Cooper, J. - The Magna Moralia and Aristotle's Moral Philosophy

The Magna Moralia and Aristotle's Moral Philosophy
Author(s): John M. Cooper

Source: The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Winter, 1973), pp. 327-349
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/293613
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THE MAGNA MORALIA AND ARISTOTLE'S
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
It has been nearly fifteen years since Franz Dirlmeier

lished his defense of the authenticity of the Magna Mor
Reviews of the work were not numerous.2 Nor can it be said
that published discussions of Dirlmeier's views have provided the
critical evaluation of his arguments and conclusions that the
importance of the subject certainly demands.8 For, obviously,
if Dirlmeier is right, and the Magna Moralia, at any rate in
content, is the work of Aristotle himself, composed earlier than
either of the other two extant expositions of his moral philoso-
1Aristoteles: Magna Moralia, iibersetzt und kommentiert von Franz

Dirlmeier (Berlin, 1958).
2I know of only one full serious review, that by Diiring in Gnomon
33(1961), 547-57. Only three other reviews seem to have appeared
(Gigon in Deutsche Literatur-Zeitung 83 (1961), 14-19, C. Fabro in
Paideia 16 (1961), 206, and P. Pedech in Erasmus (1961), 358-59, none
of which is very searching. (Pedech, drawing no distinction between
Dirlmeier's views in his commentary and the argument of his 1939
article, attributes to him belief in a second-century date for the Magna
Moralia!) In addition D. J. Allan devotes part of his review of Dirl-
meier's commentary on the Eudemian Ethics (Gnomon 38 [1966], 138-
49: see pp. 142-43) to a rebuttal of some of Dirlmeier's claims for the
Magna Moralia. Gigon and Allan do not, while Diring does, accept
Dirlmeier's thesis of the substantial authenticity of the work. See also
Diiring's Aristoteles (Heidelberg, 1966), 438-44.
Treatments of Dirlmeier's views on the Magna Moralia occur in
Gigon, "Die Sokratesdoxographie bei Aristoteles," Mus. Helv. 16 (1959),
174-212 (esp. 192 ff.), Philip Merlan, Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle,
(Wiesbaden, 1960), 83-93, and Karl Barthlein, "'OpObs X6yos in den
Magna Moralia," Archiv f. Geschichte d. Philos. 45 (1963), 213-58.
Pier Luigi Donini, in his dissertation, L'Etica dei Magna Moralia
(Torino, 1965) deals often and in detail with Dirlmeier's interpretations
of particular points; he accepts somewhat mechanically the traditional
view of the work's authenticity, but regards it (pp. 222-25) more as
an independent work by an aristotelizing Hellenistic writer than as
in any sense a commentary on or condensation of the two Aristotelian
Ethics. This is certainly an improvement over the older versions of the
traditional view, but seems, as will be clear from what I say below,
pp. 338 if., an inadequate theory for many passages of the Mag. Mor.
327
328 JOHN M. COOPER.
phy, we have in this work an extremely valuable tool for tra

out Aristotle's philosophical development, as also for th
terpretation and evaluation of his moral philosophy itself
The importance of the Magna Moralia in this latter con
tion deserves emphasis, since it tends to go unmarked by
non-philosophical scholars, Dirlmeier included. First, on
issues the simpler treatment found in the Magna Mo
presents more adequately a basic insight which the other,
elaborate treatments tend to obscure; 4 these insights c
claimed for Aristotle, if the treatise is genuine, and used to
into clearer focus the theories of the other ethical writ
Secondly, in several instances the Magna Moralia include
cussions of important and difficult points never explicitly f
in the other treatises: the most noteworthy instance of
the discussion of the question what to do in case the rules of
virtues dictate conflicting actions in a particular situation
Mor. 2.3.1199 b 36-1200 a 11).5 Thirdly, where the M
Moralia differs in doctrine from either of the other treatises the
exact determination of the differences, if they can be presumed
to be due to Aristotle himself, always throws interesting new
light on the theories and arguments of the other version. Thus
the Magna Mloralia (1.33.1193 b 24-30) explains justice as a
mean between getting more and getting less than one's share. If
4 Thus Mag. Mor. 1.16 comes closer to recognizing the importance of

intention in determining responsibility than the elaborated, but nega-
tive, treatment in Eth. Nic. 3.1. Likewise the account of the "final
good" in Mag. Mor. 1.2 is a necessary supplement to Eth. Nic.'s much
less straightforward and distinct treatment. Again Mag. Mor. 2.7. 1204
b 4-1205 a 6 gives a much clearer version of Aristotle's rebuttal of
Speusippus' doctrine that pleasure is a yevea-s than Eth. Eud. 6.12 (=
Eth. Nic. 7.12) 1152 b 33 ff. does. (Though the difficulty of the latter
version is not caused by overelaboration.) The exposition of the theory
of the three types of friendship in Mag. Mor. 1208 b 36-1209 a 36 has
important implications for the origin of the theory (cf. esp. 1208 b 10
ff.) which help to bring the theories of Eth. Eud. and Eth. Nic. into
better focus.
5 The other four problems discussed in Mag. Mor. 2.3.1199 a 14 ff.

are of varying interest. But they and the opening chapters of the treatise
(1.1-3), which discuss various ways a thing can be good and to which
nothing quite corresponds in the other treatises, should not be over-
looked by any student of Aristotle's moral philosophy.
THE "MAGNA MORALIA " AND ARISTOTLE. 329
the treatise is genuine then its account of justice both serv

explain the occasional half-survival of the same view in Eud
ian Ethics 4 (=- Nicomachean 5) and to point up the na
and degree of Aristotle's later achievement in getting be
such a restricted understanding of justice (on this see furt
below, section 2