarily suitable for the purpose. The only
animals admissible were those which served the Israelites as food,
and had been reared by themselves ( 21), and which therefore
stood in a biotic relation to the person presenting the sacrifice
( 22). We have already examined the meaning of these provi-
sions,and have found that, whilst all the Corbanim were primarily
and chiefly representatives of personal self-surrender to Jehovah,
the altar-sacrifices possessed this character in an especial and exclu-
sive manner. And another difference has also presented itself
( 24); viz., that the animal sacrifices set forth the person of the
sacrificer himself and his vital powers the vegetable sacrifices, the
fruits and performances of those vital powers. And in connection
with this, it must also be borne in mind, that the laws of food sanc-
tioned and established the notion, that the clean, i.e., the edible
animals, from which alone it was lawful to take those that were
sacrificed, were representatives of Israel as the chosen nation; whilst
the unclean animals, on the other hand, were representatives of the
heathen world, which stood outside the sanctifying covenant with
Jehovah ( 3; vid. Lev. xx. 24-26). If, as we have already seen
( 23), the altar-sacrifices were regarded as food for Jehovah
( hOAhyla MH,l,), it follows as a matter of course, that Israel durst not offer
to Jehovah such food as His own people had been forbidden to eat
because it was unclean; and if the intention of such offerings was
not to present earthly food, of which Jehovah had no need, but
spiritual food, which alone is well-pleasing to Jehovah, and which
was really requisite to His Jehovistic relation--in other words, the
faithful self-surrender of the covenant nation,--all unclean animals
were necessarily excluded, as being representatives of the heathen
world. And the fact that even clean animals were not all admis-
sible in sacrifice, but only such of them as were the objects of their
own care and rearing, of their daily thought and need, had, as we
have seen, its good and obvious foundation in the spiritual worth
of this food of Jehovah, and in the personal self-dedication of the
sacrificer, of which it was the representation.
With regard to the sex, both male and female were admissible;
at the same time, the law for the most part gave express directions
when a male animal was to be offered, and when a female, and pro-
ceeded generally upon the rule, that the male, as superior in worth,
power, and importance, was to be used for the higher and more im-
portant sacrifices. The age of the animal was also taken into con-
sideration: it was not to bear any signs of weakness about it,
either because of its youth, or because of its age. As a general
rule, it was required, that animals from the flocks should be at least
eight days old (Lev. xxii. 27; Ex. xxii. 30); and in most cases it
was prescribed, with regard to sheep and goats (Lev. ix. 3, xii. 6;
Ex. xxii. 28; Num. xxviii. 3, 9, 11), and once with regard to oxen
(Lev. ix. 3), that they should be a year old. But a still greater age
is generally indicated in the case of oxen, by the use of the word rPA
and hrAPA (as distinguished from the calf, lg,fe Lev. ix. 3), without any
limits being assigned. According to the rabbinical regulations, no
animal was to be more than three years old.1--With regard to the
character of the animal, bodily faultlessness was strictly required
(Lev. xxii. 20-24). Both of these demands--viz., that of a vigor-
ous age, and that of bodily faultlessness--were connected with the
appointment of the animal as a medium of expiation. As so
appointed, it was not to have the very same thing that it was de-
signed to expiate in the person presenting the sacrifice. In man,
no doubt, the infirmities, wants, and injuries, for which the expiation
1
In Judg. vi. 25, the instruction to offer a bullock of seven years old was
connected with the duration of the Midianitish oppression; and therefore, as an
exceptional case, was not necessarily opposed to the rabbinical tradition.
82 THE PRESENTATION AND LAYING ON OF HANDS.
was intended, were moral in their nature; whereas an animal, not

being an accountable creature, could have none but physical faults.
But what sin is in the sphere of the moral spirit-life, bodily infirmi-
ties and injuries are in the sphere of the physical and natural life;
and, for that reason, bodily faultlessness and vital energy were
adapted to copy and represent symbolically that spiritual purity
and fulness of life, which were requisite in a perfect sacrifice as a
medium of expiation, and as an antidote to ethical wants, infirmi-
ties, and crimes.
On proceeding now to examine what was done with the sacrifi-
cial materials so chosen and constituted, we find the whole process
consisting of six leading stages: (1) The presentation of the animal,
by bringing it to the altar in the court; (2) the laying on of
hands; (3) the slaughtering before the altar; (4) the sprinkling of
blood against the altar; (5) the burning of the flesh upon the
altar; and (6) the sacrificial meal which was held at the sanctuary.
CHAPTER III.
THE PRESENTATION AND LAYING ON OF HANDS.
35. The BRINGING of the animal by the sacrificer himself is

expressed by the verb xybihe, and is to be distinguished from the
offering of the animal (=byriq;hi); the latter term being used to
denote the whole of the sacrificial rite. The place to which the
sacrifice was required to be brought was the court of the sanctuary
(Lev. i. 3, iv. 4, 14, etc.), as being the only spot where sacrifices
were allowed to be offered (Lev. xvii. 1-6). The reason for this
act lies upon the surface: the person presenting the offering showed
thereby that he felt and desired to put into practice the wish, the
need, or the obligation to renew, to fortify, and to give life, by
means of such an offering, to his fellowship with that God who
dwelt and revealed Himself there ( 12). The presentation of the
animal was followed, no doubt, by an examination on the part of
the priests, to see whether it answered in kind and condition to the
directions contained in the law ( 34), inasmuch as it was necessary
that this should be decided before any further steps could be taken.
36. Of incomparably greater importance was the LAYING ON
THE PRESENTATION AND LAYING ON OF HANDS 83
OF HANDS, which was done by the sacrificer himself. This took

place in connection with every kind of animal sacrifice (even in the
trespass-offerings, 122), except that of pigeons; and even then
j the omission was certainly made on outward grounds alone, and had
therefore no decisive meaning. The standing expression applied to
this ceremony, OdyA-tx, j`masA (which led the Rabbins to call the act
itself the Semichah), is stronger and more significant than our
laying on of hands: it denotes a resting, leaning upon the hand.
The choice of this expression, therefore, shows that it had reference
to a most important act--an act which required the strongest energy
and resoluteness both of mind and will,--for which reason the Rab-
bins expressly required that the Semichah should be performed
with all the powers of the body (Maimonides, HaKo-lkAB; cf. Oehler, p.
627).1
The laying on of hands in general denotes, throughout the Holy
Scriptures, the transfer or communication of some supersensual ele-
ment to or upon another, whether it be a power, gift, affection, or
obligation: for example, in the act of blessing (Gen. xlviii. 13, 14;
Matt. xix 13-15); in the communication of the Holy Spirit in
general (Acts viii. 17 sqq., xi:x. 6), and especially in connection with
consecration to any theocratical or ecclesiastical office (Num. xxvii.
18 sqq.; Deut. xxxiv. 9; Acts vi. 6; 1 Tim. v. 22); in the mira-
culous cures of Christ and His Apostles (Matt. ix. 18; Mark vi. 5;
Luke xiii. 13 Acts ix. 12, 17); in the setting apart of a personal
substitute (Num. viii. 10, x:xvii. 18 sqq.; Deut. xxxiv. 9); in the
sentence of a malefactor to execution (Lev. xxiv. 14 and Susannah
ver. 34).2 Consecration, therefore, to some new position in life, by one
who had the power and the right to make the appointment, and to
qualify and equip the other for it, is to be regarded as the general
purpose of the imposition of hands. For blessing may be looked at
1
According to the unanimous tradition of the Jews, a verbal confession of
sins was associated with the imposition of hands; and, according to the Mish-
nah (cf. Outram, p. 170), it ran as follows:--Obsecro Donmine, peccavi, deliqui,
rebellavi, hoc et illud feci, nunc autem paenitentiam ago, sitque haec (hostia) ex-
piatio mea. Bahr also admits that "the sacrificial ceremony can hardly have
been performed in perfect silence; but, just as among the heathen, prayers or
other formularies were repeated during the sacrifice." But the law of Moses
never mentions any such custom; for Lev. xvi. 21 does not bear upon the point
at all ( 45), and the command in Lev. v. 5 and Num. v. 7 with regard to the
confession of sin cannot be adduced as any proof of the custom, since it is not
connected with the imposition of hands, but precedes the whole sacrificial cere-
mony.
2
For a fuller examination of these passages, cf. 45.
in this light, and miraculous healing also: the former is the conse-
cration of the person blessed to the course and sphere of labour
which the person blessing intends for him; the latter, the consecra-
tion of the person who has hitherto been ill or crippled, to a healthy
and vigorous life. What power, gift, affection, or obligation it was
that was communicated or transferred to this end through the im-
position of hands, must be learned from the peculiar circumstances
under which, the purpose for which, or the psychical emotion and
decision with which it was performed in the cases referred to, as
well as in connection with the sacrificial ceremony.
37. In Bahr's opinion (ii. 341), the laying on of hands in con-
nection with the sacrifice was nothing but a formal and solemn
declaration, on the one hand, that this gift was his actual property,
and on the other hand, that he was ready to give up this property
of his entirely to death, i.e., to devote it to death for Jehovah. In
my Mosaisches Opfer, p. 65 sqq., I have, as I believe, already shown
this view, together with all the positive and negative arguments
adduced in its favour, to be perfectly groundless and untenable,
and I therefore feel that I am relieved from the necessity of repeat-
ing my objections here.
Hofmann, on the other hand, in the first edition of his Schrift-
beweis (ii. 1, pp. 153-4), has expressed himself as follows on the
significance of this ceremony:--"What the person offering the
sacrifice inwardly purposed to do, when bringing the animal to the
Holy Place, was to render a payment to God; and he had full power
to appropriate the life of the animal for the rendering of this pay-
ment.1 And the meaning of the imposition of hands was, that he
intended to make use of this power, and so inflicted death upon the
animal, by which he purposed to render payment to God." Exam-
ples, analogies, and other proofs of this assertion, he did not think
of furnishing. In the second edition the passage is wanting, and
in the place of it we read (pp. 247, 248), that the laying on of
hands was an appointment of the animal for a slaughter, the ob-
ject of which (as Delitzsch admits) was twofold, viz., to obtain the
blood for the altar, and the flesh for the fire-food of Jehovah,
whether the intention was to supplicate the mercy of God towards
the sinner, i.e., to make expiation, or (as in the case of the thank-
offering) to present thanksgiving and prayer for the blessings of
life." But this correction has not really mended the matter. For
1
Strange to say, Hofmann bases this power upon the fact recorded in
Gen. iii. 21; cf. 68.
THE PRESENTATION AND LAYING ON OF HANDS. 85
if the "appointment for such a slaughter" was nothing more than

the declaration, that by virtue of the power accruing to him from
Gen. i. 26, he had determined "to do to this animal all that neces-
sarily followed from his desire to obtain the mercy of God, or give
glory to His goodness by thanksgiving and supplication" (p. 247),
such a declaration was very superfluous; for it had already been
sufficiently made in the simple act of bringing to the altar an animal
that really belonged to him, and was entirely subject to his control.
Nothing short of such a difference in the manner in which the im-
position of hands took place, in the sin-offerings on the one hand,
and the thank-offerings on the other, as would have shown that the
former expressed a desire for the mercy of God, and the latter
thanksgiving and prayer for the blessings of life, and thus would
have introduced a new feature that was not already expressed by
bringing the animal to the altar, could possibly deliver the laying
on of hands, if so understood, from the reproach of a perfectly idle
and unmeaning pleonasm. But if the appointment of the animal
was something more than a simple declaration of the purpose for
which it was offered; then, just as the imposition of hands in the
ordination to an office was something more than the declaration
that the person to be ordained was appointed to that office (viz., the
requisite endowment with the Spirit of God), so must it also in this
case have been intended to express a communication, both answering
to, and qualifying it for the purpose to which it was devoted. But
this is just what Hofmann denies.
38. Whilst Bahr and Hofmann are thus unable to content
themselves with the traditional and orthodox view, which has pre-
vailed from time immemorial, and was adopted alike by the Rabbins
and the Fathers of the Church, viz., that the laying on of hands
was expressive of the transfer of sin and guilt from the person
sacrificing to the animal sacrificed; that view has met with numerous
supporters even in our own day. And even Keil, who in other
respects has thoroughly given up the Church theory of sacrifice,
has not been able in this particular point to break away from it
though, as we shall soon discover, he has involved his own doctrine
in the most striking self-contradictions by thus stopping half-way
( 53).
Modern supporters of this view start with the assumption, that
the laying on of hands must denote, in the ritual of sacrifice, as in
every other place in which it occurs, a communication or transfer,
the object of which, here as everywhere else, was to be gathered
from the feelings or intention of the person by whom the act was
performed. Now, as the starting point in sacrifice was the conscious-
ness of guilt, and the end the expiation of that guilt: as the soul of
the sacrificer, therefore, was entirely filled with the desire to be
delivered from its guilt and sin; the imposition of hands could only
express the (symbolical) transfer of his sin and guilt to the animal
to be sacrificed. But with regard to the special adaptation of this
view to the various kinds of sacrifice, the advocates of this view
differ from one another, and may be classified in two separate
groups.
In the opinion of some, the laying on of hands had throughout
the sacrificial ritual, in the burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, as
well as in the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, one and the same
signification, viz., the transfer of sin or sinfulness from the person
sacrificing to the animal sacrificed, since in every case it was pre-
paratory paratory to the expiation, and the expiation alone. This view ,
formed one of the leading thoughts in my own Mosaisches Opfer;
and among later writers it has met with approbation from Havernick
Ebrard, Kliefoth, Stockl, and others.
In the opinion of the others, on the contrary, the idea of the
transfer of sin was expressed in the laying on of hands in the case
of the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings only. In the burnt-
offerings and peace-offerings they attribute to it a very different
meaning. This remark applies to Neumann, Delitzsch, and Keil
more especially, but also to Gesenius, Winer, Knobel, Tholuck, and
others. Keil, who has gone most thoroughly into the question,
expresses himself thus: "If the desire of the sacrificer was to be
delivered from a sin or trespass, he would transfer his sin and tres-
pass to the victim; but if, on the other hand, he desired through
the sacrifice to consecrate his life to God, that he might receive
strength for the attainment of holiness, and for a walk well-pleasing
to God, he would transfer this desire, in which the whole effort of
his soul was concentrated, to the sacrificial animal; so that in the
latter, as in the former instance, the animal would henceforth take
his place, and all that was done to it would be regarded as being
done to the person who offered it. But if the intention was merely
to express his gratitude for benefits and mercies received or hoped
for he would simply transfer this feeling of gratitude to the victim
so that it would represent his person only so far as it was absorbed (?)
into the good received or sought for." Delitzsch expresses him-
self to the same effect: "By the imposition of hands the person
presenting the sacrifice dedicated the victim to that particular object

which he hoped to attain by its means. He transferred directly to
it the substance of his own inner nature. Was it an expiatory
sacrifice, i.e., a sin-offering or a trespass-offering; he laid his sins
upon it, that it might bear them, and so relieve him of them."
Delitzsch does not go any further into a discussion of their meaning
in the case of the burnt-offering and peace-offering. Neumann
says, The person presenting the sacrifice laid his hand upon the
victim, to transfer to it his own individual determination by means
of the appropriation. . . . Only, let it not therefore be supposed, that
in every case it denoted a simple imputation of sins. If I brought
a peace-offering to my God, the victim upon which I had laid my
hand would carry my peace into His presence; and if I brought
an atoning sacrifice, it would express my desire to be delivered from
my guilt and sin." Hengstenberg affirms, that its signification in
general was to show the rapport between the person sacrificing and
the sacrifice itself. Anything more precise must necessarily be
learned from the nature of the particular sacrifice. . . . In the sin-
offering and burnt-offering the thought was expressed symbolically,
That am I; and in the thank-offering, on the other hand, That
is my gift, my thanksgiving.
39. According to the view last mentioned, therefore, the
imposition of hands had a different meaning in every one of the
different kinds of sacrifice just as it did not represent the same
thing in a miraculous cure as in a simple blessing, nor the same
thing in consecration to an office as in a sentence of execution.
But are we warranted in resorting to such an analogy? In the
latter, the act has reference in every instance to a totally different
department of life; and in all the cases mentioned, the attendant
circumstances, the occasions, and the subjects, differ entirely from
one another. In the former, on the contrary, notwithstanding the
difference in the sacrifices, the act itself is always confined to one
and the same department, being performed with the same attendant
circumstances and on the same foundation; and even the persons
by whom it is performed are not distinguished in relation to that
act by special and different endowments, or official positions, as is
the case with a father who gives his blessing, with a worker of
miraculous cures a consecrating dignitary, or an accusing witness.
But if, notwithstanding this, the imposition of hands in the different
kinds of sacrifice effected the transfer of different objects, one
would suppose that this difference would be indicated in some way,
say, by a verbal declaration connected with the imposition of hands;

yet of this there is nowhere the slightest trace.1
What can have been the object transferred in the case of the
burnt-offerings and peace-offerings if not the same as in that of
the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings? Delitzsch leaves the ques-
tion unanswered, and thus evades the difficulty of expressing a clear
and definite opinion. According to Neumann, the peace-offering
was thereby commissioned by the person presenting it to carry his
peace before God (1). And yet none of the sacrificial rites which
followed favour such a conclusion; for the sprinkling of its blood
upon the altar served, according to Lev. xvii. 11, as a covering for
sin; and the burning of the fat cannot have been intended as an
execution of that commission an more than the eating of the
flesh. It is just as difficult to understand how Hengstenberg can
maintain his distinction, seeing that the burnt-offering was un-
doubtedly quite as much a gift and offering as the thank-offering.
Keil's distinction is perfectly incomprehensible. That the animal
constituting the sin-offering or trespass-offering should, after I had
transferred my sin or guilt to it, be treated itself as sinful or guilty,
and that what happened to it should be regarded as happening to
the person offering the sacrifice," is perfectly intelligible. But when
I had transferred my wish for powers of holiness to the animal
selected as a burnt-offering, would the animal itself be regarded as
wishing for such powers? or would the thank-offering, to which I
had transferred my gratitude for benefits received or desired, be
treated as expressing thanks for such benefits, and all that happened
to it be looked upon as the fulfilment of my wish, or the result of
my gratitude? Certainly not; for it was slaughtered immediately
afterwards, and therefore could neither receive the power desired,
nor manifest the gratitude that was felt. Moreover, in the presen-
tation of a thank-offering, another feature was associated with the
feeling of gratitude. The thoughts of the person offering the
sacrifice were directed from the very first to the sacrificial meal,
and to what was signified by that meal, namely, fellowship with
God; so that the desire for this would fill and move his soul when
laying on his hands, and even force itself into the foreground. Why
then should not this be the object transferred? And just as the
1
The peculiar and unparalleled case mentioned in Lev. xvi. 21 cannot serve
as a proof, that the imposition of hands in connection with all the sin-offerings was
accompanied by a verbal declaration; to say nothing of the burnt-offerings and
peace-offerings. Vid. 45.
want of expiation sought and found satisfaction, not only in the sin
and trespass-offering, but in the burnt-offering and peace-offering
also; so not in the burnt-offering only, but in the sin-offering, tres-
pass-offering, and peace-offering also, did the striving after a self-
surrender, that craved sanctification, seek and find satisfaction;
the former being met by the sprinkling of blood, and the latter
(though not in the same degree) by the burning upon the altar.
Consequently, according to our opponents' premises, the imposition
of hands would necessarily be preparatory not merely to the sprin-
kling of blood, but to the other sacrificial functions also; so that in
the sin-offering, not merely the sin, but also the wish for sanctification
would be transferred, and in the burnt, offering, not merely the latter,
but the former as well. This, or something similar, is actually
maintained by Ewald (Alterthk. p. 47). "The laying on of hands,"
he says, "indicated the sacred moment when the person presenting
the sacrifice, just as he was commencing the sacred rite, laid all the
feelings, which gushed from him in fullest glow, upon the head of
that creature whose blood was to be shed for him, and to appear as
it were before God."
In all the different varieties of sacrifice, the laying on of hands
stood in the same local, temporal, and conditional, i.e., preparatory,
relation to the slaughtering, and the sprinkling of the blood. Are
we not warranted, therefore, and even obliged, in every case, to
uphold the same signification in relation to them? Take the burnt-
offering, in connection with which, in the very front of the sacri-
ficial law in Lev. i. 4, expiation is so evidently, expressly, and
emphatically mentioned as one point, if not as the main point, and
placed in the closest relation to the laying on of hands ("He shall
put his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering; and it shall be
accepted for him, to make atonement for him"). Is it really the
fact that even here the: imposition of hands stood in no relation
whatever to the expiation? Certainly, if there were nothing else to
overthrow such a view, the passage just quoted would suffice, and
before this alone it would be compelled inevitably to yield.
40. Let us now examine the other view, of which I was once
a supporter, that the imposition of hands was intended to express
the same simple meaning in connection with all the sacrifices, viz.,
the transfer of sin or sinfulness from the person sacrificing to the
animal sacrificed. I will confess at the outset, that I am no longer
prepared to maintain my old opinion in this particular form ( 44
sqq.); but as the arguments of my opponents have not led me to
this change in my views, my relinquishing that opinion has not

made me insensible to the elements of truth which it contains.
We will compare it first of all with the view which Keil and
Delitzsch oppose to it. In how much simpler, clearer, more intelli-
gible, and concrete a form does it present the meaning of the cere-
mony in question! And what objection has been offered to it from
this side ? It is true, the final purpose in connection with the
burnt-offering was the burning, and with the peace-offering the
sacrificial meal and consequently the ultimate intention of the
person presenting the sacrifice was directed, in the former, to a
complete self-surrender to Jehovah, in the latter, to fellowship with
Him. But in the mind of the worshipper, the consciousness of his
sin rose like an insuperable wall in the way of both: he knew that
his self-surrender could never be well-pleasing to God, and that
his longing for fellowship with God could never be satisfied, till
atonement had been made for his sin. Even in the sacrifice of a
burnt-offering or peace-offering, therefore his desire was first of
all directed to expiation; whilst his purpose of self-surrender, and
the striving after fellowship with God, could only come to light
when his sin had been covered and atoned for. Would not the
longing for forgiveness, so long as it remained unsatisfied, stand in
the foreground of his thoughts and feelings, and suppress for the
time every other feeling? But if this question must be answered
in the affirmative, every ground for our opponents' view is swept
away. The only thing that could have favoured that view at all
would have been, that the laying on of hands in the burnt- and
peace-offerings should have taken place after the atonement was
completed, and immediately before the burning or the sacrificial
meal,--the animal of course having been killed in the meantime.
In the case of the burnt-offering, we appeal with conclusive
force to Lev. i. 4; for it is not to the burning, but to the atone-
ment, and to that alone, that the imposition of hands is there ex-
pressly represented as preparatory. Even in the burnt-offering it
was requisite that all the desires and actions of the worshipper, all
the co-operation and help of the priest, should be directed first of
all to the making of atonement, before anything further or any-
thing different could be undertaken; for the complete surrender,
which was the ultimate purpose in the burnt- (or whole) offering,
had necessarily to be preceded by complete expiation.
This applies to the peace-offering also. In the pious Israelite,
the consciousness of his own sin and of the divine holiness was so
clear and strong, that he was afraid lest he should die if he drew
near to God and held communion with Him (Ex. xx. 19, xxxiii.
20, etc.); and consequently his longing for that communion, and
for the joy which it inspired, was overpowered by the fear that he
might not be able to stand. When he brought a peace-offering,
therefore, hoping thereby to obtain communion--real house-and-
table fellowship with God how could it be otherwise than that the
sinfulness which rendered him unfit for that fellowship should be
present to his mind, and his whole soul be filled with the desire
for expiation before anything else, and therefore in connection
with the laying on of hands? And if the feeling of gratitude for
benefits received, or the prayer for blessings desired, impelled him
to present a peace-offering, would not the contrast between his own
sinful unworthiness and the blessing enjoyed or hoped for so occupy
and control his thoughts and feelings, that here also the conscious-
ness of sin and the want of expiation would assert themselves, and
fill his mind before everything else?
There is also another point of importance. If the imposition of
hands, even in its preliminary signification, had respect to the
objects which lay beyond the expiation, and, in the case of the
burnt- and peace-offerings, to one of them exclusively, as our oppo-
nents maintain,--viz., in that of the burnt-offering to self-surrender
in the burning, and in that of the peace-offering to fellowship with
God in the sacrificial meal; we should expect to find an imposition
of hands, or something answering to it, connected with the meat-
offering also (especially when it was not introduced as a mere
appendage to the bleeding sacrifice, but was an independent offer-
ing without the basis of an animal sacrifice: 151 sqq.), inasmuch
as the desire for sanctification and fellowship was as prominent a
feature in these as in either the burnt- or the peace-offerings. But
as nothing of the kind is to be found, we are warranted perhaps in
drawing the conclusion, that the sacrificial imposition of hands had
exclusive regard to the atonement, and therefore was admissible in
the bleeding sacrifices alone.
41. Hofmann's own view of the sacrificial imposition of hands
we have already shown to be untenable ( 37). In his arguments
against my view and those of his other opponents, he really does
nothing more than lay hold of certain expressions which are easily
misunderstood, and are probably to some extent inappropriate or
wrong, and then, having fathered upon them a meaning which
does not belong to them, exhibit the absurdities to which this
meaning leads. Thus he seizes upon the ambiguous expression of

Delitzsch (p. 737), "By the imposition of hands the worshipper
appropriated to himself the victim for that particular purpose to
which he intended it to be applied," and observes, in reply (p. 247),
"It is perfectly obvious that it was his own property; and that
being the case, he did not require first of all to appropriate it to
himself." But who cannot see that what Delitzsch means by
"appropriating" is not appropriating it as property, but appropri-
ating what was his property already to the purpose which as a
sacrifice, it was intended to subserve? Thus again he replies to
Kliefoth: "But it was not a real transfer of sin and guilt; for it
is impossible to see how they could ever be really transferred to
an animal;" whereas Kliefoth means something entirely different.
For, when he says (p. 52), "The imposition of hands was not a
sign that the person laying his hands upon the head of another
attributed something to him; but invariably, wherever it occurs in
the Scriptures, some real communication is made in consequence,"--
he evidently refers to the imposition of hands apart from the sacri-
ficial worship, and certainly does not mean to deny that in the
purely symbolico-typical ceremonial it represents symbolically, what
in other departments it really effects. It is much the same when
Hofmann observes, in reply to Keil (i. 206), "Nor was it an ap-
pointment of the animal to be or to suffer anything in the place of
the person offering it, either by causing it to be punished for his
fault, which would be quite out of place in the thank-offering, or
by transferring his own intention to it, when the slaughtering of
the animal was really the commencement of its fulfilment." But the
transfer of an intention is something very different from the fulfil-
ment of that intention; and, so far as the supposed inappropriate-
ness of this meaning to the imposition of hands in the case of the
"thank-offerings" is concerned, Keil has fallen into just the same
error as Hofmann here.
42. Hofmann argues most warmly and elaborately against the
opinion expressed by me in my Mosaisches Opfer (pp. 67 sqq.
"According to Kurtz," he says, "the imposition of hands always
denoted the impartation of that which the one possessed and the
other was to receive; consequently, in the case of sacrifice, as every
sacrifice, in his opinion, was an expiatory sacrifice, it denoted the
communication of the sinful affection to the animal soul, so that
the death which took place was thereby rendered a representative
death. An exchange of position was expressed by it: the soul of
the sacrifice appearing as if laden with sin and guilt, and that of
the person sacrificing as free from both." This view Hofmann now
takes the trouble to expose, as leading to absurd consequences.
"But how was it," he replies, "with the imposition of the hands
when a person was blessing, or healing, or ordaining? Did he
change places with the person upon whom his hands were laid, so
that he lost the good which he conferred upon the other? In all
these cases the imposition of hands was the act, which accompanied
the conferring of whatever the person acting intended for the other.
The internal process of intention and application was expressed in
the corresponding pressure of the hand, applied to the head of the
person for whom anything was intended, whether it belonged to the
person officiating or not. The agent needed plenary power to com-
municate it, but there was no necessity for it to be his own; to say
nothing of his parting with it by conferring it upon another, or ex-
changing it for what the other previously possessed. The person
blessing did not transfer his own peace, nor the healer his own
health, nor the person ordaining his own office: he simply made
use of his own priestly character, his healing power, his official
standing, to do to the other what this authority empowered him to
perform."
I must acknowledge at the outset, that I now consider the ex-
pression, "a change of places," both inappropriate and liable to be
misunderstood; and that, looking at the circumstances, it may pro-
perly be said, that by the imposition of hands the sacrificial animal
was appointed to play the part of the sinner meriting punishment,
i.e., to bear the merited punishment in his stead, but not (what the
expression might certainly be made to mean, though I never in-
tended to say it) that the person presenting the sacrifice had hence-
forth to take the place which previously belonged to the animal
sacrificed. But Hofmann does me a grievous injustice when he
forces upon me the absurd assertion, that through the imposition of
hands the person sacrificing not only transferred his sin and guilt
to the sacrificial animal, but exchanged them for "what the other
(viz., the animal) formerly possessed." I have undoubtedly said
(p. 83), that "by the imposition of hands sin and guilt were sym-
bolically imputed to the soul of the sacrifice;" but not that, vice
versa and eo ipso, the previous innocence of the animal sacrificed
was imputed to the sacrificer. I have also said, it is true, that
"henceforward the animal to be sacrificed passed for what HE was
before, viz., laden with sin and guilt, and therefore took his place;"
but not that the person presenting the sacrifice passed henceforward
for that which the animal was before, and so took the place of the
animal. And Hofmann has no right to father such nonsense upon
me.
I grant that what the person acting conferred upon the other was
not necessarily his own, in the sense of being his own property; but
I have never said that the imposition of hands was the communica-
tion of something that was the property of the one and was to
become the property of the other, but "of what the one had and
the other was to receive." And certainly, in any case, I must first
have what I am to impart to another. So that here also Hofmann
twists my words, and then convicts me of talking nonsense.
Nor did I ever think of maintaining anything so foolish as that
the person laying on the hand always, and under all circumstances,
parted with the good which he conferred upon the other, or that
the person blessing always transferred his own peace, the healer
his own health, the ordainer his own office; and this does not fol-
low in any way from my explanation. Sin and guilt are not a
"good," but an evil; and that makes an essential difference, which
Hofmann is pleased to ignore. Where the imposition of hands de-
notes the communication of some salutary power or gift (as, for
example, in blessing, in the communication of the Spirit, in ordina-
tion, or in the miraculous cures of Christ and His Apostles), which
the agent desires another to possess, though without parting with it
himself, we must regard such a communication as somewhat resem-
bling a flame lighting a second flame without being extinguished,
or the sun imparting light and warmth to the earth without thereby
losing its luminous and warming power. But when, as in Num.
viii. 10, it denotes the transfer from one person to another of a cer-
tain responsibility, from which the former desires to be free, the
communication is to be regarded as exhaustive and complete; and
the same would also be the case when it denoted (as in Lev. xxiv.
14 and Susannah 34, according to my opinion at that time) the
rolling off or rolling back of a certain crime upon another. And it
was upon the latter, not the former cases, that I rested my view,
that the sacrificial imposition of hands, in which there was also the
transfer of a responsibility and the rolling away of an evil, denoted
the imputation of sin. It is only by generalizing, therefore, what I
had particularized, that Hofmann has succeeded in stamping my
view as absurd. How thoroughly unjust such generalization must
be, is evident from Hofmann's observations in another way also;
for, in the reckless heat of his generalizing process, he brings for-

ward a case as impossible, which is not only possible, but is men-
tioned in the Scriptures as having actually occurred. For in Num.
xxvii. 18 sqq. and Deut. xxxiv. 9, Moses is said to have transferred
his own office to Joshua by the imposition of hands." And in how
thoughtless and unfair a manner are the other two sentences com-
posed! It is true, the person conferring the blessing does not
transfer his own peace, or the person effecting a cure his own
health;" but the former imparts the blessing power, and the latter
the healing power, entrusted to him, and that without suffering any
loss in consequence, because it is in the very nature of such spiritual
powers that they should not be exhausted through communication
to others.
One more remark in conclusion. "In all these cases," says
Hofmann, "the imposition of hands was the act which accompanied
the appropriation of what the person acting intended for the other."
Only the accompaniment, then, and not the medium? No doubt the
latter would be inconvenient enough for Hofmann's theory of the
sacrificial imposition of hands; but does this warrant him in diluting
the mediation, which is so obvious in these cases, into a mere accom-
paniment? Was nothing more intended than a mere accompani-
ment, and not a real means of conveying the gift, when the Apostles
communicated the Holy Ghost by the laying on of hands; or when,
as is stated in Deut. xxxiv. 9, "Joshua was filled with the spirit of
wisdom, FOR Moses had laid his hands upon him," and when Jehovah
said to Moses, with regard to the same imposition of hands, "Thou
shalt lay of thine honour upon him" (Num. xxvii. 20)?
43. We have already seen in 36, that the imposition of hands
in all cases that were unconnected with sacrifice, denoted dedication
to some new office, or some new position of responsibility. Was
this also the idea when the imposition of hands was associated with
the sacrificial worship? I do not imagine that any one will be able
to answer this question in the negative. According to Lev. i. 4
(cf. 39, 40), it denoted the dedication of the sacrificial animal, as
the medium of atonement for the sins of the person whose hands
were laid upon its head.
But on this common basis, as an act of dedication, there arises
at once a considerable variety of divergences. In some cases the
imposition of hands effected the substitution of one person for an-
other (vid. Num. viii. 10, xxvii. 18; Dent. xxxiv. 9). What the
person previously entitled, qualified, or required, was no longer able,
or willing, or bound, to perform, was henceforth to be done by the

other. In other cases, again, there was no room for the thought of
any such substitution as this. Now, to which of these classes did
the imposition of hands in the sacrificial ritual belong? We reply,
without the least hesitation, to the former; and in this we may con-
gratulate ourselves on the agreement of nearly all the commentators,
who attribute a representative character to the sacrificial animal,
though they do so in different ways, and who regard the imposition
of hands as denoting dedication to this vicarious position.1 And
properly so. For if the assumption is warranted, that the God of
Israel sought the sacrificial gift, so far as it was a gift, not for what
it was in itself--i.e., not as bodily food, and not on account of its
material worth--and that Israel never imagined that it could serve
its God with such gifts as these, but that, on the contrary, God
sought the giver in the gift, and Israel represented thereby its own
self-surrender;--if, moreover, it is also true that Israel, even on the
ground of its laws of food (Lev. xx. 24-26, cf. 4), was accustomed
to regard the animals which were allowed to be offered in sacrifice
as representatives of itself in contrast with the heathen world
and if, lastly, it is evident from Lev. xvii. 11 that the animal, on
account of the soul which dwelt in its blood, was also the medium
of atonement for the soul of the person presenting it, which, as we
shall presently see, it could only be through a vicarious expiation of
his sins,--all this places it beyond the possibility of doubt that the
animal sacrificed had also a representative character.
When Moses approached the end of his earthly course, he
ordained Joshua as his successor, and substituted him for himself,
by communicating of his glory ( j~d;Ohme) to him (Num. xxvii. 20),
and filling him with the spirit of wisdom (Deut. xxxiv. 9), through
the laying on of hands. In Num. viii. 10, on the other hand, the sub-
stitution of the Levites in the place of the first-born of all the tribes,
is described as effected through the laying on of the hands of the
1
Even Keil admits, in various places, the representative character of the
sacrificial animal by virtue of the imposition of bands, though this involves him
in contradiction with his own fundamental view of the meaning of the sacri-
ficial worship ( 53, 69). Thus in the passage already noticed, when he says
of the sin-, trespass-, and burnt-offerings, that "the sacrificial animal henceforth
took the place of the person offering it, and what happened to it is to be re-
garded as happening to the sacrificer himself." But when he afterwards says
that he admits the representative character of the peace-offering "only so far
as the victim was absorbed in the good received or prayed for," I confess that I
am perfectly unable to make out what the sentence means.
congregation, i.e., of the elders as its representatives; and what was

transferred in this case, was the obligation of life-long service in the
sanctuary, based upon the fact, that all the first-born belonged to
Jehovah ( 6). In the one case, therefore, it was a good, a salutary
power and gift, which was transferred; in the other, a burdensome
obligation. Which of these two was analogous to the imposition of
hands in the sacrificial ritual? Certainly not the first. For, ac-
cording to the relation in which the imposition of hands is proved
by Lev. i. 4 to have stood to the act of expiation, the idea was not
the giving up of any good, but the getting rid of a certain evil.
But was it analogous to the second? Undoubtedly it was. As the
debtor is under obligations to the creditor, the thief to the person
robbed, the rebel to the king, in the sense of being bound to render
to him, or stiffer from him, according to the wrong that he has
done; so also is the sinner to his Lord and God. This obligation
was transferred by the person sacrificing to the sacrificial animal,
that it might render or suffer all that was due from him to God, or,
vice versa, on account of his sin; and through this, the blood of the
animal, in which is its soul, became the medium of expiation for the
soul of the person sacrificing ( 28).
44. This was the meaning of the imposition of hands in the
sacrificial ritual. Consequently, I must candidly confess, that my
previous opinion of this ceremony-viz., that it denoted a transfer of
sin and guilt, a so-called imputation of sin, in sacrifices of every
kind--cannot be sustained. But so far from adopting in the place
of it the opinion of Neumann, Keil, and Delitzsch, that the idea of
the imputation of sin is to be restricted to the sin-offerings and
trespass-offerings, I should be disposed to pronounce their opinion
all the more untenable, just because of this unwarranted restriction
( 39, 40). Moreover, as I have already stated, no argument ad-
duced by any one of my opponents--either Hofmann or Hengsten-
berg, Keil, Delitzsch, or Oehler--has brought me to the conclusion
that my previous opinion was untenable. What produced this con-
viction, was chiefly a more careful examination of Lev. xvii. 11, the
very same passage which I had principally relied upon to support
my previous opinion, and, in fact, a very simple argument ( one so
obvious, that I am puzzled to understand how it could ever have
escaped my own notice, or that of my former opponents and sup-
porters), namely, that if the souls of the persons sacrificing, or, to
speak with still greater precision, the sins adhering to or proceeding
from their souls, were to be covered by the blood of the sacrifice, as
Lev. xvii. 11 states that they were these sins could not have been
communicated to the blood itself (or, more correctly, to the soul of the
animal which was in the blood), but must have adhered to the soul of
the sacrificer after the imposition of hands, as well as before.
45. The evidence adduced both by myself and others who
held the same view, in support of the transference of the sins from
the sacrificer to the sacrifice through the imposition of hands, I
find on closer scrutiny to be insufficient. We will take first of all
the argument based upon Lev. xvi. 21, which has been appealed to
with the most confident assurance of victory (cf. Tholuck, p. 94,
Neumann, 1853, p. 343; Ebrard, p. 49; Delitzsch, p. 737). The
allusion is to the second goat presented as a sin-offering on the great
day of atonement (after the first had been sacrificed in the ordinary
way as an expiation), and the passage runs thus: "And let Aaron
lay ( j`masAv; ) both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess
over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their
transgressions in all their sins and put 0n)1) ut Zthem upon the head
of the goat," etc. All that Hofmann has said to weaken the cer-
tainly apparent force of this passage, is little adapted to do so. He
says (p. 246): "Reference has been made to Lev. xvi. 21, as the
passage where we are to learn the meaning of the imposition of
hands in connection with the sacrifices. But why is it stated there
that the priest is to lay both his hands upon the head of the animal,
which is an essentially different attitude, viz., that of a person -
praying over the animal? The act which we are considering cor-
responds to what followed afterwards, when he laid the sins of the
congregation upon the head of the animal, that it might carry them
into the wilderness." But who is likely to be convinced by the
argument, that because the expression generally employed is "to
lay on the hand," and here Aaron is to lay on both hands, therefore
the ceremony referred to in the latter place is not the imposition of
hands, but the attitude of prayer? If the difference between sin-
gular and plural be pressed at all, how is it possible to understand it
in any other way than this, that the laying on of both hands denoted
a greater amount of energy in the communication than the laying
on of only one? Moreover, is not the very same act, which is
designated in Num. xxvii. 18 as a OdyA-tx, j`masA ("lay thine hand upon
him"), afterwards described in Deut. xxxiv. 9 as a vydAyA-tx, j`masA
(Moses had laid his hands upon him)? Where are the proofs,
then that laying on the hands ever was or could be an attitude of
prayer? And how weak and empty is the subterfuge, that it was
not the laying on of Aaron's hands, but what followed--viz., Aaron's

laying the sins of the congregation upon the head of the animal--
which corresponded to our ceremony! Is it not obvious that the
latter was the necessary consequence and effect of the first? You
have only to read the passage with the three consecutive verbs in
the Perfect tense, to be convinced how utterly powerless the reason-
ing is. And by what means, if not by the laying on of the hands,
are we to suppose that the sins were laid upon the head, of the
goat?
There is certainly more force in what Bahr has said (ii. 339)
against the bearing of this passage upon the doctrine of imputation.
The goat, he says, neither took the place of the high priest nor
that of the children of Israel; it was not even put to death, but sent
alive into the desert; in fact, it was not a sacrifice at all, and the
treatment of it therefore proves nothing with regard to the ritual
of sacrifice." In fact, everything connected with this imposition of
hands was done in such a way, as to distinguish it entirely from the
ordinary sacrificial ceremony. In addition to the circumstance
pointed out by Bahr, it should also be remembered, that in every
other case in which a sacrifice was presented for the whole congre-
gation, it was not by the high priest, but by the elders as repre-
sentatives of the congregation, that the lain on of hands was
performed, and that thiis the only occasion on which the cere-
mony is accompanied by a verbal declaration ( hDAvat;hiv; ) which serves
to explain it. And this very circumstance, that a verbal explanation
was thought necessary as an accompaniment to the act itself, is a
proof that here, and. nowhere else, the imposition of hands was to
be regarded as a laying on of sin. We shall return to this passage
at 199.
46. Again, Lev. xxiv. 14 has been misinterpreted in a manner
that favours the doctrine of imputation. It is there commanded that,
before stoning a blasphemer who has been sentenced to death, the
witnesses of his blasphemy are to lay their hands upon his head.
The same occurs in Susannah 34, when Susannah is condemned
to death on account of her supposed adultery. The reason for this
is thought to have been, that the capital crime committed within a
community was supposed to reflect a kind of complicity in the guilt,
a stain or curse upon the whole community, or, at all events, upon
the witnesses of the act; and that this was to be rolled back upon
the actual criminal. But no proof is to be found that such an idea
was ever entertained. For the fact that the sins of forefathers
.
continued to adhere to their descendants as guilt demanding
punishment or expiation (2 Sam. xxi.), and the circumstance that
the family of a criminal was regarded and punished as sharing in
the guilt (Josh. vii.), had nothing in common with Lev. xxiv. 14.
And Num. xxxv. 31-34, in which I once thought that I had dis-
covered the key to Lev. xxiv. 14, has just as little bearing upon that
passage. It is there commanded, that no ransom is to be accepted
for the forfeited life of a wilful murderer, but he is to be executed
forthwith. If this be neglected by Israel, the land is thereby de-
filed, and the blood which has remained unavenged will bring a
curse upon the land, which will rest upon it until the demands of
strict justice are satisfied. But this passage would only favour
the view in question, provided the curse upon the land came from,
the crime of the murderer, which is evidently a misapprehension.
It was not from the malefactor or his crime that it came, but from
the neglect, on the part of the judges appointed for that purpose,
to punish him for the crime.
Nevertheless, Lev. xxiv. 14 may help us to a correct interpreta-
tion of the sacrificial imposition of hands, or at least help to con-
firm the conclusion which we have already reached by a different
method ( 43). And it will do so all the more, if Ewald is really
correct, as seems very probable, in stating that "the older sacrificial
rite evidently furnished the model" for the judicial custom men-
tioned in Lev. xxiv. 14. In both cases it was a dedication to death
which was expressed by the imposition of hands; with this differ-
ence, however, that the dedication in the case of the sacrificial ani-
mal signified a substitution of the animal for the person sacrificing
it, whereas there could be nothing of the kind here, inasmuch as the
act had reference simply and solely to the sin of the person about
to be executed. "There is no transference here," as Hofmann
correctly says, "of what is one's own to some one else; but the sin
committed by the criminal is placed upon his own head, that it may
come upon him in the punishment which he afterwards receives."
On the other hand, the character of the transference, or assignment,
was essentially the same in both. The idea in both cases was the
assignment of an obligation or debt: in the former instance that of
another ( 43); in the latter, his own, viz., the obligation to submit
to death on account of the sin or crime that had been committed.
In the former, the sinner himself devoted the animal to death for
his own sin; in the latter, it was the witnesses of the crime who
dedicated the criminal himself to death: for in the one, the sinner
SLAUGHTERING, AND THE SPRINKLING OF THE BLOOD. 101
himself was his own accuser, because either he alone was aware of
his sin, or he was best acquainted with it; in the other, it was the
witnesses who (with the exception of the criminal himself) were the
only persons aware of his crime, or those best acquainted with it.
47. Hengstenberg adduces, as one of the principal arguments
for a transference of the sins to the sacrificial animal, at any rate
in the case of the sin-offering and trespass-offering, the names of
the sacrifices themselves, txF.AHa (= sin) and MwAxA (= guilt); and he
has been followed by Baumgarten and Keil. Through the transfer
of the sin, or trespass, he says, the animal became as it were a living
sin or trespass. But Oehler (p. 649) has justly replied to this:
The name of the sin-offering, txF.AHa, at all events, ought not to be
adduced in support of such a view, since by a very simple metonymy
(vid., e.g., Micah vi. 3, where fwaP, also stands in connection with
txF.AHa) it is used to designate the sacrifice offered for the sin
(txFA.Ha-lfa, Lev. iv. 3), on which account the LXX. generally ren-
der the name quite correctly, peri> a[marti<aj. In addition to Micah
vi. 7 (not vi. 3), we may adduce, in proof of the frequent occurrence
of such a metonymy in the current phraseology, Isa. xl. 2, where the
expression hAyt,xF.oHa-lKA can only be rendered all the punishments
or "expiations for their sins," not all their "sins;" also Zech. xiv.
19, where, in the same manner, Myirac;mi txF.aHa cannot mean the sin,
but the punishment of Egypt. The thought, that through the
"imputation of sins," the person to whom it was imputed actually
became "sin," is, as it appears to me, a monstrous and inconceiv-
able one, which presupposes that, at all events before the laying on
of hands, the sacrificer was either sin himself, or equivalent to
sin.
CHAPTER IV.
SLAUGHTERING, AND THE SPRINKLING OF THE BLOOD.1
48. The imposition of hands was followed by the SLAUGHTER-

ING (hFAyHiw;, 2 Chron. xxx. 17), by the hand of the person offering the
1
The word sprinkling we have used here in its broadest sense; so that it is
to be understood as including the application of the blood to the altar, and other
media of expiation in every possible way (viz., literal sprinkling (hz.Ahi), rinsing
(qrazA), and smearing with the finger).
102 SLAUGHTERING AND THE SPRINKLING OF THE BLOOD.
sacrifice, and this again by the SPRINKLING OF THE BLOOD (hqAyriz;)

by the hand of the priest. If the conclusion which we have arrived
at above ( 36, 43) as to the meaning of the imposition of hands
in connection with sacrifice be the correct one, viz., that according
to Lev. i. 4 it denoted the consecration of the animal to be the medium
of atonement for the sins of the person sacrificing, by means of a
substitutionary transference (as shown by the analogy of Num. viii.
10) of the obligation to do or suffer, in his stead, that which his God
demanded from him on account of his sin; then the slaughtering
could only express the completion of the act, or the endurance of
the punishment, in order that the animal, or rather its blood, in
which was its soul, might thereby become fitted to be a medium of
expiation. The imposition of hands, therefore, may be more exactly
defined as the consecration to death (according to the analogy of
Lev. xxiv. 14; cf. 45), and that a vicarious, penal death; the
slaughtering, as the completion of this penal death, by which the
blood of the animal was fitted to become the medium of expiation;
and the sprinkling of the blood, the completion of the expiation
itself.
This combination and this conclusion are so clear, firm, and
certain, that even if there were no other passage in the Old Testa-
ment in which death is represented as the wages of sin (Rom. vi.
23), the sacrificial worship itself would be sufficient to prove that it
is a genuine Old Testament doctrine. But there are other passages
which can be shown to teach it. It may be traced, in fact, to the
very first and fundamental beginning of divine revelation in the
primeval history of man. For the declaration tUmTA tOm (thou shalt
surely die"), in connection with the first sin (Gen. ii. 17, iii. 17),
taught it; and every one of the innumerable repetitions of tmaUy tOm
(he shall surely be put to death), which occur in the law, con-
firmed the lesson taught.
The truth involved in Gen. ii. 17, iii. 17, that every sin, whether
small or great according to a human standard, is to be regarded as
rebellion against the will of God and an abuse of the image of
God, and therefore as deserving of death, but that a decree of
divine grace intervened, in consequence of which death does not
take place on the first sin, or every subsequent sin, but only when it
pleases God to cut off the man and the respite provided by that
sparing mercy (Gen. vi. 3); this truth is not only confirmed, but
explained and expanded by the Mosaic sacrificial worship on the
one hand, and the Mosaic jurisprudence on the other, or rather by
the supplementary or antithetical relation in which they stand the

one to the other.
The eternal counsel of Divine Mercy devised a redemption from
sin and its consequences. Death, indeed, as the necessary wages of
sin, cannot be, and is not intended to be, averted in consequence,
since the mortality which through sin has pervaded the corporeal
life, must be brought, like an abscess, to a head, in order that in
like manner it may then be overcome, and removed by means of a
curative process. On the other hand, not only is the approach of
death retarded as long as God sees fit, that man and the human
race may have time to manifest the subjective conditions of salva-
tion, which the divine counsel of mercy demands, but death is
divested of its eternal duration and rule; for as death is in a man
before he actually dies, so the man is in death after he dies. In the
former case, death is a potentiality, bound and repressed by the
vital energy; in the latter, it is an unfettered power without him,
and possessing unlimited supremacy over him. The author of the
book of Genesis did not, of course, possess so clear and sure an
insight into the relation between sin, death, and redemption, as has
been made possible for man on New Testament ground; but GOD
possessed it, and even under the Old Testament it was by this that
He regulated His treatment of man.
But whilst this general alteration of things removed the original
necessity for every single sin to be immediately punished with
death, and the divine provision intervened, that man might con-
tinue alive for a longer or shorter time notwithstanding his sinful-
ness and his many actual sins; that provision did not extend to all
actual sins, for example, not to such as threatened and endangered
the very existence either of the moral world in general, or of the
special theocratic plan of salvation, and therefore not to capital
crimes. But in order that the consciousness might still be pre-
served, served, that strictly and originally every sin, even those which
seemed the most trivial, deserved immediate death, and this law
of nature was only interrupted by the sparing mercy of God; the
institution of sacrificial expiation was established, or rather per-
mitted and legitimated by God,--an institution which stood in a
typical relation to the complete salvation that had been predeter-
mined in the eternal counsels of God, as the progressive develop-
ment of the plan of salvation showed with growing clearness (Isa.
liii.), and the event at Golgotha displayed in perfect light (cf. 57).
49. Keil (i. 211), indeed, thinks that the scriptural proofs of
104 SLAUGHTERING, AND THE SPRINKLING OF THE BLOOD.
the sacrificial death having been a penal death, are drawn by me

among others, "merely" from two "misinterpreted" passages, viz.,
Rom. vi. 23 ("the wages of sin is death"), and Heb. ix. 22 ("with-
out shedding of blood there is no remission of sins"). But I can
safely affirm, that in this sentence both the "merely" and the
misinterpreted are wrong. Where the misinterpretation of
Rom. vi. 23 is supposed to lie, I cannot imagine, since I have under-
stood, the passage in just the same sense as Keil himself, who
gives this exposition: "The wages of sin is the justly acquired and
merited reward which follows sin." And Keil cannot deny that
these wages "may be called a punishment so far as the reward is an
evil and not a good." But in his opinion, "so long as it has not
been proved from other sources that the sacrificial act (he ought to
have said, the act of slaying) is to be regarded as a judicial act,
there is no ground for applying Rom. vi. 23 to the sacrificial slay-
ing." Very good; but where is the misinterpretation of Rom. vi.
23, if the explanation is correct, and it is only our application of the
correct explanation which is inadmissible?
When Keil charges me, on the other hand, with misunder-
standing Heb. ix. 22, the true ground for the charge is, that I have
interpreted it in a different manner from himself. By the ai[mat-
ekxusi<a, for example, I understand the pouring out of the blood in
the act of slaying . Keil understands it, in common with other
expositors, of the sprinkling of blood, and consequently accuses
Bleek, who gives the same explanation as I have done, of counting
the passages in its favour instead of weighing them. Since then,
Lunemann and Delitzsch have given the same interpretation of the
passage. What Keil himself has adduced in opposition to this
meaning, certainly does not seem adapted to prove it to be inadmis-
sible. For instance, he says (i. 212): "The ai[matekxusi<a in the
Epistle to the Hebrews cannot be understood as referring to the
slaying of the sacrifice, because in the whole of the law of sacrifice
the shedding of blood is nowhere referred to, and the slaying is
never spoken of as a shedding of blood." But could not the writer
of the Epistle to the Hebrews by any possibility gather more from
the law of sacrifice, than is stated there expressis verbis? And is
not the slaying of an animal eo ipso a shedding or pouring out of
its blood?1
1
Keil closes his discussion of Heb. ix. 22 with this remark: "The expres-
sion ai[matekxusi<a relates to the pouring out of the blood on the altar, which
appears to have been indispensable to the forgiveness of sin. And the shedding
However, I shall not dispute any further here, whether Heb. ix.
22 refers to the shedding of the blood or the sprinkling of the blood,
but will leave the decision of this controversy to the commentators
on the Epistle to the Hebrews; since, even if the latter were proved
to be the correct view, it would only show that the (possibly more
extended) view of the writer of that Epistle was in harmony with
our interpretation, though not the authoritative and genuine view
of the lawgiver and his contemporaries.
50. As there is nothing at variance with the Old Testament
in the idea of death as a penal suffering, consequent upon sin and
indispensable to the expiation of sin; so also there is nothing at
variance with it in the other idea involved in our interpretation of
the Shechitah (the slaying), viz., that of vicarious suffering. This
even Oehler admits (p. 631); and the correctness of it is established
by the following passages:
(1.) The vicarious death of an animal for a man is most clearly
expressed in Gen. xxii. 13, in the words OnB; tHaTa, a in the stead of his
son." Abraham was to have offered his son as a burnt-offering,
and therefore to have given him up to death; but instead of his
son, he sacrifices, puts to death, a ram, according to the divine pur-
pose, and under the direction of the word and providence of God.
It may be questioned whether this sacrifice was to possess an expia-
tory worth as well, and whether the slaying is to be regarded as a
death occurring as the wages of sin; but it cannot be disputed that
the severity of the test of Abraham's faith consisted not in the
tOlfEha (i.e., in the burning) of his son, after he had been slain, but
in the killing of his son, which was indispensable to such a sacrifice,
and that the killing of the ram as an offering saved him from any
such necessity, and according to the gracious will of God was a
substitute for it: so that in this case, at all events, the death of an
animal did take place as a substitute for the death of a man, which
was strictly required. And that is all that is necessary for our
purpose.
(2.) To this we may add the ceremony prescribed in Deut. xxi.
of the blood of Christ is to be judged by the same rule. The satisfaction ren-
dered by His death did not lie in the dying or shedding of blood as such, but
in the fact that He gave up Himself, or His life, as a guilt-offering for the sins
of the world." But who has ever maintained that the satisfaction rendered by
the Old Testament sacrifices consisted in the death as such? All that is main-
tained is, that it consisted in the death as so appointed by the imposition of
hands; and mutatis mutandis the same remark equally applies to the sacrifice of
Christ.
1-9, at the basis of which, even according to Oehler's decision,

"there evidently lies the idea of poena vicaria." (See also Delitzsch
on Hebrews, pp. 742-3.) The blood of a murdered person demanded
the blood of the murderer as an expiation (Num. xxxv. 33). But if
the murderer could not be discovered, a heifer was to be killed, and
the elders of the nearest town were to pray to God, that He would
regard its death as representing the execution of the murderer who
could not be found; that the innocent blood which had been shed
might no longer lie uncovered, i.e., unexpiated (ver. 8), in the land
(because, according to Gen. iv. 10, so long as that was the case, it
cried to heaven for vengeance); and that the city might not re-
main under the ban, which the murder committed in the neighbour-
hood had brought upon it. It is true, the object in this instance
was not to cover or atone for the sin of the murderer, and therefore
not to obtain blood as a means of expiation for that sin; so that, as
a matter of course, the act of slaying could not be designated a
hFAyHiw;. But the idea of a poena vicaria, suffered by an animal in-
stead of a man, is as evident here as in the sacrificial worship; the
only difference being, that in the one case the punishment could not
be inflicted upon the person who deserved it because he was not to
be found; and in the other case, it was not to be inflicted upon him,
because the mercy of God had provided a means of expiation for
his sin in the blood of the animal offered by him and dying for him.
(3.) A still further proof of the existence of the idea that an
innocent person might die for a guilty one, and the latter thereby
escape the punishment he deserved, is to be found in Ex. xxxii
When the people had sinned in the wilderness through the worship
of the golden calf, to such an extent that the wrath of Jehovah was
ready to destroy them altogether (ver. 10), and that even Moses
ordered them to be decimated by the swords of the Levites to satisfy
in some measure the just demands of that wrath (vers. 27, 28); he
said (ver. 30), "I will go up unto Jehovah; peradventure I may
be able to make expiation for your sin;" and then went before
Jehovah interceding for the rest, and saying (ver. 32), "Now for-
give them their sin, or else blot me out of Thy book." The meaning
of this prayer is, that God might accept the punishment inflicted
upon those who had been executed already, as an expiation or
covering for the same sin on the part of those who were living still;
and that if this did not suffice (since the latter had their own sins
to atone for), that He would take his own life, the life of the inno-
cent one, as a covering or expiation. No doubt Jehovah refused
to grant this request, and said (ver.. 33), Whosoever bath sinned
against Me, him will I blot out of My book; but the existence of
the idea of such a, substitution in the religious consciousness of
Moses is nevertheless unquestionable.1 And more than that, the
existence of a thought so opposed to all human notions of justice in
the case of a man like Moses would be perfectly inexplicable and
inconceivable, if it could not be traced to the manifestation of the
very same idea in the sacrificial worship with the direct sanction
of God.
(4.) To this we may add, that what Moses the servant of God
offered, though God did not accept the offer, was to be actually
performed by another, greater Servant of Jehovah--by one who, ac-
cording to Isaiah's predictions in chaps. xl.-lxvi., was Moses' true
antitype in the history of salvation in this as in everything besides,
a Moses in higher potency,--and to be performed with the consent
and approval of Jehovah (chap. liii.). Of this Servant of Jehovah
it is stated in vers. 4 sqq., He hath borne our griefs and carried
our sorrows. He was wounded for our transgressions, He was
bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon
Him ; and by His stripes we are healed." And in ver. 10, with
express allusion to the sacrificial worship, it is stated that God made
"His life an offering for sin." Could there be a more obvious,
more lucid, or more indisputable interpretation of the sacrificial
slaying than this? The undeniable fact, that the later Jewish
theory of sacrifice regarded the slaying as a vicarious penal death,
might be despised as a rabbinical error; but the exposition of a
prophet, like the writer of Isa. liii., instead of being thus lightly set
aside, must be regarded as authentic. And even if the words of the
prophet are not admitted to possess the character of an interpreta-
tion at least they must have all the force of an expansion of the
Mosaic view of sacrifice; and in that case they would at all events
prove as much as this, that the foundation for such a view of the
sacrificial slaying already existed in the Mosaic ritual of sacrifice.
51. Whilst Bahr (ii. 343) attributes to the slaying a meaning
in accordance with his general theory of sacrifice, viz., that it ex-
1
Hofmann (p. 248) enters his protest against this view. All that Moses
really asks, he says, "is that if Jehovah will not forgive the nation He may
blot out his name from the book of life. He has no wish to live if his people
are to forfeit their sacred calling, which they have received from God." But
the answer given by God in ver. 33 requires our interpretation; for it presup-
poses that Moses had asked to be blotted out of the book, for the purpose of
preserving those who had deserved it because of their sin. Cf. Rom. ix. 3.
hibited the completion of the self-surrender, for which the laying

on of hands had already exhibited a willingness, and Neumann (l. c.
343) regards it as an acknowledgment on the part of the person
presenting the offering, that he gave the animal entirely up, re-
nouncing for ever both it and its life (both of them opinions which
we do not feel it necessary to refute); Delitzsch, Oehler, and Hof-
mann do not allow it to have possessed any independent significance
at all. Oehler says (p. 628), In the Mosaic ritual the slaying
was evidently nothing more than a necessary link in the process;
it was simply the means of procuring the blood." Delitzsch again
says (p. 426), "The Shechitah merely answered the double purpose
of providing the blood, in which was the life of the animal, for the
expiation of the soul of the sacrificer, and the flesh as fire-food for
Jehovah;" and this Hofmann expressly approves and adopts in the
second edition of his Schriftbeweis.
Delitzsch observes, at p. 744, "The killing was merely the
means of procuring the blood and offering the sacrifice; and hence
it was not called killing, but slaughtering." Let us look at this first
of all. In opposition to the penal theory, Delitzsch lays stress upon
the fact, that the killing of the sacrificial animal is always desig-
nated by the verb FHw, never by tymihe. In this he thinks that he
can discover a proof that the idea of killing, as an act of signifi-
cance in itself, was foreign to the sacrificial slaying, and the sole
intention was to take away life, as the necessary step to another
purpose, viz., the procuring of the blood or the flesh. This thought
is derived, however, not from the Hebrew, but from the German
idiom, where the notion of slaughtering certainly has received such
an application. And the fact that the verb FHw is never used in
ordinary life to denote a literal slaughtering for the purpose of
cooking the flesh (HbF is the word generally used) ought to have
created some distrust of this attempt to define the meaning of FHw.
Moreover, we actually find this verb applied to the slaying of a
man, where there could not have been any other object than to put
a him to death, namely, as punishment for a crime that was thought
worthy of death (e.g., Num. xiv. 16; Judg. xii. 6 ; 1 Kings xviii.
40; 2 Kings x. 7, 14, xxv. 7 ; Jer. xxxix. 6, xli. 7). FHw ac-
cording to its etymology is related to hHw, HHw, tHw (vid. Rodiger
in Gesenius Thes.), and its primary meaning was probably to throw
down, to strike to the ground, to destroy, to lay in ruins. In the
more developed stage of the language it became a technical term
for the killing of an animal; from that it settled down into a
special term belonging to the sacrificial worship, and thus acquired

so definite and fixed a meaning, that people were afraid to apply it
to the slaughtering of an animal for the ordinary purposes of life.
From its original use, however, which was restricted to the killing
of an animal, it came also to be applied to the killing of a man,
when it took place, not in the mode adopted in an ordinary execu-
tion, but in a summary and informal manner, by striking to the
ground (as a beast is killed). Thus it is evident, that neither in
the derivation of the word, nor in its customary use, is there the
least warrant for attributing to it that exclusive reference to the
procuring of blood or flesh, which certainly has come to be asso-
ciated with the German word schlachten (to slaughter).
52. In opposition to the idea that the Shechitah had no inde-
pendent significance of its own, there rises with irresistible force
the solemnity of the act, its firm incorporation into the sacrificial
ritual, and the necessity for its being performed on holy ground,
before Jehovah (Lev. i. 5, etc.), by the side of the altar, in the
presence of the priest, and with his indispensable, and therefore
certainly significant, co-operation. If it had been nothing more
than the means of procuring the blood and flesh for sprinkling and
burning upon the altar, it is difficult to see why it was necessary
that it should be performed on holy ground; why not at a man's
own home, from which the blood and flesh could easily have been
taken to the altar, without in any way detracting from the worth of
the sprinkling and burning. This was at all events indicated in the
original law (Lev. vii. 25, xvii. 3-5), where the slaughtering of every
animal, even for domestic and ordinary purposes, is ordered to be
carried out in precisely the same manner as a peace-offering (cf. 5).
But what furnishes the strongest testimony against this attempt
to deprive the Shechitah of all independent worth, is the command,
that animals offered in sacrifice should be killed on the north side
of the altar only.
It is true, this command is particularly and expressly mentioned
only in connection with the burnt-offerings, sin-offerings, and tres-
pass-offerings (Lev. i. 11, iv. 24, 29, 33, vii. 2); and the Rabbins
have inferred from this (11 without reason," as Keil also says, i.
205), that the peace-offerings were to be slain on a different
side (viz., the south). But if the lawgiver had intended to make
the peace-offering an exception to this otherwise universal rule, he
would have indicated it, not by silence, but by an express command.
This silence is rather a direct proof of the contrary.
What the reason for this command was, it is impossible to de-

termine with perfect certainty. But Ewald's opinion is assuredly
wrong, that we may see in this "the remnant of an earlier belief,
that the Deity resides either in the north or in the east, and that it
is from thence that He comes." Tholuck's conjecture is a much
more probable one, viz., that the north side (NOpcA, the hidden dark
midnight side, hence the side pregnant with evil) was regarded as
the gloomy and joyless one. Should this be accepted as the true
explanation (and it would be difficult to find one more plausible),
not only would it be a proof in itself of the independent worth of
the Shechitah, but would throw a considerable weight into the scale
in favour of the very same meaning which we obtained in 48, 50,
by a different process.. But whatever may be the reason for the
command, there must at all events have been some reason; and
this is in itself a proof that the slaughtering, to which it referred,
must have possessed some significance also.
A few commentators, indeed--e.g., Fr. v. Meyer (on Lev. i. 11)
and Bunsen (ad h. l.)--imagine that they can find a sufficient
reason for the command in the external necessities of the case. On
the eastern side, they say, there was the heap of ashes (ver. 16), on
the western the tabernacle and the large basin (Ex. xl. 30), and on
the southern the entrance; so that the only side left for the
slaughtering was the northern side. But there is no force in this;
for if there had been no other (symbolical) difficulties in the way,
the southern side would have been the most appropriate, just
because the entrance was there.
53. That Oehler should see no meaning in the sacrificial
slaughtering in itself, was a necessary consequence of his funda-
mental view of sacrifice; and in no other way could he possibly
succeed in bringing the slaughtering into harmony with his expla-
nation of the other parts of the sacrificial ceremony. This opinion
is based upon the correct premiss, that if the sacrificial slaughtering
had not the force of a poena vicaria, we must give up all idea of
discovering any symbolical meaning whatever. But with the
independent position which it occupied, the solemnity with which
it was performed in the Holy Place, etc., it is very hard to do the
latter. Hence, even Keil acknowledges the necessity of attributing
to it a significance of its own. The meaning which he has given,
however, is more decidedly erroneous than even Oehler's negation
of all meaning, since it drives him inevitably into partly open and
partly latent opposition to the scriptural data, and also to his own
interpretation of the other parts of the ritual of sacrifice. He

commences (i. 206) with the admission, that "the slaughtering of
the animal was a symbol of the surrender of life to death;" only
not a surrender, he adds, to death as the punishment of sin, . . . for
although the death of the sacrificer, symbolized by the slaying of the
victim, was a fruit and effect of sin, it did not come under the
aspect of punishment, because sacrifice was an institution of divine
grace, intended to insure to the sinner not the merited punishment,
but, on the contrary, forgiveness of sins; whilst the death which
follows sin is and remains, as a rule, a punishment only for that
sinner for whom there is no redemption, and brings to those who
are redeemed and forgiven deliverance from all evil, and an entrance
into eternal and blessed life with God.1 If, therefore, the object
of sacrifice was the reconciliation of man to God, and his reception
into a state of grace with all its felicitous consequences, which no
one denies and there is no possible ground for denying, the death
connected with the sacrifice can only be regarded as the medium
of transition from a state of separation and estrangement from God
into one of grace and living fellowship with Him, or as the only
way into the divine life out of the ungodly life of this world. And
even though the necessity for this way displays the holiness of the
righteous God, who has appointed death as the wages of sin; yet a
death which redeems man from sin, and introduces him into eternal
life, cannot be called a punishment, since the idea of divine holiness
and righteousness is by no means exhausted by the notion of punish-
ment alone.
In examining this argument, even if we take no notice of the
unhistorical blending of the Old and New Testament standpoints
(for it is only the latter which teaches that death is the bridge for
crossing from the ungodly life of this world into the godly life of
eternal blessedness with God) and if we also pass over the doctrinal
ambiguity, which both affirms and denies that death is the punish-
ment of sin in the case of the redeemed, and ascribes to death,
which is and remains under all circumstances the wages of sin,
what belongs to redemption alone;--we shall still find this view in
all respects untenable as applied to the ritual of the sacrificial wor-
ship. The death of the sacrificial animal is said to typify the death
of the redeemed, which, however, is "not punishment for sin,"
1
So far as these assertions are directed against the theory of penal death,
we shall examine them by and by at 65. Here we are only concerned to
examine Keil's own view.
but rather "a passage into the divine life out of the ungodly life of
this world." Now Oehler does not state, what alone would make
good sense, that the holiness of the person sacrificing, qua redeemed,
was "transferred to the victim," but, like Keil himself in his expla-
nation of the imposition of hands in connection with the atoning
sacrifice, maintains that "the sin and guilt" of the sacrificer as a
sinner were so transferred; so that the animal was made "as it
were incarnate sin," and its body "a body of sin." It is not by
the atonement of sin, therefore, but by giving compensation for sins
still unatoned for, that death is stamped as the "medium for the
transition from a state of separation and estrangement from God
into one of grace and living fellowship with God;" and yet, after
all this, the sinner who is already perfectly redeemed, inasmuch as
he has already entered "into a state of grace and fellowship with
God," into "eternal and blessed life with God," is then for the first
time to have expiation made for his sins. According to this theory
of Keil's, the expiation, i.e., the sprinkling of the blood, ought
necessarily to have preceded the slaughtering; for it was through
the expiation that the life of a sinner was first qualified for entering
into a state of grace and fellowship with God, into eternal and
blessed life with God. This no one has ever yet denied, or ever
can deny.
By thus rejecting the true meaning of the sacrificial slaying,
Keil is driven into opposition, partly to the biblico-orthodox doctrine,
which he nevertheless still holds, and partly to his own interpreta-
tion of the other parts of the sacrificial ceremony. But it becomes
still more striking when we find in other parts of Keil's work the
very same doctrine which he has here opposed and rejected when
advocated by me, expressed in the very same words, and given as
his own view of the sacrificial slaying. For example, whereas he
affirms, at p. 207, that "the slaying typified the surrender of the
life of the sacrificer to death, but did not typify death as the punish-
ment of sin;" at p. 237 he says, "Now the ram of the trespass-
offering stood for the person of the guilty man, and by being slain,
suffered death in his stead as the punishment for his guilt." At p.
228, again, he says, " By being slain, the animal of the sin-offering
was given up to death, and suffered death for the sinner, i.e., in the
place of the person sacrificing, as the wages of sin!" and at p. 283,
By these attributes (sc., freedom from blemish, and a fresh,
vigorous fulness of life) the animal was perfectly fitted to bear as a
sin-offering the guilt of the congregation imputed to it by the laying
on of hands, and to suffer death in a representative capacity as the wages

of sin." So also at p. 384: As a sacrifice appointed by the Lord,
the paschal lamb suffered death vicariously, as the effect of sin, for the
father of the family who killed it for himself and his household.
Only on one or two occasions does it seem to have occurred to
the writer that it was necessary to reconcile these self-contradictions.
Thus at p. 213 he observes: "But the justice of God was made
manifest through the grace that ruled in the sacrificial atonement,
in this respect: expiation presupposed death; without death, in fact,
i.e, without dying spiritually, it is absolutely impossible to be re-
ceived into the fellowship of divine mercy; and without physical
death there can be no entrance into eternal blessedness. And
herein lies the reason, why every sacrifice of atoning worth was
necessarily required to be a sacrifice by death, and why, in the
performance of the sacrificial rite, the victim had to suffer death,
before its blood could be sprinkled upon the altar." But even with
reference to this exposition, which is not overburdened with super-
fluous clearness, we have several important queries to make. If
expiation presupposed death, how could death even before expiation
lead from the ungodly life of this world into the blessedness of
life eternal, seeing that evidently this could only be said, if death,
on the contrary, presupposed expiation? Only to a man redeemed
and pardoned, says Keil himself, at p. 207, "could death bring
redemption from all evil, and effect a transition into eternal and
blessed life with God." But how is pardon itself secured? Is it
through physical death in itself? Is it not rather through expiation,
or the extermination of sin? And yet, according to Keil, expiation
presupposes death, which forms the passage to eternal life, instead of
death presupposing expiation. How strange a righteousness of God
would that be, which should be manifested in the reception of a
sinner through death, before expiation, and therefore without expia-
tion, into the blessedness of eternal life? And yet this is said to
constitute the reason why in the sacrificial ritual the victim was
necessarily put to death, before its blood could be sprinkled on the altar!
And if this was actually the reason why the sacrifices of an expia-
tory character (i.e., according to Keil, the sin- and trespass-offerings)
were required to be sacrifices by death, and why death necessarily
preceded expiation,--where are we to look for the reason why the
sacrifices, that were not expiatory in their character (viz., the burnt-
offerings and thank-offerings), were also required to be sacrifices by
death, and in their case also death necessarily preceded the expiation?
I am quite unable to find any reconciliation of the contradictions

occurring here, in what Keil says at p. 228. The sinner, he
says, a certainly merited death, and the victim taking his place had
to suffer it in his stead, because the mercy of God could not, and
would not destroy, or even weaken, the holiness of the law; and
therefore, even when the sinner was intended to discern in the
death of the sin-offering what he himself would have deserved, if
God had dealt with him according to His justice, the law contains
no statement to the effect, that the sin-offering was in any sense a
satisfaction," etc. (for the rest, see 65, 67). On the contrary, the
discrepancies appear rather to multiply. For how could the sinner
discern in the death of the sacrificial animal what he himself would
have deserved, viz., death as the punishment of sin, if that death
was a symbol, not of death as the punishment of sin, but, on the
contrary, of a death which redeemed from sin and introduced into
the blessedness of eternal life? And how can it be said, that the
victim had necessarily to suffer in the place of the sinner the death
deserved by him as the punishment of his sin if the death of the
victim is not to be regarded as a penal death at all? And how is
it possible to find the idea expressed in the institution of sacrifice,
that the mercy of God could not destroy or weaken the holiness of
the law which demanded death as the punishment of sin, if, as is
stated immediately afterwards, the sacrifice had no satisfactory
worth, and the grace of God out of pure mercy covered over the
sin? Does not "pure" mercy in this way become an arbitrary
mercy, opposing the demands of the holiness of the law, and not
merely weakening, but actually abolishing it?
54. We will now adduce two other examples, to show how
the denial of a satisfactio vicaria in the Old Testament sacrifices, on
the part of theologians who are generally anxious to adhere to the
biblical and orthodox standpoint, is sure to drive them to inconsis-
tencies and contradictions. Delitzsch, speaking of the imposition of
hands which preceded the slaying, says (p. 737), "If it was an
expiatory, i.e., a sin- or trespass-offering, he laid his sins upon it,
that it might bear them and carry them away from him." Now, if
this be correct, it is placed beyond all doubt, that between the impo-
sition of hands and the sprinkling of the blood (at any rate, in the
case of the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings) something must have
intervened, by which the sin imputed in the laying on of hands was
overcome, wiped away, and changed into its opposite. For, just as
sin could not be covered expiated wiped away by sin so the blood
of the animal, which after the imposition of hands was laden (as
the vehicle of the soul) with sin and guilt, could not in that condi-
tion become the means of expiation. Something else must neces-
sarily have been done to it in the meantime, by which the sin
imputed to it, and by virtue of that imputation regarded as its own,
had been conquered and wiped away, and by which it had been
fitted to be used as a means of expiation; and there is nowhere else
that we can look for this, but in the slaying which intervened, and
which could only be a vicarious penal suffering, by virtue of which
it suffered the death which the sacrificer deserved, and suffered it
for him. The blood brought to the altar was then a proof that the
merited punishment had been endured, and in that light was fitted
to cover the sinful soul of the sacrificer himself.
Delitzsch, again, always lays great stress upon the necessity of
acknowledging the representative character of the sacrificial animal.
But as he is unwilling to acknowledge it in the hFAyHiw; where it is
primarily and chiefly appropriate, he is induced to place it in the
sprinkling of the blood. Thus he says, at p. 741, "In Lev. xvii.
11 it is stated that the blood of the animal made expiation for the
soul of the person offering it, by virtue of the soul which was con-
tained in it: evidently, therefore, the soul of the animal took the
place of the soul of the man; and when poured out in the blood,
covered the soul of the man, which was deserving of death, before
an angry God." And again, at p. 745: "The Old Testament
sacrifice, so far as it was expiatory, was intended to be regarded as
representative. There was no ritual manifestation, indeed, of the
penal suffering, since the expiation was only effected through the
blood, apart from the violent death; but the bleeding expiation,
when understood typically, as it was intended to be understood, and
has been prophetically expounded in Isa. liii., also pointed to a vica-
rious satisfaction to be rendered to the judicial righteousness of
God." But the idea of representation in the first half of the sacri-
ficial ceremony (i.e., before the burning) was evidently applicable to
the slaying alone, as a penal suffering, and not at all to the atone-
ment, i.e., the sprinkling of the blood. The blood brought to the
altar, or rather the soul which dwelt within it, was to cover the soul
of the offerer there. How could it, then, take the place of the latter?
For, where one person takes the place of another, the other is not
there himself, but the representative is there in his stead, performing
or suffering what the former ought to have suffered or performed.
55. The meaning of the SPRINKLING OF THE BLOOD is self-
evident, after what has been stated already. The person presenting
the sacrifice was conscious of his sin or sinfulness; he knew that he
was liable, in consequence, to death as the wages of sin. It is true,
the divine long-suffering, which, notwithstanding the threat to the
first sinner, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die"
had preserved his life for a lengthened period, extended to him also
as to every other sinner. Provided he did not commit, or had not
committed, any sin which threatened to overturn and destroy the
moral order of the universe generally, or the essential elements of
its specifically theocratic order, and which it was necessary on that
account for the judicial authorities of earth to punish with death, he
need not immediately die. But, for all that, he was under sentence
of death for every minor sin, and even for mere sinfulness, from
which all actual sins proceed; and this sentence of death lay like a
ban upon him, disturbing the peace of his soul, preventing him from
the quiet and happy enjoyment of the blessings of life, causing him
to see himself as an object of divine wrath, and even in this earthly
life threatening him either with a quick and painful death, or with
evils and calamities of every description. And with the Old Testa-
ment Israelite this was all the more the case, because his want of a
clear perception of eternal life hereafter was accompanied with an
equal want of any clear perception of retribution, hereafter; and
the whole weight of divine retribution to his consciousness, there-
fore, fell not in the life beyond, but in the life on this side the
grave. To be delivered from this ban by the expiation, the wiping
away, the forgiveness of his sin, was therefore the inmost desire of
his soul, the most pressing need of his life. But from the very
earliest times God had established an institution of grace, by which
he could secure the expiation or forgiveness of his sins. Accordingly,
relying upon the divine vyTitan; (I have given it, Lev. xvii. 11), he
brought to the altar an animal from his own stall--a living, animated
being like himself, a domesticated animal, which as such belonged
to his own house, which had been tended by himself almost as one
tends his own child, which was dear to him almost like a man-
servant or maid-servant, but which was not a sinful creature like
himself, his servant, his maid-servant, or his child, but sinless, in-no-
cent, pure, without blemish, without fault or failing, and which, on
account of all this, was apparently well fitted-at all events better
fitted than any other gift which he could possibly offer as a recom-
pense for his guilt--to redeem his soul which was under the death-
ban of sin. And to that he set apart the animal, being directed to
SLAUGHTERING, AND THE SPRINKLING OF THE BLOOD 117
do so by God Himself. By laying his hands upon it he transferred

to it his own sentence of death, and caused it to suffer in his stead
the punishment, which he was conscious that he himself deserved
on account of his sins. Upon this the priest, as the mediator be-
tween God and the nation, carried to the altar the blood which had
passed through death, the wages of sin, that on that spot where,
according to Ex. xx. 24 (cf. 13), Jehovah had promised to come
to His people to bless them, he might cover and atone for the sinful
soul of the person presenting the sacrifice.
The imposition of hands was the qualification of the sacrificial
animal for the vicarious endurance of punishment; and the death
in which this was completed was the qualification of the animal
blood, in which its soul resided, for the act of expiation; and this
again was completed by the bringing of the blood thus qualified to
the altar, where it covered (ideally) the sinful soul of the person
offering it. The imposition of hands did not deliver the person
sacrificing from his sin; for it was not a transference of his sin to
the sacrificial animal ( 44), but only the communication of a sub-
stitutionary obligation, to suffer on his behalf what he had deserved
on account of his sin. Even the slaying, in which it suffered death
vicariously for him, did not effect in itself an expiation or wiping
away of his sins, just as my pecuniary debts are not wiped out by
the fact of another having earned the necessary money through the
labour of his hands. The debts themselves can only be wiped out
by his covering them with the money which he has earned; and so
a debt of sin requires to be covered by the merit of the suffering of
the sacrifice before it can be regarded as atoned for and wiped out;
in other words, the meritorious performance of the sacrifice must be
transferred to the sinful soul of the person presenting it, and person-
ally appropriated to him (so as to be regarded as his merit, his per-
formance), in the same way in which his obligation had previously
been imputed to the sacrifice. And, according to Lev. xvii. 11, this
was done by means of the sprinkling of the blood, in which the sinless
and guiltless soul of the sacrificial animal covered (if only ideally) the
soul of the person offering it. The merit acquired by the soul of the
victim, which in itself was pure and sinless and therefore liable to no
punishment on its own account, through its vicarious endurance of
death, now acted upon the sinful soul of the sacrificer as a covering
for sin, that is to say, it rendered his sin inoperative ( 28).1
1
Compare the pregnant words of Kahnis, i. 271: "The sacrificial blood
atones, so far as it is the life of the animal in compendio; for in the blood (Lev.
56. But for this expiation to possess any objective validity, it

was necessary that it should be performed at the altar (Lev. xvii.
11), and by the priest (Lev. i. 5, 11, etc.), not by the sacrificer him-
self; and even that was insufficient unless the antecedents and pre-
liminaries--viz., the presentation, the imposition of hands, and the
slaying--had taken place before the altar and in the presence of the
priest. The latter contains its own explanation; for it is self-evident
that an obligation or debt which I owe to any one must be discharged
either in his own presence or that of his accredited agent, whether
I discharge it in my own person or by deputy. The former proves
that the sacrificial blood was not fully qualified for the purposes of
atonement, either in itself, or through the imposition of hands and
the infliction of death; but that it acquired for the first time its
objective; atoning power, through the fact that the priest, as medi-
ator of the saving grace of God brought it to the altar (i e. to the
place of mercy and salvation, where Jehovah came to His people to
bless them), and there it acquired a divine energy which supplied all
its defects and endowed it with plenary power.
Substitution under any circumstances is of course a problema-
tical thing, and its acceptance and acknowledgment are dependent
upon the mercy of God (Ex. xxxii. 33). But the substitution re-
ferred to here, is in all respects so obviously insufficient, that we
cannot speak of its possessing validity according to natural law,
but only according to the law of mercy laid down by the divine plan
of salvation. It is true, the sacrificial animal, as belonging to the
flock and home, stood in a biotic rapport with the person presenting
the sacrifice ( 23); but the animal was not, what a thorough sub-
stitution would have required, re vera of his own nature--was not
re vera, but only symbolically, his alter ego: there was altogether
wanting an internal basis of substitution, a positive unity of nature
and will, resting upon the nature and will of both. The animal,
again, was certainly guiltless and sinless; but only because it stood
below the sphere of sin, not because it was elevated, or had raised
itself, above that sphere. It is true, the obligation to suffer death
for the sinner was transferred to it by the imposition of hands; but
this transference, again, was only symbolical and figurative, not
literal and real. The animal was doubtless the property of the
person sacrificing it; consequently, he possessed the right and the
xvii. 11) is that life, which carries negatively the death that it has endured in
our stead, and positively a pure life, which can be brought into fellowship with
God." See also p. 585.
authority to offer up its life for his own good and salvation. But
for all that, it was a forced, and therefore an insufficient representa-
tion; inasmuch as it was impossible, from a pneumatico-ethical
point of view, for the animal to declare its free-will to give itself up
to death for the sinner as the wages of his sin, being utterly desti-
tute as it was of this pneumatic character, and of the least freedom
of will and purpose ( 33); whilst from a Psychico-Physical point
of view, it would resist with all its might the attempt to use it in
this way as a means of atonement; whereas the sin to be expiated
had sprung from the soil of free personality, and therefore it was
requisite that the expiation itself should be the product of free per-
sonality, the sacrifice a voluntary one, the result of an independ-
ent and perfectly unconstrained resolution of the will. Again,
the sacrifice, it is true, was put to death. But the death which the
animal suffered, was not of the same kind or importance as that
which the sinner deserved; for the life of an animal belongs to a
lower stage than that of man, and hence death to an animal is
something different from death to a man. Moreover, in the sacri-
ficial worship, sin was considered, not as a violation of human
rights and claims (for in this respect it was liable to the penal juris-
diction of earthly magistrates), but as rebellion against God--both
God without us, i.e., a resistance to the objective will and law of
God, and also God within us, i.e., a violation of the image of God
in us, which in the form of conscience protests and strives against
sin. But if the foundation of all justice is the jus talionis (Ex. xxi.
23, soul for soul, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, etc.), and consequently
the violation of that which is violated must return upon the person
of the violator with all the force given to it by the greatness of
the injury, and the importance of that which is injured; it is evi-
dent that, although the violation of earthly relationships may be
atoned for by earthly punishment (and in its most intense form
by capital punishment), yet sin, as an injury done to the eternal,
holy God, the Lord and Creator of heaven and earth, demands a
death which is not exhausted by earthly death (the only death pos-
sible to the sacrificial animal), and a punishment which continues
even in Sheol (as the abode of the departed human soul), yea,
to all eternity, because the God offended is an eternal God.
57. The whole of the sacrificial ceremony, up to the act of
expiation itself, moved upon the basis of symbolism; and the sacri-
ficial blood, therefore, was capable of nothing more than a symboli-
cal atonement. But Lev. xvii. 11 does not state that the atonement
was merely symbolized by the sprinkling of the blood; on the con-

trary, it assigns to it a real atoning power. Whence did the sacri-
ficial blood acquire this; and by what means did its symbolical
atoning power acquire the potency of a real atonement, and the
empty, powerless symbol a sacramental efficacy?
According to the principles of natural (so to speak, Elohistic)
justice, the expiation of a sin can only be effected by personal satis-
faction; that is, by the sinner himself enduring all the punishment
deserved, in other words, an equivalent to the sin. But it is alto-
gether different with the principles of saving (Jehovistic) justice.
For the divine plan of salvation has, discovered a way by which the
sinner, without completely exhausting the punishment of sin in his
own person, may be freed and delivered. It consists objectively in
this, that a righteous being interposes for sinners, endures for them
the merited punishment,--a; righteous one, whose life is worth in-
finitely more than the life of all sinners together, whose temporary
sufferings surpass in worth and importance even the eternal suffer-
ings of the whole human race,--a righteous one, who, by placing
himself in essential rapport with sinful humanity, becomes their
true (not merely conventional) representative, their real alter ego,
and thereby qualifies himself to endure the punishment of sin for
them; and who undertakes all this of his own free-will. It con-
sists subjectively in this, that the sinner, on the other hand, is placed
in a condition to enter into essential rapport with this righteous
being by an unconstrained determination of his own will; so that,
as the righteous one bears and exhausts the sinner's punishment as
his own, he also may make the sin-exterminating merits, thereby
acquired by the righteous one, into his own.
According to the counsel of God the self-sacrifice of this right-
eous being could not, and was not intended to become a historical
event until the fulness of time. But to the consciousness of God,
who is exalted above time and space, and to whom there is no past
or future, but only an eternal now, this sacrifice, while to man still
in futurity, was ever a present event; and therefore its fruits and
its merits were objectively present also. And this was the genuine
and essential atoning power with which God endowed the sacrificial
blood that was brought to the altar, as the place of salvation and of
grace, so as to change the empty symbol into a true sacramental
type. Then, too, the saying applies: accedit verbum (Lev. xvii. 11,
"I have given it") ad elenaentum, et fit sacramentum. For even then
God could appropriate the merit of that righteous one, which had
already an objective existence to Him, to the covering of the sins

of those who were subjectively fitted for it. But to prevent the de-
lusion, that sin was a light thing in the estimation of God, that He
could and would forgive sin and bestow His mercy without reserve,
or without satisfaction being rendered to justice, an institution was
provided in the sacrificial worship of the Old Testament for the
sinner who desired salvation, that brought before his mind afresh,
with every new sin for which he sought atonement, what his sin de-
served, and he would have had to suffer, if he had been required to
atone for it himself, and what must necessarily take place to release
him from that obligation; inasmuch as what God then directed to
be done to the animal, was what would one day be done in the ful-
ness of time to that righteous one, for the covering of the sins of
all sinners who desired salvation and were fitted to receive it.
58. Thus far we have taken our stand upon the New Testa-
ment, Gospel ground, that we might be able from this point of view
to understand the meaning of the sacrificial expiation of the Old
Testament, and see in what the objective atoning worth ascribed to
it consisted. The question becomes incomparably more difficult,
when we look at it from the legal standpoint of the Old Testament,
and seek to discover the meaning attached to it by Moses and his
contemporaries. Was the Israelite of that age also conscious of this
typical import of the animal sacrifice; or, at any rate, was it pos-
sible for him to attain to this consciousness?
In the first place, we may here point to the fact, that this typi-
cal import of the sacrifice actually did develop itself in the heart of
Judaism, without any New Testament influence, and therefore out
of the elements existing in the Mosaic ritual; for not only is it ex-
pressed from the pre-Christian standpoint of an Isaiah (chap. liii.),
but from the equally pre-Christian standpoint of many of the later
Rabbins, who maintained very decidedly that the animal sacrifices
would cease with the coming of the Messiah, because He would
perform in the most perfect manner all that the sacrifices had been
designed to accomplish.
We are warranted, therefore, in expecting and looking for the
germs, or germinal elements, of this consciousness in Mosaism itself.
Among these we notice first of all those shortcomings and defects
in the animal sacrifices, which we have already pointed out, and
which could not be overlooked even from the standpoint of an
Israelite under the Old Testament. For the fact that the blood
of bulls and goats could not take away sin (Heb. ix. 12), was one
which must have forced itself upon the mind of every thinking man.
It would also be brought before the Israelite by the fact, that aton-
ing efficacy was not attributed to the blood of the animal, after or
in consequence of the imposition of hands and infliction of death,
but was acquired first of all from contact with the altar, upon
which God came down to His people with power to bless and save
(Ex. xx. 24).
But when this imperfection in his sacrificial worship was once
clearly brought before his mind, and with it the contrast between
the insufficiency of the means and the fulness of the promise, which
insured an eventual and perfect efficacy to those means notwith-
standing these defects; he could hardly fail to investigate and
search for the explanation of this incongruity between the means
employed and the effect produced. For ordinary purposes, the
promise This blood maketh atonement for your souls was prac-
tically sufficient, provided it was received in simple faith; for
the faith which laid hold of this word grasped at the same time
the blessing of the sacrifice promised therein, which was really the
same, even though its internal ground might not be perceived.
But to any one who studied the secrets of the divine plan of sal-
vation, and the sacred imagery of the ritual,--who did not "let the
book of the law depart out of his mouth, but meditated therein day
and night" (Josh. i. 8),--whose "delight was in the law of the
Lord" (Ps. i. 2),--who prayed, "Open Thou mine eyes, that I may
behold wondrous things out of Thy law,"--there must have pre-
sented themselves the first glimpses of a deeper knowledge, even
if he perceived at the same time, that a more perfect insight could
only be obtained after a further development of the sacred history
and its accompanying revelation. Did not Moses himself point out
the symbolical and typical character of the entire ritual appointed
by him, when he distinctly stated that the eternal original had been
shown to him on the holy mount? And what could be more simple,
than to bring the germ and centre of the whole ritual into connec-
tion with thee primary promises of the salvation to be secured through
the seed of the woman, and the seed of the patriarchs? What
more simple, than to connect the centre of his hopes and expecta-
tions with the centre of his worship--to imagine a hidden, even
though incomprehensible, link between the two, and to seek in this
link the solution of the sacred enigma?
But undoubtedly, for a clear perception and deep insight into
the historico-typical import of the sacrificial atonement, and a full
solution of its enigmas, the way was first prepared through the pro-
phetic standpoint of an Isaiah, and eventually completed in the
sacrifice on Calvary.
59. The juridical interpretation of the Old Testament sacrifice,
in which the slaughtering is regarded as a poena vicaria endured
by the sacrificial animal in the stead of the person offering it, has
been the one generally received, from the time of the Rabbins and
Fathers--at least so far as the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings
are concerned; and even in the most recent times it has found
many supporters of note. Among these are Gesenius, De Wette,
Winer, Hengstenberg (in his Christology, and his Sacrifices of Holy
Scripture), Scholl, Bruno Bauer, v. Meyer, Havernick, Lange, Thal-
hofer, Stockl, Tholuck, Ebrard, Knobel, Kliefoth, Keil, Thomasius,
and Kahnis.
On the other hand, it has met with numerous opponents, espe-
cially in modern times; though the arguments adduced certainly
do not gain in importance from the fact, that for the most part
they are founded upon feelings altogether distinct from the subject
in hand, viz., an antipathy to the orthodox, New Testament doctrine
of reconciliation, as is undeniably the case with Steudel, Klaiber,
Bahr, and Hofmann. In the case of Keil, who repeatedly reverts
to the orthodox, traditional view, and thereby involves himself in
striking discrepancies, it is to be lamented that he should evidently
not have been conscious of the discrepancies, or he would certainly
have adhered throughout, and not merely in isolated passages, to
the old well-tried truth, instead of his new and untenable discoveries.
Neumann's views and words are so misty and obscure, that they
have consequently but little weight. But Oehler and Delitzsch,
who cannot certainly be supposed to have any ulterior end to serve,
have been led away to their negative position by attaching too much
importance to various plausible arguments.
60. We will now examine the objections offered to the view
in question. Steudel adduces four objections in his Vorlesungen
uber d. Theol. des A. T.: (1.) "Throughout the whole of the Old
Testament we never meet with any such idea as this, that the
pardon which God confers must be purchased first of all by sub-
stitution. He grants forgiveness at once, as soon as the sinner
repents; and that not merely according to the teaching of the
prophets (Ezek. xviii. 1 sqq., xxxiii. 14 sqq.), but according to the
teaching of the Pentateuch also (as in Deut. iv. 30, 31, xxx. 2 ; Lev.
xxvi. 40 sqq.), where the promise is given, that when the Israelites
turn to the Lord, He will also turn at once to them in mercy, and
bestow upon them all His blessing." To this I have already given
the following answer in my Mos. Opfer: How marvellous! whilst
some writers take the greatest offence at the wrathful Jew-God of
the Old Testament, who can only be appeased with blood, others
find in Him a loving Father, who forgives in the most indiscriminate
manner. God grants forgiveness, they say, without anything further;
in other words, without a sacrifice. But the whole law of worship,
which never promises forgiveness without anything further, but
always makes it dependent upon a sacrificial expiation, rises against
this. Steudel does indeed modify his "without anything further,"
by introducing the condition of repentance. But does not that
addition prove the very opposite of what it is meant to prove? It
proves, that is to say, that for the Israelite there was no forgiveness
without sacrifice; for conversion, turning to Jehovah, included the
offering of sacrifice. What could it mean but returning to the
theocratic union? And this could only be effected through sacri-
fice. What else could it mean than returning from a heathen to a
theocratic life, the central point of which was the sacrificial wor-
ship? What else, than resuming and faithfully performing the
theocratic duties that had been neglected, and which had their
centre in sacrifice? By what other means could the Israelite give a
practical demonstration of the earnestness, the genuineness, and the
permanence of his repentance, than by a faithful worship of Jehovah,
as demanded in the law, the very soul of which was sacrifice? If,
therefore, forgiveness could only be obtained by repenting and turn-
ing to Jehovah, by that very fact it was made dependent upon the
sacrifice, in which this was practically exhibited; and the entire argu-
ment is consequently reduced to this circle: an assumption that sacri-
fice did not involve substitution may be adduced as a proof that it did.
(2.) Steudel says, It is just in connection with the more im-
portant sins that we never find the slightest intimation of their need-
ing to be expiated by sacrifice. And yet if sacrifices were appointed
for the violation of precepts relating to outward acts, how important
must it have seemed, supposing substitution to have been the idea,
that sacrifices should be offered for moral offences in the strict sense
of the word, which were of much greater importance!" But the
most casual glance at the sacrificial law will show, that it was not
merely the violation of outward precepts, which the law undoubtedly
exhibits as equally important, and in certain circumstances more
important than many offences of a strictly "moral" character, that
had to be expiated by sacrifice, but offences of the latter kind as

well. In one respect, indeed, the statement is certainly correct.
There were certain offences of greater importance--those, for
example, which arose from wantonness and rebellion (Num. xv.
30, 31), whether they were violations of outward or of strictly
moral laws--which could not be expiated by sacrifice, but had to
be punished by extermination. The reason why the latter could not
be "bound" (as, mutatis mutandis, in the Christian Church), even
in the case of repentance, was, that the institution of sacrifice
under the Old Testament related to the earthly theocracy alone
the sinner was excluded by his sin from membership in the covenant
and theocracy; and the atoning sacrifice was intended to qualify
him for readmission, a thing which execution rendered eo ipso impos-
sible. But the fact that the institution of sacrifice in the Old Testa-
ment contained no allusion to the life everlasting after death, may be
explained on the ground, that the standpoint of the Old Testament
did not furnish any clear or profound insight into the life eternal.
(3.) Steudel's third objection is this: "According to Lev. v. 11,
in cases of extreme poverty a bloodless sin-offering of meal might
be offered instead of the bleeding sacrifice. Hence the only correct
view of the sin-offering must be one, which regards it as of no
essential moment, whether the offering presented consisted of an
animal or of meal, and therefore does not recognise a poena vicaria.
But even Bahr (ii. 181) will not allow, that there is any force in
this argument. "D. Strauss is right," he says, "in pronouncing
this decision perfectly incorrect, and in saying, as he does in his
Streitschriften, p. 163, Whenever it was possible, whenever any one
was in a condition to bring a pair of doves, the sin-offering was to
be a bleeding one; it was only in cases of extreme distress that
meal was allowed to be substituted; but we have no right to allow
the nature of the substitute to exert any influence upon our inter-
pretation of the thing itself, and to regard the characteristic which
was wanting in the former, as being necessarily absent from the
latter also."' We cannot regard this argument, however, as Bahr
does, as sufficient in all respects to meet Steudel's objection, for the
substitute must be related in some way to the thing actually re-
quired, however inferior it may be in actual worth and importance.
Stones, for example, could never serve as a substitute for coffee,
though acorns might. And if, as a matter of course, even the
poorest of the people were to be furnished with the means of ob-
taining expiation; in cases where it was absolutely impossible to
procure a sacrificial animal for the purpose, the substitute appointed

would necessarily be, not an animal that was not suitable for sacri-
fice, but something which at all events might be offered. The sym-
bolical manifestation of the satisfactio vicaria in the slaughtering of
the animal would no doubt be wanting; but the satisfactio itself
might be there, as the element of real satisfaction even in the
animal sacrifice did not proceed from the slaughtering, but was
communicated by the grace of God to the blood sprinkled upon the
altar through a donum superadditum.
(4.) He argues, On the great day of atonement (Lev. xvi.) the
one goat upon which the sins of the people were actually laid, was
sent away at perfect liberty into the desert, without any poena
vicaria, whilst upon the other goat, which was sacrificed, the sins
were not laid; so that neither in the one instance nor in the other
is substitution of any kind to be thought of." (For our answer to
this, see 199 sqq.)
61. Whilst Steudel's objections, to which we have just referred,
have not been repeated by any later writers, those of Bahr, in part
at least, have met with great approval. They are the following:
(l.) The juridical view, we are told, makes the act of slaying,
by which the punishment was completed, the culminating point
and centre of the whole of the sacred transaction. But this shows
at once the fallacy of that view. For nothing is more obvious, than
that the blood, and not the death, and the use made of the blood,
the sprinkling therefore, and not the slaying, constituted the main
feature and centre of the sacrifice. But the ritual law distinguishes
the two, the slaying and the sprinkling, most sharply from one
another, and states expressly that it was by the latter, and not by
the former, that the expiation, the ultimate object of the sacrifice,
was effected. In any case the sprinkling of the altar or Capporeth
was not a penal act; and it follows indisputably, therefore, that the
notion of punishment can never have been the central point of the
idea of sacrifice." Similar objections are made again and again by
Bahr. For example, at p. 347 he says, "With this view, the
sprinkling of blood--that main action, that culminating point of
the whole of the sacrificial transaction--sinks into a mere accom-
paniment, a kind of supplement or appendix to the main action
(the penal death); and it is impossible to see how, notwithstanding
all that, it can have been, as the Scriptures so distinctly state, the
sine qua non of the expiation." And again, at p. 280: "He makes
the death, and not the blood, the medium of expiation, contrary to
the express declaration of Lev. xvii. 11. For, let any one only
make the attempt to read at pleasure death for blood, per synec-
dochen, in this leading passage, and the words, otherwise so clear,
become mere nonsense."--In Oehler's opinion, also, these objections
are well founded. At p. 628 he says, "If the act of slaughtering ;
were intended to represent the penal death deserved by the person
offering the sacrifice; and if the shedding of blood, therefore, by
the sacrificial knife were the true expiatory act; it ought to have
been brought into greater prominence." And at p. 631: It would
be perfectly inexplicable, in that case, why the sacrificial ritual
should represent the offering of the blood upon the altar, and not
the slaughtering, as the real act of payment or of covering."
These objections have none of them any force at all, except on
the assumption, that according to our view the slaughtering is re-
garded, or must be regarded, as the real act of expiation. But if it
be shown that this is a misunderstanding, and if, moreover, it can
be proved that the theory of a penal death can stand without any
such assumption, and in fact, when rightly understood, actually
excludes it, all these objections fall to the ground. Now I believe
that I have already sufficiently, and for every unprejudiced reader,
conclusively proved, that this is the case (compare more particu-
larly 55, 56, 57). After the explanations I have given there, I
trust that it will be understood, that I also make, not the slaughter-
ing, but the sprinkling of blood upon the altar, the main point, the
kernel and centre of the sacrifice; and that I regard, not the death,
but the blood which has passed through death, and is endowed for the
first time with real atoning efficacy upon the altar, the true-medium
of expiation. To Oehler's remark, that according to my view the act
of slaughtering ought to have been brought into greater prominence,
I reply, (1) that I too regard the sprinkling of the blood as more im-
portant and more significant than the slaughtering, as is evident from
what I have stated already; and (2) that the act of slaughtering
in Lev. i., for example, where the burnt-offering is mentioned, is
really brought into no less and no greater prominence than the
sprinkling of the blood (vers. 5, 11, 15). This is also the case in
chaps. iv. and v., where the sin-offering is referred to. For the
slaughtering is never passed by unnoticed; and if it is simply men-
tioned without any further description of the manner in which it
should take place, whilst the command to sprinkle the blood is fol-
lowed by a minute description of the manner how, any one can see
that such a description was quite as unnecessary in the case of the
128 SLAUGHTERING, AND THE SPRINKLING OF THE BLOOD
former, as it was indispensable in that of the latter. For the mode

of slaughtering would be understood by everybody, and was just
the same for one sacrifice as for another. There was no necessity,
therefore, to describe it. And what would not be so naturally
understood, namely, the catching of the blood by the priest, is
distinctly and expressly enjoined. But the manner in which the
blood was to be sprinkled was not so self-evident, and differed with
different kinds of sacrifice. It was necessary, therefore, that this
should be described with minuteness and precision. And if the
person and place are "described with the necessary fulness in con-
nection with the sprinkling of the blood, a similar description
is to be found with all necessary fulness in connection with the
slaughtering also, since it is expressly observed, that it was to be
effected by the person presenting the sacrifice before the altar, on
its northern side ( 53), and in the presence, as well as with
co-operation, of the priest who caught the blood.
But if Bahr means, that the sprinkling of the altar or of the
Capporeth cannot possibly be regarded as a penal act, the non-
sense must be put to his own account; for no one has ever asserted
anything of the kind, and it does not follow either from my own
exposition or from that of any one else. His argumentum ad homi-
nem reads almost like a burlesque, when he advises that some one
should just try for once to read at pleasure death for blood per synec-
dochen in Lev. xvii. 11. In my Mos. Opfer I have already replied
to this, to the following effect: We cannot help imagining that the
zeal of the esteemed author for his cause left him no time for
reflection; otherwise we should set down as utterly unworthy, a line
of argument, which might indeed dazzle and confuse a simple and
unintelligent reader, but which has not the smallest shadow of force
or of truth. To prove this, we need do nothing more than carry
out the proposed synecdoche. Thus: Whosoever eateth the death
shall be cut off, for the soul of the flesh is in the death, and the
death maketh an atonement for your souls: whosoever therefore
eateth the death shall be cut off. No doubt this is mere non-
sense; but we wash our hands in innocence the mere nonsense
belongs to the line of argument which led to it. The passage does
not refer ex professo to sacrifice, but to eating; and for that very
reason, not to eating death, but to eating blood. Sacrifice is only
referred to for the purpose of explaining that the blood was not to
be eaten because it was the medium of expiation. As a matter of
course, therefore, the synecdoche could only be applied to those
words, which really relate to sacrifice: "I have appointed the blood
of the animal, as the seat of the animal soul, to be the medium of
expiation for your souls." If we make the proposed substitution
here, the words will read, "I have connected expiation with the
'death' of the sacrificial animal: the 'death' of the animal makes
expiation, covers your souls, viz., your sinful souls, and therefore
your death." This may possibly be an incorrect statement, but it
is by no means "mere nonsense."
62. (2) It is thoroughly incompatible with the juridical view,
that the sacrificer himself, and not the priest as the representative
of God, should inflict the penal death. For if the sacrificing were
a penal act, God would certainly appear as the punisher, and the
sacrificer as the person to be punished." Even to later writers this
argument has appeared to be peculiarly forcible and conclusive.
We find it, for example, in Hofmann (p. 244); and Oehler
strengthens it by the emphatic inquiry: "Or does God really
appear as a judge, who commands the evil-doer to execute him-
self?" It is quite out of place, however, to speak of self-execution,
since the animal to be slaughtered was not a symbolical ipse ego of
the person sacrificing, but a representative alter ego. But even if
we should regard it as a symbolical ipse ego, a symbolical "self-exe-
cution" would perhaps not be so absurd a thought after all; for
when translated into its literal meaning, this symbol would express
the thought, as true as it is profound, that the sinner must punish
himself to escape the punishment of God. But this idea of the
sacrifice, as a symbolical ipse ego, is decidedly erroneous ( 67, 69).
Kliefoth does me a great injustice when he says, that my "only"
reply to Bahr's objection, that God would necessarily have directed
the animal to be slain and the punishment to be inflicted by the
priest, is, that no doubt this might have been commanded, but God
ordered it otherwise. I have devoted almost two entire pages in
my Mos. Opfer to the proof, that the connection between punish-
ment and suffering is a necessary one; that punishment is the con-
tinuation of sin, its complement, which is no longer within the
sinner's caprice or power; and that death is the finishing of sin,
comprehending all the punishment, according to the words of the
Apostle, "sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." Sin,
from its very nature, is a violation of the moral order of the world,
a pressure as it were against the law, which, because of the vitality
and elasticity of the law, produces a reaction, that falls upon the
sinner in the form of punishment. Sin, therefore, is a half, un-
finished thing, that demands completion; and that completion is to

be found in death, which is not foreign to it therefore, or arbitrarily
imposed from without. On the contrary, it is the sin itself that
bringeth forth the death which existed in it potentially from the
very first. From this point of view, therefore, we may say that
God does not punish the sinner, but the sinner punishes himself;
the recoil of the law, which reaches him as punishment, being evoked
and determined by himself alone.
Kliefoth says nothing essentially different, at any rate, nothing
better, when he supplies the supposed deficiency of my reply as
follows: "That which slays the sacrifice is really the sin of the
sinner which it has to carry." And I must pronounce it utterly
erroneous, when he proceeds to observe that God Himself cannot
possibly be represented as inflicting the punishment, since He puts
no one to death, but lets the sin produce death by its own develo-
ment; and as the sacrifice cannot put itself to death, since sacrifice
is not suicide, there is actually no one left but the sacrificing sinner;
and he therefore, as the cause of the death, must necessarily inflict
it.--In opposition to this assertion, I still abide by my former argu-
ment (p. 76); viz., that inasmuch as this elasticity of the law, or
of the moral order of the universe, is given to it by God, and is
sustained by Him; or rather, inasmuch as God Himself is this
moral order of the universe; He is also Himself the judge and
punisher too. There is the same apparent discrepancy here which
we find in the words of Christ, who says in John v. 22, that the
Father hath given all judgment to the Son; and in John xii.
47 sqq., that the Father has not sent the Son into the world
to judge the world; and that whoever does not believe is judged
already, has judged himself. There is no intention to deny that
God can be represented as the inflicter of punishment; but the
same motive which led Christ, in John xii. 47 sqq., to transfer;
the act of judicial punishment from Himself to the sinner, may
also have regulated the symbolism of worship. In the institution
of sacrifice, for example, God appears as the merciful One, who
desires not the death of the sinner, but his reconciliation and re-
demption (of course in a manner accordant with justice); whilst
the sinner, on the other hand, appears as one who has brought
death and condemnation upon himself through his sin, and is con-
scious of having done so. In this case it is peculiarly appropriate
and significant, that he should accuse himself, pronounce sentence
of death upon himself, and inflict it himself upon his symbolical
substitute, which the plan devised by God has allowed him to

choose.1
But those who accept the evangelical and prophetical teaching
(Isa. liii.) respecting the sacrificial death of Christ, and admit the
vicarious and penal character of His sufferings, and yet, for the
reasons mentioned, deny all this in the case of the Old Testament
sacrifices, should ask themselves the question, who it was that in-
flicted the death on Golgotha; whether it was God, or whether it
was not rather the world whose punishment the Sacrifice had taken
upon Himself?
63. (3.) "The atonement," in Bahr's opinion, "can never
have had God for its object, whilst in the juridical view the
demands of divine justice are satisfied, and the wrath of God is
appeased."--An argument without the slightest force, which rests
entirely upon the inadmissible identification and interchange of
reconciliation and atonement. (See 28, particularly the note.)
(4.) "It is equally opposed to the thank-offerings, in which
confessedly there is no idea of warding off a punishment, least of
all the punishment of death, and in which God never appears as a
judge to punish " (p. 281).--Again a perfectly futile argument, for
the former cannot be admitted ( 31, 41); nor can the latter be
sustained.
(5.) "If the sacrificial death had been a penal death, every sin
for which a sacrifice was offered would necessarily have been re-
garded as deserving of death; and that no one can maintain. For
sin-offerings were offered for sins of ignorance, and for not even
purely moral, but theocratic offences" (p. 281).--The latter is palp-
ably a mistake ( 92); and the former may be met by the remarks
in 48 (cf. also 56, 59), in connection with which we may refer
instar omniur to Deut. xxvii. 26, Cursed be he that confirmeth
not all the words of this law to do them.
(6.) "The juridical view confounds symbolical substitution with
real, religious with judicial. The sacrificial animal, in its estimation,
was not a mere symbol, but a substitute for the person offering it;
so that the penal act itself was of necessity not a figurative, but a
1
Cf. Kahnis, luth. Dogmatik i. 270: "As every sacrifice was representa-
tive, the person offering it expressed, in the slaughtering of the animal, the
sentence which he had previously pronounced upon himself, before venturing
to hope for communion with God. After the man had thus practically declared,
by the slaughtering of the animal, I am a sinner deserving of death in the
sight of God, the priest sprinkled," etc.
real one. But in this way the sacrifice loses entirely its symbolico-
religious character, and becomes a purely outward, formal, mecha-
nical act."-That the former was not the case, has already been
shown in 56, 57; but even if it really were so, the latter would be
a very superficial or a very inconsiderate expression. Or does Bahr
really mean that punishment inflicted before a worldly tribunal is a
merely outward, formal, mechanical act, without any inward, essen-
tial, and moral signification?
(7.) Lastly, we read at p. 347: "The typology based upon the
juridical view regards the sprinkling of the blood, as a type of the
imputatio justitice Christi et applicatio meritorum ejus. But how
could this be effected by the sprinkling, not of the person offering
the sacrifice, but of sacred places?" We find the same argument
in Oehler, Hofmann, and Keil. But it is a sufficient answer, to show
that the application of blood to the altar was necessary, chiefly and
primarily necessary (this has already been done at 56, 57), and
that it involved eo ipso an (ideal) application to the person of the
sacrificer. But the latter is unquestionably taught in Lev. xvii. 11,
where it is distinctly affirmed, I have given you the blood upon the
altar, to make an atonement for your souls." The souls of the per-
sons sacrificing, therefore, were ideally upon the altar, and were there
covered by the sacrificial blood; a view which rests upon Ex. xx. 24
cf. 13.
64. We now turn to the forces with which Neumann, Keil, and
Oehler have come to the help of Bahr's phalanx of objections. Let
us look first of all at Neumann. "It would be foolish," he says,
"if a sacrifice seeks and is the medium of forgiveness, to try to
convince us that the forgiveness is secured through punishment, and
that a punishment endured, not by the person seeking forgiveness,
but by a creature having no share whatever in the guilt to be en-
dured." But who wants to convince Dr Neumann, that forgiveness
was secured through punishment? So far as I know, all the sup-
porters of the satisfactio vicaria have hitherto taught that forgiveness
comes through mercy, but mercy is made conditional upon, and
rendered possible by, the fact that the punishment of the guilty is
sustained and endured by one who is innocent. The idea that par-
ticipation in the guilt to be punished was the necessary condition of
a vicarious endurance of punishment, is absurd; for the very opposite
was the case; and the prerequisite of substitution was, that there
should not be participation in the guilt to be punished, since other-
wise the substitute would have to undergo punishment, not as a
substitute, but on its own account. At the same time, substitution

required an essential, internal rapport, a transfer of the obligation
from the one to the other; and this took place (at least symbolically)
through the imposition of hands. But we have already seen ( 50)
that the idea of vicarious suffering is a familiar one in the Old Tes-
tament, even apart from the sacrificial worship. Moreover, if there
were any force in this argument, the charge of absurdity would be
just as applicable to the doctrine of satisfaction in the New Testa-
mentas in the Old, and yet the author has apparently no wish to
abandon the former.1
65. We will now examine the fresh arguments adduced by
Keil. (1.) At p. 207 he says, "Although the death of the sacrificer,
typified by the slaughtering of the victim, was the fruit and effect
of sin, it did not come under the notion of punishment; for sacrifice,
was an institution of divine mercy, which was intended to secure for
the sinner, not the merited punishment, but forgiveness instead."
--We have already seen, at 53, how untenable and contradictory
the results of Keil's own theory of the slaughtering of the sacrifice
have been, and necessarily must be, in consequence of his rejection
of the idea of punishment in death. All that we have here to do
with is the assertion, that sacrifice, as an institution of mercy, was
intended to secure for the sinner, not punishment, but forgiveness
instead. But how inconsiderate this reply really is! For that very
reason, that the institution of sacrifice as a provision of mercy was
intended to secure for the sinner, not punishment, but grace, and for
the purpose of rendering this possible, it transferred the obligation
to endure the punishment from the person sacrificing to the animal
slain. The same incautiousness meets us again at p. 211, note 3.
"For when Kurtz," he says, adds at last, that in the institution of
sacrifice God appears as the merciful one, the exaltation of the
1
With reference to the prophetic intuition of the self-sacrifice of the Servant
of Jehovah (Isa. liii.), Neumann himself proposes this question: "Can we have
any doubt that the prophet regarded this sacrifice of the Servant of God as the
punishment of our sins?" and then replies, "Certainly we have considerable
doubt, for, etc." I also not only doubt, but most decidedly deny that folly, to
which Neumann seeks to forge the signature of the Church. No one on our side
has ever taught that our sins were punished in the sacrifice of Christ; but, on
the contrary, it is always maintained that our sins, or rather we the sinners,
receive mercy in that sacrifice. And when Neumann afterwards states the fol-
lowing as the true meaning of Isa.liii.: "He endured the punishment which
ought to have fallen upon humanity in the judgment of the Just One,"--I sub-
scribe this meaning, and cannot see in what it differs from the orthodox theory
of sacrifice.
divine mercy does not tally at all with the assumption, that the death
of the sacrifice represents the Punishment of the sinner with death
for the mercy of God does not punish sin, but forgives it."--Most
decidedly, it is not the mercy of God which punishes, but His justice.
But why should it not be possible, and even necessary, for the justice ;
of God to find expression in the institution of sacrifice by the side
of His mercy; if, as Keil himself maintains (p. 228), mercy cannot,
and will not, forgive sins, without anything further, that is to say,
without justice being previously satisfied
But when Keil still further maintains, at p. 207, that univer-
sally death, which entered through sin, is and remains a punish-
ment only for that sinner for whom there is no redemption, this
no more needs any thorough refutation than the strange statement,
that death delivers man from sin, and introduces him into eternal
life; for in the latter he ascribes to death what can only be
affirmed of Christ, the Redeemer from sin and death ; and with
regard to the former, we need only appeal to the terrors and bitter-
ness of death, even to the pious Christian, as attested both by the
Scriptures and experience, to show that even to him death is still
the wages of sin, i.e., punishment. Moreover, here again Keil con-
founds what ought to be carefully distinguished and kept apart
when the sacrificial worship is concerned, the death which comes
upon all men, both good and bad alike, on account of Adam's sin,
i.e., on account of the universal sinfulness of the human race (Gen.
iii. 19), and the death deserved afresh for every special sin (cf. 48).
Keil is speaking of the former, whereas the institution of sacrifice
has simply to do with the latter. Consequently his argument, even
if it were in itself as correct as it is weak and untenable would ne-
cessarily fall wide of the mark. And when Keil still further observes
(p. 207), that a death which delivers man from sin, and introduces
him into eternal life, cannot be called a punishment, "because the
idea of divine holiness and justice is by no means exhausted by the
notion of punishment,"--I must certainly leave this unanswered, be-
cause I do not understand it. For though I might venture perhaps
to interpret the sentence by itself, I must confess that I cannot com-
prehend what it has to do with the context.
But (3) Keil seems to promise himself the most effect from his
reply on p. 213. Death, he says, a even regarded as the wages
or punishment of sin, is no extermination of sin, from which a
restitutio in integrum follows, since even after this punishment the
sin remains. The injury that it has done to man, the desolation
brought by it into body and soul, is not removed, and the sinner
sinks into eternal death, unless the mercy of God forgives the sin
and quickens new life. So the fact that the authorities punish a
thief or a murderer with death, does not restore what was stolen to
its owner, or give back life to the dead. Death, therefore, re-
garded as punishment, cannot be described as the expiation of sin,
since the punishment of sin neither cancels nor forgives. So also
it furnishes no satisfaction for sin, but only for divine justice and
objective right."--This is certainly luce clarius! And yet, strange
to say, even Oehler, who is quite as decided an opponent of the
theory of penal death as Keil, and a much more consistent one,
thinks that "what Keil has said in opposition to the idea of the
extermination of guilt by death, and a consequent restitutio in
integrum, can hardly be regarded as decisive." Certainly I have
sagacity enough to know that the execution of a murderer does not
bring the murdered man to life again. But the fact is simply this,
that Keil has not understood me. When I spoke of a restitutio in
integrum, I did not mean the undoing of the deed by which the
moral order of the universe had been disturbed, but the restoration
of the disturbed order itself. And that I still maintain.
(4.) To this is added, what is really a surprising statement from
such a quarter, that "the law, and in fact the whole of the Scrip-
tures, contain neither a direct nor an indirect assertion to the effect
that the sin-offering possessed the character of a satisfaction." For
how does this tally with the author's admissions on the very same
page, that "the sinner deserved to die, and the victim which took
his place had to suffer in his stead;" and that "the animal of the
sin-offering suffered death in the place of the person sacrificing, as
the wages of sin? If the victim must suffer death for the sinner,
and in his stead, as the wages or punishment of his sin, and the
design of the sin-offering--viz., the expiation or forgiveness of the
sins of the person sacrificing--could not be secured without such a
vicarious death, can it well be denied that such a death possessed
the character of a satisfaction? Moreover, at p. 237, the author
expressly admits, at least in the case of the trespass-offering, what
he here as expressly denies in the case of the sin-offering. "The
trespass-offering," he says, "having been slaughtered, and having
suffered death in the place of the person sacrificing, as the punish-
ment for his guilt, and satisfaction having thus been rendered to
justice," etc. And again, a few lines further on, he maintains that
by the trespass-offering "satisfaction was rendered to divine jus-
tice," and that "the trespass-offering was a work of satisfaction, in

consequence of which full pardon was granted to the guilty person
on the part of God." It is true that at p. 228 he is speaking of
the sin-offering alone, and at p. 237 of the trespass-offering only,
the fundamental idea of which, according to Keil's theory (p. 223),
is that of sufficiency or satisfaction, in marked distinction from the
sin-offering. We shall show as we proceed that this theory is inad-
missible ( 95). But even if it were as well-founded as it is un-
tenable, the self-contradiction we complain of would not be removed.
For at pp. 223, 226, where he lays down the idea of satisfaction as
the common fundamental notion of all the trespass-offerings, he
understands by the word "satisfaction" something altogether dif-
ferent from what he does at p. 228, where he denies that the sin-
offering had any satisfactory worth, and at p. 237, where he attri-
butes such worth to the trespass-offering. In the former passage
(pp. 223, 226) he defines the fundamental notion of the trespass-
offering, as that of satisfaction for the violation of the rights of
others, or of compensation (remuneration) for the purpose of re-
covering lost theocratic rights; so that it had regard to a satisfac-
tion which the person sacrificing had to render to another, along
with the sacrificial expiation; whereas in the latter (pp. 228, 237)
he speaks of a satisfaction to be rendered to divine justice as such,
and rendered, not by the offerer himself, but by the victim offered
by him, through its endurance of death in his stead, as the pun-
ishment for his sin or trespass. But here, according to Keil's own
doctrine, sin- and trespass-offerings are not opposed to one another,
but perfectly parallel and harmonious. If (according to p. 237)
divine justice was satisfied through the vicarious endurance of death
on the part of the trespass-offering, as a punishment for the guilt
of the person sacrificing, that death, which the sin-offering endured
vicariously for the person sacrificing and in his stead, must also be
regarded as rendering satisfaction to the justice of God; and that
all the more, because, according to Keil's own doctrine, the sin and
guilt of the person sacrificing were imputed to the sin-offering as
well as to the trespass-offering, through the laying on of hands
( 38). There prevail throughout Keil's work, as we shall again
have occasion to notice ( 95), great obscurity and confusion with
regard to the notion of satisfaction; and this is the cause of the
present and other mistakes.
When Keil boldly appeals to the whole law, in fact to the whole
Scripture, as bearing witness against the satisfactory import of the
sin-offering, we cannot help asking whether he also intends to

deny that there was any satisfactory import in the self-sacrifice of
Christ? And yet, after what has been stated before, we must
assume that he either denies all satisfactory import to the sacrifice
of Christ, in opposition to both the Bible and the Church, or that
he denies to that sacrifice the validity of a sin-offering, just as
firmly as he attributes to it the exclusive validity of a trespass-
offering. But we are forbidden to assume the former by the
author's position in relation to both the Bible and the Church, and
the latter by his definition of the sin-offering. For no one--cer-
tainly not Keil himself--would think of maintaining that the im-
port and validity of the self-sacrifice of Christ are exhausted by
the notion of satisfaction for the violation of the rights of others,
or a compensation (remuneration) for the recovery of lost theocratic
rights. And what was the expiatory sacrifice of the great day of
atonement, which undoubtedly shadowed forth the atoning sacrifice
of Christ in a fuller, clearer, and more comprehensive manner than
any of the Old Testament sacrifices? Was it a trespass-offering
or a sin-offering ( 202)?
66. The first of Keil's arguments mentioned above is re-
peated with still greater emphasis by Delitzsch, p. 742, and with the
greatest of all by Oehler, p. 631. The former says, "The animal
sacrifice did not set forth in figure the events on Calvary, for this
simple reason, that the institution of sacrifice was an institution of
grace, in which, instead of justice punishing, grace forgave." But
could grace do under the Old Testament what it cannot under the
New, namely, forgive without the satisfaction of justice? And
was not that institution, of which the proceedings upon Calvary were
the kernel and centre, also an institution of grace? And if in the
latter there was, for all that, an actual exhibition of penal suffering,
why should there not be a symbolical (or typical) exhibition of it in
the sacrificial ceremonies of the Old Testament? The institution
of sacrifice in the Old Testament became an institution of grace,
through the simple fact that the condition of pardon was the vicari-
ous, penal death of the sacrifice.
In Oehler the argument runs thus: In the Old Testament
ceremonial God did not sanctify Himself by acts of penal justice
neither the house, in which His name dwelt, nor the altar, at which
He met with the congregation, was a place of judgment. Whoever
had sinned wantonly against the covenant-God and His ordinances,
fell without mercy under the penal justice of God: for him there
was therefore no more sacrifice, and for him the ritual of sacrifice
was not designed. That ritual was a provision of divine grace for
the congregation, which had indeed sinned in weakness, but was
seeking the face of God."--The assertion, however, that the theory
of a penal death makes the altar, or the house in which the name
of God dwelt, a place of judgment, is one which could be made
with justice, provided the act of slaying had really taken place upon
the altar, or in the tabernacle. But it did not; and, as we shall
presently see, Oehler is disposed to adduce this fact as an additional
argument against the theory in question. But does not one argu-
ment cancel the other? The fact that the completion of the
symbolical poena vicaria took place beside the altar and not upon
it, before the door of the tabernacle and not within it, previous to
the act which expressed forgiveness and not after it, set forth the
idea that mercy could only have free course after and in conse-
quence of the satisfaction of justice. And why should not God be
able to sanctify Himself in the sacrificial ritual also by "acts of
penal justice," if such acts really are the preliminaries of mercy, if
they promise it and render it possible, and if they are the necessary
condition and basis of its manifestations? But what Oehler still
further adds with regard to wanton sins against the ordinances of
God, and sins committed in weakness, even if it had any force,
would only affect the views we hold, provided it proved that sins of
weakness, which admitted of sacrificial expiation as such, were not
followed by judicial punishment at the hands of God, even when
they remained intentionally unatoned for, in conscious contempt
of the means of salvation that had been provided. Now it is evi-
dent that this was not the case, for the sinner offered sacrifice for
the purpose of escaping the penal justice of God.
Oehler is quite wrong again, in my opinion, when he observes,
at p. 629, "And if the slaying had been the real act of expiation,
it would have taken place upon the altar itself, and not merely by
the side." I have already abundantly and superabundantly shown,
that according to our view the slaying was by no means the real
act of expiation. But even if this had been the case, and if it
would have been more in harmony with the idea for it to have taken
place upon the altar than by the side of it, the actual impracticabi-
lity would have been sufficient to prevent it. In conclusion, we
may be allowed to take this opportunity of reminding our esteemed
opponents of what we have written already at 52.
67. "The question as to the central idea of sacrifice," as
Delitzsch has very properly said, "may all be summed up in this:

Why, and in what sense, was blood, i.e., the life, when made to stream
out by violence, the Old Testament medium of expiation?" We
have already answered this question ( 55 sqq.), and fortified it
against all the objections and attacks with which we are acquainted.
All that now remains for us to do, is to explain and examine the
positive theories of our opponents.
Bahr's views are thus expressed at p. 210: The symbolical
character of the sacrifice consisted in the fact, that the offering of
the nephesh in the sacrificial blood upon the altar, was a symbol of
the self-sacrifice of the person sacrificing, and of his drawing near
to Jehovah. As the offering of the animal blood was a surrender
and giving up of the animal life to death, so the psychical, i.e.,
personal, life of the individual sacrificing, which was opposed to
God, was to be surrendered and given up, i.e., to die; but as this is
a surrender to Jehovah, it is no actual cessation of existence, but a
dying, which becomes eo ipso a living. . . . The psychical a]poqa-
nei?n is the condition of true life. The meaning of sacrifice, there-
fore, was briefly this: the psychical, sinful existence (life) was
given up to God in death, for the purpose of obtaining true being
(sanctification) by union with God. " But to this more negative
and subjective side there is added a positive and objective one (p.
211), viz., the reception and acceptance on the part of Jehovah,
and the impartation of sanctification, the condition of true life, to
the person thus surrendering himself. This latter element rendered
the sacrifice a sacramental act, by which the blood appeared as the
medium appointed by God, for covering sin or the soul, for bringing
into union with God, and so producing sanctification. In the words
of the law peculiar prominence is given to this sacramental character,
especially in Lev. xvii. 11. The question, "how this sacramental
character could be given to the blood," is answered by Bahr at p.
212, where he shows, (1) that the blood of the sacrifice, as the means
of expiation and sanctification, was "something apart from the per-
son for whom atonement had to be made, something different from
himself, and in fact something appointed and chosen by God; (2)
that it was nevertheless not something absolutely different, foreign,
and opposed, but something related to him, analogous in its nature,
homogeneous." If we add to all this the discussion as to the
sprinkling of the blood, in p. 346 ("If, then, the blood represented
the nephesh of the person presenting the sacrifice, the sprinkling of
the blood upon one of the holy places (in this term Bahr includes
all the vessels of the sanctuary) could have no other object, than the
bringing of the nephesh to the place in which the holiness of God
was manifested, that it might attest itself, and work efficaciously as
such, i.e., might sanctify him, and so destroy, cover over, what was
sinful in him, make atonement for him "), we have the quintessence
of Bahr's theory of sacrifice.
The simple fact that this theory has never met with approval,
been adopted by any of the later commentators may be regarded
as a sufficient proof how little truth there can be in it, and may
release me from the necessity of entering into so thorough a refuta-
tion here, as I have on a former occasion. Passing over, therefore,
many other obscurities and self-contradictions, I shall simply point
out in a summary manner how untenable its main propositions are.
In the first place, then, it makes the soul of the sacrifice a figurative
ipse ego of the person sacrificing, instead of a representative alter
ego; whereas it is expressly stated in Lev. xvii. 11, that the animal
soul, which was in the blood, covered the soul of the sinner upon the
altar, and therefore in this, the culminating point of the sacrificial
ceremony, even in its symbolical character, was regarded as another,
and as entirely distinct from the soul of the person sacrificing.
Secondly,--and this is connected with the former,--it makes the
animal sacrifice, as Delitzsch expresses it, nothing more than the
attendant shadow of the personal act of the man himself. Thirdly,
as Delitzsch has also justly observed, to die to oneself, or to give
oneself up to God through death, is an idea completely foreign to
the whole of the Old Testament. Fourthly, the sacramental signifi-
cance which it attributes to the sacrificial blood is not only entirely
baseless, but is at open variance with the symbolical meaning which
it is supposed to possess. Fifthly, and lastly, we may be allowed
to point out, how Bahr, whenever he is speaking against the
juridical view, cannot affirm with sufficient emphasis, that, in
direct opposition to all the data of the law of sacrifice, it makes the
act of slaying the real act of expiation, the kernel and centre, the
climax and main point in the whole ceremony, and reduces the
sprinkling of blood to a mere appendix and supplement; and yet,
with his theory of the psychical or personal a]poqanei?n, he has
plunged over head and ears into the very same, or even greater
condemnation. Let any one read the whole of Bahr's exposition.
of the notion of sacrifice, and just observe how the word "death"
and its various synonymes are crowded together: he is continually
speaking of the surrender and giving up of life to death, of dying,
of the cessation of life, of an a]poqanei?n, as the strictest and most

essential idea of sacrifice. Now is not this making death the cul-
minating point of sacrifice? The prw?ton yeu?doj of Bahr's theory
is the thoroughly false position which he assigns to sanctification in
relation to justification; and this Kliefoth also has observed. "The
fundamental error in this view," he says, "is that it makes expia-
tion and forgiveness the effect and consequence of sanctification,
whereas the very opposite is the truth."
68. We will now turn to Hofmann. At pp. 248-9 he writes
as follows: It was not the animal sacrificed, or the blood brought
to the altar, which came between the sinful man and the holy God;
but through the act of sacrifice the man produced the effect of a
rp,Ko upon God (cf. 28); with it he interposed for himself, or himself, the
sinner, and redeemed himself front guiltiness." And again: That
authority over a living creature, which had its origin in the first
forgiveness of sins on the part of God, was employed by man, who
sacrificed in this way as an expiation, for the purpose of offering to
God such sacrifice as was most closely related to him, the living one,
and which he could not offer in any other way than by inflicting
upon it the suffering, so painful for himself, of putting it to death.
By this act, expressive both of faith in the revealed willingness of
God to forgive sin, and of a consciousness of guilt, the man inter-
posed for himself, the sinner, that he might be delivered from his
guilt in consequence. As he could not come to God himself in such
a way as that the death, through which he came to Him, should be
the termination of that attitude towards God which sin had pro-
duced, and the commencement of a new one, he offered what was
foreign to himself, and yet was really his own, and what participated
in his attitude towards God only through its appointment as a
sacrifice, so that with the death, through which it came to God, its
relation to the sin of the sacrificer, that had cost it its life, was over,
and he prayed to God that He would now bring his relation to Him
to an end, whether that relation depended upon his sins in general,
or upon some one particular sin."
The manner in which Hofmann explains the necessity for
bringing the blood to the altar is also very peculiar. In the first
edition (p. 152) he says, The meaning of the sprinkling was this:
the slaying of a living being, which took place as an atonement for
the person presenting the sacrifice, was appropriated to the Holy
Place in the blood, which had been its life. It was sprinkled, and
not the person sacrificing, because it was he who made the payment,
and God to whom it was made. The sin of the person sacrificing
made the Holy Place unclean, inasmuch as it was the place of his
connection with God. Hence, what he had done for the restoration
of his fellowship with God was attributed to it, and the uncleanness
with which his sin had defiled it was thereby taken away. The
very same thing, which was done on the yearly day of atonement
to every part of the sanctuary, including even the Most Holy Place
(Lev. xvi. 16 sqq.), was done to the altar of burnt-offering in con-
nection with every sacrifice."--In the second edition I miss this
passage, which is remarkable for its clearness. But the idea that
he has renounced the view expressed in it, is precluded by p. 258,
where he says, in perfect harmony with p. 164 of Ed. 1: Now, if
the procedure with the blood was the most distinctive peculiarity of
the sin-offering, the essential purpose must have been, to bring to
God what had been the life of the sacrificial animal as a payment
rendered by its being shed, and by means of that payment to deliver
the abode and vicinity of God from the defilement which sin had
brought upon it." For the correctness of this view, he appeals to
Lev. viii. 15, and xvi. 15. Consequently, it appears as though
Hofmann only retained this view in connection with the sin-offering, "
and had discovered that it was inadmissible in relation to the burnt-
offering and the thank-offering.
In all the rest, too, Hofmann's theory appears to be essentially
the same as before. The sacrifice is still, in his estimation, an act
performed for God, or a payment made to God, with which the
sinner interposes for himself, and frees himself from the obligations
by which he is bound. The idea of a mulcta is not yet fully laid
aside, and he still retains the indefensible allusion to Gen. iii. 21,
and the opinion, so irreconcilable with Lev. xvii. 11, that it was
not the soul of the sacrificial animal that was offered, but what had
been the soul or life of the animal, that in which the animal had had
its life. Now, in the first place, so far as regards his fundamental
view of the sacrifice, as an act performed, or a payment made to
effect deliverance from liabilities which sin had imposed; this falls
along with the equally untenable interpretation of the rP,Ki (cf. 28).
His reference to Gen. iii. 21, according to which the "first forgive-
ness of sins "was introduced by God's slaying animals and using
their skins" to clothe the nakedness of the first sinner, which had
been changed into a shameful nakedness in consequence of sin," for
the purpose of teaching him, that in future he and his descendants
could, and might deliver themselves from the liabilities produced by
sin through the slaying of animals, has not the slightest warrant,
either in Gen. iii. 21, or in the whole of the sacrificial Thorah. For
in Gen. iii. 21 there is nothing of the kind to be found, any more
than in the Thorah itself, in which there is never the slightest
allusion to any connection with the fact recorded in Gen. iii. 21;
and the existence of any such connection is precluded by the fact,
that the skins of the animals were not given back to the person
sacrificing to be used as clothing, but in the case of the burnt-offer-
ing were assigned to the priest, the representative and servant of
God (Lev. vii. 8), and in that of the sin-offering, when the priest
himself was the person presenting it, were ordered to be burned
along with the flesh outside the camp (cf. 112).
Lastly, the interest which Hofmann has in still maintaining
that the blood brought to the altar was not the soul of the sacrifice
itself, but what had been its soul, may be very easily understood.
At the same time, it is evident that he does so in the interest of
his own singular theory of sacrifice, and not in that of any biblical
datum; least of all, in that of the statement made in Lev. xvii. 11,
which is in the most open and direct contradiction to what Hofmann
maintains. For if, as is there stated, the blood was given upon the
altar to make atonement for the soul of the offerer, and the atoning
efficacy is attributed to the fact that the blood made atonement
through the soul (or in Hofmann's words, as the soul, 29), it follows
as a matter of course, that what is intended is not the blood without
the soul, but the blood as animated by the soul.
For this simple reason I cannot comply with Ebrard's expectation
(p. 48), that I should willingly adopt the incidental (?) correction,
that it was not the soul of the animal itself, but the slain and extinct
life of the animal, in other words, the proof that the vicarious death
had taken place, which was brought to the altar before the eye of
God. For, according to Lev. xvii. 11, the blood of the sacrifice
atoned, and could atone, only because, and so far as the soul which
had endured the poena vicaria was in it still; or, as Neumann
expresses it (p. 352), so long as the breath from above still moved
within it," viz., the a breath of life" which made the animal also a
"living soul" ( 32). And in what sense the blood which had just
flowed from the animal might be regarded as still being, as it were,
the bearer and possessor of the soul, that is to say, as living blood,
may be explained from the analogous phrases living water and
living flesh (in distinction from cooked meat, 1 Sam. ii. 15). As
Oehler observes (p. 630): Can it be surprising, then, that the fresh,
steaming, and still fluid blood should be regarded as a blood with

life and soul in it still?"
Lastly, with regard to Hofmann's view, that the sprinkling of
the altar with the blood of the sacrifice served to deliver the former
from the defilement, which the sin of the person sacrificing had
brought upon it: this is erroneous only on the supposition that the
intention of the sprinkling is limited to that; in which case it is
decidedly erroneous. In Lev. xvii. 11 we do not read, "I have
given you the blood upon the altar, to make atonement for the
altar," but "to make atonement for your souls." But if the sin of
the soul is expiated upon the altar, the sin is regarded as existing
upon the altar and defiling it. But the sprinkling of blood, i.e., the
expiation, had reference primarily to the sin; let this be conquered
and exterminated, and then eo ipso the altar is delivered from its
defilement. Keil and Delitzsch therefore are wrong in condemning.
Hofmann's view without reserve, that is to say, in opposing both
what is false and what is true. That the blood of the sacrifice,
when brought to the altar, purified the altar as well as the person
sacrificing, is distinctly stated in Lev. viii. 15. Compare 201.
69. The principal points of Keil's theory of expiation are the
following: "The bleeding sacrifice was also a sacrificial gift, and
acquired its vicarious signification from the simple fact, that the
faithful covenant-God appointed it, in His condescending mercy, as
the vehicle of His grace (i. 205). By the laying on of hands there
were transferred to the animal, as the representative of the person
sacrificing, in the case of the sin- and trespass-offerings, the sin and
guilt of the person sacrificing; in that of the burnt-offerings, his
desire for sanctification; and in that of the peace-offerings, his
gratitude for favours prayed for or received (p. 206). The slaying
represented the surrendering to death of the life of the person
sacrificing, but by no means to death as the punishment of his sin
(p. 207); though, according to pp. 228, 237, 283, 384, it did set
forth death as punishment for sins ( 53). This death (which pre-
ceded expiation) still further represented death as the medium of
transition from a state of alienation and separation from God into
a state of grace and vital fellowship with Him, or as the door of
entrance into the divine life out of the ungodly life of this world;--
as a death which redeemed from sin and introduced into the blessed-
ness of eternal life, into which, therefore, in the case of the sin- and
trespass-offerings at least, the soul which was laden with sin and
guilt, or rather bad become sin or guilt through the imposition of
hands (p. 227), had already entered, even before the expiation or
forgiveness of sins. The sprinkling of blood upon the altar, which
then took place, denoted the reception of the person sacrificing into
the divine fellowship; and this was "symbolically effected through
the sacrifice, in such a manner, that by virtue of the substitutionary
character of the sacrificial animal, the soul of the person sacrificing,
which was offered up in the blood sprinkled upon the altar, was
brought to the place of the Lord's gracious presence,--i.e., brought
within the operations of divine grace, which (out of pure compassion
p. 228) covered or expiated, i.e., forgave sin."
As the refutation of this theory, in our account of which we
have employed throughout the author's own words, is to be found
in 39, 40, and 65, so far as relates to the imposition of hands and
slaying of the animal, we shall confine ourselves here to the meaning
assigned to the sprinkling of the blood. The first thing which strikes
us is that with Keil, just as with Bahr, the (symbolical) substitution
which was maintained at first, and afterwards referred to again and
again, is suddenly changed into a mere similitude of the person
sacrificing, and the dissimilar alter ego becomes a similar ipse ego.
But I cannot regard this alteration as an improvement, for it is ob-
viously at variance with Lev. xvii. 11. It is distinctly taught there,
that the soul of the sacrifice comes to the altar, as a most holy means
o f atonement for the soul of the sacrificer; whereas Keil maintains
that it came as a similitude of the soul of the sacrificer, and there-
fore as being itself unholy and in need of expiation. Again, according
to Lev. xvii. 11, the soul of the sinner was covered upon the altar
by the soul of the animal which was in the sacrificial blood; whereas,
according to Keil, "the soul of the sacrificer, which was offered up
in the blood sprinkled upon the altar, was brought within the opera-
tions of divine grace, which covered sin;" so that, according to Keil,
the soul of the sacrifice was that which had to be covered up,
whereas, according to Lev. xvii. 11, it was that which effected the
covering.
But, secondly, this sudden change of the dissimilar alter ego into
a similar ipse ego is at variance (at least latently) in two respects
with Lev. xxii. 20-24. For example, if, as Keil teaches, the sacri-
ficial animal was intended to be not a dissimilar alter ego, but a
similar ipse ego, it would be, impossible to conceive, why the law
should have demanded with such emphasis and stringency perfect
spotlessness and faultlessness, as the conditio sine qua non of sacrificial
fitness. If the person sacrificing came (as no one has denied that
146 SLAUHTERING, AND THE SPRINKLING OF THE BLOOD.
he did, at least in the case of the sin- and trespass-offerings) as one

laden with sin and guilt, as blemished and unclean, as needing atone-
ment and sanctification; then, on the supposition that all that was
intended was, that there should be a symbolical representation of the
moral condition in this ipse ego, the law would never have demanded
such features in the animal sacrificed, as were expressive of a con-
dition the very opposite to the existing moral condition of the person
presenting the sacrifice. On the contrary, his sinfulness, his un-
holiness, and his need of expiation and sanctification, would have
been symbolized in the sacrificial animal by such a condition as could
truly be regarded as his likeness; and the removal or negation of
that condition would have needed to be superinduced by the ritual
of sacrifice. But in the actual law of sacrifice we find precisely the
opposite; for all the regulations with regard, to the nature of the
sacrifice were designed to exhibit it as innocent, holy, pure, faultless,
spotless, healthy and strong, and by that very sacrificial ritual (ac-
cording to Keil's explanation) sin and guilt, uncleanness and un-
holiness, were imputed to it.
Thirdly, this view of the matter is altogether opposed to and
perfectly irreconcilable with Keil's own explanation of the previous
slaying of the sacrifice ( 53) The soul that had already been in-
troduced through death, with all its sins unatoned for, into the
fellowship of the divine life, into the blessedness of life eternal, had,
now to'be torn away again from this eternal blessed life, and be ex
post atoned for again by being placed within the operations of divine
grace in the earthly kingdom of God (for that was the signification
of the altar, according to Keils own correct interpretation: cf. i.103,
104).
Fourthly, whilst Keil has correctly affirmed, on p. 228, that
the sinner deserved death for his sin, and the victim which inter-
posed for him had to suffer that death in his stead, because the
compassion of God neither could nor would either abolish or weaken
the holiness of the law,--a few lines further down, this truth is de-
nied, again; for there we are told, that "the soul of the man con-
fessing his sin, which was represented by the blood of the victim,
could only be brought into the fellowship of divine grace, or into
the sphere of its operations, by means of the sprinkling of blood;
and out of pure compassion that grace then covered up and exter-
minated sin." What becomes, then, of the firm demands of the
holiness of the law, which compassion neither could nor would either,
abolish or weaken?
Lastly, Keil's view of the sprinkling of the blood is proved to

be perfectly untenable by the fact, that through the sprinkling of
blood not only the sinful nation, or one particular individual be-
longing to it, but the defiled sanctuary and its furniture, could be
and were commanded to be cleansed ( 189). Now if, according to
Keil's theory, the atonement for a sinful man was effected by the
soul of the animal being brought, as a substitutionary representative
of the soul of the man for whom atonement was to be made, to the
place of the gracious presence of God--i.e., within the sphere of
the operations of divine grace,--then, in the same manner, when the
polluted altar was to be expiated or purified, the blood of the sacri-
fice would necessarily be regarded as its substitutionary representa-
tive, placed within the sphere of the operations of divine grace (i.e.,
upon the altar); which would be simply absurd.
70. The views entertained by Delitzsch of the sacrificial expia-
tion of the Old Testament may be gathered from the following
passages of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews (p. 740)
"That by which sin and uncleanness, or the person to whom it at-
tached, was to be covered, could not be merely a symbol of the man
himself; it must take his place not merely in a symbolical manner
(as a substitute), but actually (as a representative in a legal sense)."
And again at p. 742: "Satisfactio vicaria, or, as it may also be
called, poena vicaria, is by no means strange, therefore, to the law
(cf. Ex. xxxii. 30); though we are not to regard the slaying of the
animal as an actual infliction of punishment. The animal sacrifice
did not represent the proceedings upon Calvary, for this simple
reason, that the institution of sacrifice was an institution of mercy,
in which, instead of justice punishing, mercy forgave. As the
event on Calvary is presupposed by the sacrament of the New
Testament, though it is not repeated in that sacrament; so did that
event form the mysterious background from which the divine ap-
pointment of animal sacrifice proceeded, though without there being
any intention that the ritual should really depict it." Again at p.
426: "Placed in the light of the New Testament counterpart, the
surrender of the life of the sacrificial animal acquires a signification
above the sacrificial ritual of the law. For in the latter the She-
chitah was simply the means adopted for the double purpose, of
obtaining the blood as the atonement of the soul of the sacrificer,
and its flesh as fire-food for Jehovah. The offering up of the
sacrificial animal was an involuntary submission to constraint on its
part; and by the previous Semichah, or laying on of hands, an inten-
tional signification was merely impressed upon it from without.

But the death of Christ performed that, of which the sacrificial
animal had without knowledge and will to serve as the means, in
free, conscious self-determination; and unravelled the vyTitan; (I have
given it', Lev. xvii. 11), in which the faith of the Old Testament
"had to rest." p. 745: Rightly understood, the sacrifice of the
Old Testament, so far as it was expiatory, was intended to be sub-
stitutionary also. The penal suffering, it is true, was only exhibited
typically, since the expiation was effected simply by the blood apart
from the violent death; but the bleeding expiation, when under-
stood stood typically, as it was intended to be understood, and has been
prophetically unravelled by Isa. liii., also pointed forward to a
vicarious satisfaction to be rendered to the punitive justice of
God.
It will be apparent, without further proof, that Delitzsch's view
is the most like my own of all those that differ from it; in fact,
Delitzsch has undertaken to defend my view against Bahr, Keil, and
Hofmann, and shown wherein, according to his opinion, it is superior
to the theories of the above-named theologians (pp. 739, 740). He
then sums all up in these-words: " It is not to be denied, that the
so-called juridical view defended by Kurtz, is the simplest, the most
intelligible, and the most in harmony with the New Testament anti-
type." His objection to my view rests primarily upon certain dif-
ficulties connected with my explanation of the Shechitah, which he
regards as insuperable. But if my new line of argument, which is
modified in many respects and strengthened on the positive side,
and my reply to his difficulties ( 28, 30, 39, 40, 43, 44, 52, 54-
56, 66) are not altogether without force, I may possibly hope to see
him take his stand still more decidedly and completely upon my
side.
71. Oehler's view is to be found at p. 632 of his solid and fre-
quently cited work, which has rendered essential help to the study
of this subject. He there says: "The real covering, that which
atoned for the souls of the people, needed to be soul itself. A man
might put his thanksgivings and his prayers into the form of a gift;
but, as the gift of an unclean and sinful person, it would be itself
unclean, and could only be pleasing to God so far as it presupposed
the self-surrender of the person presenting it. For this reason, God
appointed something in connection with the ceremonial of worship
to represent this self-surrender. For the unclean and sinful soul of
the worshipper, He substituted the soul of a clean and guiltless ani-
mal. Offered in the blood of the sacrifice, the soul intervened be-
tween the person sacrificing and the holy God. God thus beheld a
pure life upon His altar, by which the impure life of the person
approaching Him was covered over; and in the same manner, this
pure element of life served to cover and remove the impurities that
were attached to the sanctuary. Hence the importance of the blood
in the sacrifice was altogether specific. It was not to be regarded
as the noblest gift consecrated to God; but it was that which ren-
dered the acceptance of all the gifts possible on the part of God,
since the self-surrender of the person sacrificing was accomplished
vicariously in it, and in it also the sinful soul of the person sacrific-
ing was introduced into the gracious fellowship of God. Because
the unfitness of a man to enter into the immediate fellowship of
God was asserted anew with every sacrifice; therefore it was neces-
sary that, with every sacrifice, the person offering it should be
covered by a pure life in the presence of God. The importance
attached to this particular feature depended upon the question,
whether the expiation simply formed the conditio sine qua non for
the offering of the gift, or whether the whole, of the sacrificial act
was designed as an expiation; and this also regulated the proceed-
ings in connection with the blood." But even this view, which does
away with a host of difficulties that beset all the rest, still leaves the
leading and fundamental question, how the soul of the sacrificial
animal, which was merely pure on its own account, could be regarded
as covering or atoning for the soul of the sinner, i.e., as wiping away
sin, without violating the idea of divine justice, an insoluble
enigma, in which neither the imposition of hands nor the slaying
of the animal can receive its due importance, according to the place
assigned it in the ritual of sacrifice. This point, however, has been
fully discussed in its proper place.
We conclude this chapter, therefore, with the firm and certain
persuasion, that the so-called juridical or satisfactory view of the
sacrificial expiation, of which the imposition of hands and slaying
of the animal formed the introduction, and which was represented
by the sprinkling of the blood, is not only, as Delitzsch says, and
even Oehler admits, the simplest, the most intelligible, and the one
most in harmony with the New Testament antitype," but the only
one which is clear and intelligible, and the only one which is in har-
mony with the New Testament antitype.
150 BURNING THE SACRIFICE. THE SACRIFICIAL MEAL.
CHAPTER V.
BURNING THE SACRIFICE. THE SACRIFICIAL MEAL.
72. After the sprinkling of the blood was finished, the ritual
of the bleeding sacrifice entered upon a new and different stage,
viz., into one in which it rested upon the same basis, and moved
within the same limits, as the bloodless sacrifices. For what now
followed, viz., the burning of the sacrifice and the eating of the sacri-
fice, were processes to which the latter were subjected in essentially
the same manner, and which constituted, in their case, the entire
ritual. All that has hitherto been described in connection with the
bleeding sacrifice (the imposition of hands, the slaying of the ani-
mal, and the sprinkling of the altar), was absent here; and neces-
arily so, because the very nature of the bloodless sacrifice furnished
no substratum or point of contact for these ceremonies. The bleed-
ing sacrifice was, in this second stage of its ritual, what the bloodless
sacrifice was altogether, an offering, a gift, food (nourishment) for
Jehovah ( hOAhyla hw.,xi MH,l,, cf. 23). Henceforth the whole ceremony
has relation to the flesh, which is the food of man as much as
bread and wine, and which, as food offered for Jehovah, could only
be a symbol of what it was the duty and desire of the covenant-
keeping, pious Israelite to offer as food to his God. It was different
with the blood, which was the kernel and goal of the first stage of
the sacrificial ritual. It is only in the most general manner that
the blood, which was brought to the altar, could be designated a gift
for Jehovah. For even though the sacrificer presented the animal,
and brought it to the altar himself, he did not give it its atoning
virtue and significance; nor did these exist already in the blood
itself, but they were communicated to it by Jehovah alone
have given it," Lev. xvii. 11, cf. 57). The flesh, on the other
hand, as well as the bread and wine, already possessed the charac-
ter of food, and therefore was naturally adapted to serve as a sym-
bolical representation of the food to be offered to Jehovah. Again,
neither literally nor generally could the atoning blood be designated
as food for Jehovah. As blood is not a means of physical nourish-
ment, and was not allowed to be used as food for man (Gen. ix. 4;
Lev. xvii. 11; cf. 5), it could not represent spiritual food, or food
for Jehovah; consequently, we find that even the blood brought
to the altar was there appropriated, not to Jehovah, but rather to
BURNING THE SACRIFICE. THE SACRIFICIAL MEAL. 151
the offerer himself ( 28). The appropriation of the sacrificial gift

to Jehovah was effected solely through burning it upon the altar as
hOAhyla hw.,xi; and as the blood could not be hOAhyla hw,.xi so also it could
not be hOAhyla MH,l, either.
73. According to one view, which was formerly very generally
adopted, the BURNING OF THE FLESH OF THE SACRIFICE (for
which the expression used in the law is constantly ryfiq;hi i.e., to
cause to ascend in smoke or vapour, and never JraWA was a symbol of
the everlasting punishment of hell (Isa. lxvi. 24; Mark ix. 44, 46,
48 ; Rev. xx. 10). J. D. Michaelis, for example, expresses himself
thus in his Entwurf der, typischen Gottes-gelahrtheit ( 20): "To
show that sin was not expiated by death, but that there was also a
punishment after death; it was ordered that either the whole or
part of the sacrifice should be burned with fire. The meaning and
intention of this command become still more obvious, when we
observe that the punishment of burning among the ancient
Hebrews was inflicted, not while the criminal was living, but after
his death; and that the punishment, which was inflicted after death
for the purpose of increasing the ignominy, showed, according to
the explanation given by Moses himself in Deut. xxi. 22, 23, that
the sinner had not suffered enough for his sin by being put to
death, but still remained accursed of God. Consider, moreover,
how generally the idea of the punishment of hell was represented
in the ancient countries of the East under the image of fire; and
there will surely be no room to doubt, that the burning of the
sacrifices was intended to symbolize the punishments of hell." Von
Meyer expresses a similar opinion. In the Blatter fur hoh. Wahrheit
x. 51 53, he says, with reference to the uninterrupted burning of
the fire upon the altar: "The slaughtering of the animal was the
death of the body, and the burning the punishment after death.
So long as the altar stood and burned for the consumption of the
sacrifices, the wrath of God on account of sin was not yet extin-
guished." De Maistre also says, in his Soirees de St Petersbourg ii.
234: "The victim was always burned in whole or part, to show that
the natural punishment of crime was by fire, and that the substi-
tuted flesh was burned in the place of the flesh that was really
guilty." But this view is decidedly and totally wrong. It misap-
prehends the significance of the flesh, in regarding it as guilty or
sinful, and the purport of the fire as well. It cannot be denied,
indeed, that fire is met with in the Scriptures as a figurative repre-
sentation of devouring wrath, and of the torturing punishment of
hell. A glance at the concordances will show how frequently this

is the case in both the Old and New Testaments. For all that, the
view in question is a false one; because, through confining itself to
the surface, it overlooks the deeper ground of this usage of speech,
and its original unity with the still more common one, in which fire
is a figurative representation of refining and sanctification. Fire is
essentially the source of light and heat. But light and heat are the
immediate and most important conditions of life. Without light
and heat, all life becomes interrupted, becomes numbed and dies;
but when nourished by light and heat, all life grows more cheerful,
vigorous, and strong. The first thing noticed, therefore, in con-
nection with fire, is its life-quickening, life-exciting, in a word, its
animating power. The second is its power to refine. This is the
second, because it is dependent upon the existence of a second
thing, viz., of something ignoble, perishable, corrupt or corrupting,
which is eliminated by the fire that refines the object. This second
signification of fire, therefore, intervenes, when the perishable has
infected and pervaded the imperishable. But it is identical with
the first, since the eliminating and refining are eo ipso the restoring
of the vital energy that has been interrupted. The third meaning
of this element is that of consuming, torturing, damning; it is in-
troduced in cases where the perishable has swallowed up the im-
perishable, and transubstantiated it into its own nature. A suffi-
cient explanation of the connection between the second and third
is to be found in 1 Cor. iii. 11 sqq., where the wood, hay, and a
stubble are said to be burned by it, whilst it refines and tests the
gold, silver, and precious stones. Fire is the noblest, finest, keenest,
and purest of the elements--I might, indeed, say the most godlike
for as nothing (morally) unclean can approach God, without re-
ceiving pain and condemnation in its accursed uncleanness, where-
as as the pure are happy in His presence, so nothing (physically) un-
clean can come into contact with fire without being consumed,
whilst that which is pure receives thereby an elevation of its vital
power. For this reason, fire is also employed in the Scriptures as
the symbol and vehicle of the Holy Spirit; and this serves to ex-
plain the fact, that in all merely natural religions fire was regarded.
as the symbol, and even as the incarnation of Deity itself.--This
view also misapprehends the meaning of death. It tears asunder
the death of the body and eternal death as entirely heterogeneous;
whereas here they ought to be regarded simply in their point of
unity. In the death of the animal the death of the sinner was
symbolized in all its relations. The view in question, considered in

its typical bearing, would lead to Aepin's doctrine of an intensive
endurance of the punishment of hell on the part of Christ on His
descent thither, a notion which is neither doctrinally nor exegeti-
cally tenable. According to this view, again, the atonement made
was necessarily insufficient and nugatory, and for that reason was
abolished; whereas in Lev. xvii. 11, etc., it is accepted and de-
clared clared to be perfectly valid. Moreover, how could such a burning
be regarded as a sacrifice of a sweet-smelling savour to Jehovah"
( 20)? Equally irreconcilable with this view is the constancy
with which the function in question is designated by the verb ryFiq;hi.
"If," as Oehler has well expressed it--"if the fire on the altar was
a penal fire, and the burning sacrifice was as it were a burning in
hell; how could the smoke of the sacrifice be described as a smell
that was pleasing to God?" Lastly, another thing which speaks
most decidedly and undeniably against this interpretation, was the
circumstance that the meat-offering, with its accompaniments (oil,
incense, and salt), was burnt in the same manner, and along with
the meat of the sacrifice. Now, the idea of punishment is abso-
lutely untenable and absurd in connection with the burning of the
meat-offering, and still more with that of the accompaniments.
The meat-offering signified good works, the incense the prayers of
the believer, and the oil the Spirit of God. Both Michaelis and
v. Meyer admit this ( 141 sqq.). Were these, then, also liable to
the punishment of hell-fire?
74. All the commentators since Bahr are agreed in the opinion
that the burning of the sacrificial gift as a ryFiq;hi,--i.e., as causing it
to pass away in smoke and vapour, or as sending it up to heaven,
where God dwells,--was intended to express the appropriation of
the gift to Jehovah. At the same time, there are many unessential
diversities along with this general agreement. According to Bahr
(ii. 347), the primary intention of the burning was that the gift
might be consumed by fire, and so be entirely annihilated, as far as
the sacrificer to whom it belonged was concerned. This intention,
however, was merely a subordinate and negative one (there were
other ways in which it might have been annihilated); the gift
having been annihilated to the giver, was eo ipso to ascend to Him
who dwells on high. And the burning indicated for whom the gift
was intended, and whither it was directed; this was, in fact, the
real and positive design of the act of burning. What was already
indicated to a certain extent by the altar upon which the gift was
offered viz, its elevation towards Him who dwelt on high, was
first really completed leted by the fire through which it ascended."
Oehler expresses a similar opinion. At p. 632 he says: The
burning denoted, on the one hand, the completion of the offering
on the part of the sacrifices, the gift being annihilated so far as he
was concerned. The main point, however, was not this but the
acceptance of it by God, which was also completed in the burning."
But there is no warrant whatever for introducing a double refer-
ence, viz., the destruction of it to the person sacrificing, as well as the
appropriation of it to Jehovah. Wherever the former is indicated in
the sacrificial worship--as, for example, in connection with the flesh
of the peace-offering which was left over ( 139),--the burning
is not a ryFiq;hi, but a JOrWA, and it takes place not on the altar, but in
a clean spot outside the sanctuary. Who ever thinks of a presenta-
tion, as being the annihilation of the gift itself to the person pre-
senting it? It is simply an annihilation of his right of possession;
and that annihilation requires no peculiar form of expression, but is
effected eo ipso by the presentation itself.
We regard the appropriation of the gift to Jehovah, therefore,
as the real and only design of the burning. Through the burning
the gift was resolved into vapour and odour: its earthly elements
still remained, but its real essence ascended in the most refined and
transfigured corporeality towards heaven, where Jehovah was en-
throned--a sweet odour of delight to Him, an hOAhyla HaOHyni Hayre hw.exi.
Kliefoth is wrong (p. 62) in a rejecting every interpretation
which supposes any kind of refining, purifying, or sanctifying
process to have taken place in connection with the burning of the
sacrifice." "It was pure in itself," he says, "and needed no re-
finement; and it was obliged to be clean, not merely as a means of
expiation, but as an object well-pleasing to God; in which, and
through the substitution of which, the person sacrificing also be-
came well-pleasing. On the contrary, the burning by the fire of
the altar signified nothing more than that, pure and good as it was,
it was divested of its materiality by the fire of God, transmuted
from an earthly into a heavenly nature, transfigured, and so united
to God." But was not this "divesting of materiality," this "trans-
mutation of the earthly into a heavenly nature," this "transfigura-
tion in order that it might be united to God," in itself "a refining,
purifying, and sanctifying" process? Undoubtedly the sacrificial
animal was pure and spotless in itself, for that was the conditio sine
qua non of its fitness for sacrifice ( 34),--and nothing had occurred
since ( 44), by which its natural cleanness and spotlessness could

have been altered. But it was not absolutely pure, in comparison,
that is, with the holiness of God, to whom it was to be offered as a
gift; but only relatively so, in comparison with the unclean, sinful
man, whose sanctified self-surrender the surrender of the animal
was intended to represent ( 19). Although in this relation it was
pure and faultless, without sin or blemish, yet with the stamp of the
earthly it bore the faults and imperfections of everything earthly.
Even of the holy angels of God it is said in Job xv. 15, "Behold,
He putteth no trust in His holy ones; yea, the heavens are not
clean in His sight" (cf. iv. 18, xxv. 5). If, then, even the heavenly
creation is not to be regarded as clean in comparison with God,
how much less the earthly creation, laden as it is with a curse!
(Gen. iii. 17, v. 29.) And if anything earthly is to be offered to
God, even though it be relatively the most holy and pure, it re-
quires first of all to be purified, refined, and sanctified. The dross
must be removed, and the true metal exhibited in its genuine re-
finement. And that was done by the purification and refinement
effected by the fire.
But that fire, by which the sacrificial gift was appropriated to
God in a refined and transfigured form, was not ordinary fire. It
was holy fire: the very same which came out from God in connec-
tion with Aaron's first sacrificial service (Lev. ix. 24, cf. 2 Chron.
vii. 1), and consumed the sacrifice, and which was henceforth never
to be allowed to go out, that its character as fire of divine origin
might be sustained. The refining and sanctifying power of which
this fire was the symbol, was a power proceeding not from man but
from God--the power of the Holy Ghost, which dwelt in the con-
gregation, the fire-spirit of the law, which was proclaimed in fire
on Sinai, and burned into the hearts with fiery glow, whose funda-
mental idea is the commandment, "Be ye holy, for I am holy"
(Lev. xix. 2).
75. It is of course self-evident, that the flesh of the animal,
being given up to the holy fire of the altar, was not regarded as
simple flesh, as what it was in itself, but rather in the relation in
which it stood to the person sacrificing. But the question arises
first of all, what kind of relation this was; whether it was that of
actual substitution, in which another, as another, takes my place-
does instead of me what I ought to have done, suffers instead of me
what I ought to have suffered, so that, inasmuch as it has been done
and suffered by this other, I am released from the responsibility to
do or to suffer it myself; or merely that of an ideal representation,

in which what the other does or submits to as my representative in
my stead, does not release me, but, on the contrary, binds me to do
it, or to submit to it myself as well. In the one case the repre-
sentative is my real alter ego, in the other, my ideal ipse ego.
We have already shown, in the previous chapter, that in the first
stage of the ritual of animal sacrifice, the representation could only
be understood in the sense of an alter ego, and that Bahr and
Keil's favourite interchange of this idea, for that of a symbolical
ipse ego, is the fundamental error and the prw?ton yeu?doj of their so
thoroughly mistaken theory of expiation. We must now proceed
to inquire, whether consistency and unity of thought, so far as the
whole of the ritual of sacrifice is concerned, require that in this
second stage we should still firmly adhere to the idea of an alter
ego, which is required in the first stage quite as much by the nature
of the case as by the express statement of the law of sacrifice (Lev.
xvii. 11).
If it were absolutely necessary to reply to this question in the
affirmative, the burning of the flesh of the sacrifice could only
be understood as signifying that the person sacrificing, after re-
ceiving expiation and forgiveness of sins through the completion
of the sprinkling of blood, was conscious indeed of the obligation
henceforth to cause all his members and powers, and all the activity
of his life, of which they were the instruments, to pass through the
refining fire of sanctification, and to present them, thus refined and
sanctified, and consecrate them to God; but that, as he had not
confidence in his own ability to perform this duty fully, he pre-
sented the sacrificial animal in the fire of the altar as a symbolical
compensation for any defects.
But this view would throw the door wide open to the most
momentous consequences, viz., to the danger of moral indifference;
and would answer but little, or rather be altogether opposed, to the
spirit of moral stringency and thoroughness which pervades the
whole of the Old Testament. The exposure to damnation which
follows sin, could be and was to be remitted to the penitent sinner
desiring salvation, on the ground of the eternal, saving, counsel of
God ( 57), and in association with the symbolico-typical satisfactio
vicaria of the sacrificial animal. But the obligation to a life and
conversation thoroughly refined by the fire of the law, and to a
self-sanctifying surrender and dedication of all his members and
powers to Jehovah (cf. Rom. vi. 13), neither was nor could be
intended to be remitted to the sinner, even after expiation had been

secured. As justification necessarily presupposes repentance and
faith, so is it on the other hand the basis and introduction to a
sanctification and renovation of the whole future life, without
which it is null and void. And whilst in itself this view is mis-
taken and contradictory, it has not the slightest link of connection
or point of contact in the law of sacrifice. The warrant, to regard
the death of the sacrificial animal as really and objectively vicarious,
is found in Lev. xvii. 11, where God promises to give real atoning
efficacy to the sacrificial blood which has passed through death; but
there is no promise to be met with anywhere to the effect that the
burning of the sacrifice should possess, really and objectively, a similar
representative character through direct communication from God.
76. The body of the sacrificial animal, which was given up to
the fire of the altar, cannot be regarded, therefore, as a substitu-
tionary, objective alter ego of the person sacrificing, but only as his
representative, subjective ipse ego. This is obvious from its charac-
ter as a presentation, a gift, food, for Jehovah. Were the former
the case, just as in the first stage of the ritual the sacrificial blood
was the medium of expiation as the vehicle of the animal soul, the
sacrificial flesh would also be the object of presentation as what it
is in itself, viz., as the vehicle of corporeal, nutritive power. But
the Old Testament revelation of God makes the firmest declaration
to the contrary: Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood
of goats?" It is not about the gift for its own sake that Jehovah
is concerned: "If I were hungry, I would not tell thee; for the
world is Mine, and the fulness thereof " (Ps. 1. 12); but about the
giver, who puts his love and attachment, his readiness to sacrifice
his own entire being, into the gift, and in the gift surrenders him-
self. The character of the sacrificial flesh as a NBAr;qA, a hOAhyla MH,l, is
as decidedly at variance with the idea of a real and objective repre-
sentation, as it demands and determines the character of one that
is ideal and subjective.
But if the one half of the sacrificial animal, viz., the blood, be
thus regarded as a substitutionary alter ego, and the other, viz., the
flesh, as a representative ipse ego, does not this introduce an inad-
missible duplicity into the sacrificial ritual, which completely destroys
the unity of idea? It appears so unquestionably. But we must
bear in mind that this duplicity is already there--that it is deter-
mined, established, and regulated by the duplex and antithetical
character of the two different stages in the sacrificial ritual, viz., by
the fact, that the blood is introduced, not as a gift and food for
Jehovah, but as a real, objective means of expiation for the sinner,
whereas the flesh to be burned is introduced, not as means, but as
end-not as a gift of God for the sanctification of man, but as a gift
presented to God by the self-sanctifying man, as a symbol of his
sanctified self-surrender, an expression of his obligation to make such
a surrender of himself.
Let any one present to his own mind the relation, in which
the two stages of the sacrificial ceremony stood to one another.
The essence of the NBAr;qA, the sacrifice, as its very name denotes
( byriq;hi= offerre), was the presentation, or gift; and the burning
served to effect this. The act of expiation, the manipulation of the
blood, therefore, is not expressed in any way in the name of the
sacrifice; and this of itself is a proof that it was something distinct,
independent, and superadded. In the idea, and possibly also in the
history of the institution of sacrifice, the presentation or gift was the
first and primary thing, even though the manipulation of the blood
preceded the burning of the flesh in the ritual itself. Whether it
was in connection with the very first act of sacrifice that was ever
performed, or as the result of a later development of the institution of
sacrifice, that the truth was discovered, that a gift or presentation
could only be acceptable to God when preceded by the expiation and
forgiveness of sin; it was certainly in consequence of, or in connec-
tion with this discovery, that the manipulation of the blood was added,
and made the necessary preliminary of the presentation and gift,
whilst in it the latter received its real and indispensable foundation.
That this was the course of development of the idea of sacrifice,
--in idea at all events, and probably historically also,--is evident, as
we have already stated, from the name itself. It is still further
evident from the fact, that at all times there were offered in con-
nection with the bleeding sacrifices bloodless offerings also, which
bore the name, and possessed the character and force of sacrifice
quite as much as the former, although their very nature precluded
the possibility of their being employed to set forth an act of expia-
tion. And, lastly, it is evident from the historical account contained
in the book of Genesis: Cain presented merely bloodless offerings,
viz., the fruits of the ground; Abel offered bleeding sacrifices, the
firstlings of his flock and the fat thereof. But the application of the
term Minchah, which was afterwards employed according to invari-
able usage to denote a bloodless gift exclusively, to Abel's offering as
well as Cain's, is a proof to us that the two are looked at from the
BURNING THE SACRIFICE. THE SACRIFICIAL MEAL 159
same point of view; and therefore that the manipulation of the

blood, which was usual in connection with the bleeding sacrifices at
a later period, had not yet been introduced, or at all events that it
cannot have possessed the same importance als in the sacrificial
worship of later times.
Now, if the two stages of the ritual of sacrifice were thus both
apparently and ideally distinct, different, and antithetical, in their
relation to one another, so that each of them possessed its own inde-
pendent and distinctive character, starting point, and goal; there is
the less reason for surprise that in each of the two stages the funda-
mental idea should have shaped itself differently according to the
diversity in the characteristics of the two.
77. We already know from 23 and 72 that the sacrificial gift,
which, after being refined by the fire of God, was appropriated to
Him, was intended as food or nourishment for Jehovah, as the MH,l,
hOAhyla; and in 23 we have also shown in what sense it was meant
that Jehovah needed such food for His existence. The sacrificial
gift, namely, was the symbol of the self-dedication of the people in
fidelity to the covenant, which was as it were the "daily bread" of
Jehovah, because (according to the bold but apt words of Hengsten-
berg) "the prayer of man, Give us this day our daily bread, had
by its side the demand of God, Give Me this day My daily bread.
But as the food which God has given to man for his daily supply
is twofold, animal and vegetable (Gen. ix. 3), the food which the
Israelite offered to his God in the sacrificial gift was twofold also
flesh, in the bleeding sacrifice; bread, wine, and oil, in the bloodless
offering. This difference and antithesis, when transferred to the
sphere of spiritual nourishment, must have its double signification
even there. We have already briefly proved, too ( 24), that the
animal sacrifice represented the person of the man and his life's
work; the vegetable, on the other hand, the fruit and produce of that
work. Here also, with regard to the former, we may remind the
reader of what has already been stated in 3, 4, with reference to
the choice of clean animals as representing the chosen (holy) nation.
It was an essential defect in my former work, that I did not give
sufficient prominence to the notion of nourishment, of the "bread of
Jehovah." The consequence of this defect was a wrong interpre-
tation of the flesh of the sacrifice, that was given up to the fire of the
altar, which I here retract with all the greater earnestness because
it has been adopted by other commentators. My former opinion
was in substance the following: Blood and flesh are the two essen-
tial components of the animal. The blood is the seat of the soul,
and this is the impelling force of all vital activity. The flesh, on
the other hand (including bones, nerves, sinews, etc.), is the instru-
mentof the soul, through which it receives all its impressions from
without, and directs all its energy from within outwards,--the in-
strument, therefore, of all the soul's activity. Hence the burning
of the flesh of the sacrifice denoted a surrender and consecration of
all the members and powers of the body to Jehovah, by means of
the sacred fire which Jehovah Himself had given for that purpose,
and through which they were refined and purified from all the dross
of earthly imperfection, and in this transfigured form appropriated
to Jehovah. As the sprinkling of the blood was a figure of justifi-
cation, so the burning of the flesh was a figure of sanctification. It
expressed the obligation of the person sacrificing, who had now ob-
tained forgiveness of sins by means of the expiation, henceforth to
consecrate to Jehovah all the energy of his life, all the members and
powers of his body; or, as the Apostle puts it in Rom. vi. 13, no
longer to yield his members as instruments of unrighteousness unto
sin, but to yield himself unto God, as one alive from the dead, and
his members as instruments of righteousness unto God.
The allusion to justification in the sprinkling of the blood, and
to sanctification in the burning of the flesh, I still hold most firmly.
I cannot regard the latter any longer, however, as based upon the
signification of the flesh as the complex of all the organs of the soul's
activity, but trace it solely to the import of the sacred fire as a symbol
of the refining, purifying, and sanctifying powers of God, which He
had given to His people in the law. For there is no trace anywhere
of the flesh that was burned being regarded as the sum-total of the
organs of the soul. The utility of the flesh as food for man is the
only point referred to; and from this alone therefore, can we deter-
mine the symbolical meaning of the flesh of the sacrifice that was
burned. In relation to food, the flesh itself is the principal thing;
in relation to activity, the bones and sinews. Now, undoubtedly
these were consumed as well as the flesh in the case of the whole- (or
burnt-) offerings; but in the other descriptions of sacrifice, the fat
portions alone were placed in the altar-fire. The fat portions were
evidently regarded in this case as the best and noblest part of the
whole, the flos carnis. And they were so also from that point of
view from which the flesh was regarded as food; but they never
could pass for the highest and strongest instruments of the soul's
activity, even where the body was regarded as the organ of that
activity. On the contrary, in this connection fat is the figure em-

ployed to represent inactivity, idleness, obstinacy (Isa. vi. 10). Now,
if the flesh when burnt had been regarded as the organ of the soul's
activity, in the case of the sin-offerings and the trespass- and peace-
offerings, where it was of supreme importance that only the best of
the flesh should be burned, the folds of fat would certainly never
have been selected, but rather the organs of motion and action, of
seeing, hearing, etc.
In relation to the burning of the flesh of the sacrifice, therefore,
we simply adhere to the idea that it was food for Jehovah, but
without giving up on that account, what is perfectly reconcilable
with it, the allusion in the case of the flesh to a representation of
the person of the sacrificer, and in the bloodless offerings to the
fruits and results of his life's activity ( 24). The real sanctified I,
and the fruits of a sanctified activity, these are the food which
Jehovah desires, the nourishment which He needs in His capacity
as covenant-God, as the God of salvation, and which are in His
esteem a sweet savour of satisfaction and delight.
78. To my former view Hofmann has replied (p. 241), If
the blood of the sacrificial animal was not a symbol of the soul of
the sacrificer, the flesh could not represent his body, nor could the
burning of the former signify sanctification. Sanctification and
justification do not stand in the same relation to one another as
body and soul; nor can we see why the sanctification of the body
should be symbolized, and not that of the soul." I still agree, as I
formerly did, with Hofmann, in opposition to Bahr and Keil ( 67,
69), that the blood of the sacrificial animal could not be a symbol
of the soul of the person sacrificing; and I also, agree with him,
that the flesh of the former did not represent the body of the latter,
as the sum-total of the organs of his soul; but I still adhere to the
opinion that the "burning of the flesh signified sanctification."
For this meaning is unquestionably contained in the symbolical
worth of fire, which prevails throughout the Scriptures. No doubt
flesh and blood, or body and soul, form the two essential halves of
the sacrificial animal, as justification and sanctification are the two
essential sides of redemption, of which the former was shown in
the manipulation of the blood, the latter in the burning of the
flesh. But the fact that the former was intended to exhibit justi-
fication really, and the latter to exhibit sanctification symbolically,
precludes Hofmann's deduction, to the effect, that it necessarily
follows that sanctification and justification must stand in the same
relation as body and soul, and that sanctification must relate to the
body, and justification to the soul.
But there is no force in Kliefoth's objection, that even in the
burning the flesh was regarded as still animated (p. 63). For
this reason," he says, "the flesh of the sacrifice was always to be
eaten on the same day; the eating was not to be separated so far
from the act of slaughtering, etc., that the flesh could no longer be
regarded as a living (2) part of the victima, of the personality sacri-
ficed." The correct answer has been given already, viz., that in
the burning of the flesh of the sacrifice the contrast between flesh
and blood, or body and soul, was no longer the point considered.
The flesh of the sacrifice was merely a gift, and in fact a gift which
served as nourishment. But into this gift, which from its very
nature ( 3, 24) was better adapted to represent himself than any
other gift could possibly be, the giver conveyed his love and grati-
tude his attachment his readiness to deny himself, his desire for a
renewal of life,--in a word, himself, and his whole personality; and
bound himself to refine and purify himself by the fire-spirit of the
law, just as the gift was refined by the altar-fire, and, thus refined,
to consecrate and surrender himself, with all his thought, will, and
feeling, to Jehovah, just as the sacrificial gift, ascending to heaven
in the fire, was symbolically appropriated to Jehovah. This was
the true and real "sweet savour to Jehovah," the designation so
frequently applied in the law to the burning of the sacrifice.
79. In conclusion, we have still to examine the SACRIFICIAL
MEAL which terminated the entire series of sacrificial acts. It is
true, there was only one kind of sacrifice with which it was associ-
ated, viz., the peace-offering; but for all that, it formed an equally
independent feature, and one that was quite as essential to the
complete exhibition of the idea of sacrifice, as the sprinkling of the
blood and burning of the flesh by which it was preceded. It is
necessary, therefore, that we should examine it here.
After the portions of fat that were appointed for the altar had
been burned, and the pieces that fell to the lot of the priests had
been taken away, viz., the so-called wave-breast and heave-leg
(Eng. Ver., shoulder), the rest, of the flesh was eaten, in the case
of a peace-offering, by the person presenting it, and by the mem-
bers of his household (together with the poorer Levites), in a
joyous meal "before the Lord," that is to say, at the tabernacle
(Lev. vii. 15 sqq., 31 sqq.; Deut. xii. 7, 17 sqq.).
About the meaning of the meal itself there can be no question.

To an oriental mind," says Bahr, ii. 373, two ideas were insepar-
ably associated in the notion of a meal: on the one hand, that of
fellowship and friendship existing among the participators them-
selves, and also between them and the provider of the meal; and
on the other hand, that of joy and gladness, so that even the
highest and purest joy, viz., blessedness in the kingdom of heaven,
is described under the figure of a meal (Ps. xxiii. 5, xvi. 11, xxxvi.
8; Matt. viii. 11, xxii. 1; Luke xiv. 15). And as what was pro-
vided for the meal in this case belonged, strictly speaking, to
Jehovah, to whom it had been entirely given up through the act of
presentation, all who took part in the meal ate with Him at His
table. It was He who gave the meal; and this was a pledge of
friendship and peace with Him."
This view was also adopted by me in my Mos. Opfer; and I
attributed the following meaning, in consequence, to the sacrificial
meal: The atonement was complete; the sin which had separated
the sacrificer from Jehovah was covered, cancelled; the sacrificer
had sanctified, consecrated, and surrendered himself and the fruit
of his activity to Jehovah; and Jehovah now turned to him, wel-
comed him to His house and table, prepared for him a meal, and
gave him meat and drink at His table. The sacrificial meal, there-
fore, was an expression and pledge, as well as an actual, symbolical
attestation and enjoyment, of the blessedness offered to the covenant
nation in fellowship with Jehovah. It exhibited the highest sacra-
mental point of the whole process of sacrifice; or, to express the
progressive stages of the sacrificial idea in doctrinal phraseology,
just as the burning of the sacrifice answered to sanctification, and
the sprinkling of the blood to justification, so the meal corresponded
to the unio mystica.
It is quite in harmony with this explanation of the sacrificial
meal, that, according to Deut.. xii. 7, 18, the family of the person
sacrificing took part in it, including even the servants, and also the
Levites, who were supposed to be in need.1 The meal, it is true,
was prepared at the instigation and for the sake of the person sacri-
1
In Dent. xvi. 11, 14, widows and orphans are also mentioned, as well as
the strangers dwelling in the land, as taking part in the festal rejoicings of the
harvest-feasts (Pentecost and the feast of Tabernacles). But I question whether
it is meant by this, that they took part in the sacrificial meals, as Hengstenberg
(p. 41) and Oehler (p. 642) suppose, since the sacrificial meal is not expressly
named.
ficing but not for him alone, since this would have robbed it of
the essential characteristic of a social meal. The whole of the
covenant-nation, in its normal relation to its covenant-God, had
really a claim to share in the enjoyment of the happiness of which
this divine meal was the symbol; so that, strictly speaking, if it
had been practicable, the whole of the covenant-nation might and
should have been invited; but as this was impossible, a small
number of its members, chosen from the immediate circle of the
person sacrificing, were invited to represent it, after the analogy of
the paschal meal, at which every company formed a congregation
by itself, or rather represented the whole congregation. The addi-
tion of the members of the family and of the servants also was all
the more appropriate, since they participated in the reason for pre-
senting the peace-offering, the flesh of which was eaten in the sacri-
ficial meal (viz., in the divine blessings either prayed for or already
received).
80. But strong opposition has lately arisen from many sides
to the view expressed above, that at the meal Jehovah was to be re-
garded as the host and provider of the meal. The principal objec-
tors are Hengstenberg (p. 40), Neumann (Sacra V. T. Salutaria, p.
37 nota), v. Hofmann (ii. 1, p. 229), Keil (i. 251, 253-4), Tholuck
(p. 88), Ebrard (p. 42), and Oehler (p. 642). On the other hand,
Kliefoth (p. 65) and A. Kohler (Herzog's Cyclopaedia) have adhered
to the original view even in the face of this opposition.
Hofmann observes: "It was not the person offering who ate
at the table of God; but, on the contrary, it was he who invited
Jehovah to his table His ability to keep a feast in worship of
God, and to invite God to it as a guest, he owed to the divine ar-
rangement," etc. So Oehler again: God condescended to become
a guest at the table of the sacrificer, and received as the piece of
honour the breast of the animal, which He then handed over to His
servant the priest. In this sense, the meal was a pledge of the
friendly and blessed fellowship which He was willing to maintain
with His owls people among whom He dwelt." Keil goes much
deeper, and says, The sacrificial meal cannot be looked at in this
light, as though God provided the meal, welcoming all who took part
in it to His table and home, and giving them to eat and drink of
His own property; but it is simply to be regarded as a meal in wor-
ship of God, in which God entered into association with His people,
or with a certain portion, one particular family--not only receiving
a part of the food destined for the meal, and giving it to His repre-
sentatives, the servants of the sanctuary, to eat, but allowing the

persons who presented it to eat the rest, along with their families,
before Him, i.e., in His immediate presence. Thus the sacrificial
meal became a covenant meal, a meal of love and joy, which
shadowed forth not only a fellowship of house and table with the
Lord, but also the blessedness of the kingdom of heaven. For by
the fact that a portion was handed over to the Lord, the earthly food
was sanctified into a symbol of the true, spiritual food, with which
the Lord satisfies and invigorates the citizens of His kingdom."
I fully agree with Keil in his general view of the sacrificial meal,
and of the symbolical importance of the flesh that was eaten in con-
nection with it. But for that very reason, I feel irresistibly com-
pelled to regard God as the host; and just because Keil has not done
this, he has involved himself in a striking self-contradiction, which
is apparent in the concluding words of his explanation, where the
food eaten at the meal is said to be a symbol of the true spiritual
food with which the Lord satisfies and invigorates the citizens of
His kingdom;" and still more decidedly upon p. 385, where the flesh
of the paschal meal, which he himself also regards as a sacrificial
meal, is called a means of grace, through which the Lord received
His spared and redeemed people into the fellowship of His house, and
gave them bread of life for the invigoration of their souls." And
at p. 386 he states in express words: Through the oneness of the
lamb to be eaten, the eaters were united into an undivided oneness
and fellowship with the Lord, who had prepared the meal for them."
But is it not perfectly obvious, that I am received into the house
and table fellowship" of another, not by inviting him, but by his
inviting me? And how could the sacrificial meal be a meal of
blessedness, or a shadow forth the blessedness of the kingdom of
heaven," if the meal was prepared, and the food given, not by God,
but by the person sacrificing? Was the latter the possessor and
dispenser of the true spiritual food? Was he not rather its
needy recipient? Or did a man bestow the blessedness of the
kingdom of heaven upon God"? Was it not God who bestowed it
upon man? The other commentators who have taken the same
view, have succeeded in steering clear of such self-contradictions;
but they have robbed the sacrificial meal, in consequence, of that
deeper and richer meaning, of which the Apostle makes use for the
purpose of establishing its relation to the Lord's Supper (1 Cor.
x. 16-21), and which is so closely connected with the parables of
Christ in Matt. xxii. 1 sqq. and Luke xiv. 15 sqq.
81. The first thing objected to by the opponents of our view,

is the foundation upon which it rests; namely, that through the act
of presentation the whole of the sacrificial animal was appropriated
to Jehovah, and therefore was henceforth to be regarded as His
property, and not as that of the person presenting it. "The
offering, says Hengstenberg, "was as such not a whole offering,
and the parts eaten were those that were not consecrated to the
Lord." Keil, again, says, "What was entirely appropriated to the
Lord, and was to belong entirely to Him, had of necessity to be
entirely given up to Him." And Hofmann observes: "The sacri-
ficer did not eat what God left for him; but before he ate, he gave
the best of his meal to God. The sacrificial animal did not become
the property of God through the presentation, in any such sense
as that it now, strictly speaking, belonged entirely to the altar; but
being intended as a thank-offering, it followed as a matter of course,
that it belonged to the altar only so far as this destination involved.
. . . . It was really the case, that the priest ate of the altar, or of the
table of God since the law assigned to him the breast and shoulder,
which the person sacrificing was not allowed to eat, and which for
that very reason were heaved and waved, i.e., given up to God.
But what was not so excepted, was intended from the very outset
to be consumed with religious rejoicing, and was not merely given
back by God for that purpose." I have no doubt whatever, that this
view may be taken of the affair, but I cannot see that it must be. To
Hengstenberg I reply, that the sin- and trespass-offerings were also
as such not whole offerings; and yet the whole of the sacrificial
animal was undoubtedly presented to the Lord, and appropriated to
Him through the presentation. And to Keil: that by the simple act
of presentation to the sanctuary, the sacrificial animal was both alto-
gether designed for and altogether surrendered to the Lord; and
that the fact of the priest's receiving the animal, indicated the trans-
fer of it from the possession of the sacrificer to that of Jehovah.
And to Hofmann: that as the animal was presented as a thank-
offering, even on the assumption that it thereby became the pro-
perty of God, it follows as a matter of course, that only so much of
it came to the altar as this destination involved, and that the rest
was applied to the purpose to which it was devoted by virtue of its
destination as a thank-offering. But if it be once admitted, that the
priest ate from the altar, or from the table of God, what fell to him
as his share of the thank-offering; I cannot see why the same thing
might not be said with regard to the eating on the part of the per-
son sacrificing, since the priest's portion was to be removed by the

heaving and waving, as Hofmann himself affirms, not from being
consumed by the fire of the altar, but from being consumed by the
person sacrificing.
And when Hofmann still further observes (p. 230), "If this
were not the case, the presentation of the firstlings could not be
classed along with the thank-offerings ; for in the former, God was
evidently invited as a guest, and the distinction between the two
presentations consisted simply in the fact, that on the one occasion
it was a religious meal, and on the other a social eating and drink-
ing, from which God received His share;"--I cannot see any
necessity which compels us to class together two things so hetero-
geneous in their nature and intention. Still less can I understand
how Hofmann could maintain that, in the presentation of the first-
lings, "God was evidently invited as a guest;" since the firstlings,
at least so far as they were not presented as a kind of peace-
offering, themselves--e.g., the firstlings of the ox, the sheep, and the
goat ( 229, 230)--were not generally intended as a meal which
the person offering them had to provide, but were delivered as
feudal payments to the feudal Lord of the land, who remunerated
His servants the priests with the proceeds. And lastly, with regard
to the stress laid by Keil and Oehler upon the custom of heaving and
waving the breast and shoulder, the meaning of which custom they
suppose to rest upon the assumption, that the host at the sacrificial
meal was not God, but the person sacrificing, I hope to be able to
prove in due time ( 138), that the separation of the wave-breast and
heave-shoulder was perfectly reconcilable with the opposite view.
With greater plausibility, perhaps, might those passages of
Deuteronomy be adduced, in which the sacrificer is instructed to
invite not only his family and his servants, but the (needy) Levites
also, to participate in the sacrificial meal; inasmuch as it appears
to have been left to his own free choice, whom he would invite,
which certainly favours the view that he himself acted the part of
host. But even this argument cannot be regarded as conclusive.
If the plan devised by God reached so far as to accept the best and
noblest part of the sacrificial gift presented as a "sweet savour," a
sign that they were welcomed as well-pleasing, and after having
thus sanctified the rest, to give it back to the sacrificer for the pre-
paration of a joyful meal, it is impossible to see why it may not also
have reached so far, as to leave the offerer to make the selection of
the guests to be invited.
82. We have seen that the arguments adduced in support of

the opposite view of the sacrificial meal, are all of them ambiguous
and none conclusive. On the other hand, the proofs which we can
furnish of the view we advocate, appear to leave no doubt as to its
correctness. They are the following: (1.) Wherever in the law
the peace-offerings are referred to, the term, offerings for Jehovah,
or before Jehovah, is constantly applied to them as a whole, and
not merely to that particular portion which was to be burned upon
the altar, or assigned to the priest through the ceremony of waving
(cf. Lev. ii. 1, 8, 11, 12, 14, iii. 1, 6, 7, 12, vii. 11, 14, 29, etc.).
But what was offered to Jehovah and accepted by Him, became
undoubtedly the property of Jehovah in consequence. (2.) It is
evident from Lev. xxi. 22, when every part of the sacrifice which
fell to the lot of the priest (the "most holy" flesh of the sin-offer-
ing, and the merely "holy" flesh of the peace-offering) is designated
the bread of God, that the sin-offerings, trespass-offerings, and
peace-offerings, of which only the fat portions were enjoyed by
Jehovah as a sacrifice of a sweet smell, ought properly to have
been entirely consumed in the altar-fire, as really was the case with
the burnt-offering; but that God, according to His gracious arrange-
ment, contented Himself with the fat portions, and gave up the rest
of the flesh, partly to the priest and partly to the person sacrificing,
to be devoted to other purposes. Now, whether we regard the
genitive as gen. obj. or gent. subj., in either case the expression "the
bread of God" is a proof that the whole of the sacrificial flesh in the
peace-offerings, as well as the sin- and trespass-offerings, belonged to
God after and in consequence of the presentation. (3.) The view
held by Oehler is thoroughly unsuitable and inadmissible. "God
condescended," he says, " to become the guest of the person sacri-
ficing; He received the breast as the portion of honour, and handed
it over to His servant the priest." But if only the portion of honour
was given up to God, and not the whole of the animal sacrificed,
it was the fat which He Himself received that really constituted the
portion of honour, and not the breast allotted the priest: moreover,
neither God Himself, nor His servant and representative the priest,
took part in the meal; for the latter was allowed to eat the breast
and shoulder which fell to his share in any clean place, along with
his sons and daughters (Lev. x. 14). (4.) If the person sacrificing
was to be regarded as the host, there could be no reason whatever
for the instructions to prepare the sacrificial meal "before Jehovah,"
i.e., at the tabernacle, and therefore at the house of God; at all
events, it would have been more appropriate to hold it in the house

of the sacrificer himself. (5.) Another argument is furnished by
the analogy of the paschal meal, which furnishes no appropriate
sense, on the supposition that the master of the house invited God
to his table, instead of God providing the food for those who partook
of it (cf. 186). (6.) It is evident, from 1 Cor. x. 18, 21, that we
have the authority of the Apostle Paul in favour of our view. In
ver. 18 he affirms, that the ancient Israelites ("Israel according to
the flesh"), who ate of the sacrifices, entered thereby into the fellow-
ship of the altar; and from this premiss he deduces the further
conclusion in ver. 21, that whoever took part in the sacrificial meals
of the heathen as such, became a partaker of the table of demons,
just as the Christian, when eating the Lord's Supper, became a
partaker of the table of God. No proof surely is needed, that by
the "Israel according to the flesh," we are to understand not the
Israelitish priests to the exclusion of the people generally, but the
nation itself; and consequently, that the eating refers not to the
flesh of the sin-offerings, but to that of the peace-offerings. But if
such eating brought the eater into the fellowship of the altar, or
made him a participant of the table of God, it must have been
regarded as eating at the table of God, and GOD must have been
the provider of the food. This was also the case at the Lord's
Supper, to which the Apostle regards the sacrificial meal as standing
in a typical relation. The Christians presented the bread and wine,
but they ate and drank of them, after they had been consecrated by
the eu]logi<a; they partook of them, however, as food given to them
by God, through the eating and drinking of which they became
partakers of the table of the Lord.
83. This view of the sacrificial meal, however, gives rise to a
very peculiar difficulty. The surrender of the sacrificial animal to
the fire of the altar represented, for instance, as we have seen above,
and as nearly every other commentator admits, the self-surrender
of the person sacrificing. This was most conspicuous in the case
of the burnt-offering, when the whole of the body of the animal
was consumed. But in the case of the peace-offerings also--when
the greater part of the flesh had to be preserved for the sacrificial
meal, and only the flores carnis therefore, viz., the fat portions,
were to be burned as representing and sanctifying the whole--
according to the universal laws of symbolism, precisely the same
meaning must be attributed to the burning itself and the part to
be burned. And if the flesh to be burned represented the person
of the sacrificer himself, it seems as though it were hardly possible

to ascribe any other meaning to the flesh that was eaten, since they
were both parts of one and the same whole. But this would involve
the strange conclusion, that in the sacrificial meal the person sacri-
ficing was fed with that which represented himself, that is to say,
with himself; a conclusion from which it is hardly possible to obtain
any reasonable or tenable meaning. Hence all the commentators
( 80), with the exception of Kliefoth ( 84), drop the symbolical
force of the sacrificial flesh as representing the person of the sacri-
ficer, and either restore its original significance as spiritual food, or
introduce a different meaning corresponding to its new destination.
But is not this mere caprice, which is perfectly inadmissible,
and under all circumstances to be rejected? Apparently it is; but
only in appearance. If we take a clear view of the whole condition
of things, we shall see, that even with this dualistic view the unity
of the idea is preserved, so that we obtain not two explanations
which are mutually exclusive, but only two sides of the very same
explanation.
Throughout the whole of the sacrificial ceremony, the flesh of
the sacrifice continues to be nourishment, food, MH,l,. It was food
for Jehovah, so fat as it was burnt upon the altar; and food for
the sacrificer and his household, so far as it was eaten by them at
the tabernacle before Jehovah. Since flesh and bread are the
daily food of man, when the immediate object was to present to
Jehovah food befitting Him, the food demanded by Him, these two
were chosen as a symbolical representation of that food which is
spiritual in itself, and therefore could not be actually presented in
a form perceptible to the senses. It remained and signified what it
always was, viz., nourishment or food; but inasmuch as it was
intended to be food for Jehovah, its real character was eo ipso
necessarily, changed into a corresponding symbolical one. And
since the remainder of the food, of which Jehovah received a por-
tion as " a sweet savour," was given up to the sacrificer and his
family, it received in consequence the character of such food as
the person eating required, both from his nature and his position at
the time. It thus came once more undoubtedly under the literal
aspect of bodily food, but only to assume at once a symbolical
a character in accordance with the character of the eater as a justi-
fled and sanctified sinner, and with the solemnity of the meal, as
an act of fellowship with Jehovah, and of participation in that
blessedness which such fellowship affords.
The gift presented by the sacrificer was his own property; he

put, so to speak, his heart, his feelings and emotions, his whole
personality, into the gift. Thus the surrender of his property be-
came a representative self-surrender: the body, the flesh of the
sacrificial animal, became the symbolical representation of his own
person; and this was the nourishment which Jehovah demanded,
this was the food which was to Him HaOhynil; well-pleasing, the source
of contentment and satisfaction. And in just the same manner the
flesh, which was destined for the food of the sacrificer, and there-
fore was not given up to the altar-fire, received a symbolical dignity
befitting the design and significance of the sacrificial meal.
If a friend presented me with a select portion of the produce of
his vintage, his orchard, or his farm, upon which he had bestowed
all his time and earnest attention, the gift would represent, in my
estimation, his own personal devotedness; and if I then invited him
to my table and entertained him with his own gifts, he would par-
take of them, not as representing himself, but as my gifts to him, as
representing my friendship and affection towards him. Precisely
so was it with the sacrificial gift which God had received and
accepted from the sacrificer, and with which He then entertained
the giver himself. By the fact that he partook of the gift in the
house and at the table of the Lord, he partook of it, not as his own
gift, but as the gift of God; partook of it, not as what it was
before, the representation of his own love and attachment to God,
but as what it had become, the representation of the friendship and
affection of God towards him.
84. Kliefoth (pp. 63 sqq.) offers the most decided opposition
to this idea of a transformation of the symbolical import of the
sacrificial flesh, from a representation of the devotedness of the
sacrificer to Jehovah, into a representation of the devotedness of
Jehovah to the sacrificer,--from a feeding of Jehovah with the
covenant-performances of Israel, into a feeding of Israel with the
saving blessings of the house of God. He still maintains that the
flesh must have had the same signification at the meal as in the
burning; and he has set up a new interpretation for the former in
consequence, viz., that the sacrificial animal bore vicariously the
sin of the person sacrificing, and made atonement for him; and
God accepted this substitute, and in it the sacrificer, as an object of
good pleasure. But it was also necessary that the person forgiven
should be received again into the fellowship of His holy nation.
When the sacrifice, therefore, had represented the sinner in the
presence of God, to make atonement for him, it had also to repre-

sent him in the presence of the holy nation of God, to reconcile him
with this as well, and restore him to its communion. . . . God had
taken what was ideally the best of the animal, viz., the fat; but He
gave to His people what was humanly the best, viz., the flesh; for
it afforded pleasure to God, and advantage to the people of God,
when an atoning sacrifice interposed for the sinner. This gift God
bestowed upon the representatives of His holy nation, viz., the
priests, and the smaller circle which more immediately surrounded
the sacrificer himself, and stood towards him in the stead of the
whole community, including, under certain circumstances, the sacri-
ficer himself. These representatives of the holy nation then ate the
sacrifice in a social meal. . . . In the sacrifice, the nation received
the sinner whom that sacrifice represented, rejoiced in him again,
incorporated him once more into its own body, allowed him again to
share the benefits of its social life, and, in short, restored him to its
fellowship. The consequence of this was, that such a sacrificial
meal was a rejoicing before "Jehovah (Deut. xxvii. 7) to all who
participated in it."
This explanation has really much to commend it. If it were
tenable on other grounds, we should regard it as a great recom-
mendation, that it would enable us to look at the eating of the flesh
of the sin-offering from precisely the same point of view as the
eating of the flesh of the peace-offering. But the fact that the law
itself never intended to place them in the same point of view, is
shown clearly enough by the fundamentally different, and in many
respects opposite treatment, which they received (cf. 116). In
the case of the peace-offerings, moreover, the eating of leavened
bread along with them ( 154) would present a difficulty which it
would be very hard to remove. And here, again, we must point
to the fact, that the priest did not take part in the sacrificial meal
at the peace-offerings, but ate the portions which fell to him in his
own family circle, whenever and wherever he pleased. And lastly,
this explanation involves the incongruity, that the person sacrificing
partook of what was the symbol of himself, in other words, was fed
with himself. This difficulty did not escape Kliefoth, and he has
endeavoured to remove it in a really ingenious, but hardly a satis-
factory manner. If a sacrificial meal," he says, was to take place
at all, the officiating priests, at any rate, would certainly partake of
it, for it was really they who represented the nation as the holy
nation of God. On the other hand, the circle of participants could
be enlarged, especially when the notion of fellowship was placed in

the foreground by the social meal. The greatest possible extension
took place when the sacrificer himself was added to the circle of
participants. . . . And even then the fundamental idea, which we
have already expounded, still remained: the person sacrificing re-
ceived into himself the sacrifice which had made atonement for
him. It is true he did not accept it in the same way in which God
accepted it, namely, so as to give validity to its atoning virtue; but
the sacrifice which God had accepted and reckoned to him as recon-
ciliation, he received again at the hand of God, partook of it, and
rejoiced in it, and in the reconciliation which he had obtained there-
in; whilst in that sacrifice he became himself well-pleasing to God,
and, being reconciled in his own conscience, received it, with all that
it had procured, as his own flesh and blood, and applied it to the
improvement of his own life. In short, he ate the sacrifice along
with the other participants, and in partaking of it, the sacrificer was
received (by both the others and himself) as an object of good
pleasure. And lastly, in thus joining in the meal, the sacrificer
completed his own subjective appropriation of the sacrifice."
The leading fundamental mistake in this explanation is, that it
confounds the subjective, ideal substitution set forth by the animal
as a sacrificial gift, in the second stage of the sacrificial process,
with the objective, real substitution exhibited in its first stage as a
medium of expiation (cf. 75, 76). Moreover, this still leaves the
question unanswered, why, if the design of the eating of the sacri-
fice was primarily and universally restoration to the fellowship of
the holy nation, it should have been restricted in the case of the
sin-offerings to the smallest circle of participants, viz., to the priests
alone (even to the exclusion of their families), and in that of the
peace-offerings should have been extended to the largest possible
circle. Lastly, according to this view, the admission of the person
sacrificing to participate in the meal appears to be nothing more
than an extraordinary arrangement made on his behalf, which
might very well be dispensed with, and actually was dispensed with
in the case of the sin-offering, without prejudice to the idea of the
sacrificial meal; whereas in the law he is represented as the princi-
pal person in the case of the peace-offerings, and his eating is not
only the most important point, but is actually indispensable, whilst
the participation of the rest is a subordinate and entirely optional
arrangement. (See 116.)
174 DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BLEEDING SACRIFICES.
PART II
VARIETIES OF THE BLEEDING SACRIFICE.
CHAPTER I.
DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BLEEDING

SACRIFICES.
A. THE SIN-OFFERING, BURNT-OFFERING, AND PEACE-OFFERING.
85. The first thing which we select as distinguishing these

three kinds of sacrifice, is the difference in the ritual. The presen-
tation, imposition of hands, and slaughtering, were the same in all.
But in the remaining functions, the sprinkling of the blood, the burn-
ing, and the sacrificial meal, we find characteristic differences, inas-
much as each one of these three stands out by itself as a peculiarly
emphasized and prominent feature in one of the three kinds of
sacrifice. The sprinkling of the blood was the culminating point
in the sin-offering. In the others it evidently fell into the back-
ground, the blood being merely poured around upon the altar; but
in the sin-offerings it acquired an incomparably greater significance,
so indefinite and vague an application of the blood appeared in-
sufficient, and the horns of the altar of burnt-offering, in which the
whole worth of the altar culminated ( 13), were appointed as the
object upon which the blood was to be sprinkled. In some cases,
indeed, even this appeared insufficient, and the blood was taken into
the Holy Place, where it was sprinkled upon the horns of the altar
of incense, towards the curtain before the Capporeth, and some-
times even upon the Capporeth itself, in the Most Holy Place,
The act of burning, again, was the culminating point in the burnt-
offering. The gradations in this act were not shown, as in the
sprinkling of blood, by an increase in intensity, but by increase in
amount. For whilst in other kinds of sacrifice only certain select
portions were laid upon the altar, in this the animal was entirely
burnt.--Lastly, the sacrificial meal was the main point and real
characteristic of the peace-offering. In the case of the burnt-offer-
THE SIN-OFFERING, BURNT-OFFERING, AND PEACE-OFFERING. 175
ing, where everything was burnt, this could not possibly take place;
and in that of the sin-offering, not only was it not allowed, but every
one except a priest was strictly prohibited from even touching the
flesh (Lev. vi. 27).
From this we obtain a by no means unimportant insight into the
nature and distinguishing characteristic of the sacrifices. What
we have already found to be the import of the sprinkling of the
blood was the special object of the sin-offering, viz., expiation, justi-
fication. All the rest fell into the background beside this sharply
defined purpose. In the burnt-offering the burning was the culmi-
nating point; and if the design of this act was no other than to
give expression to the consciousness of the duty of sanctified self-
surrender to Jehovah, this was also the chief purpose of this kind
of sacrifice; it was the sacrifice of entire, full, unconditional self-
surrender. In the peace-offering the meal was the principal feature;
and if this represented the most intimate fellowship with Jehovah,
friendly intercourse, house and table companionship with Him, we
must seek in this the end and object of the sacrifice. The same
progressive stages, therefore, which distinguish redemption and its
symbolical correlate, the complete idea of sacrifice, incorporated
themselves as it were in these three varieties of sacrifice: the stage
of atonement, of justificatio, in the sin-offering; that of sanctifica-
tio, in the burnt-offering; and that of sacramental fellowship, of
the unio mystica, in the peace-offering.
The characteristic distinctions thus obtained are confirmed and
extended, when we fix our eyes upon the order of succession of the
different kinds of sacrifice. We should naturally expect, for ex-
ample, to find the same order observed in the arrangement of the
various kinds of sacrifice, as in that of the different sacrificial acts.
And this was really the case. Where two of the sacrifices in ques-
tion, or the whole three, were brought at the same time, the sin-
offering always preceded the burnt-offering, and after this came the
peace-offering; e.g., Ex. xxix. 14, 18, 28; Lev. v. 8, 10, viii. 14,
18, 22, ix. 15, 16, 18, xii. 6 sqq., xiv. 19 sqq., xvi. 11, 15, 24. It
cannot be fairly adduced as an objection, that in the account of the
festal sacrifices in Num xxviii. and xxix., the burnt-offerings, which
were only a multiplication of the daily burnt-offerings, are mentioned
first, and the sin-offering not till afterwards; for there is nothing to
compel us to regard this summary statement as describing the order
in which the sacrifices were offered. The burnt-offering, as being
the most common sacrifice, and one which was proved to be the
leading sacrifice by the simple fact that it was multiplied in so signi-

ficant a manner, especially at the feasts, might very properly be
mentioned first (as is evidently the case in Lev. xii. 6 8, compared
with chap. v. 8, 10, xiv. 19 sqq.), without any regulative instruc-
tions being added with regard to the order of succession, which was
sufficiently established already.
86. Our insight into these sacrifices will be still further-
deepened and extended, if we notice the characteristic peculiarities
connected with the starting point of the different kinds of sacrifice,
and with the motive which prompted them. The first thing which-
strikes us in this respect is the following. Wherever sin-offerings
are demanded by the law, we always find special faults or special
circumstances mentioned, which lay under the curse of sin ( 213),
and needed to be expiated by sacrifice.1 In the case of the burnt-
offerings and peace-offerings these are entirely wanting. No special
reasons are assigned for the burnt-offering. It was offered every day,
and without any special occasion. It was different with the peace-
offering: whenever this was required or presented, there was always
some special reason assigned or assumed--some manifestation of
divine mercy, either to be asked for, or already received. It follows,
from this, that the burnt-offerings had regard to the religious life
in general; the other two, to the religious life in its particular mani-
festations. The burnt-offering was necessarily the expression of such
religious feeling as a pious Israelite ought to maintain continuously
and without interruption. This is in perfect harmony with what
we have already ascertained to be the characteristic of the burnt-
offering, namely, that it was intended as a symbolical manifestation
and realization of the duty and readiness of the person sacrificing
to make a complete and sanctified surrender of himself to Jehovah.
The consciousness of this obligation would naturally be the deepest
and most constant feeling in the mind of a truly pious Israelite.
The idea of expiation might fall into the background by the side of
it; but even this could not be altogether wanting, since all self-
surrender rests upon justification. But the expiation was of a more
general character, just as the sin to which it had regard was sin in
general, and not any particular sin that could be mentioned by
name. The expiation of the burnt-offering corresponded to the
general consciousness of sin and unworthiness, as first produced by
the demand for a perfectly sanctified self-surrender.--In the case of
1
On the apparent exception in the case of the sin-offerings presented at the
feasts, cf. 105.
the peace-offering also, no particular sins are mentioned; but here,

again, the general consciousness of unworthiness, excited by the
contrast to the blessings bestowed by God, came into prominence,
and demanded the same general atonement which was also asso-
ciated with the burnt-offering. The sin-offerings, on the other hand,
had to do, not with sin in general, not with such sinfulness and
infirmity as even the most pious were not free from, but with cer-
tain manifestations and effects of sin, which are mentioned distinctly
by name. The allusion in this case was to sin that had grown into
action, that had assumed a visible form; to sin intensified, there-
fore, which necessarily demanded an intensified atonement. An
actual separation from Jehovah had taken place, a positive breach
of the state of grace had been committed; consequently, the primary
and pre-eminent object of the sacrifice was to reconstitute this state
of salvation and of grace. In the case of the burnt-offerings and
peace-offerings, the general sinfulness to be expiated was undoubt-
edly also something ungodly and displeasing to God, and therefore
something which required to be removed or atoned for; but it was
merely a habitual distance, not an active departure from Jehovah
the sacrificer was still standing upon the foundation of salvation, upon
which he desired to establish and fortify himself. This may serve
to explain the fact, that the sin-offerings were always followed by a
burnt-offering. The object of the former was to effect a restoration
into a state of grace; that of the latter, to secure the positive exer-
cise of the duties and privileges thereby obtained. It also explains
the fact, that it was only with burnt-offerings and peace-offerings
that meat-offerings were associated--never with sin- (and trespass-)
offerings. In connection with the former, the sacrificer always stood
upon the ground of salvation. But this position needed to be attested
by fruits of sanctification; hence the addition of the meat-offerings.
In connection with the latter, he had fallen from a state of grace.
Their simple object was to reunite the broken bond, so that there
could as yet be no allusion to fruits of sanctification.
87. There is one point of peculiar importance which we must
not pass over here, namely, the relation between the sacrificial wor-
ship of the Mosaic, and that of the pre-Mosaic times. And the first
thing which strikes us is, that previous to the time of Moses we
only read of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, never of sin- (and
trespass-) offerings. It is true that both of these have recently been
disputed, and that in the most opposite ways. Whilst Bahr (ii. 363)
denies that there ever were peace-offerings in the pre-Mosaic times,
178 DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BLEEDDING SACRIFICES.
and recognises none but burnt-offerings as existing then, v. Hofmann

maintains that, in addition to burnt-offerings and peace-offerings,
sin- (or trespass-) offerings were just as common even then as in the
Mosaic age, "only it was reserved for the Mosaic law to define more
sharply the distinction between them" (p. 225).
It is easy enough to prove that- there is no ground for Bahr's
assertion. Even Abel's offering (Gen. iv. 4) must be regarded as
the first step towards the development of the slain- or peace-offerings
(for in the Pentateuch the two names denote one and the same
thing; 125). But we find them perfectly developed in distinction
from the burnt-offerings in Ex. x. 25, when Pharaoh offers to allow
the Israelites to go for a short time into the wilderness to serve
Jehovah their God, i.e., to offer sacrifice (chap. viii. 23), and Moses
insists upon their being allowed to take all their cattle with them,
for the purpose of presenting slain-offerings ("sacrifices," Eng. V.)
and burnt-offerings. And the fact that, according to Ex. xviii. 12,
Jethro, on meeting with Moses (before the giving of the law), offered
burnt-offerings and slain-offerings, is a proof that the distinction be-
tween these two kinds of sacrifice was common to the Terahite family
generally, and hence that its origin may be traced back to a time
when that family was still undivided.
On the other hand, there is just as little foundation for Hof-
mann's assertion, that not only burnt-offerings and peace-offerings,
were known in the pre-Mosaic times, but sin- (or trespass-) offerings
also. "No other argument can be adduced," he says at p. 225, "in
favour of the opposite view, than that, sin-offerings are never men-
tioned before the time of Moses; an argument which causes all the
less difficulty, since even Abel's offering was not a thank-offering as
distinguished from a burnt-offering, nor Noah's a burnt-offering as
distinguished from a thank-offering; and that in the account of the
restoration of fellowship between Jehovah and Israel (Ex. xxiv
5), burnt-offerings and thank-offerings only are mentioned." We
readily admit that, in the time of Abel's and Noah's sacrifices, the
distinction between burnt-offerings and peace-offerings had not yet
been fully brought out. But it is indisputably evident from Ex. x
25 and xviii. 12, that this had been done in the time of Moses and
Jethro, and before the giving of the law. And when Hofmann
proceeds, at p. 267, to explain the limitation, of the sacrificial wor-
ship described in Ex. xxiv. 5, which also occurred before the giving
of the law, to burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, excluding both
sin- and trespass-offerings, on the ground "that the latter did not
refer, like the former, to the general relation of sinful man to God,
which was the only point contemplated when a new relation was
established between man and God, to which sinfulness was to be no
impediment," the worthlessness of this loophole is soon apparent.
For if, when a general relation of fellowship was restored between
God and Israel, it was only necessary to have in view the general
sinfulness of humanity, and not special or individual sins, we cannot
see why, when a particular relation of fellowship was restored be-
tween God and the family of Aaron (Lev. viii. 2 sqq.), or between
God and the Levites (Num. viii. 8); and at the yearly renewal of
the relation of fellowship between God and Israel at the feasts, it
should have been necessary to keep in view anything more than the
general sinfulness of man. The fact is rather, that the omission of
sin-offerings from the covenant-consecration of the people can only
be explained on the supposition that, previous to the giving of the
law of sacrifice, sin-offerings were as yet unknown (cf. 163).
But observes Hofmann at p. 225, "are we to suppose that
before this time sin never gave occasion for sacrifice? Is it not
related of Abraham, that all over Canaan, wherever he settled
for any lengthened period, he erected an altar for the purpose of
regular and social worship? And is it not most likely that every
separate expression of piety had its own sacrifice, and its distinctive
characteristic found its fitting expression in some peculiarity in the
sacrifice itself? The Mosaic law does not introduce the sin- and
trespass-offerings in any special manner; but whenever they are
referred to, it presupposes that, like the burnt-offerings and thank-
offerings, they are already known."--Again mere arguments, of
which one is as weak and worthless as the other. For with the
very same arguments we might prove that the whole of the Mosaic
ritual was known and carried out by Abraham, and that at the
most it was reserved for the Mosaic law "to give it a sharper outline."
And when Hofmann says, "It is impossible to see why sin-offerings
should first have been introduced with the law of Moses, and in
connection with breaches of its commandments; or how it could ever
have been omitted when once sacrificial service had been estab-
lished;" Keil has given a sufficient reply. As if, he says, there
had not been an atoning element in the burnt-offering as well.
Sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, as distinguished from burnt-
offerings and peace-offerings, are undoubtedly to be regarded as a
specifically Mosaic institution; and this is the only way of ex-
plaining their not being mentioned in the pre-Mosaic times, and
their being altogether unknown in heathen lands both before and

after the time of Moses. They were peculiarly theocratic in their
character, and were connected with sins, to which the law first gave
a distinctive character that specially demanded them. The fun-
damental law of Israel, so far as religion was concerned, was, Be
ye holy, for I am holy, saith Jehovah." This holiness, which was
demanded by the law, and was the condition of theocratic fellow-
ship, consisted in separation from the world to Jehovah, in being
different from the heathen. Every transgression of the law, as
the standard of that holiness, removed the Israelite from the sphere
of the covenant with Jehovah into the sphere of heathenism; he
acted just as if there was really no theocratic law for him; in other
words, he acted like a heathen, placed himself on a par with the
heathen, conducted himself as if he had not been dedicated to
Jehovah--was not Jehovah's property and mancipium, but was a
law to himself, and left to himself, just as the heathen were. Now,
so far as these sins still admitted of expiation ( 89 sqq.), being
sins which received a peculiarly theocratic character from the
theocratic position of the person committing them,1 they necessarily
required to be expiated by these peculiarly theocratic sacrifices.
And this is in perfect harmony with what we have already discovered
to be the distinctive characteristic of the sin-offering, viz., the
heightening of the expiation, before which all the other features of
this kind of sacrifice fell into the background. The importance
and responsibility of sin, and its just exposure to curse and death,
were heightened by the law. Where no law is, says the Apostle
(Rom. iv. 15), "there is no transgression;" and (Rom. v. 13), sin
is not imputed where there is no law." The pre-Mosaic sacrifices
answered to a consciousness of sin on the standpoint of the law
written in the hearts, and the Mosaic, to that produced by the
"law of commandments contained in ordinances;" and so far as
particular sins belonging to this standpoint were concerned, the
sin-offerings related specially to them. The former standpoint was
the lower and more undeveloped of the two, and therefore the
1
It might indeed be argued in opposition to this assertion, that not the
Israelites only, but the MyriGe also were entitled and required to offer sin-offerings
(Num. xv. 29). But there is no force in the objection. For inasmuch as they
were equally bound down by a number of peculiarly theocratic laws (cf. 2),
it was really necessary that, so far as the transgression of those laws admitted
of expiation at all, they should also be allowed to offer sin-offerings as an atone-
ment for them.
institution of sacrifice connected with it was also more undeveloped,

and the expiation especially more general and undefined. The
latter was the more defined, more developed and higher of the two;
and the whole of the institution of sacrifice, therefore, was more
developed, and its individual features were expanded into indepen-
dent, self-subsistent sacrifices, every one of which served as the
representative of some one particular feature.
88. In every one of the four varieties of sacrifice, account
was taken of the need of expiation, and the necessity for sanctifi-
cation of life. Both together constituted the essential nature and
purpose of the sacrificial worship, and could not be omitted from
any act of sacrifice, whose nature allowed of a manifestation of
the two; though the emphasis might be differently laid according
to circumstances,--the one being placed in the foreground in one
case, and the other in another, or both being placed in the back-
ground, as in the case of the peace-offerings, and merely serving as
a foil to the idea to be set forth in the sacrificial meal.
With this subdivision of the idea of sacrifice into sacrifices of
various kinds, it inevitably happened, that when two or three of
these were offered together, as was frequently the case, there was
a repetition or crowding together of individual features. Thus,
for example, when sin-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings
were presented at the same time, there was a triple reiteration of
the ideas of expiation and self-surrender. The question might be
asked, therefore, whether it would not have been more appropriate,
either to combine the three in some one description of sacrifice in
as complete a way as the sacrificial idea required, or else to limit
every kind of sacrifice to that one feature, the necessity for which
was peculiarly prominent at the time. But for many reasons, both
internal and external, the latter would have been unadvisable and
impracticable. And the former would have been both unnecessary
and impossible;--impossible, because, for example, no sacrificial
meal could have been held in cases where it was requisite that the
whole should be burned; and unnecessary, because it was not
desirable that an equally distinct and strong expression should be
given to all three ideas in connection with every sacrifice. There
was no other course open, therefore, than to arrange the sacrificial
worship upon the plan which has actually been adopted in the law.
This is done, not by a mechanical division, but by the same living
individualization which we meet with on every hand through the
spheres of both physical and spiritual life. Just as the separation
182 DISTINGUISHING, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BLEEDING SACRIFICES.
of the human race, for example, into individuals, characters, tem-

peraments, nationalities, is not effected by any mechanical division,
so that one individual receives only one portion of what belongs to
the idea of humanity, and another individual another portion; but
by one in which every individual receives all that belongs to the
idea of humanity, since without this he would cease to be a man,
whilst the different elements vary in potency, something being
prominent in this man which falls into the background in that, or
a peculiar susceptibility for the development of some one organ or
talent being apparent in this man, and of some other organ or talent
in that;--so was it with the subdivision of the one sacrificial idea
into sacrifices of various kinds. All, that is essentially and indis-
pensably necessary to the idea of sacrifice is found in every one,
but in different degrees of potency.
The repetition of particular features, which was undoubtedly
inevitable in consequence, but to which there are many analogies.
in other parts of the ritual, was so far from introducing any dis-
turbance into the idea of sacrificial worship, that it rather served
to bring to mind a thought essentially inherent in it; viz., the
truth, that none of them could at once and for ever meet all de-
mands, but that they all needed to be continually revivified or
entirely renewed.
B. THE COMMON BASIS OF THE SIN-OFFERING AND TRESPASS-

OFFERING.
89. The presentation of a trespass-offering, like that of a sin-
offering, was always occasioned by special acts of sin, or at all events
by special circumstances which were regarded as sin. The latter
we shall consider more fully by and by ( 213 sqq.). Our present
task is to determine what special and actual transgressions were
generally regarded as admitting and requiring sacrificial expiation,
either by means of sin-offerings or trespass-offerings; after which
we shall proceed to inquire which of them were expiated by sin-
offerings, and which by trespass-offerings.
The sins which, as a general rule, admitted of sacrificial expia-
tion, are represented in Lev. iv. 2, 22, 27 (where sin-offerings are
referred to) and in Lev. v. 15 (which treats of trespass-offerings);
as being those which were committed hgAgAw;Bi, i.e., by mistake (Ang.,
"in ignorance"). What is meant is evident enough, when we
observe that in Lev. v.17 fdayA xlov; ("and knew it not'') is substi-
COMMON BASIS OF THE SIN-OFFERING AND TRESPASS-OFFERING. 183
tuted for hgAgAw;Bi (compare tfada yTil;Bi in Dent. iv. 42 and Num. xxxv.
11), and Un.m,.mi Mlaf;n, (hidden from him) in Lev. iv. 13, v. 2, 3, 4,
and that in Lev. iv. 14, 23, 28, the discovery of a sin that had been
previously unknown is given as an occasion and motive for offering
the proper sacrifice for the sin in question. From all these passages
it is perfectly obvious that the sins primarily regarded as admitting
of sacrificial expiation were such as had been committed uncon-
sciously, unintentionally, or from haste, and therefore could not be
visited with judicial punishment. For this reason, in my Mos.
Opfer, p. 156, I followed Bahr ii. 388, in regarding such sins alone
as admitting of expiation, and all intentional and presumptuous sins
as excluded from it. I find the same view still advocated by some
of the latest commentators, e.g., Havernick (p. 192), Welte (p. 177),
and Knobel (p. 343). All the rest pronounce such a limitation too
narrow,1 and include sins of infirmity among those that admitted
of expiation; whilst Hofmann (p. 251), Keil (1, 219), and Delitzsch
(p. 174), are unwilling to exclude even sins of infirmity committed
consciously and intentionally, or, as Keil expresses it, "those which
were committed with forethought and deliberate intention or from
weakness of the spirit in its conflict against the flesh." But I must
still pronounce the idea of "sins of weakness" as one which it is
at variance with the Scriptures, and quite impracticable, to introduce,
for the purpose of determining the limits of the possibility of atone-
ment. For the idea itself is so variable, elastic, and vague, that it
might be applied to almost every sin, especially if we include such
as have been committed "with forethought and design," and is per-
fectly useless, at all events, for legal purposes. Moreover, the word
hgAgAw;Bi precludes this explanation; for he who errs, i.e., misses the
right way, does so, not from weakness, i.e., because he has not
strength to keep in the well-known way, but because he either does
not know the way, or has missed it through inattention. Who, for
1
Whether Hengstenberg, indeed, should be included in this number, is doubt-
ful, on account of the self-contradiction into which he falls. On the one hand,
for example, he explains hgAgAw;Bi as meaning "sins of infirmity," and maintains
that "Kurtz is wrong in substituting unintentional, unconscious sins, for sins of
weakness" (pp. 17, 18). Yet, on the other hand, in the very same breath, he him-
self defines sins of infirmity as unintentional or unconscious; and says, "It was
for sins of infirmity that the Psalmist asked forgiveness when he exclaimed, Who
can understand his errors? Cleanse Thou me from secret faults,--appealing to
the desperate finesse of sin, which understands in so masterly a way to render
itself invisible, to disguise itself, to assume the appearance of good, and which
we cannot escape, on account of this finesse, even with the most laudable zeal."
example, could refuse to class adultery among sins of infirmity,

especially when it is not a premeditated act, deliberately planned,
but simply the result of a temptation that was not sought, and a sud-
denly excited passion?1 And yet the law commanded that even such
an adulterer should (not offer an atoning sacrifice, but) be stoned.2
90. Nevertheless, I willingly admit that the category of uncon-
scious and unintentional sins is not co-extensive with that of the sins
that allowed of expiation; only the extension of the former to many
sins committed knowingly and intentionally, which is unquestionably
necessary, must not be deduced from the word hggwb; for this merely
denotes a sin committed through mistake, and is authoritatively
interpreted by the law as meaning unconsciously or unintentionally:
The' following is rather the fact:-In those sections of the law of
sacrifice, which point out, in a fundamental and general way, what
sins may be and are to be expiated by sin-offerings (Lev. iv. 1-35),
and what by trespass-offerings (Lev. v. 14-19), they - are all charac-
terized through such terms as hgAgAw;Bi, fdayA xlo, and so forth, as com-
mitted unconsciously and unintentionally. That was the rule there- .
fore. But here also the maxim applied, that there is no rule with-
out an exception. There were sins, for example, which could not
be called unconscious or unintentional, but which were evidently so
modified by other circumstances as likewise to admit of expiation by
sacrifice. A few of such sins are mentioned in the law of sacrifice
itself, in those sections where the sins, for which sin-offerings or
trespass-offerings might be presented, are specially enumerated;3
(Lev. v. 1-13, and vi. 1-7);-for example, in chap. vi. 2, 3, the
keeping back of something stolen, entrusted, lent, or found, accom-
panied by a denial on oath of its possession. These are all sins
1
I do not expect any protest against this suggestion, at all events from
Hengstenberg; for, in his opinion., even David's adultery was "chiefly a sin of
infirmity" (p. 18), which I cannot dispute. But I certainly do dispute the assertion,
that that was the reason why, according to the law, this sin of David's was not
included among those that were to be punished with death, but those that were
to be expiated by sacrifice. Undoubtedly, the sentence of death was not exe-
cuted on David. The reason for this, however, was, not because the sin itself
did not require it according to the law, but because there was no one in all
Israel who was qualified to inflict the punishment prescribed in the law upon
the anointed of the Lord, and the punishment therefore was necessarily left to
the immediate judgment of God.
2
The case recorded in Lev. xix. 20-22 is no proof against the validity of
this rule.
3
The connection between Lev. iv, and v., which is here assumed, we shall
examine and justify below ( 98, 99, 103).
which could not possibly be placed in the category of unconscious

and unintentional sins. But there might be circumstances connected
with them which mitigated the guilt, and rendered the sacrificial
expiation admissible: for example, if the guilty person, as is ex-
pressly mentioned in chap. vi. 5, spontaneously acknowledged the
crime which he had denied at first, and even denied on oath, and
which could not be punished by the judicial authorities because it
could not be proved, and if he voluntarily restored what had been
taken fraudulently, together with the addition of a fifth of its worth.
The case described in Lev. v. 1 also belongs to the same category, as
the hDAvat;hi (he shall confess) in ver. 5 clearly proves, viz., that of a
person who was able to give evidence in connection with any matter
that was the subject of judicial inquiry, and yet, after hearing the
adjuration to all who knew anything about it, either from fear or a
wish to please, neglected to do so.
In addition to these, there were no doubt included in the same
class all sins that were not actually capital crimes, and for which,
after they had been civilly expiated by the infliction of the punish-
ment prescribed in the law, religious expiation was still demanded.
It is true that there is only one case of this kind, in which the ad-
missibility of and necessity for a sacrificial atonement is expressly
mentioned (viz., Lev. xix. 20-22, cf. 100); but this is quite suffi-
cient to show the principle upon which it was founded, and to give
it validity in all other cases of a similar kind. In the former case,
it was by a voluntary, penitent confession, accompanied by a volun-
tary restoration, with compensation, in the latter, by the endurance
of the civil punishment which the crime deserved, that the way was
opened for a sacrificial atonement, and the intentional sins in ques-
tion placed upon the same level in this respect with those that were
unintentional.
Such sins, indeed, as the law visited with the punishment of
death could not be atoned for by sacrifice, however sincere might
be the sorrow, and however earnest the repentance: and that not
because a person executed is no longer able to offer a sacrifice for
himself; for sacrificial expiation, like absolution in the Christian
Church, might have preceded, execution. The reason was rather a
purely internal one, based upon the peculiarity or imperfection of
the Old Testament standpoint. Under the O. T. there was still
wanting that clear insight into eternal life which has been opened
to us by the New Testament revelation, and consequently the pre-
requisite which is essentially necessary to any combination of reli-
gious absolution from sin with the infliction of the capital punish-
ment which the sin deserved, and which is requisite for the main-
tenance of the social, civil, and moral government of the world. In
addition to this, there was the O. T. identification of State and
Church, of the national community and the religious community, in
consequence of which, absolute exclusion from the former (which
execution involved) necessarily involved absolute exclusion from the
latter also; and vice versa, the restoration of the interrupted fellow-
ship of religion and worship (which was effected by sacrificial atone-
ment) necessarily involved eo ipso the restoration of social and na-
tional fellowship; so that in capital crimes, and all such cases where
the latter was inadmissible, the former was eo ipso the same.
91. All sins were divisible into two classes, therefore,--those
that admitted of expiation, and those that did not. Capital crimes
were the only ones that were absolutely excluded. The sins that,
admitted of expiation, again, might be subdivided into those which
from their nature could be expiated at once by sacrifice--viz., such
as had been committed hgAgAw;Bi or tfada yTl;Bi i. e., without knowledge
and will, without intention and forethought--and those which,
although committed consciously and with forethought, and there-
fore in themselves not admitting of expiation, had yet been ren-
dered expiable by other intervening circumstances. Among the
latter were (1) sins which could not be proved, and therefore
escaped judicial punishment, but of which a perfectly free, spon-
taneous confession had been made, dictated by penitence and a
desire for atonement, and accompanied by a voluntary and super-
abundant reparation of the injury inflicted, so far as such reparation
was possible; and (2) sins which could be legally proved, and
therefore were liable to punishment, but which had been legally
atoned for by the endurance of the merited punishment. Of the
former we have an example given in Lev. vi. 3; of the latter, in
Lev. xix. 20-22.
But this really fourfold division, which we obtain from Leviticus,
does not seem to harmonize very well with Num. xv. 27-31. It is
stated there, for example, that for a sin committed in ignorance
(hgAgAw;Bi) forgiveness might be obtained through the presentation of
a sin-offering; but that no expiation or forgiveness could be found
for a sin committed with a high hand (hmArA dyAB;), because Jehovah
was reproached thereby, His word despised, and His commandment
brought to nought. On the contrary, he who committed such a
sin was to be utterly cut off from the nation. The meaning of
hmArA dyAB; cannot be doubtful. It signifies with hand raised, i.e.,

with conscious rebellion against the will and commandment of God.
The expression is not so clearly and sharply defined, indeed, that
no difficulty could ever occur in deciding whether a particular sin
belonged to this category or not. One might suppose, for example,
that it would necessarily include a gross, premeditated robbery, as
being a presumptuous rebellion against the seventh commandment;
and yet, as Ex. xxi. 37 (xxii. 1) sqq. clearly proves, such a sup-
position would be just as erroneous, as the counter idea that adultery,
even when caused by the strong temptation of sudden excitement,
ought not to be included. But the ambiguity connected with
the expression hmArA dyAB; is removed by the command, that any one
who had so sinned should be cut off from the midst of the nation.
From this it is perfectly obvious that a sin committed "with a
high hand" was one which the law regarded as a capital offence,
and consequently punished by death. The man who gathered
sticks on the Sabbath (Num. xv. 32 sqq.), probably under the
impulse of actual need, and the man who committed adultery in a
moment of strong temptation, both of them sinned "with a high
hand," and were to be put to death, though the one might plead his
poverty, and the other the weakness of the flesh, in extenuation of
his offence. The sanctity of the Sabbath, and the sanctity of mar-
riage, were both of them fundamental laws of the theocratical
commonwealth, the essential foundations of whose existence would
be threatened and shaken if its, laws were not observed; conse-
quently any violation of them was a. crime deserving of death--a
transgression committed hmr dyb with a high hand.
A similar want of precision, to that which we find in hmr dyb, in
ver. 30, is also inherent in the expression hggwb, in ver. 27. Ac-
cording to its etymological signification, which corresponds entirely
to the usage of the sacrificial law, the word denotes the unconscious
or unintentional character of the sin in question (like fdayA xlo or
tfada yTil;Bi); here, however, as the antithesis shows, it also includes
such intentional sins as were liable to civil punishment, though not
deserving of death, but which had been brought to the level of sins
committed hggwb, so far as the requirements of the sacrificial wor-
ship were concerned, by the endurance of the proper judicial pun-
ishment, and which might, by a more general use of the term, be
even included among them.
92. Bahr is not satisfied, however, with our admission, that
the absolute exclusion of all intentional sins from sacrificial expi-
ation is untenable. He would rather extend the law of exclusion

to all breaches of the moral law, all moral transgressions in the
strict sense of the term, and so limit expiation to theocratical sins
alone, that is to say, to transgressions against the positively religious
law, the law of worship given to the people of Israel. I do not
think it worth while to refute this obviously erroneous assertion
with the same minuteness as in my former work, and shall content
myself with repeating the leading points in that refutation.
First of all, then, the distinction and contrast between posi-
tively religious (ceremonial) laws, and general, moral laws, upon
which his conclusion is based, is one that had no existence what-
ever to the Israelites. Moreover, it is evident that the hOAhy; tOc;mi-lKA
(all the commandments of Jehovah), for the breach of which sin-
offerings were to be offered according to Lev. iv. 2, and trespass-
offerings according to Lev. v. 17, included the general moral laws,
and that the words of Num. xv. 27, 28, do not permit an exclusion
of moral transgressions generally, any more than these passages do;
and also that the sins which required a trespass-offering, according
to Lev. vi. 1 sqq. and Lev. xix. 20 sqq. (e.g., theft, retention of
another's property with a denial of its possession, unchastity with
the bondmaid of another), did not belong to the category of posi-
tively religious transgressions, but of moral transgressions generally.
Lastly, we may also mention the characteristic circumstance,
that a sin-offering (and also a trespass-offering) always consisted of
one animal only; there were never several animals slaughtered for
one and the same object, as was the case with the burnt-offerings
and peace-offerings, especially on the feast days (Num. xxviii. and
xxix.). So far as I know, Hengstenberg and Ewald are alone in
attempting any explanation of this. Hence it is evident, says
the former (p. 24), "that in the sin-offerings the objective feature
was of supreme importance, and that they were regarded chiefly as
the means of expiation established by God. With sacrifices of a pre-
eminently internal character it was left to the worshipper to offer
as many animals as he pleased. There were no limits set to the
promptings of his own mind." In the sin-offering all the emphasis
and all the significance were concentrated upon the act of expiation;
and this was an act of mercy on the part of God, in which every-
thing thing depended upon the grace of God, and not upon the act of
man. In the burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, on the contrary,
the act of expiation was kept in the background; and the idea of
presenting the gift, which was an act of man, came into prominence,
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SIN-OFFERINGS AND TRESPASS-OFFERINGS 189
and was really the main point, the germ, and the goal in all sacri-
fices of this description. Hence in their case an expansion, a
heaping up of the gifts, was admissible. Ewald's explanation, on
the other hand, is perfectly forced and phantastical. "The num-
ber of the animals," he says (p. 67), "could not be increased, as in
the case of the thank-offerings and whole offerings, at the will of
the person sacrificing, as if he could thereby obtain greater favour
from God: this one animal, indeed, he was required to bring,
and that quite alone, as in solemn solitude and desolation, and as
though there were no other resembling it, with which it could be
associated or compared. But for that very reason, this gloomy
severity might be relaxed in certain (?) instances, when the law
allowed, or even prescribed, a whole offering in addition."
C. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SIN-OFFERINGS AND TRESPASS-

OFFERINGS.
93. All that we have hitherto ascertained, with regard to the
fitness or unfitness of particular sins for expiation, is quite as ap-
plicable to trespass-offerings as to sin-offerings. But the question
is more important and more difficult: In what did the sins, for
which a trespass-ojering was adapted, differ from those which re-
quired a sin-offering?
There is scarcely a single question connected with the whole
range of biblical theology on which there has been so much pure
conjecture, and about the settlement of which theological science
was so late in arriving at a correct conclusion, although the founda-
tions for it evidently existed in the biblical text, and were not very
difficult to find. Most of the opinions expressed need no refuta-
tion. For example, that of Clericus (on Lev. v. 16), who main-
tains that the difference is in the words only, and not in the
thing itself; or that of Carpzov. (App. crit. Antiqu. p. 707), who
contents himself with saying, "omne istud differentias genus ex
sapientissimo legislatoris arbitrio pendere;" or that of Saubert (de
sacrif. vet.), who understands by MwAxA an intentional and malicious
sin, and by txF.AHa an unconscious one; or that of Nichaelis, who
refers the former to sins of omission, the latter to sins of commis-
sion, in which he is just as arbitrary as Grotius, who does the
very opposite. We may put Abenezra in the same class, when he
refers the sin-offering to sins in which ignorance of the law could
be pleaded, and the trespass-offering to those in which the law was
forgotten; and Abarbanel also, with other Rabbins, who maintain

that trespass-offerings were presented when the transgression was
doubtful, and sin-offerings when this was not the case. Philo's
opinion is quite as wide of the mark, viz., that the trespass-offering
was intended for cases, in which the sinner was impelled by his own
conscience to accuse himself of the sin. The same opinion, essen-
tially at least, has been advocated by Josephus, and among modern
theologians by Venema, Reland, and others; and last of all by
Winer, who maintains (ii. 432), that whoever brought a trespass-
offering was convicted by his own conscience; but he who brought
a sin-offering was convicted of a definite, but yet unconscious sin."
Bahr (ii. 912) is also of opinion, that this view comes the nearest to
the truth; though he admits that it by no means removes all the
difficulties, and that he does not see how they are to be removed.
Gesenius says that nothing more can be determined than that the
sin-offerings were presented in gravioribus maxime delictis, and the
trespass-offerings in levioribus locuam habuisse. Hengstenbergs view
is by no means satisfactory (Beitr. zur. Einl. ins alte.Test. iii. 214
sqq.; Opfer, p. 21). It amounts to the following: Every sin, even
when committed against a neighbour, was a robbery of God, and
as such demanded reparation. But the sacrifice could not satisfy
this demand. For the quieting, however, of anxious consciences,
and the stirring up of sleepy ones, the trespass- (or compensation-)
offering was introduced (according to Num. v. 5, 6, Mwx literally
means compensation). The sin was appraised, and in the sacri-
fice, to which the same value was ideally attributed, a restitution or
compensation was made for the robbery of God, which was con-
nected with every sin. And as the principal object was to repre-
sent the idea that sin is a robbery of God, and to establish that
idea in the Church, the trespass- or restitution-offering was ex-
pressly instituted for a limited number of cases only." In opposi-
tion to this, we must repeat that Mwx does not signify compensation
at all; that by this view the atoning force of the sin-offering is
destroyed: that if it were correct, every sin would have required
a trespass-offering; and that in that case the trespass-offering would
have been more important than the sin-offering, whereas, as the
ritual clearly proves, the opposite was really the case. Ewald's
view is still more decidedly false. A simple sin-offering was
sufficient," he says; "and no further special act of penance could
intervene, either when the transgression of a single individual was
first of all observed by others, and then pointed out to him, or
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SIN-OFFERINGS AND TRESPASS-OFFERINGS. 191
when the transgression proceeded from the whole congregation, so

that no one felt himself to be more guilty than another; whereas,
on the other hand, if anything improper or unholy lay at the door
of an individual, of which he alone was conscious at first, or which
he felt at first as pressing upon him alone, without there being any
necessity for others to call upon him to offer an atonement for it,
the atonement could not remain so simple an act, but his atoning
sacrifice had to be increased in a peculiar manner into a trespass-
or penitence-offering; and very frequently even this was not suffi-
cient without compensation for an injury that might possibly have
been deliberately inflicted."
94. Even the view which I have worked out in my Mosaisches
Opfer (pp. 197 sqq.) did not suffice, though Oehler (p. 642) thinks
he must admit, that even if it did not quite hit the mark, it pre-
pared the way for the correct view, which has been brought out
chiefly by the investigations of Rinck and Riehm. Their leading
thoughts are the following: (1.) Every sin is also a debt. As dis-
obedience against the commandment of God, it is sin; but as de-
manding compensation and restoration, it is a debt. (2.) At the
same time, there were many sins to which the term debt was pre-emi-
nently applied, viz., those in which the idea of debt was specially pro-
minent; and from that the offering connected with them received its
name (debt-offering). (3.) But the name Mwx relates not only to
the ethical character of sin, as an injury done to the holy God and
a violation of His rights and claims, but also to its earthly, social
character, inasmuch as earthly, divinely instituted relations and
rights are thereby disturbed and injured. On both accounts com-
pensation and restoration are requisite. Compensation, indeed, for
injury done to God, a sinner is never in himself able to render;
but compensation for the earthly injury, inflicted by his sin, is
often possible, and in such cases it was obliged to be rendered.
(4.) Compensation for the injury done to God was therefore made
by the sacrificial blood, which was placed by the sinner upon the
altar, and covered his sin before Jehovah; and compensation for the
earthly injury by a material reparation of the wrong that had been
done. The two kinds of compensation were most closely related to
each other; and for that reason the term MwAxA was applied not only
to the sacrificial animal, but to the material reparation also (Num.
v. 8; 1 Sam. vi. 4, 8). (5.) Sin-offerings were to be presented for
sins, whose earthly asham could not be paid by the sinner, any more
than the super-terrestrial (or ethical) one. Trespass-. (debt-) offerings,
on the other hand, for sins whose earthly asham could be paid; so
that, in this case, along with the ethical asham, for which the sacri-
ficial expiation intervened, the earthly asham had really to be paid
as well.
There is, for the most part, but little force in the objections made
to this view by Rielam, Rinek, and Keil. At the same time, it would
be useless to enter into any proof of this; since I no longer regard
it as fully meeting every case, in which trespass-offerings were re-
quired and presented without any payment of the earthly asham
being possible ( 100, 101), and am ready to adopt, with a few
slight modifications, the more correct explanation which Riehm has
given. In his opinion, sin-offerings were presented for breaches
of the covenant ordinances and commands, trespass-offerings for
violation of the covenant rights; or, as he has since more cor-
rectly expressed himself,--in consequence of Rinck's objection, that
the contrast between covenant rights and covenant commandments
cannot be sustained, for the simple reason that the former were pro-
tected by the latter, and the violation of the one, therefore, was also
a transgression of the other,--"Trespass-offerings were presented
for such breaches of the covenant commands as were also violations
of covenant rights, and sin-offerings for those transgressions of
covenant commands to which the latter did not apply."
The only point that I should object to as untenable in this
definition, is the emphasis laid upon the violated rights and com-
mands, as covenant rights, and covenant commands. For although
Riehm does not restrict these terms to specifically theocratical rela-
tions, but places them upon a more general moral basis, by includ-
ing the legal relation in which individual Israelites stood to one
another as members of the covenant, a limitation is still involved
which is irreconcilable with the fact that, according to Num. xv.
29, the foreigners dwelling in the Holy Land, who were certainly
not members of the covenant, could also present sin-offerings. Even
Oehler, who defends Riehm's view, has silently removed this limita-
tion; and Knobel (p. 397), who agrees with all the rest, pronounces
the reference to the theocratical covenant incorrect, though the
reasons which he has assigned are untenable. For his allusion to
the offering of an MwAxA on the part of the Philistines for their deten-
tion of the ark which they had carried off (1 Sam. vi. 3), is out of
place, since the Philistines did not offer an ethical, but a material
MwAxA i.e. not a trespass-offering, but simply golden presents as a
compensation; and the observation, that the graduations of both the
atoning act and the atoning material, which existed in the case of
the sin-offering, were wanting in that of the trespass-offering, proves
too much, as Num. xv. 19 evidently shows, and therefore proves
nothing.
95. One objection offered to Riehm's definition by Rinck, and
after him by Keil,--viz., that in the trespass-offering of a leper who
was cured (Lev. xiv. 12 sqq.), and also in that of a Nazarite who
had defiled himself (Num. vi. 12), there was no question of any
violation of the rights of others,--is just as groundless, as their own
explanation of this sin-offering, that it was a service rendered or pay-
ment made for reinstatement in the possession of the lost covenant
rights, or the former state of consecration, is inadmissible ( 101).
Moreover, Rinck (p. 371) declares it to be incorrect to classify the
sacrifices objectively, according to the differences in the sins, instead
of subjectively, according to the kind of expiation; consequently,
he finds the chief point and distinctive feature of the trespass-
offering, not in the sin which required it as a violation of right, but
in the satisfaction to be rendered through the sacrifice or in connec-
tion with it, and regards the following as the difference between
the two, that "the trespass-offering bore the same relation to the
sin-offering as satisfactio to expiatio." Appealing to the law of the
trespass-offering in Lev. v. 17, which is couched in just the same
terms as the directions for the offering of a sin-offering in Lev. iv.
27, he thinks that, as every sin, even where positive covenant rights
were not concerned, was to a certain extent a violation of the rights
of God; a trespass-offering (like a sin-offering) might be presented
for every sin, according as the necessity for satisfaction or for re-
conciliation predominated. In the trespass-offering the troubled
soul brought a compensation for the injury according to the valua-
tion of the priest in the sin-offering, by the laying on of the hand
it put itself on a level with the sacrificial animal, and received
reconciliation through the priestly sprinkling of the blood."
Rinck very properly brings out the idea of satisfaction, i.e., of
compensation for the injury caused by the sin, as an essential feature
in the trespass-offering; but the false application which he gives to
this idea is evident from his statement, that the satisfaction was to be
rendered through the sacrifice, or in connection with it; whereas, on
the contrary, whenever it was rendered at all (and, as a matter of
course, this necessarily took place wherever it was possible), it was
always in connection with the sacrifice, and never through the sacri-
fice itself. The primary object of the sacrifice as such, even of
the trespass-offering, was invariably expiation. Thus in Lev. v.

16, 18, vi. 7, xiv. 18, 21, etc. the words vylAfA rPekal; are expressly ap-
plied to the trespass-offering, which is a sufficient proof of the
incorrectness of the assertion, that sin-offerings and trespass-offer-
ings stand in the same relation to one another as expiatio and
satisfactio. Moreover, it is certainly folly to affirm that the satis-
faction had to be exhibited either through the sacrifice, or in con-
nection with it. The law must have applied either to the one alone
or to the other alone. If the satisfactio took place in connection with
the sacrifice, the sacrifice must have had some other object besides
satisfaction, and that can have been no other than expiation (hrAPAKa ).
And unity of idea required, that even where there was no satisfac-
tion connected with the sacrifice, the sacrifice itself should still serve
the purpose of expiation, and that in that case the element of satis-
faction should not be exhibited through the sacrifice, but rather be
omitted altogether; and this occurred, and could only occur, when
satisfaction was impossible, i.e., where the violation of the rights of
others consequent upon the sin could not be repaired, and compen-
sation could not be made for the injury inflicted.
The same objection applies in the main to Delitzsch, who writes
(p. 743): "The fundamental idea of the sin-offering was the expia-
tion or atonement; that of the trespass-offering, the mulcta or com-
pensation." And when Keil compounds his definition from elements
taken from Riehm and Rinck, and writes (p. 226), that "a trespass-
offering was brought, when the object to be answered was a satis-
faction for the violation of rights, or compensation (payment or
service), for the purpose of obtaining a restitution of theocratical
rights, which the person presenting it had lost," the dualism of he-
terogeneous principles (on the one hand, a wicked violation of right;
and on the other, an innocent loss of right) is but little adapted to
commend the definition, which may be proved to be false on other
grounds as well ( 101). But it is self-deception on the part of
Keil (p. 223), when he imagines that he can reconcile this dualism,
and elevate it to a higher point of unity, by calling the payment or
service demanded for the restitution of complete theocratical right,
satisfaction, and thus laying down "the idea of satisfaction as the
fundamental idea common to all trespass-offerings." For no one can
call the payment or service demanded of me for the restoration of
a right, which has been lost without any fault of my own, a satisfac-
tion. The payment, by which I redeem a right or a possession, is
no satisfaction. For the notion of satisfaction always presupposes
guilt. And if this be admitted, every ground is taken away (at

least, so far as Keil is concerned) for placing the trespass-offering
of the leper and the Nazarite in a different category from the other
trespass-offerings (cf. 101).
96. In Hofmann's opinion (Schriftbeweis, Ed. 1), "hxAFA.Ha was an
action, MwAxA an existing condition of things. The former had taken
place, the latter had grown. The one was conduct, by which the
wrong-doer had violated his relation to the thing with regard to
which he did wrong. The other determined the relation itself,
which consisted of the fact that he had injured another, and was
bound to make reparation" (p. 167). Again, in Ed. 2 he says,
"Sin-offerings and trespass-offerings bore the same relation to one
another, as the transgression of the law and an illegal condition of
things: the latter were presented when, and only when, expiation
was not excuse" (p. 265). "The conflict between an existing state
of things and the law of God demanded a different kind of expia-
tion (in the trespass-offering) from the expiation of an illegal
action" (in the sin-offering). In reply to Keil, who objects that
all conduct brings about an existing condition of things, and every
existing condition of things proceeds from some conduct, from some
action, he still further observes: "He has not understood my
meaning. I am not speaking of a condition of things that has
resulted from an act performed, but of such a condition as might
arise quite as easily without an action as through an action, for
example, in the case of the leper or the Nazarite."
But even with this supplementary restriction, the distinction
laid down by Hofmann is quite untenable. For after the cure of
an issue of blood in the case of a woman, or of seminorhea in that
of a man, there was a "conflict between a continuous state of
things and the law of God," and "a condition of things that had
not resulted from an act performed," quite as much as after the
curing of a leper; and yet this condition of things was not atoned
for and removed by a trespass-offering (Lev. xv. 15, 30), but a sin-
offering was brought to expiate the existing uncleanness. These
examples are sufficient to prove, that the distinction between a state
of things at variance with the law, and an action opposed to the
law, cannot be adduced as determining the difference between tres-
pass-offerings and sin-offerings; for in Lev. xv. conditions are men-
tioned at variance with the law, in which no trespass-offerings were
presented, but on the contrary sin-offerings, although an issue of
blood and seminis emissio were not actions opposed to the law, but
a condition of things at variance with the law. In order to antici-

pate any similar rebuke to that which Keil has received, I will just
add, however, that the last-mentioned incongruity certainly appears
to be removed, when Hofmann states, that in the word action,
which is inapplicable to these circumstances, he includes the term
occurrence (Vorfall), which was to him a consequence of sin."
But in this case he must allow, that the choice of the word " ac-
tion," to determine the general rule for the sin-offering, was a very
unhappy one. Nor can I satisfy myself with the artfully turned
expression, an occurrence, which was to him a consequence of sin.
For a death which happened unexpectedly in the neighbourhood of
a Nazarite, and defiled him, was indeed an occurrence, but not an
occurrence which was to him a consequence of sin; it was only to
the deceased that it was that. The uncleanness resulting from the
infection of his own sinful and mortal nature with the impurity of
the corpse, was the only consequence of sin to the man himself.
The uncleanness which came upon him in this way, might indeed,
as every one would admit, be called a condition or state of things,
but never an action.1 And if the entrance of this uncleanness be
designated an occurrence, I have no objection to offer, but would
simply remark, that on the same ground the entrance of any con-
dition whatever could be, and should be, designated by the same
term.
97. We now proceed to an independent examination of the
subject, and shall restrict ourselves first of all to the complex law in
Lev. v. 14-vi. 7, which undoubtedly refers to the trespass-offering,
and is to be regarded as the fundamental and normal passage in
relation to it. This passage is divided, by the repetition of the in-
troductory formula in chap. v. 14 and vi. 1 ("And Jehovah spake
unto Moses, saying"), into two sections promulgated independently.
But, notwithstanding this, as the similarity of the opening words
If a soul commit a trespass, and sin" (v. 15), a If a soul sin, and
commit a trespass" (vi. 2)) clearly proves, they both treat of a com-
mon description of sins, namely, those which the Hebrew designated
as lfama.
The idea expressed by this word is very obvious. The original
meaning of lfm like that of dgb, was to cover over; then to act in a
covered, deceitful, faithless manner. But in actual use dgb acquired
a different signification from lfm, inasmuch as Jehovah is almost
1
It is hardly necessary to say, that the same remark applies, mutatis mu-
tandis, to the commencement of the leprosy itself.
exclusively introduced as the personal object of the latter (hvhy lfm).

Only in Num. v. 12, 27, is the adulterous conduct of a woman
described as a h.wAyxiB; lfama lfom; (whereas in Ex. xxi. 8 the putting away
of a wife by her husband is condemned as h.bA Odg;Bi; an exception
which is evidently based upon the fact, that the relation of a wife
to her husband was regarded as analogous to that of the congrega-
tion to Jehovah). From this restriction of the personal object of
lfama to Jehovah, which is retained everywhere else,--and that not
merely where the faithlessness and wrong directly affected Jehovah
himself (as, for example, in the case of idolatry, of self-will in
connection with the service of Jehovah, or of the keeping back of
first-fruits, tenths, etc.), but also where they primarily affected a
fellow-citizen or fellow-man (cf. Lev. vi. 2 sqq. ; Num. v. 6 sqq.;
Ezek. xvii. 20; Prov. xvi. 10), it is evident that the distinction
between lfama and dg,B,, was this, that in the latter the wrong inflicted
was regarded simply as a violation of social fidelity between man and
man, in the former as a violation of the covenant fidelity of Israel
towards Jehovah. For, according to Lev. xix. 2, the fundamental
requirement of this covenant fidelity was, Be ye holy as God
is holy;" and this holiness included fidelity to one's neighbour.
The Israelite, who acted faithlessly towards his neighbour, was
also faithless towards Jehovah, because unmindful of his covenant
obligations to Him. And whilst committing a OtymifEBa dg,B,, he ren-
dered himself also guilty of a hOAhyBa lfama. But before a OtymifEBa dg,B,
could be designated as a hOAhyBa lfama, it was unquestionably necessary
that the person acting fraudulently should belong to the covenant
nation of Jehovah; not, however, that the person defrauded should
belong to it also, as Riehm supposes (p. 97). The instance which he
has quoted himself from Ezek. xvii. 20 ought to have convinced
him that this view is wrong; for there King Zedekiah commits a lfama
hOAhyBa through not keeping his oath to the heathen Nebuchadnezzar
(cf. ver. 13). The design of Jehovah in giving His law was not
merely to defend the rights of the members of the covenant one
towards another, but quite as much to preserve the rights of a
heathen in relation to an Israelite. An Israelite could no more rob
and defraud a heathen without breaking the covenant, than he
could his fellow-countrymen and religious associates.
98. Thus, the obligation to present a trespass-offering, which
is referred to in Lev. v. 14-vi. 7 (the basis of the law of the tres-
pass-offering), presupposed a hOAhyBa lfama i.e., a violation of the rights
and claims of others, regarded as a breach of covenant faithfulness
towards Jehovah. But every hOAhyyBa lfama could not be expiated by a

trespass-offering. And the design of the passage before us is to
give more particular information upon this point.
We will commence with the first, and, as we shall soon see, the
leading section, in chap. v. 14-19. It mentions first of all one
particular kind of sins, namely, those committed in connection with
the holy things of Jehovah (hOAhy; ywed;q.Ami). This includes everything
belonging to Jehovah, whether consecrated or laid under a ban
(cf. Jos. vii. 1, Mr,H,Ba lfama), those portions of both the bleeding and
bloodless sacrifices which belonged to the priests (Lev. xxii. 14),
and the first-fruits and tithes, which were set apart for the remune-
ration of the priests and Levites, and were to be looked at in the
light of feudal payments to the divine King of Israel (Num. xviii.
13; Lev. xxvii. 30). But even this class of sins is restricted to
those committed "through ignorance." For the expiation of such
offences two things were enjoined: (1) the restitution of that which
had been kept back, with the addition of a fifth part of its value;
and (2) the offering of a ram without blemish, subject to the priest's
valuation, as a trespass-offering. Thus along with, and previous to,
the ethical MwAxA, there was a material one as well (for the material
compensation for an injury is also called MwAxA in Num. v. 8; 1 Sam.
vi. 4, 8).
So far everything is perfectly clear. But at ver. 17 a by no
means inconsiderable difficulty seems to stand in our way. The
rule for the presentation of a trespass-offering is thus expanded
and made general: "If any one sin, and do one of all the command-
ments of Jehovah (hOAhy; tOc;mi lKomi tHaxa), which he ought not to do,
and knoweth it not (fdayA xlov;), etc." This rule for the trespass-offering
is almost exactly the same as that for the sin-offering in Lev. iv. 2,
22, 27, with this single exception, that instead of fdayA xlov; ("and
knoweth not"), we there find hgAgAw;Bi ("in ignorance"). The earlier
commentators for the most part were at their wits' end here. Bahr
(ii. 401) helped himself out of the difficulty by referring to the
command that the animal to be offered should be valued by the
priest, which is repeated, in ver. 18 from ver. 15, and which was not
given in, the case of the sin-offerings. But it is also wanting in the
case of many of the trespass-offerings; e.g., in Lev. xiv. 12 sqq.;
Num: vi. 12; Lev. xix, 20 sqq., etc. Winer refers to the condition
introduced in Lev. iv. 23, 28 in connection with the sin-offering,
"if it come to his knowledge'' ( vylAxe fdaOh Mxi), which signifies an
objective conviction; whereas, according to Lev. vi. 5, the trespass-
offering presupposed a free confession: But this leads to no con-

elusion, because the section in vi. 1-6 relates to a totally different
class of trespass-offering sins from those referred to in chap. v. 14-19
( 99), and an objective conviction is certainly not intended to be
excluded in vers. 14-19. The opinion expressed by me in my Mos.
Opfer (p. 210 sqq.) was also quite as wrong. I there stated that
the fdayA xlov; (and knoweth not) in chap. v. 17 had respect, not to the
sin committed, but to the commandment broken; and that whilst the
sins referred to in chap. v. 17 were such as had been committed in
ignorance of the command, in those referred to in chap. iv. 22, 27,
ignorance of the commandment could not be pleaded, but thoughtless-
ness, or the absence of intention (hgAgAw;Bi ), in breaking the command.
This view, however, is precluded by the fact that in chap. v. 18 the
sin in question is called a hgAgAw;. The explanation of fdayA xlov; given
by Hofmann is also inadmissible. He says (p. 259): "It is intended
to show, how it was that the sin had not been expiated at once. . . .
Whoever had remained for a length of time unconscious that he had
sinned against the law, was to bring a trespass- (debt-) offering,
apart from the expiation of the sin itself, for the fact that, although
unintentionally, he had allowed the debt to continue so long." But
even in cases where only sin-offerings, and not trespass-offerings,
were to be brought, it must frequently have happened that the
sinner was not conscious of his sin for a long time, and therefore
the expiation was neglected, or the debt continued, until he was
aware of it (cf. chap. iv. 13, 23, 28).--But there is no possible way of
escaping the conclusion that the fdayA xlov; (and knew it not) signifies
exactly the same thing as hgAgAw;Bi in chap. iv. 22, 27, v. 15.--Riehm
was the first to give the true explanation. This passage, he says,
viz., chap. v. 17-19, a has not a new formula of introduction, and
therefore is immediately connected with what precedes (chap. v. 14-
16); so that the same class of sins is intended as before. A more
general application is given in vers. 17-19 to the special law con-
tained in the preceding verses."
In determining the category of the trespass-offering, the law
started with unfaithfulness in connection with what belonged to
Jehovah. But the principle expressed required that it should em-
brace other analogous sins as well. Hence in vers. 17-19 there
follows a generalization of the rule laid down in vers. 14-16 for
circumstances of a particular kind. That the words, "If a soul
commit a trespass, and sin through ignorance" (ver. 15), are to be
understood as more precisely determining the expression, "If a soul
sin" (ver. 17), and therefore that they include fraudulent acts in
connection with another person's property, is evident, so far as the
form is concerned, from the close connection between this precept
and the foregoing one, which is announced contemporaneously with
it, and included in the same "the Lord spake " (ver. 14),--an
argument that possesses all the greater force from the fact that it is
also referred to in the second a the Lord spake," which follows in
chap. vi. 1,--and so far as the substance is concerned, from the
sameness in the expiation required. Keil imagines, indeed (i. 221),
that as no reference is made to a material compensation, the sin
alluded to must be of such a kind as to render such compensation
impracticable. But that is a mistake; for, since it is stated in ver.
18, that a ram is to be offered according to the valuation of the
priest, there must have been some fixed standard of valuations and
that could only be the full compensation for what had been kept
back, with the addition of a fifth, according to the directions of ver.
16, which we must assume to be equally applicable here.
99. In proceeding now to examine the next section, Lev. vi.
1-7, which is introduced, with a new and independent hOAhy; rBeday;va
the Lord spake "), we must endeavour to determine first of all the
point in common between the two, and secondly, their antithetical re-
lation. Common to both is lfama lfom;, which is placed in both instances
at the head, and governs the entire section. But it is quite a mis-
take on the part of some commentators to regard the antithesis be-
tween the two sections as consisting in the fact, that the first treats
of fraud in connection with the property of Jehovah (ver. 15), the
second in connection with that of one's neighbour (vi. 2); for
this antithesis does not apply to the whole of the first section, but
only to the first half (vers. 14-16); whereas the second half (vers.
17-19) undoubtedly includes in its hOAhy; tOc;mi-lKAmi tHaxa (ver. 17) the
breaches of the law mentioned in the second section (denial on
oath of the possession of property stolen, found, obtained by fraud,
or entrusted). The real antithesis, which the commentators have
overlooked, lies in the fact, that the frauds mentioned in the first
section are such as have been committed, hgAgAw;Bi (in ignorance, ver.
15), or, what is quite the same thing, those in which the plea he
knew it not can be put in; whereas in the second section (vi.
1-7) every mark of that kind is wanting, and from the nature of
the sins mentioned, really impossible.
The relation between the two sections is therefore the following.
In vers. 14-19, unconscious want of faithfulness in relation to the
property of Jehovah is the first thing represented as demanding a

trespass-offering; and then the same demand is extended to all
unconscious acts of unfaithfulness, of whatever kind they might be.
This absolves the whole sphere of the trespass-offering, so far as it
is governed and affected by the general principle, that only such
sins as have been committed "in ignorance" admit of sacrificial
expiation. The trespass-offering, as thus bounded (v. 14-19), like
the similarly defined sphere of the sin-offering (iv. 1-v. 13), is
comprehended in one single hOAhy; rBeday;va (iv. 1 and v. 14). But the
truth, that from the complex character of earthly things there is no
rule without an exception, applies even here. And the exception,
which is admissible here, is expressed in a new law by a second
(supplementary) "Thus saith the Lord." For example, in a con-
scious and intentional "trespass" there might be points introduced,
by which the sin was modified and a classification with unintentional
sins rendered possible, especially when the offender, who had at first
denied, and that on oath, a sin which could not be punished be-
cause it could not be proved, afterwards repented and made a spon-
taneous confession. And this is what is added in chap. vi. 1-7.
But this indulgence was not extended to conscious sin in connec-
tion with what belonged to Jehovah, because in that case fraud be-
came sacrilege, which all legislators separate from ordinary theft as
deserving of severer punishment. According to the spirit of the
Mosaic law, it must be assumed that such sins were to be punished
with death; and in Josh. vii. 15 this is confirmed by an actual fact.
A third passage, from which the law of the trespass-offering
may be determined, is Num. v. 5-10. As nothing is said here of
the two modifying circumstances (viz., the absence of intention on
the one hand, and the confession of the crime on the other), under
which a simple trespass-offering, accompanied with the restoration of
the object of the fraud and the addition of one-fifth of the value,
was admissible without any further civil punishment, an acquaint-
ance with the two laws in Leviticus relating to the sin-offering is
evidently presupposed; and so far as they relate to wrong done in
connection with the property of another man, they are rendered still
more precise by the addition of directions, which are wanting there,
as to what is to be done with the material compensation, provided
the person injured should have died in the interim.
100. According to the laws hitherto examined, for every act
of fraud committed by a member of the covenant in connection
with the property of another, whether performed unconsciously and
brought to his knowledge afterwards, or committed knowingly and

afterwards repented of and voluntarily confessed, a trespass-offering
was to be presented for the expiation of the faithlessness involved
towards the holy covenant-God, and restitution to be made to the
rightful possessor, accompanied with the addition of one-fifth of its
value.
But if we look still further at the other cases in which trespass-
offerings were also to be presented, we find that the definition of this
kind of sacrifice which we have obtained from Lev. v., is not in-
correct perhaps, but yet too limited; and it is evident that unfaith-
fulness in connection with the (material) property of another was
not the all-embracing genus, but simply a species, though the main
species, of the sins to be expiated by trespass-offerings, viz., that
which gave rise to the entire institution, and which therefore con-
stituted the standard per analogiam for every case that might be
added afterwards.
The passage which comes closest to the fundamental passage
in Lev. v., and is therefore to be explained most easily from the
principle exhibited there, is Lev. xix. 20-22: "If a man lie with a
woman, and have connection with her, and she is a slave wyxil; tp,r,H<n,,
and not redeemed nor emancipated, a punishment (tr,qo.Bi) shall take
place: they shall not die, for she is not free ; and he shall as his
trespass (OmwAxE-tx,) offer to Jehovah a ram of trespass." wyxil; tpr,H<n,
cannot certainly signify here, that the maid is despised by her
master; for in that case, as Riehm observes (p. 104), we should
expect hAyn,doxEl; or hAyn,doxE yneyfeB;, and it would not have been necessary
expressly to mention that they should not die." Nor can it mean
"betrothed to a man," or even " to her master;" for as betrothed
she would have been guilty of adultery, and therefore liable to be
put to death; and it would be a perfectly unwarrantable exception,
if only a free woman, and not also a slave, had to expiate with death
any violation of conjugal fidelity, either as betrothed or married,--
an exception precluded by the fact, that the children of maids were
treated as legitimate. The expression in question must rather be
rendered, as it has been by Ewald, Hofmann, Bunsen, and others,
given up to a man. According to Ex. xxi. 7-11, every maid was
thus given up to her master, since he possessed the right, at any time
and without reserve, to take her to himself, or give her to his son, as
a concubine.
Hofmann (p. 260) is of opinion, that there is no ground for
assuming that a maid of Israelitish descent is intended here; but
there is certainly no ground for his own assumption, that only a

foreign woman is intended, who had neither honour nor rights. The
truth is, that the text does not exclude either; and the law, there-
fore, was equally applicable to the dishonouring of an Israelitish
maid and to that of a stranger. But this is not the only violence
which Hofmnann has done to the same text, to force it within the
limits of his own preconceived opinion respecting the trespass-
offering. For example, tr,q.oBi he renders inquiry, instead of ven-
geance, punishment. I do not of course dispute the fact, that it
might from its etymology mean inquiry. But the fact certainly is,
that the Talmud and the Rabbins understand it as meaning chas-
tisement, scourging (hence the Vulg. vapulabunt ambo), with which
Furst (Lex. i. 214) compares the AEthiopic lqb and the Arabic rqm
(both signifying "to beat"), and that this meaning at all events is
more suitable to the text than the other. For what could be the
object of an "inquiry in which the circumstances were examined,
and judgment given accordingly," in this particular case, I certainly
cannot see; and the restriction which follows, "they shall not die,"
evidently presupposes corporeal punishment. Hofmann is still more
decidedly mistaken, when he maintains that the wrong in this case
was not a violation of her master's right of possession, and traces it
rather to the fact, that "such a person abstracted from the nation
of God what he expended upon the dishonoured stranger, who had
not the control of her own body, but was without rights, and com-
pletely in the power of her master, and could not bear children
either to him or to his nation:" and also when he still further bases
the necessity for a trespass-offering upon the fact, "that he had to
free himself from the debt which he had incurred, on account of
the reproductive power which had been squandered and lost to his
family and nation." This may suit Hofmann's theory of the tres-
pass-offering perfectly well; but it is so much the less in harmony
with the law, which expressly allowed any Israelite to marry a
woman of foreign descent, who had been taken in war, after she had
cut off her hair, pared her nails, changed her clothes, and mourned
a whole month for her father and mother. And it is well known
that the lawgiver himself married first of all a Midianitish wife, and
afterwards a Cushite. The marriages with foreign wives, which
were untheocratical according to the law, were those in which the
heathen woman remained a heathen still (Judg. iii. 6, 7; Ezra x.
18, 19).
The violation of another person's bondmaid, whether of foreign
or Israelitish descent, is certainly presented in this passage in the

light of an injury done to another's property, and therefore as a
trespass." Her master, as such, possessed the right to the entire
possession of her person, since he could take her without hesitation
to be his concubine. He was defrauded of this right when another
seduced her; but it was not adultery so long as her master had not
actually availed himself of the right, and therefore the punishment
of death was not to be inflicted. But the violence done to the pro-
perty of another had to be expiated, as well as the consequent sin
against Jehovah. The latter was expiated through the trespass-
offering. On the other hand, a positive compensation for the wrong
was impossible. Hence there is nothing said about a valuation of
the rain to be presented. But for a positive compensation there
was substituted a negative one. If the wrong done by the seducer
could not be met positively by something given to the person in-
jured, it could negatively, by something inflicted upon the wrong-
doer. The sensual pleasure which had been enjoyed could be
covered and counterbalanced by corporeal punishment.
101. There is more difficulty connected with Lev. xiv. 12 sqq.,
in which directions are given respecting the trespass-offering to be
presented by the leper at his purification; and with Num. vi. 12,
where the Nazarite, who had defiled himself by touching a corpse,
and thereby had broken his vow, is ordered to present a trespass-
offering at the renewal of his consecration.
Rinck and Keil (i. 221) have disputed the applicability of the
idea of a "trespass" to these two cases. The notion of a violation
of right Keil regards as quite foreign to them both. The leper,
he says, had not brought upon himself the leprosy, which com-
pelled him to abstain for a time from the public worship of God,
but had been seized by it. Nevertheless he had been shut out by
his leprosy, like an excommunicated person, from the possession and
enjoyment of all covenant rights; and it was by means of sacri-
fice that he was to be reinstated in these rights, through a process
of sacerdotal purification. To obtain these rights again, he was to
bring a trespass-offering, as payment for them; upon which he was
formally consecrated like a priest, and thus was restored to the fel-
lowship of the priestly nation. So also the Nazarite, who had
unawares become unclean through a sudden death occurring in his
neighbourhood, had violated no law, but had simply interrupted the
period of his vow, which never ought to have been interrupted,
through the defilement that needed as such to be expiated by a sin-
offering. The trespass itself he was required to make good mate-

rially, by commencing afresh the period of his vow, and by also
bringing a lamb for a trespass-offering as payment or compensation
for reinstatement in his former consecrated condition."
On the inadmissible dualism of heterogeneous principles, which
is introduced by this doctrine into the laws of the trespass-offering,
we have spoken already ( 95);--here, therefore, we have simply to
prove that the second principle is inadmissible also.
When Keil maintains that the leper had not brought his leprosy,
nor the Nazarite his sudden defilement, upon himself; we inquire,
(1) how in that case the law could demand a sin-offering from
him as well as the trespass-offering, seeing that the former un-
doubtedly presupposed moral guilt; (2) how the leprosy could in-
volve the loss of covenant rights, and a payment be demanded for
reinstatement in covenant rights which had been lost without any
fault of his own; (3) how this payment could be made to consist
of a trespass-offering, which served "to make atonement for him"
(Lev. v. 16, 18, vi. 7, xiv. 18, 21); and (4) how nevertheless Keil
himself can possibly speak upon the very same page of a "tres-
pass" to be set right by the trespass-offering, just as he speaks at p.
237 of a "fault which was not of a material, but of a theocratico-
ethical character," and also call, the cured leper and the defiled
Nazarite a "guilty person, who received full pardon at the hands of
God, so that he was restored to full, unlimited possession and en-
joyment of theocratic rights and blessings, and also of the mercy of
God."
The leper had certainly brought his leprosy, with the consequent
exclusion from the congregation, and the Nazarite his defilement,
with the consequent disturbance of his vow, upon himself;--not
indeed by any special, sinful act of the will, but by the sinful
habitus, which is inherent in human nature generally, and there-
fore was inherent in him as an individual, and through which he
was predisposed to the leprosy or to defilement from a corpse, and
without which neither one nor the other could have infected and
clung to him. Even Keil himself, when treating ex professo of the
Levitical purifications, can tell us much that is true and striking
respecting the "connection between these defilements and sin," and
point to the fact (p. 280), that these laws of cleanness were intended
"to awaken and preserve in man the consciousness of sin and guilt,
based as they were upon the assumption that human nature gene-
rally is infected, both body and soul, by sin," etc.
206 DISTINGUISHING CHARACTIRISTIGS OF 'THE BLEEDING SACRIFICES
If, then, in consequence of this sinful corruption of his human

nature, a member of the priestly nation ( 1) was affected with
leprosy, or a consecrated Nazarite defiled by touching a corpse;--
in the first place, the sinful habitus of his nature, which was thus
brought to light, needed expiation; and this was "accomplished, as in
every serious defilement, by a sin-offering. And in the second places
since the uncleanness of leprosy, or the contact of the Nazarite with
a corpse, had caused a disturbance in the covenant relation towards
Jehovah inasmuch as leprosy excluded from the fellowship of the
sanctuary, and the performance of God's service (hdAbofE, Ex. xii:
25, 26, xiii. 5), which was obligatory upon every member of the
covenant-nation, was rendered impossible, whilst the defilement of
the Nazarite prevented the fulfilment of his vow, a wrong had been
inflicted upon Jehovah, which also needed expiation; and this was
accomplished by means of a trespass-offering. And as the other
trespass-offerings were to be accompanied with an augmented com-
pensation for the material injury or loss occasioned by the "trespass,"
so the defiled Nazarite was to gender the same, by commencing the
whole period of his vow afresh. In the case of a leper this was
impossible, and therefore was omitted. But in neither case could
there be any idea of a priestly valuation of the animal of the tres-
pass-offering according to the shekel of the sanctuary (cf. Lev.
18, vi. 6), since the wrong done to Jehovah could not be com-
pensated by money or money's worth, and therefore furnished no
standard for the valuation of the sacrificial animal. Moreover, the
two cases are analogous to the one quoted in Lev. v. 14-16, and
therefore are to be regarded as a kind of "trespass in the holy
things of the Lord."
102. After all, the idea of the trespass-offering must be defined
as relating to the violation of the rights and claims of others, or, as
we might put it, to some kind of robbery committed upon others,
not merely in material possessions and property which it would be
possible to restore, but in rightful and obligatory services, based
upon agreement or covenant, the neglect of which, from their very
nature, could not always be compensated afterwards. In the case
of the former, as a matter of course, the compensation (augmented
by the addition of one-fifth of the value) necessarily preceded the
offering; whilst in that of the latter it could only be required when
and so far as it was possible.
This expresses also the point of difference from the sin-offering,
which was connected with all such sins as could not be regarded as
a robbery (either of God as the covenant ally and King of Israel,

or of a fellow-man), committed upon earthly possessions, or upon
services required by duty or compact. The common canon for
sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, which is expressed in essen-
tially the same terms, for the former in Lev. iv. 22, 27, and for
the latter in Lev. v. 17, enjoins that they shall both be presented
on the breach of any one of all the commandments of Jehovah
(hOAhy; tOc;mi-lKAmi tHaxa). But the canon of the sin-offering in Lev. v.17
is distinguished and restricted by the clause lfama lfom;ti-yKi wp,n, in ver.
15, which governs the entire section, Lev. v. 14-19; whereas in the
law of the sin-offering no such restriction is laid down (cf. 98,
99). The state of the case, therefore, is the following:--Originally
and primarily a sin-offering was appointed for the transgression of
any of the commandments of Jehovah; but in the further de-
velopment of the laws in question, all such breaches of the com-
mandments of God as could be looked upon in the light of a lfm
were excepted from this rule, and a different kind of sacrifice, viz.,
the trespass-offering, appointed. This appears, therefore, as a sub-
ordinate species of sin-offering, modified in a peculiar manner.
This distinction between the sin-offering and trespass-offering in
the law of sacrifice corresponds to the distinction in the usage of the
Hebrew language between tOc;mi and MyFiPAw;mi. As the sin-offering
was originally intended for all sins, so the term tOc;mi frequently
denotes the whole of the commandments of God ( =hrAOT ). But just
as the subordinate idea of the trespass-offering developed itself
from the primary idea of the sin-offering, and the trespass-offering
assumed a settled form as an independent branch of the sin-
offering, so that henceforth the two stood side by side; so out of
the general idea of tOc;mi there sprang the special idea of MyFiPAw;mi,
and the term tOc;mi came eventually to designate only such com-
mandments as were not also MyFiPAw;mi (i.e., determinations of those
rights, which in a theocratical commonwealth the one had to de-
mand, and the other to receive, in their relation one to another),
and the whole law is called MyFiPAw;mihav; tOc;mi.ha, the commandments
and the judgments" (Lev. xxvi. 3; Num. xxxvi. 13).
The analysis here given is based upon the admirable work of
Rehm (p. 106 sqq; but I cannot follow him when he proceeds
to maintain (p. 109) that "the word tOc;mi in the laws of the sin-
offering in Lev. iv. and Num. xv. 22, is to be taken in the more
limited sense as not including the MyFiPAw;mi. "For in that case, in
the description of the domain of the trespass-offering in Lev. v. 17,
as distinguished. from that of the sin-offering, the expression MyFiPAw;mi

would necessarily have been employed, and the same term tOc;mi
could not possibly have been used. Riehm himself has felt this;
but he has by no means met the difficulty by his romantic supposi-
tion, that "in this passage the writer made use of a formula from
the law of the sin-offering, for the purpose of generalizing the
preceding command." In opposition to this erroneous view (but
only in opposition to it), Keil is, in part at least, perfectly correct,
when he replies at p. 226: "Although a distinction can be made
between covenant commands and covenant rights, covenant rights
are never opposed or placed in antithesis to covenant commands
(? cf. the examples already cited, Lev. xxvi. 3; Num. xxxvi. 13);
least of all in the precepts respecting the sin-offerings and tres-
pass-offerings, where one species of the transgressions requiring a
sin-offering is described as the doing of tOc;mi which ought not to be
done." The true explanation is, that in both passages (in Lev. v. 17
as well as iv. 27) tOc;mi-lKA includes all the commands of God without
exception; but that in Lev. v. 17 the expression is limited to the
MyFiPAw;mi in by the clause, "if a soul commit a trespass," which has to
be supplied from ver. 15, and in Lev. iv. is reduced to such tOc;mi
as were not also MyFiPAw;mi by the introduction of exceptions that
required a sin-offering (Lev. v. 14 sqq.).
103. Lastly, we must also examine the previous section, Lev.
v. 1-13. On account of ver. 6, "and he shall bring his trespass-
offering unto the Lord for his sin," this section was formerly re-
garded as the introduction to the law of the trespass-offering and
even Bahr adopted this view. But I opposed it in my Mos. Opfer
(p. 229 sqq.), and endeavoured to prove that it was intended to be
regarded as a continuation of the section relating to the sin-offering.
With the single exception of Hofmann (pp. 263-4), all the more
recent expositors have adopted my view, and to some extent added
force to my arguments. Hofmnann's opposition to this view renders
it necessary that I should enter into a more minute examination of
this question.
The only objection that Hofmann is able to offer to our view is
the expression, he shall bring his trespass-offering, in ver. 6,
which cannot have any other meaning than the same words in ver.
15 or chap. vi. 6. But there is a great difference between ver. 6
and the other two passages. For in both the latter, after the
sacrificial animal to be offered has been mentioned, a second MwAxAl;
is added to the expression hOAhyla OmwAxE-tx,, and it is that addition
which distinguishes the sacrifice in question as a trespass-offering

(cf. chaps. xix. and xxi.). In ver. 6, on the other hand, txF.AHal;: is
added in a similar way, and by this the sacrifice is distinguished as
a sin-offering. Ver. 6, therefore, is to be rendered, "let him bring
as his asham (= his debt) for his sin a female sheep as a sin-
offering;" and ver. 15, and chap. vi. 6, "let him bring as his debt
a ram for a trespass-offering." For it is evident that in connection
with the sin-offering there was also a debt, an asham, to be ex-
piated, from the fact that in chap. iv., where the sins which re-
quired a sin-offering are mentioned, prominence is expressly given
every time to the asham which was thereby to be expiated. And
not only in ver. 6, but throughout the entire section, wherever the
object of the sacrifice is expressly indicated, we find txF.AHal;, never
MwAxAl; (vers. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12); and when in conclusion it is enjoined
that neither oil nor wine is to be added, the reason assigned is that
it is a sin-offering (xyhi txF.AHa yKi). It is true, this has not escaped
the notice of our opponent. "Undoubtedly," he says, " this must
also be borne in mind, that it is nevertheless stated in ver. 6, that
the animal presented as a trespass-offering served txF.AHal;." But
how thoroughly romantic is the explanation which Hofmann gives
of this striking mode of expression! "All the cases enumerated
in vers. 1-4," he says, "remind us so far of the cases classed
together above, in which trespass-offerings were required, that in
every instance a condition of things opposed to the divine command
had lasted for some time before the expiatory payment was made.
. . . There are faults which impress those who perceive them as
demanding a trespass-offering, whereas from their true nature they
require sin-offerings instead. For this reason it is said, 'let him
bring his trespass-offering,' which is then treated as a sin-offering."
The following brief summary is given by Hofmann himself of
the cases mentioned in vers. 1-4: (1) When a man had omitted to
furnish information which he was solemnly bound to furnish; (2)
when a man had touched something unclean, and was not aware of
it till afterwards (?); (3) when a man had thoughtlessly given his
word on oath that he would perform a certain thing, and was not
really conscious till some time afterwards that he had taken such an
oath.--Here we must remark, however, that Hofmann added the
"not till afterwards," and "not till some time afterwards," of which
there is not a syllable in the text, from his own fancy, in order that
the sin, which "from its nature required a sin-offering," might have
to some extent the appearance which was requisite to enable him to
state, on the basis of his theory of the trespass-offering (which we

have already proved to be erroneous, 96, 98), that it "impressed
those who perceived it as requiring a trespass-offering." A man
might abstain from giving the testimony demanded, or touch an
unclean thing unawares, or promise something on oath without
consideration, and become aware of it immediately after it had oc-
curred. In the vast majority of cases, in fact, it would be so. But
could such cases be regarded as studiously excluded from vers. 1-4,
instead of being classified under them? Certainly not. So that
there is not a word in the text about what, according to Hofmann,
was to produce the (deceptive) impression, that the case referred to
was suitable for a trespass-offering. And as Hofmann himself
maintains that from their very nature all these cases required a
sin-offering, there is no necessity to bring proofs of this fact.
104. The other reasons adduced by Riehm and myself for not
including Lev. v. 1-13 among the laws of the trespass-offering, are
ignored by Hofmann; but they are clear and conclusive notwith-
standing. They are the following: (1) The section is shown to be
closely connected with the foregoing one, so that the two together
make but one whole, by the fact that in the entire passage from
chap. iv. 1 to v. 13 the introductory formula, "And Jehovah spake
to Moses, and said," is only inserted once, viz., at the commence-
ment in chap. iv. 1, and that it is not repeated at chap. v. 1;
whereas the following section, again, is proved to be a new law by
the repetition of this introductory formula in chap. v. 14. (2) As
the sins mentioned in chap. v. 1-4 are introduced in other places as
requiring, not trespass-offerings, but sin-offerings (particularly de-
filement, Lev. xii. 6-8, xv. 15, 30, etc.), so, on the other hand, the
animals prescribed in chaps. v. and vi. (a ewe-sheep or goat) do not
occur anywhere else in connection with the trespass-offerings, but
only with the sin-offerings of the common people (Lev. iv. 28, 32).
(3) In the sections relating to the trespass-offerings, we certainly
never read anything about the exchange of the sacrificial animal
(vers. 7 sqq.) for another of inferior value, or for bloodless offerings,
on account of the poverty of the person presenting them; whereas
there are unquestionably other places where this occurs in the laws
relating to the sin-offerings (Lev. xii. 8, xiv. 21). The latter, which
is the principal point, Hofmann does not refer to. On the other
hand, he discusses the question, whether the exchange permitted in
vers. 7 sqq. is to be restricted to the cases mentioned in vers. 1-4, or
whether it is to be regarded as a general rule for all cases of sin-
offering. He decides in favour of the former. For, in his opinion,

the mode of transition in ver. 7 places it beyond the reach of doubt,
that the subject of ver. 7 is identical with the subject of vers. 1-4.
We may admit that this opinion is well founded, without on that
account being forced to the conclusion, that the permission in
question was only granted exceptionally in certain peculiar cases
where sin-offerings and trespass-offerings were prescribed. Hofmann
himself maintains, with perfect correctness, that the three cases
cited in vers. 1-4 are merely intended as specimens of a whole
series of similar transgressions. And if this be the case, the three
series of transgressions thus indicated may be regarded as represent-
ing the whole range of sin-offerings. Both here, and in Lev. xii. 8
and xiv. 21, the law mentions poverty on the part of the person
presenting the offering as the sole and exclusive ground for the
change; whereas Hofmann is obliged to seek for the main ground
in the fact, that "all these faults admitted of an excuse," of which
there is not a syllable to be found in any one of the passages. And
the one excuse mentioned in connection with the faults named in
chap. v. 1-4, might be pleaded in an equal measure, and for the
most part undoubtedly in a still higher degree, in connection with
all the sins committed "in ignorance," which are described in Lev.
iv. as demanding a sin-offering. But the real reason why a modi-
fication was regarded as admissible in the sin-offerings and not in
the trespass-offerings of the common people, on account of poverty,
is to be found in the characteristic distinctions between the two;
that is to say, in the fact that it was in the latter alone that there
was any question of the robbery of earthly goods or sources, which
demanded an equal restitution from both rich and poor.
105. Hitherto we have spoken simply of such sin-offerings
and trespass-offerings, as had to be presented for the expiation of
particular offences that are mentioned by name. But in addition
to these, sin-offerings had also to be presented on all the feast-days
for the whole congregation, without any reference to particular sins.
This raises two questions, that we must examine and endeavour to
answer: (1) How is this fact to be reconciled with the assertion
made in 86, that both sin-offerings and trespass-offerings were
invariably presented for the expiation of certain overt acts of sin,
and not, like the burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, merely for the
expiation of general sinfulness? and (2) why were only sin-offer-
ings presented at the feasts for the whole congregation, and not
trespass-offerings also?
The first of these two questions may be answered without diffi-

culty. If, as we have seen in 89-91, "ignorance," or "not
knowing," constituted the true, fundamental, and determining
characteristic of those sins which could be, and were to be, sub-
jected to expiation by means of a sin-offering, as soon as the sinner
became conscious of them; and if, on the other hand, there is
ample ground for the words of the Psalmist (Ps. xix. 12), "Who
can tell how oft he offendeth? forgive my hidden faults," and the
lawgiver himself was conscious of their force; he might assume
with undoubted certainty, that in every interval between the feasts,
a number of such sins had been committed, that were not expiated
because not known, and which were therefore made the subject of
a summary expiation (see especially Lev. xvi. 16, 21).
The second question is more difficult to answer. Among the
offences of the congregation which had remained undiscovered, and
therefore unexpiated, and which were to be subjected to a general
expiation at the feasts, it may certainly be assumed, that there
would be some which, from their nature, demanded a trespass-
offering. Why then was no trespass-offering presented for these?
Of the two classes of sins to be expiated by trespass-offerings,
which are described on the one hand in Lev. v. 14-19, and on the
other in Lev. vi. 1-7, those of the second class, viz., those which
had been committed consciously, but had afterwards been repented
of and voluntarily confessed at the instigation of the sinner's own
conscience ( 99), could not, of course, come into consideration;
for they did not admit of expiation in themselves; and when they
did so in consequence of the repentance and confession of the
sinner himself, they still stood in need of special expiation. But so
far as the sins of the first class were concerned, viz., acts of fraud
and robbery committed "in ignorance," no trespass-offering could
be presented at the feasts for offences of this kind which remained
unacknowledged and unatoned for, simply because it was essential to
the very nature of this kind of sacrifice, that the sacrificial expiation
should be based, so far as it was possible, upon a previous material
restitution. Thus, from the very nature of the case, trespass-offer-
ings could only be presented for acknowledged sins. Hence for sins
which required trespass-offerings, but had not been acknowledged,
it was necessary that sin-offerings should be presented; and that
could be done, because the trespass-offering was merely a subordi-
nate kind of sin-offering with peculiar modifications. In a sum-
mary act of sacrifice, the expiation effected by the sin-offering
RITUAL OF THE SIN-OFFERING AND TRESPASS-OFFERING. 213
might be regarded as comprehending that of the trespass-offering;

but not vice versa. And the classified expiation for the acknow-
ledged sins of individuals returned, so far as the unacknowledged
sins of the whole congregation were concerned, to its original uni-
formity.
CHAPTER II.
RITUAL OF THE SIN-OFFERING AND TRESPASS-OFFERING.
106. Before proceeding to an examination of the ritual of the

SIN-OFFERINGS, we must first of all cast a look at the peculiar
directions given with reference to the materials to be employed.
Apart from those sin-offerings which were presented in con-
nection with Levitical purifications, as well as at the new moons
and yearly feasts, or on occasions of special solemnity (e.g., the
consecration of the priests and Levites, of the tabernacle, etc.) ; a
young bullock, i.e., a bullock in the full vigour of youth (Lev. iv.
3), was offered for the expiation of the sins of the high priest, as
the head and representative of the whole congregation.1 And
1
The rule in question commences thus: "If the priest that is anointed
do sin to the inculpation of the nation (MfAhA tmaw;xal;), etc." By the anointed
priest, according to Lev. iv. 16, xvi. 32, xxi. 10, the high priest alone must
be intended; for he alone was consecrated by the complete anointing of his
head (Lev. viii. 12), whereas his sons were merely sprinkled with anointing oil
(Lev. viii. 30). This is the opinion of commentators generally. Yet what is
most striking is, that no instructions are given respecting the animals to be
offered by the ordinary priests, and yet their expiation would hardly be included
in any of the other categories mentioned in Lev. iv. The commentators pass over
this difficulty, as though it had no existence at all. But if their expiation could
neither be placed on a par with that of the private individual, nor with that of
the prince, no other course is open than to compare it to that of the high priest.
Nevertheless we must adhere to the opinion, that Lev. iv. 3 refers to the high
priest alone, to the exclusion of his sons. We are shut up to this not only by the
settled usage of the expression "the anointed priest," but also by the phrase
MfAhA tmaw;xal; (to the inculpation of the nation). On this phrase Knobel has
justly remarked: "The sin intended could only be one which he had committed
in his official capacity as head of the nation." But the rest of the sentence is
wrong: to the exclusion of smaller private offences; for it is evident from
Lev. x. 6, xxi. 10, 11, that even in the case of private offences, the high priest
was still regarded as the anointed one, i.e., in his official capacity. At all times,
and under all circumstances, he was ever the high priest, the head and repre-
214 RITUAL OF THE SIN-OFFERING AND TRESPASS-OFFERING.
both for external and internal reasons, the demand could not
be stretched any further, even in the expiation of the whole con-
gregation, including the entire priesthood (Lev. iv. 13). On the
other hand, a he-goat (Myz.ifi ryfiW;) sufficed for the expiation of a
prince (xyWinA) of the congregation (Lev. iv. 23); and a she-goat or
sheep for that of one of the common people (Lev. iv. 28, 32, v. 6).
But in cases of extreme poverty, instead of the goat or lamb, two
pigeons might be offered (one for a sin-offering, the other for a
burnt-offering); and where even this could not be procured, a
bloodless offering might be presented as a substitute for the bleed-
ing sacrifice, viz., the tenth of an ephah of semmel (white) meal,--
though without oil or incense, for the purpose of distinguishing it
from the meat-offering, and so indicating its character as a sin-
offering (Lev. v. 7, 11; cf. 60).
The first thing which strikes us in these regulations is the
graduation in the object sacrificed, according to the theocratical
position of the person sacrificing; and an explanation of this is all
the more requisite, from the fact that it does not occur in connec-
tion with any other kind of sacrifice. The explanation is no doubt
to be found in the fact, that expiation by means of a sin-offering
had reference to special sins, which are particularly named, and
not merely to general sinfulness like the burnt-offering and peace-
offering, and therefore bore a more individual, or more distinctly
personal character; and also, that the higher the offending indivi-
dual stood in the scale of theocratical office and rank, the greater
was the moral guilt involved in his offence. The sins which required
sin-offerings were such as had been committed directly and imme-
diately against Jehovah, as the Holy One and Lawgiver in Israel,
and against Him alone; whereas those which required trespass-
offerings, being violations of merely earthly rights and claims, were
committed primarily against the earthly holders of such rights and
claims (including Jehovah also in the capacity of feudal Lord of the
land). Fraud in connection with the property of another bore pre-
cisely the same character, whether the guilty person were a priest,
a prince, or a private individual, and required the same material
compensation in every case; so that the ethical compensation which
sentative of the nation, and on no occasion was regarded as acting without the
anointing, and merely as a private individual. Hence an offence of the high
priest always brought guilt upon the congregation (Lev. x. 16), just as a family
was involved in the sin of its head (Josh. vii. 24), and a nation in the sin of its
ruler (2 Sam. xxiv. 10 sqq).
accompanied it, and was estimated according to it, was also the same
for all in the case of the trespass-offering. On the other hand, it
made a difference of no slight importance, whether the priest or the
common man had defiled himself in consequence of imprudence.
(On the substitution of the bloodless offering for the bleeding sacri-
fice in the case of the sin-offering, we have said all that is neces-
sary at 60.)
107. In the ritual of the sin-offering, the presentation, the
imposition of hands, and the slaying of the animal presented no
peculiar or unusual features, but in the sprinkling of the blood the
distinctions are all the more surely and decidedly marked. Whereas
in all the other kinds of sacrifice the blood was poured indifferently
round about the altar of the fore-court, in the sin-offering, even of
the lowest grade--those of the common people for example--it was
not to be sprinkled, lest the intention should be overlooked, but
smeared with the finger upon the horns of the altar ("and the
priest shall put of the blood upon the horns," Lev. iv. 7, 18, 25, 30,
34). This was also done in the case of the sin-offering of a prince
of the congregation (Lev. iv. 25, 30, 34). But in the sin-offering
of the high priest, and that of the whole congregation, the officiating
priest took the blood into the Holy Place, sprinkled (hz.Ahi) some of it
seven times with his finger before Jehovah against the Parocheth1
(the curtain of the Holy of Holies), and then smeared it upon the
horns of the altar of incense (Lev. iv. 5 sqq., 16 sqq.). The blood
which had not been used was poured out, in the case of all the sin-
offerings, at the foot of the altar of burnt-offering, probably behind
the lattice-work which surrounded it ( 11). The act of expiation
was carried to a still higher point in the principal sin-offerings of
the great day of atonement. The blood was then taken into the
Holy of Holies itself, and there sprinkled upon the Capporeth
( 200).
All differences in. the ceremonial, which coincided, as gradua-
tions of the expiatory act, with corresponding graduations in the
material employed, according to the theocratical position of the
person sacrificing, and which rested upon the same foundation
1
According to Hofmann and Knobel tk,ropA yneP;-tx, (Lev. iv. 6, 17) signifies
before the Parocheth, i.e., upon the ground in front of it. But this is improba-
ble; for in that case the most holy blood would have been trodden beneath the
feet of the priests officiating in the Holy Place, or at any rate of the high priest
when entering the Holy of Holies on the day of atonement, and would thereby
have been profaned.
( 106), are to be accounted for from the differences in the signifi-

cation of the sacred places and things which were immediately con-
cerned ( 12 sqq.). The fore-court was the place for the unpriestly
nation, or rather the nation that had not yet grown up to its priestly
calling ( 1). For that reason the expiation of all the non-priestly
members of the nation, the prince as well as the beggar, was neces-
sarily sarily effected there. The Holy Place, on the other hand, was the
place where the priest really served Jehovah, and held communion
with Him, and where the priestly nation, according to its vocation,
ideally did the same. Here, therefore, the expiation of the priest
was effected, and also that of the nation as a whole, which still
retained its priestly character in its entirety and as distinguished
from the rest of the nations, though the individuals composing it
might have forfeited theirs. The expiation of the priestly nation
was effected in the Holy Place, to show that its ideal calling to the
priesthood, which had been disturbed by the sin to be expiated, was
restored, and that it still possessed the hope and claim to enter really
at some future day upon that priestly calling which it only possessed
ideally now. But the highest culmination in the process of expia-
tion, which could only be effected once a year, and then by the
high priest alone, was assigned to the Holy of Holies, which was
closed even to the priests at every other time (Lev. xvi.), as a
typical sign that the nation would one day reach the summit of its
history, in consequence of that highest, most perfect, and primary
expiation of which this was but a feeble copy, and would then dwell
within the light of the now unapproachable glory of Jehovah.
The application of the blood to the horns of the altar may be
explained from the significance of the horns themselves, as the
elevated points, in which the idea of the altar culminated ( 13).
It was done, as Oehler says, "to bring the atoning blood as near as
possible to God," and thus to increase its atoning efficacy. The
sprinkling seven times, whether against or in front of the curtain,
had reference not to the curtain itself, which was not an instrument
of expiation, but to the Capporeth behind it, which was thus to be
sprinkled not directly, but indirectly. In Keil's opinion, indeed,
this affords but little explanation. But to my mind, if properly
understood, it explains everything. The sprinkling of the curtain,
which concealed the Holy of Holies, indicated that the ultimate
intention of the atoning act was to reach the highest and most per-
feet medium of expiation, but that in the present standpoint of the
plan of salvation there was still an obstructing veil between. This
sevenfold sprinkling against the Parocheth was not an independent

act of expiation, or so distinct from the smearing of the horns of
the altar of incense, that it would be right to speak of a twofold
expiation; but it was one with it, and to be understood as im-
pressing upon it the character of a substitute for the sprinkling
of the Capporeth, which was what was really necessary. In con-
nection with this it may still be maintained, that the sevenfold
repetition of the act, which was not a leading but an auxiliary one,
was determined by the force of the number seven as the sign of
covenant-fellowship.
Lastly, so far as the arrangement was concerned, that all the
blood which was not used in sprinkling should invariably be poured
at the foot of the altar of burnt-offering, I cannot adopt Keil's
explanation, that in this way the whole of the sacrificial blood was
brought to the place of God's presence, and thus it was indicated
that the soul was received not partially merely, but entirely into the
gracious fellowship of the Lord. There are three reasons why I
cannot do so: first, because the idea that it was possible for only
one portion of the soul to be received into the gracious fellowship
of the Lord and the other to be excluded, is so unintelligible and
far-fetched, that there certainly could be no necessity for the law of
sacrifice to notice it at all; secondly, because the altar itself, and
not the foundation of the altar, or the ground upon which it stood,
was "the place of God's presence;" and when Jehovah promised
in Ex. xx. 24, "There will I come unto thee, and bless thee," He
certainly did not refer to the foundation of the altar, or the ground
upon which it stood and thirdly, because even thus the end sup-
posed would not be attained, inasmuch as this separation of the soul
would be most obviously expressed in the case of those sacrifices in
which the blood was brought into the Holy Place, and the smaller
portion of the soul would be brought into the higher fellowship
with God, represented by the Holy Place, whilst by far the larger
portion of the soul would only be brought into the inferior fellow-
ship represented by the fore-court. The pouring away of the re-
mainder of the blood at the foot of the altar, was nothing more
than a fitting arrangement by which the blood was disposed of in a
sacred place, and thus saved from profanation.
108. The directions given in the law, with reference to the
course to be adopted with the FLESH of the sin-offering, are quite as
peculiar as those relating to the blood, and still more complicated
and difficult to understand.
The BURNING upon the altar did not apply to the whole animal,
as in the case of the burnt-offering, but was restricted, as in the
peace-offering, to the FAT PORTIONS (MybilAHEha) alone. From re-
peated statements in the law of the sin-offering (Lev. iv. 10; 26,
35), it is evident that these were the very same portions as were
burned in the case of the peace-offering (Lev iii. 3-5, 9, 10, 15).
Four different portions were included, when the sacrifice consisted
of a bullock or a goat, viz.: (1) the fat which covered the viscera,
i.e., the great network of fat "which extended from the stomach
over the intestines, and enveloped the latter; (2) the fat upon the
intestines, i.e., the fat "which had formed upon the intestines, and
could easily be taken off;" (3) the two kidneys, with the fat in
which they were enclosed ; and (4) the dbEKAha-lfa tr,t,yo, also called
dbeKAh Nmi tr,t,yo, or merely dbeKAha tr,t,yo (Lev. viii. 16, 25, ix. 19, etc.).
By the latter, Gesenius, Bahr, Ewald, Keil, and others understand,
like the LXX. (lobo<j), the great liver-lobe: But this, being a com-
ponent part of the liver itself, could not be spoken of as upon the
liver, nor was it a fat portion like all the rest; moreover, it could
not be obtained by merely loosening or peeling off, but only by
cutting the liver in pieces. For this reason, it is more correct to
regard it as the so-called small net or caul of the liver, "which
commences between the two lobes of the liver, and stretches across
the stomach to the neighbourhood of the kidneys" (Luther, De
Wette, Fiirst, Knobel, Oehler, Bunsen, etc.). In addition to these,
when a sheep was sacrificed, there was (5) the fat tail, which fre-
quently "weighs fifteen pounds and upwards in some species of
oriental sheep, and consists entirely of something intermediate be-
tween marrow and fat."
109. On the meaning of this selection, Ewald writes as follows
(p. 45):--"The different portions are generally called simply the
fat, that is to say, the internal part; but, strange to say, the heart
and the other blood-vessels are never included." In a note he adds,
"where sheep are referred to, the tail is added: so thoroughly had
the simple notion of fat, as such, gradually become predominant."
The fundamental idea embodied in this opinion has been appro-
priated by Keil (i. 231). In connection with the view formerly
advocated by myself, but which I now find to be erroneous, with
regard to the flesh of the sacrifice ( 77, 78), he says : "If the flesh
of the victim generally represented the body of the person sacrific-
ing as the organ of the soul, the fat portions of the inward part of
the body, together with the kidneys, which were regarded as the
seat of man's tenderest and most secret emotions, could only repre-
sent the better part or inmost kernel of humanity, the psychical
body (sw?ma yuxiko<n), and the rest of the flesh merely the outer
man, the sw?ma xoi*ko<n, a distinction analogous to that drawn by the
Apostle Paul in Rom. vii. 22, 23, between the inner man (o[ e@sw
a@nqrwpoj) and the members (ta> me<lh)."
This explanation, with its contradictory consequences ( 111,
114, 219), might well be regarded as the most unfortunate part of
Keil's sacrificial theory. For it is evident at the first glance, that
the selection of the altar-portion, as instituted by the law, is too
narrow for that theory on the one hand, and too broad for it on the
other.
In the first place, it is too broad for it. At p. 217, Keil has
faithfully reported that the fat tail was burnt along with the fat
from the inside, whenever a sheep was sacrificed. But when he
proceeds to the explanation of the burning of the sin-offering, he
stedfastly and consistently ignores the tail. He speaks everywhere
merely of "fat portions from the inside," of "internal fat." But
it is easy to see why the fat tail is so studiously avoided. For it
must be evident to any one, that the fat tail cannot represent the
inner man," the "inmost kernel of humanity," the "inner, better
part of human nature," the "seat of a man's tenderest and most
secret emotions." And if Keil's interpretation of the fat portions
is inapplicable to the fat tail, it must also be regarded as errone-
ous so far as the other portions of fat are concerned. To Ewald,
with his historical and critical assumptions, this difficulty is by no
means an insuperable one; but with Keil's historical views, there is
no way of overcoming it. Nothing is gained, however, by ignoring
an insuperable difficulty.--In the second place, the selection is also
too narrow for Keil's interpretation. For if the contrast between
the fat portions and the rest of the flesh is really to be understood
in the way he supposes, the heart, as being the central seat of the
inmost and noblest emotions, ought certainly to have been placed
upon the altar; and it would have been far better to select the en-
trails themselves (the MyimaHEra) as the seat of pity, love, compassion,
mildness, and goodness, instead of the net of fat which surrounds
them, and the liver itself, instead of the liver-caul. It is true, Keil
understands by tr,t,yo, not the liver-net, but the liver-lobe. But this
is of no avail; for in that case the liver itself would certainly have
been placed whole upon the altar, and not merely a portion of it.
We may also see how thoroughly wrong Keil's explanation is,
if we inquire into the symbolical worth assigned to the fat from a

psychological point of view. The conclusion to which our inquiry
leads is, that the fat is the symbol of want of feeling or sensibility,
obstinacy, and hardness of heart,--the very opposite of what Keil
supposes it to indicate. It is quite enough to point to Isa. vi. 10,
where a layer of fat, formed about the heart, is a sign and proof of
the hardening of the heart. And according to the analogy of this
passage, the folds of fat which envelope the entrails, kidneys, and
liver, when looked at from the standpoint of psychological inter-
pretation, can only indicate a quality that deadens and destroys all
the nobler feelings and emotions, of which they are the symbolical
expression.
But the simple contrast of sw?ma yuxiko<n and sw?ma xoi*ko<n, of
o[ e@sw a@nqrwpoj (the inner man) and ta> me<lh (the members), and
still more the parallel drawn between this antithesis and that of
the outward flesh and the inward fat, can hardly be exempted
from the charge of great obscurity, and a confusion of dogmatical,
ethical, and psychological notions. The lobes of fat, the kidneys,
the liver-lobe, and the fat fail represent, we are told, the e@sw
a@nqrwpoj (the inner man), and this is identical with the psychical
body, whereas the rest of the flesh represents "the members," as
opposed to the psychical body. We will lay no stress upon the
fact, that the sw?ma xoi*ko<n (the earthly body) is not a biblical ex-
pression or idea, but one arbitrarily formed, and not very happily
chosen in this connection.1 But how is it possible to designate
the "psychical body" (sw?ma yuxiko<n) as the innermost kernel of
humanity, and to identify it with the "inner man"? Is not the
psychical (natural) body distinctly spoken of in 1 Cor. xv. 42
sqq, as the corruptible and perishable part of man, and identified
with the "outward man," the "members," the "flesh and blood,
which cannot inherit the kingdom of God? Is not the real anti-
thesis to the sw?ma yuxiko<n the sw?ma pneumatiko<n or "spiritual
body"? and the antithesis to the a@nqrwpoj xoi*ko<j, or "earthly
man," the a@nqrwpoj e]poura<nioj or "heavenly man"? Must not
the sw?ma yuxiko<n, therefore, be rather identical with the sw?ma
xoi*ko<n (if indeed the expression be admissible at all)? How has
Keil, then, come to identify it with the "inner man," notwith-
standing the Scriptures? Whether we take the Bible, the rules of
1
It is true we read in 1 Cor. xv. 47 sqq. of a prw?toj a@nqrwpoj e]k gh?j
xoi*ko<j (the first man is of the earth, earthy); but the Apostle neither speaks,
nor could speak, of a sw?ma xoi*ko<n.
language, or logic as our guide, if we seek for a contrast to the

"earthly body," must we not necessarily find it in the "spiritual"
or a heavenly body"? Keil, indeed, could not make use of this,
because his "psychical body" (="the inner man ") is still in need
of purification by fire, of separation from earthly dross. And this
difficulty is not removed by exchanging the "spiritual body" for
the "psychical body," in Keil's sense of the word, as equivalent to
the "inner man." The "earthly man" does require, indeed, such
purification and separation from dross, because the "spiritual" or
heavenly body" is fettered and imprisoned within it; but Keil's
"psychical body," the idea of which is identified with that of the
"inward man," and excludes the idea of the "earthly body" or the
"members," neither requires nor admits of such purification.
The contrast between the "inner man" and the "members"
seems to present a far better antithesis than that between the
psychical body and the "earthly body;" and even if the former
be foreign to the Old Testament, so that it cannot be applied to the
interpretation of the ritual of sacrifice, the New Testament Apostle
has really adopted it. But the purpose to which Keil has applied
it, apart altogether from the inadmissible admixture of Old and
New Testament ideas, is a very unfortunate one. What the Apostle
understood by the "inner man" he tells us in what follows, where
he substitutes vows (the "mind") for it, and draws a contrast be-
tween it and "the members." But do the fat tail, the net of fat,
the kidneys with their fat, and the lobe of the liver (?) really re-
present the nou?j? We will even drop the fat tail and fat lobe, and
confine ourselves to the kidneys alone, which were regarded as "the
seat of a man's tenderest and most secret emotions," and for that
reason have probably led our author astray into his most unfortu-
nate interpretation. But do the Old Testament tOylAK; (reins) cor-
respond to the New Testament nou?j? I think not; but rather the
bbAle (heart) as the seat of wisdom and knowledge. But the "heart"
formed part of the "remainder of the flesh," the "earthly body"
(sw?ma xoi*ko<n), which "being corrupted by sin," and " exposed to
death," was not placed upon the altar. Even if we were willing,
however, from accommodation to the psychology of our author, to
allow the reins (tOylAK;) to be substtuted for the mind (nou?j), would
anything be gained by so doing? Again I say, no; for I cannot
escape from this alternative: either the kidneys stand per metony-
miam for the movements and affections of the mind, of which they
were regarded as the seat,--and in that case the head, the heart,
the bowels, and even the feet, the eyes, the ears, etc., must do so
too, and cannot be opposed to the kidneys, the liver-lobe, the net
and tail of fat, as "the earthly body" to the "psychical body,"
nor as "the members" to the inner man;--or the kidneys, the
liver, the fat tail, and the net of fat are regarded as "members "
(me<lh), as well as the heart and entrails, the head, shoulder, leg,
and foot,--and in that case they cannot serve, any more than the
latter, as representatives of the " inner man."
110. To arrive at the correct interpretation of the portions of
fat, which were to be burned upon the altar "for a sweet savour
unto Jehovah" (Lev. iv. 31), we must revert to the signification
of the burnt sacrifice as hOAhyla MH,l,, of which we have frequently
spoken already ( 23, 72, 77). From this expression we have
already seen, that the psychological standpoint is not the true,
scriptural point of view for the interpretation of the burnt sacrifice;
and that the flesh was burned, not as being the organ of the soul,
but as food for Jehovah, and food alone. But from this point of
view the fat portions, as contrasted with the rest of the flesh, can
only be regarded as the noblest, best, and most sublimated portion,
the flos carnis (as Neumann, Sacra V.T. salutaria, p. 35, has well
expressed it); and such passages as the following may be adduced
as explanatory of the expression, and also of the question itself,
viz.: Gen. xlv. 18, "the fat of the land;" Deut. xxxii. 14, "the
kidney-fat of wheat;" Ps. lxxxi. 16, fat of the wheat; Num.
xviii. 12, "fat of oil and fat of wine," 2 Sam. i. 22, "the fat of
the mighty'" i.e., the most distinguished heroes ; Ps. xvii. 10, xxii.
12, 29, 1xviii. 23 ; Amos iv. 1; Ezek. xxxiv. 16, 20; Zech. xi. 16,
etc., "the fat" of the nation, i.e., the rich and powerful among the
people. Since the whole of the flesh was not to be placed upon
the altar in the case of the sin-offering, for reasons to be examined
presently, the fat portions only were to be burned, as being the
first, best, and most distinguished part, and as representing the
whole of the flesh. In these portions the whole of the flesh was
sanctified and consecrated to Jehovah.
With regard to the burning of these flores carnis upon the altar,
in the case of the sin-offering; it cannot have any other significa-
tion than the burning of the same portions in the case of the peace-
offering, offering, and of the whole of the flesh (of which these were the
first-fruits) in the case of the burnt-offering. What that meaning
was, we have already shown and explained at 75 sqq. It denoted
the personal appropriation of the gift to Jehovah, and that gift was
food for Jehovah (hOAhyla MH,l,), inasmuch as it represented the person-

ality of the offerer himself, whose self-surrender was the food, which
Jehovah desired as the God of salvation, and of which in that ca-
pacity He ever stood in need. Its being presented to Him in the
holy fire of the altar pointed to the fact, that such surrender, how-
ever earnestly and honestly it might be meant, required, like every-
thing earthly, to be purified by the fire of divine holiness, before it
could appear in the presence of Jehovah Himself (Isa. vi. 6, 7).
111. The subject becomes much more difficult, when we
inquire why the whole of the flesh was not burned upon the altar
(as in the burnt-offering), instead of merely the first-fruits, since
there was no sacrificial meal in the case of the sin-offering, as there
was in that of the peace-offering.
In Knobel's opinion (Lev. p. 344), this question may be settled
by the simple remark, that "in the sin-offering and trespass-offer-
ing no flesh was burnt at all, because Jehovah accepts no food from
sinners." But Jehovah did accept the fat portions from sinners.
And if the burning of the whole animal (both fat and flesh) in the
case of the burnt-offering, and the very same fat portions in that
of the peace-offering was to be regarded as food for Jehovah, the
same action in connection with the sin-offering must certainly
possess the same signification.
Keil's answer to this question also embodies a similar idea. He
builds still further upon the basis of his mistaken interpretation of the
fat portion ( 109), and proceeds thus (pp. 231-2): Consequently,
by the burning and complete consumption of the internal (2) portions
of fat, the inner and superior portion of human nature was com-
mitted to the sanctifying fire of divine love, and ascended thence
towards heaven purified, and in its glorified essence, as an offering
well-pleasing to the Lord. The outer man, on the contrary, the
sw?ma xoi*ko<n, could not ascend to God in a glorified form, because
it was disordered by sin, and condemned to death. The flesh of the
sin-offering, therefore, might not be consumed upon the altar."
It is hardly necessary to say, that from the inadmissible as-
sumptions contained in this reply, it cannot be correct ( 109); but
even apart from these assumptions, it is altogether fallacious. The
writer seems to have had such passages of the New Testament float-
ing before his mind as 1 Cor. vi. 13 and xv. 50, where we read of
the belly, which God shall destroy," the "flesh and blood which
cannot inherit the kingdom of God," and the "corruption which
doth not inherit incorruption." But it is very apparent, that we
have here to do with antitheses, to which the outward portions of

a flesh and the inward (?) portions of fat in no way correspond.
According to the Apostle's doctrine, the outer man, the earthly
(psychical) body, is undoubtedly corrupted by sin and sentenced to
death (fqora<); but he also adds, that "this corruptible must put
on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality," and in
the former passage, that the same "members," which he contrasts
with the inner man in Rom. vii., are "members of Christ," and
that the same "body," which he regards in 1 Cor. xv. as given up
to fqora<, is nevertheless "the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in
you." Why then should "the outward man," the "earthly body,"
or the "members," not "ascend to God in a glorified form" in the
symbol of the sacrificial worship, and their symbols from the animal
world "be burnt upon the altar," if they both can be, and are,
members of Christ, and temples of the Holy Ghost? According
to Keil's own admission, the burning seemed to refine and glorify
the object burned, to remove the fqora<, or xoi*ko<n, that "in their
glorified essence they might ascend to God." Or does he possibly
regard the outer man, the body of a man, or his "members," as ab-
solute fqora<, mere dross, and therefore incapable of being refined
and glorified? He cannot do this; for it would call to mind Mani
and the Gnostics too strongly, and directly contradict in every point
the teaching of the very same Apostle, upon whose doctrines Keil
professes to have founded his theory.
Moreover, how did the case actually stand, in the first place, with
the pigeons that were offered as sin-offerings, with reference to which
Keil himself affirms (p. 218), that in all probability, after removing
the crop with its contents, which were thrown upon the ash-heap, just
as in the burnt-offering, the entire animal was burnt upon the altar?
In this case, at any rate, the "earthly body," sw?ma xoi*ko<n, could
be burnt upon the altar, and ascend to God in a glorified form!--
And how did it stand, in the second place, with the burnt-offerings?
In their case the inward (?) portions of fat were burnt upon the altar
along with the outward flesh,--that is to say, the "inner man" or
"psychical body" along with "the outer man" (the members or
earthly body"),--and "being refined by the fire of divine love,
ascended to God in a glorified form." Keil will probably answer
that the sin and guilt of the person sacrificing were not imputed to
the burnt-offering, as they were to the sin-offering ( 38). But to
that I should reply, (1) that it is not true, that by the imposition
of hands in the case of the sin-offering the outer portions of flesh
became the representatives of the " outer man (= sw?ma xoi*ko<n

ta> me<lh)," and the inner (2) portions of fat the representatives of
the inner man; but if they were so at all, they were so from their
very nature, and from the natural contrast between them;--(2) that
even in the case of the burnt-offering a sprinkling of blood, i.e., an
expiation, took place, and therefore there must have been sin to
expiate;--and (3) that if the sin and guilt of the sacrificer were
placed upon, or imputed to, the animal in the sin-offering, and thus
the outer portions of flesh were infected with sin and uncleanness,
the inner portions of fat and the outward tail of fat (which were
burned upon the altar) must have been similarly infected with sin
and uncleanness. Or does Keil really intend to maintain that the
effect of the imposition of hands was restricted to the heart, liver,
entrails, muscles, tendons and bones, and did not extend to the liver
and kidneys, the net of fat, and the fat tail?--How did it stand, in
the third place, with the sin-offering of the red heifer (Num. xix.),
where the very opposite took place, and the inward portions of fat
as well as the outward flesh and bones were burnt outside the
camp as being corrupted by sin and liable to death, and thus given
up to an annihilating death? (cf. 219).--And how did it stand,
in the fourth place, with the blood of the ordinary sin-offering (to say
nothing at present of the blood of the, red heifer, which was burnt
along with the inner and outer portions of fat and flesh)? Did the
imposition of hands, by which the animal was laden with sin and
guilt, and which made it as it were an incarnate sin (txF.AHa), a "body
of sin," exert the same influence upon the blood (which was also
placed upon the altar), or not? Though Keil is always ready to ''
affirm most unreservedly, that in the imposition of hands the sin
and debt of the person acting were transferred and imputed to the
sin-offering and trespass-offering, so that from that time forward it
might be regarded and designated as an incarnate sin or debt ( 46);
yet he nowhere expressly states, whether he supposed this imputation
to extend to the whole animal, or merely to its blood as the a vehicle
of the soul," or only to the flesh as the "organ of the soul," and if
the latter, whether to the outer portions of flesh and the inner por-
tions of fat, including the outward tail of fat, or only to the first of
these. But it must be patent to every one, that a discussion of
these questions, a distinct and full answer to them, was indispens-
able as the foundation of his theory of the sin-offering. Yet he has
not given one; so that we are under the necessity of collecting his
views from expressions scattered here and there. Let us endeavour
therefore to supply the want in this way, as a reliable answer to

these questions is absolutely necessary to enable us to understand
and pronounce upon his theory.
When we read in different passages of his work, that by the
imposition of hands sin and debt were transferred and imputed to
the sin-offering and trespass-offering as such, and that it thereby
became, as it were, an incarnate sin or debt, the most natural sup-
position is, that he regards the effect attributed to the imposition
of hands as extending to the whole animal, and therefore to both
flesh and blood. On the other hand, when we find it stated in a
still larger number of passages, that in the blood of the sacrificial
animal (as the vehicle of its soul), the soul of the sacrificer was
brought symbolically and vicariously to the altar as the place of the
Lord's gracious presence, i.e., within the sphere of the operations of
divine grace, in order that its sin might be covered over by the
grace and mercy of God, i.e., forgiven ( 69);--we can draw no
other conclusion than that the imputation effected by the imposition
of hands affected chiefly, if not exclusively, the blood or soul of the
sacrificial animal, which was in itself perfectly free from sin and
guilt, from blemish of any kind; and the latter would really be the
only view in harmony with the facts. For the blood, which per-
vades the whole body even to its minutest fibres, is the seat of the
animal's soul; and the soul of the sacrificial animal, which was sin-
less and innocent in itself, but which after, and because of, the
imposition of hands represented the soul of the sacrificer, with all its
load of sin and guilt, was brought to the altar, in order that in it or
with it, the sins of the sacrificer might there be covered over. In
any case, therefore, the sin of the person sacrificing must have been
symbolically transferred to the blood of the animal,--and to it alone,
not to the flesh and fat as well; for the blood alone was the seat and
vehicle of the soul and not the bloodless flesh or fat and the soul
alone was the vehicle and cause, the bearer and confessor of sin,
and not its organs (the flesh, bones, nerves, and sinews). We are
certainly not wrong, therefore, in supposing the author's meaning
to be, that by the imposition of hands the blood alone, as the vehicle
of the animal's soul, was laden with sin and guilt, and not its flesh
as well. And yet, when we read a little farther, and find the same
author affirming that the flesh of the (slaughtered) animal (when
drained of its blood) could not be placed upon the altar, because it
was a unclean in consequence of the sin imputed to it" (p., 233), or
because it was a laden with the sin imputed to it" (p. 231), we are
obliged once more to assume, that he does not regard the sin of the
sacrificer as imputed and transferred to the blood, because this was
placed upon the altar, but as imputed to the flesh alone, and in fact
to the outward flesh alone to the exclusion of the internal fat and
the external tail. Accordingly, at p. 412 he says, "The sacrificial
blood did not defile in any sacrifice, but touching the flesh of the
sin-offering did."
Thus from different passages of the same author we are brought
by logical necessity to different and contradictory answers to the
same question. And we may venture even here to affirm, that the
fundamental ideas upon which his theory of the sin-offering is based
are as incorrect and deceptive, as they are necessarily obscure and
contradictory. (id. 114.)
112. The true answer to the question proposed at the head of
the previous section, must be obtained from the design and disposal
of the flesh, which was not burned upon the altar. This was two-
fold. Sometimes it was burned outside the camp in a clean place,
where the ashes of the sacrifices were also thrown, together with the
hide, head, bones, entrails, and dung (Lev. iv. 11, 12, 20, 21 ; cf.
xvi. 27). This was done in the case of all the sin-offerings, whose
blood was brought into the Holy Place (Lev. vi. 23), and therefore
with the sin-offering of the priest and that of the whole congrega-
tion (including the priests). But with all the sin-offerings, whose
blood was not brought into the Holy Place, and therefore with those
of the laity, whether prince or common man, it was eaten in a holy
place, i.e., in the fore-court, by the officiating priest and his sons
his wife and daughters not being allowed to participate (Lev. vi.
18, 22).1
In addition to this we have the following directions (Lev. vi.
27, 28): Whoever else touched the flesh was forfeited to the sanc-
tuary (wDAq;yi),--probably in this way, that, like a man who had vowed
himself to God, he had to redeem himself for a definite sum of
money (Lev. xxvii. 2 sqq.). If any one's clothes were sprinkled
by the blood of the sin-offering, he was to wash them in a holy
place. And the pot, in which the flesh of the sin-offering was
boiled, was to be broken if it were an earthen one, and carefully
soured out and rinsed with water if it were of brass. Compare
with this Lev. x. 16-20, the only passage which affords us any help
1
If the officiating priests could not eat the whole, all that was left over was
probably burned in a clean place outside the camp, as was expressly commanded
in the case of the peace-offering ( 139).
in the interpretation of these striking commands. Aaron's sons had

offered the first sin-offering for the people (apart from the priests,
Lev. ix. 15), and, without Moses knowing it, had burned the flesh
outside the camp, just as Moses had commanded them to do with
the flesh of the sin-offering that they had offered for themselves.
When Moses discovered this, he reproved the priests, and said,
Wherefore have ye not eaten the sin-offering in the Holy Place,
seeing it is most holy, and He hath given it you to bear (or take
away, txWelA) the iniquity of the congregation, to make atonement for
them before the Lord? Behold, the blood of it was not brought in
within the Holy Place. Ye should indeed have eaten it in the Holy
Place, as I commanded." Aaron excused his sons on the ground that
they had offered their sin-offering and their burnt-offering on the very
same day, and then added, Such things have befallen me: and if
I had eaten the sin-offering to-day, should it have been accepted in
the sight of the Lord?" And Moses was satisfied with this reply.
113. Cornelius a Lapide (on Lev. x. 17) has given this expla-
nation of the eating of the flesh of the sin-offering by the priests
Ut scilicet cum hostiis populi pro peccato simul etiam populi peccata
in vos recipiatis, ut illa expietis. Deyling follows him, and says
(Observv. ss. i. c. 45, 2), hoc pacto cum ederent, incorporabant quasi
peccaturn populique reatum in se recipiebant; and Hengstenberg also,
who writes thus (p. 13): Both of these (the eating by the priests
in the one case, and the burning outside the camp in the other)
pointed to the fact that the uncleanness of the sacrificer was trans-
ferred to the sacrifice, and imbibed as it were by it. . . . The eat-
ing of the flesh by the priest was an act of worship. It rested upon
the supposition, that the uncleanness of the sinner was transferred
to the sacrifice, and upon the idea, that for its complete removal it
was necessary that it should enter into a closer relation to the priest-
hood instituted by God, through which relation it was consumed by
the holiness conferred upon that office, in anticipation of a time
when both sacrifice and priesthood should be united in the same
person. We meet with the same idea in Lev. x. 17. Equally con-
elusive, too, is the circumstance that those sin-offerings, in which
the priests themselves were concerned, and therefore could not act
as representatives (?), had to be burned outside the camp. Removal
from the camp, which was a type of the Church, was always a sign
of uncleanness under the Mosaic law."
But there are the gravest objections to this view. If the sinner's
uncleanness was transferred to the sacrifice, and imbibed by it as it
were it is perfectly inconceivable that only the outer flesh should

have been infected, and not the internal portions of fat as well.
And if Hengstenberg admits this, I should ask him then how it is
conceivable, that a gift which was saturated with uncleanness, and
which not only represented sin, but was as it were a visible manifes-
tation of it, could possibly be placed upon the altar, and designated
in Lev. iv. 31 as a sweet savour to Jehovah? But if he does not
admit it, the remarks which I have made in 111 with reference
to Keil, are equally applicable to him. Moreover, how could the
flesh of the sin-offering be still regarded as laden with imputed sin,
after the expiation of the sins imputed had been effected by the
sprinkling of the blood (and that in the most forcible manner that
could possibly be conceived)? But if the flesh of the sin-offering
had been regarded as unclean, it could not have been designated as
most holy" (Lev. x. 17); and the priest, who had most scrupu-
lously to avoid all contact with that which was unclean, could hardly
have been commanded to eat it. The directions given in Lev. vi.
20, 23 speak quite as decidedly against the uncleanness of the sin-
offering. The flesh was so holy, that not even the priest's relatives
were allowed to eat of it, and it might only be eaten in the Holy
Place. A layman, touching it by accident, was affected by its holi-
ness, and was to be regarded as sanctified, dedicated to Jehovah.
If a drop of the blood happened to be sprinkled upon the clothes of
those who were present, they were to be washed in the tabernacle it-
self. All these directions are suggestive, not of uncleanness, but of the
extreme purity and holiness of the sin-offering; and judging by their
analogy, therefore, the breaking of the earthen pot, and the scour-
ing of the copper vessel, in which the flesh had been boiled, are to
be attributed, not to their defilement, but to their sanctification, and
the importance of preventing the desecration of a sacred vessel by
its being afterwards put to a profane use. Hengstenberg supposes,
indeed, that he can dispose of all these instances by the simple re-
mark, that the uncleanness of the sacrifice was essentially different
from that of the sinner; and sin transferred could never be exactly
equivalent to indwelling sin. But the difficulty is not to be re-
moved by such arbitrary assertions. Uncleanness is uncleanness,
whether it has developed itself within the subject, or has been trans-
ferred to it from another unclean object. For example, according
to Lev. xv., not only did a person's own sexual uncleanness require
purification, but the uncleanness transferred to another also; and
the distinction between personal and transferred uncleanness was
not an essential one, but simply one of degree.1 The prw?ton

yeu?doj in this view, however, is the dogmatically and exegetically
inadmissible idea of a transference of the sin itself from the sacri-
ficer to the sacrificial animal, whereas it was only the obligation to
suffer or perform in the place of the sacrificer, what divine justice
and holiness demanded on account of his sin, that was actually
transferred ( 43 sqq.). Again, the idea that the clean place out-
side the camp, where the flesh of the priest's sin-offering was
burned, was strictly speaking an unclean one (an unclean clean
place therefore!), is and remains a crying contradictio in adjecto,
notwithstanding Hengstenberg's loophole, "that this belongs to the
other side of the sacrifice."--This explanation, too, must also be pro-
nounced untenable, because it gives a meaning to the eating of the
flesh of the sin-offering by the priest, which is entirely inapplicable
to the eating of the peace-offering, though there was a perfect
analogy between them, and the only differences were those of de-
gree ( 118), and also because it places the burning of the flesh
outside the camp in a totally different aspect from the correspond-
ing burning of the flesh that was left over from the passover lamb,
and from the peace and consecration services (Ex. xii. 10, xxix. 34;
Lev. vii. 17, viii. 32, xix. 6).
114. Hengstenberg is followed by Keil (i. 231), who says:
"If the first part of expiation, namely, the forgiveness of sins, was
effected symbolically in the sprinkling of the blood; the second
part, viz., the extermination of sin and the sanctification of the
pardoned sinner, was represented by the course adopted with the
flesh of the sin-offering. . . . For as death merely puts an end to
the continued activity of the sinner, but does not exterminate the
sin, so (?) the flesh of the sin-offering, notwithstanding the death
endured, was still laden with the sin imputed to it; and this also
needed to be exterminated, if the expiation was to be complete.
This extermination of the sin in the flesh was effected in the ritual
1
Even the uncommon, though fruitless exertions made by Keil (i. 235), to
convince us that "anything affected by sin and uncleanness might still be re-
garded as most holy, if we only put clearly before our mind the hieratic notion
of what is most holy," are only adapted to place the inconceivableness of most
holy sin or most holy uncleanness in a clearer light, especially if we agree with
Keil in regarding the sin-offering as becoming an "incarnate sin," and "a body
of sin," which as such " was to be sentenced to the death of annihilation by
fire" in the case of the sin-offerings of the priests and the congregation, and
that "outside the camp, i.e., outside the kingdom of God, from which every
dead thing was taken away."
of sacrifice in a twofold manner, . . . This double procedure with

the flesh of the sin-offering must be based upon one idea . . . . The
eating of the flesh on the part of the priests was an act of worship
according to Lev. x. 17, an official function, by which they were to
bear the sin of the congregation,--an incorporatio therefore of the
victim laden with sin, by which they exterminated the sin through
the holiness and sanctifying power imparted to them by virtue of
their office. . . . In those sin-offerings, on the other hand, in which
they were themselves concerned, they could not act vicariously (?)
. . . and as they needed expiation and sanctification themselves,
they could not at the same time impart sanctification and expia-
tion, but the sin could only be exterminated in fire by the burning
of the flesh of the sacrifice that was laden with it. In both cases,
therefore, the flesh, to which the sin was imputed, was destroyed;
in the first instance, by its sinful nature being swallowed up by the
holiness of the priests,--in the second, by the manifestation of the
fruit of sin, i.e., of the death which sin produces. . . . For the
priests themselves there was no one, in the economy of the old cove-
nant, who could have borne and exterminated their sin by eating
the flesh of the sin-offerings that were offered on their behalf. For
this reason it was necessary that the flesh of the sacrifice laden with
their sin, should be condemned as the body of sin to the death of
annihilation, and be consumed by fire, not upon the altar, however,
since it had become unclean through the sin imputed to it, but out-
side the camp, i.e., outside the kingdom of God, from which every,
dead thing was removed. At the same time, inasmuch as it was the
flesh of a sacrifice, it was ordered to be burnt in the clean place to
which the ashes were conveyed from the altar of burnt-offering,
and not in any unclean place, that what had been set apart for a
holy use might not become an abomination."
We observe here in the first place, that all we have said in 113
with reference to Hengstenberg's theory, is equally applicable to this
further expansion of it. The different points in this extension are
quite as erroneous as the groundwork itself. And, first of all, we
must condemn the confusion in language, which is apparent in the
too comprehensive use of the word "expiation" on the one hand,
and the too restricted use of the expression "extermination of sins"
on the other, not merely because they are opposed to the forms of
speech, but chiefly because of their obscurity, so far as the doctrinal
idea is concerned. For instance, Keil divides the idea of expiation
into two parts,--(1) forgiveness of sin, or justification, and (2) ex-
termination of sin, or sanctification. Now this is opposed to the

usage of the language; for the Latin word expiatio is admitted by
all lexicographers to be perfectly identical with the German word
Suhanung (expiation), and forgiveness of sin, according to Keil's
own view, is identical with the "expiation of sin." It is also at
variance with fact; for rPekal; always relates to the sprinkling of
the blood as such, and never to the burning upon the altar as such
(it cannot, therefore, be regarded by him as a consecration of the
gift already cleansed from sin by the sprinkling of the blood);--to
say nothing of the possibility of its being applied to a burning to
annihilation," and outside the kingdom of God, from which every
dead thing had to be removed." There is something confusing,
too, in the definition of sanctification as the extermination of sin.
For the forgiveness of sin, or justification, might be defined in pre-
cisely the same way. And the definition is all the more inappro-
priate here, from the fact that the sin-offering had regard not to
sinfulness in general, or to the sinful habitus, which is the object
exterminated in the case of sanctification, but to certain acts of sin,
the extermination of which is effected not by sanctification, but by
justification.
But not only does Keil resolve expiation into two component
elements--forgiveness of sin, or justification, and extermination of
sin, or sanctification,--and regard the former as effected by the
sprinkling of the blood, the latter by the course adopted with the
flesh; he also resolves the latter again into two new elements
(1) the purification of the psychical body, i.e., of the better
portion or inmost kernel of humanity, in the burning upon the
altar; and (2) the annihilation of the body of sin (= sw?ma xoi*ko<n,
the earthy body). And this again is accomplished by a twofold
process: (1) in the sin-offering of a layman, by the priests' eating
the sw?ma xoi*ko<n, or body of sin, and exterminating the sin through
their official holiness; and (2) in the sin-offering of a priest, by the
body of sin being removed from the kingdom of God, and sentenced
to the death of annihilation by fire, that is to say, being burnt up.
--But this resolution of the main idea of expiation into the anti-
theses which it is supposed to contain, presents many other difficul-
ties besides those already discussed at 109, 111, 113, which we
must examine in order thoroughly to pronounce upon, i.e., to con-
demn, this theory of the sin-offering.
The difficulties in question relate to the a second " element in
the expiation, namely, to the extermination of sin, or sanctifi-
cation, and the antitheses which it involves. The first of these

antitheses is (a) the purification of the inner man, and (b) the anni-
hilation of the outer man. The two together are said to complete
the idea of sanctification, or the extermination of sin. This pre-
sents at once a difficulty which I cannot get over; for the idea of
sanctification is that of purification, but not of annihilation; on the
contrary, it rather excludes the latter. Nor can I understand the
assignment of these two antithetical ingredients of sanctification to
the inner and outer man. If the "inner man" be regarded as
pure, as opposed to the outer man, and therefore pure from sin and
corruption, I cannot see what there was that needed to be purified
and burnt out by the altar-fire. But if, on the other hand, it be
regarded as dwelling in the outer man, in the body of sin, and
affected or infected by its sinfulness or sins, I cannot imagine how,
according to Keil's theory, it could be placed upon the altar, since
even then it would be "corrupted by sin," and "rendered unclean
by the sin imputed to it." It would surely rather have needed "to
be removed outside the camp, i.e., outside the kingdom of God."
There is the same internal contradiction in the second element of
sanctification, viz., the annihilation of the outer man = ta> me<lh
sw?ma xoi*ko<n. If we take the idea of ta> me<lh seriously, and there-
fore do not regard the outer man in a thoroughly Manichean
fashion as essentially and altogether sin, but according to the
teaching of both the Scriptures and the Church, as merely per-
vaded and defiled by sin, it is an object for purification, refinement,
glorification, but not for destruction. But if we treat the idea of
sw?ma xoi*ko<n seriously in this sense, that we regard it as mere
corruption, mere dross, and therefore look upon the outer man
(physically) as that part of us which becomes and remains the
prey of corruption, or (ethically) as that which excludes and is
excluded from the kingdom of God and eternal blessedness; the
idea of destruction is certainly applicable, but not in any way that
of sanctification, i.e., of refinement, for the ore is the object for
refining, but not the dross.
But even if we were willing or able to accept the idea of anni-
hilation, which is inapplicable to the outer man, as the vehicle or
means of sanctification, there is something in the antitheses, into
which this idea is again resolved, which, in our opinion, is perfectly
inconceivable; viz., (1) the annihilation of the outer man in the case
of the laity, by its being eaten by the priests in the Holy Place, and
(2) the annihilation of the outer man in the case of the priests, by its
being burnt outside the camp, or the kingdom of God. The eating
in the former case, and the burning in the latter, are said to signify
the same thing, namely, annihilation, i.e., sanctification; and even
the object of this annihilation or sanctification is essentially the
same, viz., the outer man, in the one case of the priest, in the other
of the layman. Now, how is it conceivable that essentially the
same end could be answered in essentially the same objects, when
the one was received into the inmost centre of holiness, viz., into
the priests, who were kat ] e]coxh<n the holy persons, the representa-
tives of God, and the other removed from the kingdom of God to
the place appointed for every dead thing, and disposed of there
by being burnt with ungodly, i.e., unholy fire? Even if recourse
were had to the doctrine of modern physiology, that the process of
digestion is a process of burning (which would hardly be advisable),
there would still be the inexplicable incongruity, that the subject in
the one case is holy, viz., the consecrated priests and they alone, to
the exclusion even of the members of their families, and in the
other case unholy, viz., profane fire; and again, that in the former
the burning was to take place in the sanctuary itself, as the sym-
bolical concentration of the kingdom of God, and could only be
effected there; whereas in the latter it was ordered to take place
not only outside the tabernacle, but even outside the camp, i.e., the
kingdom of God. And supposing it possible that the sacrificial law
could have been capable of such self-contradiction, should we not
expect to find the very opposite arrangement, viz., that the annihi-
lation, i.e., sanctification, of the outer man of the consecrated priests
would have been effected in the sanctuary, and that of the outer
man of the unconsecrated laity outside the camp?
115. Ewald gives a different turn to the same fundamental
idea of an incorporatio peccati: According to the ancient belief,
he says, "when this sprinkling of the blood was finished, with its
most holy solemnity, the uncleanness and guilt were loosened and
irresistibly enticed out of the object to which they adhered; and so
we too must evidently understand the ceremony in the sense of
antiquity. But shaken loose though it was, according to the same
view, it passed first of all only into that body, whose blood had so
irresistibly drawn it out: so that the remains of this body were
now themselves regarded as having become unclean, and conse-
quently were looked upon with all' the horror which was felt to-
wards anything unclean in the sight of God,--in fact, with even
greater horror than usual; and it was just in this point that the
night side of this entire class of sacrifices became most strikingly

manifest. In perfect accordance with this idea, these remains were
all burnt, exactly as they were--that is to say, without removing the
filth belonging to them--far away from the sanctuary, in a common,
though otherwise clean place, like any other object of disgust, that
could not be got rid of and destroyed in any other way. . . . This
burning was only carried out, however, in the case of expiatory
sacrifices of the most solemn description. . . . In ordinary cases
the ceremony was evidently abbreviated in this way, that after the
sprinkling of the blood the mercy of God was at once implored, to
take away entirely the guilt which had thus been set in motion.. . .
But when once they had got over the gloomy obligation to burn the
remains of this sacrifice, and had learned, at least in ordinary cases,
to solicit even without it the divine removal of guilt, so that the
flesh destined to annihilation appeared as though rescued by superior
mercy: they could venture still further, and it became legal in
Jehovahdom, to take a portion of every sacrifice of this mournful
description and throw it into the altar-fire. . . . But the sacrificer
himself durst not eat of it; nor was this ever afterwards allowed.
. . . For this reason the flesh of the ordinary sacrifices was indeed
preserved, but it was regarded as something miraculous, which had
been preserved from destruction purely by the mercy of God, as a
most holy thing. Every one who touched the flesh with a com-
mon hand was regarded as forfeited to the sanctuary. None but
priests of the sanctuary were considered qualified to consume the
dangerous flesh; but from them it was also expected that they
should take it into themselves and consume it, and with it, as it
were, the guilt that had been atoned for. . . . How difficult this
was at first, we may learn from the book of Origins (Ursprunge)
in the account of Aaron and his four sons."
So much of this view as is old, and admits of a refutation, has
already received it in what has gone before, and will still further
receive it in what follows. What is new is so unintelligible, fan-
tastical, and arbitrary, as to admit just as little of refutation as of
adoption. Even Knobel (p. 386) does not hesitate to throw away
at once Ewald's notion of the dangerous character of the flesh, as a
romantic idea.
116. Kliefoths theory (pp. 67-70), according to which the
eating of the flesh of the sin-offering by the priests is to be looked
at in the same light as the sacrificial meal at the presentation of a
peace-offering, and indicated, like the latter, the reconciliation of
the sinner, and his actual reception into the fellowship of the holy
nation, has been already discussed and shown to be inadmissible
from the standpoint of the peace-offering ( 84). We have now to
examine it from the standpoint of the ritual of the sin-offering.
The chief fault in this view of Kliefoth, is the essential equality
attributed to two different functions that admit of no comparison.
If the eating of the sin-offering by the priests be compared to the
eating of the peace-offering, the comparison in the case of the latter
cannot extend to the true sacrificial meal, but must be restricted
entirely to the eating of that portion of the peace-offering which
was peculiar to the priests, viz., to the eating of the heave-shoulder
and wave-breast. With the sacrificial meal connected with the
peace-offering, the eating of the sin-offering by the priests had no-
thing in common. In the former, the sacrificer himself was the
principal person concerned; next to him came his family, and then
any one else that he chose to add out of the circle of his acquaint-
ance. The eating in common was the chief thing, the institution
of a lively, joyous, festal meal; and the participation of the priest
in this meal was either not expected, or at all events was not essen-
tially necessary. On the other hand, the sacrificer himself was
most strictly forbidden to eat of the flesh of the sin-offering; none
but the officiating priests were entitled to do so; a layman, who
only touched the flesh, was forfeited to the sanctuary; and it was
so far from having anything like the character of a common meal,
that not even the priest's family was allowed to take part in it.
But it certainly presented an essential analogy to the eating of the
heave-shoulder and wave-breast by the priests, which merely stood
upon a lower level on account of the inferior holiness of the peace-
offering; so that the command that it should be eaten in the Holy
Place, and by the officiating priests alone, was allowed to be so far
modified, that a clean place could be substituted for the Holy Place,
and their wives and daughters admitted to partake; a distinction
corresponding to the respective epithets applied to them, of holy,
and most holy.
Kliefoth endeavours, indeed, to bridge over the chasm between the
non-priestly meal connected with the peace-offering, and the eating a
of the flesh of the sin-offering by the priests. But the arguments
which he adduces can hardly be regarded as sufficient for the pur-
pose.1 There is something far more satisfactory in what the author
1
For example, he says (p. 69): "As we found throughout the whole course
of the sin-offering, that the activity of the sacrificer was to be confined to his
adduces in explanation of the omission of the sacrificial eating from

those sin-offerings, in which the priests themselves were the sacri-
ficers either in whole or in part;1 and we can give unqualified
assent (looking to the analogous procedure adopted in connection
with the paschal lamb and the peace- and consecration-offerings),
when he affirms that the burning of the flesh of such sin-offer-
ings outside the camp had no religious (or symbolical) significa-
tion.
117. That the burning (JrW) outside the camp had no symboli-
cal signification, but only answered the purpose of preserving the
flesh from putrefaction and profanation, because no one was allowed
to eat it, had been maintained by Bahr (ii. 395) before Kliefoth;
and all later writers, with the exception of Hengstenberg, Keil, and
Ewald, have followed him in this. A still more generally received
opinion, which Ewald is alone in rejecting, is, that this flesh, which
was given up to be burned outside the camp, was not to be eaten
by the priests, because the priests themselves were the sacrificers,
or were associated in the sacrifice; since it was characteristic of the
sin-offering, that the person presenting it was not allowed to eat of
it. And no tenable objection can be offered to this, although the
law itself lays no stress upon the point,2 but always enforces the
necessity for the burning outside the camp, on the ground that the
blood of these sin-offerings had been brought into the Holy Place,--
the the meaning evidently being, that the flesh of these sin-offerings
was holier than that of the others, and too holy even for the priests
to eat (Lev. vi. 23, x. 18, xvi. 27). But these points of view do
penitence, and that in every act which was subservient to his expiation and
restoration he was placed entirely in a receptive condition; so, in relation to
the sacrificial meal (?), he was only to acknowledge to himself, what was accom-
plished thereby both for him and with him. On the other hand, the priests alone
--those who were officially holy, and therefore actual priests,--to the exclu-
sion even of their families, were to eat the flesh of the sin-offering; for it was in
the very nature of a sin-offering that the sinner for whom atonement had been
made, should be restored to holy fellowship, and indeed to the very centre of
holiness."
1
P. 70. "In these cases no sacrificial eating could take place, since the
priests themselves were the sacrificers, and sacrificers were not allowed to par-
ticipate. But even in these cases no sacrificial meal was necessary; for all that
was requisite for the whole nation and the priesthood, was restoration to the
fellowship of God, and the act of burning (sc. upon the altar) sufficed for that.
A holier human fellowship, to which these sacrificers could have been restored,
was nowhere to be found."
2
See, however, the allusion to the meat-offerings of the priests in Lev. vi.
16.
not exclude one another; for the flesh would in this instance be too
holy even for the priests to eat, inasmuch as they themselves take
the position of unholy persons here, and persons needing expiation,
--not, however, as Knobel supposes (p. 386), because this flesh
could not be eaten by men at all, on account of its having been
"touched by God."
But what was there in the character of the sin-offering which
precluded the person presenting it from eating of the flesh? The
true answer is simple and not far to seek:--because the eating
of the flesh of the sacrifice by the person presenting it was the dis-
tinguishing characteristic of the peace-offering, and the sin-offering
was to be a sin-offering and not a peace-offering;--or, in other words,
because, according to the arrangement of the institution of sacrifice,
so as to embrace sacrifices of several different kinds, the sin-offering
merely laid the foundation for the presentation first of a burnt-offer-
ing, and then of a peace-offering, so that it could not raise the person
sacrificing to that culminating port in the symbolism of sacrifice,
which was represented by the eating of the flesh of the peace-offering
( 79 sqq.).
But the discovery of the reason why the person presenting a sin-
offering was not allowed to eat of it himself, by no means solves the
whole of the difficulty. We have still further to inquire, why the duty
of eating was transferred to the priests, when the sacrifice was not
offered by themselves? And if here we answer, with Hofmann (p.
281), "It was a rule, that what was offered in sacrifice belonged to
the priest as a reward for his service, so far as it was not burned
upon the altar," the question with which we started returns again,
--why was not all the flesh placed upon the altar in the case of the
sin-offering, but only a portion selected from the best of it? Here,
again, the answer is easier and more simple than the far-fetched
and, as we have already seen, erroneous replies of Knobel, Keil,
Hengstenberg, Ewald, and Kliefoth would lead us to suppose. It
is simply this: because the sin-offering was not intended as a burnt-
offering, the distinguishing peculiarity of which consisted in the
fact that all the flesh was placed upon the altar; or because the
sin-offering did not elevate the person presenting it to that height
in the symbolism of sacrifice, which was expressed in the burning
of the entire sacrifice; but this was first effected by the burnt
offering which followed and rested upon it.1
1
See Oehler's excellent observations (p. 648): "If in the case of other
kinds of sacrifice the previous expiation formed the conditio sine qua non for
118. Now, so far as the eating of the flesh of the sin-offering by

the priests, wherever it was admissible, was in itself concerned, this
need not be looked at in any case in an essentially different light from
the eating of the flesh of the peace-offering (viz., the wave-breast
and heave-shoulder, 132, 133). In making this assertion, indeed,
we must notice the fact, that Keil has repeated with still greater
emphasis the charge which he brought, not only against me, but
against Hofmann also, viz., of having "confounded the sin-offering
with the thank-offering." But, serious as this charge appears, there
is really very little in it. For the distinctive independence of each
of these two descriptions of sacrifice is fully brought out, and the
boundary line between them immoveably fixed, if we keep firmly
in mind the fact, that not only the priests but the sacrificers them-
selves were allowed to partake of the flesh of the peace-offerings;
whereas of the sin-offerings the priests alone were permitted to
eat, never the persons presenting them, not even the priests when
they themselves were the sacrificers. The institution of a formal
sacrificial meal by and for the sacrificer and his family constituted
the one distinctive peculiarity of the peace-offering; and we affirm
as decidedly as Keil, that this was not admissible in connection with
the sin-offering. But the eating of the breast and shoulder by the
priest, in the case of the peace-offering, differed from his eating
the whole of the flesh of the sin-offering solely in these respects
first, that in the former a portion only was assigned to the priest,
and in the latter the whole of the flesh (with the exception of the
fat). But this may easily be explained, on the simple ground that
in the former a meal had to be instituted for the sacrificer and his
family, which was not the case in the latter;--and secondly, that in
the sin-offering none but the officiating priests were allowed to eat
the flesh, not even their families, and they were required to eat it
in the Holy Place; whereas in the peace-offering even the female
portion of their families might participate in the flesh assigned
them, and it could be eaten in any clean place (Lev. x. 14). This
also may easily be explained, on the ground that the former, being
assigned solely and exclusively to the priests, was most holy (cf.
149); whereas the latter, being participated in alike by both priests
and sacrificer, was simply a holy thing. All the rest was essenti-
what was the chief thing in them, namely, the offering of the gift; in the sin-
offering, on the contrary, the gift which followed served to confirm, and thus in
a certain sense to complete, the expiation which this sacrifice was intended
directly to effect."
ally the same in both: the priest as subject, the eating as the act
performed, the flesh of the sacrifice as the object. We are perfectly
justified, therefore, in adhering to the assertion, that there was
no essential difference, but only a difference in degree, between the
signification of the eating of the flesh of the peace-offering by the
priests, and their eating the flesh of the sin-offering.
In proceeding to inquire what the eating of the flesh of the (sin-
and peace-) offerings by the priests really signified, we must revert
to the question, whether it was parallel and correlative to the true
sacrificial meal, in which the flesh was eaten by the sacrificer him-
self, or to the burning upon the altar, which could be regarded in
certain sense as hOAhy; MH,l,, i.e., as also an eating, namely, by Jehovah.
I have no hesitation in giving an answer at once in the negative to
the former, and in the affirmative to the latter, for the simple reason,
that the priest officiated in the sacrificial ceremony as the servant
and representative of God, who rewarded and entertained him on
that account, supplying him, so to speak, with food from His own
table. For, notwithstanding Keil's remonstrance, I must adhere to
the assertion (the correctness of which is proved by the burnt-
offering as the leading and normal sacrifice), that, strictly speaking,
the whole animal ought to have been placed upon the altar as a
gift and food for Jehovah; and that the only reason why this rule
was ever departed from was, that here and there other circumstances
intervened which required a part of the gift to be kept back from the
altar.
The eating of the flesh by the priests, therefore, had no other
signification than to set forth the idea, that the priests, as the ser-
vants of God and the members of the household of God, were sup-
plied from the table of God. The priest received his portion of the
food which the people offered. to their God. And as the presenta-
tion of this food on the part of the people to Jehovah was a re-
presentation of their surrender of themselves to Him, the trans-
ference of a part of this food to the priests would also express the
idea, that the people were bound to make a similar voluntary sur-
render of themselves, not only to God, but in gratitude and devoted-
ness ness to the priests also, as the servants and representatives of God.
If any one choose to call the eating of the flesh of the sin-offer-
ing by the priests, when looked at from this point of view, an official
eating, I have no objection to offer. But if the term official be
used in the more comprehensive and literal sense, so that the eating
is reckoned (as it is by Hengstenberg and Keil) among the official
RITUAL OF THE, SIN-OFFERING AND TRESPASS-OFFERING. 241
functions of the priests, and regarded as co-ordinate with the sprin-

kling of the blood, and even designated (as it is by Keil) as a "second
stage of expiation," I must enter my protest against it in the most
decided manner. It was dependent upon their office, but it could
never be regarded as a function of the office itself. When the ser-
vant of a household partakes of the food assigned him from his
master's table, he eats, or rather receives it, in the capacity of a
servant , but eating it is certainly not one of the duties of his office.
119. As a proof of the assertion, that the eating of the flesh
of the sin-offering by the priests was an official act in the strict and
literal sense of the word, Hengstenberg and Keil refer us to Lev. x.
17 sqq. It is necessary, therefore, that we should enter, in conclu-
sion, into a closer examination of this passage.
Besides the meaning given to this passage by Hengstenberg and
Keil,--which cannot be the correct one, for the simple reason that it
gives a signification to the eating of the flesh of the sin-offering,
that we have already seen to be untenable and full of contradictions
from every point of view,--we have two others before us which are
worth examining more minutely. One is supported by Oehler, who
says (p. 649): When we read in Lev. x. 17, that the sin-offer-
ing was given to the priests to eat, to take away the guilt of the con-
gregation, and to make atonement for it before Jehovah; as the
actual removal of the guilt and the atonement had already been
effected through the sprinkling of the blood, the expression must be
taken as declaratory. The eating of the flesh on the part of the
priests, like the burning of the fat, implied an acceptance of the
sacrifice on the part of God, which served as a declaration and
proof, that the sacrifice had really effected the expiation designed.
So far Philo (de vict. 13) was correct in his view, when he stated
that one of the reasons for this appropriation of the sin-offering was
to satisfy the person presenting it as to his having obtained forgive-
ness; because God would not have called His servants to partake
of such a meal, unless the sin had been completely forgotten:--I
have also no doubt that such a declaratory signification may be
attributed to the eating of the flesh by the priests, as well as to the
correlative eating of it on the part of God ( 118). But I cannot
admit that this is expressed in the words of Lev. x. 17. If we once
take the words Mk,lA NtanA to mean, "He has given it you to eat," and
therefore understand the clause, "to bear the iniquity of the con-
gregation, to make atonement for them," as denoting the purpose
and effect of the eating, we must take them, not in a declaratory,
but in an effective sense, as Hengstenberg and Keil have done. For

that is how the words read, and the passage affords us neither war-
rant nor occasion for changing the effective reading into a declara-
tory sense.
The other view we find in Hofmann (p. 281). He says: "It
is not the eating of the sin-offering which is there said to be a bear-
ing of the iniquity of the congregation; but it is stated of the sin-
offering itself, that God has given it to the priest to take away the
iniquity of the congregation, to make atonement for it before
Jehovah. Nor does this show why it was eaten, but why it was to
be regarded as a specially holy thing. If the sin-offering, therefore,
was given to the priest to make atonement for the congregation,
which he could not otherwise have done, he was not to regard it as
a Typhonic sacrifice, but as a holy thing, and not to shrink from
partaking of it, but to make an actual use of his right to eat it as
the reward of the expiatory duties of his office." Although Keil has
condemned this view as "perfectly arbitrary" (p. 235), Hofmann
has inserted the passage verbatim in the second edition of his Schrift-
beweis, without thinking it worth while to notice Keil's objections.
And it seems to me that, at all events, he has done right to adhere
to his own view. For there is really no force in Keil's assertion,
that "Jehovah had not merely given the sin-offering to the priest,
but had given it to him to eat, that by this eating he might bear the
sin of the congregation." Nor do we find any more trace of a proof
of his own view, than of a refutation of the opposite. It is simply
assertion versus assertion. And whilst Hofmann has given reasons
for his opinion taken from the passage itself, I cannot discover any
such in Keil.
The correctness of Hofmann's view becomes the more apparent,
the more closely we examine the construction of the passage. Moses
inquired, "Why have ye not eaten the sin-offering in the Holy
Place?" and met the supposed reply of the priests, that they had
not done so because it was unclean, by asserting that, on the con-
trary, it was most holy. It was most holy, because God had given
it to them, that thereby they might take away the guilt of the con-
gregation, and make expiation for it before Jehovah. Now, since
the previous question refers to the eating of the sin-offering, we
might indeed suppose the lkx (eating) mentioned in the inquiry to
be still understood in the Mk,lA NtanA (has given you), and understand
by this "giving," giving to eat, if that would give us a sense appro-
priate to the circumstances; but there is nothing in the words to
RITUAL OF, THE SIN-OFFERING AND TRESPASS-OFFERING. 243
require this, nor could anything necessitate it except the actual

occurrence of the word lkox<l, in the sentence. But as it is not
there, and the insertion of it would not give us a sense in harmony
with the circumstances, but one in all respects at variance with
them, it is certainly most advisable to abstain from supplying any-
thing, and to take Ntn simply as it stands.
In reply to Moses' question and reproof, Aaron excused himself
and his sons, on the ground that they had offered their own sin-
offering and burnt-offering the same day, and had regarded the
command to abstain from eating them as a command to abstain
from eating the flesh of any sacrifice on that day, on account of the
mourning of which the offering of a sin-offering was the foil. Now,
though this reason for not eating might be one that was not sup-
ported by the law of sacrifice, and therefore might be an arbitrary
extension of that law; yet as it really proceeded from pious motives,
it deserved to be excused, and that Moses did not refuse. But the
same thing had happened to Moses here, which happened again on
a different occasion (Num. xxxii. 6 sqq.), namely, that his rash and
excitable character had led him to attribute wrong motives to the
actions of others, because those actions did not correspond to his
expectations. At the same time, in this instance he might cer-
tainly be excused, on the ground that it was unquestionably natural
enough, with the Typhonic sacrifices of Egypt before him, to
conclude that their reason for not, eating had been based upon
them.
The discrepancy which Knobel imagines that he has discovered
between this passage and Lev. iv. 21, and on account of which he
supposes it necessary to attribute the two passages to different
authors, has been already proved by Hofmann to have no existence.
Of the sin-offerings, he says, "which the consecrated person
(Aaron) presented, one for himself and one for the nation, he
burned the flesh of the former, because he was not allowed to derive
any other benefit from it than that which was derived by every one
else for whom a sin-offering was presented, viz., the forgiveness
of his sin. But the flesh of the other it was his duty to eat; and
it is not merely an oversight of the Elohist that it is so represented,
since this sacrifice applied to the nation in contrast to the priest, and
not, like the one prescribed in Lev. iv. 13-21, or xvi. 15, to the
congregation generally, i.e., to the whole of Israel (including the
priests)."
120. In the sin-offering of pigeons, which served in cases of
great poverty as a substitute for the sheep that should properly have
been offered, the ceremony was variously modified according to the
outward circumstances (Lev. v. 7 sqq.). Just as in the case of the
burnt-offering of pigeons (Lev. i. 15), the imposition of hands and
slaying of the animal by the person presenting the sacrifice were
omitted. The priest severed the head at the back of the neck, but
without entirely detaching it, and then sprinkled (hz.Ahi) some of the
blood upon the wall of the altar ( HaBez;mi.ha ryqi-lfa), and squeezed out the
rest of the blood at (lxe) the base of the altar. With the pigeon
of the burnt-offering it was also commanded, that the crop should
be removed with the filth and thrown upon the ash-heap, that an
incision should be made in the wings, though without entirely sepa-
rating them, and that the whole animal should then be burnt upon
the altar. These directions were probably equally applicable to the
pigeons of the sin-offering (cf. 111).--But Keil is wrong in de-
scribing the ceremony connected with the burnt-offering of pigeons
as perfectly identical with that of the sin-offering, and in attributing
to the former what was restricted to the latter, and constituted its
distinctive characteristic as a sin-offering (cf. 107), namely, that
the priest sprinkled some of the blood of the latter upon the wall
of the altar, and let the rest flow out at the foot of the altar." The
law of the burnt-offering in Lev. i. 15 contains no allusion to the
sprinkling ( hz.Ahi ) of the blood upon the wall of the altar, and a sub-
sequent squeezing out of the rest of the blood at the foot of the altar,
but rather precludes this double process, by directing that the blood
shall be squeezed out against the wall of the altar, and thus com-
bining the two acts into one.
121. On the ritual of the trespass-offering we can be much more
brief. The animal appointed for this was, as a rule, a ram; but
for the trespass-offering of the leper and the Nazarite, a lamb was
selected; "no doubt," as Oehler supposes (p. 645), "to show the
inferiority of the MwAxA." We cannot determine with certainty why
a male sheep should be preferred to a female in this case, whereas
for the sin-offerings of thee laity a female was preferred, whether
sheep or goat. Riehm (p. 117) conjectures that the violation of a
privilege had more of the character of violence in it; and Rinck (p.
372), that the intention was "to give greater scope for the valua-
tion." The exclusion of goats from the trespass-offering is attri-
buted by Knobel to the character of the trespass-offering, as the
payment of a fine; because in ancient times the sheep was the ordi-
nary medium of payment whether of fines or tribute.
The valuation of the ram by the priest (Lev. v. 15) was some-
thing altogether peculiar to this kind of sacrifice, and does not occur
anywhere else. Hengstenberg observes on this point: "The ram
of the MwAxA received an imaginary value through the declaration of
the priest. This ram, it was said, which N. N. offers as compensa-
tion for his robbery of God, shall be equivalent to the amount of
his robbery. The ram, which was presented as a compensation for
the spiritual o]fei<lhma, was appraised as high as the amount that
was given in compensation for the outward, material o]fei<lhma. By
this symbolical act the idea of debt was most vividly impressed, and
the necessity for making a settlement with God clearly placed be-
fore their eyes" (Dissertations on the Pentateuch, ii. 176, Eng. Tr.
1847). Riehm objects to this, because "such a mode of reckoning
by imaginary amounts was foreign to the spirit of antiquity;" and
he supposes the valuation to refer to the actual worth of the ram.
"It was requisite," he says, "that the value of the ram, which de-
pended upon the size, fat, etc., should correspond to the amount of
the lfama. Bunsen takes the same view, and renders the passage,
according to thy valuation, worth at least two shekels." Oehler
also supposes that by the indefinite value fixed, viz., two shekels
and upward, scope was given in the valuation, to bring the worth
of the ram into a certain relation to the extent of the lfama committed."
The actual worth of the ram has no doubt to be taken into consi-
deration, but we must still maintain, with Keil (p. 236), "that the
valuation had a symbolical meaning, since the actual worth of the
different rams, all of which were without a fault, could not very
greatly vary." In any case in which it was impossible to appraise
the material lfm by money or money's worth, the valuation of the
animal brought as a trespass-offering was, as a matter of course,
omitted (Lev. xiv. 12 sqq. ; Num. vi. 12; Lev. xix. 20 sqq.).
The offering of the animal sacrifice, which expiated the lfm
before God, had to be accompanied by a material compensation to
the injured person for the wrong that had been done through the
lfm increased by one-fifth of its worth. The addition of the fifth
was to be regarded as a mulcta, so far as the wrong-doer was con-
cerned, and afforded compensation to the injured person for the
temporary loss of his rightful property; being, in fact, a kind of
interest. The choice of a fifth as the particular price to be paid, is
to be attributed to the symbolical meaning of the number five, as
the half of the full number ten. In the case of an aggravated
theft, on the other hand, the compensation demanded was either
double, fourfold, or fivefold, according to circumstances (Ex. xxii.

1 and 4). Even in the case of taxes, a fifth was frequently the
proportion fixed upon (Gen. xli. 34, xlvii. 24).
The suggestion of Clericus and Rosennzuller, that Ox (or) should
be supplied, so as to leave it free whether a ram should be brought
or the amount in money, is equally inadmissible, whether we con-
sider the words or the circumstances, and is not worth refuting.
122. The imposition of hands is never expressly mentioned in
connection with the trespass-offering; and for that reason Rinck
(p. 376) and Knobel (pp. 343, 396) maintain that it did not take
place, and endeavour to explain the omission on the ground of the
peculiar nature of this kind of sacrifice. The former maintains
that "the idea of a sacrifice of compensation or restoration pre-
eluded it;" but we must bear in mind his distorted and mistaken
opinion, that the relation between the trespass-offering and sin-
offering was that of satisfaction and expiation. Knobel, on the con-
trary, says, that "as the payment of a debt, it was not subjected to
the imposition of hands, which was expressive of a free gift;" but
the imposition of hands was not expressive of the freedom of the
gift, nor was the trespass-offering, as distinguished from the sin-
offering, characterized by the want of freedom in the gift of the
sacrificial animal presented as an expiation. The absence of any
express reference to the necessity for the imposition of hands in
the case of the trespass-offering, has been very well discussed and
accounted for by Keil (p. 238): In Lev. vii. 1-7, for example,
there is, no doubt, an omission of any such statement; but there is a
similar omission in the case of the sin-offering in the corresponding
passage, Lev. vi. 24-30. It is only in the section relating to the
sin-offerings in Lev. iv., where the different cases are enumerated
in which sin-offerings were to be presented, that it is mentioned at
all; and if there is no allusion to it in the corresponding section
relating to the trespass-offerings (Lev. v. 14 sqq.), this is to be
explained from the fact, that the ceremony connected with the
sacrificing of the trespass-offering is not described at all.--The
relation in which the section referring to the trespass-offering
(Lev. v. 14) stands to the earlier section on sin-offerings is that
of a supplementary limitation, which provides in certain cases for
the offering of a trespass-offering in the place of a sin-offering
( 102). In accordance with this, which is its true intention, it is
content with describing the cases in which that was to take place.
It formed part of this, no doubt, to notice the payment of the six
fifths as compensation, and the valuation of the sacrificial animal,

but not to describe the rest of the ritual (the imposition of hands,
the slaying, and the sprinkling of the blood). This is supplied
afterwards in Lev. vii. 1 sqq.; and if the laying on of the hand is
not specially mentioned, that is simply because the law assumed that
the necessity for it was self-evident in the case of the trespass-
offerings as well as in that of every other sacrifice.
In the slaughtering of the trespass-offering there was nothing
peculiar (Lev. vii. 2); but the sprinkling of the blood was not carried
out in the same intensified form as in the case of the sin-offering;
and the reason for this, no doubt, was, that in the normal trespass-
offering the trespass appeared to be lessened by the voluntary
material restitution. The question, however, is not without its
difficulties, how we are to understand the bybisA HaBez;miha-lfa qroz;yi which
was required in the case of the trespass-offering (as well as in that
of the burnt-offering and peace-offering; vid. Lev. vii. 2). Bahr,
Keil, and Knobel suppose it to denote a sprinkling upon the altar,
or on the walls of the altar round about. But as the term. hz.Ahi,
which is applied to the ritual of the sin-offering alone, and never
used in connection with the trespass-offering, burnt-offering, and
peace-offering, undoubtedly signifies sprinkling in the literal sense
of the word, and hence the verb qrazA must refer to the application
of blood to the altar in some other form, the preference must cer-
tainly be given to the signification of pouring or swinging out,
which is more in accordance with its use elsewhere, and also to
Hofmann's view, according to which HaBez;mi.ha-lfa qroz;yi denotes a swinging
about over the surface of the altar (p. 256). That something more
is intended than a sprinkling upon the walls of the altar, or upon
the altar itself," as Winer supposes, is evident from the fact, that
the blood could not have been all used up for that purpose; and
yet we never read of any remainder having to be poured out at the
foot of the altar, in connection with either the trespass-, the peace-,
or the burnt-offerings, whereas this is never omitted in the laws re-
lating to the sin-offering (Lev. iv. 7, 18, 25, 30, v. 9). It is quite
as impossible to understand by it a pouring or swinging out of the
blood against the outer walls of the altar, since in that case the
blood would have run down the walls upon the bank which sur-
rounded the altar, reaching about half way up ( 11), and under
the priests' feet. At the same time the bybisA, upon which such
emphasis is laid, must not be overlooked. The blood was not to be
poured upon the middle of the surface of the altar, where the altar-
fire was burning, but by a twist of the hand was to be poured

round in such a manner that it should fall upon the inner margin
of the altar. So also the squeezing out of the blood of the pigeon
offered as a burnt-offering HaBez;mi.ha ryqi-lfa, and the sprinkling of the
blood of the pigeon offered as a sin-offering HaBez;mi.ha ryqi-lfa, hardly
refer to the outer walls of the altar, but probably to their upper or
inner surface. But when Bahr and Knobel appeal to the analo-
gous expression HaBez;mi.ha ryqi-lfa in the case of the burnt-offering of
pigeons, and take this as the rule by which to interpret the simple
expression HaBez;mi.ha-lfa, I am compelled to maintain, vice versa, that
the expression HaBez;mi.ha ryqi-lfa, which is always applied to the offering
of pigeons, and that alone (i. 15, v. 9), must mean something dif-
ferent from the simple HaBez;mi.ha-lfa, which is constantly applied to the
oxen, sheep, and goats, so that the evidence is in the very opposite
direction.
With reference to the course to be adopted with the flesh of the
trespass-offering, according to Lev. vii. 7 the law for the sin-offer-
ing was applicable to this also. It is true, that the only point
expressly mentioned there is the eating of the flesh on the part of
the priests, without admitting the female portion of their families,--
so that the sacrifices alluded to were those that had been offered by
laymen. Yet, as there can be no doubt that the sins which required
trespass-offerings might be committed by priests, it follows as a
matter of course, that in such cases also the law of the sin-offering
determined the course to be adopted with the flesh. Now if the
higher form of sprinkling was not adopted in the case of the tres-
pass-offering, and those circumstances which rendered the flesh of
the sin-offering most holy were wanting, and yet its flesh was also
regarded as most holy, the only explanation that can be given of
this is, that the trespass-offering, as a subordinate species of sin-
offering, retained the character of most holy which was inherent in
the latter, although the circumstances were wanting which had
originally stamped that character upon the sin-offering itself.
RITUAL OF THE BURNT-OFFERING AND PEACE-OFFERING. 249
CHAPTER III.
RITUAL OF THE BURNT-OFFERING AND PEACE-OFFERING.
123. The most common name for the so-called BURNT-OFFER-

ING is hlAfo. We may quietly pass by Ewald's interpretation of the
word, as meaning the "long burning," for the root of which he
invents a verb, lUf=rUf, to glow, or burn, appealing as a matter of
fact to Lev. vi. 9, and still adhere to the old and traditional deri-
vation from hlAfA, to ascend. In any case it is designated as the
ascending one par excellence (in distinction from the other kinds of
sacrifice, of which only the fat was placed upon the altar), because
the whole animal was burnt upon the altar with the exception of
the skin (Lev. i. 9, lKoha), and this is expressed in the less common
name lyliKA, whole-offering (Dent. xxxiii. 10; Ps. li. 19; 1 Sam.
vii. 9). At the same time, it may be questioned, whether by this
term hlAfA we are to understand an ascent to Jehovah through the
burning upon the altar, or simply the ascent to the top of the altar
itself (Lev. ii. 12). Knobel, who decides in favour of the latter,
traces the origin of the name to the fact, "that in the earliest times
the whole-offering was the only sacrifice presented;" in which case,
however, Gen. iv. 4 would have to renounce its claim to historical
credibility. In support of this explanation of the word, Oehler
appeals to the frequent combination of hlAfo hlAf<h, with HaBez;mi.ha-lfa or
HaBez;mi.Ba= cf. Ps. li. 19). With very rare exceptions, he says, hlAf<h,, is
the verb specially connected with the burnt-offering, just as byriq;hi,
HbazA, wyGihA are connected with the other kinds of sacrifice. The other
allusion, viz., to the ascent of the smoke of the sacrifice, is supported
by Jerome (ad Ez. c. 45: quod totum sacro igne consumitur); the
Septuagint rendering (o[lokau<twma) is based upon it; and it is
decidedly the one most generally received by modern theologians.
Delitzsch, on the other hand, maintains that a in the Hebrew hlAf<h,
the idea of causing to ascend in the fire, and that of bringing upon
the altar, are merged into one another, and it cannot be maintained
that in ordinary usage either the one or the other prevailed " (Heb.
p. 313 A) ; and even Hofmann (p. 226) cannot dispute this. But
as the true and ultimate design of the sacrifice was not to raise it
upon the altar, but to cause it to ascend in the fire, that Jehovah
might partake of it, and be satisfied with the "sweet savour" (Gen.
250 RITUAL OF THE BURNT-OFFERING AND PEACE-OFFERING.
viii. 21); and, moreover, as the still more frequent designation of

the sacrifices as hOAhy; yw.exi, hOAhy; MH,l,, HaHoyni Hayrel; hw,.xi outweighs the fre-
quent combination of hlAfo hlAf<h, with HaBez;miha-lfa the idea of causing
to ascend in the fire is certainly to be regarded as at all events the
leading idea. And the expression MyrihAh, dHaxa lfa hlAfol; UhlefEha, in Gen.
xxii. 2, is more favourable to this view than to the opposite one,
since it shows in what sense HaBez;miha-lfa hlAf<h, is to be understood.
124. We have already seen that no special reasons are men-
tioned for presenting the burnt-offerings ( 86). They were neither
consequent upon the commission of particular sins, like the sin- and
trespass-offerings, nor upon particular manifestations of divine mercy,
like the peace-offerings. For this reason no prominence was given
to the act of expiation, nor was there any opportunity afforded for
the sacrificial meal. On the other hand, the burning upon the
altar is the culminating point, by which all the rest is regulated,
and which marks it as an expression of perpetual obligation to
complete, sanctified self-surrender to Jehovah ( 74 sqq.).
It is incorrect, however, to affirm, as Keil has done, with refer-
ence to the offerers of this sacrifice, that "through the covenant
which God had made with Israel, membership in the theocratic
community was a prerequisite to the offering of a burnt-offering;
so that it could only be presented by those who stood in covenant
with the Lord, since none but those who were partakers of the
grace of God could sanctify their lives to the Lord" (p. 241). For
he has quite overlooked Lev. xvii. 8, and xxii. 18, 25, where refer-
ence is expressly made to burnt-offerings and sin-offerings that
should be offered by strangers. From these passages it is very
evident, that a simple acknowledgment of Jehovah as the only true
God was quite sufficient, without any formal admission into the
covenant of the theocracy, to entitle those who were not Israelites
to participate in the sacrificial worship (cf. 2).
Any kind of animal that was fit for sacrifice might be offered
as a burnt-offering; but only the males of oxen, sheep, and goats
(Lev. i. 10). In the case of pigeons the gender was a matter of
indifference, because it was not outwardly visible, and did not affect
the entire organism in any peculiar manner (ver. 14). The choice
of the male animal, says Oehler, p. 635, "pointed to the superior
rank of this kind of sacrifice, just as male animals were selected
for the higher description of sin-offerings." At the same time, the
explanation already given by me, which Oehler admits and Keil
quotes with approbation, viz., that the demand for a male animal
was founded upon the peculiar idea of the burnt-offering, as a com-

plete, earnest, energetic self-surrender, may be maintained as well.
In the male sex all the limbs, bones, nerves, and muscles are stronger
and more fully developed. Hence the male sex, since the form cor-
responds to the substance,--that is to say, since the powers of soul
and spirit are strong and enduring in the same proportion,--is the
prominent, vigorous, working sex, and in every language the idea of
strong and energetic is expressed by the term masculine. Kliefoth
also looks upon the demand for the male/animal as founded on the
character of the burnt-offering as a whole-offering, and explains it
on this ground, that "the male animal was more an entire animal
than the female." The ceremony with the blood was the same as
in the case of the trespass-offering ( 122). The directions how to
prepare the flesh for burning upon the altar (Lev. i. 6-9) were
based simply upon outward convenience, and therefore had no
really symbolical significance. "Since the animal," says Keil, p.
242, "was to be offered as food for the Lord, it could not be burnt
with the skin and hair upon it, but had first of all to be flayed.
The cutting up of the animal, however, was for the purpose of
burning, and was necessary, if for no other reasons, because it was
impossible for a large animal to be laid upon the altar whole."
And Bahr observes (ii. 366), that "the reason for commanding the
hind-legs and entrails to be washed before they were burnt upon
the altar, was simply that it was just these portions that could most
easily be defiled by impurities." The assignment of the skin of the
burnt-offering to the priest (Lev. vii. 8), was in accordance with
the principle that they who wait at the altar are to be partakers of
the altar (1 Cor. ix. 13). And if the burnt-offering, because it was
a whole-offering, could not furnish the priest with food, its skin
could be, and was to be, assigned to him for clothing.
125. The specific name of the fourth kind of bleeding sacri-

fice is MymilAw;. The singular Ml,w, only occurs in Amos v. 22 as the
name of a sacrifice. Where one single sacrifice of this kind is re-
ferred to, it is called MymilAw; Hbaz,. This has generally been rendered
a THANK-OFFERING, after the example of Luther, who followed
Josephus (Ant. 3. 3, 1, xaristh<rioj qusi<a); or a PEACE-OFFERING,
after the Septuagint (ei]rhnikh> qusi<a) and Vulgate (sacrifcia paci-
fica); and lately a SAVING-OFFERING (Heils-opfer: sacrificia salu-
taria), after a rarer rendering of the LXX. (swth<rion), which
Philo (de vict.), and lately Outram, Hengstenberg, Bunsen, and others,
have adopted. But as not one of these three names appeared to

answer exactly in etymology and meaning to the idea of MymilAw;, a
number of other explanations have been attempted: such as resti-
tution-offering (Bahr), payment-offering (Ebrard), finishing-offer-
ing (Baumgarten), offering of blessedness (Neumann).
There are two things connected with the interpretation of the
word MymilAw;, which have been especially the subject of dispute: (1)
with reference to the form of the word, whether it is derived from
the Kal MlawA or MlewA = integrum esse, as Keil, Oehler, Neumann,
Hengstenberg, Tholuck, Kliefoth, and others maintain; or from the
Piel Ml.ewi = to compensate, repay, as Bahr, Hofmann, Knobel, and
others suppose: and (2) with regard to the actual meaning, sup-
posing the former derivation is to be preferred, whether it is the
terminus a quo or the terminus ad quem which is designated as MOlwA.
In support of the derivation from the Piel Ml.ewi, and the con-
sequent signification, thank-offering, offering of retribution or com-
pensation, appeal has been made (by Knobel for example) to the
fact that the Piel is frequently connected with the various kinds
of sacrifice belonging to the category of Shelamim, e.g., MyridAn; Ml.ewi
or tOdOT Ml.ewi (Ps. lvi. 12; cf. Hos. xiv. 3, MyriPA Ml.ewi); and also that
nouns derived from Kal, so far as the form is concerned, by no
means unfrequently revert to the Piel in their signification (Ewald,
Gramm. 150 b), a proof of which is to be found in connection
with this verb in the word Mynimol;wa = bribery, in Isa. i. 23. It is
evident enough," says Hofmann, "that Ml,w, means the same as line,
which is formed from it, and which again is interchangeable with
MUl.wi (Micah vii. 3). A present made to a judge for a favourable
decision, is called NOml;wa in one instance and MUl.wi in the other.
Whether the present is made before the verdict, or afterwards, it is
still a gift for a favourable sentence. . . . Ml,w, denotes a gift from
one who needs favour to one who grants it, whether the favour has
been already granted or is merely being sought. The MymilAw; there-
fore were gifts presented to God, through which a man acknow-
ledged that what good he possessed he owed to the favour of God,
and what good he needed he must seek from that favour,--in a word,
that they were xaristh<ria." The objection, that Shelamim were
also presented in connection with prayers offered in circumstances
of distress (Judg. xx. 26, xxi. 4; 1 Sam. xiii. 9; 2 Sam. xxiv. 25),
is met by Knobel in this way: "Just as afflicted psalmists could
associate the liveliest thanksgiving with earnest prayer, because
they comforted themselves with the assurance of being heard (Ps.
xxxi. liv. lvii. lxxi.), so could others accompany their petitions with
a thank-offering, and thus attest their gratitude beforehand, for the
purpose of moving God the more readily to grant their request."
The possibility of Ml,w, possessing the idea of compensation can-
not be disputed; but to the application of this idea to the kind of
sacrifice mentioned here there are many obstacles, which cannot be
easily removed. It is always a much more simple course to retain
the signification of the Kal, when the noun is, derived from the Kal
in form, and to regard it as a designation of the state of that rw,xE
Mlaw;ye. To this we are also led by the nearest cognate adjective MlewA
complete, uninjured, living in peace and friendship, friendly (Gen.
xxxiv. 21); whilst the frequent expression hOAhy; Mfi MlewA (1 Kings
viii. 61, xi. 4, xv. 3) points us to Him, whose peace and friendship
were sought through the Shelamim. The expression ymiOlw;, my
friend, he who lives in friendship with me, must also be borne in
mind (Ps. x1i. 9). From this signification of the Ml,w,, which is
certainly the most natural one, there could be no reason for depart-
ing, and reverting to that of the Piel, unless the design and signifi-
cation of this kind of sacrifice absolutely demanded it; for the
word NOml;wa, which is derived from Ml,w, in form, need not have had
the same meaning on that account in actual use, even apart from the
fact that it would, at any rate, be a very doubtful thing to apply
the idea of bribery to the Shelamim. And Knobel's argument, that
Shelamim were offered even in circumstances of misery and distress,
does not make this view by any means less doubtful. A psalmist, with
his inward certainty of the approaching help of God, might perhaps
express his gratitude in the simple prospect;1 but he would do so as
a poet, carried forward in spirit to the time when help had already
arrived, or as a hero of faith moved by the Holy Ghost, and assured
by the same Spirit that his petition would be granted. It is a very
different question, however, whether what the inspired poet might
do in thoughts and words in moments of special inspiration and
elevation, could have the same legal or general force, as a rule and
model for every individual in all the circumstances of this prosaic,
every-day life, destitute as it is of any lyric flight, or theopneustic
1
In the Psalms mentioned by Knobel, however, I cannot find one instance
of present thanksgiving for that particular help, which is only solicited and
hoped for, but merely a certainty and joyous anticipation of future thanks-
giving answering to the certainty of future help (cf. Ps. liv. 8, lvii. 10, lxxi.
14 sqq.). But in Ps. cxviii. 21 we find what could be and was to be the object
of thanksgiving in the very midst of suffering.
elevation above the simple necessities of the present time. For my

own part, I have my doubts about it. And whilst Hofmann justly
pronounces Knobel's opinion a "miserable evasion," we have all the
more right to condemn it as arbitrary on his own part, and at vari-
ance with both grammar and facts, to place what has been received
from the favour of God, and what has yet to be solicited from that
favour, under the common point of view of a xaristh<rion, and thus
in the strangest way to designate as thanksgiving not only praise for
benefits already received, but prayer for benefits needed still. There
is some sense in Knobel's "miserable evasion," but I can find none
in Hofmann's evasion.
So far as the expressions MyridAn; Ml.ewi and tOdOT Mle.wi are con-
cerned, they unquestionably prove that the offering of these two
kinds of Shelamim rested upon a moral and religious obligation.
But as the same expressions are not applied to the third kind of
Shelamim (the tObdAn;), and according to this idea could not be ap-
plied to them, we have here a proof that the MymilAw;; could not derive
their name from the verb Mle.wi; otherwise this verb would have been
equally applicable to the tObdAn;. Even on this ground, therefore, it is
evident that the meaning and purpose of the MymilAw; do not necessi-
tate, but rather preclude, our tracing the derivation to the Piel of Mlw.
This becomes still more obvious if we institute a comparison
between the name of the Shelamim and that of the other kinds of
sacrifice. Just as the name hlAfo (and more decidedly still the name
lyliKA) pointed to what formed the distinguishing mark, the true
purpose and culminating point of the burnt-offering, namely, the
burning of the whole upon the altar (Lev. i. 9), and as the name
txF.H pointed to the characteristic and most important feature of
the sin-offering, viz., the act of expiation; so the name MymilAw; also
pointed to that which was the distinctive peculiarity of these sacri-
fices, to that which they contemplated more than any other kind
of sacrifice, viz., the sacrificial meal.1 But if it cannot be denied
1
The other name MyHibAz;, or slain-offering, which is restricted in the Penta-
teuch to the peace-offerings, also points to the sacrificial meal. The verb Hbz,
for example, denotes the slaughtering of an animal with express reference to
the meal which it is to furnish, especially the sacrificial meal, whilst slaughter-
ing for ordinary meals is generally expressed by HbF, and FHw contains no
allusion to a meal at all. At the same time, there is no reason for denying that
in the later usages of the language the name nut is sometimes applied mistakenly
to the bleeding sacrifices in general; for the most part, however, exclusively of
the burnt-offering, which is only included in the phrase hHAn;miU Hbaz,.
( 79) that the meal was an expression and attestation of a condi-

tion of peace and friendship, of the maintenance and blessedness of
fellowship, no other course is open than to trace the name of the
MymilAw; to the desire of the person presenting the sacrifice to see
himself employed by means of the offering as hOAhy; Mlewo, as Mfi MlewA
hOAhy;.
The recognition of this will furnish us at once with the true
answer to the question mentioned above, whether the name of the
Shelamim denotes the terminus a quo or the terminus ad quem of the
offering. But if, according to what has been already stated, we
must decide in favour of the latter, we cannot for all that fully
agree with Kliefoth. "The Shelamim," he says (p. 75), "received
their name from the condition, which they were to produce in the
person presenting the sacrifice: they were to cause it to become
right with him, to produce MOlwA between him and his God." For
it was necessary that it should be right with him, and that he should
stand in a relation of MOlwA towards his God, before he could even
think of presenting a Shelem at all. If it had not been right be-
tween him and Jehovah,--if there had not been peace and harmony,
but division and discord, between him and his God,--it would have
been necessary that the cause of the discord should first be expiated
by either a sin- or a trespass-offering. A state of peace and friend-
ship with God was the basis, and sine qua non, to the presentation of
a Shelem; and the design of that presentation, from which its name
was derived, was the realization, establishment, verification, and en-
joyment of the existing relation of peace, friendship, fellowship, and
blessedness.
From what has been stated it is evident that the name most in
accordance with the Hebrew, and most in harmony with the idea
of this kind of sacrifice, is that of peace-offering. The expression
salvation-offering (Heils-opfer) is too indefinite and ambiguous. At
the same time it must be admitted, that the sacrificia pacifica of
Jerome is likely to mislead. This Gussetius perceived, and hence he
preferred the name sacrilicia pacalia; quibus pax cum Deo fovetur.
126. The peace-offerings may be divided, according to Lev.
vii. 11 sqq., into three species: (1) hdAOTha Hbaz,, i.e., praise-oferings ;
(2) rd,n, Hbaz, MT, votive offerings; and (3) hbAdAn; Hbaz,, freewill-offerings.
No one, so far as I know, except Hengstenberg, has disputed the
admissibility of this threefold division. "In vain," he says (p. 36),
"have many (?) attempted to change the generic name hdAOTha Hbaz,
into that of a particular species." He even goes so far as to assert,
that "the words of Lev. vii. 11 sqq. do not favour it, but are most
decidedly opposed to it." But the most cursory glance at the pas-
sage in question shows how thoroughly groundless this confident
assertion is. Since the law of the Shelamim is announced in ver.
11, and this law commences in ver. 12 with the words hdAOT-lfa Mxi
Un.b,yriq;ya (if he offer it for a thanksgiving), and the offering is then
immediately designated as hdAOTha Hbaz, (sacrifice of thanksgiving),
and MymilAw;.ha tdOT Hbaz, (the sacrifice of thanksgiving of his peace-
offerings), we should necessarily expect to find that Shelamim could
be offered for other reasons, which of course would not in that
case he called "sacrifices of thanksgiving." This expectation is
fully realized in ver. 16, where, after the materials and ritual of the
thanksgiving-offering have been described, we find these words:
OnBAr;qA Hbaz, hbAdAn; Ox rd,n, Mxiv; ("but if the sacrifice of his offering be a
vow, or a voluntary offering"); so that two new species of Shelamim
are introduced which presented a common contrast to the thanks-
giving-offering. In ver. 15, for example, it is stated that the flesh
of the thanksgiving offering was all to be eaten on the same day
on which it was slaughtered; whereas, according to ver. 16, some
of the flesh of the votive and voluntary offerings might be eaten
on the second day. How, then, can any one think of the possibility
of identifying the thanksgiving offering with the votive and volun-
tary offering, and regarding the former as the genus and the latter
as the two species? And what intolerable tautology would be con-
tained in the designation MymilAw;.ha tdaOT Hbaz,, if MymilAw; and tdoOT were
perfectly equivalent terms! And when Hengstenberg maintains
that "only two classes of thank-offerings are known in Lev. xxii.
18, 21, the votive offering and the voluntary offering," the state-
ment is correct enough if for known we substitute named. The
reason why only these two species of peace-offerings are named here,
is that this law merely supplies what was omitted in Lev. vii. 11
sqq., namely, a description of the materials allowable for these two
species, and of the fixed line of distinction between the two, which
arose out of the materials employed.--Moreover, as Oehler observes
at p. 638, the fact must also be noticed, that in Lev. xxiii. 37, 38
(also Num. xxix. 39) and Dent. xii. 6, an offering is mentioned dis-
tinct from both the MyridAn; and tObdAn;, where we cannot think of any-
thing else than a hdAOTha Hbaz,, which, as being the leading and truest
peace- (slain-) offering ( 128), is so designated par excellence.
127. Most commentators follow Philo and the Rabbins, and
maintain that the Shelamim embraced not merely thank-offerings
in the stricter sense (for divine gifts already received), but also
supplicatory offerings (for gifts first asked for at the time). Thus
Outram (i. 11, 1) describes the sacrificia salutaria as those quae
semper de rebus prosperis fieri solebant, impetratis utique aut impe-
trandis; and Hengstenberg (Beitr. iii. 36) says: "The Shelamim
undoubtedly had salvation for their object; but, according to the
variation in circumstances, they were offered either as incorporated
thanks for what had been imparted, or as embodied prayers for
what had yet to be received." Scholl, Tholuck, Keil, and others,
agree with this; Bahr and Kliefoth being alone.in disputing it.1
Bahr observes: "Scholl's argument, that otherwise the Mosaic
worship would have no supplicatory sacrifice at all, in the strict
sense of the word, cannot have any force in itself; for, according
to this method, what is there that could not be brought into the
Mosaic worship?" To this I have already replied (M. O. pp.
134-5): "If the supplicatory offering rested upon a truly religious
basis, and the idea to be expressed therein was really founded upon
a religious necessity,--a fact which cannot be disputed, and which
even Bahr himself admits, though he refers to the burnt-offering
for the satisfaction of that want,--we are certainly warranted in
expecting that the Mosaic economy, as a divine institute, would
meet that want and satisfy it, and are bound to look for a provision
answering to it. And we by no means agree with Bahr in the
opinion, that it was characteristic of Mosaism, and a proof in its
favour, that the supplicatory offerings so common elsewhere were
not to be found in it, for it was so easy for magical notions to
grow up, as to the power of these sacrifices to bind and compel
the Deity, as was the case for the most part with heathen sacrifices.
What would not Moses have had to reject from the ceremonial of
worship, if he had allowed himself to be deterred by such fears and
impelled by such principles as these! The same magical notions
of a force binding and compelling the Deity were to be feared in
connection with all the rest of the sacrifices, and may spring up
quite as easily with the most spiritual of all the forms of worship,
viz., prayer. Moreover, it should be borne in mind, that support
is by no means wanting to the notion of a power in prayer to bind
and compel the Deity, and therefore in sacrifice also, the anticipated
1
Stockl (p. 263) describes the denial of the supplicatory offering as the
"sententia communis of Protestant symbolism;" and yet the good man, as his
book shows, has not read a single Protestant work on sacrifice, except Bahr's
Symbolik! This is something more than naivete.
operation of which is founded upon promises quite as express and

definite. We have only to remember how frequently, both in para-
bles and without parables, the Redeemer attributes a compelling
(though certainly not a magical) power to prayer." Besides, the
presentation of Shelamim in times of trouble and distress (Judg.
xx. 26, xxi. 4; 1 Sam. xiii. 9; 2 Sam. xxiv. 25) is a sufficient proof
of the fact disputed by Bahr.
But the question is not without difficulty, whether the contrast
between the thank-offerings and supplicatory offerings is to be in-
troduced into the three subordinate species of Shelamim, and if so,
how? Scholl was of opinion, that as the sacrifice of thanksgiving
was undoubtedly a thank-offering in the literal sense, the supposi-
tion was a very natural one, that by rd,n, and hbAdAn; we are to under-
stand two distinct kinds of supplicatory offerings. Hofmann objects
to this, on the ground that "the names do not harmonise with the
latter, since a vow might be quite as easily the payment of grati-
tude for a request obtained, as the attendant of a prayer for help
or blessing; and a free gift might be so called for the simple reason
that it was prompted by nothing else than the will of the person to
present some offering." But the fallacy of these objections may
easily be detected. For according to the general usage of speech,
a vow can only be regarded as an "accompaniment of a prayer for
help," and never as "the payment of gratitude for a request ob-
tained and as it stands to reason that a spontaneous act must
have something to occasion it, some such occasion must be presup-
posed in connection with the presentation of a freewill-offering.
Hofmann does not tell us very distinctly where he would place the
supplicatory offerings, the existence of which he so firmly maintains.
But when he quotes with approval the words of Hengstenberg re-
ferred to above, saying "Hengstenberg is right in maintaining of the
Shelamim generally, that, etc.," it may probably be inferred that
he looks upon every one of the three species of "thanksgiving offer-
ings as adapted to serve equally as an expression of thanks for a
favour already granted, and prayer for one now first implored.
He has also stated this, in so many words, of the votive offering;
but how he reconciles it with his explanatian of the hbAdAn; as given
in the same place, I am quite unable to discover. Nor can I see
how it is to be applied to the hdAOT, the very name of which evidently
points to praise and thanksgiving for benefits received, and cannot
be interpreted as an expression of prayer and entreaty for future
benefits, without the greatest confusion of language.
128. To arrive at a solution of the question before us, we will

take the three species of Shelamim seriatim. The clearest and most
systematic is the idea of the PRAISE-OFFERING, or hdAOTha Hbaz,. The
verb hdAOh signifies professus est, confesses est, then gratias egit, lau-
davit, celebravit; hence hdAOT = praise, thanksgiving. The Todah-
offering, therefore, was a praise- or thank-offering in the literal
sense; and in contrast to the vow- and freewill-offerings, would be
presented whenever the reception of divine benefits impelled the
pious Israelite to offer praise and thanksgiving to the Giver of all
good gifts; and impelled him with the greater force, because of
his consciousness that under all circumstances the blessing was
undeserved, and he himself was but little worthy of such favour.
It was this inward constraint of the pious heart that distinguished
it from the hbdn; just as the absence of any previous vow, that
thanks should be offered in a particular way after the blessing;
sought for had been obtained, distinguished) it from the rd,n,.1 The
restriction of the praise-offerings, however, to benefits received, un-
hoped for and unasked, is too sweeping and unfounded (Oehler,
p. 638, and Kliefoth, p. 78). It would confine the praise-offering
in a most singular manner to far too narrow a circle, whereas it
was evidently the leading, most literal, and most frequent Shelem.
It was not the receipt of some unexpected good, but the receipt
of it apart from any vow- or freewill-offering, which constituted
the distinctive characteristic of the praise-offering. A plentiful f;
harvest, for example, even if it had been both hoped and prayed
for, but had not been the subject of any previous offering either
vowed or actually presented, would certainly be a reason for pre-
senting a praise-offering. So also the slain- or peace-offerings pre-
sented at the yearly festivals (Lev. xxiii. 19), and on special festal
occasions (e.g., Lev. ix. 18; Josh. viii. 31 ; 1 Kings viii. 63), were
undoubtedly praise-offerings. The fact adduced above ( 126) for
a different purpose, viz., that in Lev. xxiii. 37, 38, Num. xxix. 39,
and Deut. xii.6, MyHibAz; are mentioned along with the votive and
freewill-offerings, but distinct from them, by which, therefore,
praise-offerings alone can be understood, is also a proof of our
position.
1
Ewald's opinion (p. 59), that the praise-offering differed from the others,
not in the occasion, but in the solemnity of the offering itself, which was accom-
panied, he thinks, with songs of praise by learned vocal and instrumental
performers, provided by the person presenting the sacrifice, to give greater
solemnity to the offering, we may leave to its own merits.
129. The votive and freewill-offerings present a common

contrast to the praise-offerings. This is not only shown in the
difference in the ritual ( 139), but also proved by the passages
just quoted, in which the generic name of this kind of sacrifice is
applied to the praise-offerings, and the other two species are dis-
tinguished from them.
Now, first of all, so far as the VOTIVE OFFERINGS are con-
cerned, the commentators have omitted for the most part to settle
two questions, which are essential to a clear understanding of their
position and meaning, viz.: (1) whether the votive offering itself
was to be regarded as the object of the vow, or as an accompani-
ment merely; and (2) whether the votive offering was invariably
offered after the blessing for which the vow was made had been
received, or sometimes before it was received. Kliefoth is the only
person, who has given any thorough answer to these questions; but
unfortunately his answer is wrong. In his opinion, the presentation
of the sacrifice was not in itself the object of the vow, but some
other performance; e. g., a gift to the tabernacle, abstinence from
food and other enjoyments. The performance of the vow was
always accompanied by this sacrifice, and it was after the receipt of
what had been prayed for that both were presented. Examples of
this are to be found, he thinks, in Num. vi. 13, 14; 1 Sam. i. 24;
and 2 Sam. xv. 8. But the last of these examples is a proof of the
very opposite. Absalom says there: "While I abode at Geshur in
Syria, I vowed a vow, if Jehovah shall bring me again to Jeru-
salem, I will perform a service to Jehovah (hOAhy;-tx, yTid;bafAv;). "Now,
whether this vow referred, as was probably the case, to the offering
of sacrifice, or to the performance of any other service, the passage,
at any rate, does not speak of a performance of the vow, and a
votive offering connected with it. But the fact that in Num. vi.
14 a sin-offering and a burnt-offering are demanded along with and
before the thank-offering, and that in 1 Sam. i. 24 three bullocks
are offered, one of which was probably intended as a Shelem, is a
proof that these two cases cannot serve as a model for the rest.
In both instances the vow referred to is a Nazarite's vow, and the
connection of the redemption of the vow with a sin-offering, burnt-
offering, and peace-offering was consequent upon the peculiar and
unique character of this kind of vow (cf. 232). In addition to
these passages, Kliefoth quotes Gen. xxviii. 20, Num. xxi. 2,
Judg. xi. 30 sqq.; and here, too, there is not the slightest trace of
a votive offering accompanying the performance of the vow. With
the exception of Gen. xxviii. 20, they are not even supplicatory vows,
and therefore have no bearing at all upon our subject. But when
Kliefoth follows up the assertion that vows could be of a very
different character, and that a votive offering was connected with
all these vows, by stating that all these vows are regulated minutely
in the law (Lev. xxvii. 1 sqq.; Num. xxx. 1 sqq., vi. 1 sqq.; Deut.
xii. 1 sqq.), it is a very singular fact that, with the exception of the
law relating to the Nazarite vow in Num. vi., these minute regu-
lations never mention a single votive offering to be connected with
them.
On the other hand, I must support Kliefoth when he maintains,
in opposition to Hofmann, Oehler, and others, that the votive offering
was not presented till after the receipt of the blessing, the need of
which had prompted the vow, and the acquisition of which it was
intended to facilitate. This is so evidently and essentially a cha-
racteristic of the conditional or supplicatory vow (compare, for ex-
ample, Gen. xxviii. 20 sqq.), that one would think the matter must
be self-evident, and could admit of no doubt at all. But when,
notwithstanding this, several commentators think it necessary to
assume a previous presentation of the votive offering, this is to be
attributed to the fact that, on the one hand, they are obliged to
admit the existence of supplicatory offerings, and on the other
hand, do not know how to arrange them in a natural manner;
consequently they confound them most unnaturally with the votive
offering, since at any rate the vow had a petition as a foil, though
they ignore the fact that the performance of the vow was condi-
tional upon the granting of the request.
The votive offering, therefore, if it was offered after the receipt of
the blessing prayed for, was a thank-offering, as the praise-offering
was; but it differed from this in, the fact that it had been previously
vowed, whereas the true praise-offering presupposed a blessing that
had come from the pure, and nothing but the pure and unmerited
grace of God, had been prompted by no promise of any performance
in return, and therefore awakened livelier gratitude in proportion
to the greater consciousness of unworthiness. Consequently, a
higher place must be assigned to the praise-offering than to the
votive offering in the scale of Shelamim.
130. If, then, on the one hand, we must assume with cer-
tainty the existence of true supplicatory offerings in the Mosaic
economy, i.e., of such offerings as were not conditional upon the
fulfilment of the prayer, but were connected with the prayer, to
give it greater force; and if, on the other hand, neither the praise-
offerings nor the votive offerings answer to this character; we neces-
sarily expect to find it in the third and only remaining class of
Shelamim. And there is really nothing to disappoint this expecta-
tion. The common contrast everywhere drawn between the praise-
offering, on the one hand, and the FREEWILL-OFFERING and votive
offering, on the other, is sufficient of itself to lead to this conclusion.
If the presentation of a Todah- (praise-) offering had reference to a
pure act of divine grace dependent on, and determined by, no service
in return we shall have to seek the common characteristic of the
other two Shelamim in the fact that they were associated with an
act of divine grace, which might be regarded as consequent upon
some counter-performance of man. And this, in fact, is the one
thing which was common to the votive offering and the supplicatory
offering, which differed from one another simply in the fact, that
in the former the sacrifice was not presented till after the blessing
had been obtained, and in the latter was associated directly with the
prayer. The former did not need to be presented, if the prayer
was not granted; the latter had already been presented, even if the
request continued unfulfilled. And just as the former presupposed
a lower, and the latter a higher scale of piety and devotedness to
God; so for the latter an animal of lower value might appear ad-
missible. The fact that the directions in the law (Lev. xxii. 23,
131) answer to this expectation, furnishes a fresh proof of the cor-
rectness rectness of our interpretation of the hbAdAn;. It is also borne out by
the name of this kind of Shelem. The argument which Hofmann
has based upon this, in opposition to the classification of the Neda--
both among the supplicatory offerings (namely, that the freewill-
offering as such could not be prompted by anything but the desire
of the person presenting it to offer something), we have already
shown to have no force ( 127). If we understand the name of the
hbAdAn; Hbaz,, in the only way in which it can be understood, as antitheti-
cal to the rd,n, Hbaz,, and if the latter expresses the obligation to pre-
sent the sacrifice referred to, the former must express the voluntary
character of the offering, which might have been omitted without
any sin, or the violation of any religious duty. And this was actu-
ally the case. For the vow once made, had to be performed without
fail, as soon as the conditions were fulfilled; and therefore if the
object of the vow was the presentation of an offering, this had to be
presented without fail (Num. xxx. 3 ; Dent. xxiii. 22 sqq.). The
supplicatory offering, however, i.e., the strengthening of the petition
by an offering presented at the same time, might be omitted with-

out the violation of any religious duty; and therefore it was justly
called a freewill-offering.
How vague, loose, and unsatisfactory the limitation given to the
hbAdAn; Hbaz, by Kliefoth1 and Knobel2 appears by the side of this firm,
certain, and clearly-defined explanation!--a charge from which
my own explanation, as given in a previous work, is not altogether
free.3
131. With regard to the materials for the peace-offerings, no
restrictions at all were laid down. Oxen, sheep, and goats, of either
sex, might be taken (Lev. iii. 1, 6, 12, xxii. 19, etc.). Pigeons
alone are nowhere to be met with as peace-offerings; and from
this it may be inferred, that there was not the same stringent neces-
sity for the offering as in the case of the sin-offering for example
(cf. Lev. v. 7 sqq.). This wide range was probably allowed for the
choice of the sacrificial animal (to judge from the analogy of Deut.
xvi. 10), in order that it might be rendered proportionate to the
magnitude of the divine gift to which it referred, or to the means
of the person presenting it. Faultlessness was required in all the
animals offered as Shelamim; and in the case of the freewill-offer-
ings only could even animals with too short or too long a limb be
admitted (vid. 130). All the other requisites of cleanness were
demanded even in this class of sacrifices (Lev. xxii. 22, 23).
The laying on of hands, the slaughtering, and the sprinkling of
the blood were performed in just the same manner as with the burnt-
offering and trespass-offering (Lev. iii.). We have seen ( 30) that
1
"There may be very various and manifold states of mind, in which a man
is not conscious of any particular sin, but yet feels the need of making his peace
with God. The outward events and inward conditions which might produce
this are so manifold, that they could not be specified or fixed beforehand.
Hence, in addition to the praise-offerings and votive offerings, the Thorah
formed a third, open class of Shelamim."
2
"The hbAdAn; was a sacrifice, which was not occasioned by any distinct act
of divine mercy, nor by any particular promise, but sprang from the prompting of
the heart itself, from a free, religious impulse (Ex. xxxv. 29, xxxvi. 3); as it
were without the existence of any moral or legal obligation, though it always
had especial reference to the goodness of God, and, as an acknowledgment of
that goodness, was really a thank-offering " (p. 408).
3
"The freewill-offerings could only have an anticipatory reference to acts
of divine mercy, whether they related to some special manifestation of grace to
be sought for, or, without any reference to particular blessings to be prayed for,
were intended to secure the possession or continuance of prosperity in general"
(M. O. pp. 138, 139).
even in the case of these sacrifices, an atoning efficacy was attri-

buted to the sprinkling of the blood, and have shown in 40 why
an act of expiation was required in their case also. If, therefore,
we must reckon the peace-offerings among the expiatory offerings
in the broader sense, we cannot go so far as Kliefoth, with whom
the distinction between this sacrifice and the sin- and trespass-offer-
ings threatens to vanish altogether ( 125), especially as he places
the sacrificial meal of the Shelamim upon the same footing as the
eating of the flesh of the sin-offering by the priests ( 116). The
former appears most distinctly, and in the most inadmissible way,
in his examination of the votive sacrifices, where he has gone so far
astray, in his endeavour to show that in the case of all the Shelamim
there were certain circumstances existing, which introduced some-
thing wrong into the relation in which the sacrificer stood to God
and his nation, and which had to be set right (6tr) by these sacri-
fices, as to pronounce vowing generally a sin, and to represent this
as actually the view and teaching of the Thorah. "Vowing," he
says, "came very near to a venture, by which God was tempted.
The sinful man ought to have considered that he could not even
perform his common duty uprightly. The Israelite should have
rested in the full assurance, that as a member of the covenant
nation he would receive all the blessings of God, even without any
presumptuous promise; and if, notwithstanding that, he still made a
vow, he placed himself in a wrong attitude to God and the people
of God. . . . And it was just this which was not right between
the maker of the vow and God, and which had to be disposed of by
a Shelem even after the vow had been paid." Whether, and if so
how far, this view of a vow can be sustained on ethical and religi-
ous grounds, this is not the place to inquire. But when Kliefoth
represents it as distinctly taught in the Pentateuch, and appeals to
Num. xxx. 3 and Deut. xxiii. 21-23 in proof of this, nothing fur-
ther is needed to refute this assertion, than to request the reader to
examine the passages for himself.
132. Of the flesh of the peace-offerings the same portions were
burned upon the, altar as in the case of the sin- and trespass-offer-
ings ( 108), namely, the fat portions (Lev. iii. 3 sqq., 9 sqq., 14
sqq.), and had just the same significance ( 110). The reason why
only the MybilAHE, were burned upon the altar in the case of the peace-
offering, offering, is much simpler and more obvious than in the other cases
( 111 sqq ). It is to be found partly in the appointment of the
sacrificial meal in connection with the peace-offering for the wor-
shipper and his family, and partly in the necessity for allowing the priest his
portion as the servant of God. The significance of the eating of the flesh of the
sacrifice by the priest we have already explained at 113-9. On the other hand, we
have to examine the reasons for selecting the particular pieces assigned to him,
and the forms with which they were assigned. The two pieces set apart for
the priest were the breast (hz,HA) and the right leg (Nymiy.Aha qOw), Lev. vii. 30, 32.1
1
According to Ewald, Riehni, Knobel, Bunsen, and others, Deut. xviii. 3 is
at variance with this, since according to that passage the part allotted to the
priests from the slain- or peace-offerings was not the wave-breast and heave-leg,
but a fore-joint, the two cheeks, and the stomach, the Hbaz, yHeb;zo txeme in ver. 3
being evidently a more minute explanation of the hOAhy; yw.exi in ver. 1. But it
is perfectly inconceivable that the Deuteronomist should have been ignorant of
the directions of the Levitical Thorah, even if he had lived at a much later
period. And if they were known to him, there must have been some special
reason to induce him to make such an alteration; yet no one will ever succeed
in discovering any such reason. We should have to assume, therefore, in ac-
cordance with the Jewish tradition, which goes back to the Mishnah, Josephus
(Ant. 4. 4, 4), and Philo (de Sacerd. hon. 3), that the Hbaz, yHeb;zo are not
peace-offerings, but ordinary slaughterings, and that this supplementary law
was intended as an indemnity to the priests for the falling off in their revenues
in consequence of the repeal of the provisions of the earlier law in Lev. xvii.
1 sqq. by Deut. xii. 15. The term hbazA in Deut. xviii. 3 furnishes no evidence
against this view, since it is used in Deut. xii. 15 also, in connection with the
ordinary slaughterings; and the hOAhy; yw.exi in ver. 1 is rather a proof of the
opposite of what Knobel supposes it to teach. Ver. 3, for instance, commences
with the words, "And this shall be the priests' due from the people" (MfAhA txeme).
This is evidently intended as an antithesis to ver. 1, which states what they are
to receive from Jehovah (" They shall eat the offerings of Jehovah, and His
inheritance"). The difficulty started by Bunsen (p. 313), that "the law in Lev.
xvii. 1 sqq. was abolished in this book because of its impracticability, and such
an appointment as the Talmud discovers here, would only introduce another
impossibility in its stead," has been already met by Oehler, in Herzog's Real-
encyk. 12, 181-2, by the remark, that "the passage is far from containing any
allusion to an obligation to bring or send the portions mentioned to the sane-
tuary itself. Even the Jewish tradition classed these gifts among the ywdq
lvbgh (i.e., among those gifts to the priests which there was no necessity to
send to the priests officiating at the time, but which might be banded over to
any priest they chose). The gift might be sent to a priests' city, or to a priest
staying in the neighbourhood; and that the performance of the duty might be
omitted whenever there was no opportunity of carrying it out, is an assumption,
that we are as fully warranted in making, as that the command to invite the
Levites to the feast of tithes was based, as a matter of course, upon the supposi-
tion that there were actually Levites in the neighbourhood." The question, why
these three pieces in particular should have been singled out for the priests, is
hz,hA, from hzAHA = to split, divide (then to distinguish, to see),

signines the breast-piece, which is called the Brust-kern (breast-
kernel) in oxen, sheep, and goats, consisting for the most part of
gristly fat, and forming one of the most savoury portions. . . . As
Jehovah received the pure fat, as the best portion of all, so His
servants received the finest breast-piece, which consisted of marbled
and palatable gristly fat" (Knobel).--qOw, from qUw, qqawA, to run, is
understood by Luther and most modern commentators, after the
example of the LXX. (braxi<wn) and Vulgate (armus), as denoting
the fore-leg, or rather the shoulder. But Knobel has justly objected
to this rendering, on the ground that faroz; is the standing word for
the fore-leg (Num. vi. 19; Deut. xviii. 3), and qOw must be under-
stood as denoting the hind-leg, because it is even employed to desig-
nate the human thigh (Song of Sol. v. 15; Ps. cxlvii. 10; Judg.
xv. 8). Moreover, the priest, to whom as the servant and represen-
tative of God the best portion belonged, would hardly have been put
off with the shoulder, which is a poor joint in comparison with the
leg; and it stands to reason that it is the thigh portion (the ham)
that is intended, and not the shin-bone, which is almost bare. And
under such circumstances Hofmann's far-fetched explanation, that
the shoulder referred to the "burden of the office borne by the
priest," smacks too strongly of the caprice of the ancient allegorists
to lead us to alter our opinion. Still less, indeed, can we make up
our mind to accept Knobel's explanation of the reason for selecting
the hind-leg, viz., that according to the Old Testament idea, it was
"from the hip that children issued (Gen. xxxv. 11, xlvi. 26 ; Ex. i.
5 ; Judg. viii. 30; 1 Kings viii. 19) and life proceeded, and there-
fore the hip was peculiarly the seat of vital power."--In the selec-
tion of the thigh for the priest the only point considered was the
flesh, and the flesh was selected only to be eaten; hence the choice
of the leg was determined solely by the fact that it contained the
best and most savoury meat.--And the reason why the right leg was
the one appointed for the priest, was simply that the right side is
always regarded as the better of the two (Gen. xlviii. 13).
The breast and leg, which fell to the portion of the priests, are
frequently designated, the former as the wave-breast, hpAUnT;ha hzeH,E the
latter as the heave-leg, hmAUrT;ha qOw (Ex. xxix. 27; Lev. vii. 34, etc.),
because they were subjected to the peculiar ceremony of waving or
answered thus by Oehler and Schuhltz: "Of every one of the three principal
parts of the animal (the head, trunk, and legs) some valuable portion was to be
set apart."
swinging on the one hand, and of heaving on the other. What the
waving and heaving signified, however, has been by no means
elucidated with perfect clearness and certainty by any previous
investigations. It is true, that when we observe how the latest
commentators (Keil, Knobel, and Oehler) arrive at the same results
through the same means, and with what assurance they speak,
whether in their affirmations or their denials, we ought properly to
regard the question as set for ever at rest through their researches.
But a more minute examination of their arguments, and of the re-
lation in which they stand to the biblical fact, will show that they
have helped forward only one part of the question, whilst they have
thrown the other into still greater confusion, and removed it alto-
gether away from its true solution.
133. The ceremony of WAVING occurs not only in connection
with the wave-breast of the peace-offering, but also "in the Shela-
mnim offered at the ordination of the priests (Lev. viii. 25 sqq.) and
at the consecration of a Nazarite (Num. vi. 20), in the meat-offering
of jealousy (Num. v. 24), in the trespass-offering of the leper (Lev.
xiv. 12), in the offering of the sheaf of first-fruits at the Passover,
and also of the bread of the first-fruits and the lambs of the Shela-
mim at the weekly festival (Lev. xxiii. 11, 20) " (Oehler). The
verb Jynihe, which it would be more correct and more intelligible to
render swing than wave is used to denote the backward and for-
ward movement of a saw (Isa. x. 15) and of a threatening finger
(Isa. xi. 15, xix. 16), and also the movement of a scythe, first from
right to left, and then back again from left to right. The Talmud
describes the sacrificial waving as a xybimAU j`yliOm, i.e., a backward and
forward motion, in which the proper direction was given to the
piece of the sacrifice which lay upon the hands of the offerer by the
hands of the priest placed underneath (vid. Bahr ii. 355). The later
Rabbins, on the contrary, and most of the Christian archoeologists,
assume that the movement was in the direction of the four quarters
of the globe, and suppose allusion to have been made to the omni-
presence of God to whom the gift was thereby to be consecrated.
This view is certainly quite as reconcilable with the text of the Bible
as the other; but no proper use can be made of the meaning which
it gives, since it is impossible to see what an allusion to the omni-
presence of God could do in this connection, inasmuch as Jehovah
dwelt in the sanctuary, and not in all the four winds of heaven
(Keil, p. 253). It is much more advisable, therefore, to keep to the
simple explanation of the Talmud, as the latest expositors have done.
Even Kliefoth does this, though in a thoroughly untenable way. In

his opinion, "the priest took hold of the offering which lay upon
the hands of the offerer, and first drew it towards himself, and then
pushed it back again towards the offerer" (p. 59). The meaning
of this is said to have been, "that the priest first accepted the gift
from the offerer in the name of God, and then it was given back to
the offerer as a gift from God,"--a view which stands in direct and
open contradiction to the statements of the text (Lev. vii. 34, x. 14,
15; Ex. xxix. 28), which show that the wave-breast was assigned
to the priest and not to the offerer. The same rule applies to the
waving of the Levites, to which he appeals; for they were not given
back to the nation, but given to Aaron and his sons as their own
(Num. viii. 19). What Rinck means by his air purification,
which was to be effected by the waving, it is impossible to tell.
The true explanation is rather that of Keil (p. 250), that the waving
was a movement towards the altar, or perhaps, better still, towards
the door of the tabernacle, and thence back again towards the
waving priest. The words "before Jehovah" (Ex. xxix. 26, etc.),
which describe more exactly the purpose of the waving, are in per-
fect harmony with this, since they always contain an allusion to the
tabernacle, when employed in connection with the ritual of worship.
The swinging in a forward direction, says Oehler (p. 640), a evi-
dently denoted the presentation of the gift to God,--it was a prac-
tical declaration that, strictly speaking, it belonged to Him; whilst
the movement back again denoted that God gave back the gift, and
assigned it as His own present to the priest." This is essentially
the same view as that expressed by Hofmann (p. 283) and Knobel
(p. 412).
The statement in the Talmud, that with every waving the priest
placed the pieces to be waved upon the hands of the offerer, and
then put his own hands underneath and so completed the waving,
has probably been too readily adopted by most of the later expositors.
Hofmann is right, it appears to me, in rejecting it as having no
support in the law itself. It is true, some have imagined that the
requisite confirmation could be found in Ex. xxix. 24 and Lev. viii.
27, where the consecration of Aaron and his sons to the priesthood
is described, and a waving of the right shoulder of the offering
certainly does take place in the manner described. But on closer
examination, these passages are rather adapted to sustain the very
opposite conclusion. For if the animal offered in sacrifice received
the name of "ram of the filling" (se. of the hands, vid. 170), it
must have been something singular, which only occurred in connec-

tion with this sacrifice. And since it is stated immediately after-
wards, in Ex. xxix. 26 and Lev. viii. 29, that Moses took the breast
of the ram of the filling and waved it before Jehovah, this wav-
ing cannot possibly have been performed in precisely the same
way as the previous waving of the leg, viz., in the hands of the per-
sons to be consecrated. We shall not be wrong, therefore, if we
assume that the introduction of the offerer in Lev. viii. 27 and Ex.
xxix. 24 was occasioned by peculiar circumstances, and required to
be expressly mentioned, because it was something extraordinary, a
deviation from the usual mode of waving. (We shall find a proof
of this in 170.) This view is also at variance with the fact, that
by the presentation of the sacrificial animal the offerer renounced
all right of ownership, and assigned it absolutely and entirely to
Jehovah, so that from that time forward it was to be regarded as
no longer his own, but as Jehovah's property ( 81, 82). The
offerer, whose right of ownership in the animal had ceased, could not
assign the breast-piece on his own account first to Jehovah and then
to the priest; but the priest, to whom it was to be allotted accord-
ing to the rules of the sacrificial worship, was required, before
actually taking possession of it, to declare by the waving that it
belonged to Jehovah, and that it was from Jehovah that he had
received it.--On Num. vi. 19 cf. 233.
134. There is more difficulty in describing and explaining the
HEAVING, which was performed upon the right leg. According
to the Jewish tradition, the heaving was a symbolical ceremony,
answering to the waving, in which the movement was in an upward
direction, the gift being elevated therefore, and so consecrated to
the God who was enthroned in heaven. This view continued the
prevalent one till the most recent times. It was adopted by Winer,
Bahr, Hengstenberg, Kliefoth, Ewald, and Stockl; and, notwith-
standing the very plausible objections offered by Keil, Knobel,
Schultz, and Oehler, it is still retained by Hofmann, and in my
opinion with perfect justice. For example, the writers named
maintain that the waving is the only ceremony laid down in the
Mosaic law as a special act of worship; that the heaving (lifting), on
the other hand, simply denoted the lifting off or taking away of one
portion from the rest, for the purpose of handing it over to Jehovah,
to the sanctuary, or to the priests; that hmAUrT; is nothing more than
the lifting off, or the portion removed from a ass to be devoted to
sacred purposes, and that it denotes in general the holy offering.
Thus, says Oehler, hmAUrT;ha qOw was "the leg, which, after Jehovah had
received His portion, and handed over the breast to the priest, was
taken from what still remained, and handed over to the priest who
officiated at the ceremony, as a mark of respect on the part of the
offerer. "
Of all the arguments adduced in proof of this, the weakest un-
doubtedly is the appeal to the Septuagint, in which the words hmAUrT;
and Myrihe are said to be understood in the same sense, inasmuch as
they are rendered by a]fai<rema, a]parxh<, a]fairei?n, periairei?n, a]fori<-
zein; for the Septuagint rendering of hpAUnT; and Jynihe is also a]fai<rema,
a]fo<risma, a]parxh<, a]fairei?n, a]fori<zein. Consequently the LXX.
have evidently regarded Myrihe and Jynihe, not simply as homogeneous,
but as identical notions; and if anything is established by this
fact, it is our own view, and not that of our opponents; for, whilst
in the former Myrihe and Jynihe are homogeneous notions, in the latter
they are quite heterogeneous, and have nothing whatever in com-
mon. But there is still another consideration which favours our
view. The idea of separation has two distinct aspects, a negative
and a positive--that of separation from something, and that of
separation for something. Now that the LXX., even when ren-
dering the words Myrihe and Jynihe by a]fairei?n and a]fai<rema, or by
a]fori<zein and a]fo<risma, looked more at the positive than at the
negative side, is evident from the fact that, as a general rule, they
rendered the Hebrew terms by Greek words which present the
positive side alone,--e. g., do<ma, ei]sfora<, e]pi<qema, dwre<omai, pros-
fe<rw, a]podi<dwmi, a]nafe<rw, e]pife<rw, e]piti<qhmi. And no proof is
needed, that in doing so, they approach much nearer to our view
than to that of our opponents.
Again, Oehler says, "there is not one passage in the Pentateuch,
in which this signification of the word would not be found sufficient,
without the slightest necessity for assuming that there was any
special ceremony of heaving." But, in the first place, this assertion
is incorrect; for in Num. xxxi. 50, 52, it is not sufficient1 inasmuch
as the officers are there said to lift up all the gold, "which every one
1
Strictly speaking, in Num. xviii. 17-19 also; for the first-born of oxen,
sheep, and goats, which are here assigned as hmAUrT;, were not lifted from the
mass, since this was not yet in existence, but only expected. And it will hardly
be possible for any one to satisfy himself with the statement, that if such first-
born were not taken out of a more numerous offspring of one particular animal,
they might be regarded as a selection from the whole flock; for this command
undoubtedly applied not merely to the possessors of whole flocks, but also to the
possessors of one single animal.
had found," and not merely a select portion of it, as a heave-offer-

ing to Jehovah; and in the second place, even if it were correct, it
would prove nothing, as is evident from the simple fact, that in all
the passages in the Pentateuch the idea of hpAUnT; and Jynihe may be
expressed quite as well a]fo<risma and a]fori<zein, or a]fai<rema and
a]fairei?n, the terms actually employed in the Septuagint along with
others of a similar meaning.
Knobel says, Myrihe is never connected with hOAhy;-lx,, or, like Jynihe,
with hOAhy; ynep;li when sacrifices are referred to, but the invariable ex-
pression is hOAhyla Myrihe. To this it may be replied, (1) that Jynihe also
is connected with hOAhyla (Ex. xxxv. 22 , Num. viii. 13); (2) that
Jynihe also is never connected with hOAhy;-lx,; and (3) that the phrase
hOAhy; ynep;li Jynihe, which occurs so frequently, is as intelligible and ap-
propriate a combination as the phrase hOAhy; ynep;li Myrihe would be unin-
telligible and unmeaning, and therefore we should never expect to
meet with the latter. For, since Jynihe applied to Jehovah; who
dwelt in the tabernacle in the midst of His people, hOAhy; ynep;li is the
most suitable, and therefore the most frequent indication of the
personal object, both here and everywhere else, where Jehovah is
regarded as dwelling in the tabernacle. But Myrihe applied to the
"God who dwelleth on high," and therefore hOAhy; ynep;li Myrihe would be
an unintelligible phrase; and even hOAhy;-lx, Myrihe would not be pecu-
liarly appropriate, since the gift could not be reached up by the
heaving to God enthroned in heaven.
135. It is equally impossible to prove the necessity of accept-
ing the meaning lifting off for hmAUrT;, on the ground that the
word is frequently used with Nmi before the whole mass from which
the heave-offering was heaved up, or taken away; for if only apart
was to be consecrated to Jehovah through the ceremony of elevating,
it is self-evident that it was taken from the whole. In all the pas-
sages cited by Knobel (Lev. ii. 9, iv. 8, 10, 19, vi. 8 ; Ex. xxix. 27;
Num. xviii. 26, 30, 32), the whole, of which a part was heaved up,
was already brought to the tabernacle itself, and consequently the ele-
vation of the part to be lifted up coincided with the lifting of it from
the whole, and the lifting off was eo ipso a lifting up, which was not
the case with the horizontal movement of the waving, so that Myrihe
might very properly be connected with Nmi, but not Jynihe. This argu-
ment could only be conclusive, however, if Myrihe were also connected
with Nmi in cases where the lifting off took place outside the sanctuary,
and the part lifted off was brought to the sanctuary afterwards.
For example, Nmi could be used in Num. xviii. 26, 30, 32, to denote
the heaving of the priestly tithe, because the mass from which it
was lifted, viz., the Levitical tithe, was already in the sanctuary;
but it could not be applied in ver. 24 to the heaving of the Levitical
tithe, which was taken from the entire mass outside the sanctuary.
And just as in this case, so in every other instance, in which the
lifting from the whole took place outside the sanctuary and there-
fore could not coincide with the elevating, the Nmi which is thought
to be so ominous, is entirely wanting; e.g., in the heaving of the
first-fruits in Num. xv. 19, 20, in the share of the booty which fell
to the sanctuary in Num. xxxi. 28,1 in the sacred gifts generally in
Lev. xxii. 15 and Num. xviii. 19, and in the contributions to-
wards the building of the tabernacle in Ex. xxxv. 5, 21, 22, 24.
How natural would it have been, especially in the passages quoted
from Ex. xxxv., to employ Nmi, and write Js,K,ha Nmi hmAUrT; instead of
Js,K, tmaUrT; in ver. 24, if the argument of our opponents were a just
one. For, although it certainly was not the intention of Moses
that the Israelites should bring all the gold, silver, and brass, all the
skins, all the linen and woollen clothes, all the shittim-wood, all the
oil and all the spices and jewels which they possessed, but only a
portion of them, yet the Nmi is invariably wanting. Can this be
merely accidental?
This also takes away the force of a fact mentioned by Bahr,
upon which Keil and Oehler lay the greatest stress, and which the
former cites with these words: The same act which is designated
mi Myrihe in Lev. ii. 9 is expressed by Nmi CmaqA in chap. ii. 2; again, for
Un.m,.mi Myrihe in chap. iv. 8, we find Hbaz,.mi byriq;hi in chap. iii. 3; and, lastly,
for MraUy rw,xEKa in chap. iv. 10, we have rsaUh rw,xEKa in vers. 31 and 35;
--a convincing proof, that; Nmi Myrihe does not apply to any particular
ceremony of heaving, but only to the lifting or taking away of the
portions to be burned upon the altar." But by the laws of uni-
versal logic, we are not warranted in declaring, that because two
ideas are applicable to the same object, they must on that account
coincide with one another. If in the cases referred to Myrihe is also
rysihe, or byriq;hi, or cmaqA, it by no means follows that every rysih,e byriq;hi
and CmaqA must be a Myrihe also, and the two completely coincide.
And when Knobel, after reckoning up the cases in which a Myrihe
is mentioned in connection with worship, adds, that there is no
1
There is a Nmi indeed associated with Myrihe, but it stands before the offerer,
and not the offering. No one, therefore, will be foolish enough to press this
in opposition to my assertion; for in that case the offerers (= warriors) would
have to be regarded as the mass, of which one portion was to be lifted off.
passage in the law in which it has a special ritual signification, but

it is always used in this general sense" (viz., lifting off), we can
easily see, that this is a perfectly vague assertion; for in all the pas-
sages, whether quoted by him or not, the word certainly may be
understood to denote a ritual elevation quite as naturally as a simple
and non-ritual selection; in fact, as we have already observed, the
latter is not admissible, in one of the passages at least, viz., Num.
xxxi. 52. And if I chose to meet his assertion, that the word has
not a ritual signification in any one of these passages, by a counter-
assertion that the word has a ritual signification in every one of
them, we should just have assertion for assertion, and the one
would still need to be proved quite as much as the other. Our
opponents have hitherto failed to bring proofs on their side. Let
us see now whether there has been greater success on ours.
136. Oehler acknowledges that it cannot be disputed, that
in the later Jewish ritual there was a distinct ceremony of heaving,
but no such ceremony can be proved to exist in the Pentateuch.
This admission is based upon the rabbinical tradition, which goes
back to the earliest times. Now we have no desire to question the
fact, that many things crept into the later temple worship, and still
more into the rabbinical tradition of the Talmud, to which no
reference is made in the ritual laws of the Pentateuch. But in this
instance the unanimity and great antiquity of the tradition in ques-
tion must not be underrated. For if there is nothing at variance
with it either in the language or the facts of the Pentateuch, as is
evident from the foregoing proof of the futility of all the objections
that have been offered; and if, on the other hand, the view we
hold can be shown to be in perfect harmony with the language,
the facts, and the laws of the Pentateuch, as will presently appear
there can be no reason whatever for disputing the correctness of
this tradition.
First of all, then, so far as the word is concerned, there is not
the slightest doubt that MUr means to be high, and nothing else.
Myrihe therefore signifies to make high, to elevate, to raise on high.
And it is only in this sense that it is ever met with in the whole
Hebrew thesaurus, apart from its application to the offerings of
divine worship. What is there then to warrant us in rejecting this,
the only established meaning, and the only one in harmony with
the language, as soon as we come to the department of worship, and
in inventing a totally different meaning, which it never has any-
where else, and for which the fundamental idea of the root offers
no possible link of connection? Was the Hebrew language so poor

in words to express separation or cutting off, taking off and away,
that no other resource was left than to force this idea in connec-
tion with worship upon a word, with whose radical meaning it had
nothing whatever in common? Certainly not; on the contrary, it
abounded in such words. Then, again, how simple, natural, and in
accordance with the whole procedure, that every gift presented and
assigned to Jehovah, whether actually assigned to Him personally
by being burned upon the altar, or presented to Him to supply the
necessities of His dwelling-place or His servants, should be indi-
cated symbolically as intended for Him, and consecrated to Him, by
being elevated in the place of His abode (either by the side of or
upon the altar).
If we examine the use of Myrihe, in the law of sacrifice, we meet first
of all with the three passages. Lev. ii. 9, iv. 8 sqq., vi. 8, the misun-
derstanding of which, in Keil's opinion, has been the principal cause
of the prevalent, but erroneous idea of a ritual elevation. But this is
certainly an unfounded opinion; for it is not from these passages
that the interpretation of Myrihe as a peculiar ceremony has arisen
but from those numerous passages in which the heave-leg and
heave-offerings (tmoUrT; ) are mentioned, and it is this which has sug-
gested the necessity for understanding the Myrihe in Lev. ii. 4, 6 in
the same way. The relation between them is, in fact, the very
opposite: the rabbinical opinion is not based upon Lev. ii. 4, 6 ;
but, on the contrary, it is from this very passage that the opposition
to that traditional opinion has proceeded. Let us look, however, at
the passages more carefully. The command in Lev. ii. 9 and vi. 8,
that the priest is to heave a portion of the meat-offering (the so-
called Azcarah, cf. 148) and burn it upon the altar, and again, in
Lev. iv. 8 sqq., that he is to heave all the fat of the sin-offering,
just as that of the peace-offering was heaved, and then burn it
upon the altar, can hardly be understood, as it is by Keil, as denot-
ing a mere lifting off or taking away, since Myrihe never means to
take away, but always to lift on high; but rather, as it is by Bahr,
as relating quite generally to the presentation of the gift upon the
altar, which was really an elevation. And it would certainly never
have been understood in any other sense than that of simple eleva-
tion upon the altar, if the later passages in the law, with regard to
the heave-leg and heave-offerings, had not suggested the idea that
a special and ritual signification ought to be attributed to the heav-
ing. But cannot the simple and natural sense of a lifting of the
gift upon the altar for the purpose of burning, be made to harmonise
with the symbolical siginification of the lifting as a dedication to
God, who dwells on high? I answer this question without hesita-
tion in the affirmative. For the altar itself was a high place hmABA),
and was required to be a high place ( 13), because the gift upon it
was to be brought nearer to God, who was enthroned on high.
The actual fact, therefore, was as follows: the heaving or lifting
(Myrihe) in the ceremony of worship always signified the offering or
presentation of the gift to God by lifting it up. Now, if the gift
was destined to be actually and personally appropriated to Jehovah,
i.e., to be burnt upon the altar, a special and independent ceremony
of lifting up was unnecessary, because this was already effected by
lifting it upon the altar itself. Everything that was brought to
the altar to be burnt was eo ipso lifted up; there was no necessity,
therefore, to embody this in an express command. But if the gift
was not destined to be burnt upon the altar, which was always the
case with offerings that were not appropriated to Jehovah person-
ally, but was simply presented to Him for the maintenance of His
dwelling-place (the tabernacle) or of His servants (the priests and
Levites), it was requisite that a hmAUrT; should be performed by the
side of the altar as a special and independent rite. In the first
case the gift remained on high (i.e., upon the altar), and was there
accepted by Jehovah Himself; in the second, it was taken down
again from the height to which it had been raised, and this was an
intimation that God renounced His own claim to it, and handed it
over to His servant, the priest, or to His house, the tabernacle.
Hence the signification of the heaving was essentially the same as
that of the waving ( 133); the only difference being, that the waving
had reference to the abode of God in the tabernacle in the midst of
His people,--the heaving, on the contrary, to the abode of God in
heaven.
137. The conclusion to which we have thus been brought is
confirmed in a most unquestionable manner, when we consider the
relation in which the Thorah places the Myrihe to the Jynihe and the
hmAUrT; to the hpAUnT;. Who is there, who could observe with an un-
prejudiced mind, how the wave-breast and the heave-leg are con-
stantly mentioned together and placed in the same category in the
case of the peace-offerings (Ex. xxix. 24; Lev. vii. 34, x. 14, 15;
Num. vi. 20), without the conjecture, or rather the certainty, irre-
sistibly forcing itself upon his mind, that the hpAUnT; and the hmAUrT;
were homogeneous acts,--especially if he considers that in their
radical signification the two words Jynihe and Myrihe are expressive of
thoroughly homogeneous ideas--the one denoting a movement from
right to left, the other a movement in an upward direction? And
when we observe still further how the hpAUnT; is evidently pointed out
in the text itself as a rite of consecration (Ex. xxix. 24; Lev. viii.
27), how can we any longer doubt that the hmAUrT; is to be understood
in the same way? Let any one read with an unbiassed mind Ex.
xxix. 27, And thou shalt sanctify the breast of the wave-offering
and the shoulder (leg) of the heave-offering, which is waved and
which is heaved up, etc.;" and how is it possible to attribute a ritual
signification to the waving, and none at all to the heaving? How
could two such heterogeneous ideas as that of waving (a solemn and
significant rite of consecration), and that of lifting (the simple and
unmeaning act of removing a portion from the whole), be placed in
such intimate and essential relation to one another? And how is it
conceivable that the heave-leg should have received its distinctive
name from the insignificant act of removing or separating a portion
from the remainder of the flesh, when the designation would indi-
cate nothing peculiar or characteristic, seeing that the fat portions
which were placed upon the altar, and the breast which was waved,
were also removed and heaved (lifted) off the whole mass of the
flesh in precisely the same manner as the heave-leg?
Heaving and waving, therefore, were two essentially homogene-
ous rites of consecration, differing in unessential points alone. And
this alone will serve to explain the fact, that in a wider and less
stringent sense the two words could be used promiscuously, or iden-
tified and interchanged. Thus, for example, the freewill-offerings
for the building of the tabernacle are called hOAhy; tmaUrT; in Ex. xxxv.
5, 21 (cf. chap. xxxvi. 6), and hOAhyla hpAUnT; in Ex. xxxv. 22 (cf.
chap. xxxviii. 24); and. an offering of gold is referred to as hpAUnT;
in Ex. xxxv. 22, xxxviii. 24, whereas a similar offering is called
hmAUrT; in Num. xxxi. 52. In Num. xviii. 11, again, in the very same
verse the lxerAW;yi yneB; tpoUnT; are designated MnATm
A a tmaUrT;; and in Lev. ix.
21 the term waving is applied in common to the heave-leg and wave-
breast, and in Lev. x. 15 even to the fat portions burned upon the
altar. How hopeless do these facts render Keil's explanation
Since those portions of the sacrifices, which were waved, were
also regarded as sacrificial gifts to Jehovah, which He handed over
to the priests, every heave-offering might also be regarded as a wave-
offering,"--a consequence, the correctness and even the admissibility
of which is beyond the reach of my understanding; for, so far as I
can see, the only thing that could follow is this, that every wave-
offering might be designated a heave-offering, but not vice versa.
But the former was the only one which would help Keil's views out
of the difficulty.
138. With reference to these two peculiarities and irregulari-
ties in the mode of expression, Bahr is of opinion, that at all
events as a rule the two movements were connected together, but
the usage of speech was not always perfectly exact, and the two
were frequently designated by one expression. If the movements
had occurred separately, they would necessarily have had different
objects; but this is hardly conceivable."--Whether the two forms
of consecration were associated together in the other heave-offerings,
we may leave undecided (I do not look upon this as improbable);
but that in the case of the peace-offerings they were distributed
between the breast and leg, is evident from the fixed and unchange-
able designation of the one as the wave-breast, the other as the heave-
leg. There is also another distinction, which is frequently over-
looked. According to Lev. vii. 31, the wave-breast was to fall to
the lot of Aaron and his sons, and therefore not to the officiating
priest merely, but to the whole body of priests who were perform-
ing the service of the sanctuary at the time; on the other hand,
according to ver. 33, the heave-leg was to belong to that one par-
ticular son of Aaron who had attended to the sprinkling of the
blood and the burning of the sacrifice, that is to say, to the officiat-
ing priest alone.
Thus we find a triple rite of consecration in the case of the peace-
offering: (1) the lifting (heaving) of the fat portions upon the top
of the altar (Lev. iv. 10), where Jehovah accepted them personally
and enjoyed them in the fire-vapour; (2) the waving of the breast,
which Jehovah handed over to Aaron and his sons (Lev. vii. 31);
and (3) the heaving of the right shoulder, which Jehovah handed
over to the officiating priest (Lev. vii. 33). Through these three
a]parxai<, which were taken from the whole mass, and, having been
consecrated to Jehovah, were enjoyed partly by Himself and partly
by His servants the priests, the rest of the flesh, from which they
were separated, and which Jehovah handed over to the offerer
( 82), was consecrated and sanctified also (Rom. xi. 16), and was
then eaten by the latter along with his household and friends. Thus
we see that in the case of the peace-offerings, all who were more or
less concerned, Jehovah and His servants, the offerer and his house-
hold, derived from them food, satisfaction (HaHoyni), and joy.
The only question that presents any difficulty is this, why was the
breast waved and assigned to the priests in general, whilst the leg was
heaved (lifted up) and fell to the lot of the officiating priest alone?
I know no other way of arriving at an answer to this question, than
that of tracing the relation of the breast, as half-fat, to the fat of the
burnt sacrifice, and that of the leg, as the best of the flesh, to the
flesh of the sacrificial meal. As the offerer of the sacrifice brought
his whole family to the sacrificial meal, so Jehovah admitted His
whole family, so to speak, i.e., the whole of the priests performing
service at the time, to participate in His enjoyment,--not indeed
by assigning them a portion of the pure fat, which would have been
thoroughly uneatable, but by assigning them the nearest to it, viz.,
the half-fat; and the reason why this was not heaved, but waved
"before Jehovah," i.e., moved towards the door of the tabernacle
and then back again towards the priest (cf. 133), was probably
because the service of the priests in general had respect to God,
who dwelt within the tabernacle. And as the wave-breast, as half-
fat, was related to the meal provided for Jehovah ("the bread of
Jehovah"), so the heave-leg, as the best of the flesh-meat, was re-
lated to the meal provided for the offerer. It was heaved (not
waved), probably to exhibit its relation to the altar, upon which,
Jehovah's portion was burnt. Both of these are in perfect harmony
with the fact, that the leg was allotted to the officiating priest alone;
for he alone performed the loving service for the offerer of presenting
his gift to Jehovah, and he alone performed the service at the altar,
of sprinkling the blood and burning the sacrifice.
Thus the different mode of assigning the wave-breast and heave-
leg to the priesthood was expressive of their double position, on the
one hand as servants of Jehovah, and on the other as mediators
of the people; and special regard was had to each of these two
aspects of their official calling. But Oehler is wrong in supposing
that the wave-breast was the piece of honour, which the offerer
of the sacrifice presented to Jehovah, who accepted it, and then
caused it to be eaten by His servant as His representative; whilst
the heave-leg was the gift presented by the offerer directly to the
priest. For, apart from the fact that after the presentation had
taken place, the offerer had no longer any right of ownership in the
animal, if the separation of a "piece of honour" for Jehovah could
possibly take place at all, the term could only be applied to the
which Jehovah really accepted and partook of as His bread. And
the heave-leg (even according to Oehler's own view of the hmAUrT;)
could not be regarded as a direct gift from the offerer to the priest,
but, like all the tmoUrT;, as really presented to Jehovah, and assigned
by Him to the tabernacle or the priests.
130. That the sacrificial meal had to take place at the taber-
nacle, is expressly commanded in Deut. xii. 7, 17 sqq., and was
quite in harmony with its character as a hospitable meal, with which
God refreshed and rejoiced the heart of the offerer. On the other
hand, in Lev. x. 14 the priests are allowed to eat the wave-breast
and heave-shoulder outside the sanctuary (though only in a clean
place), and to bring the members of their families (sons and
daughters) to participate. This is an indisputable proof that the
eating of the flesh of the peace-offering on the part of the priests
is not to be regarded as a participation in the sacrificial meal, as
Oehler supposes, but only, like the eating of the flesh of the sin-
offering, as an entertainment providedd by Jehovah for the priests, as
the servants of His house (vid. 118).
On the other hand, the different grades of importance or holiness
belonging to the three descriptions of peace-offerings ( 126 sqq.)
caused a difference undoubtedly, so far as the eating of the sacri-
ficial flesh was concerned, which was equally applicable, whether it
was by the priests or the offerer that the flesh was eaten. For
example, according to Lev. vii. 15 sqq., xix. 6, 7, xxii. 30, the
flesh of the praise-offering was to be eaten on the very same day on
which it had been sacrificed. It is true, the same rule was binding
generally in the case of the other two kinds of Shelem. But on
account of the inferior importance of these two kinds, it was allow-
able to eat some of them on the second day, though none could be
eaten on the third. All that remained had to be burned with fire
(on the third day, probably like the sin-offering presented by a
priest, 112, 117) in a clean place outside the camp. Although it
is not expressly stated, yet according to the analogy of Lev. viii.
32, Ex. xxix. 34, and xii. 10, this rule was probably applicable also
to any of the flesh of the praise-offering which had not been eaten
on the first day. So far as the purpose and meaning of this com-
mand are concerned, I cannot agree with Oehler, that the intention
was "to prevent niggardliness" (since the sacrificial meal also pos-
sessed the character of a love-feast, i.e. was to embrace the poor
and needy); for the simple reason, that the command applied, not
only to the flesh set apart for the sacrificial meal, but also to the
flesh which was assigned to the priests. What Oehler himself
admits to be the principal reason, I am compelled to regard as the
sole motive for the command, viz., "the putrefaction which would
have taken place, and rendered the flesh unclean, a danger which
it was especially necessary to avoid in the case of the highest kind
of peace-offering, viz., the praise-offering." It was on the same
ground also that the commandments were based, that sacrificial
flesh which had come into contact with anything unclean should not
be eaten at all, and that any one who was levitically defiled was
not to eat of the flesh of the peace-offering on pain of extermina-
tion (Lev. vii. 19 sqq.).
With reference to the public Shelamim, that is to say, the peace-
offerings presented in the name of the whole nation, Winer has
expressed the opinion, that in their case all the flesh was assigned
to the priests. But this is expressly stated only of the two lambs
which were to be offered as a peace-offering, along with the loaves
of first-fruit at the feast of Passover (Lev. xxiii. 20); and Keil
has justly objected to the extension of this rule to all the public
Shelamim, on the ground that "it is at variance with Deut. xxvii.
where the people are commanded to offer thank-offerings at the
solemn institution of the law upon Mount Ebal, and to rejoice
before Jehovah, i.e., to provide a solemn sacrificial meal from these
thank-offerings. Again, at the consecration of Solomon's temple,
the flesh of the 22,000 oxen and 120,000 sheep, which Solomon-
offered as a thank-offering (1 Kings viii. 63), could not possibly
have fallen to the lot of the priests, but must have been employed
in providing sacrificial meals for the whole of the assembled crowds.
Moreover, no thank-offerings at all were prescribed for the regular
weekly and yearly festivals (except the pentecostal offering already
mentioned ; cf. Num. xxviii. and xxix.), so that the sacrifices slain
at the feasts (Lev. xxiii. 27) are to be reckoned among those which
were spontaneously offered."
BOOK III,
THE BLOODLESS SACRIFICE.
CHAPTER I
MATERIAL OF THE BLOODLESS SACRIFICE.
140. The bloodless or vegetable sacrifice, which was called NBAr;qA

like all the sacred offerings, and hOAhy; hw.exi or hOAhy; MH,l, like all the altar-
sacrifices, is also designated hHAn;mi, a gift, present, tribute, as dis-
tinguished from and opposed to the bleeding (animal) altar-sacrifice.
In this broader sense1 the word is not only used in the combination
hHAn;miU hlAfo (Ex. xxx. 9 ; Lev. xxiii. 37 , Josh. xxii. 23, etc.), and
hHAn;miU Hbaz, (Ps. xl. 6; Isa. xix. 21 ; Jer. xiv. 12, etc.; cf. 125, note
2), but still more frequently stands quite alone. In a more precise
and limited sense, again, the name is restricted to that portion of the
bloodless sacrifice which consisted of meal, as distinguished from the
libation of wine associated with it which is designated j`s,n, (from
j`sanA =to pour out). The complete offering is then called j`s,n,vA hHAn;mi,
In the Septuagint hHAn;mi is generally rendered qusi<a or dw?ron qusi<a
(qusi<aj); in the Vulgate, oblatio sacrificium or oblatio sacrificii;
and by Luther, Speis-opfer (food-offering);--whilst j`s,n, is rendered
spondei?on, spondh< by the LXX., libamentum, libamen in the Vul-
gate,and Trank-opfer (drink-offering) by Luther.
We have already seen at 21 that all tree-fruits were excluded
from the Minchah, as well as garden-produce (vegetables, etc.). It
was limited to the productions of agriculture and vine-growing, these
being the characteristic employments of the nation in the Holy Land.
At the same time, as the offering represented not only the fruits of
1
In a still broader sense, also allowed by the etymology, the expression is
applied on one occasion to a bleeding sacrifice, viz., to Abel's offering in Gen.
iv. 3.
282 MATERIAL OF THE BLOODLESS SACRIFICE.
their labour, but also the presentation of food for Jehovah ( 23),
it was not brought to the altar in the form of raw produce, but
dressed and prepared in the manner in which it served as the daily
food of man. Hence the food prepared from corn might be of-
fered in very many different forms, whilst the drink-offering could
only be presented in one, viz., as a libation of wine.
In Lev. ii. for example, three leading descriptions of meat-
(food-) offering are mentioned: in the form of groats (lm,r;Ka Wr,G,,
i.e., with the fresh ears roasted by the fire, and the dried grains
coarsely rubbed or crushed, ver. 14);--(2) as white meal (tl,so, ver.
1; this was the term applied to the finest wheaten flour: barley flour
was only used in connection with the so-called jealousy-offering,
Num. v.: the groats and flour were covered with oil as well as
mixed with it, and incense was then laid upon them);--(3) in the
form of loaves or cakes, made of white meal mixed with oil. The
last was prepared in three different ways: (a) Baked in the oven
(rUGTa, ver. 4): either in the form of tOl.Ha or Myqiyqir;, both of which
were rubbed over with oil after they were taken out of the oven.
It is doubtful whether the name tOl.Ha is derived from llH, to pierce,
or from llH = lUH, to move round, to twist. In the former case it
would suggest the idea of loaves or cakes, with holes made in them
that the oil might penetrate them more easily; in the latter, which
the more probable of the two, it would indicate their circular
shape (= rKAKi, 2 Sam. vi. 19). The name qyqirA signifies something
beaten out thin and broad, corresponding probably to our pancake.
--(b) Prepared upon the tbaHEma (a flat iron plate: vers. 5, 6). The
difference between this and the previous sort was, that it consisted
of a thin layer of dough baked crisp, which was broken in pieces
(MyTiPi) and dipped in oil.--(c) Prepared tw,H,r;maB;. Even the earlier
translators could not agree whether by this we are to understand
a broiled upon the gridiron, or stewed in a saucepan (in oil), or fried
in a frying-pan (fritters or pancakes: Knobel).--The oil used in all
these preparations was olive oil. Nothing at all is said with refer-
the colour of the wine.
141. The meat-offering, as well as the drink-offering, appears
first of all in the light of property, especially of property acquired
by the labour and toil of the offerer, produced by his own diligence
and care ( 21, 22). This idea of property, however, is certainly
not to be taken in the sense in which Thalhofer takes it, for the
purpose of serving the interests of Roman Catholicism, namely, as
relating to punishment (inflicted upon property) and abstinence.
MATERIAL OF THE BLOODLESS SACRIFICE. 283
The notion of a satisfactio vicaria, he says, " was not applicable

to the bloodless sacrifices, since in their case the punishment was not
borne by another in the place of the man, but the man inflicted it
upon himself through abstinence: and this constitutes the leading
mark of distinction between the bleeding and the bloodless offerings;
--in the bloodless offerings the punishment of death was wanting,
and nothing remained but the punishment of property; the man
feeling himself bound to an infirm nature, with which his spirit
could not hold unconditional intercourse, drew the latter away from
the former, and by abstinence subjected it to a punishment, which
was connected with guilt that lay at the foundation of this infirm
condition. At the same time, in the bloodless offerings regard was
had, not so much to the hereditary guilt, as emphatically to heredi-
tary corruption; for which reason the punishment was also distin-
guished in this case as the punishment of property alone, whereas
in that of the bleeding sacrifices it was the punishment of both
death and property." But how very little the idea of abstinence ,
was associated with the sacrificial offering is evident from the peace-
offerings and the meat-offerings connected with them, which tended
rather to promote enjoyment, and summoned to rejoicing. And the
very name of the Minchah shows how thoroughly it is opposed to the
idea of punishment; for who could regard a gift, a present, which
love and gratitude impelled him to present to an esteemed friend as
a punishment inflicted upon himself? or who could associate such
an idea with the offering of a child, who brought the labour of his
own hands as an expression of his affection towards his parents?
Moreover, the idea of property was only a subordinate one in
any case in connection with the sacrificial offering, and distinguished
the gift as one which stood in a close relation to the offerer, and so
fitted it to serve as an expression and representation of his own self-
surrender. surrender. But the main point kept in view in determining the
constituent ingredients of the Minchah was that of food. They
were the principal articles of daily consumption among the Israel-
ites, with the exception of animal food; and when offered upon the
altar of Jehovah, they were to serve as symbols of that food, which
Jehovah demanded of His people, and of which He stood in need
as the God of salvation ( 23). In contrast with the flesh of the
animal sacrifice, the offering of which represented more the self-
surrender of the person of the offerer to Jehovah, the vegetable
offerings, as we have shown at 24, represented rather the fruit and
result of his life's work and the duties of his calling.
They were the signs of spiritual nourishment, of that spiritual

food which the people had prepared, and which they were bound to
present to their God as a covenant performance, a testimony to the
keeping of the covenant, in which Jehovah rejoiced, which was to
Him a sweet savour, and which He partook of as His own nourish-
ment, as the bread presented to Him by His people (Num. xxviii. 2,
ymiH;la yniBAr;qA ) We find a confirmation of this in the words of Christ
in John vi. 27, and chap. iv. 32, 33. In the first passage He says
to the people, whom He had just been feeding in the desert, Labour
not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth
unto everlasting life, which the Son of man shall give unto you;"
and in the second He says, with reference to Himself, "I have
meat to eat that ye know not of. My meat is to do the will of Him
that sent Me, and to finish His work." The spiritual food of Christ,
therefore, was to do the will of God, and accomplish the work en-
trusted to Him. And, according to chap. vi. 27, the people also
were to procure this spiritual food, they also were to do the will of
their God; but as Christ had given then material food, it was He
also who would give them spiritual food.
We may see from these passages, that according to the sym-
bolical view and language of Hebrew antiquity, the faithful perform-
ance of the work assigned by God, with the faithful employment
of the means and powers entrusted by Him, were regarded as a
procuring and producing of spiritual food; and that towards the
material food, the supply of which depended upon the help and
blessing of God, it stood in the relation of type to antitype. The
earthly calling of Israel was to cultivate the soil in the land assigned
by Jehovah. The fruit of that calling, under the blessing of God,
was corn and wine, their bodily food, that which nourished and sus-
tained their corporeal life. The spiritual calling of Israel was to
work in the field of the kingdom of God, in the vineyard of its
Lord; this work was the covenant duty of Israel. The result was
spiritual bread, the spiritual nourishment which promoted and sus-
tained their spiritual life, viz., the well-executed labours of their
vocation crowned with divine blessing and success.
In addition to this there was another feature of importance, to
which Kliefoth (p. 103), whose admirable exposition we insert ver-
batim, has directed particular attention. Bread and wine, he
says, were not merely products of the soil, not merely articles of
food growing up ready for man's eating through the goodness of
God; they were wrought out by man himself, his production, ac-
quired through his own labour in the sweat of his brow. Yea
more, they were also wrought by man; they were not gifts of God
remaining in their natural form, not raw productions, that is to say,
but something which man had produced by his own diligence and
skill out of the gifts of God and through the blessing of God.
Thus the materials of the Minchah represented not merely every-
thing that man receives through the goodness of God, but every-
thing that he produces by his own labour out of the gifts of God,
and through the assistance and blessing of God,--his labours and
their results." And if the attempt is made to establish a difference
in the symbolical significance of the bread and the wine, according
to the light afforded by Ps. civ. 15, it must be sought in this, that
the bread represented the strengthening, and the wine the refresh-
ing side of the Minchah; in support of which, the proverb in Judg.
ix. 13 may also be quoted, that wine "cheereth God and man."1
142. The bloodless sacrificial gift came under the same point
of view as the bleeding sacrifice, so far as the latter was a gift;
and it was entirely a gift, when once the blood had answered its
object as a means of expiation, and the flesh of the animal, together
with the portion burnt, became the object of the sacrificial function.
The one was quite as much a gift and food, and nothing more, as
the other was. Just as a man who wished to spread his table
abundantly would place not only bread and wine upon it, but
animal food as well; so the Israelite also brought the same to his
God as food and nourishment,--the latter representing the self-
surrender of his personality, the former the self-surrender of the
fruitss of his labours and endeavours. But this parallel between the
bleeding and the bloodless gifts has been sometimes misunder-
stood, and at other times denied; misunderstood by Bahr, denied
by Kliefoth.
Bahr is quite right in stating that the fundamental idea of the
bloodless gift is related and parallel to that of the bleeding one;
but he is altogether mistaken when he proceeds to say, "The very
1
The view defended with such zeal by Roman Catholic theologians, that
the bloodless sacrifice was a type of the Lord's Supper, we cannot possibly admit.
The fact that the Old Testament Minchah was allotted exclusively to the priests
after the burning of the altar-portion, and therefore was taken entirely away
from the people, is a sufficient proof to the contrary. No doubt the sacrificial
worship of the Old Testament does present a type of the Lord's Supper; but
this is to be sought for, not in the eating of the Minchah by the priests alone,
but simply in the sacrificial meal ( 82). The Apostle Paul finds it in this, and
this alone (1 Cor. x. 16-21, cf. 1 Cor. v. 7).
appearance is a proof of this. The bread (meal, corn) corre-

sponded to the body of the animal, the oil to its fat, and the wine
to the blood, which was likewise poured upon the altar. By virtue
of this relationship the bloodless offering might in exceptional cases,
as Lev. v. 11, be made a substitute for the bleeding sacrifice."
A more unfortunate appeal, however, is hardly conceivable than
that made to Lev. v. 11 here; for that very passage, if you only
read it to the end, proves the very opposite of what Bahr employs
it to prove. For example, the verse closes with the words: "He
shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense
thereon, for it is a sin-offering." Now it was indispensably essential
in the case of the bleeding sin-offering, that its fat should be placed
upon the altar. How, then, could the oil of the bloodless offering
correspond to the fat of the bleeding one? Still less, again, could
the wine correspond to the blood; for the man gave the wine upon
(or at) the altar as a gift and food for God, but the blood was
given by God upon the altar (Lev. xvii. 11) as a medium of ex-
piation for the soul of man : the wine was regarded in the light of
food, but the eating of blood was most stringently prohibited.1
Kliefoth has fallen into the very opposite error (cf. 25, note).
Whilst Bahr regards even the blood as a gift to Jehovah ( 67),
Kliefoth will not for a moment admit that the flesh possessed the
signification of a gift; and whereas, according to Bahr's opinion,
the idea of self-surrender in the bleeding sacrifice absorbs the idea of
expiation, in Kliefoth's view the idea of expiation swallows up that
of gift. The former can see nothing but self-surrender in the whole
of the animal sacrifice; the latter, nothing but a means of expiation.
Hence in the view of the former the bloodless sacrifice was really
parallel to the bleeding one, whilst in that of the latter it was in
direct contrast to it; in the one case everything answers the pur-
pose of expiation, in the other all is gift and thanksgiving.
"The bleeding sacrifice," says Kliefoth (p. 87), "always served
as expiation ( rPekal; ) the bloodless offering served just as invariably
1
Stockl (p. 293) also maintains, that as the bread corresponded to the flesh,
so the wine corresponded to the blood of the sacrificial animal; and he even goes
so far as to affirm that "the burning of the Azcarah was a symbol of the
latreutic side, and the pouring out of the wine of the propitiatory side, of the
ceremony." "But," he adds at p. 295, "as the oil represented the Spirit of the
Lord, the might and power of God, so we shall hardly be mistaken in subscrib-
ing to the view, that the association of the oil with bread and wine involved a
reference to the subsequent transformation of these into the body and blood of
Christ." (Sic!)
as thanksgiving (hrAKAz;xal;). It is evident, therefore, that in conse-

quence of this distinction, all the processes that were common to
both the bleeding and bloodless offerings must have had a some-
what different signification in the latter from that which they had
in the former." But rpkl is invariably applied to the sprinkling of
the blood, and never to the burning of the sacrifice or the sacrificial
meal; and if the ritual of the bleeding sacrifice in its second stage
had certain points in common with that of the bloodless offering
( 72), the inference must necessarily be drawn from this, that not
only the actions themselves, but the foundations upon which they
rested, and the conditions which they presupposed, must in both
cases have had the same signification. The burning of the sacrifice
in the case of the bleeding as well as the bloodless offering had its
signification simply in this, that it was to be an offering made by
fire, of a sweet savour unto the Lord (cf. Lev. i. 9, 13, 17, and
Lev. ii. 2, 9).
Again, it is perfectly inconceivable, how Kliefoth can have re-
garded it as a distinctive mark of the bloodless offering, in the first
place, that the giving to God was only a giving back, and therefore
every bloodless offering was hrAKAz;xal;, (i.e., according to this mistaken
interpretation, for thanksgiving, cf. 148); and in the second place,
that God never retained the gift of the bloodless offering, but
always returned it for the good of the offerer himself, and usually
in a symbolical manner for him to eat. As if the produce of the
flocks was not quite as much the gift and blessing of God as the
produce of the land, and the presentation was not quite as much a
grateful giving back to God in the one case as in the other. More-
over, did not God retain His own share of the food-offering, quite
as much as of the sin-offering, the trespass-offering, or the peace-
offering, and cause it to be burnt upon the altar as a savour of
satisfaction (cf. Lev. ii. 2, 9, 16)?
143. We have still further to speak of the things which were
commanded to be used as accompaniments of the meat-offering, and
also of those which were prohibited. And here the question must first
of all be discussed, whether the OIL was to be regarded as an accom-
paniment, or as a distinct portion of the meat-offering, like the bread
and the wine. Hengstenberg and Keil maintain the former; Bahr,
Neumann, Kliefoth, Oehler, and Thalhofer, the latter. The question
is not without its difficulties. The hypothesis that the oil (like the
incense) was to be regarded as a mere accompaniment to the meat-
offering, and (according to Hengstenberg), like the anointing oil, as a
symbol of the Spirit of God, through whose co-operation the spiritual

food was prepared, is favoured by the fact, that in the case of the
Minchah the oil is never found standing independently like the wine
by the side of the corn; but either the corn is mixed with it or
boiled in it, or the oil is rubbed over or poured upon the corn (Lev. ii.
1 sqq., vi. 21, vii. 10 sqq.; Num. xv. 4 sqq., etc.). These passages,
which are as lucid as they are numerous, must be taken as the rule
by which to interpret Lev. vi. 15, where the meal and the oil are
merely mentioned side by side, without its being expressly stated
that they were to be mixed together. And the command in Lev.
xiv. 10, that at the cleansing of the leper a log of oil should be
brought along with the Minchah of meal mixed with oil, cannot
possibly lead to any other conclusion; for this log of oil did not be-
long to the meat-offering, but was introduced for a totally different
purpose. It is true, Neumann repeatedly maintains, though without
any scriptural proof, that the oil is to be met with, not only as an
accompaniment to other sacrifices, but also as an independent por-
tion of the sacrifice; but until he furnishes proofs, his assertion
can hardly be regarded as conclusive. Let any one read with an
unbiassed mind Lev. ii. 1, 15, where we find the meat-offering
mentioned for the first time in the law of sacrifice ("his offering
shall be of white meal (groats), and he shall pour oil upon it, and
put frankincense thereon"), and it will be impossible to have any
other impression, than that the oil was merely an accompaniment,
as well as the incense. The co-ordination of the oil and the incense
is still more obvious in Lev. v. 11, where oil and incense are for-
bidden to be added to the sin-offering of meal presented by the
poor man; and in Num. v. 15, where they are also prohibited in
the case of the offering of jealousy. The force of this co-ordination
is modified undoubtedly, but hardly destroyed, by Oehler's remark,
that the omission of oil, which renders food palatable, in the case
of both these sacrifices, may have been intended to answer precisely
the same end as the prohibition to mix a libation of wine with them,
and the command to select an inferior description of meal for the
jealousy-offering, namely, to give them a mournful character.
In support of the opposite view, that the oil is to be regarded
as co-ordinate with the corn and wine, and thus (in Oehler's opinion)
to be looked upon like them as a means of subsistence procured
through toil, in which light it is frequently mentioned in the Old
Testament along with corn and wine as one of the leading pro-
ductions of Palestine,--Oehler adduces the following arguments
(1) "The oil, which is mentioned in the Scriptures as a symbol of

the communication of the Spirit, is only the anointing oil, never the
oil that was eaten." At the same time, he admits that, in the case
of need referred to in Lev. ii., the use of the oil might be regarded
as an anointing consecration of the meat-offering. (2) "It is per-
fectly obvious from Num. xv., especially from the quantities given
there, that the oil of the meat-offering was co-ordinate with the
wine of the drink-offering." But this conclusion is not quite so
indisputable as Oehler supposes. The quantity of the meal, oil, and
wine varied according to the quality of the sacrificial animal ( 149);
and though the quantity of oil and wine might be the same, it by
no means follows that the position of the oil in connection with the
meat-offering was precisely the same as that of the wine. It would
only have been so if the oil could have been offered and used inde-
pendently as well as the wine; but this, as we have seen, was never
the case.
After all, I must still adhere to the conclusion, that the oil in
the case of the sin-offerings did not constitute an essential element,
but was simply to be regarded as a significant accompaniment. In
addition to the reasons already assigned, I am chiefly urged to this
by the fact, that even if oil is frequently mentioned along with
corn and wine, as representing the leading productions of Palestine,
it is never met with as being of itself food and nourishment. Bread
alone is mentioned on innumerable occasions as a representative of
all kinds of food, and very frequently bread and wine, but never
bread, wine and oil, or oil alone. And as it was in the usage of
language, so is it also in daily life: bread is eaten by itself, and
wine is drunk by itself; but pure oil is never eaten or drunk as an
article of food. It is always used either in the preparation of food
or as an accompaniment of food, especially of food composed of
meal, which is rendered more palatable in consequence. Now, if
the idea of the Minchah was exhausted in that of the food which
the Israelite offered to his God, and if oil was not food in itself, but
only the means of rendering food palatable, the oil in the Minchah,
in which it was used in the same way as in the preparation of food
in ordinary life, could not be placed side by side with the bread
and wine as the third essential ingredient.
144. But the question still needs a somewhat careful exami-
nation: what was the actual signification o f the oil, as the means of
preparing, i.e., of rendering palatable, the food offered to Jehovah?
Was it the same as it unquestionably possessed in the case of the
anointing oil, or was it a different one? Neumann (p. 340) arrives

at the conclusion, that it always signified "the gentle, invigorating
influence of an all-pervading, healing, peace-producing power," and
thinks that he is not wrong in recognising "in the mercy of God
the secret of the heavenly brightness of the oil." This explanation
f is not the traditional one, it is true, but it is an orthodox one for all
that; for the Gospel of Nicodemus, the earliest testimony in the
Christian Church, relates that, when Adam was drawing near to
death, he sent Seth to the tree of mercy for some oil to anoint him
with, that he might recover, etc. Now when sacrifice was offered
in connection with this oil, it represented the surrender of the soul,
which, sustained by the gentle power of this compassion, had found
in it the strength to draw near to the Lord, before whom nothing
unclean can stand.
Kliefoth (pp. 106, 120), on the other hand, finds a double signi-
fication in the oil. As the material employed in anointing, he re-
gards it as the symbol of the Holy Spirit; as the material for as
burning, he looks upon it as representing that part of human nature
which, when inflamed by the holy fire of God, gives out the light
of divine truth and knowledge; in distinction, that is to say, from
the active life of man set forth by the bread, it represented his life
of thought and knowledge. In the Minchah, however, it was not
the anointing material, but the burning material, the source of
light, that was employed; for it was placed in the fire, even the
altar-fire, the fire of God. This view also we must object to on
several grounds. The use of oil in daily life may be described as
threefold. In the first place, it was used for the anointing of the
body, by which the skin was to be rendered soft, smooth, blooming,
and shining, refreshed, strengthened, and invigorated. In this case
a virtue was ascribed to it which penetrated even to the bones
(Ps. cix. l8). Coincident with this in all essential points was the
use of oil in sickness, especially in the case of wounds, as a means
of lulling pain and restoring health (Isa. i. 6; Luke x. 34; Mark
vi. 13; Jas. v. 14). The second use of oil, viz., in the preparation
of food, is to be looked at from essentially the same point of view.
Here also the object was to anoint the food,1 so as to make it
soft, palatable, and pleasant to the mouth. The third use also,
which was not less frequent or important, namely, as material for
1
In Lev. ii. 5 and vii. 12, the cakes to be offered are expressly called
Nm,w,.Ba MyHiwum;, oleo uncti.
burning or giving light, may be looked at from the same point of

view, as an anointing, for the purpose of enlivening, refreshing, in-
vigorating. The thing to be anointed was the wick of the lamp.
The wick would burn without oil, but only with a weak and miser-
able light, and very speedily its burning and illuminating power
would burn itself out. It is very different when the wick is anointed
with oil. Then it burns with a strong, bright flame, which is all
the brighter and more lasting the more copious the anointing has
been.
These three modes of using oil were all transferred to the sym-
bolism of worship. The first was adopted in the anointing of the
priests, the tabernacle, and the holy things (Ex. xxix. 22 sqq;
Lev. viii. 10 sqq.), in that of a leper who had been restored (Lev
xiv. 26 sqq.), in that of the king (1. Sam. x. 1; 1 Kings i. 33;
2 Kings ix. 1), and once also in that of a prophet (1 Kings xix.
16); the second is met with in the Minchah of the fore-court;
and the third, in the Minchah of the Holy Place, viz., in the oil
which was burnt in the seven-branched lamp.
We cannot possibly adopt Kliefoth's view, that the mixing or
rubbing of the Minchah of the fore-court with oil was not to be
regarded in the light of anointing oil, but in that of burning and
illuminating oil. So thoroughly distorted is this view, that it does
not for a moment appear to require a serious refutation. We ad-
here, on the contrary, to the conclusion, that the saturation of the
Minchah of the fore-court with oil, whatever kind of Minchah it
might be, expressed the thought, that the only spiritual food pre-
pared by man that could be well-pleasing to God was that in
which the Spirit of God had co-operated, and the only food that
could be offered to Him was that which had been anointed with
the oil of His Spirit. And though Kliefoth pronounces this view
inadmissible, because in every case of anointing the oil was brought
to the man from without and poured upon him, whereas the oil of
the Minchah of the fore-court was brought by the man and pro-
ceeded from the man, this objection does not appear insuperable.
For as the food was rendered palatable by the fact that the man
who prepared it introduced, in addition to his own labour, the
effects of the oil which performed the most important art with-
effects any merit of his own, so the spiritual food prepared by him
for Jehovah acquired its true fitness to give pleasure to Jehovah
from the help and co-operation of the power of the Spirit of God,
which came to his aid from the institutions of salvation. If the
salt, which was also provided and added by the man, could be desig-
nated ''the salt of the covenant of thy God" (Lev. ii. 13), the oil
also may very properly be regarded as that of the Spirit of God.
Just as decidedly must I oppose Kliefoth's assertion, that there
was no allusion to the Spirit of God in the oil of the lamp in the
Holy Place. We will defer our reasons till a more suitable occa-
sion. (vid. 160).
There is no foundation whatever for Neumann's objection, that
even in the case of the anointing oil there was no allusion in the
oil itself to the Spirit of God, since the essential element was not
the oil, but the balsamic scents with which the oil was impregnated,
and the substance of the glorified life (which was indicated by the
mingled odours) was merely condensed by means of the oil, and
so imparted to the anointed one. No doubt Neumann had Ex.
xxx. 22 sqq. in his mind, where a description is given of the pre-
paration of the holy oil from common oil and four fragrant spices
for the purpose of anointing the tabernacle and its furniture, as
well as Aaron and his sons (ver. 30, Lev. viii. 10 sqq.), but where
it is also strictly forbidden to prepare or use such oil for the pur-
pose of anointing anything else. Now, are we to suppose, notwith-
standing this, that the oil with which the leper was anointed, or
even that which was used in the anointing of Saul, David, Solomon,
or Jehu, was this same holy oil? If not, and if it was simple,
ordinary oil, without any admixture of such balsamic odours, either
these anointings must have been all unmeaning and invalid, or
Neumann's objection must be regarded as unfounded and vain.
145. The description given in Lev. ii. of the different modes
of preparing the Minchah is closed in ver. 11 by the general com-
mand, that every meat-offering was to be unleavened, and therefore
neither leaven nor honey was to be used.
Leavened bread is more agreeable to the ordinary palate than
unleavened, and more nutritious for ordinary digestions, provided
the process of fermentation be stopped at the proper moment, and
fixed by the force of heat in the baking. To understand the
PROHIBITION OF LEAVEN, therefore, in the meal or bread, as used
symbolically, we must go back and inquire what the leaven really
was. Its component ingredients were the same as those of sweet
dough, and it was once sweet dough itself; but through fermenta-
tion it was changed and corrupted, and thus became sour dough or
leaven. Hence, as distinguished from sweet dough, it represented
the old, corrupt, degenerate nature. And upon this was founded
the first, prototypical prohibition of leaven at the exodus from

Egypt in Ex. xii. (cf. 175). Upon this Paul links his admoni-
tion to Christians in 1 Cor. v. 6 sqq., to purge out the old leaven,
that they may become a new dough; and when the same Apostle
writes in Gal. v. 9, a little leaven leaveneth the whole dough," he
intends thereby to warn the Galatians of the danger of falling back
to the old legal standpoint of Judaism. Christ also refers to leaven
as a representative of the old, degenerate nature when He says
in Matt. xvi. 6 and Mark viii. 15, "Beware of the leaven of the
Pharisees and Sadducees." And it is in this same light that we
have to regard the leaven in the case of the Minchah. When the
Israelite prepared spiritual food and presented it to his God, it was
to be rendered palatable to Jehovah, not with the leaven of his
own old nature, but with the oil of the Spirit of God. Making
the meal palatable with oil and with leaven, were two opposite pro-
cesses which precluded each other. In the former case the end
was attained by a mild, quiet penetration into the food; in the
latter, by a restless, fermenting disturbance and swelling up of the
same. The leaven, which was dough itself, bore the same relation
to the sweet dough pervaded with oil as the restless nature and
driving of the natural man to the calm, mild bearing of a man
sanctified and filled with peace by the Spirit of God.
The prohibition of HONEY stands side by side with that of
leaven. The question, whether the honey of grapes or of bees is
meant, there can certainly be no difficulty in answering. The
prohibition applied to one quite as much as to the other. Heng-
stenberg (Diss. on Pentateuch, vol. 2, p. 533 transl.) supposes the
allusion to be to the delicias carnis, to the pleasures of the world
in themselves, to which no one was to give himself up who wished
to prepare spiritual food acceptable to the Lord. In support of
this he appeals to Hos. iii. 1 (vid. Opfer, p. 45). But as in the
case of the leaven it was not the palatable taste imparted to the
bread that was taken into consideration, so in that of the honey
it would not be its sweetness, but the fact that, like leaven, it also
tended to produce fermentation. In proof of this we may not
only refer to the meaning which the verb has in rabbinical
phraseology (= fermentescere), and to the testimony of Pliny (H.
n. 18, 11) as to this quality of honey, but above all to the Thor
itself, which embraces the prohibition of sour dough and honey
under the common expression made with leaven (CmeHA hW,fAte-xlo
Lev. ii. 11).
These prohibitions of leaven and honey are then followed in

ver. 13 by the command, that every meat-offering is to be salted
with salt, and that no Minchah is to be without the SALT of the
covenant of thy God.1 As the oil used in the preparation of the
spiritual food for Jehovah brought in the Spirit of God as co-
operating, so the salt, through its pungent and purifying power,
warded off all putrefaction from the food, and ensured its lasting.
In the corrosive and antiseptic property of salt there is hidden
something of the purifying and consuming nature of fire ; hence
the Redeemer, in Mark ix. 49, combines the salting of the sacrifice
with the purifying fire of self-denial. The power of salt to ensure
continuance and render indestructible, is also shown in the epithet
applied to an inviolable and permanent ordinance of God, "a cove-
nant of salt" (Num. xviii. 19; 2 Chron. xiii. 5). And when the salt
added to the Minchah is called the salt of the covenant of thy God,
it is thereby stamped as a divine power proceeding from the cove-
nant of God with Israel, and co-operating in the preparation of the
food, so as to render it a brw?sij ou]k a]pollume<nh, a]lla> me<nousa
ei]j zwh>n ai]w<nion (John vi. 27).
146. There is a difference between the INCENSE, and the other
accompaniments connected with the Minchah, viz., the oil and salt.
The offering was so saturated and penetrated by the latter, that
they were no longer outside or by the side of it, but only existed
in it and with it;--the incense, on the contrary, though burned
upon the altar at the same time as the Minchah, remains apart,
accompanying but not pervading it. Connected with this is the
fact, that only a small portion of the Minchah was placed upon the
altar, and the rest was allotted to the priests; the incense, on the
other hand, was to be entirely consumed (Lev. ii. 2, 16, vi. 15). Of
the food intended for Jehovah, a portion was allotted to the priests
for their board; but not even the priests could be fumigated with
the incense burned for Jehovah ( 149).
Whilst the fumigation of the fore-court was restricted to the
substance of the incense, according to Ex. xxx. 34 sqq., three other
fragrant substances were added for the fumigation of the Holy Place.
There is the same distinction here, as between the anointing oil for
the anointing of the sanctuary and the priests (Ex. xxx. 23), and
1
That the salting mentioned in Lev. ii. 13 not only could be restricted to
the Minchah, as Oehler maintains, but was to be so restricted, is evident from
the words themselves, notwithstanding Ezek. xliii. 24 and Mark ix. 46; for the
reading is not j~n;BAr;qA as Keil and Oehler give it, but HlAm;Ti Hlam.,Ba j~t;HAn;mi NBar;qA.
the anointing oil for the anointing of the leper when cured (Lev.
xiv. 12, 15 sqq.). But the fundamental signification is undoubtedly
the same in both.
There is no other symbol of worship, the meaning of which is
so clear and unmistakeable, or so indisputably established by express
and authentic statements in the Scriptures themselves, as that of the
incense is. It was the symbol of prayer. In Ps. cxli. 2 prayer is
distinctly compared to incense, tr,Foq;. Isa. vi. 3, 4, is almost equiva-
lent to an express interpretation. The seraphim praised God with
their thrice holy, so that the foundations of the thresholds of the
temple moved at the voice of their cry, and the house was filled with
smoke. The same may be said of Luke i. 10, where the people are
said to have prayed in the fore-court, whilst the priest was in the
Holy Place burning the incense. In Rev. v. 8 the four zw?a and
the four-and-twenty elders are introduced with golden vials (bowls)
full of incense, "which are the prayers of saints." So, again, in
chap. viii. 3, 4, the incense is described as destined for the prayers
of the saints before the throne of God. According to Num. xvi.
46, 47, Aaron burned incense by Moses' directions, making atone-
ment thereby for the people that were infected with the plague, and
so causing the plague to cease. But what else could the burning of
incense in this case represent, than the intercession of the high.
priest? So also the burning of incense by Aaron in the Holy of
Holies on the great day of atonement, "that he might not die"
(Lev. xvi. 12, 13), could have this effect only as being the symbol
of prayer.
If we look now for the tertium comparationis between prayer
and incense, two things present themselves: the fragrance, and the
ascent of the incense in the smoke (cf. Rev. viii. 4). Both these
are to be connected together: the burning of the incense caused
the fragrance to ascend to Jehovah; and here, as everywhere else
in the ritual of worship ( 74), the holy fire by which the incense
was resolved into ethereal vapour had the force of purification.
Bahr's interpretation of the fragrance diffused by the burning
of the incense, as a symbol of the divine name (Symb. i. 462 sqq.,
ii. 327) or of the divine breath (der salom. Tempel, p. 181), needs
no further refutation. I think I have already answered it in a
most conclusive manner in my Beitrage zur Symbolik des mos.
Cultus, p. 41 sqq. And Neumann's contracted interpretation of the
holy incense as an "image of the soul glorified in God, and there-
fore of the priestly nature," in which prominence is given to the
296 THE MINCHAH OF THE FORE-COURT.
rough, sharp, bitter fragrance as the essential and distinctive

characteristic of the incense, whilst in further explanation a pas-
sage is quoted from the Guide Book for the Easter Candle," pub-
lished by the present Pope as a contribution to religious instruction
in the States of the Church,1 may be laid aside without hesitation
for the explanation which is given of the incense in the Scriptures
themselves, and which is just as simple and natural, as it is compre-
hensible and clear.
CHAPTER II.
THE MINCHAH OF THE FORE-COURT.
147. Bloodless offerings were presented not only upon the

altar of the fore-court, but also upon the altar, table, and cande-
labrum of the Holy Place. Hence we have to distinguish between
a Minchah of the fore-court, and a Minchah of the Holy Place.
The law for the Minchah of the fore-court is laid down in Lev.
ii. As we find in chap: i. the different kinds of burnt-offerings
(oxen, ver. 3 ; sheep or goats, ver. 10; pigeons, ver. 14), in chap.
iii. the different kinds of peace-offerings (oxen, ver. 1; sheep, ver.
6; goats, ver. 12), and in chap. iv. the various kinds of sin-offer-
ings (a bullock, vers. 3, 14; a he-goat, ver. 23; a she-goat, ver.
28; a sheep, ver. 32), arranged according to the quality of the
animal to be offered; so do we find in chap. ii. the different kinds
of meat-offerings divided into offerings of meal, bread or cake, and
groats ( 140). Now if we compare together what is said of these
three descriptions of Minchah, we are struck with the fact, that
whereas the accompaniment of oil and salt, and the absence of
honey and leaven, are expressly mentioned as common to them all,
the accompaniment of incense occurs only in connection with the
offerings of meal and groats, and is not mentioned at all in con-
nection with the different offerings of cake or bread. If this
omission was intentional and planned, so as to be equivalent to a
1
The passage runs thus: La Croce fatty sopra il cero con cinque grani
d'incenzo significa, che i Cristiani in virtu delle cinque piaghe di Cristo devono
portar volontieri la Croce, per dove il buon odore di una santa pazienza e ras-
segnazione. Neumann seems to attach great importance to this book, as he fre-
quently quotes it in proof of his explanations.
THE MINCHAH OF THE FORE-COURT. 297
command to offer this kind of meat-offering without incense, the

reason must have been, that in the case of the meal and groats the
want of that fuller preparation, through which the cake-offerings
had passed, was to be supplied by the introduction of the incense.
And if it were so, from the explanations given in 141, 146, there
can be no great difficulty in discovering a suitable symbolical mean-
ing. At the same time it may be more advisable, not to attribute
any exclusive significance to this silence with regard to incense in
the case of the offerings of bread or cake; since the loaves of shew-
bread offered in the Holy Place were by no means without their
accompaniment of incense (Lev. xxiv. 7), although in name, in in-
gredients, and in mode of preparation they were essentially one with
the tOl.Ha mentioned in Lev. ii. 4.
148. Again, the command to place a portion of the gift upon
the altar, and then to cause it to ascend in smoke as an hOAhy; hwe.xi
through the altar-fire, is common to all three kinds. In the case of
the meal-offering, a handful of the dough saturated with oil was
ordered to be taken (ver. 2, cf. vi. 15, and ix. 17). Of the offerings
of cake and groats the quantity was not fixed. But the analogy of
Ex. xxix. 23 sqq. warrants us in assuming that a specimen of every
kind of cake was placed upon the altar. The portion set apart for
the altar bore the name of hrAKAz;xa, which is rendered in the Septua-
gint mnhmo<sunon, in the Vulgate memoriale, by Luther Gedachtniss
whilst Bunsen prefers the rendering fire portion. The derivation
ordinarily accepted, viz., from the Hiphil ryKiz;hi, is rejected by Knobel,
on the ground that the Aramean form hrAKAz;xa for hrAKAz;ha cannot be ex-
pected in the early Hebrew. Hence he invents for the Kal rkazA the
meaning to think of = to present with anything, and so gets the ren-
dering donation, gift, contribution. But this meaning is quite foreign
to rkz. And even though the Aramaean form be somewhat surpris-
ing, the derivation of such a form from the Kal is decidedly much
more incomprehensible. Moreover, the derivation from the Hiphil
is supported by the epithet applied to the meat-offering of jealousy
in Num. v. 15, NOfA tr,Kz, ;ma. If we adhere, therefore, to the derivation
from ryKiz;hi the question arises, whether we should accept the pri-
mary signification, to bring to remembrance, or the secondary
meaning, to extol, or praise. The latter is adopted by Bahr (i. 411,
ii. 428), who appeals to the common phrase hOAhy; Mwe ryKiz;hi, and the
rendering which he gives is Lobpreis, praise. Hofmann follows
in the same track, and explains it as meaning the active praise of
God." But Oehler justly objects, that the name Azcarah is also
given to the altar-portion of the sin-offering in Lev. v. 12, and of

the meat-offering of jealousy in Num. v. 26, where the idea of
praise cannot possibly be thought of. Kliefoth's rendering, thanks-
giving (Danksagung), has still less claim to adoption, for ryKiz;hi never
means to thank; and Ewald's translation, Duft, odour, is perfectly
baseless. As we find in Lev. xxiv. 7 that incense was laid even
upon the shew-bread, which was not burnt, but eaten by the priests
after it had lain for a week upon the table of skew-bread, "that it
might be an Azcarah, an offering made by fire unto the Lord,"
whilst in Isa. lxvi. 3 the presentation of incense is called hnAbol; ryKiz;hi,
the conjecture is a very natural one, that the name was originally
given to the accompaniment of incense, and then was transferred to
the offering of meal, which it accompanied. In that case the name
(in the sense of praise) would be a very appropriate one, and the
otherwise inexplicable fact would become intelligible, that the term
was applied to the altar-portion of the meat-offering alone, and never
to that of the animal sacrifice. But Lev. v. 12 and Num. v. 26
place difficulties in the way of this explanation, which it is very hard
to overcome; since the altar-portion of the meal sin-offering and
the meat-offering of jealousy, where the addition of incense is ex-
pressly prohibited as entirely at variance with the character andd
meaning of those offerings, is also called Azcarah. We must go
back, therefore, to the rendering adopted by the earlier translators,
to remind, to bring to remembrance; and understand the name
Azcarah, as denoting that the offerer desired thereby to bring him-
self into gracious remembrance before God. The corresponding
description of the offering of jealousy as NOf tr,K,z;ma NOrKAzi tHan;mi ("an
offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to remembrance," Num.
v. 15), may be regarded as a confirmation of this view. In both
instances the offering of the Azcarah brings to remembrance the
works of the person for whom they are burned upon the altar; with
this difference, however, that in the latter the absence of the oil and
incense calls to mind the doubtful and suspicious nature of the works
in question.
149. Whilst only a comparatively small portion of the meat-
offering was thus burnt upon the altar, the accompaniment of incense
was all consumed (Lev. ii. 12, 16, vi. 15). There cannot be any sur-
prise felt at this regulation. For Jehovah might very well supply
His servants the priests from the food which Israel offered to Him as
the representative of its grateful self-surrender ( 118); but incense,
like the prayer which it represented, belonged to Himself alone.
After deducting the Azcarah, the remainder of the meat-offering

in all its forms, as being most holy, was assigned to Aaron and his
sons (Lev. ii. 3, 10), who were to eat it in a holy place, i.e., in the
fore-court (Lev. vi. 16, x. 12, 13). According to the more minute
directions in Lev. vii. 9, 10, there was this distinction between them,
that the remainder of the Minchah of cake was to be eaten by the
officiating priest alone, whilst the Minchah of meal and groats1
was to be eaten by all the sons of Aaron, the female members of
their families being excluded (Lev. vii. 10). Hence it follows as a
matter of course, and in Lev. vi. 17 it is even expressly stated, that
the remainder of the Minchah of meal and groats had first of all to
be baked, though without leaven. But if the Minchah was offered
by a priest on his own account, it was all to be burnt upon the altar
(Lev. vi. 23).
Both these directions present various analogies to those relating
to the remainder of the animal sacrifice of the sin- and peace-offer-
ings, so far as the latter became the portion of the priests. For
example, they call to mind Lev. vii. 31, 33, where it is stated that
in the case of the Shelamim the wave-breast was allotted to all the
priests who were present at the sanctuary, whilst the heave-leg
was the portion. of the officiating priest alone , but they differ from
the rule relating to the peace-offerings (Lev. x. 14), and approxi-
mate to that of the sin-offerings Lev. vi. 26, 29) in the fact that
the remainder of the meat-offering, as being most holy, was to be
eaten in a holy place, and only by the men. The same circumstance
(cf. 118) which gave to the priest's share of the peace-offering the
lower character of holy, and to the priest's share of the flesh of the
sin-offering the higher character of most holy, imparted the charac-
ter of most holy to the meat-offering also. Just, for example, as
that portion of the flesh of the sin-offering which was not placed
upon the altar was assigned entirely and exclusively to the priests,
so was it with the whole of the remainder of the meat-offering,
strictly so called; whereas the remainder of the flesh of the Shela-
mim was divided between the priests and the person presenting it.
The rule that none of the meat-offering of a priest was to be eaten
(Lev. vi. 16), tallied with the similar rule respecting the sin-offering''
of a priest, and rested upon the same ground (cf. 117).
150. The DRINK-OFFERING is nowhere mentioned in the true
1
Of the two kinds of Minchah of meal mentioned in Lev. vii. 10, one
mixed with oil and one dry, the latter must be understood as referring to the two
cases in Lev. v. 11 and Num. v. 15, in which the addition of oil was prohibited.
300 HE MINCHAH OF THE FORE-COURT.
law of sacrifice (Lev. i.-vii.); and throughout the whole of Leviticus

it is only referred to in chap. xxiii. 13, 18, 37, in connection with
such meat-offerings as were to be presented as an accompaniment
to the burnt-offerings at the feasts. And there it is to be observed
that the law commences in ver. 10 with the words, When ye be
come into the land which I give unto you," etc. In Exodus like-
wise the drink-offering is only mentioned in chap. xxix. 40, 41, as
an accompaniment to the daily burnt-offering which was to be con-
tinued "throughout your generations," and in chap. xxx. 9, where
burnt sacrifice, meat-offerings, and drink-offerings are forbidden to
be offered upon the altar of incense in the Holy Place. In Numbers,
bowls and cans for the drink-offering are mentioned among the
vessels of the sanctuary in chap. iv. 7, and drink-offerings as well
as meat-offerings are included in the sacrificial gifts to be offered
by the Nazarite (chap. vi. 15). On the other hand, meat-offerings
AND drink-offerings are described for the first time thoroughly and
ex professo in Num. xv. 1-12; and here the law is also introduced
with the words, "When ye be come into the land of your habitations,
which I give unto you, and ye will make an offering by fire unto
Jehovah, a burnt-offering or a slain-offering," etc. Then follow
minute directions as to the quantity of meat-offering and drink-
offering to be added to these bleeding sacrifices.
From the facts thus noticed the conclusion may apparently be
drawn, that the lawgiver, for very obvious reasons, did not order
a drink-offering to be connected with the meat-offerings presented
in the desert, but deferred the obligation till after the settlement
of the Israelites in the Holy Land.
But neither in Num. xv., nor even in Num. xxviii. and xxix.,
where a minute account is given of the daily, the sabbatical, and
the yearly sacrifices, and of the meat- and drink-offerings to be
appended to them, according to the rule laid down in the funda-
mental law in Num. xv.,1 nor, in fact, in any of the canonical books
of the Old Testament, are we expressly informed what was done
with the wine set apart for the drink-offering. That it was offered
1
For the bleeding sacrifice of a lamb or kid a meat-offering was required of
the tenth of an ephah of white meal, which was to be mixed with a quarter of
a hin of oil, and a drink-offering of a quarter of a hin of wine. When a ram was
offered, the quantity was increased to two-tenths of an ephah of meal, a third of
a hin of oil, and a third of a hin of wine; and for a bullock to three-tenths of
an ephah of meal, half a hin of oil, and half a hin of wine. The hin was nearly
twice as much (1 2/3) as the ephah, and according to the most probable calcula-
tion, held about 187 Rhenish cubic inches (vid. Keil ii. 142).
THE MINCHAH OF THE- FORE-COURT. 301
along with the meat-offering, and the presentation was effected by

pouring it out, is evident from the independence and signification
of the name j`s,n,; and that it was all poured out, without the priests
receiving any portion, may be inferred with tolerable certainty from
Lev. x. 9 as compared with Lev. vi. 16, 23, x. 12, 13. For in the
former passage the priests are forbidden to drink either wine or
strong drink when they enter the tabernacle on pain of sudden
death (such as befel Aaron's eldest sons, Nadab and Abihu). And
as one characteristic of the Minchah, according to Lev. vi. 16, 23,
was that the offerer did not partake of it himself, the same com-
mand must certainly be regarded as holding good. in the case of the
drink-offering also.
But nowhere in the Old Testament does there seem to be any
hint, from which we can gather where the wine was to be poured.
The first allusion to this occurs in the Book of Wisdom (l. 15).
In the account of the official duties of Simon the high priest, it is
stated with regard to the drink-offering, which the son of Sirach
calls ai$ma stafulh?j (the blood of the vine), that e]ce<xeen ei]j qeme<lia
qusiasthri<ou. But this statement is the less admissible, from the
fact that it contradicts the rabbinical tradition (Thalhofer, p. 117
that the altar of burnt-offering in the second. temple was hollowed
out at the south-west corner, and that two pipes led from the altar
to the brook Kedron, and that the wine and the blood left over
from the sprinkling were poured into one of these, and the libation
of water at the feast of Tabernacles into the other. Moreover, it
appears to rest upon the utterly erroneous assumption ( 142), that
the wine of the Minclaala corresponded to the blood of the animal
sacrifice. Another statement occurs in Josephus, who says that the
drink-offering was poured peri> to>n bw?mon (when the tabernacle was
in existence, Ant. iii. 9, 4). It is quite an arbitrary assumption
that this is identical with the ei]j qeme<lia qusiasthri<ou of the Book
of Wisdom. But Josephus probably selected his expression from,
and understood it according to the analogy of, the sprinking of
the blood in the case of the trespass-, burnt-, and peace-offerings,
bybisA HABez;mi-lfa. At the same time it may be questioned, whether he
was led to identify the place at which the libation of wine took
place with that where the blood was sprinkled by any ancient tra-
dition, or merely by his own subjective notions. And even if we
could safely assume the former, the question would still remain,
what is the correct interpretation of the expression bybisA HaBez;m-i lfa
( 122)?
The usual opinion of modern antiquarians, who think they can

rely upon the Book of Wisdom and Josephus, is that the wine was.
poured out at the foot of the altar of burnt-offering, like the blood
of the sin-offering which was left over after the sprinkling had been
effected ( 107). But I cannot help regarding this view as the
least tenable of all. For the wine had nothing in common with the
blood of expiation. It was nourishment, drink for Jehovah; and
as it "maketh glad the heart of man" (Ps. civ. 15), so also it was
to "cheer the heart of God" (Judg. ix. 13); consequently, like the
flesh and bread, its proper place was the top of the altar, and not
the foot. Wine intended for a king is not usually poured under the
table, but placed upon the table. It is true, that after the necessary
quantity of the blood, of the sin-offering had been put upon the horns
of the altar, the remainder was poured ei]j qeme<lia qusiasthri<ou,
but this was assuredly only for the purpose of disposing of what
was left over of the most holy blood in a suitable, i.e., a holy place
( 107). If this could serve as an analogy, therefore, for the liba-
tion of wine (though I can find no warrant for such a conclusion),
the plan adopted would necessarily be this, that only an Azcarah of
the wine would be poured upon the altar, and the remainder at the
foot,--a possible thing certainly, but not a probable one. I must
still most decidedly declare my adhesion to the view which Thal-
hoer pronounces long since antiquated, viz., that the wine was
poured upon the flesh of the sacrifice as it lay upon the altar, in
which case, of course, only a small portion would evaporate in the
fire, whilst the greater part would soak into the earth which filled
the altar-chest. We cannot, indeed, appeal to Num. xv. 5 (wine
for a drink-offering shalt thou prepare hlAfohA-lfa) in support of our
opinion, for lfa in this connection in all probability merely denotes
the concomitance of the offering; but we may appeal to Ex. xxx. 9,
which has hitherto been left unnoticed. The Israelite is there for-
bidden to offer either burnt-offerings or meat-offerings upon the
altar of incense in the Holy Place; and then it is added Uks.;ti-xlo j`s,nev;
vylAfA ("neither shall ye pour drink-offerings thereon''),--an indis-
putable proof, in my opinion, that the drink-offering was poured
upon (vylAfA), and not at the foot of the altar of the fore-court. In
addition to this, we may also adduce the similar custom connected
with heathen sacrifices, which even Thalhofer admits, and of which
he quotes examples. At any rate, this view not only appears the
most natural and obvious one, but the only one that has any signi-
ficance. If all the altar-gifts were placed upon the altar, the drink-
offering would certainly be no exception; and if the design of all

was to serve, at least in part, as a sweet savour to Jehovah, this
would not only be the best, but the only way of attaining that
object in connection with the wine.
151. In accordance with Bahr's example (ii. 191, 199), I have
already maintained that the meat-offerings, apart from the pecu-
liarly modified and qualified instance mentioned in Num. v. 15,
were never offered by themselves, but always as an accompaniment,
i.e., in connection with some burnt-offering or peace-offering that
had been presented before. Hengstenberg also observes (p. 42),
that "the meat-offerings were connected with the bleeding sacrifices
so as to form one whole, and never occurred independently;" and
Kliefoth (p. 116), that "every Minchah offered in the fore-court was
attached to a bleeding sacrifice;" so that both of them advocate the
same view. Thalhofer has lately opposed this view with peculiar
zeal, and evidently under the influence of the doctrinal desire to
find an Old Testament type for the Romish theory of the unbloody
sacrifice of the Lord's Supper. Stockl naturally joins him, and even
Keil describes it as one of the two leading errors of my former work.1
But various misunderstandings have crept into this discussion.
In the first place, our assertion naturally related to the Minchah
of the fore-court alone; and there was certainly no intention to
deny the independence of the Minchah of the Holy Place. There
was just as little intention to maintain, that the meat-offering was
an accompaniment to the bleeding sacrifice in the same sense in
which the incense, the salt, or the oil was an accompaniment to
the meat-offering. Nor did I mean to dispute the fact, that the
meat-offering was co-ordinate with the offering of flesh, which
Oehler justly maintains, but simply to affirm its subordination to
the sprinkling of the blood, and, since the latter was necessarily
peculiar to the bleeding sacrifice, to that extent to maintain its
subordination to the bleeding sacrifice itself. And though Keil
argues (in the Luth. Zeitsch.), that we can no more draw the con-
elusion that the meat-offerings were mere accompaniments to the
slain-offerings, from the fact that, according to Num. xv., no burnt-
offerings or thank-offerings were to be presented without meat and
drink-offerings, than we can take the many passages in the law
which direct that a burnt-offering shall be added to the sin-offering
1 The other is this, that I regard all the bleeding sacrifices as expiatory,--a
view which I am still unable to give up: vid. 30 and 178, note.
1
as necessarily leading to the conclusion that the burnt-offerings

were accompaniments to the sin-offerings; yet it is very evident,
that when and so far as a burnt-offering necessarily followed the
sin-offering, it might unquestionably be called an accompaniment,
in the sense already mentioned. Keils argument in favour of the
presentation of a meat-offering independently of any burnt-offering
or peace-offering, on the ground that all the sacrifices are called by
the collective terms hHAn;miU Hbaz,, is equally inconclusive; for if this
kind of proof were admissible, the expression j`s,n,vA hHAn;mi would also
prove that a drink-offering might have been presented without
accompanying a meat-offering, a separation never recognised by
the law. And when Keil appeals to the fact, that in the law of
sacrifice, strictly so called (Lev. i.-vii.), the meat-offerings are
treated as perfectly co-ordinate to the burnt-offerings, the thank-
offerings, and the sin- and trespass-offerings, he seems to have over-
looked Lev. vii. 11 sqq.; for there, even according to Keil's own
view of the passage (p. 255), the meat-offering is really subordinate
to the peace-offering. And is it not possible that two things should
be co-ordinate, and yet be so closely connected that the one should
never appear without the other?
The assertion that, according to the Mosaic law, the meat-offer-
ing was always connected with a bleeding sacrifice, will be proved to
be untenable, when instances are adduced in which a meat-offering
is presented without a previous burnt- or peace-offering. In Keil's
opinion, we find such instances "in the meat-offering which the
priests had to present during the seven days of their consecration
(Lev. vi. 20 sqq.); in the sin-offerings of the poor (Lev. v. 11
sqq.); and in the jealousy-offering (Num. v. 15, 25, 26)." But
Lev. v. 11 is not a case in point; for the offering mentioned
there is not a meat-offering, but a sin-offering (although to a cer-
tain extent in the form of a meat-offering, i.e., as meal, but with-
out oil and incense; 60). There is apparently greater force in
the appeal to the jealousy-offering in Num. v., since this really
was regarded as a meat-offering ( 235); but the thoroughly unique
character of this sacrifice places it rather in the position of an ex-
ception, which does not affect the validity of the rule. Lastly, so
far as the meat-offering of the priests is concerned, the force of the
passage cited is a doubtful one, even apart from its questionable
interpretation, because this meat-offering was undoubtedly pre-
ceded by a bleeding (burnt) sacrifice. We shall discuss this more
thoroughly at 156 and 167. No other examples have been cited
of meat-offerings, either actually occurring, or supposed to occur,

without the basis of a bleeding sacrifice. Hence, so far as this
argument is concerned, the assertion might still hold good, that
(apart from Num. v.) the meat-offering always followed a bleeding
sacrifice, and was sustained by its expiatory worth.
152. With regard to the law of the meat-offering in Lev. ii.,
Keil thinks it doubtful whether "the freewill meat-offerings ap-
printed there could be offered independently or not, since we have
no certain clue to the decision of this question." Thalhofer, on
the contrary, lays the greatest stress upon this passage, and by
comparing it with Num. xv., xxviii., xxix., arrives at the following
result that the Mosaic law recognised two kinds of meat-offerings,
which differed in form and signification: (1) the so-called Bei-opfer,
subordinate offerings, which could only be presented as an accom-
animent to a burnt- or peace-offering (Num. xv., xxviii., xxix.).
and (2) independent meat-offerings, which were not attended by a
bleeding sacrifice (Lev. iii. 6, 7). This view of the question involves
two assertions: a. that the meat-offering could be offered without
resting upon the foundation of a bleeding sacrifice; and b. that the
meat-offerings presented by themselves and those accompanying a
bleeding sacrifice were two different things. A further investiga-
tion of the question has convinced me, that the first point must be
granted, but the second cannot be sustained.
Any one who reads with an unbiassed mind the introductory
formula of Lev. ii., byriq;ta-yKi wp,n,, which runs parallel both in form
and substance to the byriq;ya-yKi MdAxA Lev. i. 2, must certainly receive
the impression that the passage treats of the presentation of a meat-
offering as co-ordinate with that of a burnt-offering. But as we can
not infer from the introductory formula to chap. i. that the burnt-
offering could never be offered in close connection with a previous
sin-offering; so we cannot infer, as Thalhofer does, from the intro
ductoty formula .to chap. ii., that the meat-offerings described there
were always to be presented without a bleeding sacrifice preceding
them. But if it appears from the later laws that the burnt-offering
could be presented independently, i.e., without resting upon the basis
of any other sacrifice, the presumption is certainly a very natural
one, that the same rule might apply to the meat-offerings described
in chap. ii. This presumption is not proved to be erroneous by the
fact, that the rule was afterwards laid down (Num. xv., xxviii., xxix.),
that burnt-offerings and peace-offerings were never to be presented
without a meat-offering following them;--that would only be the
case, provided it could be shown from subsequent laws that a meat-

offering was never to be presented without a previous bleeding
sacrifice. But it is impossible to prove this. On the other hand,
the opinion derived from a comparison of Lev. ii. 1 with Lev. i. 2,
that the meat-offering could be offered by itself as well as the burnt-
offering, without the way being prepared by any other sacrifice, is
a mere assumption, and not a necessary conclusion--conjecture, not
certainty. To give this uncertain assumption the force of a certain
result, we require different proofs from any that the introductory for-
mula to Lev. ii. can possibly supply.
153. Thalhofer images that he has obtained many such proofs
from a comparison of Lev. ii. 6, 7, with Num. xv., xxviii., xxix.
Irreconcilable contradictions, for example, between the meat-offer-
ings described in the latter and those described in the former of
these two passages, are supposed by him to lead irresistibly to the
conclusion, that there were two different kinds of Minchah, one of
which is referred to in Leviticus, and the other in Numbers.
If this were really the case, however, we should certainly expect
to find, that separate names had grown up for these two different
classes of meat-offerings, just as they did for the three classes of
peace-offerings ( 126). But there is not the slightest trace of
anything of the kind. They always bear the same name hHAn;mi, and
no distinguishing predicate is ever added. Hence we are not only
entitled but compelled to assume that the very same class of meat-
offerings is intended in Leviticus as in Numbers; a conclusion
quite as little prejudiced by the distinction between the Minchahs
of meal, of cake, and of groats in Lev. ii., as by the distinction be-
tween the burnt-offerings of bullocks, sheep, and pigeons in Lev. i.
But let us examine the supposed discrepancies. The first is,
that the Minchah in Lev. ii. was furnished with an accompaniment
of incense, to which no reference is made in Num. xv., xxviii., xxix.
But we also find no allusion there to the salt to be added and the
leaven to be avoided, the necessity for which even Thalhofer feels
himself compelled to "transfer from Lev. ii. to Num. xv." And may
not the lawgiver, who knew that in the original law of the meat-
offerings in Lev. ii. he had pointed out the necessity for the Minchah
of meal to have an accompaniment of incense, have assumed this
in the latter case as well known and a matter of course?--The
second is, that the meal Minchah in Num. is always accompanied
by a libation of wine, which is not mentioned in Lev. ii. But are
we really warranted in taking the absence of any express reference
to a drink-offering along with the meat-offering in Lev. ii. as lead-

ing to the conclusion, that no drink-offerings could be associated
with the meat-offerings in question? May not the lawgiver have
had his peculiar reasons for not mentioning on this occasion both
the meat-offerings and drink-offerings that were requisite to make
the bloodless offering complete, and for referring to the meat-
offerings alone? Is it not conceivable that in Lev. ii. he may have
intended to speak of the meat-offering alone, as being the essential
portion of the bloodless sacrifice, and that which constituted both
its antithesis to the bleeding sacrifice (in the one bread, in the other
flesh) and its distribution into the three different species (the Min-
chap of meal, cake, and groats)? Does not the entire organization
of the four first chapters of Leviticus really compel us to assume
this? As the libation of wine had no influence upon the classifi-
cation of the bloodless sacrifices, it is quite subordinate and indif-
ferent in relation to that particular point which the lawgiver there
had in view. He therefore passed it over on the same ground on
which he omitted so much in chap. i., iii., iv., that he afterwards felt
obliged to supply. Should there be any one who is still not satisfied,
we refer him to the conjecture noticed in 150, that the meat-
offerings generally (the subordinate, as well as the independent
ones were offered without the accompaniment of the libation of
wine during the journeying in the desert.
And what rational ground can we think of, that could have
induced the lawgiver to withdraw from the subordinate sacrifices
the accompaniment of incense, or (except in the case referred to)
from the independent Minchah the libation of wine?
154. Again, Thalhofer lays stress upon the fact, that only the
first of the varieties of Minchah mentioned in Lev. ii., viz., the meal
Minchah, is referred to in Num. xv. xxviii. xxix. as an accompani-
ment to the burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, but never the cake
Minchah; and that the Minchah of groats is never mentioned in
connection with, or as resting upon, the basis of a bleeding sacrifice
at all. In this we think we must support him. Kliefoth, indeed,
maintains that the Minchah of groats described in Lev. ii. 14 sqq. is
to be regarded as the regular meat-offering connected with the two
Sheler lambs offered at the feast of Pentecost (Lev. xxiii. 19), a
combination which we shall afterwards show to be inadmissible
( 193). Kliefoth thinks he has found four examples of the occur-
rence of a cake Minchah as an accompaniment to a bleeding sacrifice;
but this is equally groundless. The first is said to be in Lev. vii.
308 THE. MINCHAH OF THE FORE-COURT.
12-14. The meal Minchah" so Kliefoth affirms, a might indeed

be associated with the burnt-offerings as well as with. the votive and
freewill peace-offerings, according to Num. xv. 3," but never with
the praise--Shelamim.. For the latter, on the contrary, Lev. vii. 12
sqq. prescribes a cake Minchah, which was a higher form of meal
Minchah, just as the praise-offering itself was superior to the votive
and freewill-offerings (cf. 128 sqq.).
But this view is decidedly untenable. Lev. vii. 12 sqq. cannot
possibly be combined with Lev.. ii. 4 sqq. It is true the materials
were essentially the same in both cases; viz., tOc.ma tOl.Ha and yqeyqir;
tOc.ma ( 140). But the form and purpose of the offering are irre-
concilably opposed to one another. According, to Lev. ii. an Az-
carah of the cakes was burnt upon the altar, and all the rest fell
to the lot of Aaron and his sons or, more strictly speaking, to the
officiating priest (Lev. vii. 10). In Lev. vii. 12 sqq., on the other
hand, no allusion whatever is made to an Azcarah; in fact, the
context seems to preclude the presentation of anything of the kind.
For instance, instead of the Azcarah a hmAUrT; is mentioned, which
was offered to Jehovah, but which, instead of being burnt upon
the altar, fell to the lot of that particular priest who had sprinkled
the blood of the accompanying Shelem; and this Terumah was re-
stricted to NBAr;qA-lKAmi dHAx, i.e., in all probability (according to the
analogy of Ex. xxix. 33) to a portion of each of the varieties of
bread or cake offered, which included not merely unleavened cakes,
but leavened bread as well,--another contrast to the stringent pro-
hibition of leaven in Lev. ii. That the rest of the loaves and cakes
were then eaten at the sacrificial meal, may be regarded as a matter
of course.
But it is not with Lev. vii. 12 sqq. only that Kliefoth's view is
at variance; it also gives an inadmissible interpretation to the
words of Num. xv. 3. It is there commanded, Ye shall make an
offering by fire unto Jehovah, a burnt-offering, or a slain- (= a
peace-) offering, for the, consecration of a vow (rd,n,-xl.ePl a ;), or as a
freewill-offering (hbAdAg;Bi), or at your feasts, etc." Now, no doubt
the words hbAdAn;bi Ox rd,n,-xl.ePal; might be taken, as they are by Kliefoth,
as epexegetical to the foregoing hbaz,, and therefore so as to exclude
praise-offerings. But it is more than improbable, that in this very
passage, which is written for the express purpose of determining
how large a quantity of meal, oil, and wine should be added to the
bleeding sacrifices as a meat- and drink-offering, no reference what-
ever should have been made to the praise-offering, which was the
most frequent and most important of all, and was really the only
kind of Shelamim offered at the feasts. Now if we bear in mind
that the generic names of the peace-offerings (MymilAw; and MyHibAz;) are
used for the most part to designate the first, the most frequent, and
the leading species, viz., the praise-offering, as being the peace-
offering par excellence, and that in Lev. xxiii. 37, 38, Num. xxix.
39, Deut. xii..6, the three classes of peace-offerings are mentioned
side by side as MymilAw; (or MyHibAz;) MyridAn; and tObdAn;, it seems unques-
tionable that in this passage also, when the rd,n, and the hbAdAn; are
mentioned aloe with the Hbaz, we are to regard Hbaz, as the name of
a particular species, and not as a generic name.
Keil's view of Lev. vii. 12 sqq. is also wrong in several respects.
In one point we must unquestionably admit that he is correct; viz.,
that the rest of the cakes and loaves were set apart for the sacrificial
meal. And he may also be right in saying, that what is stated
here of the praise-offering, the first species of the Shelamim, we
may accept without hesitation as the rule for the other two species,
the votive and the freewill-offerings." But when he speaks of
these cakes at the same time as the true Minchah of all the peace-
offerings, he comes into evident collision with Num. xv., where a
Minchah of meal, and not of cakes, which he erroneously restricts
to the burnt-offerings (through overlooking Num. xv., and con-
fining himself to Num. xxviii. and xxix., where the peace-offerings
are not mentioned at all), is prescribed for the peace-offerings.
155. Thalhofer has formed comparatively the most correct
view of the injunctions in Lev. vii. 12-14. But even his view is
not free from decided errors. He says that a with every burnt-
and peace-offering there was associated a Minchah of meal as a
subordinate offering with oil and salt, but without (?) incense, to-
gether with a drink-offering of wine. This Minchah of meal was
all (?) burnt in the case of the burnt-offering, as well as in that of
the peace-offering. This was all that was required in the case of
the burnt-offering. But for the peace-offering, besides the general
offering of the Minchah of meal, there was also a special accom-
paniment of unleavened pancakes, and cake, with leavened loaves,
one portion of whichh was allotted to the officiating priest, whilst
the remainder was used for the sacrificial meal."
This view I am quite prepared to adopt, except where I have
inserted a note of interrogation. It seems to me probable that
what is stated in vers. 12-14 respecting the praise-offering is also
applicable to the other two kinds of Shelem, viz., that in addition
to the general accompaniment of a meal-offering there was a special

offering of cakes as well, and that the latter had reference simply
to the sacrificial meal. The object of the lawgiver in Lev. vii.
12-20 was to lay down such regulations as the offerer of a peace-
offering had to observe, in relation to that portion of the sacrificial
gift which was assigned to him for the sacrificial meal. Now as
these were not the same in all three kinds of Shelem, on account
of the rapidity with which the flesh would decompose ( 139), it
was necessary that they should be separated. He commences with
the most important and most frequent description, the praise-offer-
ing, referring first of all to the bloodless accompaniment, because
what he has to say upon this point applies to all three Shelamim.
He makes no allusion to the general accompaniment to all the
peace-offerings, viz., the meal Minchah, because none of this was
devoted to the sacrificial meal according to Lev. ii. 2, 3; but after
an Azcarah had been offered upon the altar, all the rest was given
to the priests. Moreover, in the form in which it was offered (viz.,
as meal or dough) it would have been unsuitable to the sacrificial
meal and would first of all have needed to be baked. For this
reason, in the case of the peace-offerings also, along with the meal
Minchah for the altar and the priest, there was a special accompani-
ment of unleavened cakes and leavened bread required for the
sacrificial meal of the offerer. Now if the same rule did not apply
to the two other kinds of Shelamim as to the praise-offering, this
ought to have been pointed out with quite as much distinctness as
it is in relation to the flesh (ver. 16 sqq.).
Hence this special accompaniment of cake and bread, of which
no Azcarah was placed upon the altar, but which had reference
simply to the sacrificial meal, is not to be looked at in the light of
an ordinary meat-offering; nor is it called Minchah, but Corban.
If it had been regarded as a Minchah, then, according to Lev. ii.
11, leavened loaves ought never to have been associated with it.
A cake Corban of this kind, along with the legal Minchah of meal,
is expressly mentioned in Num. vi. 15, 17, in connection with the
peace-offering of the Nazarite. This passage serves in two ways
to confirm our view. In the first place, it is stated in express terms,
that it was not to be offered instead of the usual legal Minchah of
cake, but along with it; and in the second place, it is not a praise-
offering, but most undoubtedly a votive offering that is referred to
here.
From all this it is obvious that the Corban of cake in Lev. vii.
12-14 cannot be identified with the Minchah of cake in Lev. ii.

4-10. The second example adduced by Kliefoth, viz., the offering
of cake already mentioned, which accompanied the Nazarite's sacri-
fice (Num. vi. 15, 17), is still less admissible; for, as we have seen,
it was also not a Minchah at all, and the peace-offering upon which
it was based was not a praise-offering, as Kliefoth supposes, but a
votive offering also.
A third example, adduced by Kliefoth, of the combination of
a Minchah of cake with a bleeding sacrifice is Ex. xxix. (cf. Lev.
viii.), where the dedication or so-called filling sacrifice, offered at
the consecration of Aaron and his sons, is accompanied by a cake
Minchah. That we have at last a real Minchah before us, of which,
according to the directions in Lev. ii., an Azcarah was burned upon
the altar, is apparently proved in the case of the former by ver.
23 sqq., and in that of the latter by ver. 26 sqq., where it is stated
that a portion of each kind of cake was placed upon the altar along
with the fat portions of the filling sacrifice. And yet this is a
mistake. For if the portions placed upon the altar were to be
regarded as an Azcarah, then according to the general rules laid
down in Lev. ii. 10, vi. 14, and vii. 10, the remainder of the pastry
could not have been used at the sacrificial meal by the offerers of
the sacrifice (Aaron and his sons), whereas this actually was the
case in Lev. viii. 3 (Ex. xxix. 32). The offering was not a Min-
chah, but simply a Corban, like the one described in Lev. vii. 12
(cf. 170).
The fourth example adduced by Kliefoth is Lev. vi. 20 sqq.,
where we have an account of the Minchah which the high priest
had to offer on the day of his anointing, or, more correctly ( 178),
the day after his anointing, and twice a day from that time for-
ward. But this example also breaks down. For, even if we could
regard the daily burnt-offering to which it was attached, but which
had its own meal Minchah (Ex. xxix. 40; Num. xxviii. 5 and
was the offering not of the high priest but of the whole nation, as
its actual basis, it by no means corresponded to the rule laid down
in Lev. I with regard to the Minchah of cake. For the whole
of this high-priestly gift was placed upon the altar, and not merely
an Azcarah. Moreover, it was restricted entirely to one of the three
kinds of cake mentioned in Lev. ii., viz., to the second description
( 140), which was baked upon the Machabath and broken in pieces.
156. Taking all together, therefore, we must certainly admit,
that Lev. ii. is by no means exactly co-extensive with the cases in
which meat-offerings could be added to the bleeding sacrifices, and

therefore that the meat-offerings might be offered by themselves;
i.e., without special preparation being made through the atoning
medium of a bleeding sacrifice. Nevertheless, it is still true that
throughout the whole of the Old Testament not a single datum can
be discovered, to prove that such independent offerings were either
customary or frequent. And it is perfectly absurd for Thalhofer
to maintain that there was a complete antithesis between the Min-
chah as an accompaniment and the independent Minchah. The
rule for both is given in Lev. ii. It is true, the meal Minchah
was selected exclusively as the legal accompaniment to the normal
burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. But the material and ritual
of the meal Minchah were precisely the same, whether it was offered
by itself or in connection with a bleeding sacrifice. The fact,
however, that no burnt-offering or thank-offering could be offered
without the accompaniment of a meat-offering and drink-offering,
showed, as Hengstenberg truly observes (Passa, p. 158), that self-
surrender does not consist in merely idle feelings, but must manifest
itself in diligence in good works." And the fact that the Minchah
never occurs as an accompaniment to a sin- or trespass-offering,
may be explained from the design and significance of both of these.
Sin-offerings and trespass-offerings were so exclusively restricted
to the expiation of particular sins, that there could be no allusion
even to the ideal offering of the fruits of righteousness.
As the Minchah of cakes and groats is never met with as the
accompaniment to a bleeding sacrifice, the validity of a sacrificial
offering that was to be presented by itself must be accorded to it.
But whether the meal Minchah, which holds a prominent position
in the sacrificial worship, as a constant accompaniment to all the
burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, could be offered by itself as
well, cannot be either affirmed or denied with certainty. The latter
would be perhaps the more probable conclusion. But so far as
the Minchah of groats is concerned, it is restricted by the epithet
MyriUKBi tHan;mi in Lev. ii. 14 to the first-fruits of the wheat harvest
and is adopted here as the simplest and rudest form of preparation.
With the tywixre NBar;qA in Lev. ii. 12 (cf. Num. xv. 19), which con-
sisted of leavened loaves made of the first-fruits, it had so much in
common, that, like this, it was the freewill-offering of first-fruits
on the part of an individual; but it differed in this respect, that
it was a Minchah in the strict sense of the word, and therefore
an Azcarah of it was placed upon the altar; whereas this was not
allowed in the case of the loaves of first-fruits, which were leavened

like ordinary bread (Lev. ii. 11), and consequently they too are
called, not Minchah, but Corban.
157. In conclusion, we have still to examine Thalhofer's
assertion (p. 113 sqq ), that "of the meal Minchah prescribed by
the law as an accompaniment to the burnt-offering and peace-offer-
ing, not merely an Azcarah, but the whole had to be consumed in
the altar-fire." His proof of this assertion is really a curiosity.
"If we bear in mind," he says, "that the accompaniment was a
thoroughly essential ingredient of the burnt-offering, it is impossible
to see how a portion could be assigned to the priests, seeing that
it was in the very fact of its being entirely burnt that the real
character of a burnt-offering was expressed." He does not fail to
perceive, indeed, that if this kind of argument be applied to the
meal Minchah, when offered as an accompaniment to the Shelamim,
the distinguishing characteristic of which was the eating, the very
opposite conclusion must be drawn; but he helps himself out of the
difficulty by the hopeless subterfuge, that in applying Lev. ii. 3 to
the peace-offerings, the priests "had evidently received too much
of the bloodless gifts in comparison with the small share which
they had of the bleeding sacrifices."
Keil (p. 256) also agrees with Winer (i. 494), that the Minchah
of the burnt-offering, like the burnt-offering itself, was entirely
burned; inasmuch as this is involved in the very idea of a burnt-
offering. But the independent character of the Minchah is to be
firmly maintained, even when it stands as a necessary accompani-
ment to the burnt-offering; it still remains a hHAn;mi and is not
thereby raised to the footing of an hlAfo or lyliKA, and therefore is to
be measured by the standard, not of Lev. i., but of Lev. ii. An
express testimony, however, to the fact that even of the Minchah
of the burnt-offering, as prescribed in Lev. ii., only a handful was
placed upon the altar, is furnished by Lev. ix. 17, on which Thal-
hofer naively remarks: "Lev. ix. 17 cannot possibly be adduced
in opposition to our assertion; for most probably the allusion there
is to an independent Minchah;" and this he supports by an argu-
ment as arbitrary as it is worthless, viz, that "this is indicated
by the Vav with which the clause is introduced,"--an argument, of
which, as Thalhofer himself adds, we need not trouble the reader
with any further explanation.
But there is a statement of Keil's which also requires examina-
tion. At p. 256 he says : "If the rule laid down in Lev. ii. 3
314 THE MINCHAH OF, THE FORE-COURT.
and vi. 14 sqq. applied to all the public burnt-offerings, at the

yearly feast of Tabernacles alone there would fall to the lot of the
priests (during the week's festival) about six Dresden bushels of
white meal, mixed with about 250 Dresden quarts of oil, which had
to be eaten as unleavened bread . . . . But the priests could not
possibly eat such a quantity as this in a week, even if they ate
nothing but unleavened oil-bread." To estimate properly the force
of this argument, we must first of all settle the question, whether
the priests were really obliged, as Keil assumes, to eat that portion
of the Minchah which was assigned to them, according to Lev. ii.,
on the very day on which it was offered. In Lev. ii. itself there
is not a syllable about any such obligation; nor is there in Lev. vi.
This was the case, undoubtedly, according to Lev. vii. 15, with the
flesh of the praise-offering; but there it was expressly commanded,
and the reason, no doubt, was the rapidity with which putrefaction
occurs in hot countries. But this does not at all apply to meal
mixed with oil. Consequently, it was in all probability left to the
option of the priest himself, in what time he could or would eat it
after it had been baked (Lev. vi. 17), the only thing required being,
that he should eat it in a holy place, i.e., in the fore-court (Lev.
vi. 16). If, however, in opposition to this, we should be referred to
Ex. xxix. 34 and Lev. viii. 32, where the (cake) Minchah of the
consecration-offering of the priests is ordered to be eaten by Aaron
and his sons on the self-same day, after burning their Azcarah (Ex.
xxix. 33 sqq.; Lev. viii. 26 sqq.), and whatever is left is directed to
be destroyed on the following day by being burned with (common)
fire; this passage, if it bears upon our question at all, tells directly
against Keil's own view, and gives a totally different solution to the
example which he has adduced.
Lastly, with regard to Thalhofer's opinion, that the burnt-
offering of pigeons, which was offered for the most part by very
poor people only (Lev. xiv. 21 cf. v. 7), always remained without
the accompaniment of a meal Minchah; this is a perfectly arbitrary
and groundless assertion. For we have a proof of the very opposite
in Lev. xiv. 21, 31, where a leper who has been cured is directed,
in case of poverty, to present a burnt-offering of pigeons along with
a meat-offering, instead of the lamb usually required.
THE MINCHAH OF THE HOLY PLACE. 315
CHAPTER III.
THE MINCHAH OF THE HOLY PLACE.
158. We must here refer to the results obtained in 12-14,

and expand those results by an inquiry into the signification of the E .d
gifts offered in the Holy Place.
If we compare the ritual of the Holy Place with that of the
fore-court, we find first of all, that the independent bleeding sacri-
fice was entirely wanting in the case of the former (Ex. xxx. 9),
and confined exclusively to the latter. It is true the most important
part, viz., the atoning blood, was taken into the Holy Place when-
ever expiation was made for the priests or the ideally priestly
nation, and there the atoning act was completed upon the horns of
the altar of incense ( 107). But even in these cases what gave
to the blood of the sacrifice its validity as atoning blood, viz., the
imposition of hands and slaughtering of the animal, belonged ex-
elusively to the fore-court. The Holy Place represented that stage
in the history of salvation, in which the great fact of vicarious
suffering for the sins of the world lies in the past, and all that is
needed is the personal appropriation of the atoning virtue of the
blood that has been shed.--If we turn next to the gifts themselves,
that were offered in the Holy Place, they were the same as those
presented upon the altar of the fore-court, viz., bread, wine, oil,
incense, and salt; but the form in which they were presented was
modified in various ways, and the offering of flesh, which was the
main thing in the gifts of the fore-court, altogether failed. The
latter, as we have already seen, represented the self-surrender of the
person as a person to be sanctified; the former, the surrender of the
fruits of his sanctification, of the results of the sanctified work of
his life and calling ( 24, 141). Now, in the fact that only the
latter was exhibited in the Holy Place and not the former, the idea
was expressed, that the Holy Place represented that standpoint in
the development of the history of salvation, in which personal self-
surrender no longer needs to be expressly exhibited (because its
complete and continuous accomplishment is the self-evident assump-
tion of such a standpoint), and the fruits and results of the life's
work alone need to attest their living and active existence.
Again, the bloodless offerings of the fore-court, meal (bread),
316 E MINCHAH OF THE HOLY PLACE.
oil, and incense, appear continually intermingled, and are completed

in the same act and on the same holy altar; whereas those of the
Holy Place are divided into meat-offerings, incense-offerings, and
light-offerings. The bread and the wine were placed upon the
table; and if the accompaniment of oil and incense was not wanting
in the case of this bread, yet oil and incense, by being offered sepa-
rately--the incense upon the altar of incense, and the oil upon the
candlestick--were raised from the subordinate position of a mere
accompaniment into that of an independent offering: they were no
longer merely means to an end which lay beyond them, but an end
in themselves. That is to say, even now the works of sanctification
to be offered require the co-operation of the Spirit of God, perpe-
tuity through the salt of the covenant of God, and presentation in
connection with prayer. But by the side of this the incense was
also constantly burning by itself upon the altar of incense, and bore
witness to the fact, that the lives and actions of the saints of God
are a continual prayer, a praying without ceasing, and a praying
which needs no special stimulus, but which, being the breathing of
the spirit, is as natural, necessary, and indispensable a vital process,
as the breathing of the lungs is to the life of the body. Upon the
candlestick there burned, the whole night through, the oil of the
Spirit of God which dwelt in the congregation, bearing witness to
the word of the Lord: Ye are the light of the world.
By this separation of the gifts, as Kliefoth observes, it was
possible to give a fuller expansion to the forms of presentation.
And the different elements were fuller, richer, and more developed.
Instead of the meal Minchah, which was the most common in the
fore-court, we find the cake Minchah, which was more perfect both
inform (tlo.Ha) and mode of preparation (rUn.ta hpexEma). The incense
too was no longer the simple and ordinary kind, but compounded
with other and still more delicate perfumes. And the oil for the
lamps was the finest and purest olive oil that could possibly be ob-
tained (Lev. xxiv. 2 ; Ex. xxvii. 20).
On the altar of burnt-offering only an Azcarah of the gift was
offered up; but the whole of the gift was invariably placed upon
the altar, table, and candlestick, in the Holy Place. Upon the
former a gift was offered up from time to time; but upon the table
in the Holy Place the bread was always lying, whilst the incense
emitted its fragrance upon its altar from morning to evening, and
the light burned upon the candlestick the whole night through.
Bread and wine, which were offered in the fore-court as food for
Jehovah, needed to be purified by the fire of the altar before they

could become "a sweet-smelling savour to the Lord;" but the
loaves laid before Jehovah upon the table in the Holy Place, needed
no such purification. It is true the accompaniment of perfume and
the incense of the altar needed to be burned, as well as the oil of
the candlestick: the burning in this case, however, did not denote
purification, but was the only way by which the incense could be
made to give out its fragrance and the oil its light. For it was not
the incense itself in its concentrated form which was the symbol of
prayer, but its perfume ascending to heaven and it is not the
mere possession of the Spirit of God which makes the congregation
of saints the light of the world, but the fact that the Spirit shines
through them.
159. We will now examine one by one the offerings of the
Holy Place; and first of all let us look at that which stood nearest
to the Minchah of the fore-court, viz., the face-loaves, or, as the
Hebrew name is rendered by Luther and others, the SHEW-BREAD
(LXX. a@rtoi proqe<sewj, Vulg. panes propositionis). How this
striking name arose, and what it signifies, we may learn from Ex.
xxv. 30, where the shew-bread is mentioned for the first time.
The command is given there, Thou shalt lay upon the table face-
bread before My face continually. MyniPA MH,l,, therefore, is an ab-
breviation for hOAhy; ynep;li rw,xE MH,l,: they were loaves that were laid
before the face of God (i.e., before the Capporeth as the throne
of God in the Holy of Holies), that God might see them and re-
joice in them. Bahr's interpretation of the name, viz., that it de-
noted that bread " by which God was seen, i.e., with the eating of
which the sight of God was associated, or through the eating of
which a sight of God was obtained," is as unfounded and un-
scriptural as it possibly can be. There is no necessity to prove
this here, though Stockl has lately adopted this misinterpretation,
and on the strength of it describes the shew-bread as "a splendid
type of the N. T. Eucharist." It is sufficient to refer to Lev. xxiv.
8: "Every Sabbath he shall set it (the bread) before Jehovah con-
tinually, on the part of the children of Israel, an everlasting cove-
nant." The later name tk,r,fEm.aha MH,L, (Neh. x. 33), or tk,r,fEm.aha alone
(2 Chron. ii. 4), points back to the directions in Lev. xxiv. 6, that
the loaves were to be placed in two rows or piles upon the
table in the Holy Place.
The number of loaves to be renewed every Sabbath corre-
sponded to the number of tribes of Israel (Lev. xxiv. 5). They
318 THE MINCHAH OF THE HOLY PLACE.
were called tOl.Ha on account of their shape ( 140). For each

loaf two-tenths of an ephah of white meal was used. It is not
expressly stated anywhere that leaven and honey were to be avoided,
and oil and salt to be employed instead; but according to Lev. ii.
this is to be understood as a matter of course. Whether the loaves
were to be placed in two rows side by side, or in two piles one upon
another, cannot be determined with certainty, on account of the
fluctuating meaning of tk,r,fEma. The dimensions of the surface of
the table (two cubits long by one broad) render the latter the more
probable of the two. And the instructions in Lev. xxiv. 7, that
the incense to be added was to be laid tk,r,fEm.aha-lfa also confirm
this. After the loaves had been laid upon the table from Sabbath
to Sabbath, they were taken away and fresh ones substituted.
Those which were removed were assigned to the priests, who were
required to eat them in a holy place, as being the most holy of the
fire-offerings of Jehovah (ver. 9). This epithet might appear
surprising, as none of the loaves were placed in the altar-fire; but
the explanation is to be found in the fact that their accompaniment
of incense was actually burned (probably upon the altar of burnt-
offering after the removal of the loaves, and before they were
eaten), and was called their Azcarah in consequence (ver. 7). This
places them in the same category as the remainder of the ordinary
meat-offering which was left over after the burning of the Azcarah
( 149).
A libation of wine in connection with them is not mentioned in
any of the passages which treat professedly of the arrangement of
the shew-bread (Ex. xxv. 30; Lev. xxiv. 5 sqq.; Num. iv. 7); but
it must certainly be taken for granted, on account of the frequent
allusion to the bowls and cans belonging to the table of shew-
bread (cf. Ex. xxv. 29, xxxvii.16 ; Num. iv. 7).
160. With regard to the offerings of OIL or LIGHT, direc-
tions are given in Ex. xxvii. 20, 21, xxx. 7, and Lev. xxiv. 3, 4,
that the high priest is to clean the lamps in the Holy Place every
morning, and fill them with the finest oil of pressed olives, and to
light them in the evening, that they may burn the whole night.
We have already shown at 144, that the oil which imparted its
bright and lasting luminous properties to the burning wicks of the
seven-armed candlestick in the Holy Place, like the oil which was
mixed with the meat-offerings of the fore-court, may be regarded,
or rather, according to the laws of symbolism, must be regarded,
as anointing oil, and consequently as the symbol of the Spirit of
God. Kliefoth, it is true, as we pointed out there, has entered his

protest against this view, but without convincing us of the incor-
rectness of our view or the correctness of his own. In this, how-
ever, we agree with him, that the juxtaposition of the twelve
loaves of skew-bread and the seven burning lamps represented the
active life of believers on the one hand, and their intellectual life
on the other. This explanation, we are prepared to maintain with
him, is sufficiently attested by such passages as Matt. v. 14-16,
Luke xii. 35 ; Phil. ii. 15; Zech. iv.; and Rev. i. 12, 20. But
the grounds upon which he defends this interpretation we must
pronounce decidedly erroneous. For instance, he maintains that
the oil had a double signification: that whilst as the anointing
material it was undoubtedly a symbol of the Spirit of God, as
burning or illuminating material it denoted that element in man
which, being kindled by the holy fire of God, gives forth the light
of divine truth and knowledge. But, in the first place, every
symbol must receive, as far as possible, one uniform interpretation.
Secondly, it was not the oil in the lamp that was lighted, but the
wick, which burned brightly and permanently however, only be-
cause and so far as it was supplied with oil; consequently the wick
and not the oil would represent that part of human nature which,
being inflamed by the holy fire, enlightens the darkness of the
world. But the wick would give only a dull light, and be very
quickly extinguished, if it were not fed or anointed with oil; and
so the power of human thought and knowledge, even though
enkindled with sacred fire, would never be able to enlighten the
darkness of this world, if it were not anointed and fed with the
oil of the Spirit of God. And thirdly, the passages adduced by
Kliefoth himself do not sustain his interpretation.
He refers to Zech. iv. 12 and Rev. xi. 4; and we quite agree
with him that the sons of oil mentioned there are the prophets; but
the oil which they conduct to the Church of God, to render the
wick in its candlestick burning and luminous, is not a human
attribute of their own, but a divine attribute, which even the
prophets did not derive from themselves but received from God
that they might convey it to the Church. So again, the oil referred
to in Matt. xxv. 1 sqq., which fails the foolish virgins at the end,
and the want of which excludes them from participating in the
marriage supper, because they know not how to supply it, cannot
signify their own mental power--for in that case their difficulty as
to the source of supply could not have been very great,--but must
320 THE MINCHAH OF THE HOLY PLACE.
denote the Spirit of God, which, if despised and rejected in the

day of grace, will not be found in the day of need. Bahr's inter-
pretation, according to which the light burning in the Holy Place
was a light proceeding from God and diffused by God, which
served to enlighten the Church of God, falls to the ground with his
similar and equally erroneous interpretation of the shew-bread and
incense ( 146),--a fall from which Stockl's support will hardly
protect it.
161. With regard, lastly, to the INCENSE-OFFERING, we have
little more to do than to refer to 146 and 158. In the place of the
simple incense of the fore-court, a fragrant material, composed of
four separate ingredients (including frankincense), is described in
Ex. xxx. 34-38 as being used in the Holy Place; and the high
priest was to renew and kindle it every morning and evening (Ex.
xxx. 7, 8). At a later period this task might be performed by an
ordinary priest (Luke i. 9, cf. Ex. xxx. 20). On the different in-
gredients of which this incense was composed, see Keil, pp. 90, 91.
On a former occasion I gave it as my opinion, that the four in-
gredients represented the four component elements of perfect prayer
raise, thanksgiving, supplication, and intercession); but Keil has
very properly observed (p. 107), that the fact of the anointing oil
being similarly composed of four ingredients (Ex. xxx. 32 sqq.) is
at variance with this, and forces us to regard the quadruple num-
ber of ingredients as being in both cases the stamp of the kingdom
of God.
Stuckl (p. 303) separates himself entirely from, the sententia
communis of Protestant symbolism, just as in other cases he is
fond of speaking with the most innocent naivete of the isolated
standpoint of Bahr, the only Protestant whose work he has read
upon the subject ( 127, note). He cannot help admitting, how-
ever, that according to the clear statements of the Scriptures them-
selves, the incense was a symbol, not of the breath of God, but of
the prayers of saints. But in so doing lie runs against the words
of Matt. ix. 16: Nemo autem immittit commissuram panni rudis in
vestimentum vetus, tollit enim plenitudinem ejus a vestimento, et pejor
scissura fit. For nothing is more certain than that the offerings of
the Holy Place must be regarded either as all three gifts proceed-
ing from God to the holy nation, which is Bahr's view, or as all
three offerings presented by the holy nation to Jehovah. At all
events, this is demanded by a Protestant " hermeneutics, and is
really a sententia communis of Protestant symbolism.
The three offerings in the Holy Place, therefore, were the

characteristic distinctions of that stage in the development of the
priestly nation, which was represented by this division of the
tabernacle, as a nation of uninterrupted prayer, of world-enlight-
ening knowledge, and of successful work in the duties of, its voca-
tion.
BOOK IV.
MODIFICATION OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP IN CONNEC-

TION WITH SPECIAL SEASONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.
CHAPTER 1.
THE CONSECRATION OF THE PEOPLE, THE PRIESTS, AND THE
LEVITES.
A. COVENANT CONSECRATION OF THE PEOPLE.
162. The covenant consecration of the people at Sinai (Ex.

xxiv.) took place after the solemn promulgation of the funda-
mental law, but before the erection of the sanctuary, and even
before the publication of the law of sacrifice. After the people had
unanimously declared their willingness to accept the duties and
privileges of the covenant as expounded to them by Moses, and to
regulate their conduct by them, Moses built an altar, which repre-
sented the striving of the people upwards, and the stooping of the
gracious presence of God downwards. He then erected twelve
pillars (probably round about the altar) as symbols of the nation.
In this way was the fundamental idea of the future place of wor-
ship, viz., the gracious presence of God in the midst of the twelve
tribes of Israel, first exhibited. Moses then sent some young men
of the children of Israel to offer young oxen as burnt-offerings
and peace-offerings; and taking one half of the blood, he sprinkled
it upon the altar. After this he read the book of the covenant
(Ex. xx.-xxiii.) to the people. When the people had repeated
the promise, that they would live and act according to its precepts,
he took the other half and sprinkled it upon them, saying, "This
is the blood of the covenant which Jehovah concluded with you."
Moses and Aaron then ascended the holy mountain, with Nadab
and Abihu, Aaron's eldest sons, and seventy of the elders of Israel;
CONSECRATION OF THE PEOPLE, PRIESTS, AND LEVITES. 323
and when they had seen Jehovah, they partook of the sacrificial
meal (Ex. xxiv. 1-11).
The question arises here, What was the position of the young
men who offered the sacrifice? I have already given the following
repl: The young men represented the sacrificing nation in the
period of its youth, as a nation that had all the eagerness of youth
to enter upon its course (Hist. of O. C., vol. ii. p. 143). Keil gave
his full adhesion to this in his Arch. i. 261, but he has withdrawn
it again in his commentary, on the strength of the objection adduced
by Oehler, that it could not be the nation which offered a sacrifice
here on its own account, for the fellowship with God, which would
enable it to approach God in sacrifice, had yet to be established."
But this is incorrect, for the people had certainly been allowed to
approach God in sacrifice before this. Abel, Noah, and Abraham
had all done so, and even the Israelites themselves at the offering
of the paschal lamb in Egypt. Moreover, Oehler continues,
according to vers. 1 and 9, the nation already possessed its repre-
sentatives in the seventy elders, and Moses alone officiated as priest;
so that the young men must have officiated simply as the servants
of Moses, that is to say, in the same manner in which the Levites
assisted the priests afterwards. But it is not stated anywhere that
the severity elders took part in the actual duties of sacrificing;
whereas in ver. 5 it is distinctly affirmed that the young men were
to offer and slay the sacrifices. Now that was not the work of a
servant, but an essential and independent function. Again, we
never find the work performed or the help afforded by the Levites
described as a tlofo hlAf<h, or MymilAw; MyHibAz; HbazA as is the case in ver. 5
nor could it be so described. In the terminology of the Mosaic
ritual the expression hlAfo hlAfEh, is applied exclusively to the person
sacrificing (e.g., Lev. xvii. 8) or to the officiating priest (Lev. xiv.
20); and if the same expression is applied here to the young men
before the issuing of the sacrificial law, it can only be in the same
sense as in Gen. viii. 20, xxii. 2, 13. The young men undoubtedly
appear as the sacrificers, and that in the old way, in which offerer
and priest were united in the same person; but the old arrange-
ment passes over into the new, inasmuch as the young men do not
carry out the act of sacrificing any further than the point of slaying
the animals, and then Moses steps in and performs the rest (viz.,
the manipulations with the blood) entirely by himself, the people
and their representatives assuming only a passive and receptive
attitude. In this there was a practical declaration of the fact that
324 CONSECRATION OF THE PEOPLE, PRIESTS, AND LEVITES.
henceforth, according to the new order of things, every sacrificial

transaction would require a specifically priestly mediation. The
seventy elders, on the other hand, represented the old Israel, which
was now born again into a new, young Israel, and therefore was
represented by young men as well.
163. It is still further striking, that no mention is made of a
sin-offering in connection with this sacrificial transaction. If the
period referred to were later instead of earlier than the promulga-
tion of the law of sacrifice, we should necessarily expect to find the
way prepared by a sin-offering, as was the case in all the festal and
solemn sacrifices offered afterwards. Hence the absence of any
sin-offering in this case furnishes conclusive evidence, that this kind
of sacrifice was introduced for the first time by the sacrificial, law,
--a sufficient reason for its never being mentioned before ( 87).
The significance specially assigned to the sin-offering afterwards,
must be sought for here in the sprinkling of blood in connection
with the two other kinds of sacrifice. On the other hand, the
peace-offering was already introduced in association with the burnt-
offering, and it was necessary that both kinds should be offered
together on this occasion, since the peculiar feature in the burnt-
offering, viz., the burning of the whole, which was expressive of
complete self-surrender, as well as the sacrificial meal, which was
restricted entirely to the peace-offering, needed to be exhibited as
an attestation of fellowship with God.
Now, since the sacrifice consisted not of one kind only, but of
two kinds, viz., of burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, another
question arises, namely, whether the blood used in the way described
was the blood of the burnt-offering or of the peace-offering, or of
both; and if the last, whether the two were mixed together, or each
was taken by itself as "blood of the covenant." As the text (vers.
6-8) speaks only of blood generally, we are not warranted in restrict-
ing the proceedings described to the peace-offerings alone. But the
other question, whether they were used separately or mixed together,
must remain unanswered. And since the distinguishing feature in
the two sacrifices is to be sought for, not in any similarity in the ap-
plication of the blood, but in the different ways in which the flesh was
disposed of, the answer to the question is of no essential importance.
The number of bullocks to be offered is not stated either for the
burnt-offerings or the peace-offerings. They are simply spoken of
in the plural number. As a very considerable quantity of blood
would thus be obtained, the sprinkling of the people can hardly
COVENANT CONSECRATION OF THE PEOPLE. 325
have been limited to their representatives, whether the young men

who offered the sacrifices in their stead, or the seventy elders. It
is more natural to suppose that Moses passed between the ranks of
the assembled nation, and sprinkled the people themselves (though
not of necessity every individual).
164. The sprinkling of the altar with the blood of the sacrifice
had for its object, here as everywhere else, the expiation of the
offerer, i.e., of the nation at large, and thus laid the foundation for
the conclusion of the covenant. That such a foundation was needed,
is apparent at once. Only a short time before, the people had said,
"Speak thou with us, and we will hear; but let not God speak
with us, lest we die " (Ex. xx. 19). Sinful man cannot draw near
to God, still less make a covenant with Him, without bringing to
light the real character of his sin, as deserving death and a curse,
and evoking the wrath and punishment of God. That which
separates him from God, and renders any approach to God the
cause of death and destruction, viz., sin, must first of all be rendered
harmless and powerless. And this was accomplished through the
medium of the hrAPAKa or sacrificial atonement.
But whereas in other cases the whole of the blood of the burnt-
and peace-offerings was placed upon the altar, in this case only half
of it was so applied, and the people themselves were sprinkled with
the other half. Hofmann is right in disputing the expiatory cha-
racter of this second sprinkling. This was done, he says, not
to make atonement for the people, for atonement had already been
made by the pouring out of the blood upon the altar, but to con-
secrate them. The same life that had been offered as a mediation,
and by the surrender of which expiation had been made for them,
was now used to qualify them for the relation of fellowship with
God, to consecrate the expiated nation into a sanctuary; and for
this reason the blood sprinkled upon the congregation was not called
the blood of atonement, but the blood of the covenant. Otherwise,
what need could there be for this unusual transaction?
The division of the blood into two equal portions does not relate
to the fact that there were two parties to the covenant, Jehovah on
the one hand, and the people on the other. Still less has it anything
in common with the heathen custom of mixing the blood of two
contracting parties together, as a symbolical representation of the
idea that henceforth their lives and labours were one. On the con-
trary, it was one blood which was sprinkled half upon the altar, as
the place where Jehovah appeared (Ex. xx. 24), and half upon the
people, with whom Jehovah was about to conclude a covenant.

And when one half was put upon the altar, it was placed in relation
not only to Jehovah, as a protection against His judicial wrath,
but also to the nation, whose sin it was to cover or expiate there.
And when the other half was sprinkled upon the people, not only
was it thereby brought into connection with the people, but as it
was taken from the very same blood, of which one half had been
placed upon the altar, and as the same indivisible soul dwelt in the
one half as much as in the other, the same relation to Jehovah
which was established by the former half was equally valid and
close in the case of the latter also. The same blood, i.e., the same
soul, which had expiated the sin of the nation upon the altar, was
now to consecrate and unite the nation into covenant fellowship
with God by the divine power which it had there acquired. If
it had been intended, or possible, that the idea here referred to
should be fully set forth, the whole of the blood ought first of all
to have been placed upon the altar, and then, after it had been in-
vested with saving power, and the gracious presence of God had
been imparted to it upon the altar, it should have been taken away
again and sprinkled upon the people. The correctness of this view
is supported by the analogy which we find in the consecration of
the priests, when, according to Ex. xxix. 21 and Lev. viii. 30, the
blood was first poured out upon the altar, and after that as much as
was necessary was taken off the altar again and applied to the
sprinkling of Aaron and his sons ( 171). But as this could not be
done in the case before us, where so large a quantity of blood was
required for the sprinkling of the people, in order to approximate as
closely as possible to a full exhibition of the idea, one half of the
blood was kept back, and with that the people were sprinkled; for
notwithstanding the division, the half of the blood contained within
it, whole and undivided, the very same soul which had acquired the
divine powers of the altar in the other half.1
1
The allusion to the sprinkling of the blood in Heb. ix. 19-21 deviates in
several by no means unimportant points from the account given in Ex. xxiv.
For (1) it speaks of Moses as using the blood tw?n mo<sxwn kai> tra<gwn,
whereas the Pentateuch only mentions tw?n mo<swn (i.e., young oxen), and says
nothing about tw?n tra<gwn, which are introduced in the Mosaic law as
specifically sin-offerings. (2) Along with the sacrificial blood employed in the
sprinkling, it mentions water, coccus-wool, and hyssop, as used for the same
purpose. (3) It describes not only the whole nation, but the book of the covenant,
and even the tabernacle and all the furniture of the priesthood, as having been
sprinkled; whereas the latter were not yet in existence.
COVENANT' CONSECRATION OF THE PEOPLE. 327
After the covenant of God with Israel had thus been concluded, negatively
by expiation, and positively by the consecration of the people, the confirmation of
the newly-established covenant fellowship followed in the sacrificial meal. It is, of
course, very obvious that the whole nation could not be invited to this, but only a
selection or representation; and it is perfectly intelligible that the representatives
should have been chosen from the elders of Israel. But when the number is fixed at
70, not only is the symbolical value of this number (70 = 7 X 10) to be regarded as
the reason, but its historical significance also, as seen in Gen. xlvi. 27. No
explanation need be given of the fact that Moses took part in the meal; and the
addition of the two eldest sons of Aaron had reference, no doubt,
But the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews cannot possibly be accused of
any such anachronism as the statement last mentioned would contain, if it could
be regarded as coinciding in point of time with the covenant consecration of the
people. We are entitled, or rather compelled, to assume that he has disregarded
the precise order of time, and introduced a fact which occurred at a later period,
because it was subservient to the same idea and helped to exhibit it fully from
every point of view. And if we are shut up to this conclusion by an otherwise
unexampled and inconceivable anachronism, which could only have sprung from
the most incredible ignorance on the part of the author, we are also warranted
in disposing of the other discrepancies between the passage in question and Ex.
xxiv. in precisely the same way.
The idea which the writer wanted to carry out and confirm in vers. 19-21
is clearly expressed in ver. 18, viz., that the old covenant could not be conse-
crated without blood. This consecration, however, was not completed and
exhausted in the covenant consecration of the people (Ex. xxiv.); but that of the
priests and Levites (Lev. viii. and Num. ix.), the former of which embraced the
consecration of the sanctuary and its furniture, needed to be included. And
this, it appears to me, is what the writer has done. But such a summary mode
of putting the whole together necessarily involved certain incongruities, which
could not fail to appear whenever the attempt should be made to separate the
different points and arrange them in chronological order.
These three acts of consecration (of the people, of the priests with the sane-
tuary, and of the Levites) appear to me to be quite sufficient to sustain every
particular mentioned by the author, with the sole exception of the sprinkling of
the book of the covenant, which is not mentioned anywhere in the Pentateuch,
and which the author therefore can only have derived from tradition; so that
there is no necessity to bring in the ritual of the great day of atonement, which
had nothing to do with the inaugural consecration, that was only once per-
formed. From the covenant consecration of the people the author obtained the
sprinkling of the whole nation (Ex. xxiv. 8); from the consecration of the priests,
the sprinkling of the tabernacle and its furniture (Lev. viii. 10, 11, cf. Ex. xl.
9-11); and from that of the Levites, the sprinkling with water, coccus-wool, and,
hyssop (Num. viii. 7). It is true that in Num. viii. 7 we read of a sprinkling
with water of purifying, txF.AHa yme, but no reference is made to coccus-wool and
as Keil observes in his Commentary, i. 490, to their future election

to the priesthood.
B. CONSECRATION OF THE PRIESTS AND SANCTUARY.
165. The command to consecrate the priests is contained in
Ex. xxix. 1-37; but the consecration was not to be carried out till
after the building and furnishing of the sanctuary had been com-
pleted, and the law of sacrifice had been proclaimed. After the
former had taken place, the consecration of the sanctuary was also
commanded in Ex. xl. 9-15; and after the promulgation of the
law, the double consecration (that of the priests themselves, and
that of the place and instruments of their official duties) was
effected, in the manner described in Lev. viii. 1-36.
The consecration of the priests consisted of two parts, each
comprising three distinct actions. The first embraced the washing,
clothing, and anointing of the persons to be initiated. The second
was a triple sacrificial action,-the sacrifice of a sin-offering, a
burnt-offering and a peace-offering; the last of which was desig-
hyssop. This difference, however, is quite irrelevant. Either the author had
in his mind, as Delitzsch supposes, a rod of hyssop, which was bound round
with coccus-wool and served as a sprinkling brush, such as we find used
on other occasions for the purpose of sprinkling water (Lev. xiv. 6, 7; Num.
xix. 18); or he was thinking (according to the analogy of Num. xix. 6, cf.
221) of hyssop and coccus-wool as medicinal ingredients mixed with the
water, by which it was made into txFA.Ha yme, through the virtue of the one as a
medium of purification, and that of the other (i.e., the wool soaked in coccus
juice) as a healing medicine. In either case, this account is to be regarded as a
fuller expansion of the brief description contained in the Pentateuch, for which
the writer might refer to legal analogies, and probably also to traditional data.
The diversity certainly is a more serious one, when we find the author of the
Epistle to the Hebrews referring expressly to the sprinkling of the sanctuary and
its furniture with blood, whereas the account in the Pentateuch only mentions a
sprinkling with oil (Lev. viii. 10, 11; Ex. A 9-11), and it is merely the priests'
clothes that are represented as being sprinkled with blood and oil (Lev. viii. 30).
But the supposition that the writer has supplemented the statement in the Penta-
teuch with traditional data, is rendered probable by the fact that Josephus (Ant.
3, 8, 6) perfectly agrees with him, and refers not merely to the priests and their
clothes, but also to th<n te skhnh>n kai> peri> au]th>n skeu<h as being sprinkled
with oil and sacrificial blood during the seven days of priestly consecration.Lastly,
so far as the goats connected with the bullocks are concerned, I am inclined to
assume with Delitzsch, p. 417, that "bulls and goats were a standing expression
with the author to denote all the bleeding sacrifices, just as dw?ra< te kai> qusi<ai
embrace the offerings of every description." But if this does not suffice, I still
regard it as more suitable to refer to the goat in Lev. ix. 3 than to that in Lev. xvi.
15.
CONSECRATION OF THE PRIESTS AND SANCTUARY. 329
hated as the true consecration-sacrifice. Keil is wrong, however,

in drawing this distinction between the two; viz., that the former
represented the qualification of the priests for the priestly office,
the latter their installation in its dignity and privileges. For, on
the one hand, washing a investiture had nothing to do with
qualification for the priestly office; but, on the contrary, the inves-
titure,as is expressly declared in Ex. xxix. 9, represented their
installation in the dignity and privileges of the priesthood. It was
the anointing alone, which had to do with their qualification. And
on the other hand, the sin-offerings and burnt-offerings themselves
had nothing to do with their inauguration, but only the peace-
offering associated with them.
The true explanation is rather this: both installation and qualifi-
cation were represented in the first act, the former by the investiture,
the latter by the anointing, whilst a clear ground for both was pre-
pared by the washing; and the second act represented the same ideas,
but through the medium of the sacrificial worship, the sin-offering
setting forth the wiping away of sin, the burnt-offering the complete
surrender of the entire person, though without any special regard
to the specifically priestly service, whilst the peace- or consecration-
offering expressed this appointment in the most decided manner.
166. At the commencement of the ceremony Moses took
Aaron and his sons to the door of the tabernacle, where they were
subjected to a washing, most probably of the whole body. This
removal of bodily uncleanness was a symbol of spiritual purifica-
tion, without which no one could approach God, least of all one
who performed the duties of atonement (0ehler, 178). The
investiture of Aaron with the clothing prepared for him followed
next; this was equivalent to an investiture with the office itself,
the official dress being a visible expression of the official character.
Moses then took the anointing oil, which was composed, according
to Ex. xxx. 23 sqq., of four strongly smelling spices (myrrh, cinna-
mon,. calamus, and cassia) mixed with olive oil, and anointed first
of all the dwelling-place and its furniture, then (by sprinkling seven
tames) the altar of the fore-court, and all the rest of the 'utensils
belonging to it, and last of all Aaron the high priest, pouring the
oil upon his head. He then proceeded to the investiture of Aaron's
son; but no mention is made of their being anointed, either in
Lev., viii. 13 or Ex. xxix. 8.1
1
We must conclude, therefore, that Aaron alone was anointed, and not his
sons, at the time of the investiture; and we are confirmed in this opinion by
On the signification of the anointing oil, see 144. The oil

was a symbolical representation of the Spirit of God, with its enlivening,
refreshing, healing, and enlightening power. Hence the anointing with oil
indicated the communication of this Spirit, for the purpose of qualifying the
person anointed for the office upon which he was about to enter (1 Sam. x. 1 xvi.
13). The four fragrant, spicy substances which were mixed with the oil, served to
connect with the enlivening properties of the oil a capacity for diffusing fragrance
also, and to heighten its quickening influence, by their power of arousing the vital
energy. That there should be exactly four of these substances was not a mere
accident; for four was the sign of the kingdom of God. The oil was applied to the
head of the high priest, because the head is the true centre of spiri-
the fact that the high priest is frequently designated the "anointed priest,"
Haywim.Aha NheKoha, in distinction from the common priests (e.g., Lev. iv. 3, 5, 16, xvi.
32). But this seems to be at variance with Ex. xxviii. 41, xxx. 30; Lev. vii
35, 36, x. 7, where anointing is expressly ascribed to the common priests;
whilst in Ex. xl. 15 Moses is commanded to anoint the sons of Aaron, as he
had anointed their father. For this reason Keil, Oehler, and others are of
opinion, that not only Aaron, but his sons also, were anointed at the time of the
investiture, and that it is merely by accident that this is not mentioned in Ex.
xxix. and Lev. viii. And since it is most decidedly assumed in Lev. xxi. 10, 12,
that the high priest alone was anointed on the head and not the subordinate
priests, the writers referred to are inclined to adopt the rabbinical notion, that
whereas the oil was poured upon Aaron's head, it was only smeared upon the
foreheads of his sons. But this solution is decidedly inadmissible. It is hardly
conceivable, that if an anointing of the inferior priests was ordered to take
place, and actually did take place, at this time, it could have been passed by
without notice both in Ex. xxix. 8 and Lev. viii. 13; and this is perfectly in-
conceivable, if the anointing was to be carried out, and really was carried out,
in a totally different manner from the anointing of the high priest. Moreover,
justice is by no means done in this way to Ex. xl. 15; for the smearing of the
forehead with oil is an essentially different kind of anointing from the pouring
of oil upon the head. We must seek for a solution, therefore, which admits, on
the one hand, that the high priest alone was anointed at the time of the inves-
titure and not the inferior priests, and thus explains the fact that the former
alone was called the "anointed priest;" but which, on the other hand, holds
firmly to the opinion that the inferior priests were anointed as well, and that in
the same way as the high priest. And such a solution we may obtain by com-
paring Lev. viii. 10-13 with ver. 30 (or Ex. xxix. 7, 8 with ver. 21). The
anointing of the head was anointing kat ] e]coxh<n and this was performed upon
the high priest alone; hence he was also called the anointed priest kat ] e]coxh<n.
But the sprinkling of the person and clothes with oil was an inferior kind of
anointing; and according to Lev. viii. 30 and Ex. xxix. 21, this was performed
upon the high priest and the inferior priests as well.
tual life, and as such the noblest part of the body. And the oil
was poured, not merely smeared or sprinkled, upon his head, to
show that, for the discharge of the duties of his office, he needed,
and would receive, the Spirit of God in richest fulness.
167. The priestly functions connected with the sacrifice that
followed, were naturally performed not by those who were just
about to be consecrated to the priestly office, but by Moses, the
mediator of the covenant. The former were rather the offerers of
the sacrifice. As the sacrificial law had already been promulgated,
its principles were no doubt adhered to in the proceedings on this
occasion, which were peculiarly and singularly modified, only so far
as this was required by the peculiarity and singularity of the object
contemplated. Consequently, in this, as in all solemn sacrificial
occasions, the first thing done was to present a sin-offering. "Not
only the great importance of the occasion, but the position occupied
by the priests in the theocracy, as the e]klogh< of the covenant-nation,
which had been chosen as a kingdom of priests, required that the
highest kind of sacrificial animal, viz., an ox, should be chosen for
the sacrifice" (Keil, 1, 262). And the fact that the blood of this
sin-offering was not taken into the Holy Place, as was the case with
other sin-offerings of either the high priest or the whole priesthood,
but was merely smeared upon the horns of the altar of burnt-offer-
ing, as in the case of a prince or private individual, may be explained
on the ground, that the offerers of the sacrifice were not yet in
actual possession of the priesthood, but were just about to be initi-
ated. It does seem indeed to be at variance with this, that after
separating the portions of fat to be burned upon the altar, the rest
of the flesh was not given up to the officiating priest (i.e., to Moses),
as on other occasions to be eaten by him in a holy place, but as in
the case of the priestly sin-offerings, whose blood was taken into
the Holy Place, was burned outside the camp ( 113 sqq.). Hof-
mann alone, it seems to me, has solved this problem satisfactorily.
"As Moses was not a priest," he says, "but only consecrated the
priest, he did not eat the flesh of the sin-offering, as the priest did
afterwards, when he had offered a sin-offering for others. But on
this occasion the flesh was burnt; for it was the attitude of the
priest towards the nation which afterwards led to his eating the
flesh of the sin-offering."
It is a mistaken view, therefore, on the part of Keil, when he
maintains, that "this sin-offering became a consecration-offering,
chiefly through the fact that the blood was not taken into the Holy
Place, as in the case of other sin-offerings of the same kind, but

was merely placed upon the altar of burnt-offering, to purify,
sanctify, and make reconciliation for it, as is distinctly stated in
Lev. viii. 15" (i. 263). For the sin-offering presented here neither
was nor became a consecration-offering; least of all did it become a
consecration-offering through the fact that the blood was not taken
into the Holy Place. Of the other fact, that the burning of the
flesh was a complete deviation from the ordinary practice, not the
slightest explanation is attempted. The true consecration-offering
was neither the sin-offering nor the burnt-offering which followed
it, but simply and solely the peace-offering, which concluded the
whole ceremony, and for which the foundation had been laid by the
previous sin-offering and burnt-offering, both negatively (namely,
by the expiation effected in the sin-offering) and positively (by
the complete self-surrender expressed in the burnt-offering). And
when the sprinkling of the altar of burnt-offering with the blood of
this sin-offering is represented in Lev. viii. 15 as a purification and
sanctification of the altar, this is by no means to be regarded as an
"installation of the persons to be consecrated in the privilege of
approaching the altar and presenting the sacrifices of the congre-
gation upon it;" it is rather to be interpreted according to the
analogy of Lev. xvi. 16, and the explanation given at the close of
68.
168. In the ceremony connected with the burnt-offering, for
which a ram was chosen on this occasion, there was no deviation
from the ordinary custom. For it is undoubtedly an error on the
part of Keil, to reckon it as one of the peculiarities in the offer-
ing of "all three animals," that they were offered and slaughtered
not by the persons to be consecrated, but by Moses, the mediator of
the old covenant. For if this assertion were correct there would
be a complete departure from the most fundamental principles of
the sacrificial law, which it would be absolutely impossible to explain
and justify, and for which Keil has not been able to bring forward
the shadow of an explanation, as there are not many persons who
will be able to find any solution of the discrepancy in the fact, that
"Moses was the mediator of the old covenant, through whose service
Israel was consecrated as the congregation of God, and Aaron with
his sons as priests of God." That all three animals were offered
for the persons to be initiated, is placed beyond all doubt by the
fact, that in the case of every one it is expressly observed, that
Aaron and his sons laid their hands upon its head (vers. 14, 18, 22).
But if it was for them that the sacrifices were offered, they too
were required to be the offerers and slayers of the sacrifice, unless
the whole of the law of sacrifice was to be set at nought. This is
so self-evident, that any express statement to that effect was per-
fectly unnecessary. When Moses is directed in ver. 2 to take
Aaron and his sons with him, and the garments, and the anointing
oil, and a bullock for the sin-offering, and two rams, etc., this
does not surely imply that Moses is to present all these things
himself. And it is quite as much at variance with the sense and
the words, to interpret the words in vers. 15, 19, and 23, Hq.zy.va FHAw;y.iva
MDAha-tx, hw,mo (Angl. and he slew it, and Moses took the blood), as
signifying that Moses slaughtered the animals himself. I will not
lay any stress upon the fact that the Masoretic accentuation has
guarded against this misinterpretation, but I do upon the fact that,
according to the inviolable rules of grammar, the words must in
that case read thus: MDAha-tx, Hq.ay.iva hw,m FHaw;y.iva. In the order of words
as we have them, on the other hand, a different subject from Moses
must be given to FHaw;y.va ("he slew it"); and Luther gave it the
correct interpretation when he rendered it as an impersonal verb,
they slew it" (man schlachtete es).
A ram was also selected, for the peace-offering or true consecra-
tion-offering. And here, again, the course adopted both with the
blood (vers. 23, 24, 30) and the flesh (vers. 25-29, 31, 32) pre-
sents many points of peculiarity and divergence. After the ram
had been killed, Moses took some of its blood and smeared it upon
the tip of the right ear, the thumb of the right hand, and the great
toe of the right foot, first of Aaron and afterwards of his sons.
He then sprinkled the (rest of the) blood round about upon the
altar of burnt-offering, and took the portions of fat and the right
leg of the slaughtered ram, and one piece of each of the different
kinds of cake, which had been offered along with the ram; and
having placed all this upon the hands of Aaron and his sons (pro-
bably one after anothor), he waved it as a wave-offering before
Jehovah. After this he took it from their hands and burned it
upon the altar. He next took the breast of the ram, which was his
own portion, and waved it himself; after which he took of the holy
anointing oil and the blood upon the altar, and sprinkled the per-
sons to be initiated, and also their clothes.1 The remainder of the
1
It is quite true that Ex. xxix. 21 mentions this sprinkling with blood and
oil, before the directions as to the waving and burning of the altar-portions;
but that is in all probability, simply for the purpose of placing together all that
flesh, together with the rest of the cake, was then appropriated to
the sacrificial meal in the way described in connection with the
praise-offerings. In this meal no one but the persons to be initiated
took any part.
169. The smearing of the three members of the body men-
tioned, with the blood of the consecration-offering, is unanimously
regarded by commentators as a consecration of such members of
the body as would be more especially called into exercise by the
duties of the priestly vocation. The ear was to be consecrated to
listen to the command and will of God, as the rule of their priestly
walk and conduct; the hand and the foot, to observe the walk and
conduct prescribed. There was no necessity to wet the whole ear,
the whole hand, and the whole foot with blood, since the lap of the
ear, the thumb, and the great toe represented the whole, of which
they were the first and principal parts; whilst the right side was
selected on account of its superiority to the left.
Simple and satisfactory as this explanation may appear, it is, for
all that, not without its difficulties. For it cannot fail to strike us
as a most significant fact, that in both accounts (Ex. xxix. 20 and
Lev. viii. 24) the smearing of the ear, the hand, and the foot is
represented as preceding the sprinkling of the altar with the blood,
which was the real act of atonement. According to the analogy in
other instances (e.g., Ex. xxiv. 8), and the very nature of the case,
we should expect to find just the reverse, since it was upon the
altar of God that the blood received the divine and saving power
which imparted to it all its fitness to be used as consecration
blood. We should get rid of the difficulty most easily, if we were
at liberty to assume that there is a hysteron-proteron in the biblical
narrative, and that the smearing of the ear, the hand, and the foot
were mentioned first, simply as being the leading feature in the
consecration, whilst the sprinkling of the altar which preceded it
in order of time was mentioned afterwards to give completeness
to the account. But the Vav consecutive, qroz;y.iva in Lev. viii. 24,
and TAq;razAv; in Ex. xxix. 30 seem hardly to allow of any such
solution; and it is rendered still more inadmissible by the fact,
that in Lev. viii. 30 and Ex. xxix. 21 a second application of the
blood to the persons to be initiated is mentioned, of which it is as
expressly stated in the text, that it occurred after the sprinkling of
was done with the blood, before describing what was done with the flesh;
whereas in Lev. viii. the order of succession is given according to the actual
occurrence.
the altar, as it seems to be implied with reference to the other, that

it was performed before the sprinkling.
Commentators have thought far too lightly of this difficulty.
Thus, for example, Bahr (ii. 424), Hofmann (p. 285), and Knobel
(p. 425) evade it; Oehler calls attention to it, but contributes no-
thing towards an explanation; Keil alone has attempted this. "If
then," he says, those organs which would be actively employed in
the service performed by the priests, were here brought into rapport
with the sacrificial blood and endued with its power, the same
organs were brought, in and with the blood sprinkled on the altar,
within the sphere of that divine vis vitae, which was in operation at
the altar, and being pervaded by this, were sanctified and consecrated
to the true and willing service of the Lord." But, on the one hand,
the blood, even according to Keil's own view, had no power in itself,
i.e., before coming into contact with the altar, so as to be able to
endue the organs to which it was applied with saving power; on
the contrary, that power was first communicated to it in consequence ;
of its being placed upon the altar. And on the other hand, the idea
that "in and with the blood," a portion of which had been smeared
upon the ear, the hand, and the foot of the persons to be initiated,
these very organs were themselves "brought within the sphere of
the divine powers of life that were in operation at the altar," has too
little to commend it, for it to be possible to yield an unconditional
assent. And it seems to me, that the idea of a rapport being insti-
tuted between these leading organs of the priestly duties and the
blood intended for the altar, which Keil is right in enunciating,
may be held most firmly without supposing that the power which it
could only acquire at the altar was already immanent in the blood,
and without introducing the singular notion of an imaginary trans-
position of the members themselves to the altar in connection with
the blood. It is far better to regard the vital powers acquired by
the blood upon the altar, as working back upon that portion which
had previously been removed and applied to the persons about to
be initiated, by virtue of the unity and indivisibility of the soul.
which is in the blood. But even then the real problem remains
unsolved, viz., why was not the application of the blood to the per-
sons to be initiated deferred till after the sprinkling of the blood,
and so much of the blood as was necessary for the purpose taken
from the blood upon the altar, which would certainly have been
simpler and more natural, and was perfectly practicable, as Lev. viii.
30 (Ex. xxix. 21) clearly proves?
I confess that I cannot find any satisfactory answer to this

question. At the same time, I have thought of the possibility of
another view, to which I am led by an analogy in the course pur-
sued with the flesh of this sacrifice. For instance, Moses took those
portions of the fat and flesh which were intended to be burned upon
the altar, laid them upon the hands of those who were about to be
consecrated, and waved them before the Lord. If, as will be shown
in 170, this is to be interpreted as an investiture of the priests to
be consecrated with the right of performing this part of the altar
service which henceforth belonged exclusively to them; it might be
conjectured that it was much the same with the application of the
blood, which also preceded the sprinkling of the altar, viz., that
the function of dealing with the blood at the altar service was
thereby conferred upon the persons to be initiated, as a right be-
longing to them alone. With this explanation, the chief difficulty
would undoubtedly be removed. Still, it must be admitted, that
investiture with the right of sprinkling the blood might have been
expressed more suitably in a different way, and that the reason why
the ear and the foot were included is especially incomprehensible.
And though unquestionably not the first application of the blood
but the second is expressly designated a wDeqa in Lev. viii. 30 and
Ex. xxix. 21, yet looking at the analogous rite of consecration in
the case of the restored leper (Lev. xiv. 17, 25), it is impossible to
deny that even the first application possessed the character of con-
secration.
170. There were many peculiarities also in the course adopted
with the flesh. In the case of the ordinary peace-offerings, the
heave-leg and a piece of every kind of the cake provided for the
sacrificial meal ( 155) fell to the lot of the priest who had attended
to the sprinkling of the blood and the burning upon the altar; whilst
the wave-breast was assigned to the whole of the priests who were
engaged in active service at the time. Here, on the contrary, the
heave-leg and the selections of cake were included in the portions
burned upon the altar; and the wave-breast was assigned to Moses.
"For the same reason," says Hofmann, p. 284, for which Moses
did not eat the flesh of the sin-offering ( 167), the heave-shoulder
also was not allotted to him. Moses had neither priestly office nor
priestly character; and if, notwithstanding this, he discharged the
priestly functions in connection with the sacrifice, it was in conse-
quence of a special commission from God, which applied to this
case alone. For the same reason, he did not receive those portions
of the sacrifice which specially belonged to the priests. At the same

time, his labour was not to be left without reward, and this he re-
ceived in the wave-breast. Now, if the conclusion to which we
came before be correct ( 138), viz., that the double portion as-
signed to the priests in the form of the wave-breast and heave-leg
had respect to their double relation on the one hand as the servants
of Jehovah, and on the other as mediators of the nation, and that
the heave-leg had special reference to the latter, and the wave-breast
to the former; it is easy enough to explain why the wave-breast was
assigned to Moses on this occasion as the reward of his labour, and
not the heave-leg, seeing that in the act of consecration he officiated
purely under an extraordinary commission from God. On the very
same ground on which none but the persons to be initiated were
allowed to take part in the peace-offering ( 172), the heave-leg,
being the e]klogh< of the flesh of the sacrificial meal ( 138), could
not be eaten by the non-priestly administrator (Moses). But if it
could neither be used in the sacrificial meal, nor eaten by Moses, it
necessarily fell under the category of the bread of Jehovah, for
which the whole of the sacrificial animal was offered, and as such
was burned upon the altar along with the fat.
But, first of all, Moses placed so much of this offering as was to
be burned upon the altar upon the hands of Aaron and his sons, and
waved it before the Lord. This act was designated a filling, Myxil.umi;
and the animal received the name of the ram of filling, Myxil.umi lyxe, Lev.
viii. 22, 28. This does not mean, as I myself formerly agreed with
Bahr in maintaining, a present made by Jehovah to the priests about
to be consecrated; for, as Keil properly observes, "the expression
hOAhyla dyA xle.mi does not signify to offer presents to Jehovah, but to pro-
vide something to offer to Jehovah (1 Chron. xxix. 5; 2 Chron. xxix.
31; Ex. xxxii. 29). Hence, when Moses placed those portions which
were to be offered to God in the hands of the priests, and then offered
them symbolically to God before they were burned upon the altar,
the intention must have been to deliver to them the sacrifices which
they were henceforth to offer to the Lord, as a symbolical investiture
with the gifts which they would be required as priests to offer to the
Lord. It indicated the fact that from that time forward the right
and the duty of officiating at the altar, and superintending the burn-
ing of the sacrifices, would belong to them alone." But when Keil
adds, "they were to be invested, however, not merely with what
they were to burn to the Lord, but also with what they were to re-
ceive for their service," Hofmann has pointed out the error involved
338 CONSECRATION OF THE PEOPLE, PRIESTS,. AND LEVITES.
in this. It was not merely those portions, he says, "nor all those
portions which afterwards fell to the lot of the priests, that Moses
laid upon their hands, though this ought to have been the case, if the
transfer to them of certain selections from the sacrifice had been the
point really signified." Only so much of the sacrifice as was to be burnt
upon the altar, and the whole of that, was placed in their hands; and
thus the reference of the filling of their hands to the burning upon the
altar was placed beyond all possible doubt. But Keil, on the other
hand, has properly condemned the still more erroneous view expressed
by Hofmann, that "the offering made by Moses for Aaron termi-
nated with an offering by Aaron himself;" for the whole terminated,
not by Aaron attending to the burning upon the altar, but by Moses
doing so (as he had previously performed the sprinkling of the
blood). Moreover, "the true consecration of Aaron," in its com-
plete and finished form, did not "precede the presentation of this
offering;" for the smearing of the ear, hand, and foot of the persons
to be initiated, still needed, to be followed by the sprinkling of their
persons and clothes before the act of consecration was complete
(Lev. viii. 30).
171. The sprinkling of their persons and clothes was performed
with blood from the altar, and holy oil. That the two were mixed
together for the purpose of the sprinkling, as Hofmann, Keil, Knobel,
Oehler, and others assume, is not expressly stated; and the apparent
analogy in the application of blood and oil to the cured leper, when
the two were used separately, might be adduced in support of the
opposite opinion (vid. Lev. xiv. 15 sqq., 25 sqq.). But the opinion
mentioned appears to me the correct one, for the simple reason that
the two are not said to have been used separately here as in Lev.
xiv., and also because the oil is mentioned before the blood in Lev.
viii. 30, whereas in Ex. xxix. 21 the blood stands before the oil,
which could not be a matter of indifference unless they had been
mixed together.
It may at once be granted that the sprinkling had reference
"more particularly to the clothes," which were to be worn on all
priestly occasions, and on them alone;--provided only the necessary
emphasis be laid upon the fact, that the clothes were sprinkled and
consecrated upon and with the persons. The clothes represented
the office filled by the person. The person and the clothes together
represented the priest; therefore the consecration was performed
upon both together. The atoning efficacy of the blood which had
been attested upon the altar, was sufficient for the covenant conse-
cration of the people: there was no necessity for any anointing with
oil, because no special office was to be, or could be committed to the
people generally. But in the official consecration of the priests, just
because it had reference to the installation in a particular office, it
was necessary that the sanctifying power of the anointing oil should
be added to the atoning efficacy of the blood.
A peculiar, but certainly an incorrect explanation, has been
given by Keil (i. 265) to this mixing of the blood with anointing
oil. "The blood taken from the altar," he says, "shadowed forth
the soul united to God by reconciliation; the holy anointing oil
was the symbol of the Spirit of God, the essential principle of all
spiritual life in the kingdom of God. Consequently, by means of
this sprinkling, the soul and spirit of the priests were endowed with
the heavenly powers of divine life." I will only just point out in
passing, how here again the leading idea of Keil's sacrificial theory
( 70), viz., that the sacrificial blood was a symbol of the soul of the
sacrificer, is proved to be an erroneous one; for as the anointing oil
was not a symbol of the spirit of the man presenting the sacrifice,
but a representative of the sanctifying Spirit of God, so the blood
could not be a type of the soul of the sacrificer, but could only repre-
sent the atoning power of another soul interposing for him with its
purity, innocence, and holiness. And how marvellous an idea it
would be, that the soul of the sacrificer should be "endowed" with
itself! It is equally wrong to separate the blood and the oil in such
a way as to regard the former as a type of the soul of the animal
operating upon the soul of the sacrificer, and the latter as a symbol of
the Spirit of God operating upon the spirit of the sacrificer; wrong,
because the Hebrew psychology knows nothing of any such distinc-
tion between the soul and spirit of a man ( 32, 23), and still more
because the clothes which were also to be sprinked with blood and oil
could not be separately endowed in this way according to soul and
spirit (since there was, neither soul nor spirit dwelling in them), but
were only to be consecrated in a general manner as vehicles and media
of the grace peculiar to the office.
172. In the sacrificial meal there were only two distinctive
peculiarities: one, that the leavened loaves prescribed in Lev. vii. 13
(cf. 155) were omitted from the Corban of cakes connected with
the sacrifice; the other, that the right to join in the meal was re-
stricted to the persons to be initiated to the exclusion of every one
else, even of the members of their own families (Ex. xxix. 32). This
restriction, however., may be very, easily explained from the fact, that
it was the sacrificial meal connected with a consecration-offering,

which represented such a fellowship of the sacrificer with Jehovah,
as precluded participation on the part of any one who had not
been consecrated. And even the omission of leavened, bread from
the Corban of cake to be used at the meal, may be just as easily ex-
plained from the character of the meal, as the removal of all leavened
bread from the paschal supper ( 186).
The whole ceremony as thus described was repeated every day for
seven successive days. This was expressly commanded with regard
to the sin-offering (Ex. xxix. 36). In the case of the filling-offering,
indeed, the filling of the hands is all that is expressly mentioned as
having to be repeated for seven days (Ex. xxix. 35; Lev. viii. 33),
but this necessarily presupposes a fresh presentation of the filling-
offering; and since the daily anointing of the altar is mentioned at
any rate in Ex. xxix. 36, 37, the daily anointing of the persons to be
initiated is also to be taken for granted as self-evident, together with
their previous washing and investiture. During the seven days of
consecration, the persons to be initiated were not to leave the fore-
court either day or night (Lev. viii. 33). But an the eighth day the
persons initiated entered upon the independent discharge of their
priestly functions by offering for themselves a calf for a sin-offering,
and a ram for a burnt-offering; and for the people a goat for a sin-
offering, a sheep for a burnt-offering, and a bullock and ram for a
peace-offering (Lev. ix.).
There can be no doubt, according to Ex. xxix. 29, 30, and Lev.
vi. 15, that the ceremony of consecration had to be repeated in the
case of every new high priest, probably by representatives of the
entire priesthood (say by the leaders of the different orders of
priests). And the same remark applies in all probability, according
to Lev. vi. 13, to the entrance of all the priests upon the duties of
their office.
C. CONSECRATION OF THE LEVITES.
173. The consecration of the Levites, which took place at a later

period, just before the departure from Sinai, was much more simple
than that of the priests (vid. Num. viii. 5-22). The verb employed
(rheFi ) distinguishes it from the act of priestly consecration (wDeqi),
showing that it was of a subordinate character, and wanting in all
the features which constituted the specific peculiarities of the latter.
It commenced with the sprinkling of the persons to be initiated
SPECIAL PERIODS AND FEASTS. 341
with water of purifying (txF.AHa yme), the removal of all the hair upon
their body, and the washing of their clothes. As they had no official
costume, since they filled no particular office, but were merely ser-
vants and attendants, their ordinary clothes, at any rate, were to be
cleansed and renewed. The shaving off of the hair, which was a
kind of natural clothing, was also subservient to the same idea.
The water of purifying was unquestionably no ordinary water, but
water prepared expressly for this object; at the same time it was
certainly not identical with the water of separation (hDAni yme, Num.
xix. 9, cf. 217), which was prepared from the ashes of the red cow
and other ingredients, but was possibly just the same as the water
prepared with cedar-wood, coccus, and hyssop for the sprinkling of
men and houses that had been infected with leprosy (Lev. xiv. 5
sqq., 49 sqq.; cf. 224).
After this triple form of purification, the substitution of the
Levites for the first-born of all the people took place ( 6). The
Levites were brought before the door of the tabernacle, and the
congregation--i.e., the elders as its representatives--laid hands upon
their heads, to set them apart for the service of the sanctuary, as
representatives of the whole congregation, in the place of the first-
born out of all the tribes, upon whom the obligation originally
a devolved; whereupon the priests waved them before Jehovah, that
is to say, in all probability, led them to the door of the tabernacle
and back again to the altar of burnt-offering, to exhibit them as
offered to the Lord by the congregation for the service of the sane-
tuary, and handed over by Him to the priests. In conclusion, two
bullocks were sacrificed that had been presented by the Levites,
one as a sin-offering, and the other as a burnt-offering.
CHAPTER II.
ADAPTATION OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP TO SPECIAL

PERIODS AND FEASTS.
A. MOSAIC IDEA OF A FEAST.
174. The times of the Mosaic feasts are called MydifEOm and MyGiHa.
The former (from dfayA, to determine, to fix) served to characterize
them as definite, established points or periods of time, connected
342 SPECIAL PERIODS AND FEASTS.
with the natural, social, and religious life. In its more frequent
allusion to the religious life, this expression was applied indiscrimi-
nately to every period of time that was specially marked by a more
elaborate religious service, whether the object or occasion of the
festival was joy and thanksgiving, or penitence and mourning, his-
torical commemoration, or typical anticipation. The name gHA, on the
contrary (from fan, to wheel round, to dance, to rejoice), was much
more restricted, and according to its etymological signification was
applicable to joyous festivals alone (Dent. xvi. 11, 14).
The peculiar character of the Mosaic festivals was expressed
formally in their being regulated as much as possible by the number
seven, as the stamp of the covenant of God with Israel (seven being
compounded of 3, the divine number, and 4, the world number),
and materially by their being separated from the labours, toils, and
cares of everyday life for the sanctification and consecration of the
whole man to purposes of religion and the worship of God. The
common starting point for the entire legislation with regard to
the feasts, was the seventh day, or closing day of the week ( faUbwA ),
which was called for that reason the Sabbath (tBAwa) kat ] e]coxh<n,
and as such infolded prototypically within itself the fundamental
idea of every festal celebration. In the epithet hOAhyla NOtBAwa tBawa wd,qo
(Ex. xxxv. 2), the negative side is expressed by NOtBAwa tBawa, the
positive by hOAhyla. tBAwa is a concrete form of intensification (= the
rester); NOtBAwa is an abstract (= rest). The combination of the two
words expressed the strongest obligation to maintain a strict and
absolute rest. The positive and special intention of the tBAwa which
is expressed in the hvhyl, was the holy assembly (wd,qo xrAq;mi, holy
convocation, Lev. xxiii. 2), of which no precise account is to be
found in the law, but which cannot be regarded in any other light
than as a meeting of those members of the community who were
near the sanctuary, for the sake of edification by means of sacrifice
and prayer (compare the patriarchal expression, to call upon the
name of Jehovah). No doubt this included the blessing of the
people by the priest in the words prescribed in Num. vi. 24-26.
The further development of the idea of a feast, which sprang
from the Sabbath-day, was carried out in three ways. The first
was by the transference of rest (mutatis mutandis) from every
seventh day to every seventh year, or the so-called sabbatical year,
and from that still further to the jubilee year, which occurred every
seven times seven years. The fundamental idea of the tBAwa, as that
which was to be observed, remained the same; the only change was
MOSAIC IDEA OF A FEAST. 343
in the subject for which it was a tBAwa. In the Sabbath of days it

was man and beast that were to rest after six periods of labour,
and keep Sabbath during the seventh. In the Sabbath of years it
was the field that rested; for what a period of day and night is to
man and beast, that a whole year with its summer and winter is to
the field. In the Sabbath of weeks of years it was the altered con-
dition of property, that had been occasioned by the commercial
activity of the past jubilee period, which once more returned from
a state of fluctuation to one of rest, i.e., from the strange holder to
its original possessor.
But between the changes of days and years there was an inter-
mediate period, viz., the changes of the moon. This was not suitable,
however, for a uniform organic incorporation in the system of
sabbatic periods,--both because no special and peculiar subject for
rest could be assigned it, and also because the number of months in
the year was twelve and not seven. At the same time, so far as it
was possible, the change of the moon was brought within the range
of the sabbatical idea, viz., by a special festal prominence given to
the seventh new moon of every year, and by the transference of
festal ideas derived from other sources to the sphere of this parti-
cular month.
The idea of the Sabbath originated in the history of the crea-
tion. As God created the world, and all that it contained, in six
days, so man and his beasts of burden were to rest after six days
of work, and his field was to rest the seventh year after six years
of labour. The observance of the Sabbath, therefore, was a con-
fession of the God who by His almighty word created the heaven
and the earth in six days out of nothing (Ex. xx. 8-11). And the
acknowledgment of that God was the distinguishing characteristic
of the religion of Israel; for all other religions either identify God
and the world, or place eternal matter by the side of the eternal
God. Whoever kept the Sabbath, therefore, declared by so doing
that the God of Israel was the only true God, and acknowledged
Him in word and deed as his own God. Whoever did not keep
the Sabbath holy, despised and denied the God of Israel. Hence
the Sabbath was a covenant-sign for Israel (Ex. xxxi. 12-17) on
the side of nature, as circumcision was on the side of salvation.
And whoever broke the Sabbath, though a member of the cove-
nant, cut himself off from the covenant of God, and was liable to
be put to death as a traitor to the theocracy.
These two aspects exhaust the meaning and validity of the
Sabbath and the sabbatical periods, as expressly described in the

law. A further allusion has been found in Deut. v. 15, viz., to the
exodus from Egypt. But this can neither be established as a fact,
nor gathered from the words of the passage referred to; for what
they enforce by a reference to the bondage of the Israelites in
Egypt, is not the obligation to keep the Sabbath holy, but the right
of man-servant and maid-servant to share in the Sabbath rest.
Again, the allusion to the fall, which Keil follows Hengstenberg
in adducing, is nowhere expressly stated. A latent existence no
doubt it had, in the relief afforded from all the labour and toil of
everyday life, which had their origin in the fall (Gen. iii. 17-19).
And from this point of view, the earthly Sabbath reflected the
Sabbath of God after the creation was finished,--a Sabbath in
which man, beast, and field participated, in the fulness of their
native glory and blessedness before the fall. And as every re-
pristination of the lost blessings of creation, however transient, is
at the same time a typical anticipation of their future restoration,
the blessedness of the Sabbath rest, enjoyed by man, beast, and
field, was a typical pledge and prophecy of the rest of the last time
(Heb. iv. 9).
175. But whilst in the observance of the Sabbath and the sab-
batical times the acknowledgment of Jehovah on that side, on which
He had revealed Himself as Creator of the heavens and the earth,
with all that they contained, found an expression in accordance
with the covenant; on the other hand, the acknowledgment of
Jehovah as that God who had revealed and still continued to re-
veal Himself in the choice, guidance, protection, and preservation
of Israel, also needed an embodiment, and found it in the three
yearly feasts, Easter, Pentecost, and the feast of Tabernacles, in
which the two ideas were united, on the one hand, of the redemp-
tion of Israel out of Egypt, and on the other hand, of the provision
made for it in the Holy Land of everything required for its sub-
sistence. They were memorial days of the historical facts by which
the deliverance of Israel was effected, and also, in their connection
with the time of harvest, thanksgiving festivals for the harvest
blessings of the Holy Land. These three feasts were all, from
their nature, festivals of rejoicing, and were called so (MyGiHa). But
though moving in a different sphere from the sabbatical feasts, they
were closely related to them both in form and substance. Pre-
servation is only a continuance of creation. Hence they also bear
on every side the stamp of the number seven. The two most im-
portant of these feasts--Easter and the feast of Tabernacles--

commenced on the 15th of the first and seventh months respectively,
that is to say, 2 x 7 days from the commencement of the month.
And Pentecost was kept on the fiftieth day from the commence-
ment of the Easter feast, i.e., at, the end of seven times seven
days. But as the Hebrews had only lunar months, the 15th day
of the month was the time of full moon. And this represented the
culminating height and fulness of time. As the full moon with its
soft light clothes the earth in a bright and joyous festal garment,
so the feast in commemoration of the ways of God in nature and
history spread a festal splendour over the earthly life, and made
the feast-time a gHA, a bright and cheerful time of joy. It is true,
this allusion is not mentioned in connection with the feast of Pente-
cost; but only because there were purely outward reasons why it
could not be exhibited. And whereas we find the feast of Pente-
cost limited to one day, whilst Easter and the feast of Tabernacles
occupied seven; this is to be explained on the simple ground, that
in the case of those last named the historical and harvest feasts
coincided, and that the feast of Pentecost was purely a harvest
feast, and therefore was obliged to be satisfied with one day, which
bore however a sabbatical character. But at the feasts of Easter
and Tabernacles, all the seven days did not possess a sabbatical
character with abstinence from work and holy meetings, but only
the first, and (in the case of Easter) the seventh.
The common characteristic in the celebration of these three fes-
tivals was the obligation mentioned in Ex. xxiii. 17, xxxiv. 23, etc.,
to appear personally at the sanctuary before Jehovah, which was
binding upon every adult male Israelite. The intention of these
festal gatherings three times a year was not primarily a politico-
national one (though even this is not to be excluded, on account of
the theocratical character of the Israelitish commonwealth) but
first and chiefly a religious one. Israel was to be brought thereby
three times a year to the renewed consciousness that it belonged
to the sanctuary, to be reminded of its covenant and feudal obliga-
tions towards Jehovah, the God and King of the land, to appear
before Him and do homage to Him, and present its tribute as vassal
in the first-fruits and tenths of its harvest-produce.
In the third place, the atoning and sanctifying power, exerted
by the grace of God on behalf of His people, also needed a con-
crete expression in some one special feast-time; and this took place
on the great day of atonement, which was observed on the 10th day
of the seventh month. It is true, the sacrificial atonement formed

the foundation of all the feasts--in fact, of all the worship, even
that which was performed daily at the tabernacle, viz., in the
sprinkling of the blood of the burnt-offering which was to be
offered every morning and evening, and was doubled every Sab-
bath; and at all the new moons, as well as the three festal gather-
ings of the year, it was intensified in a still greater measure by
the multiplication of the burnt-offerings, and the addition of a sin-
offering for the whole congregation. But for all that, just because
expiation was the basis of all worship, the fundamental condition
of all fellowship with God, it also required a distinct, culminating
manifestation, or a festal day set apart exclusively for that purpose;
and this was precisely the object and meaning of the yearly day of
atonement, which had also a sabbatical character on account of this
its great importance.
Again, the number of the yearly festivals in which work was
suspended and a holy convocation took place, was seven; for in
addition to those already named (two at Easter, one at Pentecost,
one at the feast of Tabernacles, and one at the feast of Atone-
ment) there were two others, one on the day of the new moon of
the seventh month, and one on the 22d day of the seventh month,
immediately after the expiration of the seven days of the feast of
the Tabernacles, the so-called tr,c,fE, the concluding feast of the
whole festal period of the entire year ( 196).
176. This division of the feasts into three classes, which is
not only simple and natural, but clearly contained in the law itself,
has been set aside by Ewald for a classification which is most arti-
ficial and forced, and as unnatural as it is opposed to the clearest
data of the Scriptures. Yet even Keil has been sufficiently charmed
by its deceptive appearance of scientific accuracy to be led away
by it. According to his idea, the great day of atonement, together
with the three harvest and historical feasts, belonged to one com-
mon class, which "included all the yearly feasts that were sacred
to the memory of the mighty works performed by the Lord for the
founding, preserving, and inspiriting of His nation" (Keil, p. 354).
These annual feasts resolved themselves into two cycles, viz., that
of the Easter feast and that of the feast of Tabernacles, each of
them with a preliminary and a supplementary festival. In the
Easter cycle, the one day of the Passover formed the preliminary,
the seven days of unleavened bread the main festival, and the one
day of Pentecost the supplement. So again, in the autumn cycle,
the day of atonement was the preliminary, the seven days' feast
of Tabernacles the main festival, and the Azereth the supplement.
But it can easily be shown that this arrangement breaks down
on all hands. The first of these cycles, according to Keil, p. 354,
had reference to the elevation of Israel, and its preservation as the
people of God; the second, on the other hand, had for its object
the continuance of Israel in the full enjoyment of, the blessings of
divine grace. But how inapt is this distinction and antithesis!
The character of a harvest feast was common to them both, and
both, therefore, had reference to the preservation of the people of
God, and their enjoyment of the blessings of divine grace; and so
also the remembrance of the saving deeds and miraculous guidance
of God by which the people had been raised into a nation of God
was common to them both.
In opposition to the view which prevailed till the time of Ewald,
Keil argues as follows (p. 359): "In the fundamental laws of the
Pentateuch only three annual festivals, the feasts of Mazzoth, Har-
vest, and Assembly, are mentioned along with the Sabbath as
MyGiHa on which Israel was to appear before the Lord (Ex. xxiii.
12-17, xxxiv. 21-23); and the simple fact that neither the Pass-
over nor the day of atonement is mentioned here, shows that how-
ever important they may have been in themselves, these two feasts
were subordinate to the other three." But it seems to me that
these very passages confirm the correctness of the opinion they are
adduced to overthrow. In the first place, it is evident that they
contain no allusion to two cycles of yearly feasts; in the second
place, that they put the feast of Pentecost side by side with the
feasts of Mazzoth and Tabernacles, as of equal rank and equal in-
dependence; and in the third place, that the feast of Atonement,
which is not mentioned, must possess a different character, and
therefore belong to a different class. And it is surely a most hasty
conclusion for Keil to draw, that because neither the Passover nor
the feast of Atonement is mentioned in these passages, therefore
these two feasts must have been subordinate to the other three. For
the feast of Passover is not mentioned, simply because it was just
as much identified with the feast of Mazzoth as the feast of Booths
(which is also not mentioned with the feast of Assembly, and the
feast of Weeks (which is not mentioned) with the feast of Harvest;
and the feast of Atonement is not mentioned, because it was not
one of those festivals at which all Israel was to appear before the
Lord. But even leaving this out of the question, the conclusion,
itself, that "the Passover and the feast of Atonement were sub-
ordinate to the other three," furnishes sufficient evidence of the in-
correctness of his own view and the correctness of the one which
he rejects. For in that case the feast of Pentecost must have be-
longed to the principal feast as much as the feasts of Mazzoth and
Assembly, and therefore cannot have been subordinate to the feast
of Mazzoth, but must have been co-ordinate with it.
Keil adds still further: Lastly, another argument against the
triple division is to be found in the fact, that the law has only two
different terms for the feasts, viz., MydifEOm and MyGiHa, of which the
former is applied to all the feast-times, whilst the latter is restricted
to the feasts of Mazzoth, of Weeks, and of Tabernacles." But here,
too, Keil's words seem to me to be adapted rather to refute what
they are meant to prove, and to establish what they are meant to
refute. For, according to his own account, the feast of Weeks, or
Pentecost, was called gH, as well as the feasts of Easter and Taber-
nacles. Is it not thereby made co-ordinate with them, especially
with the Easter festival, and that all the more decidedly, because
these three alone are so designated? And how can any one adduce,
as a proof that there can have been only two and not three kinds
of feasts, the fact that only two epithets are ever applied to them,
when one of these epithets is common to all the feasts of these sup-
posed two classes, and the other is restricted to one portion of the
second class? It ought to be clear enough that such an argument
could only be a valid one if one of the two names were applied to all
the feasts of the first class, and. to them exclusively, and the other
as generally and exclusively to all the feasts of the second class.
But the distorted character of this arrangement appears still
more decidedly if we look separately at each of the two festal
cycles, which are said to form together the second class. But we
shall find a more suitable place for this as we proceed. Cf. 181,
190, 196, 197.
B. DAILY, WEEKLY, AND MONTHLY SERVICE.
177. The public worship of God, however, the chief and

central point of which was always sacrifice, was not restricted to
the actual feasts. Every day, as God brought it round, demanded
the performance of this covenant duty; but the celebration of the
feasts involved a more elaborate performance, regulated according
to the diversities in the character of the festal seasons.
DAILY WEEKLY, AND MONTHLY SERVICE. 349
The DAILY SERVICE consisted, so far as it was conducted in

the fore-court, of the offering of a yearling lamb every morning
and evening as a burnt-offering, along with the regular meat- and
drink-offerings ( 150, note; Ex. xxix. 38-42; Lev. vi. 9-12
Num. xxviii. 3-8); so that the morning sacrifice was burning the
whole day, and the evening sacrifice the whole night, as an offering
made by fire for a sweet-smelling savour to Jehovah. This daily
burnt-offering was called the continual, standing sacrifice, dymiTAha tlafo
(Ex. xxix. 42; Num. xxviii. 6, 10, 15, 23, 24), and at a later period
dymiTAha alone (Dan. viii. 11, 12, 13, xi. 31). As this sacrifice was offered
for the whole congregation, some provision must have been made for
the performance by deputy of the laying on of hands and slaughter-
ing, which ought to have been performed by the offerer himself.
According to the early rabbinical tradition, the congregation chose
so-called "standing men," dmAf;ma ywen;xa, for that purpose. Attached
to this sacrifice, which was offered for the congregation, was first
of all the Minchah of the high priest, prescribed in Lev. vi. 20 sqq.,
which will come under review in the next section. And if private
individuals had offerings of any kind to present on their own
account, they were not presented till after the ordinary morning
sacrifice. Even on the feast days, when the number of sacrifices
offered for the congregation was increased in number and elevated
in kind, the daily burnt-offering was not allowed to be omitted, but
still formed the basis of the true festal sacrifices.
Even in the Holy Place daily service had to be regularly per-
formed. Every morning fresh incense had to be kindled upon the
altar of incense, and again every evening when the lamps of the
seven-branched candlestick were lighted (Ex. xxx. 7, 8, cf. 160,
161. This was the duty of the high priest, though according to
later custom an ordinary priest might, and in fact generally did,
officiate as his substitute.
178. The Minchah of the high priest just referred to, which
had to be offered every day, needs special investigation, as fre-
quently it is either overlooked or its existence positively denied.
In Lev. vi. 20, for example, after the law of the daily burnt-
offering (vi. 8-13) and the law of the meat-offering arising from
it (vi. 14-18) it is stated that this is the Corban of Aaron and
his sons, which they shall offer unto Jehovah Otxo HwamA.hi MOyB;; the
tenth part of an ephah of white flour as a continual Minchah (hHAn;mi
dymiTA), half of it in the morning, and half thereof at night. The
preparation of this Minchah is then still further described: the
meal is to be mixed with oil, baked upon the Machabath, and then
broken in pieces (MyTiPi) before being offered (just as in Lev. ii. 5, 6,
cf. 140). Then follows the command that Aaron's successors
are to do the same after their anointing. And in conclusion, it is
designated a MlAOf-qHA, and the law is added that this Minchah (like
every priestly Minchah) is to be "wholly burnt."
In the whole line of Jewish tradition these directions are un-
derstood as denoting that the existing high priest was to offer a
Minchah of this kind for himself in connection with the daily burnt-
offering of the people, for the first time immediately after the com-
pletion of his anointing or consecration, and twice a day from. that
time forwards. Later custom, on the other hand, allowed an in-
ferior priest to act as his representative. It is in this sense, no
doubt, that the expression in the Book of wisdom (c. xlv. 14),
qusi<ai au]tou? o[lakarpoqh<sontai kaq ] h[me<ran e]ndelexw?j di<j, is to be
understood; for Keil's solution, that the daily morning and evening
Olah is intended, is overthrown by the term au]tou?. Josephus (Ant.
iii. 10, 7) speaks of the custom in very distinct and unmistakeable
terms: "The (high) priest," he says, " offered out of his own re-
sources, and that twice a day, meal of the weight of an assarius,
kneaded with oil, baked, and roasted; one half he committed to
the fire in the morning, and the other half in the evening. This
view has been thoroughly defended by Lundius (judische Heiligth.
iii. 9, 17), and more recently by Talhofer (p. 139 sqq.) and
Delitzsch (pp. 315-6), and is accepted as the correct one by Baum-
garten, Oehler, and others. On the other hand, it is disputed by
Keil, who agrees with Kliefoth and Knobel in regarding the obli-
gation to offer the Minchah in question as restricted to the conse-
cration of the priests.
But this view is opposed first of all to the designation of this
meat-offering as a "continual Minchah," which is analogous to the
"continual sacrifice" and the "continual bread" (i.e., the shew-
bread, Num. iv. 7), and must therefore be understood in the same
way (Lev. vi. 9, 13). For Keil's idea, that the term "continual"
relates to a continual offering during the time of anointing, which
lasted seven days, is surely as inadmissible as Knobel's, that it de-
noted noted that every fresh high priest was, to present it on his entrance
upon office.
There is much more plausibility in Keil's appeal to the fact,
that the expression Otxo Hwam.Ahi MOyB; cannot mean "the day after his
consecration." But in the first place, it must be observed that the
DAILY, WEEKLY, AND MONTHLY SERVICE. 351
explanation which Keil declares to be the only correct one, viz.,

on the day of consecration, i.e., during the seven days of consecra-
tion," is at any rate untenable. On the other hand, such passages
as Gen. ii. 4, iii. 5 ; 2 Sam. xxi. 12; Is. xi. 16, furnish unquestion-
able proof of the admissibility of the pluperfect rendering of the
infinitive after MOyB;; or if any doubt should still be felt, it is com-
pletely removed, both substantially and grammatically, by Lev. vii.
36, which speaks of the priests as participating in the altar-sacri-
fices, "which Jehovah commanded to be given them of the children
of Israel MtAxo OHw;mA MOyB;, a statute for ever throughout their genera-
tions."
But this view is rendered absolutely necessary by the tact, that
Moses evidently did not offer the Minchah described in Lev. vi. 20
sqq. for Aaron and his sons, as Knobel maintains, but they offered
it for themselves; whereas if it had been offered during the conse-
cration, they could not have officiated themselves, but Moses must
have officiated for them. That they did officiate is not only distinctly
expressed in the terms Ubyriq;ya (ver. 20) and hW,fEya (ver. 22), but neces-
sarily follows from the fact, that this Minchah had to be entirely
burnt because it was offered by priests (vers. 22, 23). If Moses
had officiated as priest, according to Lev. ii. 10, all that was left
after removing an Azcarah would have been assigned to him, like
the wave-breast of the filling-offering at the consecration (Lev. viii.
29). But since Aaron himself officiated, his priestly consecration
must have been finished, and the reference therefore can only be
to a presentation made after the seven days of consecration. It
In Keil's opinion, indeed, Lev. ix. 1 sqq. is at variance with the
conclusion, that this Minchah was presented on the eighth day (the
first after the termination of the period of consecration). But if
the omission of any allusion to this Minchah in Lev. ix. is a proof
that it was not offered on the eighth day, the same rule must apply
to the daily incense-offering, which is also not mentioned in Lev.
ix., but which was certainly offered on that day. Even the offer-
ing of the continual sacrifice is not professedly described; allu-
sion is simply made in ver. 17 w[j e]n paro<d& to the "burnt sacrifice
of the morning." The ordinary and everyday functions of the
priests were never intended to be described in Lev. ix., though
they were certainly not omitted on the day referred to, but only
the sacrificial rites by which that day was distinguished above all
that followed.
But this argument of .hell's soon turns against himself. If
the Minchah prescribed in Lev. vi. 20 was an essential element in

the seven days' ceremony, as Keil maintains, why is there not a
single syllable about it either in Ex. xxix. or Lev. viii., where ex
professo the ceremony of consecration is more fully and elaborately
described?
On the other hand, we cannot adopt the argument drawn by
Lundius, and recently again by Thalhofer, from Heb. vii. 27, in
support of the traditional view. For when it is stated there that
the High Priest of the New Testament needeth not daily, like
those of the Old Testament, to offer up sacrifice first for His own
sins, and then for the people's, the reference cannot possibly be to
this daily Minchah of the high priest, because none but bleeding
sacrifices, and in fact only sin-offerings, were really "offered for
sin." The solution offered by Keil and others is still less admis-
sible, viz., that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews "had the
daily morning and evening (burnt-) offering in his mind;" for this
was not a sacrifice for his own sins, and was not followed by a
second sacrifice for the sins of the people.1 The words of Heb.
vii. 27 unquestionably allow, on the contrary, of no other allusion
than to the sacrifice offered by the high priest on the great day of
atonement (Lev. xvi.). It is true this was offered "yearly" and
not "daily" under the Old Testament. But this difficulty has
been satisfactorily set aside by Hofmann thus: Kaq ] h[me<ran stands
before w!sper oi[ a]rxierei?j. The comparison is not between what
Christ would have had to do and what the high priests have to do
every day, but between what the high priests have to do and what
Christ would have had to do every day. He would have needed to
do day by day what He has now done once for all, since the expia-
tion required is constant and ever new" (p. 405). See Delitzsch,
Hebraer-brief, p. 317.
That this daily Minchah of the high priest was to be offered in
1
Moreover, Keil appears to have quite forgotten with what warmth he has
written in other places against the idea that the burnt-offerings were also expia-
tory. He has spoken of this as one of the two fundamental errors of my former
work. But if the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews had written what Keil
attributes to him, he would evidently have fallen into a far deeper error than I
have. For I have merely ascribed to the burnt-offering an atoning efficacy in
relation to general sinfulness; whilst I have restricted the expiation of actual
sins to the sin- and trespass-offerings alone. And here Keil himself informs us,
that in the Epistle to the Hebrews the burnt-offering is actually designated "a
sacrifice for sins." Will he be consistent enough to charge him also with a
"fundamental error"?
DAILY, WEEKLY, AND MONTHLY -SERVICE. 353
connection with the a continual sacrifice," may be gathered with

certainty from Lev. vi. 20, where it is stated that one half was to
be presented in the morning and the other in the evening; but
whether it preceded or followed the daily burnt-offering, is left un-
decided in the law. According to the Jewish tradition, it followed
the burnt-offering so far, that it was placed between the true
Minchah of the burnt-offering and its drink-offering. This order
of succession would evidently be based upon the idea, that the pre-
vious burnt-offering expiation formed the basis of the Minchah of
the high priest and that the drink offering was common to both
I regard this view as the correct one. If the daily burnt-offering
was offered for the whole congregation, it applied to the high priest
as well, who was the head of the congregation. But to the general
Minchah he had to add a special Minchah for himself,--a Minchah
of cake too, which represented a higher mode of preparing the corn,
and pointed to the fact that he, in whom the holiness of the whole
community culminated, had to unfold and preserve in the duties of
his calling a more exalted holiness than could be demanded from
the whole nation.
179. The observance of the SABBATH-DAY consisted negatively
in abstinence from all the labours of the earthly calling, and posi-
tively in a sacred assembly, the doubling of the two daily burnt-
offerings (Num. xxviii. 9, 10), and the placing of fresh shew-bread
in the Holy Place ( 159).
Whilst the sacrificial worship of the Sabbath was merely a
doubling of the daily worship, that of the NEW MOON'S DAY (wxro
MywidAHI ) formed a link between the ordinary worship and its festal
elaboration at the yearly feasts, inasmuch as there was offered in
connection with the "continual sacrifice" a festal offering of two
young oxen, a ram, and seven yearling lambs as a burnt-offering,
also a buck-goat as a sin-offering, for the whole congregation (Num.
xxviii. 11 sqq.). On the other hand, the characteristics of the ordi-
nary Sabbath (abstinence from work, and a holy assembly1) were
wanting, though a festal character was communicated to these days
(Num. x. 10) by the fact, that at the offering of the burnt- and
1
At a later period, however, the new moon is frequently placed as a feast
by the side of the Sabbath (Isa i 13; Hos ii 13; Ezek xlvi 1) and as one on
which ordinary avocations were suspended. (Amos viii. 5), the pious in Israel
went to the prophets for edification (2 Kings iv. 23), many families offered
yearly thank-offerings (1 Sam. xx. 6, 29), great banquets were spread at the
court of Saul (1 Sam. xx. 5, 24), and at a still later period the more, devout
fasted."--Keil, p. 368.
(freewill) thank-offerings of this day the silver trumpets were blown

"that they might be Myhilox< ynep;li NOrKAzil;."
But the festal character, which was not fully manifested in the
worship of the ordinary new moons on account of the absence of
any sabbatical service, broke through even these restrictions on the
SEVENTH NEW MOON of the year. As every seventh day and every
seventh year, so also the seventh month of every year was to parti-
cipate in the sabbatical character of the septimal divisions of time.
But as no subject could be found to which this month bore any
special relation, and the rest therefore could not be extended more
widely than that of the weekly Sabbath, viz., to cattle and men, it
would have been out of character to make the whole month a month
of rest, as the analogy of the daily and yearly Sabbaths required.
Consequently a sabbatical character, combined with a holy convoca-
tion and abstinence from all work, was given to the first day of the
month alone; and in order to give prominence to the sacredness of
character belonging to the entire month, all the principal feasts that
were not necessarily bound down to any particular seasons, were
assigned to this month, viz., the great day of atonement, the feast
of Tabernacles, and, as the last glimmer of the departing festal time,
the Azereth; so that in this month a NOtBAwa tBawa accompanied with a
holy convocation occurred no less than four times. In addition to
the daily burnt-offering and the sacrifices appointed for the ordinary
new moons, a bullock, a ram, and seven yearling lambs were offered
as a burnt-offering along with the corresponding meat- and drink-
offerings, and a he-goat as a sin-offering. The blowing of the silver
trumpets also rose from the mere fqaTA of an ordinary new moon to
a loud, strong blast, a fayrihe (on the difference between the two, vid.
Num. x. 7), and the first day of the seventh month was called in
consequence faUrT;ha MOy, "the day of the trumpet-blast" (Lev. xxiii.
23 sqq.; Num. xxix. 1 sqq.). Bahr has erroneously interpreted this
faUrT; as a voice of Jehovah, by which God showed His people
that the most important period of the year had now arrived. An
admirable reply to this view has been given by Keil (p. 370), who
also furnishes the correct explanation of the ceremony itself.
God," he says, was thereby to be strongly, loudly, and continu-
ously reminded of His people, that He might bestow His grace in
greater energy for the sanctification of the month."
The observance of the sabbatical and jubilee years we need not
dwell upon here, as they present no distinct peculiarities that have
any bearing upon the sacrificial worship.
THE FEAST OF PASSOVER. 355
C. THE FEAST OF PASSOVER.
180. The institution of this festival is described in Ex. xii.

After nine plagues had been inflicted upon the Egyptians without
effect, Jehovah directed Moses to announce to the people, that the
tenth plague, viz., the destruction of all the first-born of Egypt,
both of man and beast, would at length overcome all the opposition
of the Egyptians to the departure of Israel (chap. xi.). This took
place in the first days of the month Abib (or the earing month),
which was afterwards called Nisan. The predicted plague was to
occur in the night between the 14th and 15th of that month; but
on the 10th every householder was to select a lamb without blemish,
and to keep it till the 14th day, when he was to kill it MyiBar;fahA NyBe,
i.e., between the two evenings (of the 14th and 15th). The lintel
and two upright posts of the house-door were then to be smeared
with its blood by means of a hyssop-bush, in order that when
Jehovah passed through Egypt to slay all the first-born, He might
pass over the houses of the Israelites. The lamb was to be roasted
whole, without breaking a single bone, and eaten the same night,
with bitter herbs and unleavened bread, by the entire family. If
any family should be too small for that purpose, it might join with
one of the neighbouring families. If a portion of the lamb should
be left, it was to be burned with fire. They were to eat it like
persons hurrying away, with a staff in the hand, and with the loins
girded and the feet shod. Moreover, as a memorial of the impor-
tance of the object and the greatness of the result, this festal meal
was to be repeated by all their descendants year after year, and
the remembrance of the event to be preserved by a seven days' fes-
tival, viz., from the evening of the 14th to the evening of the 21st,
during which time no leavened bread was to be found in any of the
houses. Persons who were levitically unclean were to be excluded
from the meal; but they were commanded, as well as any persons
who might be upon a journey, to keep a second festival on the 14th
of the following month. If any one should abstain from taking
part in it without such legitimate grounds, he was to be put to
death (Num. ix. 6 sqq.).
For the yearly commemoration of this event in the Holy Land,
it was prescribed in Deuteronomy (xvi. 5-7), in accordance with the
altered circumstances, that the lamb should not be slain in their
own dwellings, but at the place of the sanctuary alone, and that it
should be prepared and eaten there. In this command it was of
course assumed, that the blood could no longer be smeared upon the
posts and lintel of the house-door, but, as in the case of all the
other sacrificial animals, must be sprinkled upon the altar; for this
could be the only object of the modification. The supposition that
such was the ordinary practice, is expressly confirmed in 2 Chron.
xxx. 16, xxxv. 11. That the fat was also burned upon the altar
is not only very probable, but is firmly maintained in the Jewish
tradition (cf. Delitzsch uber d. Paseharitus, Luth. Zeitsch 1855, 2).
It cannot be deduced from Ex. xxiii. 18, however, as Knobel and
Delitzsch suppose. This passage is rather to be explained after the
manner of Ex. xii. 10. (Vid. Hofmann, p. 271, and Keil's Com-
mentary in loc.)
Of the seven days of the commemorative festival, the first and
last (the 15th and 21st of the month) were to be distinguished by a
sabbatical observance, viz., abstinence from work and a holy as-
sembly. On the first feast day probably, viz., the 15th of the
month, or according to others the second (16th), the sheaf of first-
fruits of the new harvest (a sheaf of barley, no doubt, since wheat
did not ripen till later in the year) was offered and waved before
Jehovah.1 Along with this wave-sheaf--that is to say, before it--
1 The day on which the wave-sheaf was offered has been a subject of dispute
from the very earliest times, and continues so to the present moment. Accord-
ing to Lev. xxiii. 11, 15, it was to take place tBAwa.ha traHIm.Ami. This Sabbath was
understood by the Boethuseans as denoting the day following the weekly Sab-
bath which fell in the festal week (cf. Lightfoot, Opp. ii. 692, and Ideler, Hdb.
d. Chronol. ii. 613) ; whereas Philo, Josephus, and the Rabbins are unanimous
in regarding it as the first feast day, which had a sabbatical character (ver. 7),
and consequently in assigning the offering of the sheaf to the second day of
the feast. This view was also the prevalent one among Christian writers on
biblical antiquities, and has been adopted by Bahr (ii. 620, 621) and Keil (i. 393,
394). But, in opposition to this, Hitzig has endeavoured to prove, (1) that the
ancient Hebrews always commenced a new week with the new year, so that the
Sabbaths of the first month invariably fell upon the 7th, 14th, 21st, and 28th;
and (2) that the Sabbath referred to in vers. 11 and 15 can only have been the
21st, and consequently that the offering of the wave-sheaf ought to have taken
place on the 22d. Kliefoth dropped the first part of this exposition, but adopted
the second, and maintained that the Sabbath mentioned in ver. 11 could only
refer to the last day of assembly mentioned just before in ver. 8, and not to the
first day mentioned still further back in ver. 7, and therefore that the wave-
sheaf was not offered till the 22d of the month. Knobel, on the other hand,
approves of the first part of the theory set up by Hitzig, but disputes the second,
and maintains that the wave-sheaf was offered on the 15th Abib.--Of these
different views the Boethusean must be set aside, since the offering of the sheaf
of first-fruits had nothing to do with the weekly Sabbath. And the one which
there was offered a yearling as a burnt, offering, with the appropriate meat-
offering (two-tenths, not one-tenth, of an ephah of meal) and a drink-offering (a
quarter of a hin of wine). Before this offering had been presented, neither roasted
corn nor even bread could be eaten from the new harvest (Lev. xxiii. 9-14). Also
on each of the seven feast days a he-goat was offered as a sin-offering, and two
young bullocks, a ram, and seven yearling lambs as a
assigns the waving of the sheaf to the 22d Abib is equally inadmissible. For,
according to this view, the celebration of harvest, which was certainly intended
to be an essential factor of the Easter festival, would really have taken place
after the feast, since the feast ended on the evening of the 21st, as is evident
not only from the name given to that day, tr,c,fE (Deut. xvi. 8), but also from
the termination of the obligation to eat unleavened bread. Moreover, Josh. v.
11, where it is stated that the Israelites who had just arrived in the Holy Land
ate unleavened bread of the corn of the land HsaP,ha traHIm.Ami (which is no doubt
identical with tBAw.aha traHI.mi in Lev. xxiii. 11), is a proof that this day was
within the seven days of Mazzoth. For the idea suggested by Kliefoth, that
"what is intended is not the Easter cake, but the peculiar Minchah belonging
to the feast of Harvest," will not be likely to commend itself to any one who
observes that all the Menachoth were eaten by the priests alone, and not by the
people. The choice simply lies, therefore, between the, 15th and 16th Abib; and
it is very hard to decide between them, as they are both exposed to peculiar
difficulties. The assumption that the new year always commenced with the
first day of the week, and therefore that the 14th Abib invariably fell upon a
Sabbath, has against it the, great improbability of the early Israelites ever doing
what such a custom would have involved, viz., of their having broken off the
last week of the year in the middle, and begun to reckon from the commence-
ment again, as soon as the new moon announced the beginning of the year.
Nevertheless the biblical text appears to require this, and to exclude the tradi-
tional view. Of the passages bearing upon the subject, Lev. xxiu. 15, 16
appears to me to stand in the first rank, and to possess great force. The day
of Pentecost is fixed there in the following manner: Ye shall count traHIm.Ami
tBAwa.ha, namely, from the day that ye brought the sheaf of the wave-offering,
seven whole Sabbaths (tmoymiT; tOtBAwa) shall there be; even unto tBAw.aha traHIm.Ami
tfiybiw;.ha shall ye number fifty days," etc. Nothing is proved by Keil's appeal
to the parallel passage in Deut. xvi. 9, where the seven whole Sabbaths of
Leviticus are altered into "seven weeks " (tfobuwA ) not even that tBAwa (= faUbwA)
may also mean a week. But if this were granted, Hitzig would still be right in
maintaining, that in that case tBAwa then could only mean a week which closed
with a Sabbath-day. And even if we gave this up as well, there would still
remain the leading proof in the passage, namely, that the tBAwa.ha traHImA.mi in ver.
46 must signify the same as the same expression in ver. 15 and ver. 11, and
therefore that the Pentecost, as well as the day of the waving ,of the sheaf,
must always have been preceded by a tBAwa, whether an ordinary Sabbath-day
burnt-offering, after the "continual sacrifice" (Num. xxviii. 17 sqq.). The seventh
day, with its Sabbath rest and holy assembly, brought the whole festival to a close,
and for that reason is designated tr,c,fE in Deut. xvi. 8. In the evening of this day,
after sunset, and therefore at the commencement of the eighth day, leavened bread
might be eaten again (Ex. xii. 18).
181. The most common and general NAME of this feast is
or a high feast day with a sabbatical character. And as the latter was never
the case, we are necessarily shut up to the former. Again, Josh. v. 11 is ap-
parently conclusive against the offering of the wave-sheaf on the 15th Abib,
although both Bahr and Keil adduce this passage in support of the opposite
view. The latter says, "our morrow after the Sabbath" was understood by the
contemporaries of Moses in Josh. v. 11 as equivalent to the "morrow after the
Passover;" but he overlooks the fact, that it is stated immediately before, that
"they kept the Passover on the 14th day of the month at even," and therefore
the "morrow after the Passover," which follows directly afterwards, can only
denote the 15th of the month; and, what is still worse, he also forgets that he
himself regards the name "Passover" as belonging (not only primarily, but)
exclusively to the 14th Abib, and upon that fact has founded his proof, that
the feast of Passover was the introductory festival to the feast of Mazzoth
( 181). I also regard the "Sabbath" in Lev. xxiii. 11 as confirmatory, though
not in the same: degree as Lev. xxiii. 16 and Josh. v. 11. "Sabbath" invari-
ably denotes simply the weekly Sabbath, and is never used in this absolute manner
to denote a great yearly feast day. At all events, whenever "the Sabbath"
stands, as it does here, without any further definition, we are always justified
in thinking first of the weekly Sabbath. I do not see that any great weight
can be attached to the argument adduced by Knobel, that Deut. xvi. 8 is a still
further proof, inasmuch as on the last day of the feast not only all "servile
work," but all "work" is prohibited, and thus the day is evidently signalized
as a weekly Sabbath; for it does not appear to me that this distinction was
maintained with sufficient consistency (cf. Ex. xii. 16), however certain the
fact may be, that the command to abstain from work on the weekly Sabbaths
and the day of atonement (Lev. xxiii. 28 sqq.) was much more stringent than on any other
feast days (Ex. xii. 16). On the other hand, there seems to me to
be great importance in the remark made by Knobel, that "it is difficult to
understand why precisely the second day of the Azyma, when the people bad
gone to their ordinary occupations, and had no occasion to assemble at the
sanctuary, should have been the one distinguished by the sacrificial gift pecu-
liar to the festival. As if the people ought not to have been present when the
gift dedicated by them to Jehovah was solemnly presented!" A holy convoca-
tion was appointed for the presentation of the loaves of first-fruits at the day
of Pentecost. And as we find from Num. xxviii. 11, 19, 24, that the number
of burnt-offerings to be presented was exactly the same on all seven days, but
that on the day of the wave-sheaf there were to be offered along with this a
special burnt-offering, meat-offering, and drink-offering, the second day, on
which there was no assembly, would have bad a richer ceremonial than the first,
at which all the people were to appear at the sanctuary.
tOc..m.aha gHa, or feast of unleavened loaves. It occurs four times in the

Pentateuch (Ex. xxiii. 15, xxxiv. 18; Lev. xxiii. 6; Deut. xvi. 16).
This name was given to the feast on account of the command to
eat only sweet bread during the seven days that it lasted. On the
other hand, the name HsaP,ha gHa, or feast of passing over, occurs only
once in the Pentateuch, viz., Ex. xxxiv. 25. The name HsaP, (Chald.
xHAs;Pa, LXX. pa<sxa, Vulg. Phase or transitus) was derived, accord-
ing to Ex. xii. 13, 27, from the fact that when Jehovah passed
through the land, destroying the first-born of the Egyptians, He
passed by the houses of the Israelites. The verb Hsp signifies
literally, "to stride" or "spring over" anything; then, as that
which a man strides over he does not trample upon, "to spare:"
hence HsaP, also signifies sparing. What distinguished this feast
from all others was, (1) the paschal meal with which it began, and
(2) the eating of unleavened bread during the whole time that it
lasted. From the former it received the name feast of Pesach, from
the latter, feast of Mazzoth.
But it is quite a mistake to divide the feast of Pesach or Mazzoth
into two different feasts, as Keil has followed Ewald in doing; and
altogether wrong to suppose that the former was merely a "pre-
liminary festival," and the latter the "principal feast." On the
contrary, nothing is clearer in the whole law of worship than that
the paschal meal was the principal feast, and the eating of Mazzoth
for seven days only a subdued echo of this leading feast. Even be-
fore the preparation of the Pesach meal all leavened bread had to be
removed from the houses, and the Pesach meal itself was to be eaten
with unleavened bread. It follows, therefore as a matter of course
and is expressly stated in Ex. xii. 18, that the night of the Pesach
meal belonged to the seven days of Mazzoth, and formed the com-
mencement of them. The Pesach meal and the eating of the Maz-
zoth for seven days were a commemoration, not of the day of the
exodus and the first seven days of their journey, but of the day of
the exodus alone. And the appointment of seven days of comme-
moration for one historical day had its origin simply in the general
character of a great festival, into which the commemoration of that
one day was to be expanded. A space of seven days, neither more
nor less, with the seal of the covenant number, was essential to the
complete exhaustion of the idea of a high festival. But as the
eating of the paschal lamb was the one, indivisible, and not to be
repeated basis of the whole festival, and yet the festival itself was
to be kept for seven days, this could only be done by the other
essential part of the paschal meal, the eating of unleavened bread,

being continued for seven days. This is really admitted by Keil
when he says (p. 395), "The one day of deliverance became a seven
days' festival of holy joy, sanctified by the sacred number seven, in
which Israel rested from the oppression and toil of Egypt, and par-
ticipated in the blessedness of divine repose." But holding to this,
the correct view, how is it possible to place the Pesach and Mazzoth
side by side as two distinct festivals, and to make the seven days'
echo of the joy the leading festival, and the main celebration merely
a preliminary feast?
"But in the law," says Keil (p. 393), a the Pascha in the even-
ing of the 14th Abib is clearly distinguished from the seven days'
feast of unleavened bread which followed: cf. Ex. xii. 18; Lev.
xxiii. 5, 6; Num. xxviii. 16, 17. It is incorrect on the part of
Bahr, therefore, to abolish this distinction, and to regard the names
as simply two different names for one and the same festival."1 It
is difficult to understand, however, how Ex. xii. 18 can ever have
been placed in the series of proof passages adduced in support of
the distinction, since this is the very passage which furnishes the
most unquestionable proof of the opposite. The words read thus
On the fourteenth day of the first month, at even, ye shall eat
unleavened bread until the one and twentieth day of the month at
even." Consequently the time of the paschal meal is certainly to
be reckoned among the seven days of Mazzoth. And just as Ex.
xii. 18 furnishes a proof that the seven days' feast of Mazzoth in-
eluded the paschal meal, so, on the other hand, in Deut. xvi. 2,
where the seven days' offering of the festal thank-offerings is com-
manded in these terms, Thou shalt sacrifice the Passover to
Jehovah," we have a proof that even in the Pentateuch the name
Passover" was applied to the whole seven days' festival.
182. The meal with which the festival began was called hsaP,
(Ex. xii. 11), and the lamb that was eaten HsaP, Hbaz, (xii. 27) or
HsaP,ha gHa Hbaz, (xxxiv. 25). The first question that arises here is
1
It is with the greatest pleasure that I can appeal to Hengstenberg's energetic
protest against this view (Passah, p. 146): "From a mistaken view of Lev. xxiii.
5, 6, and Num. xxviii. 16, 17, many have assumed that in the books of Moses a
distinction is made between the Passah and the feast of unleavened bread.
This is not for a moment to be thought of. We have not two separate festivals
there placed side by side, but simply the commencement and (? or) main portion
of the feast and the whole feast. The 'feast of unleavened bread' denotes the
whole, including the paschal meal."
whether the paschal lamb was to be regarded as a sacrifice. Many

of the earlier Protestant theologians denied this on mistaken, pole-
mical grounds, connected with their opposition to the Roman
Catholic view of the Lord's Supper as a bloodless repetition of the
bleeding sacrifice of Christ (vid. History of the Old Covt., vol. ii.
p. 297). Among modern theologians, v. Hofmann is the only one
who has taken the same side; but he has done so in a totally dif-
ferent interest, and stedfastly kept his stand in spite of all opposi-
tion. The sacrificial character of the paschal lamb is defended,
first of all, by an appeal to the name Hbaz,, which is given to it. But
when Hofmann maintains, in opposition to this, that "this term
might be applied to any kind of sacrifice, as 1 Sam. xxviii. 24 and
Prov. xvii. 1 clearly prove," the true answer is not the one given
by Keil (p. 379), namely, that HbazA never means simply to slay,
like HbaFA and FHawA, not even in Prov. xvii. 1, where byri yHeb;zi are sacri-
fices of strife, i.e., fat sacrificial portions eaten in a quarrelsome
house (2) or in 1 Sam. xxviii. 24 which is to be rendered: she
sacrificed the fatted calf to the king;" but that given by Harnack
(der ehristl. Gemeinde-gottesdienst, p. 191): "The question is not
whether everything slaughtered was or could be called a Zebach,
but what act was it in connection with the O. T. theocracy and its
ceremonial law that was so described? Now it is only to the
bleeding offerings that the expression is there applied, and conse-
quently the Passah must belong to this category also."
There can be no question whatever, that by Philo and Josephus,
and in the whole line of the Jewish tradition, the paschal lamb was
regarded as a sacrifice. And the Apostle Paul also refers to it
as a sacrifice in 1 Cor. v. 7: "For even Christ our Passover was
sacrificed (e]tu<qh) for us." It is true, that even here Hofmann has
succeeded in discovering two passages (Luke xv. 23; Acts x. 13),
in which qu<ein is used of ordinary slaughtering. But in this case
also, the question is, not what qu<ein might mean in ordinary phrase-
ology, but what it did mean, in the technical phraseology of religious
worship. And can any one really persuade himself that the Apostle
did not think, and did not wish others to know that he thought, of
the sacrificial death of Christ?
Again, the paschal lamb is called a NBAr;qA in Num. ix. 7. It is
true, this passage unquestionably refers, not to the first celebration
of the Passover in Egypt, but to the first commemorative Passover
at Sinai. And upon this Hofmann founds his objection: "At all
events, a distinction must be made between the first HsaP,-Hbaz, and
the repetitions of it. In the former a lamb was slain to serve as

a meal, and that not a religious meal, but simply a meal appointed
by God. It was the repetition of it that was a religious festival.
But the lamb was not offered to God either here or there. It was
no Minchah; but in the repetitions of the festival it was applied in
a religious manner, and could therefore be called Corban." But it
is evident at once, that this explanation is confusing rather than
enlightening. Keil has very justly described it as confusing on the
part of Hofmann, that he has opposed the application of the name
Minchah to the Passover; for no one on the opposite side ever has
applied or could apply this name to it, inasmuch as every one knows
that in the whole Pentateuch except Gen. iv. 4, and the whole of
the later usage of the language, Minchah is only used of the blood-
less offerings upon the altar. In Hofmnann's opinion, the first Pass-
over was not a religious festival, whilst the repetition of it was. But
why the former cannot also be called so, we are not told. Every
performance of a divine command is "religious service" in the
broader sense of the term; therefore the slaying and eating of the
Egyptian Passover, which had been appointed by God, was so too.
And even in the more restricted sense it may be designated a re-
ligious service, an act of worship. For of all that distinguishes an
act of worship from ordinary actions, not a single essential point is
wanting here. It was appointed by God, and enforced by divine
promises to those who faithfully observed it, and by divine threat-
enings to those who despised and neglected it. The observance of
it was a practical acknowledgment of the God of Israel. It was
not an act to be performed this once only, but was to be repeated
year after year; and it is expressly described as hdAObfE, or the ser-
vice of God (Ex. xn. 25, 26). It is true, it is not placed in any
direct relation to the sanctuary or the altar. But this does not
necessarily deprive it of the validity of an act of worship; for that
was the case with circumcision also, and yet no one will deny that
this was an act of worship. In fact, the paschal supper in Egypt
has still stronger claims to the character of religious worship, than
the first circumcision in the grove at Mamre. For circumcision
continued even in later times, without any relation to the sanctuary
and altar; whereas, as soon as a sanctuary and altar actually existed,
the Passover was placed in the closest and most essential relation
to them. In Egypt, however, this relation to the sanctuary and
altar was wanting, merely because it could not be manifested, as
Israel had neither altar nor sanctuary in the land of Egypt.
The paschal lamb is certainly never called a Minchah; but no

one who knows what a Minchah is in the Mosaic phraseology would
expect or require that it should be so called. According to Num.
ix. 7, however, it both was, and was called, a Corban. Nevertheless
Hof mann maintains that neither the Egyptian nor the Sinaitic
Passover "was offered to God." But what is a Corban, if not an
offering? And if it was an offering, who was there but God to
whom it could be offered? Moreover, did not the men referred
to in Num. ix. 7, who were prevented from taking part in the
Passover at Sinai on account of a death in their neighbourhood,
expressly describe the paschal lamb as a Corban of Jehovah? Now
what has Hofmann done to evade the force of this passage? He
changes the idea of offering at once into that of "religious
application." Even the later Passover, he says, was not offered to
God, but it was applied in a religious manner, and therefore could
be called Corban. The text, indeed, is not favourable to this quid
pro quo; for the men do not say, "Why may we not apply the
Corban of Jehovah in a religious manner?" but rather, "Why
should we not be allowed to present it (byriq;ha)?" Throughout the
Bible, from Lev. i. 2 to Mark vii. 11, Corban invariably means
something offered to God. And we shall therefore do right in
adhering to our point, that at any rate the later Passover, being a
Corban of Jehovah, was also "offered to God." And if these men,
at the very first repetition of the Passover, speak at once of the
paschal lamb as a Corban, we may certainly assume that they re-
garded the normal Passover in Egypt as Corban also. The act of
bringing to the sanctuary and presenting upon the altar was certainly
omitted, because the means of carrying it out were wanting. But
did not the solemn selection and separation of the lamb, which took
place four days before it was slain, mark it clearly enough as a
Corban of Jehovah--as set apart for God, and for divine purposes?
Hofmann repudiates the idea that the paschal lamb was "offered
to God, and the meal then arranged after the manner of the thank-
offering meals." He says, "The animal was slaughtered for the
express purpose of the meal, and not offered to God and then
eaten at a meal." But how little penetration he shows in this dis-
tinction is very apparent. For has not Hofmann himself, when
speaking professedly of the thank-offering meals, laid as strong an
emphasis as possible upon the fact, that the animal slain as a thank-
offering was not merely appropriated afterwards to the meal, but
intended for it from the very first (vid. 81)?
When Hofmann rejoins that "it was a meal commanded by

God, and not an act of worship instituted by Israel for the purpose
of laying before God its desire for deliverance: the slaying and
the meal were not the spontaneous expression of this desire, but the
fulfilment of a divine command" so weak an argument hardly
need be met by the remark, that subjective desire and an objective
command, human need of salvation and the divine appointment of
salvation, do not exclude, but demand one another. To meet the
need of salvation spontaneously uttered by the Israelites, and to
guide it into such modes of action as corresponded to His plan of
salvation, God required and regulated in the law, not only the
slaying and preparation of the paschal lamb, but the slaying and
preparation of all the other sacrifices.
According to Ex. xii. 5, a male, unblemished lamb or kid of a
year old was to be chosen for the first Egyptian Passover. What
can have been the meaning and design of these requirements, if
not to show that the Passover was a religious meal? If it had
been only an ordinary meal, answering no other purpose than to
strengthen the Israelites for their approaching journey, these regula-
tions would really have been very superfluous. But we know what
importance was attached to them in connection with the bleeding
sacrifices, and how essential they were there ( 34). The same
remark also applies to the command in ver. 10, that none of the
flesh of the paschal lamb was to be left till the morning, but what-
ever could not be eaten was to be burned with fire. Does not this
remind us distinctly enough of the similar command with reference
to the flesh of the sin-offering and peace-offering ( 117, 139); and
are we not warranted, nay, almost compelled, by this agreement to
regard the paschal lamb as a sacrifice also? Another point to be
observed is, that in ver. 6 the slaying of the lamb is designated FHw,
the proper term for the slaying of a sacrifice. And when to all
this we add the fact, that in every subsequent observance of the
Passover the blood of the lamb was sprinkled upon the altar, and
the fat portions burned upon the altar, I cannot understand how
any one can still refuse to accord to the offering the dignity of a
sacrifice. And in Hofmann's reply, that the distinction between
the first and every subsequent Passover comes all the more con-
spicuously to light in consequence, but the latter, to say nothing of
the former, does not appear as an act of sacrificing, the demon-
strative force of this fact is not really met, but evaded.
183. If, then, the sacrificial character of the paschal lamb
must be admitted, the question arises, to which of the classes of

sacrifice otherwise occurring in the Mosaic economy does it belong?
Strictly speaking, to none of them; for the peculiarity belonging
to the purpose of its institution gave a perfectly unique character
to many portions of the ritual, with which it was accompanied. It
stood nearest, no doubt, to the peace-offerings; and since it has all
the characteristic marks by which they were distinguished from the
rest of the sacrifices, we feel perfectly justified in following nearly
all the commentators, both earlier and later, and placing it among
the Shelamim. It not only has the name Zebach (Ex. xii. 27,
xxiii. 18), which is applied in the Pentateuch exclusively to the
peace-offerings, but it has also the sacrificial meal in common with
them alone; and the directions in Ex. xii. 10, as to what was to be
done with the flesh that remained over from the meal, correspond
to those given with regard to what remained from the praise-
offering the most important description of peace-offering ( 139
In answer to Hengstenberg, who opposes this, and regards it as
a sin-offering--in fact, as the foundation, the root, and the centre
of all other sin-offerings--we have simply to adduce the fact,
that of all the distinguishing characteristics of the sin-offering, in
name, object, and ritual, not a single feature appears in the case of
the paschal lamb; whereas, on the other hand, all the distinctive
marks of the peace-offering are impressed upon it. And Harnack's
emendation of the prevailing opinion, in which he endeavours to
show that it comprised the nature of both sin-offering and thank-
offering, is without foundation on the one hand, since the ritual of
the Passover was wanting in every distinguishing mark of that of
the sin-offering, and unnecessary on the other hand, for the one
point which induced him to adopt this view, viz., the expiatory
worth of the blood of the Passover, has its analogon, according to
Lev. xvii. 11, in the sprinkling of the blood of the peace-offering.
Keil has adopted it for all that.
184. In the ritual of the Passover the first thing which strikes
us is the instruction given in Ex. xii. 3, that the lamb to be used
was to be selected on the 10th Abib, i.e., four days before it was to
be slain. 0. v. Gerlach attributes this simply to the hurry of their
departure; as if the choice of a lamb from the fold was an affair of
so much time as to require four whole days! Hengstenberg goes
much deeper than this. The lamb, he says, had to be selected
four days before the feast, in order that they might accustom them-
selves to regard it as a holy thing, and so the more easily forget its
common nature in the light of the divine institution; and still more,
that their minds might be led for some time before the feast to take
a right view of the great blessing to be conferred upon them, and
be truly prepared for its reception." The correctness of this view
can hardly be disputed. But it leaves the question unanswered,
why exactly four days should have been fixed upon. Why not
three, or seven? Hofmann was the first to examine this point, and
he explains it thus in his Weissagung and Erfullung (i. 123): "The
lamb had to be chosen just as many days before it was wanted, as
there had been troOD (Gen. xv. 16) since the time when Israel was
brought into Egypt to grow into a nation. Four days long did the
sight of the lamb keep up the thought of the approaching deliver-
ance, before it was dressed as a meal to give strength for the
journey." But this allusion seems to me too far-fetched and ob-
scure; and I prefer, therefore, to give the number four not a
realistic, but a purely symbolical meaning. Four is the sign of the
kingdom of God. And this was to be the characteristic number of
the paschal lamb, on account of its connection with the history of
the development of the kingdom of God. According to the Jewish
tradition, this arrangement was confined to the first Passover in
Egypt.
The slaying of the lamb was to take place on the 14th Abib,
between the two evenings (Ex. xii. 6). According to the Samari-
tan, Caraitic view, which is generally regarded as the correct one
by modern writers on Jewish antiquities, the expression MyiBar;fahA NyBe
refers to the time between six o'clock and half-past seven,--he first
evening commencing when the sun disappears below the horizon,
the second at the time of total darkness. This is favoured by the
nature of the case, and the analogy of the following passages: Ex.
xvi. 12, 13, xxx. 8; Dent. xvi. 6. (Vid. J. v. Gumpaeh, Alt-test.
Studien, Heidelberg 1852, pp. 224-37; and my History of the Old
Covenant, ii. P. 301.)
185. According to Hofmann (p. 272), even "the smearing of
the door-way with the blood off the slaughtered animal was not the
freewill expression of a desire for atonement, but the fulfilment of
a divine command." But here too the contrast between a subjec-
tive desire and an objective command is an arbitrary invention of
Hofmann himself, and is drawn not from the law, but from the air
(cf. 183) ; for the act of atonement in the ordinary sin-offerings,
trespass-offerings, burnt- and, peace-offerings, was not merely a
"spontaneous expression of desire for atonement," but was quite
as much the fulfilment of a divine command as the smearing of

the door-posts with the blood of the Passover on the day of the
exodus from Egypt.
Now since the paschal lamb was a sacrifice, as we have already
seen at 183, its blood was also expiatory, and the smearing of the
door-posts with the blood is to be regarded as an act of atonement.
This assumption is in harmony with the significance ascribed to the
smearing. For example, according to Ex. xii. 13, 23, the blood
was to be a sign and pledge to the inhabitants of the house, that
when Jehovah saw it He would pass by and spare them from the
plague which was about to fall upon the Egyptians. Israel needed
an expiation, for it could not stand in its sin when God arose to
judgment. But God desired to rescue and spare the Israelites for
the sake of their calling, and because of their faith; and for that
reason He gave atoning efficacy to the blood of the sacrifice, which
they slew at His command. This was to be appropriated by them
in faith and as a proof that they had done so, they were to mark
their houses with the atoning blood. And when the atoning blood
of the sacrifice covered the posts and lintel of the door, the whole
house, and everything within it, was thereby expiated and pro-
tected, for the entrance represented the entire house. But the
entrance to the house was formed by, the two door-posts and the
lintel which connected them; the threshold was subordinate, and
could be dispensed with. Hence the lintel only needed to be
smeared, and not the threshold. Moreover, the latter could not
properly have been smeared, as persons passing out and in would
then have trodden upon the holy blood.
The command in vers. 6, 7, "the whole assembly of the congre-
gation of Israel shall kill it, and take the blood and strike it on the
two side-posts, etc.," is regarded by Bahr (ii. 633), Hengstenberg
(Christol. iii. 525), Keil (i. 385), and others as a practical exempli-
fication of Ex. xix. 6 By this, says Keil, the whole nation
proved itself to be the kingdom of priests, which God had called it
to be. For even if every Israelite was allowed to slay a sacrificial
animal, the ceremonial connected with the blood was the exclusive
prerogative of the priests. But they forget, in the first place, that
it was through the conclusion of the covenant at Sinai that Israel
was first consecrated, and qualified to act as a kingdom of priests;
and secondly, that even before the institution of the Passover, the
ceremonial connected with the blood was performed not by specially
consecrated priests, for there were none, but by the sacrificer him-
self, and therefore there was nothing peculiar and unusual in the
instructions given in ver. 6. The design of these instructions was
to lay stress upon the fact, that no Israelite was to be excluded, or
to exclude himself, from participating in the paschal festival.
186. If, then, the paschal lamb was a sacrifice, the paschal meal
must be regarded as a sacrificial meal, and the same significance be
ascribed to it as to every other sacrificial meal, viz., to set forth
that fellowship with God which the sacrificial expiation had secured.
Hofmann, indeed, cannot see any other purpose in the paschal meal
than " to give them strength for their approaching journey." And
if the bodily strength, which this meal was unquestionably intended
to impart, in anticipation of the coming journey, be also regarded
as a symbol of a corresponding spiritual invigoration, we are per-
fectly ready to adopt this view. But this was hardly the sense in
which Hofmann understood it. In fact, with his denial of the
sacrificial idea, he could not understand it in this way. But can it
really be possible that in the sacrificial meal, the symbolical character
of which is brought out so decidedly by so many significant points
of detail, nothing more is to be found than the trivial advice, "Eat
to-night till you are quite full, that you may be in a condition to
start upon your journey to-morrow morning?"
The instructions to roast the lamb (ver. 9), and not to boil it
with water,1 were not dictated, as Bahr (ii. 636) and v. Hofmann
suppose, by the simple fact that this mode of preparation was better
suited to the hurry of the whole proceeding; but are to be explained
on the ground that in this way the character of the flesh would not
be altered by any foreign substance, and the flesh, even when
ready for eating, would still be the pure flesh of the lamb.
The further command, that not a bone of the lamb was to be
broken (ver. 46), had a corresponding meaning. Of course, what is
meant is simply dissection for the purpose of cooking, not for the
purpose of eating. The lamb was to be placed upon the table as a
perfect, undivided whole. The unity, represented in this way by
the lamb, was transferred in a certain sense by the act of eating
to those who partook of it. By eating of the one lamb as a divine
repast, at the table of God, as His house and table guests, they
1
If, notwithstanding this, we find the term lwe.Bi applied in Deut. xvi. 7 to
the preparation of the lamb, it must be borne in mind that there was a wxeBA lwe.Bi
(2 Chron. xxxv. 13; cf. 2 Sam. xiii. 8), and that it is only Myima.Ba lwe.Bi which is
forbidden in Ex. xii. 9.
were joined together in a unity based upon the same fellowship

with God (1 Cor. x. 17). For the same reason the head, the
thighs, and the viscera were also to be eaten, of course so far as
this was possible. And what remained from the meal was not to
be kept for other meals, but, burned the next morning (ver. 10).
For if it had been spread over different meals, the idea of unity
and completeness would have been destroyed, quite as effectually as
if only the half of the lamb had been roasted. Moreover, it would
have been brought in this way under the category of ordinary food,
and so have lost the character of holiness. The burning in this
case, as in the analogous cases connected with the peace-offering
meal ( 139), was simply a matter of necessity, and did, not destroy
the idea of unity. For, by being given up to the fire, it was with-
drawn from all profane, everyday use, and annihilated as if it had
never existed. In any case, the burning of the remaining flesh,
was an evil that was to be avoided as far as possible. Provision
was made for this by the instructions in ver. 4, that if there should
be too few in any house for one lamb, they were to join with a
family in the neighbourhood. The prohibition in ver. 46, against
carrying any part of it across the street from one house to another,
also served to keep up the character of unity.
With reference to the bitter herbs (Myrirom;) which were to be
eaten with the paschal lamb (ver. 8), I must still adhere to the
opinion that they were to be regarded as an accompaniment. They
were related, no doubt, to the bitterness of the bondage in Egypt,
which is thus described in chap. i. 14: The Egyptians made their
lives bitter (Urrmy). The eating of bitter herbs and the drinking
of bitter water are also used in other places as a figurative repre-
sentation of suffering and affliction (Ps. lxix. 21 Jer. viii. 14).
But as an accompaniment to the sweet flavour of the lamb, they
no doubt acquired the character of a condiment. The sweetness of
the flesh was to be rendered still more palatable by the bitter vege-
tables; for the bitterness was lost in the sweetness of the flesh, and
it was through the former that the latter was rendered truly savoury.
What the bitter condiment was to the sweet food, the remembrance
of their sufferings in Egypt would be to their, deliverance from
bondage there. But there was something more intended than the
mere remembrance of the oppression in Egypt. As bitterness, and
sweetness modified and supplemented each other in the meal, so the
sufferings in Egypt and the deliverance from Egypt stood in a close
and essential relation to one another. Without the former the latter
would never have taken place, and by the present consciousness of

the former the commemoration first acquired its true consecration
(cf. Heb. xii. 11).
The protest made by Keil (i. 386-7) against this view of mine
has not shaken my confidence in its correctness. In Keil's opinion,
the words, 'over bitter herbs (Myrirom;-lfa) shall ye eat it,' show that
the bitter herbs were not to be regarded as an accompaniment, or a
condiment, modifying the sweetness of the meat, but as the true
basis of the meal, which was covered, or subdued as it were, by the
roast meat and the unleavened bread." But the expression Myrrm-lf
furnishes neither a confirmation of Keil's view nor an objection to
the traditional one. For it is so well known that in innumerable
instances lf is used in the sense of with, along with, that it would
be quite superfluous to adduce passages in proof of this. And in
the present instance we are not only warranted, but compelled by
the very nature of the case, to take it in this sense. If a meal con-
sists of roast meat and bitter herbs, it follows as a matter of course
that the meat is the principal thing and the herbs are the accompani-
ment, and not the reverse. I am just as little able to adopt Keil's
view, when he regards the bitter herbs as a symbol, not only of the
bitter sufferings endured by Israel in Egypt, but also of the bitter-
ness of life in this sinful world, which Israel in its natural state was
perpetually to endure, but which in its spiritual state it was to
overcome at every repetition of the feast of Passover, through the
flesh of the lamb that was slain for its sins; for I cannot find the
slightest warrant for any such opinion in either the occasion or
purpose of the meal.
On the command to eat only unleavened bread at the paschal
meal, see the remarks in 145. Winer refers to Deut. xvi. 3,
where the Passover bread is called the bread of affliction, ynifo MH,L,,
and gives this explanation of the command: The Israelites of a
later age could not be reminded in a more effectual manner of the
oppression endured in Egypt, than by having to eat for a whole
week such coarse and tasteless food." But to this Bahr very pro-
perly replies: "In that case the whole of the seven days' feast
would have been made into a time of chastisement and fasting;
whereas, so far from being a feast of penitence and mourning, it
was really a an, or festival of joy. The meat-offerings and spew-
bread, which were intended, according to their symbolical worth,
as food for Jehovah, were also required to be unleavened. Was
it likely that they would be commanded to offer wretched and
tasteless bread to Jehovah?" But Bahr's own explanation ("it

was called bread of affliction because it was bread which called to
mind Egypt and the affliction endured by the nation there, but
only inasmuch as it was eaten at the time of their deliverance and
rescue from affliction") can hardly escape the charge of tracing the
derivation of a name on the principle of lucus a non lucendo. Hof-
mann (Weiss. u. Erfull. i. 124-5) gives the true explanation, which
he discovers in the clause immediately following: "For thou camest
forth out of the land of Egypt in haste, NOzPAHiB;, i.e., in forced and
anxious flight." The departure from Egypt was necessarily an ynifI,
because it had to take the form of a NOzPAHi and Israel ate its last
meal in Egypt "in affliction" (cf. Isa. lii. 12).
The command to eat the paschal meal in travelling costume,
girt, shod, and with staff in hand (ver. 11), may be explained from
the hurry with which, the very same night, the Israelites had to take
their departure, being literally forced out by the Egyptians (vers.
12 sqq.).
187. In immediate connection with the appointment of the
first celebration of the Passover (Ex. xii. 14 sqq.), the annual re-
petition of it was commanded as a festival in commemoration of the
deliverance from Egypt. The laws in the middle books contain
no precise directions as to the mode in which this commemoration-
feast was to be kept. But from Ex. xxiii. 17, where it is com-
manded that at the three principal feasts, and therefore at the feast
of Passover, all the (adult) males are to assemble at the sanctuary,
it may be inferred, that after the entrance of the Israelites into
the Holy Land, the paschal meal was to be kept there, and there
only. This is confirmed by Dent. xvi. 2, 5 sqq., where the Passah
is ordered to be slain, prepared, and eaten, not in the towns where
the people lived, but at the place of the sanctuary. The size of
the fore-court of the tabernacle precludes the supposition that this
is intended; but the supposition is equally inadmissible, that refer-
ence is made to the houses and inns in Shiloh or Jerusalem, to which
they were probably not to return till the morning after the Passover
had been held (ver. 7). It would be more correct to suppose that
the lamb was to be prepared and eaten in the open air, in the im-
mediate vicinity of the sanctuary. This is also confirmed by 2
Chron. xxxv. 13. In the New Testament times, on the contrary, it
was undoubtedly the custom to prepare the paschal meal in the
houses of Jerusalem (cf. Luke xxii. 7 sqq.).
The reasons for this transference of the feast of the Passover
from the dwelling-houses to the immediate vicinity of the sanctuary,

are no doubt to be found in the sacrificial character of the paschal
lamb. Sacrificial expiation and the sacrificial meal as such be-
longed to that place, which Jehovah had chosen, to cause His
name to dwell there (Deut. xvi. 6), to meet with the children of
Israel (Ex. xxv. 8), and there to dwell in the midst of them (Ex.
xxix. 45, 46). At the first Passover in Egypt, these two leading
branches of the festival necessarily took place in the houses, on the
one hand because Israel was then without a sanctuary, and on the
other because the existing circumstances positively demanded it.
But even at the first commemorative festival at Sinai these reasons
existed no longer. It was possible for the sacrifice of the Passover
to be regulated by the ordinary laws relating to the sacrificial
worship, and therefore this was required. The blood was to be
sprinkled upon the altar of the fore-court, and the paschal meal to
be held in the immediate neighbourhood of the sanctuary, accord-
ing to the analogy of the meal connected with the peace-offering
( 139). This assimilation of the paschal offering to the ordinary
peace-offerings extended in all probability to the fat portions of the
former (cf. 169). It is true, this is nowhere expressly mentioned
in the Old Testament; but it may be unhesitatingly assumed as a
a necessary consequence of the sacrificial character of the paschal
lamb, and of the prohibition against eating the fat of the sacrificial
animals ( 5).
188. As the Israelites in the meantime had renounced of
their own accord their universal priesthood (Ex. xx. 19), and all
specifically priestly functions had been transferred to the family of
Aaron in consequence; consistency demanded that the sprinkling
of the blood, even in the case of the paschal lamb, should hence-
forth be performed by the hands of the priests alone; and it is evi-
dent from 2 Chron. xxx. 16, xxxv. 11, that this was really the custom
of a later age. At the same time, it is questionable whether this
was, or even could be, carried out at once (i.e., at the first com-
memorative feast at Sinai). Considering, for example, the very
small number of priests who were really able to officiate in the
Mosaic times, or those immediately following, and on the other
hand the number of lambs to be slain, actually amounting as they
did to myriads, and the short time allowed for the slaying and
sprinkling of the blood,--we must certainly decide that this was
not the case. It is possible, therefore, that the outward circum-
stances of the time may have rendered it necessary to leave the
sprinkling of the blood, in the case of the paschal sacrifices, to the

heads of the families, until the priesthood had become sufficiently
numerous to carry out the necessary consequences of Ex. xx. 19,
as we find them afterwards carried out in 2 Chron. xxx. and xxxv.,
in the time of Hezekiah and Josiah.
Up to this point, but only so far, there may be a certain, though
still a very limited amount of truth in the assertion made by Philo,1
and certain modern scholars, to the effect, that at the offering of
the paschal lamb, the head of every household officiated once a
year as priest, as a sign and memorial that the priestly rights of
the nation were only suspended, and would one day be restored
in their fullest extent. The proof which Philo adduces in support
of this view, when he cites as a peculiarly priestly function, what
according to the Mosaic law was never performed by the priest,
but by the sacrificer himself, viz., the slaying of the animal, is
so obviously worthless, that even if we could understand Philo's
falling into such a mistake, it would still be perfectly incompre-
hensible how Hengstenberg could do the same.2 Havernick and
Kliefoth also hold fast to Philo's fundamental idea, though they
reject his reasoning as unsound. The former maintains, that apart
1
Philo, de vita Mos. iii, p. 686, Ed. Frcf: e]n ^$ (e[ort^?) ou]x oi[ me>n i]diw?tai
prosa<gousi t&? bwm&? ta> i[erei?a, qu<ousi de> oi[ i[erei?j, a]lla> no<mou prosta<cei sumpa?n
to> e@qnoj i[era?tai tw?n kata> me<roj e[ka<stou ta>j u[pe>r au]tou? qusi<aj a]na<gontoj to<te kai>
xeirourgou?ntoj. And again, de decal. p. 766 e]n ^$ qu<ousi pandhmei? au]tw? e!kas-
toj, tou>j i[erei?j au]tw?n ou]k a]name<nontej, i[erwsu<nhn tou? no<mou xarisame<nou t&? e@qnei
panti> me<an h[me<ran e]caireton a]na> pa?n e@toj ei]j au]tourgi<an qusiw<n.
2
Although Bochart (Hieroz. i. 2, 50, p. 376) and Vitringa (Observv. ss. ii.
3, 10) had discovered and exposed Philo's error, yet Hengstenberg writes as
follows, not only in the first edition of his Christology, but, without noticing my
reply, in the second edition also: "And in order that the people might always
remain fully conscious of this (viz., that the priests possessed rights that were
only transferred to them, and therefore their mediation would at some future
period disappear altogether); in order that they might know that they them,
selves were the real bearers of the priestly dignity, they retained, even after the
institution of the Levitical priesthood, that priestly function which formed the
root and foundation of all the others, viz., the slaying of the covenant sacrifice,
of the paschal lamb, which formed the centre of all other sacrifices, inasmuch
as the latter served only as a supplement to it. That even under the Old Testa-
ment dispensation this importance of the paschal rite was duly recognised, is
seen from Philo," etc. (vol. ii. p. 470, Engl. translation). I am glad to find
that Keil also rejects this view (i. 389). He is wrong, however, in citing it as
adopted by Bahr. For Bahr is merely referring to the first Passover in Egypt,
and agrees here ad unguem with Keil's own view, which we have already shown
to be untenable ( 185).
from the fact that at the Passover the head of the family always
officiated in an extraordinary manner, when holding the paschal
meal in his own home in the family circle and not, as in the case
of the other sacred meals, at the sanctuary (Deut. xii. 17, 18), and
therefore a reflection still remained of the privileges formerly con-
ferred upon him by the Lord, and he stood out in patriarchal
dignity,--the Passover of later times is decidedly to be regarded as
a memorial festival in remembrance, and as a lively revival, of that
first festival, when Israel really obtained and celebrated its birth,
redemption, and acceptance with God. Thus the feast of Passover
was, and always remained, a commemoration of the old, original
destination of Israel to be a holy, priestly nation," etc. But these
two fresh arguments are also untenable, and the first has been
already refuted in 187, the second in 185.
Kliefoth's reasoning appears still more unsound. At p. 151
he says, "In the fact that all the Israelites were obliged to eat
unleavened bread, which only (2) the priests were allowed to eat on
other occasions, and that more stress was laid upon this eating of
what was unleavened at the yearly than at the first Passover, the
universal priesthood of all the Israelites was certainly expressed,
though only in an altered form." But it was only the unleavened
bread which had been offered to God as a Minchah, that none but
the priests were allowed to eat. The Israelites were never forbidden
to eat unleavened bread when and where they chose. And it by
no means follows, from the fact that they were commanded to eat
only unleavened bread during the seven days of the feast of Pass-
over, that at other times the bread must all be leavened.
189. In the seven days' festival that followed the Passover
( 180) there is one thing more that claims our special attention,
viz., the presentation of the wave-sheaf on the first day after the
proper Passover. With regard to this it was commanded in Lev.
xxiii. 10, that when they came to the Holy Land, a sheaf of the
first-fruits (tywixre rm,fo) of the harvest was to be brought to the priest
on the day appointed, and to be waved by him. In connection
with this sheaf, probably as the basis of its presentation, a lamb
was also to be offered as a burnt-offering along with the customary
meat- and drink-offerings.
As the words read, they cannot be understood in any other way
than that the sheaf of first-fruits was to be presented and waved as
a sheaf; and then, according to the analogy in other cases, viz., the
similar offering of the bread of first-fruits at the day of Pentecost,
it must be assumed that the sheaf when waved fell to the portion
of the priests. It was not regarded then in the light of a Minchah,
but only in that of a Corban. Later Jewish tradition, as found in
Josephus, Ant. iii. 10, 5, and the Mishnah, Tr. Menachoth x. 1-4,
undoubtedly regards the tywixre rm,fo as a true Minchah, taking the
word rm,f as equivalent to NOrWA.fi (a tenth of an ephah), and thus
obtaining a basis for the identification of our tywixre rm,fo with the
MyriUKBi hHAn;mi in Lev. ii. 14. Accordingly, on the 16th Nisan a suffi-
cient quantity of barley ears for the measure proposed were dried
in the fore-court of the temple; the grains were then bruised and
cleansed from the bran; and after the groats so obtained had been
prepared with oil, incense, and salt, and waved, a handful was burnt
upon the altar, and the remainder was eaten by the priests.
This traditional idea of the Jews Thalhofer has attempted to
justify, as supported quite as much by the text as by the actual
nature of the case. But his arguments are anything but conclu-
sive. The relation between the two ideas MyriUKBi tHan;mi and MyriUKBi does not
favour in the slightest degree the combination or identification of
the tywixre rm,fo in Lev. xxiii. 10 and the MyriUKBi tHan;mi in Lev. ii. 14.
And though the word rm,fo was undoubtedly used according to Ex.
xvi. 36 as synonymous with probably because the average
yield of a sheaf was a tenth of an ephah. there is nothing in this
passage to warrant our taking it in that sense here. The waving
of the sheaf, again, did not make it an altar-offering; for that only
showed that it was offered to Jehovah for the priests ( 133), and
many offerings both were and were called hpAUnT; although no part
of them was placed upon the altar. It may be fully admitted that
the offering of the wave-sheaf was the characteristic, and in a cer-
tain sense the main feature in the festal ceremony of this day; and
yet it may be denied that this offering bore the character of an
altar-sacrifice. And when Thalhofer observes that "sacrifice was
the central point of the Mosaic worship, and it was only by sacrifice
and its relation to sacrifice that anything could acquire a religious
signification in Israel; even the Easter festival could only be raised
into a feast of nature by a sacrifice,"--he forgets that this was fully
met by the foundation laid for the offering of the wave-sheaf in the
burnt-offering, and the accompanying meat- and drink-offering,
which were to be connected with it.
The wave-sheaf falls rather under the general notion of first-
fruits, with this simple exception, that it was not presented as the
offering of first-fruits made by a single individual, but as the Corban
of first-fruits of the entire harvest of the whole congregation. By

the (preceding) accompaniment of a bleeding sacrifice, the congre-
gation presenting the offering had been rendered acceptable to
Jehovah, and their offering of first-fruits was thereby rendered
acceptable also. The appointment of a burnt-offering is easily to be
explained from the character and intention of this kind of sacrifice.
But it might appear strange that as the harvest-feast had reference
to the manifestation of divine goodness, a peace-offering was not
added. Our astonishment disappears, however, when we consider
that the blessing in question had not yet been received. The founda-
tion had merely been laid for its reception. At the feast of Pente-
cost, after the ripening and ingathering of the harvest, the peace-
offering was included also ( 192).
But it is still a striking fact that the meat-offering was not to
consist of one-tenth of white meal, according to the custom in other
analogous cases, but of two-tenths; whereas the measure of the
drink-offering (a quarter of a hin of wine) was not doubled in the
same way. This alteration of the rule adopted in other cases cannot
have been made without reason. The cause is probably to be
sought for in the nature of the sacrifice as a harvest-offering. The
doubling of the quantity had respect to the meal only, and not to
the wine, because the feast had reference to the corn harvest, and
not to the vintage.
D. THE FEAST OF PENTECOST.
190. On the fiftieth day, seven full weeks therefore, after

the offering of the sheaf of first-fruits ( 180, note), the feast of
Weeks (tOfUbwA gHa, Dent. xvi. 9), also called the feast of Harvest
(ryciq.Aha gHa, Ex. xxiii. 16), and feast of First-fruits (MyriUKBiha gHa, Ex.
xxiii. 16; Num. xxviii. 26), and by Josephus and the New Testa-
ment writers Pentekosth< (Acts ii. 1), was celebrated at the central
sanctuary on the termination of the corn harvest. The feast lasted
only one day, which had a sabbatical character (Lev. xxiii. 21;
Num. xxviii. 26). The distinguishing feature in this festival was
the offering of two leavened loaves of wheaten flour made from the
first-fruits, together with certain bleeding sacrifices (Lev. xxiii. 17
sqq.).
The character of this festival, which had no historical associa-
tions, was that of an expression of gratitude for the harvest.
Occurring as it did at the close of the harvest, which commenced
at the feast of Pesach or Mazzoth, it certainly may be regarded as a
THE FEAST OF PENTECOST. 377
closing festival: not, however, as even Keil follows Ewald in main-

taining, as being the close of the feast of Mazzoth, but as closing
the seven weeks' harvest which intervened. For the feast of Weeks
had nothing to do with the feast of Pesach or Mazzoth either in
substance or form; for it had no historical associations (connected
with the deliverance from Egypt), and there was so far from being
any enforcement of the obligation to eat unleavened bread, that, on
the contrary, the loaves of first-fruits to be presented and eaten by
the priests were actually required to be leavened. The feast of
Mazzoth had its own closing festival on the seventh day of un-
leavened bread, which was specially distinguished by its sabbatical
character and holy assembly, and is expressly designated tr,c,fE in
Deut. xvi. 8.
But the feast of Weeks is evidently pointed out as the conclud-
ing festival of the period of harvest, by the fact that neither the
paschal meal, nor the beginning or end of the eating of unleavened
bread, is the date from which it is reckoned, but the offering of the
sheaf of first-fruits, as being the point at which the harvest just
finished first really began (Lev. xxiii. 15, 16). The fixing of pre-
cisely fifty days from this presentation was determined not so much
by the fact that so long a period was actually required for the
harvest, as by the sacredness of the number seven which regulated
all the festivals, and the resemblance to the sabbatical and jubilee
years. The fifty days' harvest was as it were a jubilee period in
miniature.
191. With regard to the loaves of first fruits or wave-loaves
(MyriUkBiha MH,l,, Lev. xxiii. 20 , hpAUnT; l, xxiii. 17), it is questionable
whether they are to be regarded as meat-offerings in the strict sense
(Minchah), or merely as an offering of first-fruits in the sense of
Num. xv.19 and Lev. ii. 12 (Corban). Thalhofer (p. 181) answers
the former in the affirmative, and the latter in the negative; but with
just as little reason as when he makes the same assertion with regard
to the wave-sheaf of the feast of Passover ( 189). For since these
loaves were to be leavened, they could not be laid upon the altar,
and therefore could not be regarded as meat-offerings in the true
sense. For in Lev. ii. 11 it is laid down as a universal law:
Every meat-offering (hHAn;m.h i a-lKA) that ye offer to Jehovah, ye shall
make unleavened." It is true that in ver. 12 one exception to this
rule is mentioned, viz.: "as a Corban of first-fruits ye may offer
such to Jehovah;" but in this case the offering is called Corban
and not Minchah. When we find, therefore, that notwithstanding
this; it is commanded in Lev. xxiii. 16, with regard to the wave-

loaves treated of in the whole section vers. 15-21--"Unto the
morrow after the seventh Sabbath shall ye number fifty days, and
ye shall offer a new meat-offering (hwAdAHE hHAn;mi) to Jehovah," and that
immediately afterwards in ver. 17 the offering of the wave-loaves
is described (since an actual discrepancy between this passage and
Lev. ii, 11, 12 is not for a moment to be imagined, and according
to ver. 20 no part of them was really laid upon the altar), we must
assume, either that the term Minchah is used in a general sense as
equivalent to Corban, contrary to the ordinary usage, or that the
"new Minchah" here refers not to the two wave-loaves themselves,
but to the meat-offerings belonging to the bleeding sacrifices of this
day, and that they are designated as "new," to show that they also
were made from new flour, i.e., the flour of that year.
In any case these two wave-loaves of Pentecost are most closely
and intimately connected with the wave-sheaf of Easter, and bear
the same relation to it which the close of harvest bears to its com-
mencement. Hence the first-fruits were presented at Easter in
the form in which the land had produced them, without any prepa-
ration on the part of man, viz., as a bundle of ears, and, as the
barley was the first to ripen and the barley harvest was the first to
be taken in hand, of barley ears; and at Pentecost in the com-
pletest form of human preparation and human food, viz., as leavened
bread, and, as the wheat ripened and was harvested last, as bread
made of wheaten flour.
Two-tenths of an ephah of white meal were used in the prepa-
ration of these two loaves. As an omer of ears probably yielded
about an omer of grain or flour, it is a significant fact, that exactly
double the quantity required for the Easter offering of first-fruits
was ordered to be used for the wave-loaves; and this doubling of
the quantity was also shown in the fact, that the flour was made
into two loaves and not into one only. In the symbolism of the
Hebrews, however, doubling always expressed a higher gradation,
which rested in the present case upon the contrast between the be-
ginning and the close of the harvest.--The two loaves of first-fruits,
like the sheaf of first-fruits, fell to the share of the priests, after
they had been waved as the sign that they were offered to Jehovah
for His servants.
From the words of ver. 17, "Ye shall bring two wave-loaves
out of your habitations," many commentators, especially the earlier
ones (e.g., Calvin, Osiander, C. a Lapide, etc.), supposed that the
THE FEAST OF PENTECOST. 379
two pentecostal loaves were not one simple Corban presented for
the whole congregation, but that every head of a family had to
offer two such loaves, just as every one offered a lamb at the feast
of Passover. But if that had been the case, supposing the com-
mand in Ex. xxiii. 14 sqq. to be at all scrupulously observed, the
priests would have been obliged to receive and consume myriads of
loaves on that one day; a thing perfectly incredible. The meaning
of the words "out of your habitations" is rather, as Keil says
(p. 398), "bread of the daily food of the household, not loaves
separately prepared for holy purposes." No doubt leavened loaves
of first-fruits may also have been presented by private individuals
(Lev. ii. 12 and Num. xv. 19), but they were freewill-offerings and
not connected with the day of Pentecost.
192. In Num. xxviii. 27-30, two bullocks, one ram, and seven
lambs are directed to be offered as a burnt-offering, in addition to
the daily burnt-offering, along with the usual meat-offerings, and
one goat as a sin-offering,--the same number, therefore, as on each
of the seven days of the feast of Passover ( 180). But when we
find, on the other hand, that in Lev. xxiii. 18 one bullock, two
rams, and seven lambs are ordered to accompany the two wave-
loaves as a burnt-offering, one he-goat as a sin-offering, and two
lambs as peace-offerings, the question arises, whether these two
statements are to be kept apart as relating to two different offerings,
or whether they are to be regarded as identical? If the latter, then
the two lambs of the peace-offering alone are to be regarded as an
accompaniment to the two wave-loaves, and the burnt-offerings and
sin-offering as general festal offerings independent of the presenta-
tion of the wave-loaves. The difference arising from the fact, that
in Num. xxviii. two bullocks and one ram are ordered, and in Lev.
xxiii. one bullock and two rams, we should then have to admit to
be an irreconcilable discrepancy, attributable to a copyist's error.
This is the solution adopted not only by Ewald, Knobel, and others,
but also by Bahr and Kliefoth. Thalhofer and Keil, on the other
hand, follow Josephus,1 and assume that there were two distinct
offerings, one presented as a festal offering (Num. xxviii.), the other
as an accompaniment to the wave-loaves (Lev. xxiii.).
Now I am fully aware that very powerful reasons, founded both
1
According to Josephus (Ant. iii. 10, 6), the burnt-offering of the day in
question consisted of three bullocks, two rams, and fourteen lambs, and the sin-
offering of two he-goats. But his speaking of only two, and not three rams,
must be regarded as a simple mistake.
upon analogy and symmetry, may be adduced in support of the first

view, and I dare not venture to reject it unconditionally. On the
other hand, I cannot give up the last view either, so unhesitatingly
as Bahr and Kliefoth have done. An expansion and elevation of
the accompanying sacrifices, such as the latter supposes to have
existed in the relation between the wave-sheaf of the Easter festival
and the wave-loaves of the Pentecost, may be explained without any
difficulty, from the fact, that at the close of the harvest, and when
it was all gathered in, the feeling of unworthiness and the obliga-
tion of gratitude would be incomparably stronger than when the
harvest began, with the corn but partially ripened. But what
weighs the most in my opinion is, that according to the opposite
view the wave-loaves must have been left without any burnt-offering
to accompany them,--an omission opposed to all analogy, especially
the analogy of the wave-sheaf ( 190). If, then, according to Lev.
xxiii. 12, it was requisite that a burnt-offering should accompany
the usual meat-offering, we necessarily expect to find the same,
though in a still stronger degree, in connection with the offering of
the loaves. The two Shelamim lambs cannot be regarded as a sub-
stitute for this, but only as a still further expansion.
193. In any case the two Shelamim lambs, which are no doubt
to be looked upon as praise-offerings, stood in the closest relation to
the two wave-loaves. This is evident from ver. 20: "The priest
shall wave them with (lfa) the bread of the first-fruits for a wave-
offering before Jehovah, with (lfa) the two lambs; they (the loaves)
shall be holy to Jehovah for the priest." The notion that the
loaves were to be waved along with the lambs, and lying upon their
backs, is to be rejected as a rabbinical crotchet (Menachoth 5, 6).
At the same time, the ritual for the offering of these lambs certainly
presents a few singularities. Among these is the rule, that the
lambs were to be waved whole, and not merely the breast, as in the
case of the other Shelamim; which is evidently to be accounted for
in this way, that as there was no sacrificial meal, the whole of the
meat fell to the lot of the priests. In all probability (at all events
the analogy of Lev. xiv. 24, 25 seems to point to this conclusion)
the waving took place before the slaughtering. Keil's opinion, that
the burning of the fat was omitted in the case of these Shelamim,1
certainly rests upon a misunderstanding. For in that case they
1
At least this seems to be the meaning of his words: "the loaves of first-
fruits, fruits, together with these two lambs, were not burnt upon the altar, but
sanctified to the Lord for the priests."
THE FEAST OF TABERNACLES. 381
could not possibly have been called Shelamim. All that ver. 20
implies is, that the flesh of these lambs was not to be used as a
sacrificial meal for the persons presenting the sacrifice. They be-
longed to the same category as the first-born of the cattle that were
fit for sacrifice (Num. xviii. 17, 18, cf. 229).
The absence of any direct allusion to the ordinary meat- and
drink-offerings in connection with the Shelamim lambs, is no proof
of their omission; on the contrary, according to the invariable rule
laid down in Num. xv. 3 sqq., it is to be assumed as a matter of
course, that they were really added. And in fact, as even Kliefoth
supposes (p. 94), the meat-offering belonging to these Shelamim
lambs is in all probability what is meant by the "new Minchah" in
Lev. vii. 12 sqq., which is so called because it was to be made of
new corn. On the other hand, the accompaniments of cake and
bread, which properly belonged to the praise-offering, and were to
be eaten at the sacrificial meal (Lev. vii. 12 sqq. ; 154-5), were
probably omitted here, because no provision was made for a sacri-
ficial meal in connection with the pentecostal lambs, the whole of
the flesh of which became the portion of the priests.
Kliefoth understands the affair somewhat differently. He sup-
poses Lev. ii. 14-16 and Num. xv. 18 sqq. to relate to the pen-
tecostal Minchah, and therefore connects them with this passage,
and makes the Minchah mentioned here a Minchah of groats. But
there is not the slightest occasion or warrant for connecting these
passages with the pentecostal Minchah of the congregation, either
in the passages themselves, or in Lev. xxiii. 15 sqq. On the con-
trary, the offerings referred to in both passages are spontaneous
offerings of first-fruits, not restricted to any particular day.
E. THE FEAST OF TABERNACLES.
194. If the second feast in the wilderness was destitute of an

historical allusion, this was by no means the case with the third of
these festivals, which was associated with the feast of the autumn bar-
vest (of fruit, oil, and wine). In its historical aspect this was called
the feast of Tabernacles (lit. feast of Booths), tOKs.uh gHa (Lev. xxiii.
34; Deut. xvi. 13; by Josephus and in the New Testament, skhno-
phgi<a); and in its agricultural aspect, feast of ingathering (JysixAhA gHa,
Ex. xxiii. 16, xxxiv. 22). The first name it derived from the fact,
that during the seven days of its celebration, viz., from the 15th to
the 21st of the seventh month, of which the first day alone possessed
a sabbatical character with the suspension of labour and a holy as-
sembly, the Israelites were to leave their houses and dwell in booths.
These booths were constructed, on the first day, of branches newly
cut from various ornamental shrubs and fruit-trees (with the fruit
still hanging upon them), either in the court-yards and on the roofs
of the houses, or in the streets and public squares of the town (Lev.
xxiii. 40 sqq.; Neh. viii. 15, 16). It was the most joyous festival
of the whole year, and was called by the later Jews gHAha, the feast
kat ] e]coxh<n.
The design of their dwelling in booths for seven days is thus ex-
plained in Lev. xxiii. 43: that your generations may know that I
made the children of Israel to dwell in booths when I brought them
out ( yxiyciOhB;) of the land of Egypt."1 Consequently from the very
earliest times the real design of their dwelling in booths was sup-
posed to be to commemorate the sojourn of Israel in the wilderness
after the exodus from Egypt. But as the wilderness is so fre-
quently described as a terrible place, where there was no water, but
serpents and scorpions, burning heat and drought (Deut. viii. 15),
and the life in the desert, therefore, as one full of privation and
danger, this hardly seems to suit the joyous character which is
so distinctly attributed to the festival.
So much is certain, that in connection with the feast of Taber-
1
In complete disregard of the rules of the language, Kliefoth renders this
passage--"that your descendants may know, that by leading the children of
Israel out of Egypt I have brought them hither to dwell in booths;" and then on
the ground of this rendering opposes any allusion in the festival to the sojourn
in the desert: (1) because Israel then dwelt in tents and not in booths; (2) be-
cause the booths referred to were not constructed of such shrubs as grew in the
desert, but only of such as grew in the Holy Land and represented its loveliness
and fertility; and (3) because the purpose of leading the Israelites out of Egypt
was not that they might dwell in the desert, but that they might be brought to
the promised land. But any allusion in the booths to their dwelling in the Holy
Land is certainly equally inadmissible. For (1) in the Holy Land they lived
not in booths, but in houses ; (2) the reading would in that case have been, not
yTib;waOh I have caused you to dwell," but " I shall cause you to dwell;" (3) the
rendering given to yxiyciOhB; "by leading out," is arbitrary and not admissible.
The dwelling in huts and the dwelling in tents do not present the strong and
exclusive antithesis that Kliefoth supposes, but they both present a common anti-
thesis to dwelling in the houses of the towns and villages, and this alone comes
into consideration here. The omission of any allusion to the specific shrubs of the
desert is no argument against the traditional view. It would have been neces-
sary to take a journey of several days into the wilderness before these could be
obtained, and that would certainly have been too much to demand. By employ-
ing fruit-trees of the Holy Land with the fruit still hanging upon them, a fitting
expression was also given to the agricultural character of the festival.
THE FEAST OF TABERNACLES. 383
nacles, the sojourn in the desert was not to be looked at from this
point of view, viz., as a state of privation and danger. At the same
time, Keil does not quite hit the mark when he thinks to get rid of
the contrast by observing, that in the Scriptures the booth is not a
symbol of privation and misery, but of defence, protection, and con-
cealment from heat and storm. And the fact that God caused His
people to dwell in huts during their wandering through the great
and terrible desert, was a proof of the fatherly care of His covenant
fidelity, etc." Undoubtedly the booth is often introduced in the
language of poetry as a figure to represent protection and conceal-
ment, but only (and this Keil has overlooked) in contrast to the de-
fenceless and unsheltered condition of the open field or desert. And
where the booth stands, as it does here, in contrast to the firm, solid
structure of a house, it cannot have this meaning.
We must look at the sojourn in the desert from a different
side, therefore, if we would understand how it became the object
of the most joyous and merry of all the festivals. To see this,
we must first of all observe, that the introduction of the great and
terrible desert mentioned in Deut. viii. 15 is quite out of place
here. For the allusion can only have been to the first year of
the sojourn in the desert, and in fact especially, if not exclusively,
to the stay at Sinai, which lasted almost a year. For in the
first place, the object commemorated by the festival must have
been the year in which the covenant existed, and not the 382 years
of its suspension; and secondly, when the feast of Booths was in-
stituted, and Lev. xxiii. 43 was spoken, the Israelites had seen
nothing as yet of the great and terrible wilderness referred to in
Deut. viii. 15, viz., the desert to the north of Sinai; and that por-
tion of the desert which they had hitherto passed through was com-
paratively rich in supplies of water and wide-spread oases with a
more or less abundant vegetation; whilst it was more especially true,
that the places of encampment in the neighbourhood of Sinai had
little, or rather nothing at all, of the terrible, barren, and revolting
character of the northern desert. The contrast intended in Lev.
xxiii. 43 is between their condition in Egypt and that at Sinai. In
the former, the Israelite, with his oppressive and grievous bondage,
could hardly take a single step without feeling the whip of his driver
upon his back; in the latter, he felt himself under God's open sky,
free as a bird in the air, whilst he was surrounded by Nature in her
grandest and most majestic forms (Ps. cxxiv. 7). His deliverance
from the house of bondage in Egypt, which was commemorated in
the feast of the Passover, was completed here; it was here first that
it became a fait accompli, when he entered the desert of Sinai and
passed beyond the grasp of Egyptian despotism. It was the con-
trast between these two conditions that was commemorated in the
feast of Tabernacles; and to bring this to mind, even in the Holy
Land, as long as the festival continued, the Israelites were to ex-
change their abode in close, dull, lifeless houses, for a temporary
abode in booths of foliage that were fresh, free, and airy, and where
all was green, fragrant, and alive.
195. Now if this was the idea of their temporary abode in
leafy bowers, this feast stands in a close and living connection with
the Easter festival, whilst they mutually supplement each other.
Did the one represent the deliverance from Egyptian bondage, the
other represented the fruit of that deliverance--the fresh, joyous,
and happy life resulting from the unrestricted enjoyment of the
freedom they had wanted so long. And in no less admirable a
manner does the historical bearing of the feast of Tabernacles link
itself into a living unity with its agricultural aspect, as the feast
of ingathering--the joyous time of the vintage and gathering of
fruits, a time that ever overflowed with pleasure and delight. The
combination of both these made it the most joyous festival of the
entire year, Israel's true feast of blessedness in the full enjoyment of
the material and spiritual blessings which the sojourn in the desert
had brought and sealed,1 and which the fruitfulness of the Holy
Land poured out for them in richest abundance in the closing
harvest of the year.
In accordance with this character, the festal sacrifices appointed
for this feast were more numerous than those appointed for any
other (vid. Num. xxix. 12 sqq.). On each of the seven days a
he-goat was to be offered as a sin-offering, and as a burnt-offering
two rams and fourteen yearling lambs. The number of the sacri-
fices remained the same for the whole seven days; but the number
of bullocks to be offered daily as a burnt-offering was diminished
every day by one, so that whilst thirteen were offered on the first
day, there were only seven on the last, and the whole number
amounted to seventy.
1
The later Jews, surprised at the want of any festival in commemoration of
the giving of the law in the Mosaic cycle of feasts, sought to supply the want
by forcing this meaning upon the feast of Weeks. But ought it not rather to
be sought in the feast of Tabernacles? According to our view of this festival,
such a connection would be simple enough.
THE DAY OF ATONEMENT. 385
196. In immediate connection with the seven days' observance

of, the feast of Tabernacles, viz., on the eighth day, the so-called
tr,c,fE or concluding feast was held. This feast had a sabbatical
character with a holy convocation (Lev. xxiii. 36; Num. xxix.
35-38). This is generally regarded as the close of the feast of
Tabernacles; but such a view is inadmissible. For in that case not
only would it have been held on the seventh day, i.e., on the last
day of the feast, like the Azereth of the feast of the Passover, and
not on the eighth day, but the obligation to dwell in booths would
have applied to that day also. The fact that this was not the case,
but that the dwelling in tents terminated the day before, is an un-
answerable proof, that this Azereth was not a part of the feast of
Tabernacles itself. And this is confirmed by a comparison of the
festal sacrifices of this day with those of the seven days in which
the booths were continued. If the view referred to were correct,
either the diminution of the number of festal sacrifices would have
proceeded in the same manner as on the other days, or else, what
would have been still more appropriate on account of the sabbatical
character of the day, it would have risen again to the same number
as on the first day. But instead of that, the most simple offerings
were appointed for this eighth day, namely such as were offered on
the first day of the seventh month, which were far below those
presented on the seventh or last day of the feast of Tabernacles
both in number and character, viz., one he-goat as a sin-offering,
and one bullock, one ram, and seven lambs as a burnt-offering.
This Azereth is rather to be regarded as the closing festival of
the whole festal half of the year, in which the vanishing festal
period brightened up once more, gathering all the festal allusions
in softer radiance into itself, before it gave place to the other half,
in which no feasts were held. Its immediate connection with the
feast of Tabernacles, however, appears to have had this influence,
that the feast itself had not an independent Azereth of its own, as
the analogy of the Easter festival would seem to require, through
the impartation of a sabbatical character to the seventh day.
THE DAY OF ATONEMENT.
197. The design of the day of atonernents or expiations (MOy

MyriPuKiha, Lev. xxiii. 27), as the name itself shows, was the complete
and all-embracing expiation, not only of the priesthood and the
people, but also of the holy places, inasmuch as having been erected
in the midst of the sinful nation, they might be regarded as having

been contaminated and defiled by the impurity of the atmosphere
that surrounded them. It was the highest, most perfect, and most
comprehensive of all the acts of expiation. It was therefore unique
in its character; it took place only once in the entire year; it ap-
plied to all the sin and uncleanness of the whole year; and was
obliged to be performed by the high priest alone, in whom the
priestly dignity of the whole priesthood culminated, on the Capporeth
of the Holy of Holies, as the highest and holiest place of atone-
ment. But Keil (i. 404), Knobel (p. 486), and others are wrong in
restricting the expiations of this day to such sins as had remained
unknown, and therefore unexpiated, during the past year. The
universality expressed so strongly in the words of Lev. xvi. 16,
"because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and because
of their transgressions in all their sins," is irreconcilable with this
idea; moreover, the sins which had remained unknown had already
been expiated once in the numerous sin-offerings of the feasts and
new moons. The MyriPuKi of this day applied rather to all the sins of
the whole nation without exception, known or unknown, atoned
for or not atoned for. The observance of this day was founded
rather upon the feeling, that such expiation as the fore-court could
furnish was really faulty and insufficient, and that Israel had to
look for a higher and more perfect expiation, in which all the de-
fects and insufficiencies of the existing means of atonement would
be fully remedied and supplied. And this ultimate realization of
the idea of atonement was indicated, foreshadowed, and typically
guaranteed, by the ceremonial of this one day. The intention of
the day was not to supplement and complete the public and private
expiations of the year, but to exhibit them in still greater potency,
and to impart to them a still higher validity.
In accordance with this intention, not only did the day of atone-
ment assume the character of a high Sabbath (NOtBAwa tBawa), distin-
guished by the suspension of labour and a holy convocation, but all
the people were commanded to afflict their souls (Mk,ytewop;na-tx, Mt,yni.fiv;)
on pain of extirpation (Lev. xvi. 29, 31, xxiii. 27 sqq.).
The observance of this day was fixed for the tenth day of the
seventh month, so that it fell between the Sabbath of the new moon
and the feast of Tabernacles. Its being placed in the seventh month
may be accounted for, on the ground that it possessed a sabbatical
character in the most eminent degree: For the same reason it had
to be observed on one of the prominent points of this month. But
as neither the first day of the month nor the day of the full moon
was available for the purpose, the tenth of the month, which bore
in the number ten the stamp of completion and perfection, was the
only one which remained. And this suited all the better, because
the feast of Atonement was thereby brought into the closest possible
proximity to the feast of Tabernacles, and thus furnished a fitting
basis to the feast of Israel's rejoicing by its most complete and
comprehensive expiation; so that there was nothing to detract from
the confidence and purity of their rejoicing, inasmuch as it rested
upon the certainty, that they had obtained both reconciliation and
fellowship with Jehovah.
Nevertheless it is certainly a mistake to bring down the great
day of atonement to the level of a merely preliminary festival
to the feast of Tabernacles, as Ewald and even Keil have done,
making the latter the independent and principal feast, and the for-
mer the dependent and subordinate one, and thus robbing it of its,
character as a unique and independent festival, which governed the
entire year. If the design had been to give any such position and
significance to the day of atonement, the one unique act of expia-
tion performed on that day would certainly have been made the
commencement of the feast of Tabernacles, just as the seven days
of the feast of unleavened, bread were opened by the paschal meal.
But even in that case it ought still to be designated as the main
festival, and the rejoicing of the feast of Tabernacles as the result
and fruit, and therefore as the after-feast; just as the paschal
meal was the main festival, and the eating of unleavened bread for
seven days the after-feast.
198. The central point of the ' observance of this day was the
MyriPuKi, from which it derived its name, viz., the reconciliation of the
priesthood, of, the tabernacle and its furniture, and of the entire
nation, which preceded the presentation of the ordinary festal sacri-
fices, and was to be performed immediately after the daily morning
sacrifice (Lev. xvi.). To prepare for the performance of this, the
high priest, whose function it was, bathed himself, and put on the
peculiar dress prescribed for this day and for this purpose (Lev.
xvi. 4). This dress had none of the splendour of his usual official
dress, but was made entirely of white linen (dBa), and consisted of
four different articles (ver. 4)--a priest's coat (tn,toK;), drawers
(MysinAk;mi), a girdle (Fmeb;xa), and a turban (tp,n,c;mi).--Now, considering
that the day of atonement was a day of self-humiliation and mor-
tification, not for the people only, but also for the priesthood and
the high priest himself, we cannot accept Keil's view, that this par-
ticular titular kind of dress was chosen because, having throughout the
character of holiness, it was the "holiest and most glorious dress,"
holier and more glorious than the splendid official costume which
the high priest wore on other occasions, and that he wore it that
he "might appear before the Holy One as if cleansed from every
blemish of sin, in the pure holiness of the greatest of the servants
of God;" but we must still adhere to the explanation given by
Winer, Hofmann, and Baumgarten, viz., that it is to be regarded as
the plainer and more humble of the two.
The incorrectness of Keil's view is evident enough, from the
simple fact that the high priest had to put on this dress when he
offered the sin-offering for himself and his people, and therefore
that he was not yet "cleansed from the defilement of sin," and had
not yet "the pure holiness of the highest servants of God." It is
evident also from the fact, that in that case the anointed (Ex. xxix.
21), or, as it was afterwards called, the "golden" dress, would have
possessed the character of holiness and glory in a far lower degree;
whereas evidently this twofold character was not weakened, but as
a matter of course elevated and enhanced, by the addition of the
gold, the precious stones, and the holy colours. In fact, according
to this explanation, we ought, for the sake of consistency, to proceed
to the absurd conclusion, that the ordinary official dress of the com-
mon priests was much holier and more glorious than the ordinary
decorations of the high priest, since they bore an incomparably
greater resemblance, in material, colour, and make, to the dress
worn by the high priest on the day of atonement, than to his ordi-
nary official dress, and, in fact, have been regarded by many com-
mentators as precisely the same.
The evidence adduced by Keil in support of his view is very
feeble. He supposes that the dress in question "is shown to be the
most glorious in which the high priest could appear, by the epithet
holy garment, which is expressly applied to it." It has not escaped
his notice, indeed, that in Ex. xxviii. 4 the ordinary official costume
of the priests is also spoken of as holy garments; "but," he says,
"if in a law in which the Most Holy Place, where the Capporeth
was, is invariably called simply wd,q.oha (vers. 2, 3, 16), it is stated with
peculiar emphasis, with regard to the dress prescribed for this act
of near approach to God, 'these are holy garments' (ver. 4), there
can be no doubt that the predicate ' holy' is attributed to it in a
higher sense than to the ordinary priestly costume, and is intended
to designate it as the holiest costume of all." For all this, how-

ever, we still maintain with the most confident assurance, that
the white linen dress, without any ornament of gold, jewels, and
holy colours, was appointed to be worn in connection with the
expiations of the day of atonement, because it was more in accord-
ance with its character as a day of humiliation, penitence, and
mortification. As a simple and less ornamental style of dress, it
was opposed to the splendour and glory of the ordinary official
decorations, and is to be regarded as a reduction of the decorations
of the high priest to the style of an ordinary priest, in accordance
with the humiliation and self-denial demanded by the day; and the
more elevated form of the cap (the turban) alone still served to
indicate the elevation of the high priest above the rank of the com-
mon priests. On the other hand, to make the simplicity and absence
of ornament fully complete, what little ornament there was on the
dress of the common priests had to be laid aside; so that a simple
white linen girdle was substituted for the costly variegated girdle
usually worn by the priests.
199. Thus equipped, the high priest proceeded to the work of
the day. He began by bringing a bullock for a sin-offering, and a
ram for a burnt-offering, for himself and his house, i.e., for the whole
priesthood. Two he-goats were then brought for a sin-offering ,
and a ram for a burnt-offering, on the part of the congregation.
Upon the former the high priest cast two lots before the door of
the tabernacle, one designated hOAhyla, the other lzexzAfEla. The goat
upon which the lot "to JEHOVAH" fell was set apart to be slain as
a sin-offering for the nation; but the other one, upon which the
lot "to AZAZEL" fell, was placed alive before Jehovah, vylAfA rPekal;, to
be sent into the desert "to Azazel" (vers. 7-10).
Before the high priest could proceed, as the head of the whole
priesthood, to atone for the nation by means of the goat set apart
for that purpose, it was necessary that lie should first of all make
atonement for himself and his own house, as both he and his house
were involved in the general sinfulness (Heb. vii. 27). He there-
fore slew the bullock that he had already presented (ver. 11). But
something more was needed for the atonement of this day than
the application of the atoning blood to the horns of the altar of in-
cense in the Holy Place, which was sufficient in the case of an
ordinary sin-offering presented by the high priest ( 107). On the
present occasion it was requisite that this should be performed in
the Most Holy Place, upon the highest medium of expiation, viz.,
the Capporeth. But the Most Holy Place was the abode of the
unapproachable holiness of God, and was therefore closed not only
against all the people, but against all the priests as well--the high
priest alone being ever allowed to enter it and he only on this par-
ticular day; "for there," says Jehovah (ver. 2), I appear in the
cloud above the Capporeth." But as no sinful man can see God
without dying, and the high priest had to officiate there on this one
day because of his office and calling; it was necessary that he should
take peculiar precautions to avert this destruction from himself.
He filled the censer with burning coals from the altar of burnt-
offering, and, taking both hands full of beaten incense, he went
with the two behind the curtain into the holiest of all, where he
threw the incense upon the coals (without looking about him), that
the cloud of incense might cover the Capporeth above the testi-
mony, and by its effect in outwardly enveloping and inwardly
(symbolically, 146) appeasing, might protect him from the death
that threatened him (ver. 13).1 There can be no doubt, though it
is not expressly stated, that lie left the censer in the Most Holy
Place until his last time of entering, in order that the production of
smoke might continue, and the whole space be entirely filled with it.
1
It is to be hoped that the dispute first commenced by Vitringa (Observv.
ss.), and carried on with spirit by Thalemann and Rau, which has been con-
tinued even to our own day, whether the cloud mentioned in ver. 2, in which
Jehovah appeared above the Capporeth, and the cloud of incense with which,
according to ver. 13, the high priest was to cover the Capporeth, are to be re-
garded as identical or not, has been settled at last by the candid admission of
Knobel and Bunsen, that the anti-traditional view is exegetically impossible.
The cloud referred to in ver. 2, as well known, cannot be any other than that in
which the glory of God is said to have appeared in Ex. xvi. 10, xix. 9, 16, and
of which it is stated. in Ex. xl. 34, 35, in connection with the erection of the
tabernacle, that "the cloud covered the tent of the congregation, and the glory
of the Lord filled the tabernacle ; and Moses was not able to enter into the tent
of the congregation,. because the cloud abode thereon, and the glory of Jehovah
filled the tabernacle" (cf. 1 Kings viii. 11; 2 Chron. v. 13, 14). The cloud in ver.
13 is obviously distinguished from that in ver. 2 by the expression, "cloud of
the incense " (already described). Moreover, the two stand in the most decided
contrast to one another, for the cloud in ver. 2 threatens with death, and that
in ver. 13 defends against it. In ver. 2 the reason why Aaron could not go at
any time into the Most Holy Place is said to have been because God appeared
there in the cloud. Now, if the cloud intended had been only the cloud of in-
cense to be brought by Aaron, we should have to regard the appearance of God
as dependent upon his bringing this cloud with him; so that, without the cloud
of incense, Aaron might have gone into the Most Holy Place at any time, which
is the very thing expressly prohibited in the second verse.
200. The danger of sudden death in consequence of the sight

of the glory of God having thus been averted by that glory being
enveloped in the cloud of the incense, the expiations of the day, the
first stage of which was to unfold itself in the Most Holy Place, could
now commence. First of all the high priest went again into the Most
Holy Place with the blood of the bullock which had already been
slain, and sprinkled some of it once upon the Capporeth towards the
front,--at the foot, therefore, as it were of the glory of Jehovah which
was enthroned upon it,--and then seven times in front of the Cappo-
reth (ver. 14). As it was the blood of the bullock offered by Aaron
for himself and his house, both acts had respect to the sins of the
priesthood. The former, however, was intended chiefly as an atone-
ment for the persons themselves, the latter as an atonement for the
sanctuary (including of course the Most Holy Place), so far as they
had been contaminated by the sinful atmosphere of the priests. This
required a sevenfold sprinkling, because seven was the seal of the
covenant, and the sanctuary was the seat of the covenant. The
correctness of this view, in which I rejoice to have Keils support
(i. 405, 406), is evident from the object sprinkled, which was not
the Capporeth itself, but the ground in front of it. The sevenfold
sprinkling, therefore, had respect not to the Capporeth, but to the
holy spot upon which it stood, and which became the Most Holy
Place in consequence. Delitzsch opposes this view as irreconcil-
able with the wording of Lev. xvi., according to which the expiation
of the priesthood and that of the sanctuary were coincident, inas-
much as any purification of the holy things from the uncleanness of
Israel which attached to them, was at the same time an unlocking of
the grace of God towards Israel of which they were the vehicles.
But what could be the intention of a double act of sprinkling, once
upon the Capporeth, and then seven times in front of it, if the for-
mer of these two acts represented the expiation of the priesthood in
and with the expiation of the sanctuary?
The sin which attached to the high priest, who was to make
atonement for the people, and also the uncleanness which attached
in consequence of this to the place of expiation, where atonement
was to be made for the people, having thus been covered and ren-
dered inoperative, it was now possible to proceed to the atonement
for the people. For this purpose the high priest, probably leaving
the bowl with the blood of the bullock in the Holy Place for subse-
quent use, went again into the fore-court, and after slaying the he-
goat set apart as the sin-offering of the people, carried its blood also
into the Most Holy Place, where he performed just the same cere-
molly, and with just the same effect, for the people and their relation
to the Holy Place, as he had previously done with the blood of the
bullock for himself and his own relation to the sanctuary (vers.
15, 16 a).
The expiations now entered their second stage, the scene of which
was the Holy Place. This is summarily described in the following
words (ver. 16 b): And so shall he do for the tabernacle of the
congregation, that dwelleth among them in the midst of their un-
cleanness." That we are to understand by dfeOm lh,xo here, not the
whole of the tabernacle, but its most comprehensive part, the Holy
Place, cannot be doubted, on account of the obvious connection in
which it stands. And from the word NKe (so), which points to the
proceedings in the Most Holy Place described just before, it may
be inferred with certainty, that a sprinkling was to take place once
upon the altar of incense, and seven times in front of it, first with
the blood of the bullock, and then with that of the he-goat; whilst,
judging from the analogy in other cases ( 107), it is more than
probable, that the former was applied not to the surface, but to the
horns of the altar (cf. Ex. xxx. 10). But the distinctive significa-
tion of the two kinds of sprinkling would be just the same here as
in the Most Holy Place. As the Holy Place, however, was acces-
sible to the common priests, it is expressly stated in ver. 17, that
during the performance of these acts no one but the high priest was
even to enter the Holy Place.
201. The third stage of the expiations was carried out in the
fore-court, also by the high priest alone. "And he shall go," it is
stated in ver. 18, "unto the altar that is before Jehovah, and make
an atonement for it, and shall take of the blood of the bullock, and
of the blood of the goat, and smear it (NtanAv;) upon the horns of the
altar round about. And (ver. 19) he shall sprinkle of the blood
upon it (vylAfA) with his finger seven times, and hallow it from the
uncleanness of the children of Israel." The opinion expressed by
Bahr, Baumgarten, Delitzseh, Hofmann, Knobel, and others, that by
the altar that is before Jehovah," in ver. 18, we are to understand
not the altar of burnt-offering, but the altar of incense, must be
rejected as a mistake. The expression "go out" (xcAyAv;), which occurs
in ver. 18, after the acts of the high priest in the Holy Place have
been already described in ver. 16b, must relate, not to his going
out of the Most Holy Place, but simply to his leaving the Holy Place.
It is true, Hofmann cites this very expression as an indisputable
proof of the opposite view, and says that this xcyv evidently relates
to the clause in ver. 17, Otxce-dfa wd,qo.Ba rPekal; OxObB; ("when he goeth
to make an atonement in the Holy Place, until he come out").
This is true enough, but the conclusion drawn from it is false for
all that. For the "going in" and "going out" in ver. 17 relate to
his going from the fore-court into the dwelling-place, and out of
the dwelling place into the fore-court, and not to his passing from,
the Holy Place into the Most Holy, and vice versa. Such a view
might indeed be rendered necessary if the reading were wd,q.oba OxObB;
rPekal;, instead of being as it is wd,q.oBa rPekal; OxObB;, But with the words
as they stand, it is much more natural, according to the usage of
the language in other cases, to refer the going in and out to the
tabernacle as a whole. Moreover, the meaning of ver. 17 is cer-
tainly, not that just in those particular moments in which the high
priest was in the Most Holy Place no one was to enter the taber-
nacle, but evidently, that no one was to enter it at all during the
whole of the time that he was occupied within. There is nothing
in the fact, that the altar is spoken of as being "before Jehovah,"
to compel us to think of the altar of incense; inasmuch as the ex-
pression "before Jehovah" occurs in innumerable instances, as
equivalent to, before the door of the tabernacle; and the words
"from off the altar before Jehovah," in ver. 12, unquestionably
refer to the "altar of burnt-offering." Again, the appeal to Ex.
xxx. 10 loses all its force, if, as we have already shown to be
probable, ver. 16 b is to be taken in combination with it. And,
lastly, we may refer to ver. 20 (cf. ver. 33), where the different
stages are recapitulated, and consist of "reconciling the Holy Place
(i.e., the Holy of Holies), the tabernacle (i.e., the Holy Place), and
the altar." For in this passage it is obvious enough, that there were
three such stages and not two, and that what took place in the taber-
nacle (i.e., the Holy Place) according to ver. 16 b could not be ,
identical with what is described in vers. 18, 19, as having been done
at the altar. But if, notwithstanding this, any one should still per-
sist in understanding by the altar in ver. 18 the altar of incense, and
regarding vers. 18, 19 as a further explanation of ver. 16 b, he would
set altogether at nought the hW,fEya Nkev; (and so shall he do) in ver.
16 b. For this requires that the expiation in the Holy Place should
be performed in precisely the same manner as it had already been in
the Most Holy, viz., once upon the altar and seven times in front of
it whereas vers. 18 and 19 would teach in that case that even the
sevenfold sprinkling was performed upon the altar in the Holy Place.
We most decidedly object to Keil's statement, that the high

priest first put the blood of the bullock and goat upon the horns
of the altar of burnt-offering, and then sprinkled it seven times upon
the ground in front of the altar. The text of ver. 19 is vylAfA hz.Ahiv;;
and how any one can understand this to mean sprinkling "upon
the ground in front of it," I cannot comprehend. But if the seven-
fold sprinkling in the Most Holy Place certainly took place "in
front of the Capporeth," and therefore that in the Holy Place was
also performed in front of the altar of incense, it still needs to be
explained, why the sprinkling in the fore-court should have taken
place not in front, but upon the top of the altar. The answer is
by no means difficult to obtain. The two compartments of the
tabernacle were enclosed spaces, representing the abode of God in
the midst of His people; whilst the fore-court represented the abode
of that nation which had its God in the midst of it ( 12). In each
of the former the entire space was the place of the revelation of
God; in the latter, the altar alone.
In Delitzsch's view, indeed, the altar of burnt-offering needed
no further expiation, after the performance of the acts prescribed
in Ex. xxix. 36, 37; "for," he adds, "how could any of the im-
purity of Israel adhere to it, seeing that it flowed day after day
with the blood by which Israel was reconciled?" This remark is
directed against Hofmann's view ( 68), that all the sacrificial blood
which came upon the altar did so merely for the purpose of cleansing
it from the defilement brought upon it by the sin of the sacrificer.
But Hofmann (on the commion, though erroneous assumption, that
on the day of atonement the altar of burnt-offering did not pass
through the cleansing ceremony) has justly replied, that this rather
tends to confirm his view, "inasmuch as it was by the daily offer-
ings that the cleansing of the altar of burnt-offering was repeated
again and again, so that it needed no such purification as the altar
of incense on the great day of atonement."
But Delitzsch's opinion, that the altar of burnt-offering needed
no further expiation after the expiation so fully performed at its
consecration, and also Hofmann's opinion, that it needed no special
expiation on the great day of atonement because it had been ex-
piated again and again the whole year through, by means of the
daily sacrifices, are both of them decidedly wrong. The latter state-
ment is correct in itself, but does not prove what it is intended to
establish. If, as Hofmann himself maintains, not only the sins
which had been left without expiation during the year, but (accord-
ing to ver. 16) even those which had been already expiated, were
the objects of expiation on this day; then just in the same degree
in which the priesthood and the people needed a new and higher
expiation, was it requisite that the altar, at which they had been so
imperfectly expiated, should be subjected to a similar expiation.
The higher virtue ascribed to the sprinkling of the altar on this
particular day rested upon the fact, that it was the same blood
which had already been in the Most Holy Place, and had acquired
the highest atoning power at the throne of God.--In opposition to
the former, it is to be observed, that as the high priest was anointed
(i.e., consecrated) only once, but had to be expiated again and again,
so the expiation of the altar of burnt-offering needed renewal and
repetition, but not the anointing of the altar. Moreover, when we
find that a special expiation had to be made for the priesthood
before the expiation of the people, this is not to be understood as
though the last expiation applied to the people only, to the exclusion
of the priests; for in that case it would be impossible to understand,
as Hofmann correctly observes, why a double act of expiation (dis-
tributed over the two he-goats) was requisite for the congregation,
and only one for the priests. "The high priest began with the
ceremony of expiation for himself and his house; not, however, as
though the expiation for Israel had no further connection with him
and his house, but because he durst not appear in the Most Holy
Place as the representative of Israel without the cloud of smoke
from the incense, nor, since both he and his house were sinful,
without the blood of the appointed sin-offering" (Hofmann).
202. After the completion of the atonement for the priesthood,
the people, and the holy places, the second goat was brought, upon
which the lot lzexzAfEla had fallen (ver. 8). According to ver. 5, both
goats were set apart as a sin-offering (txF.AHal;). They are not to be
regarded as two sin-offerings, however, but as forming one sin-offer-
ing together. This conclusion is not demanded, it is true, by the
singular txF.AHal;; for that might very well be regarded as collective
and without the numeral tHaxa (one) there is nothing in ver. 5 to
force us to adopt it. But the simple designation of both goats as
sin-offerings requires it when we add the following circumstances
first, that the sin-offering is invariably spoken of in the singular
number ( 92); and, secondly, that nothing is done to this second
goat which could possibly characterize it as an independent sin-
offering. But two goats were requisite for this one sin-offering,
because the ritual of this exceptional sin-offering rendered it neces-
sary, that after the slaughtering and sprinkling of the blood the
animal should either still be living, or be brought to life again.
And as this could not possibly be represented by means of one single
goat, it was necessary to divide the role, which this sin-offering had
to play, between two goats, the second of which was to be regarded
as the alter ego of the first, as hircus redivivus. Whilst the first
goat, therefore, was slain as a sin-offering, and the people and
sanctuary were expiated by its blood, the second goat was placed
alive before Jehovah, and then kept to take the place of the other,
after the latter had satisfied the demands of the day as far as it
possibly could, and to carry on to completion the work which had
been begun, but was not yet finished.
This second part of the expiation, which is not met with in any
other sin-offering, is first of all summarily described in ver. 10 as
being hrABAd;mi.ha lzexzAfEla Otxo Hla.wal; vylAfA rPekal; (" to make an atonement with
it, and to let it go la-Azazel into the wilderness"), and is then de-
scribed in extenso in vers. 20 sqq. as follows: the high priest laid
both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confessed over
it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgres-
sions in all their sins, put them upon the head of the goat, and then
sent it away by a man, who was standing ready for the purpose, into
the wilderness, where it was to be let loose, in order that the goat
might carry into the wilderness all their transgressions, which had
been laid upon it.
The first question that arises here is, what are we to understand
by Azazel? The different explanations which have been given may
be divided into four classes. First, those which regard it as a, de-
scription of the place to which the goat was to be taken; secondly,
those in which it is taken to be a description of the goat to be sent
away into the desert; thirdly, those in which it is regarded as a de-
scription of a certain evil daemon dwelling in the desert, to whom
the goat was to be sent; and, fourthly, those which treat it as an
abstract noun, signifying "for complete removal."
203. The last opinion is of comparatively recent origin. It is
adopted by Paulus, Steudel, Winer, Tholuck, and Bahr. The de-
sign of the ceremony, as thus understood, has been most clearly ex-
plained by Bahr. "The true expiation," he says, "was effected
by the blood of the first goat which was set apart for Jehovah; on
the other hand, the ceremony with the other goat appears as a
mere addition made for special reasons--a kind of complement to the
wiping away of the sins, which had already been effected by means
of the sacrifice. The whole ceremony had respect to the most

comprehensive and highest form of expiation, beyond which no
other was conceivable for Israel; and the true and essential pur-
pose of the festival was to exhibit this in the clearest possible way.
Hence, after the expiation had been accomplished by the sprinkling
of the blood, the sin was still further to be carried away into the
desert. What the first goat, which died as a sin-offering, was no
longer in a condition to set forth, was supplied by the second, which
was as it were one with the first, inasmuch as it carried the sin
which had been covered entirely away, and that into the desert or
desolate place, where it was quite forgotten; so that the idea of ex-
iation or the extermination of sin was thereby rendered absolutely
perfect (cf. Micah vii. 19)." Tholuck also observes: "As the two
terms for the forgiveness of sins, rP,Ki to cover up, and xWAnA, to take
away, represent the same thing but under a different figure, so is
it with the two symbols here, and that in such a manner, that the
second is necessary to complete the first."
According to this view, the word is a Pealpal form of the Arabic
lzf = removit, and has been formed by modification from lzel;zafE
From a grammatical point of view this explanation is, no doubt,
admissible, as the examples given by Ewald (Heb. Gram. 157,
158) fully prove; though it cannot be denied, that the analogous
forms are employed more for adjectives than for abstracts. And
even from a material point of view, the objections raised by Gesenius
in his Thesaurus, and Hengstenberg in his Egypt and the Books of
Moses (pp. 169 sqq., Eng. transl.), are far from being conclusive;
as for example when the former observes: "There is something
cold and empty, and even incredible, in the supposition that this
word, so singular and unparalleled in its kind, should have no other
than the simplest and most obvious signification, for which the
Hebrew language supplied so large a number of synonymes;" or
when the latter maintains, that with any other explanation (than
that which refers it to Satan) it would still be impossible to under-
stand why the word should have been formed first of all for this
particular occasion, as would then appear to be the case, and why
it is never found elsewhere. Nor is there anything more conclusive
in Hengstenberg's argument, that if Azazel does not refer to Satan,
there could be no reason for the casting of lots; and it is impossible,
in that case, to understand why the decision should have been left
to God,--why the high priest should not have set apart the one
goat as a sin-offering, and the other to be sent away into the desert:
the very fact of the lots being cast presupposed that some personal
being stood in opposition to God, with regard to whom it was
necessary to uphold the supremacy of Jehovah, and to remove
every possibility of a comparison being drawn between them."
Here again Hengstenberg goes too far when he maintains, that
"even in ver. 8 it is impossible to tell what to do with such an
explanation as this: a lot for Jehovah and a lot for the complete
removal,' since the lot itself was not to be removed." Nor was it
the lot described as "for Jehovah" which was to be the portion of
Jehovah, but the goat upon which it fell; and no one can dispute
the lawfulness of so simple a metonymy as the use of the lot for
the thing to be chosen by lot. At the same time, justice is not
done in this way to the antithesis between "Jehovah" and "Azazel."
And Gesenius is unquestionably correct in maintaining: "Vi oppo-
siti exspectatur persona eaque talis, quae Joyae apte opponatur et con-
traria sit." And if lzxzfl were a nomen actionis, we should expect,
instead of hvhyl, to find hFAyHiw;li or hrAPAkal;. A person and an action
never form a natural or appropriate antithesis.
204. Of the three different interpretations in which the word
is treated as a concrete noun, we must at once reject the one which
regards it as a description of the place to which the goat was to be
taken,--whether it be looked upon as the name of a mountain in
the neighbourhood of Sinai, as it is by Ps. Jonathan, Abenezra,
and Jarchi, or as an appellative noun (= recessus from lzf, remo-
vere), as Bochart, Deyling, Carpzov, and Jahn maintain,--if only for
the simple reason, that the expression in ver. 10, "for Azazel into
the desert," i.e., into the solitude for the solitude, would then contain
a most intolerable tautology. Moreover, a person and a place form
no truer antithesis than a person and an action. Hence modern
commentators have very properly given up this interpretation alto-
gether. Even First, who still adhered to it in his Concordance
from rabbinical sympathies, has dropped it in his Lexicon.
The notion that Azazel is intended as a description of the goat
itself is not much better. This is the view adopted by Symmachus
(tra<goj a]perxo<menoj), by Aquila (tra<goj a]polelumme<noj), in the
Vulgate (hircus emissarius), and hence by Luther (der ledige Bock:
Angl. the scape-goat). It rests upon a thoroughly inadmissible ety-
mology: zfe = goat (? buck), and lzx= abiit. This view has long since
been antiquated, and regarded as no longer deserving of refutation;
but Hofmann (Schriftb. i. p. 431) has revived it again and under-
taken its defence. He derives lzxzf from lzf=lzx, to go away, and
renders it "gone entirely away." "The phrase lzexzAfEla Hl.awi, in which

l; is used in the same way as in the expression ywip;HAla xceye in Ex. xxi.
2, signifies to drive away as an exile (als Fernling)." Now, if it
could be proved that lzxzf was a description of the goat to be led
away into the wilderness, no doubt it would be allowable and even
necessary, to explain the words lzxzfl Hlw in vers. 10 and 26 in this
way. But that is just what is forbidden by the antithesis in ver. 8
between "the lot for Jehovah" and "the lot for Azazel;" and it
is self-deception on Hofmann's part to suppose that he has got over
this antithesis by stating that this signifies, not that the* one animal,
but that the one lot, was Jehovah's, and the other the exile's, the
lot of the animal to be sent away." For hOAhyla lrAOGha is no doubt the
lot of Jehovah, but it signifies per metonymiam the animal to be
assigned to Jehovah by lot. It was certainly not the lot, as the
object by which the selection was made, that became the portion of
Jehovah, but rather the lot as the object for which the lot was
cast, viz., the animal. And if it was not; the piece of parchment,
metal, wood, or whatever may have been employed, but the goat
upon which the parchment, etc., with the name of Jehovah upon it
fell, that became the portion of Jehovah; the same also applies, by
virtue of the antithesis, to the "exile." It was not the piece of
parchment which bore the name of exile that was to be devoted to
exile, but the other goat; and this must be distinguished from the
exile, quite as much as the first goat was to be distinguished from
Jehovah.
205. We have only one other view remaining, namely, that
which regards Azazel as the description of a personal being, viz., an
evil demon; and this has been very properly adopted by much ,
the larger majority of the latest commentators, however otherwise
divergent in their views,--e.g., not only by Hengstenberg and Keil,
but even by Knobel and Bunsen, by Ewald, Diestel, and Furst.
Nothing, in fact, can be more undeniable, than that the antithesis
of hvhyl and lzxzfl in ver. 8 proves the latter to be a designation of
some personal being, just as the former is. The same contrast
renders it, still further, even more than probable that it is some
daemoniacal being that is referred to. And this is placed beyond
all doubt by the fact that the desert is represented as his dwelling-
place. For it is not in the New Testament that we first meet with
the notion that the desert is the abode of daemons and unclean
spirits (Matt. xii. 43; Luke viii. 27; Rev. xviii. 2), but we find the
same idea current even before the time of the captivity (Isa. xiii. 21,
xxxiv. 14, cf. Lev. xvii. 7).1 Whether this idea is to be regarded
as an old Hebrew notion, dating from a period before the sojourn
in Egypt, or as one that originated in the intercourse with Egyp-
tians, and if the latter, whether Azazel is to be regarded as a
Hebrew transformation of the Egyptian Seth or Typhon, who also
appears as an evil demon dwelling in the desert, is doubtful. Heng-
stenberg (Egypt and the Books of Moses, p. 170 translation) and
Havernick (p. 203) support the latter view; but it is opposed, on
the other hand, by Diestel in his valuable treatise on Set-Typhon,
Azahel and Satan, on the ground that the Egyptological researches
of modern times have led to this result, "that the idea of Typhon
as an evil principle is to be assigned to a much later period than the
time of Moses, since the prevailing hatred felt towards Set in Egypt
arose after the time of the Ramessides, and therefore not earlier
than the 10th or 11th cent. B.C." We have neither time nor room
for settling this dispute. Nor does this seem indispensable to an
understanding of the Israelitish ritual. For even if the view upon
which it is based arose first of all in Egypt under the influence of
peculiarly Egyptian ideas, the form given to it in the festal ritual
of the day of atonement is certainly an independent, Mosaic one,
1
Hofmann disputes this, but on insufficient grounds. He maintains that a
the MyriyfiW; (Vulg. daemones; Luther, field-devils; Eng. Vers. devils), to which
the Israelites are forbidden to sacrifice in Lev. xvii. 7, correspond to the oxen
mentioned in 2 Chron. xi. 15 as objects of Jeroboam's worship, and that they are
both animal forms, representing the Deity, such as the Egyptians worshipped;
and that the MyriyfiW; in Isa. xiii. 21 are as truly animals as the hnAfEya tOnB; men-
tioned in connection with them, and are as truly goats and not goat-legged
satyrs here, as in every other passage.--But the first reply to this is, that by
the MyriyfiW; in Isa. xiii. and xxxiv. we cannot possibly understand ordinary goats
(for it is only of these that the name is used), since they are always domestic
animals, and we cannot imagine how they could ever come into association with
lira and Ziim, or ostriches, and be introduced as living in desert places and ruins.
In Lev. xvii. 7 there is not the slightest warrant or occasion for thinking of
manufactured images of goats. And it is still more certain that Hofmann's
explanation of 2 Chron. xi. 15 is a misinterpretation. There is not a trace to be
found anywhere of the worship of goats having been introduced by Jeroboam
or his successors along with that of the calves, neither in the historical books of
Kings nor in the prophetical books of Hosea and Amos, which refer so fre-
quently, so minutely, and at such length to the idolatrous worship of the
northern kingdom. The words "which he made," therefore, must be referred
merely to the "calves" mentioned in the latter passage, and the name MyriyfiW;
must be regarded as a contemptuous epithet applied to heathen deities; in con-
section with which it is to be borne in mind, that in both the Old and New
and is to be interpreted not according to Egyptian, but according to

purely Israelitish ideas.
206. If, then, we are thus brought to the conclusion, that by
the Azazel of the day of atonement we are to understand a personal
being, viz, an evil demon dwelling in the desert, the question
arises, in what relation this notion is to be placed to the ordinary
teaching of the Old Testament with reference to daemons. With
the comparatively slight development of this doctrine in the time
before the captivity, and the marked reserve maintained in the
inspired writings of those times with reference to this "mystery of
iniquity," we must give up at the very outset all hope of any doc--
trinally clear and precise account of the notions which the early
Israelite associated with this name. The occasional rays of light
which the inspired writings throw upon this dark domain, without
entering at all closely or professedly upon any description of its
character, appear undoubtedly to warrant the assumption, that both
tradition and the popular belief embraced a far more richly deve-
loped demonology than the inspired writers thought well to unfold
Testaments the heathen deities are looked upon as daemoniacal beings having
a real existence (vid. History of the Old Covenant, vol. ii. pp. 246-253, Eng.
transl.). But if by the Seirim in Lev. xvii. 7 and 2 Chron. xi. 15 we are to
understand daemons, there is no possibility of attributing any other meaning
to Isa. xiii. 21 and xxxiv. 15; and this interpretation becomes all the more cer-
tain, when we find the Lord Himself in the New Testament giving expression to
the view that the desert is a favourite abode of daemons. In Rev. xviii. 2,
where the destruction of Babylon is spoken of, we have a passage of peculiar
importance to the interpretation of Isa. xiii. 21; in fact, it is almost equivalent
to a commentary upon these words of Isaiah. And this passage also proves that
the juxtaposition of MyriyfiW; and hnAfEya tOnB;, to which the dai<monej and o@rnia
a]ka<qarta correspond, does not necessitate our regarding the former as ordinary
animals. But though undoubtedly the word MyriyfiW; is an epithet applied to
daemoniacal beings, and both their existence and their abode in the desert are
attested by Old and New Testament passages, this by no means compels us to
picture them to ourselves as actually "goat-legged." This idea may have been
current in the popular mythology, and the name may even have originated in
this idea, and yet the name, when once current, may have been adopted by
the language of revelation without the mythological representation of their
bodily form being also accredited in consequence. It is much the same in this
respect with the goats' legs of these daemons as with the angels' wings of the
Christian mythology. Supposing that a name for the angels had grown out of
this idea, the language of revelation might have employed it without thereby
adopting the idea to which it owed its origin. Christ could call the "prince
of the devils" Beelzebub or Beelzebul, without giving His sanction in conse-
quence to all the popular notions associated with the etymology of this name.
and accredit; but they are far too isolated and cursory to afford us
any deep and comprehensive view.
A comparison of Lev. xvii. 7 with Isa. xiii. 21 will show at once
that according to the popular belief, there were many demons dwell-
ing in the desert. Now if, on the one hand, the sameness of abode
is a proof that Azazel was regarded as one of them, the prominence
given to this one, on the other hand, shows that it was regarded as
holding a distinct and exalted position among them; and we shall
hardly be mistaken if we regard it as the culmination or head of
the whole of the daemon-world by which the desert was peopled.
The ritual of the day of atonement places it in a distinct and pecu-
liar relation to the sins of the nation. And this certainly suggests
the thought, that there was a close connection between Azazel and
the serpent in Paradise, by whose seductive influence upon the first
pair sin entered the world of man. At the same time, it would be
even more than precipitate to identify Azazel with the serpent in
Paradise, or rather with the spirit of the fall, to which it served as
the instrument, in such a way as to suppose that this identity was
known to and present to the minds of the contemporaries of Moses.
The serpent in Paradise was a hieroglyphic; which was not to be
clearly understood till a future day,--a seed-corn of truth, which
was not to be unfolded till the sun of revelation was about to reach
the zenith of its glory. If the Mosaic doctrine of Azazel had been
a conscious unfolding of the primeval account of the snake in Para-
dise, it would not only have been richer, clearer, and deeper than it
is, but there would also of necessity have been marked and obvious
points of contact between the two; but of this there is not the
slightest trace.
And if the serpent of Paradise could not have formed the
groundwork for the later view of the Azazel that dwelt in the
desert, there is just as little reason to regard the latter as supplying
the foundation for the still later teaching of the Old Testament
respecting Satan. For the name never occurs again; nor is the
desert ever expressly referred to as his peculiar dwelling-place. But
whilst the account of the serpent in Paradise still remains altogether
mysterious and enigmatical, and no marked or obvious points of
coincidence are to be found between the Azazel of the desert and
the Satan of a later date, it is easy to discover some very distinct
lines of relationship between them. They are both personal, in-
dividual beings, and they both belong to the daemon-world, and
occupy a prominent and unparalleled position there. There can be
no ground, therefore, for denying a priori such a connection between

the two forms, as points to conscious identity. However strange
the fact may appear, therefore, that the name Azazel never occurs
again in the later portions of the Old Testament, this may possibly
be explained to some extent on the supposition, that Azazel was
originally simply an adjective or common noun, and may still have
continued to be used in this form, whilst the name Satan grew more
and more into a proper name. The fact that Satan is never referred
to in the Old Testament as dwelling in the desert, may be accidental,
and by no means warrants an unqualified denial of his identity with
Azazel. On the other hand, the character of Satan as the enemy,
the calumniator, and the accuser of the righteous, corresponds pre-
cisely to the part assigned to Azazel in relation to the MyriPuKi of the
day of atonement. And even if the later doctrine concerning Satan
developed itself independently of the idea of Azazel, so much at
any rate is certain, that in Azazel we see the head of the daemon-
world as opposed to God and hostile to salvation, so far as it was
at that time an object of thought at all; and this sufficiently ex-
plains the ritual of the day of atonement.
With regard to the etymology of the name lzxzf, Hengstenberg and
Knobel are probably correct in taking it to be a Pealpel form
of the Arabic lzf=semovit, dimovit, se separavit, with an adjective
meaning, viz., the entirely separate one," which is perfectly in
keeping with his dwelling hrAzeG; Cr,x,B; (ver. 22 in a land cut off, or
separate. Diestel and First regard the existing form of the word
as a corruption of lxzezAfE, "power of God," or by another turn of
the expression, defiance of God, and appeal to the fact that
among the heathen Shemites the name zyzifA occurs in various ways
as a name of Deity. But the combinations of the names of angels
and daemons with lxe, the name of God, as the final syllable, are of
so late a (late in Jewish history, that it is something more than
venturesome to transfer them to the Mosaic, or even an earlier age.
207. One of the earliest explanations of the ceremony as-
sumed that the second goat was meant as a gift or present for
Azazel, and was intended to prevent him from destroying the
efficacy of the sacrifices, offered for the expiation of Israel, by
means of his hostile influence. According to the prevailing opinion,
the LXX. followed this interpretation. In ver. 8 the rendering of
lzczfl, is t&? ]Apopomtai<& the meaning of which, according to the
passages quoted by Gesenius from Pollux, Suidas, and Harpocration,
is = ]Apotropai?oj, ]Aleci<kakoj, Averruncus. But as the LXX. have
rendered the Hebrew word in ver. 10 by ei]j th>n a]popomph<n (and

in ver. 26 by ei]j a@fesin), it seems to me more probable that their
]Apopompai?oj was used passively (= a]popempo<menoj), and intended
as a name for the goat. There can be no doubt that Josephus
adopted this view, when he paraphrased the word thus in Ant. iii.
10, 3: a]potropiasmo>j kai> parai<thsij tou? plh<qouj panto>j u[pe>r
a[marthma<twn e]so<menoj. Many of the Rabbins followed him, and
among more modern writers, Spencer, Ammon, and Rosenmuller;
also Gesenius, who speaks very confidently in his Lexicon of 1833,
where he says, '"Non dubitans reddo a]leci<kakoj, averruncus, caco-
daemonem in deserto habitantem, ex ritu illo vetustissimo et gentili
hostiis mitigandum intelligendum esse statuo." He repeats this
opinion, though not with the same confidence, in his Thesaurus,
and in the later editions of his Lexicon also.
But this view is so evidently at variance with the spirit of
Mosaism and of the Old Testament generally, that it is not deserv-
ing of any elaborate refutation, and in fact does not need one in
the present condition of the question (vid. Bahr, pp. 686, 687, but
more especially Hengstenberg, l.c. pp. 169 sqq.; the numerous ob-
jections adduced by the latter are not all equally conclusive). The
principal objections are the following: (1) In the very next chapter
(Lev. xvii. 7) sacrifices are forbidden to be offered to daemons
(MyriyfiW;). (2) Both the goats are described as sin-offerings in ver.
5; and, as Hengstenberg observes, the idea of a sin-offering presup-
poses holiness, the hatred of sin, on the part of the being to whom
it is offered. (3) The two goats form but one sin-offering ( 202),
both are brought before Jehovah, and Jehovah's decision is sought
by lot as to what is to be done with them,--all of them data, which
entirely preclude our regarding one goat as a sacrifice for Jehovah,
and the other as an ovation for Azazel. (4) According to ver. 21,
the sins of the people were laid by the high priest upon the second
goat, that he might take them to Azazel. Now if the sins laid
upon it are regarded as already expiated, which they really were
by the offering of the first goat, the sending of them to Azazel was
an act of defiance and ridicule, rather than an ovation or an indem-
nification; whereas, if we lose sight of the fact that the sins were
already expiated, the sending of these sins to Azazel was no doubt
an ovation for him, but at the same time it was an act of the
bitterest defiance towards Jehovah, and the most daring renuncia-
tion of His claims.
Even the modification, which Witsius gives to this view in his
Aegyptiaca (ii. 9, 3), does not render it any more acceptable. In

his opinion, non fait caper emissarius diabolo oblatus, sed voluntate
Dei expositus vexandus diabolo. But Bahr justly objects to this,
that "the text in that case would contain no allusion to what was
really the principal thing, viz., the vexari; to say nothing of the
fact that the idea of vexari is altogether foreign to the early
Mosaism." Moreover, the goat laden with the sins of the people
would then serve as the representative of the sinful nation, and the
ceremony, in spite of the expiation already accomplished, would
teach that vexation was still required,-a doctrine that would stand
in the most direct opposition to the idea and purpose of the day.
208. The question why the sins of the people were laid upon
the second goat, or rather, as this question is authoritatively an-
swered by the text itself in ver. 22, why these sins were to be sent
to Azazel, must form the backbone of every inquiry into the true
meaning of this ceremonial. And here it is a matter of the greatest
and most essential importance, whether the laying of the sins upon
the second goat be regarded as dependent upon the previous expia-
tion of the same sins by the sacrifice of the first goat, or whether
the two acts be looked upon as equally independent, and having
no relation the one to the other, so that in both of them there was
precisely the same reference to the sins as such, i.e., as not yet
expiated. And the fact that care has not been taken to determine
this at the very outset, or rather, that in most cases the question has
not even been raised has considerably obstructed the full distinct
and thorough understanding of this singular ceremony, if not ren-
dered it absolutely impossible.
We must once more insist as we have already done upon the
fact, that when the sins were laid upon the head of the second goat,
they could not be looked at in any other light than as already
expiated. It is perfectly inconceivable that so important a transac-
tion as the previous atonement for the whole congregation and the
whole sanctuary through the blood of the first goat, which formed
the basis of, and was presupposed by, all that followed, could possi-
bly have been overlooked in what the high priest is described as
performing in ver. 21. And this is both inconceivable and impos-
sible if, as is generally admitted, the second goat is to be regarded
as the continuation of the first, as the first called to life again, as its
alter ego, occupying its place after its life had been taken, to carry
on its work, and complete the task assigned it. Moreover, any
such ignoring of the expiations described in vets. 15 sqq. as having
been effected through the blood of the first goat, in connection with
the laying on of the sins in ver. 21, would be equivalent to a direct
denial of the validity of those expiations, which nevertheless had
been carried to the highest possible point, would give the lie to the
promise of Jehovah in Lev. xvii. 11, and in fact would represent
the whole of the sacrificial ceremonial of the Old Testament as
destitute of power. Our view also receives an undeniable confirma-
tion from the fact, that the laying on of hands is described in ver.
21 as performed by the high priest. Had it been to sin as such-
i.e., as committed by the nation--that reference was made, it ought
to have been laid upon the animal by the nation itself, or by its
natural representatives, the elders. If then, as was actually the
case, this was done by the high priest, who acted throughout the
whole of the sacrificial worship solely as the mediator of the grace
of God, and therefore as the representative of God Himself, and
who in this capacity, by means of the blood of the first goat, had
already covered, neutralized, and atoned for the very same sins
which he now laid upon the head of the second goat, it appears
self-evident that they could come into consideration here only as
covered and fully expiated. The view held by our opponents leaves
it perfectly inexplicable, why on this particular occasion it should
have been the high priest who put his hands upon the head of the
goat, and not, as in other cases, the elders in the name of the
whole congregation. Lastly, the only admissible explanation of
vylAfA rPekal; in ver. 10 necessitates our view. At the same time it is
still true, that with the great difficulty that presses upon this ques-
tion, it needs a special and thorough investigation.
209. According to ver. 10, after the lot had been cast upon
the two goats, the one upon which the lot of Azazel fell was placed
before Jehovah alive, lzexzAfEla Otxo Hl.aw.al; vylAfA rPekal;; and it was not till
after the expiation described in vers. 11-19 as effected with the
blood of the Jehovah-goat was completed, that it was brought
forward again. What was then done with it is described in vers.
20-22. Consequently, we have here an authentic commentary
upon ver. 10, i.e., a detailed description of the purpose to which the
goat had been previously set apart, as described in that verse. And
if the lzexzAfEla Otxo Hl.awal; is described in vers. 21 b, 22, we shall hardly
be mistaken in regarding the vylAfA rPekal; as described in ver. 21 a,
after the command to bring up the goat has been given in ver. 20.
This making "atonement with it" is to be regarded as having been
effected by the high priest "placing both his hands upon the head
of the goat, and confessing over it all the iniquities of the children
of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them
upon the head of the goat." No other execution of this command
is ever described, or even hinted at, nor is there room for it any-
where else.
But with this view, a meaning must undoubtedly be assigned
to the expression vylAfA rPekal; in ver. 10, which this familiar formula
never has in any other connection. In other places, for instance,
the vylAfA invariably relates to the object of the expiation, either the
person laden with sin, or the Holy Place that had been thereby de-
filed. And for this reason many commentators think that we ought
to keep to the same meaning here; but they become involved in
various contradictions and self-deceptions in consequence. Not
one of them has been able to point out, even in appearance, for
what purpose, when, and by what means the expiation of the goat
took place. The goat, which according to ver. 5 had been offered
as a sin-offering, was pure, holy, blameless, and spotless, and needed
neither purifying nor expiating. The expiation of a sacrificial
animal would be a contradictio in adjecto; for the sacrificial animal
as such was always the subject, never the object, of expiation.
Moreover, under the Old Covenant expiation was always effected
solely and exclusively by the sprinkling of blood; but no allusion
is ever made to the sprinkling of the second goat with atoning
blood, nor can any place be found, in the whole of the compact
and closely connected ritual, in which such sprinkling could be
inserted.
Bahr (p. 684). maintains that "the formula in question, which
occurs so frequently, is to be understood here in the same way as
in every other connection, and to be rendered, 'to make atonement
for it (the goat)."' But why so? "Expiation in this case bore
some resemblance to that of the vessels and instruments of expia-
tion in the sanctuary, which were consecrated afresh by the sacri-
ficial blood; and this second goat was also, in a certain sense, an
instrument of expiation, inasmuch as the sins were laid upon it,
and it had to carry them away. To this purpose, therefore, was
it consecrated."--But if such a consecration had been necessary,
it would have been even more so in the case of the first goat.
Moreover, a sacrificial animal was neither in a literal nor in a
figurative sense a vessel of expiation, an instrument of expiation,
or a place of expiation, like the altar or the sanctuary; nor did
anything take place which could express or effect its expiation.
Keil (p. 410) opposes Bahr's view with some arguments1 that
miss the mark, and others which are quite conclusive (the only mis-
fortune being, that the latter2 apply as much to his own view as
they do to Bahr's); but his own solution of the problem is alto-
gether wide of the mark, and thoroughly incorrect. Thus at p.
406 he says: This goat is not to be regarded as merely the bearer
of the sin to be carried away; for it was not only set apart as a
sin-offering, but by the lot it was placed on a perfect equality with
the other, which was really sacrificed and placed like this one before
Jehovah, to make atonement for it, i.e., to make it the object of
atonement." But the second goat was unquestionably merely the
bearer of the sin to be carried away, for it is described as such, and
only as such, in the record itself (ver. 22); and were it correct that
it needed first of all to have expiation made for it, such expiation
could have had no other object than to qualify it for what is ex-
pressly mentioned in ver. 22 as its peculiar duty. Again, it is quite
wrong to state that the second goat was placed before Jehovah
like the first, to make atonement for it, i.e., to make it the object of
atonement;" for the first goat was never the object of atonement,
that is to say, it was never appointed to have atonement made for it,
but to be itself the subject or medium of atonement for the sinful
nation and the polluted sanctuary. It is true, that with the prw?-
ton yeu?doj of Keil's theory of sacrifice, according to which the soul
of the sacrificial animal was placed upon the altar as the substitu-
tionary representative of the soul of the sacrificer requiring ex-
piation, the sacrificial animal might in a certain sense be called
the a object of expiation," and therefore this expression might be
applied to the first goat; but even according to Keil's theory, the
sacrificial animal (as a substitute for the sacrificer) could only be-
come the object of expiation by its soul being brought within the
range of the operations of divine grace, in other words, by its being
placed upon the altar; consequently the second goat also could only
become the object of expiation by its soul being brought within the
1
For it is quite a misapprehension on his part, when he interprets Bahr's
very clearly expressed opinion as implying that the first goat was intended as
a symbol of the sinful congregation, and the second, of the vessels (the altar, the
tent of convocation, or the Capporeth), which had been defiled by the sin of the
congregation. Such a thought certainly never entered into Bahr's mind.
2
"The second goat," he says, "ought at any rate to have been sprinkled
with the blood of the slaughtered goat, if it was to serve in any sense as an
instrument of expiation, and as such was to be expiated itself." This is equally
applicable to every view, in which the goat is regarded as the object of expiation.
range of the operations of divine grace, i.e., by its being placed upon
the altar. But that never was the case. Instead of this, it was
taken body and soul into the desert, and so brought within the range
of the operations of Azazel, i.e., of the devil!
Hengstenberg, who also stedfastly maintains that ver. 10 re-
lates to the expiation of the second goat, by a strange self-decep-
tion imagines that he has cleared up the subject, by affirming that
through this act of expiation the second goat was placed as it
were en rapport with the first, and the qualities possessed by the
first were transferred to the living goat" (p. 174). Diestel is also
of opinion, that a we are probably to understand the matter in this
way: the goat was to bear the sins of the whole nation, and be-
came in consequence the object of the destroying wrath of God;
but this destruction would prevent its continuing as a living goat,
and therefore it was necessary that expiation should intervene to
quench this wrath of Jehovah" (p. 195). But the propounder of
this opinion hesitates, and adds immediately afterwards, "the cere-
mony by which this expiation was effected is certainly not men-
tioned." This is not the chief objection to the view in question,
however, but rather the fact that it is full of internal contradictions.
If, for example. we regard the expiation of the goat as taking place
before the laying on of the sin of the nation, as Diestel appears to
do, it is impossible to understand, (1) what there was to expiate
in the pure, holy, innocent, and spotless sacrificial animal; and (2)
how the sin, which was not to be laid upon it till afterwards, could
thus have been rendered harmless beforehand. It would be a
strange, unmeaning, and contradictory demand, to require a clean
person, who was about to carry a very dirty object, and one that
was sure to make him dirty, to wash himself carefully first of all!1
--If there is to be any sense at all in this explanation, we ought
to understand the expiation of the goat as taking place rather after
than before the sin of the people had been laid upon it. But even
then it would be incomprehensible why sin, which had already
been expiated in the highest, strongest, and most comprehensive
manner through the blood of the first goat, should have to be sub-
jected to a fresh, and in any case a weaker expiation.
210. In such a state of things, we are obviously compelled to
1
This also applies to Hofmann, who says in his Schriftbeweis (i. 431): The
goat was first expiated, that it might take the sin of others upon it, and then,
laden with the sin of Israel." He gives another explanation, however, in his
second edition (i. 289).
give up the conclusion drawn from vylf rpkl in ver. 10, that the
second goat had to be expiated before it was sent away into the
desert, as necessarily erroneous. No doubt, in other cases the pre-
position lfa with rpk always refers to the object of the expiation.
But as the expiation of a pure, holy, and faultless sacrificial animal
is a contradictio in adjecto, and pure nonsense; and again, as rpk
is sometimes used absolutely, without the addition of the object of
the expiation, to denote an expiatory action (ver. 32); we are war-
ranted, or rather compelled, to regard the rpk in ver. 10 as absolute,
and the lf as used independently, and therefore to render it, as
Hofmann, Kliefoth, and Bunsen have done, to perform an act of
expiation over it." This act of expiation must then be described
in what follows, since it is something unusual and apart, and the
description can only be sought and found in the laying on of the
sins by the high priest in ver. 21. There is the less fear of our
being wrong in this, from the fact that here, as in ver. 10, the send-
ing into the desert was the object and effect of the action in ques-
tion.
But how can that which is commanded in the first half of ver.
21 be regarded, or designated, as an act of expiation'? The twist-
ing of the laying on of the hand into the attitude or position
of a person praying over the animal, even if it were as correct in
itself as it is obviously false and groundless, would never justify
this, for the confession of sins in prayer is not an act of expiation;
nor can the laying of the sins upon the head of the goat be re-
garded as in itself an act of expiation. And the difficulty would
not be removed by our taking in the second half of the verse, as
Knobel and Hofmann do, since the sending away of the sins could
not be regarded as an act of expiation, inasmuch as the law recog-
vises no other expiation than that effected through the sprinkling
of blood. But the laying on of the sins, if taken in close and in-
separable connection with the previous expiation effected by the
blood of the first goat, might very properly be regarded as an act
of expiation. And we are warranted in combining them together
in this way by the ideal unity of the two goats ( 202), the two
together forming but one sin-offering. The laying on of the sins
by the hand of the high priest could only denote an act, which pre-
supposed and rested upon the expiation of the people and the sanc-
tuary,--an act which might be omitted in the ordinary expiations,
as being implicitly contained in them, but which it was necessary
to set forth explicite on this particular day, when everything was
so arranged as to place the expiation before the eye as in every re-

spect complete and all-sufficient.
But if this be the true interpretation of vylAfA rPekal; in ver. 10, we
have here a fresh proof of the correctness of the view already
established, that the act of laying the sins upon the head of the
goat had regard to the sins already expiated, and that they were
sent into the desert to Azazel not as still unexpiated and deserving
the wrath and punishment of God, but as expiated, covered, and
deprived of all their power.--Consequently every interpretation of
the ceremony which ignores, denies, or disputes this, we must at
the very outset declare to be erroneous.
Diestel (pp. 195 sqq.) is quite in despair. He inquires: "Was
Azazel then supposed to be capable of producing certain evils and
plagues? If so, of what kind could they be, since all the plagues
of an extraordinary kind owed their origin exclusively to the wrath
of Jehovah?" In this extremity he helps himself by pronouncing
the view of Azazel, upon which this idea is founded, an effete, ob-
scure, and incomplete theory, in a transition state, and one from
which the people might feel themselves repelled through the fear
that it would endanger a strict monotheism, and to which they might
be attracted on the other hand, as furnishing in a certain way points
of contact for a new formation, and still more as promising to give
a firm and objective hold to the consciousness of sin. The result
to which he is eventually brought is, that in Azazel we have before
us a figure which the people of Israel bad received from the heathen,
and that in the ceremony before us Israel appears as rejecting it,--
the ceremony itself being a proof that the design was not to mani-
fest any reverence, but on the contrary extreme disgust. But not
the least explanation is- given, nor do we learn where the points of
fcontact for the new formation lie or how the effete obscure and
incomplete" theory could promise to, give any fixed objective hold
to the consciousness of sin.
Knobel's explanation is much more lucid and complete, and
more deserving of approbation. "Through the sprinkling of the
blood," he says (p. 493), cc the sins committed had been forgiven,
and punishment was averted in consequence; but these sins were
still actual facts, and separated Israel from the holy God. The
confession of these sins was an expression of Israel's repentance and
abhorrence of them. Jehovah accepted the good will for the deed
He was ready to look upon the sins as set aside and removed along
with the goat, and Israel as free from sin; and He received the
nation, delivered from uncleanness and sin, into His fellowship once
more, whilst the evil Azazel had to take to himself the evil of Israel
thus sent to him by the goat. The sin-goat, therefore, embodied
the idea, that Israel was delivered from all its sins, and received
again into the fellowship of God." But there are two objections
to this view: (1) The confession of sin ought in that case to have
preceded the sprinkling of the blood, which secured the forgiveness
and security from punishment, and not to have come afterwards;
and (2) if the sin was covered, expiated, and exterminated by the
sprinkling of the blood, it no longer separated the sinner from the
holy God. And if, in addition to the neutralizing of the punish-
ment due to the sins by the sprinkling of the blood, another special
negation was still required as a fact, to open the way for the sinner
to enter again into the fellowship of the grace of God, the latter
ought not to have been omitted in the case of any expiatory offer-
ing for sin.
211. Hengstenberg paved the way for the true vindication and
explanation of the ceremony. In the first edition of his Christology
(i. 1, 37) he maintained, that "by this act the kingdom of dark-
ness and its prince were renounced; and the sins to which he had
tempted, and by which he had sought to make the nation or the
individual his own, were, so to speak, sent back to him. And in
this way the truth was symbolically expressed, that he to whom
God imparts reconciliation is free from the power of the wicked
one." But Tholuck, Bahr, and others took exception to the idea of
sending back the sins to Satan, which is altogether foreign to the
Old Testament, and in fact to the Bible generally; and Hengsten-
berg himself gave it up afterwards. In his Egypt and the Books of
Moses he says, "The doctrinal significance of the symbolic action,
so far as it has reference to Azazel, is this, that Satan, the enemy
of the people of God, cannot harm those forgiven by God, but they,
with sins forgiven of God, can go before him with a light heart,
deride him, and triumph over him" (Robbin's translation, p. 161).
In my Mos. Opfer, p. 285, I followed Hengstenberg, and ex-
plained the meaning of the ceremony thus: The expiation to be
effected on this day, being so decidedly complete and all-sufficient,
was to be exhibited as too obvious and indisputable for even Satan,
the accuser, to refuse to recognise it. Hence the sin was first atoned
for in an ordinary, but an intensified form, and then sent to Azazel,
that he might convince himself that they would no longer furnish
him with a reason and cause for accusing Israel, or for exciting the
wrath and punishment of God on their account. Satan is intro-

duced here, not as the author of sin, but rather as the accuser of
men on account of sin; and we may learn how familiar this idea
was not only to New Testament writers (Rev. xii. 10, 11), but in
Old Testament times as well, from the prologue to the Book of Job
and the vision of Zechariah (Zech. iii.).
This view of the matter, to which I still adhere, has since been
adopted by Kliefoth (p. 165). But Keil has only confused it, by
introducing extraneous and incongruous ideas. Thus at p. 407 he
says, "The goat was to carry the sins, which God had already for
given to His Church, into the wilderness to Azazel, to bring them
back to the father of all sin, on the one hand as a witness, that by
his evil influence upon men he could not touch those who had re-
ceived expiation from the Lord; and on the other hand, as a witness
to the congregation of Israel also, that those who were laden with
sins could not remain in the kingdom of God, but in case they were
not redeemed from them would be driven to the abode of evil
spirits." But if those sins which God had already forgiven were
laid upon the goat, the sending of them into the desert could not
possibly express the idea, that those who were laden with unexpiated
sins would be driven to the abode of evil spirits. And if the latter
is nevertheless to be retained, it must have been not sins that had
been expiated, but sins that were not expiated, which were laid upon
the goat and carried by it into the wilderness.
212. After the high priest had sent away the second goat into
the wilderness, he went into the Holy Place of the tabernacle, took
off the linen clothes and left them there (ver. 23). He then washed
himself again ( 198) with water in the fore-court, put on his ordi-
nary high-priestly state clothes, and proceeded to offer his own
burnt-offering and that of the people; along with the flesh of these
he burnt upon the altar the fat portions of the two sin-offering
animals already slain, whilst he caused the rest of the flesh of the
two sin-offerings to be carried, along with the skins and the dung,
to the outside of the camp, and there burned with fire. It was not
till then, and only upon this basis, that the ordinary festal sacrifices
(Num. xxix. 7 sqq.) could be offered, viz., a goat for a sin-offering,
and an ox, a ram, and seven yearling lambs for a burnt-offering,
along with the customary meat-offering, and the day be concluded
with the daily evening sacrifice.
As soon as those Cippurim, from which the day derived its
name, had been completed, there no longer existed any reason why
the high priest should wear the linen clothes instead of the ordinary
state dress ( 198), and therefore his resumption of the latter re-
quires no special explanation. We must, however, look somewhat
closely into it, on account of the misinterpretation which Keil has
given to the repetition of the washing (pp. 411, 412). According to
Keil, the high priest cleansed himself, "by washing his body and
his clothes (?) in a holy place from the uncleanness with which he
had been defiled, by the act of laying the sins of the people upon the
goat that was to be sent away into the wilderness." But by this
view the author contradicts himself, for at p. 407 even he regards
these sins as already atoned for, as those which God had already
forgiven to His congregation." Bahr's explanation of the renewal
of the washing (ii. 685) must also be pronounced erroneous. He
bases it upon Ex. xxx. 19 sqq., and infers, that because it is stated
there that the priests had to wash themselves when they entered
the tabernacle and when they approached the altar, Aaron also was
required to wash himself first before he entered the tabernacle, and
then again before he approached the altar. And Keil is quite right
in his reply to this, that with every sin-offering, whose blood was
brought into the interior of the tabernacle, the priest approached
the altar of burnt-offering, after the sprinkling of the blood in the
Holy Place had been effected, to pour out the remainder of the
blood at the foot of the altar, and to burn the fat portions upon it,
and that he did this without having first of all to perform a second
washing. On the other hand, Bahr is also correct in maintaining,
that this second washing is to be placed in the same light as the
first washing which took place before the commencement of his
duties. On both occasions the washing was connected with the
putting on of fresh sacred clothes. With the old dress the old man
was also to be laid aside, and this was symbolized by the washing of
the body. It is true this presupposes that the high priest had de-
filed himself during the time that he had on the linen clothes, or at
least might have done so. But this defilement could never have
been contracted from the holy functions which he had performed in
the meantime; it could only have arisen from himself, from his own
sinful human nature. The very same reason which Keil very aptly
assigns for the striking fact, that notwithstanding the previous
accomplishment of the highest, most perfect, and most comprehen-
sive expiation by the sin-offerings of the high priest and the people
respectively, another sin-offering occurred among the festal sacri-
fices, also serves to explain the necessity for this repeated washing
THE LEVITICAL AND PRIESTLY PURIFICATIONS. 415
Because sin always surrounds the saint while here on earth, and
defiles even his holiest resolutions and works, and he consequently
needs forgiving grace for all his undertakings, these burnt-offerings
and meat-offerings could not be well-pleasing to the Lord except
upon the basis of a sin-offering."
In conclusion, the fact must also be borne in mind, that both the
man who led away the living goat into the desert (ver. 26), and
also the man who was commissioned to burn the flesh of the sin-
offering outside the camp (ver. 28), were regarded as defiled in
consequence, and were not allowed to enter the camp again till they
had washed their clothes and bathed their bodies. But here also
Keil's explanation, viz., that all contact with the sacrificial animals
when laden with sin necessarily defiled," is not the true one for, as
we have already shown ( 110, 114), this view involves the greatest
absurdities. That the man who took the goat into the desert be-
came unclean in consequence, is intelligible enough; for he had
been into the territory of Azazel, the unclean spirit kat ] e]coxh<n.
And this also applies to the man who had to burn the flesh of the
sin-offering outside the camp. The camp, with the sanctuary in
the midst of it, was eo ipso the place of purity; and all persons who
were unclean in the highest degree, viz., all lepers, those who had
an issue, and those who were defiled by corpses (Num. v. 1-3), had
to live outside the camp during the period of their uncleanness.
Distance from the camp was equivalent, therefore, to separation
from the fellowship of the pure, and any temporary separation
might easily lead to Levitical uncleanness, without the knowledge
of the person defiled. And the holiness of the day, which was
carried to the highest pitch, required that the possibility of this
should also be taken into account.
CHAPTER III.
ADAPTATION OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP TO THE
LEVITICAL AND PRIESTLY PURIFICATIONS.
A. NATURE AND IDEA OF UNCLEANNESS IN CONNECTION WITH

RELIGION.
213. The Mosaic law, in harmony with the views of nearly

all ancient nations, particularly in the East, pronounced certain
416 THE LEVITICAL AND PRIESTLY PURIFICATIONS.
conditions and functions of the human body unclean, and defiling

to others by contact; in other words, as shutting out from the
sanctuary and from participation in its worship. The different
forms of uncleanness, the lower grades of which could be removed
by simply washing with water, whilst the higher needed a sacrificial
expiation also, may be arranged in three classes: first, the unclean-
ness of human corpses and animal carrion; secondly, the unclean-
ness of leprosy in men, clothes, and houses; and thirdly, uncleanness
proceeding from both diseased and normal functions of the human
organs of generation. These conditions and functions, the whole
of which, with the single exception of conjugal intercourse,1 were
involuntary and to a certain extent inevitable, are not treated in
the law as, sinful in themselves, or as connected with special sins.
This is evident enough from the fact that marriage was encouraged
in every way by the law, and conjugal intercourse is spoken of as
a duty (Ex. xxi. 10), whilst the corpse of the most righteous man
was regarded as equally unclean and defiling with that of the
greatest criminal. Yet by requiring a sin- or trespass-offering for
the removal of the higher forms of uncleanness, it indicates a pri-
mary connection between them and sin, so far, that is to say, as the
processes occurring in the body are dependent upon the influences
and effects of the universal sinfulness. And it was this sinfulness,
when brought to light by its operations and consequences, though
for the most part independently of the will of the persons in ques-
tion, which required sacrificial expiation by means of sin--offerings,
in the same manner as sinful acts unconsciously performed.
This is most apparent in the case of the uncleanness of corpses.
Death, with corruption in its train, is the inevitable issue of this
earthly, sinful life, according to the curse pronounced on sin (Gen.
ii. 17, iii. 19). And in death, what sin is and what it effects in
1
Sommer's assertion, that the Mosaic law did not share the ordinary view of
the defiling influence of conjugal connection, but that it arose at a later date
(1 Sam. xxi. 5, 6 2 Sam. xi. 4), and was wrongly transferred into the history
of the Mosaic times (Ex. xix. 15), could only be established by applying the
most obvious exegetical violence to Lev. xv. 18, which he was led to do, as we
shall presently see, by interests altogether apart from the subject itself. The
expression in Lev. xv. 18, as Knobel admits with laudable candour, can only
refer to actual intercourse, and not to involuntary emission, as Num. v. 13
clearly proves. And the same remark applies to the more concise expression in
Lev. xv. 24 (cf. Gen. xxvi. 10, xxxiv. 2, xxxv. 22; 1 Sam. ii. 22, etc.), and no
less to the somewhat more delicately expressed phraseology of ver. 33 (cf. Gen.
xxx. 15, 16, xxxix. 7, 12; Deut. xxii. 23, etc.).
NATURE OF UNCLEANNESS IN CONNECTION WITH RELIGION. 417
the sphere of the spirit (the disturbance and destruction of life, the
rending and dissolution of what God made one), come to light in
the sphere of the body as well.--This was hardly less apparent in
the case of leprosy, which was, so to speak, a living death,--the
destruction of all the vital powers, a dissolution and putrefaction
even in the living body, a death before death; so that, as Spencer
says, the leper was a walking tomb.
Lastly, so far as those functions and conditions of the sexual
life are concerned, which are represented as rendering unclean,
Bahr discovers a connection between these and sin and death.
Generation and death, birth and corruption, are, in his opinion, the
two poles, within which the sinful and accursed life of humanity
moves. By generation and birth the sinful life of man, which is
liable to death from the very first, is brought into existence; whilst
by death, the wages of sin, and corruption, the completion of death,
his life is brought to an end. Hence all the functions of the
sexual organs, both normal and abnormal, which are related to
generation and birth, come under the same aspect of uncleanness
as death itself.--Schultz's reply to this view is not to the point.
For when he objects that the uncleanness of animals which were
prohibited as food is not taken into account," this is just the re-
deeming point of Bahr's theory, that it clearly recognises the dis-
cordant nature of these two departments, and does not confound
them with one another. And. when he maintains that "generation
and birth could not possibly defile, inasmuch as they were instituted
by the blessing of God Himself," he overlooks the fact, that not-
withstanding the blessing of God, in Gen. i. 28, which continued
even after the entrance of sin, according to the intimations in Gen.
iii. 16 both generation and birth were brought under the curse of
sin, and affected by the influence of that curse.
On the other hand, we cannot deny the weight and importance
of another argument, brought forward by Sommer (p. 240) and
adopted by Keil (p. 280), in opposition to Bahr's view; viz., that
the two supposed poles of human life, generation and death, birth
and corruption, are placed by Bahr in a distorted relation to one
another, which is concealed by the ambiguity of the word birth
(Geburt, equivalent to giving birth, and being born). It is not
begetting and dying, nor giving birth and falling into corruption,
that are the two poles of sinful life, but being born and dying; and
therefore, according to Bahr's assumptions, it is not that which
begets and gives birth, but that which is begotten and born, which
ought to be regarded as unclean, and subjected to washing either

with or without a sin-offering.
214. But what both Sommer and Keil propose to substitute for
Bahr's theory is certainly even less tenable than that theory itself,
and is to be regarded, not as progress towards an explanation of
the matter, but as a retrograde movement. For example, Sommer
maintains (pp. 201 sqq.) that "death produces two kinds of symp-
toms of corruption: on the one hand, the so-called death-spots
upon the skin, and on the other, the corrupt secretions from the
inside of the corpse. The spots upon the skin of the leper are
analogous to the former, and certain secretions from the male and
female sexual organs, which possess the nature of decomposition,
and so indicate corruption, to the latter."--But even the analogy
asserted to exist between the death-spots on the skin of a corpse
and the spots upon the skin of a leper, is certainly a mistake. This
might pass, however. But the parallel drawn between the sexual
secretions and the corrupt secretions of a corpse is altogether un-
fortunate. An analogy of this kind might certainly be found in
the lochia, particularly the white lochia of a woman in childbirth,
and other diseased secretions from both male and female sexual
organs, but not in the normal menstruation and the hemorrhage of
women, for in this case there is not even an outward resemblance in
the secretions; and it seems hardly credible that the law of Moses,
which regarded the blood as the seat and bearer of the soul or life,
and certainly was not acquainted with the chemical difference between
the blood of menstruation and any other, should have treated the
flow of red blood, with the true colour of life, as analogous to the
pale, fetid secretions of a corpse. And it is least of all allowable
to trace any analogy between the latter and the emissio seminis in
a normal healthy intercourse, and on that account to attribute to
such an emissio a defiling influence, as Keil does without hesitation.
How can this be conceivable when the very opposite is the case,
and the semen virile is the generator of life? This contradiction
has not escaped Sommer's acuteness; but instead of altering his
self-originated theory to suit the opposing data of the law (Lev.
xv. 18) and history--(Ex. xix. 15; 1 Sam. xxi. 5, 6 ; 2 Sam. xi. 4),
he rather endeavours to set aside the latter, in favour of the former
by means of critical and exegetical arts. Keil cannot follow him
in these operations, but he becomes involved in consequence in the
very difficulties from which Sommer had succeeded in extricating
himself.
There are other points also in which Sommer's theory proves to

be untenable. No one could deny, for example, that a hemorrhoidal
discharge, which did not render unclean, belonged much more truly
to Sommer's category than a normal and healthy menstruation; or
that the secretion of mucus, diseased matter, etc., from nose or
mouth, from wounds and abscesses, which even corresponds to some
extent in smell, colour, etc., to the secretions of a corpse, would have
a much more suitable place in his category than either a voluntary
or involuntary emissio seminis. And yet not one of these is repre-
sented as defiling. On the contrary, all the secretions to which the
law attributes this result are those connected with the sexual life,
whether they bear any resemblance to the secretions of a corpse or
are as unlike as possible. It is solely in their connection with the
sexual life, therefore, that we must seek for the true cause of their
uncleanness, and this is just the point in which Bahr is decidedly
able to hold his ground against Sommer and his successors.
215. It is obvious enough from Gen. iii. 16, that according to
the scriptural view the sexual life was not only morally, but also
physically affected and changed by the curse of sin. And this view
has every claim to unhesitating adoption. In whatever department
of life sin has acquired moral supremacy, it has been invariably
followed by a physical disturbance and change and what depart-
ment of life is there in which either the one or the other has been
more decidedly and more universally manifested, than in that of the
sexual relation? Just as sin has produced mortality and sickness,
as the precursor of death throughout the entire organism of man, so
has it in an especial manner introduced diseased and deadly disturb-
ance and disorganization into the sphere of the sexual life. Medical
science may be quite, correct, from its own point of view, in pronounc-
ing the menses and lochia of women, and the involuntary seminal
emissions, etc., of men, necessary, and therefore normal and healthy
functions; but from a philosophical and theological point of view,
they must for all that be regarded as equally abnormal and un-
natural with the passing away of life into death and corruption,
which is also normal according to the dictum of medical science.
Now the fact that the sexual organs themselves, and their func-
tions in sexual intercourse, occupy, according to the sensus communis
of all nations and all ages, an abnormal position, is attested by the cir-
cumstance that they have always been the, objects of shame and
secrecy. In the Old Testament rWABA (flesh) is used to denote human
nature in its mortal, lapsed condition, and per emphasin the sexual
organs; and the priests who went up to the altar were required to wear
drawers, that the nakedness of their flesh might not be turned towards
the altar uncovered (Ex. xxviii. 42). And generation itself, which
brings into existence a new life subject to sinfulness and mortality, is
also in a certain sense a work of death. What observation teaches in
many of the lower animals, viz., that the time of copulation is also the
time of their death, has a certain analogy, so far as tendencies are
concerned, in the higher animals, and even in man (omne animal
post coitum triste); or rather, vice versa, the natural tendency to
mortality, which is only dimly seem in the act of generation in
man and the higher animals, has its perfect manifestation in those
inferior organisms. The emissio seminis in the case of a man is the
loss of a portion of his own vis vitalis, a surrendering of his own
vital energy (yniOx, Gen. xlix. 3), a disturbance and disorganization
of his inmost vital marrow, however quickly restoration may occur;
and in the same way there are disorganizations of the sexual life in
the menses as the necessary condition of conception, in the effects
of pregnancy which disturb the normal life in so many ways, and in
the lochia as the consequence of childbirth.
The double death-ban in which the sphere of human generation
is involved, and which is apparent on the one hand in the fact that
the parents can only beget a life that from the very first is sentenced
to death, and on the other hand in the fact that generation itself is
a disturbance and disorganization of their own life, is what places
generation and the whole sphere to which it belongs in an analogous
relation to death and corruption as the highest and most complete
disorganization of all, and stamps it as having, though in an inferior
degree, the same uncleanness which belongs to death and corruption
as the wages and fruit of sin. But the life begotten did not need
to be included in this declaration of uncleanness, which from its
very nature applied to generation and childbirth alone; in fact, it
could not properly be so included. It is true the life begotten was
from the very first involved in sin and death, and could not and
would not escape from death as the wages of sin, or corruption as
the completion of death; but these had not yet manifested them-
selves in any phenomena which proved that death reigned in it also.
It was unquestionably the ban of death which reigns in the
human body as the effect and consequence of sin, that stamped upon
the phenomena apparent in the different departments of generation,
leprosy, and decomposition the character of Levitical uncleanness.
And the obligation resting on the Israelites, not indeed to preserve
themselves free from such uncleanness, for that was impossible, but
whenever it occurred to purify themselves, or to seek purification in
a certain prescribed mode, was based upon the priestly character and
consecration of the people as a covenant nation ( 1), called to ap-
proach and hold communion with Jehovah, a holy God, who could
tolerate no uncleanness that sprang from sin, but unfit to approach
Him as long as the uncleanness continued. For a priest, in whom
the priestly vocation was concentrated and intensified, and who was
to hold constant and immediate intercourse with Jehovah, we can
understand that the demand for purity and purification would be
even stronger and more emphatic than for the rest of the nation
(Lev. xxi. 22).
216. As there were no special peculiarities in the sacrificial
expiation required for sexual uncleanness, we need not dwell upon
this (cf. Lev. xv.). Such expiation was not required, however, for
any emissio seminis, either voluntary in sexual intercourse, or invo-
luntary in nocturnal emission. In the latter case the man remained
unclean until the evening, and was to wash his body with water; in
the former, both the man and his wife were to do this. The sexual
flux (bUz) produced a higher stage of uncleanness. Those who were
affected with it were to stay outside the camp during the whole time
of their uncleanness (Num. v. 2), because their uncleanness would
be communicated by contact both to persons and things. In this
class were included menstruation the continuous diseased flux in a
woman, and diseased discharge from a man. In the last two cases
the uncleanness lasted till the seventh day after the complete cessa-
tion of the discharge; and in addition to the obvious washing the
law required two doves to be offered on the eighth day, one as a sin-
offering, the other as a burnt-offering, to wipe away the uncleanness.
A woman, on the other hand, during the period of menstruation, was
unclean for seven days in all, and when that time had elapsed, needed
nothing more than to wash her body and her clothes. Childbirth
produced uncleanness similar to that of menstruation, for seven days
on the birth of a boy, and for fourteen on the birth of a girl. But
ever after this time the woman had to remain at home in the blood
of her purification, for 33 more days in the former instance, and 66
in the latter; and then (after another washing) to offer a lamb as a
burnt-offering, and a dove as a sin-offering, or in cases of poverty
a dove for each.
The removal of the uncleanness produced by contact with a
corpse, as well as the purification of a leper when cured, needs a
thorough and separate examination on account of the peculiarities

in the sacrifices required, and in the other means of purification
prescribed.
B. REMOVAL OF UNCLEANNESS CAUSED BY TOUCHING A CORPSE.
217. As the scriptural view regards all corruption in nature

as primarily connected with the sinfulness of man (Gen. iii. 17
sqq., v. 29; cf. Rom. viii. 19 sqq.), we may easily understand why
the law placed not only human corpses; but also carrion, whether
of clean or unclean, i.e., edible or unedible animals, among the
things that defiled. All contact with any such object rendered
unclean till the evening, and required that both the person and the
clothes should be washed (Lev. xi. 24 sqq., xvii. 15). This did not
apply, however, to animals that had been slaughtered by man.
Vessels, clothes, etc., were not defiled, as a rule, by contact with
carrion; there were exceptions, however, in the case of eight creep-
ing things that are mentioned in Lev. xi. 32 sdq. The uncleanness
communicated by a human corpse, whether after a violent or a
natural death (Num. xix. 16, 18, xxxi. 19), was much more intense
in its character. Every tent or house in which there was a corpse,
as well as all the people in it, and all the vessels that were standing
about, were rendered unclean for seven days, during which time the
people themselves were to remain outside the camp (Num. v. 1-3).
Contact with a corpse found in the open country defiled for the
same period; also contact with graves and the ashes of the dead.
This uncleanness also passed from the persons affected by it to
everything they touched; but in this case it only lasted till the
evening. The uncleanness that proceeded directly from the corpse
itself to persons and things, could only be removed by sprinkling-
water prepared expressly for the purpose. And in the case of per-
sons, a subsequent bathing of the body and washing of the clothes
were also required. To obtain this sprinkling water (hDAni yme aqua
impuritatis) a spotless red heifer, that had never borne a yoke, was
slain as a sin-offering outside the camp. The son or presumptive
successor to the high priest (Eleazar) officiated on the occasion, and
sprinkled some of the blood seven times towards the sanctuary.
The cow was then burnt, along with the skin, the flesh, the bones,
the blood, and the dung; and cedar-wood, coccus-wool, and hyssop
were also thrown into the fire. All the persons who officiated at
this ceremony became unclean till the evening, and were required
REMOVAL OF UNCLEANNESS CAUSED BY TOUCHING A CORPSE. 423
to wash their bodies and their clothes. Whenever a death occurred

a clean man put some of these ashes into a vessel, poured fresh
running water upon them, dipped a bundle of hyssop into the water,
and sprinkled the persons or things to be cleansed on the third day,
and again on the seventh. He also became unclean in consequence,
and had to wash himself and his clothes. This ceremony of purifi-
cation had to be performed not only by the Israelites, but also under
similar circumstances by any foreigners who might be settled among
them (cf. Num. xix ).
218. Bahr (ii. 493 sqq.) has taken the first step towards an
explanation of this ceremony, and in my opinion has for ever settled
the most essential points. For the objections raised by Hengsten-
berg (in his Egypt and the Books of Moses, pp. 173 sqq., and his
Commentary on Ps. li. 9), and the explanation which he offers in-
stead are altogether worthless and untenable; and I still regard
the refutation which I gave in the Studien and Kritiken (1846, pp.
629-702 as perfectly conclusive (as Keil fully admits, pp. 286 sqq.),
although Hengstenberg has thought proper to ignore it altogether,
and to print his objections without alteration in the second edition
of his, Commentary on the Psalms.
The ultimate object of slaying and burning the red cow, was to
obtain the means of purification in the form of a sprinkling water.
Common water did not suffice, on account of the strength of the
uncleanness to be removed. An alkali was wanted; the water
needed to be mingled with ashes, and these were to be procured by
the burning of the red cow. That this cow was slain as a sacrifi-
cial animal, in fact, as a sin-offering, is proved not only by vers. 9,
17, where it is directly, called a sin-offering (txFA.Ha), but by the fact
that the priest sprinkled the blood seven times towards the taber-
nacle. An expiatory significance must therefore be ascribed to this
sprinkling of the blood, as in the case of every other sacrifice. But
whose sin was it that had to be expiated by this sprinkling of the
blood? Evidently that of the whole congregation, by which no
doubt the animal had been presented, and the laying on of hands
effected, through the medium of its representatives, the elders.
On the other hand, the burning of the red cow assumes a totally
different aspect from the burning of the other sacrificial animals
upon the altar. It is not described as yrFiq;ha, but as a JroW;; it was
neither placed upon the altar, nor in any relation to the altar; and,
lastly, not only was the fat consumed, as in the case of other
sin-offerings, or the whole of the flesh, as in the case of the burnt-
offerings, but the skin, the blood, and even the faeces in the stomach
and entrails, were all consumed together. The intention of the
burning, therefore, can only have been to procure the ashes, to the
exclusion of every other idea associated with the burning at other
times. But it is a very significant fact, that a sacrificial animal
which had been put to death by hFAyHiw; and the blood of which had
been used as a means of expiation, should have been selected for this
purpose. Vicarious endurance of punishment and expiation based
upon this were evidently presupposed by, and lay at the foundation
of, the whole ceremony.
In the entire process we may discern two distinct elements,
which are closely related, but must not be confounded: on the one
hand, the sentence of death hanging over the whole congregation,
and on the other, the uncleanness of the individual arising from
contact with a corpse. The former assumed the aspect of a conse-
quence of sin, and therefore required a sacrifice for its expiation;
the latter appeared merely as (secondary, not primary) defilement
communicated to the individual, which did not require a sacrifice,
but was removed by purification with water. As the uncleanness,
however, was peculiarly strong and difficult to remove, washing with
mere water was not sufficient;--the cleansing power of the water
needed to be strengthened and the water therefore had to be made
into a lye. But as the uncleanness which was to be washed away
by the lye had arisen from the general sentence of death, which
rests upon the whole human race, and consequently upon the congre-
gation of Jehovah, but for which expiation had already been made
by the sprinkling of the blood, it follows that the power by which
the water was strengthened, was derived from the sacrifice offered
for the cause of the defilement.
219. The explanation which Keil has given of the burning of
the red cow, as the wages of sin (p. 283), is quite inadmissible and
contradictory. A few lines before he describes the slaying of the
animal as the wages of sin; and there he ought to have stopped
(though he had already fallen into irreconcilable contradiction
with his own previous theory of the sacrificial slaughter, cf. 53),
the more especially because he would thus have escaped the fresh
self-contradiction, which appears in the fact, that by completely
throwing overboard his own theory of the sin-offering, he is obliged
to give up to the death of annihilation not only the image of
he outer man, the sw?ma xoi*ko<n, corrupted by sin and exposed to
death," viz., the flesh and bones, but also the better part of human
nature, the e@sw a@nqrwpoj" (cf. 109, 111, 114). This conclusion
has not escaped his own observation. On the contrary, he has not
hesitated to draw it expressly himself (p. 284). The blood, he
says, as the vehicle of the soul, and the fat as the surrogate of the
better I of the congregation, were given up to annihilation (?), just
as the soul and the inner man are given up to death along with
the body" (?). But if it was in the very nature of things, and
therefore inevitable, that the better I, the e@sw a@nqrwpoj, should be
given up to annihilation with the death of the body, how could this
be wanting in the case of the ordinary sin-offerings, and on the
contrary, the inner, better part of human nature, being purified
by the sanctifying fire of divine love, ascend at once in transmuted
essence up to heaven, and only the outer man, the sw?ma xoi*ko<n,
which as being corrupted by sin could not ascend in a glorified
form to God, be given up to annihilation?" But the notion that
the better part of man, the e@sw a@nqrwpoj, was necessarily given up
to "death," or rather to annihilation, is as much opposed to the
teaching of the Bible as to that of the Church; and what the author
of this notion has added by way of explanation, viz., that "as the
imperishable life-kernel of man is preserved in the dead corpse by
the omnipotence of divine grace, and raised up again to a new and
glorified life out of the ashes into which it (?) had fallen so by the
operation of the same omnipotent grace the imperishable remains
of the red cow, which were not destroyed by the fire, but only
changed (?) into ashes, furnished a powerful antidote against mortal
decay (?)," only serves to heighten the obscurity and confusion.
For the supposition that the inner, better part of human nature is
to be at once and by the same act "annihilated" and "preserved,"
involves contradictions which no doctrinal system could reconcile.
And every doctrinal system must firmly maintain, that it is not the
imperishable life-kernel of man which falls into ashes, but the
outer man alone, consisting of earthly flesh and bone, in which it
is shrouded and concealed. At the same time, we simply protest in
passing against the unhistorical commingling of the Old Testament
and Pauline standpoints evinced in the fact, that the doctrine of
the resurrection of the body, which was as yet undeveloped, is made
the basis and starting point of the symbolism of this act of worship.
220. The red cow, as we have seen, was intended as an anti-
dote to the defilement of death, which was latent in the whole con-
gregation in the form of universal liability to death, but was mani-
fested in every actual death, and in that case infected all living per-
sons who came into contact with it, and even clothes and other
articles that might be touched by the corpse. This idea of an anti-
dote against the defilement of death was the regulating principle
of the whole institution, determining not only the choice of the
sacrificial animal, but what should be added to it, and all that should
be done with it.
In the first place, a cow, hrAPA was chosen; not a bullock, as in
every other case in which a sin-offering was to be presented for the
whole congregation. According to Winer (ii. 505), a cow was se-
lected instead of a bullock, to distinguish this sin-offering, in which
the animal was the medium of a holy purpose, from the other, in
which it was presented before Jehovah in His sanctuary as the
vehicle of exculpation. (Keil regards this as admissible, though he
gives the preference to Bahr's explanation, to which we shall pre-
sently refer.) The antithesis mentioned here, however, does not
appear to me to be thorough enough to be regarded as answering
to the contrast between a bullock and a cow. In Knobel's opinion,
a somewhat inferior animal was chosen in this case, because only a
greater or smaller number of persons within the limits of the nation
were concerned, just as in Deut. xxi. 3 an hlAg;f, is appointed for the
expiation of a single city. But to this I cannot subscribe, just be-
cause the hlgf in Deut. xxi. 3 was not a sacrifice (cf. Keil ii. 304);
and, on the other hand, not only was the red cow offered in sacrifice
for the whole congregation, because it was all involved in the ban
of death, but the sprinkling water obtained from its ashes was
applied to every individual in the congregation, because every one,
with more or less frequency, was sure to be placed in circumstances
that required its use. Hengstenberg's view, however, is certainly
the most inadmissible viz, that "because txF.AHa the Hebrew word
for sin, is feminine, the animal which bore its image, and was ap-
pointed to carry it in a representative character, was required to be
the same" (Egypt arid the Books of Moses, p. 175 Eng. tr.). The
xvhi txF.AHa in ver. 9, to which Hengstenberg appeals as evidently
containing the reason, cannot be intended to explain the reason for
the command in ver. 2, that the animal should be a cow. To make
the physical gender of the sacrificial animal dependent upon the
grammatical gender of the noun denoting the sacrifice, would have
been a play upon words altogether foreign to the character of the
lawgiver of the Old Testament, and one which, if adopted at all,
ought to have been extended to every sin-offering, since they were
all called txFH. Baumgarten's explanation is no better. He traces
the command to select a cow, to the fact "that Israel is here re-
garded in its deepest corruption as a tempted and ruined woman."
The only admissible explanation is that of Bahr, which is quite
as natural as it is full of good sense, viz., that the choice of a cow
was dictated by the fact that the female sex, as distinguished from
the male, is the bearing or life-producing sex, and therefore presents
a fitting contrast to that life-destroying death whose defiling influ-
ence was to be thereby removed. Delitzsch's remark is good on this
point: "hrAPA = the fruitful one, calls to mind the fruit-producing
power of life, which is the opposite of the withered, impotence of
death."
221. The cow was to be of a red colour, hm.AduxE hrAPA Hengsten-
berg misses the mark again here, in describing the red colour as the
symbol of sin (l. c. pp. 174 sqq.). I have already given a thorough
examination (resp. refutation) to this idea (I.e. pp. 632-675); and,
as no one but the author himself has repeated this mistaken opinion,
but, on the contrary, all subsequent writers have distinctly rejected
it, and agree with me in adopting the explanation given by Bahr,
regard it as quite unnecessary to refute it again. The colour red is
the colour of life in this connection, as it is in every other passage
of the Old Testament in which it is used in a symbolical sense. I
still adhere to the opinion which I expressed in my Mos. Opfer (pp.
310, 311), that "the atoning, renovating power of the animal
resides in its blood; the outer is the reflex of the inner. Just as
in man the vital energy of the blood is manifested in the red
cheeks and lips, and in the flesh-coloured redness of the skin, so in
the red cow the blood was regarded as possessing such vigour, that
it manifested itself outwardly in the corresponding colour. The
red hue of the cow was a characteristic sign of its fulness of life; and
fitted it to become an antidote of the power of death.
In this capacity, again, it was necessary that the cow should
also possess internally the greatest possible force and freshness of
life. For this reason, not only was it to be like all other sacrificial
animals, without blemish or spot and in the full vigour of life, but
it was not to have borne a yoke, that is to say, its vital power was
not to have been consumed or diminished in any way whatever--a
requirement never made in connection with other sacrifices.
Still further to strengthen the idea already expressed in the
sex, constitution, and colour of the animal, three things were added
of homogeneous significance, viz., cedar-wood as the symbol of what
was imperishable (for proof passages, vid. Knobel on Lev. xiv. p.
428 THE LEV ITICAL AND PRIESTLY PURIFICATIONS.
476-7), hyssop as the means of purification (Ps. li. 7), and wool dyed
with coccus, as the colour of the most potent fulness of life. This
was the explanation first given by Bahr, who regards all three ad-
ditions as purely symbolical. But the emendation suggested by
Delitzsch deserves full consideration, the more especially because
the pleonasm contained in the red colour of the cow and the red of
the coccus-wool thereby disappears. "The three things," he says,
"which were thrown into the fire, were rather medicinal than sym-
bolical: the cedar-wood was to impart to the ashes an odour of in-
corruptibility to counteract the odour of death; the hyssop was
generally regarded in antiquity as a means of purification, and was
even taken internally for that purpose; and in the coccus-wool the
juice of the coccus was probably looked upon as a medicinal ele-
ment, for it used formerly to be employed as medicine for strength-
ening the heart." According to Hengstenberg, the coccus was a
symbol of sin, whilst the cedar and hyssop represented the exalta-
tion and majesty of the Creator, as well as His condescension,--
those attributes, that is to say, which were peculiarly displayed in
the expiation and cancelling of sin, viz., majesty and compassionate
love. This explanation, the fallacy of which may be detected at once,
and which has never met with approval, has been thoroughly refuted
in the Studien and Kritiken, l.c. pp. 680-691.
The ashes procured by the process of burning were to be mixed
with water, to represent lye, which is used in cases when the un-
cleanness is too strong to yield to simple water; and running, living
water was to be used for the purpose, to set forth the idea of an
antidote against the defilement of death and corruption.
The most remarkable feature connected with the burning of
the red cow, when measured by the plan adopted in other cases,
was the fact, that the feces in the stomach and entrails were to be
burned along with the cow, as well as all the blood that remained
after the sprinkling was finished. The burning of both of these
rests upon one and the same basis. "As an image of life in the
plenitude of its vigour, the animal was consumed in all its ful-
ness, and the completeness of its bodily frame" (Hofmann, p.
290). Delitzsch also observes (pp. 395, 396): "The burning of the
blood may easily be explained, on the ground that the ashes of the
animal were to furnish the quintessence of a means of purification,
in which the blood, already endowed with atoning power through
the sprinkling of one portion towards the holy tent, formed the
most important ingredient."
222. The most striking and most difficult points are these
(1) that the slaughtering, sprinkling of the blood, and burning of
the cow took place outside the sanctuary, and in fact outside the
camp; (2) that neither the high priest nor any ordinary priest
officiated, but the presumptive successor of the former; (3) that
not only all the persons employed in the sacrificial ceremony, but
all who took part in the sprinkling, were rendered unclean in conse-
quence until the evening, whilst only clean persons were qualified
to officiate; and (4) lastly, that the purifying water thus obtained
was called hDAni yme =aqua impuritatis.
Keil's solution of these problems is for the most part a mis-
taken one, and founders on its self-contradictions. He is unques-
tionably right so far, that the appellation, aqua abominationis
impuritatis, is to be explained according to the analogous appella-
tion given to the sin-destroying sin-offering, viz., txF.AHa. But this
truth necessarily becomes an error in his hands, inasmuch as he
gives the latter a decidedly mistaken interpretation, and transfers
to the former the erroneous principle involved in the latter. As
the sin offering derived its name not from the fact that the sin of
the sacrificer was imputed to it, and it became in a certain sense
an incorporate sin, but from the fact that it was a sacrifice "for d
sin," an antidote to sin, and the means of its extermination (cf.
47) so the purifying water was not called aqua impuritatis be-
cause impurity was regarded in any way as inherent in it or adher-
ing to it, but because the object of its application was the removal
of impurity. In the case of the sin-offering, the idea that it had
become as it were an incorporate sin, had at least an apparent, if
not a real basis, in the previous imposition of hands, the supposed
vehicle of the imputation of sins; but in the sprinkling water every
vehicle of this kind is wanting,--the defilement of death is not
imputed to it, nor is it rendered an incorporate defilement in any
other way. It is true, Keil supposes the sprinkling water to have
been, and to have been called, aqua impuritatis on the very same
ground on which "not only the sprinkling of the blood, the burn-
ing of the cow, and the gathering of the ashes, but the sprinkling
and even the mere touching of the purifying water, rendered the
persons in question unclean till the evening." This is to be attri-
buted he supposes, not as Bahr and I maintain, to the reference
of the whole ceremony to death and association with death, or to
the existing uncleanness with which the persons officiating came
in contact, but ,to the fact that the ashes, as the residuum of
the sin-offering, participated in the uncleanness of the sin imputed

to it."
This view is fettered on all hands with impossibilities. We will
look away from the fact that no sins ever were imputed to a sin-
offering ( 44 sqq.), and also from the fact that no uncleanness
or defiling influence ever can have been inherent in the sin-offering
as a most holy" thing, either at the commencement, in the middle,
or at the end of the process to which it was subjected ( 113 sqq.);
and even then a large body of incongruity still remains. (1) How
could the ashes of the cow defile the officiating priest, when he had
nothing whatever to do with them? Or was he really defiled by
what he had to do, viz., to sprinkle the blood? But if so, how was
it that the sprinkling of the blood did not defile the officiating priest
in the case of any other sin-offering?-- (2) If the sacrificial animal
suffered death as the wages of sin for the sin imputed to it,
then the sin imputed to it was covered, exterminated, forgiven, out
of pure mercy through the sprinkling of the blood; and in that
case "the wages of sin" were inflicted once more upon the slain
animal in the process of burning ; and even that did not suffice, but
the ashes that remained still "participated in the sin imputed!"
Does not this look as if the whole of the sacrificial worship was
calculated in the most refined manner, not to exterminate sin, but
to exhibit luculentissime the impossibility of exterminating it and
the vanity of all the sacrificial functions, so as to drive the poor peni-
tent sinner to despair instead of comforting and assuring him?--(3)
But notwithstanding the fact that the ashes of the cow, and the
sprinkling water prepared from those ashes, were themselves unclean,
and all clean persons who came into contact with them were defiled,
this very water was to cleanse those who were defiled, even though
their defilement was of the most aggravated kind!--(4) If the
ashes and the sprinkling water were themselves unclean, and ren-
dered the clean unclean, why did the law lay such stress upon the
fact, that only clean men should collect the ashes and prepare the
water, and that it should be prepared in a clean place? In Keil's
opinion, these directions were not at variance with his view; but
this confidence may simply arise from his own self-deception. At
all events, I do not see the force of his explanation, when he says
that these directions had reference to the destination of the ashes
for holy purposes; whilst the uncleanness adhering to them was
not physical but ethical, and resulted from the sin imputed to the
sacrificial animal; so that when used in the way ordained by God,
it effected a purification from thy uncleanness of death adhering to

sinners." And when he still further affirms that a certain unclean-
ness adhered to the ashes of ever sacrifice so that the priest who
carried them out of the camp to a clean place had to lay aside his
priestly dress and put on other clothes (Lev. vi. 11); the refuta-
tion is contained in the fact, that the ashes could only be carried
to a clean place. That the priest had to put off his priestly
dress and put on other clothes, cannot possibly be adduced as a
proof of the uncleanness of the ashes, but may be explained on the
ground, that the priest was not allowed to wear his official costume
outside the sanctuary, much less outside the camp; whilst, on the
other hand, the circumstance that the priest himself had to carry
away the ashes to a clean place, serves rather as a proof that
a residuum of the holiness belonging to the sacrificial animal as
a medium of expiation adhered even to the ashes. And if what
Keil says of the sacrificial ashes in general was really applicable to
the ashes of the red cow,--namely, that they were only "the foul
sediment of that which had not ascended to God in a transfigured
essence, the remains of the sacrifices which had been consumed by
the purifying fire of the altar,"--whence did these ashes acquire
the purifying energy ascribed to them as the main constituent of
the water of purification?
223. No other answer can be given to the question, how the
clean persons engaged in the preparation and application of the
sprinkling water were rendered unclean, than that which Keil so
groundlessly rejects, namely, that the defilement proceeded not from
the purifying medium itself, but from the uncleanness to be thereby
removed, on account of which, and in the very atmosphere of which,
the means of purification were prepared and employed. For that
very reason the high priest, who was not allowed at any time, or
under any circumstances, to come into contact with the defilement
of death (Lev. xxi. 10-12), could not officiate himself, as he in-
variably did when a sin-offering was presented for the whole con-
gregation; whilst, on the other hand, the act itself was so important
that an ordinary priest was not sufficient, and the priest who stood
nearest to the high priest, viz., his son and successor, was therefore
selected for the purpose. For the same reason, the whole trans-
action had to be performed outside the camp, that the camp of
Israel, not to say the sanctuary, might not be desecrated by being
thus directly and intentionally brought into contact with death
(Delitzsch, p. 395). Nevertheless, as the sprinkling of blood, with
its atoning virtue and effect, was absolutely necessary, in order to

express this clearly the officiating priest was to sprinkle some of the
blood of the cow seven times towards the sanctuary; "for since the
defilement of death was not to be brought into any connection with
the sanctuary, the blood of the animal that was appointed to remove
this defilement was only applied to the sanctuary from a distance,
in order that the sin-offering might receive its purifying or expiat-
ing virtue as it were through a power exerted from afar" (Delitzsch,
l.c.). The sevenfold sprinkling in the direction of the tabernacle cor-
responded to the perfectly analogous sevenfold sprinkling towards
the Parocheth in the case of those sin-offerings whose blood was
brought into the Holy Place, and is not to be understood, in the one
case any more than in the other, as a merely preparatory, approxi-
mative restoration of the fellowship with the Lord which sin had de-
stroyed" (Keil, pp. 284, 230). It referred in both instances to the
place of expiation, which lay in that direction, but which for other
reasons could not be approached at that particular time (cf. 107).
C. CLEANSING OF A LEPER WHEN CURED.
224. The uncleanness of leprosy was distinguished from every

other form of uncleanness by the fact that the person afflicted with
it was not only excluded, like every unclean person, from the fel-
lowship of the sanctuary, but though still alive was excluded like
a dead person from both national and family fellowship. Conse-
quently, the process of purification embraced a double restitution,
and consisted, therefore, of two stages (Lev. xiv. 1-32).
The first stage (vers. 1-9) set forth his readmission to national
fellowship, i.e., the restoration of one who had passed as dead, to the
fellowship of the living. This took place, as may be supposed, out-
side the camp; for it was not till this was effected that permission
was to be granted him to enter the camp once more. The priest
who was entrusted with the duty of declaring him clean, caused
two clean living birds to be brought (the species is not given, and
therefore was probably indifferent). One of these he killed above
a vessel of living water (i.e., water taken, not from a standing pool,
but from a running stream or spring), allowing the blood to flow
into the vessel. He then took the second live bird, dipped it along
with a bunch of cedar-wood, coccus-wool, and hyssop into the water,
and after sprinkling the person to be cleansed seven times, let the
bird go into the open country,--in other words, return to its fellows
and its own nest. In like manner, after the leper had shaved off
CLEANSING OF A LEPER WHEN CURED. 433
all the hair from his body, and had washed his clothes and bathed
himself, he was admitted into the camp, i.e., to the fellowship of
his own people.
The details of this ceremony of purification are for the most
part clear and intelligible. Water is the means of purifying and
enlivening (refreshing). In the cage of river or spring, water,
this quality is stronger and less disturbed than in that of standing
water. Blood is the symbol of life, and when mixed with water
strengthens its significance as an enlivening, renewing, and refresh-
ing medium of purification. This also applies to the cedar-wood,
coccus, and hyssop that were added ( 221). When covered with
these signs and witnesses of life, the bird, hitherto bound and im-
prisoned,was once more let loose to return to its fellows, as an
expressive representation of the cured leper, who also had been till
now kept away from the fellowship of his nation, but who was now
allowed to return with unfettered freedom, having been sprinkled
with the water of purification and thereby cleansed, and, through
the washing of his clothes, the shaving off of all his hair, and the
bathing of his whole body, having been renewed in the whole outer
man, and as it were new-born.
225. The question, on the other hand, is a very difficult one,
what was the signification of the bird that was slain, and what its
relation both to the live bird and also to the entire ceremony of
purification? From time immemorial (vid. Origen, hom. viii. in
Lev.) the relation of the two birds to one another has been supposed
to resemble that of the two goats of the day of atonement ( 202).
Keil accordingly still maintains, that the two birds were symbols
of the person who had recovered from his leprosy. And if it be
admitted that the bird set at liberty was a sign that the man who
was formerly a leper was now possessed of new vital power, de-
livered from the fetters of his disease, and free to return to the ,
fellowship of his own people, the other, which was its counterpart,
must also have been a symbol of the leper, and that in relation to
his death." "Not, however," he adds (Note 4, p. 291), in such a
way as that the former was an image of the previous death-like
condition of the leper, and the latter of his present free and living
state; to which Bahr justly objects, that the qualities of cleanness and
peculiar vitality expressly required, could not possibly represent a
condition of uncleanness and death. On the contrary, though the
slaying of the bird is not to be regarded as an actual sacrifice, since
there was no sprinkling of blood towards the sanctuary, its violent
434 THE LEVITICAL AND PRIESTLY PURIFICATIONS:
death was intended to show, that on account of his uncleanness,

which reached the very foundations of his life, the leper must
inevitably have suffered death, if the mercy of God had not deli-
vered him from this punishment of sin and restored to him the full
vigour and energy of life."
But I am afraid the conviction that the difficult question is thus
solved, and the true relation finally established, is not-altogether free
from self-deception. Keil has very properly stated that the bird
slain cannot be regarded as a true sacrifice; but his subsequent
explanation appears to me to go very far beyond the line that he
has thus drawn for himself. For if the bloody death of this bird
was really a symbolical expression of the fact, that the leper would
necessarily have suffered death in consequence of his uncleanness,
if the mercy of God had not delivered him from this punishment of
sin; and if in reality "that act of divine mercy was shadowed
forth in this institution, by virtue of which he needed only to go
down to death in spirit, that his life might be renewed through the
blood of the bird which was given up to death in his stead;" I cannot
see in what the working of this non-sacrifice is supposed to differ
from that of a true sacrifice, or what more the slaughtering and
sprinkling of the blood in the case of a true sacrifice could possibly
secure. But the analogy of the two birds to the two goats of the
day of atonement is by no means so obvious, complete, or indisput-
able as Keil assumes. The two goats are expressly designated as a
sin-offering; and by this a firm basis is supplied for the conclusion,
that the second, living, goat was to serve as the former (slain one)
revived, as hircus redivivus. In the case of the birds, on the other
hand, there is no intimation of the kind. And Keil himself over
throws the analogy in its most essential features by adding, that
whilst one bird had to lay down its life, to shed its blood, for the
person to be purified, the other was made a symbol of the person to
be purified, by being dipped in the mixture of blood and water."
Now in the case of the two goats, the second was a continuation, a
revivifying of the first, and therefore was ideally identical with it.
But, according to Keil, the first bird was the means to an end, whilst
the second represented the end of the means, so that they represented
two totally different things. How does this square then with Keil's
former assertion, that the two birds were symbols of the person
recovered from his leprosy, and that, "if it be admitted that the
bird set at liberty was a figure of the former leper, now delivered
from the fetters of his disease, the second must have been a symbo1
of the leper likewise"? I can find nothing but an insoluble self-con-

tradiction. Or could the means by which a sick man was healed "Is
possibly be a symbol of the person of the sick man himself ? And
if one bird laid down its life for the person to be purified, in order
that the other might be made a symbol of the person to be cleansed
through being dipped in its blood, this second, bird, before it was so
dipped, must have been a symbol of the leper while still unclean, and
can only have become a symbol of the cleansed leper after the dip-
ping. But Keil himself declares the former impossible, inasmuch as
the qualities of cleanness and peculiar vitality (demanded even in
the second bird) could not possibly represent a state of uncleanness
and death."
Bahr's opinion, therefore, that in the first bird it was not its death
that came into consideration, but only its blood, as setting forth the
full, undiminished vital energy of the one set free, is probably the
correct one; and Keil's reply, that in that case the slaughtered
bird would not be a symbol of the leper, but would be added simply
for the purpose of obtaining its blood, is to be regarded not as an
evidence against it, but as evidence in its favour. Neither of the
two birds represented the leper as still diseased and unclean, and the
second alone represented him as recovered. In the case of the first
bird, the only object was to procure the blood as a symbol of life, and
an animal of the same kind as the second was necessarily taken, in
order that its blood and life might be of the same kind as those of
the second bird.
226. With the readmission of the leper as healed, the second
stage of restitution commenced, by which he was restored to the re-
lious and ecclesiastical privileges of the clean, namely, into the
fellowship of the sanctuary (Lev. xiv. 9-32).
After seven days of preparation, during which he was allowed
to remain in the camp but still outside his tent or home, and after
a renewed washing, bathing, and shaving of the whole body, in order
that none of the old uncleanness might be carried over into the new
sphere of life, the true consecration commenced on the eighth day at
and for the sanctuary, by his bringing to the tabernacle a he lamb
as a trespass-offering, and with it a log of oil; also a ewe-lamb as a
sin-offering, and a male as a burnt-offering, together with three-
tenths of an ephah of white meal as a meat-offering. In cases of
poverty two doves would suffice as a sin- and burnt-offering in the
place of the lambs, and the quantity of white meal required for the
meat-offering was then reduced to one-tenth. The priest conducted
the person about to be consecrated up to the door of the tabernacle,

and there waved the lamb of the trespass-offering and the log of oil.
After this lamb had been slain in the ordinary way, he smeared the
blood upon the tip of his right ear, the thumb of his right hand, and
the great toe of his right foot. He then poured some of the log of
oil into his left hand, and having sprinkled some of it with his finger
seven times towards the door of the tabernacle touched the three
members, upon which the blood had already been placed, with the
oil, and then poured the remainder of the oil in his hand upon the
head of the person to be consecrated. After this, the sin-offering
and burnt-offering were sacrificed in the usual way.
The first thing that needs explanation is the exclusion of the
person to be received from his own home for seven days. The
reason assigned by the Chaldee for this is et non accedet ad latus
uxoris suae." This explanation is adopted by the Talmudists, and
by Bahr, Keil, and others. It cannot have been from any fear of
infection, however, as Bunsen assumes, but only to avert the oppor-
tunity and inducement to conjugal intercourse, which would have
rendered him unclean till the evening, and so have interrupted the
preparation for his consecration. Sommer, who denies that conjugal
intercourse did render unclean, has to seek another explanation, and
finds it in the fact, that a the leper, though recovered, was not re-
stored stored to the congregation, and was therefore to be perpetually
reminded that something was still wanting to his perfect restora-
tion." Keil regards this explanation as quite admissible, and com-
bines it with that of the Rabbins; but in this I cannot follow him.
In contradiction to the practice adopted at all other trespass-
offerings, Bahr maintains that the meat-offering is to be regarded as
belonging to the trespass-offering. He has probably been led into
this mistake by the fact, that in ver. 21 the meat-offering is men-
tioned between the trespass-offering on the one hand, and the
sin- and trespass-offerings on the other; whereas in ver. 10 it is
mentioned in the series after the trespass-offering, the sin-offering,
and the burnt-offering, and in both instances the true offering of the
Minchah (vers. 20, 31) is connected, not with the trespass-offering,
but with the burnt-offering. The mistake is a still more striking
one when he adds, that a this meat-offering, moreover, was regulated
entirely by the rule laid down in Num. xv. 4;" for neither ver. 10
nor ver. 21 is in harmony with this rule. In Num. xv. 4 one-tenth
of white meal is ordered to be taken with the lamb of the burnt-
offering, and not three-tenths as ver. 10 prescribes; and nothing at
all is said with reference to the Minchah of a burnt-offering of doves.

This mistake, which at any rate is concealed in the case of Bahr,
stares us boldly in the face in that of Keil, who expressly appeals to
ver. 10 in support of the assertion, that the meat-offering consisted
of one-tenth of white meal, and thus at very little cost disposes of
the difficulty, that ver. 10 really requires, not one-tenth but three-
tenths of white meal, in direct contrast with "Num. xv. 5 and chap.
xxviii. xxix., and that it is only in ver. 21 that one-tenth is spoken of
as sufficient for the poor man's burnt-offering of doves. This devia-
tion from the general rule laid down in Num. xv. 5 can only be
regarded as an exceptional case, and as warranted by the peculiar
importance of this sacrificial act.
227. We have already sufficiently explained in 101 why a
trespass-offering could be, and necessarily was, required in connec-
tion with this rite of reception. That the trespass-offering alone
constituted the true consecration sacrifice, and not the sin- or burnt-
offering, is indisputably shown in the previous waving, and the
subsequent manipulation with the blood. The reason why a tres-
pass-offering was selected for the purpose has been discussed in the
main by Hofmann, who writes as follows (pp. 261, 262): "This
sacrifice was required on account of the long estrangement of the
leper from the sanctuary and the congregation. Compensation had
to be made for the fact that he had been unclean so long, before
the man who had become clean again could present a sin-offering
as a recognised member of the congregation; and the blood, not of
the sin-offering, but of the trespass-offering, was adapted to the
purpose of his fresh consecration, because that which warranted a
readmission to the sacred fellowship of the sanctuary was not a
rite that had reference to sin as the cause of his disease, but one
having reference to the condition induced thereby. So, again, it
was from the consciousness of having been so long estranged from
the sacred commonwealth that he needed to be delivered, before he
could gain courage to pray for the forgiveness of the sin which had
been the cause of his estrangement." All that I cannot subscribe
to in this exposition is limited to two or three expressions, the un-
suitable character of which has been already pointed out at 28,
68, 96.
The smearing of the tip of the ear, the thumb, and the great
toe, first with blood and then with oil, corresponds so strikingly to
the similar proceedings at the consecration of the priests ( 169,
171), that we must necessarily ascribe to them a common basis and
the same signification. The two parts of the consecration, which

were kept apart in the other case (the ear, hand, and foot being
touched with blood alone; the persons and clothes with blood and
oil), are here simplified and combined into one. As there was
no official clothing in this instance, of course there could be no
sprinkling of the clothes. The most striking feature is the selection
of the ear, the hand, and the foot. This has been very properly
explained on the ground, that the consecration of the person to be
received was in this case also, in a certain sense, a consecration to
priesthood, inasmuch as the leper was once more to be incorporated
in the priestly nation (Ex. xix. 6), of which he had ceased to be a
member on account of his leprosy. But the difficulty arising from
the contrast to the covenant consecration of the nation ( 163-4), in
which the sprinkling was effected with blood alone, and not with
oil, has been overlooked. This contrast, it appears to me, can only
be explained on the supposition, that the leper, as one who had
passed through both physical and civil death, had lost more by his
leprosy than the covenant consecration had conferred; that is to
say, had lost not only the covenant fellowship which that consecra-
tion imparted, but also the fellowship of the nation as chosen and
blessed in Abraham, which was of much earlier date; and that he
needed therefore to be consecrated afresh, not only to the former
by the covenant blood of reconciliation (Ex. xxiv. 8), but also to
the latter by the oil of the Spirit of God.
228. I cannot but regard it as erroneous and misleading on
the part of Keil (i. 293), to forsake the symbolism that has prevailed
thus far, and to express the singular opinion, that as this oil "was
presented by the person to be consecrated as an offering from his
own resources, it did not represent the spiritual power and gifts
with which God equipped those who were set apart to special
offices in His kingdom, but the divine spirit of life, which had been
breathed into him by the Creator, and which he therefore possessed
as his own property. "But with this new interpretation the author
has overlooked the fact, that he falls into striking contradictions, not
only with the view held up in the Scriptures, but also with his own
assertions at other times. (1.) The fact, that the person to be con-
secrated presented the log of oil himself, as a sacrifice from his own
resources, does not warrant the inference, that it represented the
subjective spirit of life breathed into him through his creation, and
not the objective Spirit of God without him; for that oil with
which the Minchah was mixed or anointed was also offered by the
sacrificer himself from his own resources, and yet the thought ex-
pressed by the anointing of the meat-offering with this oil was not
that "good works are performed in the power of the spirit of life
imparted to him through creation," but, as Keil himself correctly
maintains (p. 202), that they "are performed and rendered possible
by the power of the Spirit of God, which was symbolized by the
oil." (2.) It is equally a mistake to suppose that only the holy
anointing oil compounded of the four fragrant substances, and kept
in the tabernacle, "shadowed forth the spiritual gifts and powers
with which God endowed those who were set apart to special offices
in His kingdom," and therefore that this holy oil had to be used
for every official anointing, and never merely ordinary oil. For
in Ex. xxx. 33 the use of this anointing oil is restricted to the con-
secration of the priests and holy vessels. " Whoever compoundeth
any like it," it is expressly stated, or, whosoever putteth any of it
upon a stranger, shall even be cut off from his people. On this
Keil himself has properly observed (Comment., p. 533), rzA the
stranger, was not merely the non-Israelite, but the laity generally,
or the non priest." Now, unless this commandment was broken,
the oil with which Saul, David, Solomon, Jehu, Hazael, and Elisha
were anointed to their royal or prophetic office, was not the holy
anointing oil of the tabernacle, but ordinary oil; and Keil will
hardly affirm that in these cases the persons anointed were to be en-
dowed with their own spirit of life as originally created. (3.) The
oil with which Jacob anointed the stone at Luz as a house of God
(Gen. xxviii. 18, cf. xxxi. 13) was undoubtedly common oil out
of his own resources, and yet Jacob wished to mark the spot as a
place of the revelation, not of his own created spirit of life, but of
the Spirit of God without him.
Again, Keil is very unfortunate in his further defence of this
idea when he affirms here as before with regard to the consecra-
tion of the priests ( 171), that "as the sprinkling of the blood had
reference to the soul, so the smearing with oil had reference to the
spirit, which pervades both body and soul, and unites them into a
human personality." Whereas at the consecration of the priests
he supposed the soul of the man to be endowed with his own soul,
which had been sanctified upon the altar, and his spirit with the
objective, sanctifying Spirit of God, in this case he supposes even
the spirit of the man to be endowed with his own spirit, which
had been pervaded by the Divine Spirit of grace through the
waving and sprinkling of the oil before Jehovah. We have al-
440 PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES.
ready shown at 171 how impossible it is to reconcile this dis-

tinction of soul and spirit with the lucid psychology of the Old
Testament.
Nevertheless the very point by which Keil has been led away is
both true and well established. If this oil represented the objective
Spirit of God, it necessarily belonged to Jehovah, and came from
Jehovah. And this was really the case. For though the person
about to be received presented it himself from his own resources,
yet when he was anointed with it, it was no longer his own, but
God's, and no longer common, but holy oil. To give it this cha-
racter, it was waved before Jehovah, and sprinkled seven times
towards the door of the tabernacle.
The directions with regard to the removal of the leprosy of
clothes and houses (Lev. xiii. 47 sqq., xiv. 33 sqq.) we need not
dwell upon here, as they have no connection with the sacrificial
worship.
CHAPTER IV.
ADAPTATION OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP TO CERTAIN
PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES.
A. PRESENTATION OF THE FIRST-BORN OF CATTLE.
229. From the time that the first-born of men and cattle were
spared in Egypt, they belonged eo ipso to Jehovah (Ex. xiii. 14,
15). The whole tribe of Levi was substituted for the first-born of
man of all the tribes, being set apart for service at the sanctuary,
and handed over to the priests. Nevertheless the obligation still
remained in force, as a perpetual reminder of the deliverance which
Jehovah effected for His people out of the bondage of Egypt; but
the presentation in natura was commuted into a redemption fee,
which properly belonged to Jehovah, but was allotted by Him to
the priests for their maintenance.
With the first-born of animals, everything depended upon
whether they were fit for sacrifice (oxen, sheep, or goats) or not.
In the latter case, according to Ex. xiii. 12, 13, xxxiv. 20, the first-
born were to be redeemed with a sheep, or slain; but according to
a subsequent modification, they were always to be redeemed with
money, according to the valuation of the priest, and with the addi-
PRESENTATION OF THE FIRST-BORN OF CATTLE. 441
tion of a fifth of their worth (Lev. xxvii. 27 ; Num. xviii. 15). But
the first-born that were fit for sacrifice were to be presented as a
heave-offering (MywidAq.Iha tmoUrT; ) within eight days of their birth, and
actually offered in sacrifice (Num. xviii. 17 sqq.).
Keil (i. 335) treats these offerings of first-born as ordinary
thank-offerings, presented by the possessors on their own account,
and nothing more. They were sacrificed as thank-offerings, he
says, "upon the altar of the sanctuary; and, as in the case of all
the Shelamim, the breast and right shoulder alone were assigned to
the priest, the remainder of the flesh being left to the person pre-
senting it, for a sacrificial meal" (Num. xviii. 17, 18; Deut. xii. 17,
xv. 19, 20). But this is at variance, (1) with the general and
fundamental law respecting the first-fruits and first-born, which
the owner was never allowed to claim for his own enjoyment or
use, but had to deliver up to Jehovah as a feudal tribute for
the maintenance of the priests (Ex. xxii. 28, 29, xxiii. 19; Num.
xviii. 12 sqq.; Deut. xv. 19, 20, etc.); (2) with the express and
special command in Lev. xxvii. 26, that the first-born of cattle
were not to be used as peace-offerings, because they already
belonged to Jehovah; and (3), most of all, with Num. xviii. 17, 18,
the very passage which Keil adduces primo loco in proof of his
assertion, whereas, in the clearest words, it states the very opposite.
The passage runs thus: "And the flesh of them shall be thine (the
priest's), as the wave-breast and as the right leg are thine." This
cannot obviously mean anything else than that, whereas the priest
received only the breast and leg of the ordinary Shelamim, in the
case of the offerings of first-born the rest of the flesh was to be his
portion as well; and yet Keil affirms, as though it were self-evident,
and any other meaning were perfectly inconceivable, that, as in the
case of all the Shelamim, only the breast and right leg were allotted
to the priest, and the remainder of the flesh was left to the bringer
of the offering for a sacrificial meal.
It is true he also adduces Deut. xii. 17, xv. 19, 20, as additional
proof passages, but without even mentioning the apparent discre-
parley between them and Num. xviii. 1.7, 18. In Deut. xii. 17, 18,
for instance, it is expressly commanded, that both the tithes, the
first-fruits, and the first-born, and also the peace-offerings, are to be
eaten by the persons presenting them, not in their own homes, but
only at the sanctuary. But it is very evident that in this command
the principal accent is laid upon the. fact, that this was not to be all
disposed of in an arbitrary manner, like any private property, with
which a man might do what he liked. And just as it is very cer-

tain that the meaning of the command is not, that all the tithes
and first-fruits, and the whole of the flesh of the peace-offering, in-
cluding the wave-breast and heave-shoulder, and even the fat por-
tions, were to be eaten at the sanctuary by the persons presenting
them, so also the meaning cannot be that they were to eat all the
flesh of the sacrifices of firstlings. In the brief summary contained
in Deut. xii. 17 sqq., the precise quantity that was to be eaten of
each of the objects named must be gathered from other passages
in the law, in which this point is specially and professedly treated
of. Now the rule for the firstlings is given in Num. xviii. 17, 18.
As the priests and Levites were allow, to devote a portion of the
tithes assigned to them for their maintenance to a tithing feast for
the offerers and their families at the sanctuary, so no doubt they
might also devote a portion of the firstlings to the same purpose.
The priests are not prohibited in Num. xviii. 17, 18 from using
the flesh of the firstlings for a sacrificial meal, to which the bringers
of the offerings might be invited; and Deut. xii. 17, 18 simply
forbids the bringers of the offerings to slay and eat the firstlings in
their own homes. Thus the two passages are in perfect harmony,
and there is not the slightest necessity to twist the command in
Num. xviii. 17, 18 into the very opposite.
230. Kliefoth's views are much clearer and more correct.
"The order of procedure," he says, "according to Num. xviii., was
the following: the priests had to slay the animal at the altar of
burnt-offering; the blood they poured out by the altar of burnt-
offering; the fat portions they burned upon the altar as a savour
of satisfaction to God; and the rest of the flesh then fell to their
portion, to be used in the same way as the heave-shoulder and wave-
breast of the Shelamim. There can be no doubt, therefore, that
this was a real sacrifice: not only was it brought as near as possible
to God, but it was also accepted by Him in the act of burning" (p.
99). We must pronounce it, however, a ne plus ultra of misinter-
pretation, when the same writer proceeds to affirm, that for all
that, it was not a bleeding sacrifice; although the material of sacri-
lice was an animal, and its blood was shed and brought to the
altar, yet it was not an expiatory sacrifice?"--And what is the proof
of this unheard-of and contradictory assertion?--"There was no
laying on of hands, it did not take the place of the offerer; there-
fore it did not serve rPkl . . . . It was a sacrifice, not of expiation,
but of thanksgiving." But upon what does Lev. xvii. 11 make the
THE NAZARITE'S OFFERING. 443
hrApAKa)? Is it -upon the imposition of hands? Is it not rather upon

the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar? Unquestionably upon
the latter alone. And how does Kliefoth. know that this sprinkling
of the blood was not preceded by the imposition of bands? It is
certainly nowhere expressly mentioned. And so also in the case of
the, trespass-offering it is not expressly mentioned; and not even
in that of the goat that was slain "for Jehovah" on the day of
atonement: and yet here even Kliefoth does not hesitate to take
for granted, that it was performed in connection with every animal
altar-sacrifice.
The firstling sacrifices were no doubt Shelamim, like all the
rest; but they were Shelamim offered, not by the original owner,
who had no right, according to Lev. xxvii. 26, to use them as
Shelamim, but by the priests, to whom all the first-fruits and
firstlings were assigned as tributary payments. As the Levites, to
whom the tithes were allotted, had to hand over the tenth to the
priests, so the priests were required to hand over to Jehovah a por-
tion of the firstlings assigned to them as a thank-offering for their
priestly prerogative, viz., the fat portions which were burned upon
the altar. They are to be regarded, therefore, as thank-offerings,
or more correctly praise-offerings, presented by the priests for their
priestly calling, and, like all praise-offerings, were raised upon the
basis of an atoning act effected through the sprinkling of blood.
B. THE NAZARITE'S OFFERING.
231. The Nazarite's vow (ryzinA rd,n,), as defined in the law, con-
sisted of this: an Israelite, either man or woman, consecrated himself
to Jehovah for a certain time as ryzinA (from rzn = to be separated),
and during his time of consecration abstained from all strong drink,
and in fact from everything that came from the vine-from grapes,
both fresh and dried, from must, wine, vinegar of wine, and from
everything that could be made even of the skins and pips of the
grapes. During the whole time he allowed no razor to come upon
his head, and avoided all defilement through contact with a corpse,
even that of his nearest relative. And if, nevertheless, he should
be so defiled unawares, through the occurrence of a sudden death
in his neighbourhood, he was obliged to have his head shaved, to
bring two pigeons as a sin-offering and burnt-offering, for the priest
to make expiation for him, and a yearling lamb as a trespass-offer-
ing; that he might be consecrated afresh. The time that had passed
since the commencement of his vow all went for nothing, because
the vow had been interrupted; and he had to go through the entire
period of his consecration again.
When the time of his vow, the length of which was left by the
law to the pleasure of the person himself, was at an end, the Nazarite
had to offer a ewe-lamb, as a sin-offering for the sins that he might
have committed unconsciously in his Nazarite condition, and this
was followed in regular order by the offering of a he-lamb as a
burnt-offering and a rain as a peace-offering. To the latter there
was also added, besides the legal Minchah of meal, the usual Cor-
ban of cake ( 155), to the exclusion, however, of leavened loaves.
After the Nazarite's hair had been shaved off at the door of the
tabernacle, and thrown into the fire in which the peace-offering was
burning, the priest placed the boiled shoulder (faOrz;) and one peace
of the Corban of cake upon the hands of the Nazarite, and waved
them before Jehovah. They then belonged to the priest himself.
together with the wave-breast and heave-leg. The sacrificial cere-
mony was closed as a matter of course by the sacrificial meal.
With this the Nazarite was released from his vow, and once more
permitted to drink wine.
232. The positive side of a Nazarite condition was the con-
secration of the Nazarite to Jehovah; the negative, his separation
from the world, with its enjoyments as well as its corruptions. The
latter was expressed in the fact that the vow was irreconcilable
with all defilement from contact with death, and also in the obliga-
tion to abstain from everything that came from the vine, as the
general representative of the deliciae carnis (Hos. iii. 1), and the
intoxication of worldly pleasure (Hos. iv. 11 ; Prov. xx. 1): the
former, in his allowing the hair of his head to grow, as the sign of
the consecration of his God upon his head" (ver. 7).
Hengstenberg (Egypt and Books of Moses, pp. 192-3, transla-
tion), starting with the assumption, that because in ordinary life the
Israelites wore their hair cut short, to allow the hair to grow was
an expression of indifference towards the demands of convention-
ality, and therefore a sign of mourning, regards this also as a sign
of separation from the world. But the foundation upon which this
view is based is decidedly erroneous. It is impossible to prove that
allowing the hair to grow was a sign of mourning and separation
from intercourse with the world; whilst, on the contrary, Jer. vii.
29 places it beyond all doubt that shaving off the hair was a sign of
humiliation and sorrow. And the text itself is in many respects at
THE NAZARITE'S OFFERING. 445
variance with any such view. If, as Keil justly observes (i. 327),
allowing the hair to grow was merely a sign of separation, we can
see no reason why the hair should have been shaved off in case of
defilement, since the defilement itself would have been sufficiently
removed by the sin- and burnt-offerings (ver. 11). This view is
equally irreconcilable with the description of the uncut hair in ver.
7 as a the consecration of his God upon his head" (Owxro-lfa vyhAlox< rz,ne ).
So again in vers. 9 and 18, on account of the uncut hair his head
is called Orz;ni wxro, his consecrated head and in ver. 11 the atone-
ment offered as a fresh commencement of the period of his vow,
and for the fresh growth of his hair, which had been shaved off on
account of his defilement, is described as a sanctification (wDeqa) of
his head. All this points to the fact that allowing the hair to grow
had a positive and not a negative signification rz,ne , says Keil,
"means consecration, or the sign of consecration. In this sense the
anointing oil upon the head of the priest is called rz,ne) (Lev. xxi. 12),
also the diadem which was worn by the consecrated priest (Ex.
xxix. 6), as well as that worn by the king (2 Sam. i. 10, etc.)."
The uncut hair worn by the Nazarite in honour of the Lord was a
similar sign of consecration. It was as it were the embodiment of
his vow, the visible proof of his consecrated condition: for this rea-
son, whenever his vow was broken, it had to be shaved off; and for
the same reason the supernatural power of Samson, which was a
result of his consecrated condition, departed with his hair.
The hair did not acquire this meaning, however, as Bahr sup-
poses, as a symbol a of the highest bloom or fulness of life, which
the Hebrew regarded as holiness." This view is founded upon the
groundless assumption, that in the estimation of eastern nations
generally, and the Hebrew in particular, the hair is to the head
what plants, trees, etc., are to the earth, and upon the fact that the
vine which remained uncut in the sabbatical and jubilee years was
called ryzinA (Lev. xxv. 5, 11),--a fact which proves nothing, because,
as Keil justly observes, "this biblical epithet for the vine was itself
derived from the Nazarite institution, and the tertium comparationis
consists in their not being cut, because they were separated from
ordinary use as the property of Jehovah." Still less tenable is
Baumgarten's explanation, founded upon 1 Cor. xi. 5, 7, where
allowing the hair to grow is represented as a sign of dependence
upon another present power." The true point of view is that given,
by Keil, and founded upon ver. 7: the uncut hair of the Nazarite
was "the diadem of the consecration of God upon his head." For
a rich, strong head of hair is an ornament not to a woman only,

but also to a man (2 Sam. xiv. 25, 26), and still remains so, even
where custom requires the cutting of hair, especially on the part of
the men.
Now, if we consider the unmistakeable agreement which exists
both in a positive and negative aspect between the character of the
Nazarite and that of the priest,--in both, though in different forms,
a consecration of God, a diadem (rz,ne) befitting a king upon the
head; and in both, though in different degrees, the obligation to
abstain from wine and strong drink (Lev. x. 8, 9), and to avoid all
defilement from the dead (Lev. xxi. 1, 2, 11),--if we carefully
consider all this, we shall hardly be mistaken in regarding the con-
dition of a Nazarite as a kind of priestly position, as a visible mani-
festation in an intensified form of that priesthood, which is described
in Ex. xix. 6 as MynihEKo tk,l,m;ma, and which was latent in the entire
nation.
233. The appropriateness of a trespass-offering, on the re-
newal of the vow which had been interrupted by an unexpected
death, has already been pointed out ( 101); and the fact that in
this case the trespass-offering followed the sin- and burnt-offerings,
whereas at the consecration of the restored leper it preceded it
( 227), may be explained in Hofmann's words (p. 262): "It was
just the opposite when the period of a Nazarite's vow was inter-
rupted by a death occurring near him. It was then necessary that
this occurrence, which was to him the consequence of sin, should be
first of all expiated before he was in a condition to renew his vow.
And the renewal of the vow was to be connected with a trespass-
offering, because the payment of his vow was so much longer de-
layed; and this would leave him a debtor to God, unless a trespass-
(debt-) atonement was made."
In the act of worship appointed for the dissolution of the vow at
the close of the period of his consecration, the peace-offering with
which it ended is the only point that causes any difficulty. Keil
is wrong in calling this a consecration offering, for there was no
question of consecration in this case, but rather, so to speak, of un-
consecrating. No proof is needed that it is to be regarded as a
vow-offering, and not, as Kliefoth supposes, as a praise-offering.
The cutting off of the Nazarite's hair, the sign of his consecration
to God, as soon as that consecration came to an end, furnishes ,
its own explanation; and the fact that it was thrown into the fire,
and ascended in this as a savour of satisfaction to Jehovah,
THE JEALOUSY OFFERING 447
showed that the Nazarite condition had been well-pleasing to Him.

The omission of the accompaniment of leavened bread, which was
customary, according to Lev. vii. 13, with the Corban of cake
appointed for the sacrificial meal, just as in the case of the conse-
cration offering of the priest ( 172), also attested the higher and
as it were priestly character of that fellowship with Jehovah, which
had been associated with the Nazarite's vow. A still further inten-
sification was exhibited in the fact that the shoulder, already boiled,
was assigned to the priest, in addition to the wave-breast and heave-
leg, by waving upon the hands of the offerer. This was expressive
of a closer and more intimate connection between the offerer and
the priest as the servant of God.
C. THE JEALOUSY OFFERING.
234. If a husband had evident ground for suspicion that

his wife had committed adultery, but was unable to bring legal
proofs of the fact, so that civil punishment might be inflicted, he
was warranted by the law (Num. v. 11-31) in leaving her to the
special judgment of the omniscient God by means of a solemn act
of adjuration at the tabernacle. To this end he brought the sus-
pected wife to the priest, with a Corban of the tenth of an ephah
of barley meal, though without the ordinary accompaniments of oil
and incense. The priest took her into the court of the tabernacle,
and having put some holy water (probably out of the laver of the
court) into an earthen vessel, mixed it with dust from the floor of
the tabernacle. After this, he led the woman before the Lord, i.e.,
before the door of the tabernacle, and having uncovered her head,
placed the Corban in her hands. He then took the water mixed
with dust into his own hands, and commenced a solemn adjuration
of the woman, pronouncing a curse upon her in the most terrible
words in case she should be guilty, declaring that in consequence of
the wrath and vengeance of God her belly should swell and her hip
waste away; at the same time assuring her that the curse would
take no effect provided she were innocent. The woman answered
and confirmed the words of this adjuration by a second a Amen."
After this the priest wrote the curses that had been uttered upon a
slip (rp,se ) washed the words in the water, took the Corban from the
hands of the woman and waved it before Jehovah, burned an
Azcarah ( 148) of the Corban upon the altar, and finally gave the
woman the water to drink as curse-water, Myrir;xAm.;hE Myrim.Aha yme (ver.
24), i.e., as the water of bitter-making bitternesses.
235. That the Corban of barley is to be regarded as a true

meat-offering, there can be no possible doubt; for in vers. 15, 18,
25, it is expressly called a hHAn;mi, and according to ver. 15, an Azcarah
of it was to be burned upon the altar. But Bahr is certainly wrong
in describing it as the offering of the man and not of the woman.
In the text it is expressly designated hAyl,fA h.nABAr;qA, her offering, which
is presented on her account. And the fact that it was regarded as
her offering is unrnistakeably proved by this circumstance, that she
held it in her hand during the whole of the adjuration, and that
the priest received it from her hand, before putting an Azcarah of
it in the altar-fire. It is true it was the husband who furnished the
barley meal, and brought it to the sanctuary. But there is nothing
in this to warrant the supposition that it was to be regarded as his
offering, i.e., as an offering presented on his account. From the
very nature of the case, and the customs of the Israelites, even if
it were her offering, the husband must necessarily furnish it. An
Israelitish wife possessed no property, and was only entitled to the
usufruct of her husband's. Hence, if she wished or was required
to present an offering, it could only be done from her husband's
property. Moreover, in this case the whole affair was opposed to
her desire and will. As she was brought by her husband to the
sanctuary without his asking whether she wished it or no, so her
offering was also brought by him without any regard to her incli-
nation. There is nothing at variance with this view in the fact
that in ver. 15 it is called txonAq; tHan;mi, i.e., the offering of jealousy
(sc. the husband's); for the husband's jealousy for the purity of his
marriage was the occasion of her involuntary offering, an offering
made on her account and presented for her.
But what was the purpose of an offering at all, especially a meat-
offering? To this Bahr replies (ii. 445), "According to the Mosaic
principles, every one who desired to draw near (brq) to Jehovah to
enter into any relation to Him as the Holy One, was required to
bring a Corban (Nbrq), and without this nothing could be under-
taken in the presence of Jehovah." But this explanation falls to
the ground with the erroneous assumption upon which it is based,
that it was the offering of the husband and not of the wife; whilst
it fails altogether to explain why it was a bloodless offering, and
not a bleeding sacrifice, which would certainly have been more suit-
able for that purpose.
The true answer may be obtained from the name of the sacri-
fice in ver. 15 NOfA tr,K,zm ; a NOrKAzi tHAn;mi, i.e., "a gift of memorial," by
THE JEALOUSY OFFERING. 449
which Jehovah was reminded of the wrong (on the supposition, of

course, that it had really occurred). The Minchah, as we saw at
141, was a representation of the fruits of the life and labour of
the offerer, that is to say, of the labour of his vocation in accord-
ance with the covenant. Now the wife maintained that she had
lived and acted in accordance with her vocation and with the cove-
nant, and no human tribunal could convict her of a lie. The
Almighty alone could judge justly, and therefore she was required
to present herself at His tribunal, bringing a meat-offering as a
sign and pledge that her life had been, as she maintained, one of
fidelity to the law.
As a matter of course, therefore, it was necessary that her offer-
ing should be a meat-offering, and one presented without the usual
basis of a bleeding sacrifice. This was no question of expiation.
If the wife were guilty, there was no possible expiation for her
crime; and if innocent, there was nothing to expiate, at all events,
nothing in the circumstances which occasioned the whole affair.
236. Starting with,this view, it is easy to explain the separate
data of the ceremony prescribed. Barley meal was to be used for
the meat-offering, and not wheaten flour, as was usually the case.
Barley," says Winer, i. 307, in the place of the customary wheat,
pointed to the inferiority of the person who had fallen into such
suspicion, for throughout antiquity this species of corn was regarded
as vile hordeum (Phcedr. ii. 8, 9) and far inferior to wheat. The
slighted barley answered to the ambiguous character of her calling
and life. The husband had to furnish the offering from his own
property; and with the conviction of the badness of his wife, it was
natural, and even prescribed by the law, that he should take the
worst kind of corn. The better, purer wheat would have been ob-
jectively less adapted to serve as a symbol of her life, even if she
had not been really guilty of the crime of which she was accused
for in any case she had excited suspicion by improper behaviour, as
it is distinctly shown in vers. 12-14 that the ceremony would not
have been entered upon at all, unless the husband had been able to
prove that his suspicions were well founded, and not purely ima-
ginary. This ambiguous character of the offering, which corre-
sponded to the ambiguity of the life of the woman to which it
referred, also, explains the prohibition of both oil and incense. Her
works were to be presented in the offering; and whether they had
proceeded from the Spirit of God, represented by the oil, or had
been performed with uprightness of heart towards God, and in
prayer, as represented by incense, was not only doubtful, but the

presumption was the very opposite, and therefore these symbols
were both omitted. The uncovering of her head pointed to this pre-
sumption; for the covering of a woman's head was the symbol of
conjugal fidelity and chastity. An earthen vessel was prescribed on
account of its worthlessness, and this again was expressive of the
suspicion which the woman had drawn upon herself by her conduct.
The dust of the floor of the sanctuary was related to the curse to be
uttered over her; and Bahr has very aptly compared this with
Gen. iii. 14, Where the eating of dust is the consequence of the
curse pronounced upon the serpent; also with Ps. lxxii. 9, and
Micah vii. 17, where the eating of dust is introduced as a general
sign of reprobation, cursing, and ignominy. The directions to
take not ordinary water but holy water, and not ordinary dust but
dust of the sanctuary, were also significant, since the tabernacle
was the place where Jehovah dwelt in the midst of His people and
revealed Himself, and therefore everything in it was brought into
relation to Jehovah, the Holy One, so that the curse-water appeared
the more potent in consequence. Although it was curse-water, it
was still holy water; for the curse which it brought upon the guilty
woman was the curse of Jehovah.
At first the priest acted as the attorney of the man in relation
to the woman, who was suspected and accused but still maintained
her innocence. In this capacity1 he held in his hand the curse-
water, the symbol and pledge of the curse which she had deserved
in case she were guilty, and which would certainly fall upon her.
The woman, on the other hand, maintained her innocence, and
therefore held the symbol of her innocence, the meat-offering, the
sign of good works, of righteousness before God, by which the curse
would be rendered powerless and nugatory, provided she were really
innocent, as she maintained. After the curse had been pronounced,
and she had acknowledged and accepted it by her Amen, the offer-
1
I still adhere to this opinion, though Keil has pronounced it erroneous. The
man here appealed to the judgment of God, because his case could not be brought
before an earthly tribunal. And the priest, as the servant of God and the
mediator of the nation, took up the charge, and did all that his office prescribed
to bring the matter to an issue. He may therefore be unquestionably designated
the attorney of the husband who brought the charge. But his acting as attor-
ney for the husband did not prevent him, when he had finished the husband's
part, from also acting as the attorney of the wife who insisted upon her inno-
cence, and taking up her cause as well. And this he did, when he took the meat-
offering from her hands, and caused it to ascend to Jehovah in the altar-flame.
ing was taken from her and burned upon the altar; and upon this,
she took the curse-water and received the curse which had been
washed in it into herself. The symbol of her declared innocence
was burned upon the altar, and the flame carried it to Jehovah,
who judges righteously and tries the reins and the heart; and in
the meantime the symbol of her guilt, as maintained on the other
side, penetrated within, carrying with it the curse pronounced upon
the guilty in the name of Jehovah. In this case none but Jehovah
could decide, and He had undertaken the decision because of the
importance of the matter. According to the wife's declaration, she
was pure, and living in a good and just relation towards Jehovah,
and therefore was qualified to present a meat-offering. The burning
of this meat-offering was an appeal to Jehovah, the searcher of
hearts. If her declaration of innocence were correct, God, as the
protector of innocence, was invoked to accept of her innocence on
this occasion; and if it were false, the presentation of the meat-
offering contained an appeal to Jehovah, to punish the wickedness
in accordance with the curse which the guilty woman had heard,
approved, and acknowledged. Then after the whole affair had been
given up to Jehovah, for Him to carry out, the woman drank the
curse-water, the symbol and pledge of the penal justice of God.
The drinking of the curse-water was peculiarly significant. As
an explanatory parallel, we may compare Ps. cix. 18, As he clothed
himself with cursing like as with his garment, so let it come into his
bowels like water." In case she were innocent, as the priest at the
very outset had assured her, the drinking would be followed by no
disastrous results, would do her no harm, and she would conceive
again. This last clause shows clearly in what the punishment of
her crime would consist, provided the opposite were the case, and
how the words relating to it are to be understood. Her belly (i.e.,
her womb) was to swell, and her hip to waste away; both of them
members which were most closely related to the sin in question,
and were also the organs of childbirth. The wasting away of the
hip and swelling of the belly, which only occur in extreme and
decrepit old age, after the power of childbearing has gone, are in
this case a terribly significant description of the curse of barrenness,
the greatest reproach of an Israelitish wife.
237. Bahr gave up the idea of this ceremony being intended
as an ordeal, but it has been revived again by Keil. This cere-
mony," he says (i. 298), "was an ordeal, a mode of procedure pre-
scribed by the Mosaic law for leaving the decision as to the guilt
or innocence of the woman with God." But this view is founded

upon a mistaken notion as to the nature and design of an ordeal.
An ordeal expected and required an immediate decision on the part
of God, whether the accused were guilty or no, and that for the
purpose of judicial proceedings on the part of human authorities;
whereas in this case not only the decision, but the eventual punish-
ment, was left to the judgment of God, and so far as any discovery
on the part of the human accusers and judges were concerned, the
whole proceedings were, for a time at least, entirely fruitless; and
even if the woman did not become pregnant again in the course of
time, this could not be regarded as an unquestionable proof of her
guilt, such as would warrant judicial proceedings, and the infliction
of the punishment of death as an adulteress. And even vers. 27,
28, where the law certainly declares, that the ceremony will not
remain without the intended effect, no more warrants the conclusion
that the lawgiver meant the rite to be regarded as an ordeal, than
1 Cor. xi. 27, 30 warrants the assertion that the Apostle regarded
participation in the Lord's Supper as possessing that character.
I am equally unable to agree with Keil when he speaks of this
ceremony as a sacramental act. This punishment (viz., barren-
ness) was brought upon the woman," he says, by the curse which
was written down and washed with the writing in the water.
Hence the curse-drink cannot be regarded merely as a symbol and
pledge of the punishment, which Jehovah, the Holy One, caused
to follow the solemn adjuration. This view is based upon the same
severance of the visible and invisible, which is brought out most
prominently in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper as held in the
Reformed Church, and this is also connected with the opinion
that the rite was not an ordeal. The curse was communicated to
the woman in a real, so to speak a sacramental way; so that the
water was no longer simple water, but through the word and power
of God, which were added to the water in a symbolical manner by
the washing of the written curse, it acquired a supernatural power."
The first thing that strikes us here, is the obscurity of the expla-
nation, which in the very same breath maintains the sacramental
character of the rite (in the sense of the Lutheran creed), and then
afterwards denies it. For it is a denial of it, when the author affirms,
that the word and power of God were added to the water in a sym-
bolical way by the washing of the written curse. A second mis-
take we find in the assertion, that Bahr and I are chargeable with
the same severance of the visible and invisible which is brought out
most prominently in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper as held in the

Reformed Church," and in the statement implied, that his own view
holds fast to that union of the visible and invisible which is taught
in the Lutheran dogma of the Lord's Supper. For this is not the
case; on the contrary, Keil's theory no more corresponds to the
relation between the visible and invisible as taught in the Lutheran
doctrine of the Lord's Supper, than the view adopted by Bahr and
myself, and his view represents the Reformed doctrine quite as de-
cidedly as ours. Moreover, Keil has altogether overlooked the fact,
that the Reformed doctrine of the Lord's Supper has been divided
into two branches, the Zwinglian and the Calvinistic. The latter
corresponds (if indeed things totally dissimilar can be compared) to
what he means, viz., that a supernatural potency was communicated
to the water realiter; the former to what he says, viz., that this
power was communicated to the water in a symbolical manner.
But the relation between the visible and invisible in the Lord's
Supper, is altogether incomparable to the relation between the
visible and invisible in this ceremony. In the former it is the word
of God, by whose operation the materia caelestis unites with the
materia terrestris; in the latter it was the priest's form of adjura-
tion which "was added to the water in a symbolical manner,"--
a materia caestis is never mentioned.
I conclude this inquiry, therefore, now as before, with the words
of Bahr (ii. 447): "It was not the written words of the curse washed
into the water that brought the evil upon the guilty woman. The
curse-drink was merely a symbol and pledge of the punishment
which Jehovah, the Holy One, would surely inflict upon the guilty
woman after the solemn adjuration. The water in itself was alto-
gether powerless; nor was any magical or miraculous potency com-
municated to it. But it was Jehovah from whom punishment was
sought, provided she were guilty. It was He who suspended the
punishment and the evil. Just as when His people, with whom He
had entered into a covenant, went a-whoring after strange gods,
He, as the jealous God, visited them with punishment and misery,
so the wife who had committed adultery could and would experience
His judicial righteousness: and just as He had blessed so many a
barren woman with fruitfulness, so would the fruitful woman, who
had brought the curse upon herself, be visited with barrenness."
INDEX 454
Page Page
Abel's offering 158 Cedar-wood 428
Accompaniments of meat-offering 287 rP,Ki 67
Age of sacrificial animal 81 Circumcision. 20
Altar, horns of 46 Cities of the priests 38
-----north side of. 109 Clean animals 22
-----of burnt-offering 40, 44 Cleansing of a leper 432
-----of incense 41 46
Altar-fire 155 Coccus 428
Altar-offering 55 Consecration of Levites 341, 342
-----people 322-328
Animals admissible in sacrifice 80 -----priests 328-340
-----clean and unclean 22 sanctuary 328-340
Ark of covenant 41 Corbanim 52, 64
-----covering of 47 Corpse, defilement from 422-432
Asham 101, 189 Court tabernacle 40, 42
Atonement 66-75
-----day of 385-415 Daily burnt-offering 349
------theories of 139-149 -----service 349-353
Azazel . 396-413 Day of atonement 385, 415
Azcarah 297-298 Death as the wages of sin 103
Azereth 380 Defilement from dead bodies 422-432
Desert the abode of daemons 399
Bitter herbs 369 Drink-offering 281, 299-303
Bleeding sacrifice, character- Dwelling-place of Jehovah 40, 42
istics of 174-250
-----materials of 59 sqq Eating of blood 30
-----varieties of 174-280 ------fat 32
Blood forbidden as food 30 ------flesh of peace-offering 279, 280
-----sprinkling of 56, 115 sqq., 174 ------flesh of sin-offering 228-243
Bloodless sacrifice 281 Expiable sins 186 sqq.
Bloodless sin-offering 125 Expiation 66
Bread of Jehovah 62, 150, 159 -----theories of 139-149
Bread of life 75
Burning of fat 218 Fat of sacrifices 218
------the flesh of sin-offering 237 -----burning of 218
-----the flesh of burnt-offering 249 -----eating of 32
Burning of sacrifice 151-162, 174, 218 -----meaning of 218-223
Burnt-offering 64, 174 sqq., 249 Faultlessness of sacrificial
-----altar of 40, 44 animal 81
------daily 349 Feast, Mosaic idea of 341-348
------ritual of 249-251 -----of Passover 355-376
------of Tabernacles 381-385
Candlestick 41, 47 ------of Weeks or Pentecost 376-381
Capporeth 42, 47 Fire of the altar 155
Carrion, defilement from 422 First-born of cattle 440
INDEX. 455
Pane Page
Flesh of peace-offering 264 North side of altar 109
------of sacrifices 151-162, 217
------of sin-offering 217, 223, 227 Objects used in sacrifice 75
243 Offering of jealousy 447
Food, laws of 22 Offerings, varieties of 51
------of Jehovah 62, 150, 159 Oil for the lamps 318
Foreigners 20 -----in the meat-offering 287-292
Freewill-offering 262
Paschal lamb 361 sqq.
Heave-leg 266 -----meal 368
Heaving 269 Passover, feast of 355-376
Heifer, red 426 Peace-offering 64, 174 sqq.
Holy of Holies 41, 43 -----ritual of 251 sqq.
Holy Place 41, 43 Penal death 105, 118, 223
Honey, prohibition of 293 Pentecost, feast of 376-381
Horns of the altar 46, 216 People, consecration of 322
Hyssop 428 Persons sacrificing 18
Pigeons 244
Imposition of hands 82 Place of sacrifice 39
-----on the day of atonement 98, 99 Poena vicaria 105, 123
-----on the trespass-offering . 246 Praise-offering 259
Imputation of sin 97 Presentation of sacrificial ani-
Incense 320 mal 82
-----altar of 41, 46 ----- of first-born of cattle 440
-----offered with the meat- Priestly character of the people 18
offering 294 Priests, the 33
Insufficiency of Old Testament -----consecration of 328-340
sacrifices 118 -----cities of 38
Prohibited food 22 Jealousy offering 447
Juridical view of sacrifice 123-149 Red cow (heifer) 426
Ritual of burnt-offering 249 sqq.
Laws of food 22 -----of peace-offering 251 sqq.
Laying on of hands 82 -----of sin-offering 213 sqq.
Leaven, prohibition of 292 -----of trespass-offering 244 sqq.
Leper, cleansing of 432
Levites, consecration of 340 Sabbath, the 342, 353
Living soul 75 Sabbatical times 342 sqq.
Sacrifice; bleeding 59, 174 sqq.
Materials of bleeding sacrifice 59, 80 ------bloodless 281
-----of bloodless sacrifice 281 -----burning of 151 sqq., 174
-----of burnt-offering 250 -----juridical interpretation of 123
-----of peace-offering 263 -----order of succession 175
-----of sin-offering 213 -----objects used in 75
Mazzoth, feast of 359 sqq. -----place of 39
Meal, sin-offering of 125 -----ritual of 65
Meat-offering 281-296 -----varieties of 51, 174 sqq.
-----accompaniments of 287 Sacrificial animal 81, 82
-----of the fore-court 296-314 -----meal 162-174, 279
-----of the high priest 319 -----worship, basis of 17
-----of the Holy Place 315 Salt, use of 394
Mercy-seat 42,48 Sanctuary, consecration of 328 sqq.
Mosaic idea of a feast 341-348 -----design of 42
Satisfuctio vicaria 105, 118, 123
456 INDEX.
Page Page
Nazarite's offering 443 Saving offering 251
New moon 353 Scape-goat . 394 sqq.
-----the seventh 354 Sex of sacrificial animal 81
Sexual life 415 sqq. Tabernacle 39
Shelamim 251 Tabernacles, feast of 381 sqq.
Shew-bread 317 Table of skew-bread 41, 47
-----table of 41, 47 Thank-offering 251
Sin-offering 64, 174 sqq., 182 sqq. Trespass-offering, character-
-----name of 101 istics of 182-213
-----of meal 125 -----name of 101
-----of pigeons 244 -----ritual of 244-248
-----ritual of 213 sqq. Typical character of 0ld Testa-
Sins, expiable 186 sqq. ment sacrifices 120
-----of ignorance 182 sqq.
-----name of 101 Unclean animals 22
Slaying of the sacrifice 101 Uncleanness from touching a
Soul, Hebrew idea of 75 dead body 422
Spirit, idem 75 -----its nature and idea 415
Sprinkling of the blood 56, 115, 174 Unleavened bread, feast of 359
------of burnt-offering 251
------of paschal lamb 366 Varieties of bleeding sacrifice 174
------of sin-offering 215 Vicarious suffering 105, 123
------of trespass-offering 247
Sprinkling-water used at cleans- Water of purification 423
ing of leper 432 Wave-breast 266
-----at consecration of priest 341 Wave-loaves 377
-----after contact with corpse 422 Wave-sheaf 374
sqq. Waving 267
Supplicatory offerings 257 Weeks, feast of 376
THE END.
MURRAY AND GIBB, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.
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SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AT DORPAT.

Digitally prepared and posted on the web by Ted Hildebrandt (2004)

TWENTY years have passed since I was prompted by the appear-

so many breaches have been made in the edifice erected by me,

generally stand closest together when questions relating to the

I connect it with my History of the Old Covenant, is the follow-

GENERAL BASIS OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP OF THE

A. 1-5. The People, 18

B. 6-9. The Priests, 33

,, II. 10-16. The Place of Sacrifice, 39

III. 17-25. The Various Kinds of Sacrifice, 51

THE BLEEDING SACRIFICE.

THE RITUAL OF THE SACRIFICE.

CHAPTER I. 27-30. The Notion of Expiation, 66

II. 31-34. The Objects used in Sacrifice, 75

III. 35-47. The Presentation and Laying on of Hands, 82

IV. 48-71. Slaughtering, and Sprinkling of the Blood, 101

V. 72-84. Burning of the Sacrifice, and the Sacrificial Meal, 150

VARIETIES OF THE BLEEDING SACRIFICE.

A. 85-88. The Sin-Offering, Burnt-Offering, and Peace-

B. 89-92. The Common Basis of the Sin-Offering and

C. 93-105. The Difference between the Sin-Offering and

II. 106-122. Ritual of the Sin-Offering and Trespass-Offering, 213

,, III. 123-139. Ritual of the Burnt-Offering and Peace-Offer-

THE BLOODLESS SACRIFICE.

CHAPTER I. 140-146. Material of the Bloodless Sacrifice, 281

II. 147-157. The Minchah of the Fore-Court, 296

,, III. 158-161. The Minchah of the Holy Place, 315

MODIFICATION OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP IN CONNECTION

A. 162-164. Covenant Consecration of the People, 322

B. 165-172. Consecration of the Priests and the Sanc-

C. 173. Consecration of the Levites, 340

A. 174-176. Mosaic Idea of a Feast, 341

B. 177-179. Daily, Weekly, and Monthly Service, 348

C. 180-189. The Feast of Passover, 355

D. 190-193. The Feast of Pentecost. 376

E. 194-196. The Feast of Tabernacles, 381

F. 197-212. The Day of Atonement, 385

,, III. Adaptation of the Sacrificial Worship to the Levitical and

A. 213-216. Nature and Idea of Uncleanness in connec-

B. 217-223. Removal of Uncleanness caused by Touch-

C. 224-228. Cleansing of a Leper when Cured, 432

IV. Adaptation of the Sacrificial Worship to certain Peculiar

A. 229-230. Presentation of the First-Born of Cattle, 440

B. 231-233. The Nazarite's Offering, 443

C. 234-237. The Jealousy Offering, 447

BAEHR, K. CHR. W. F., Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus. 2 Bde. Heidelb.

THE OLD TESTAMENT.

GENERAL BASIS OF THE SACRIFICIAL WORSHIP OF THE

AS the subject in hand is the sacrificial worship of the Old

that the arrangement of the place of sacrifice was affected by the

THE PERSONS SACRIFICING.

1. When Jehovah had delivered His chosen people Israel (His

vation, was not in a condition to enter at once upon its priestly

temporary demands of a separate priesthood, retained enough to

of the Pentateuch). If they would allow themselves to be formally

body as belonging to the covenant nation, the principle of separation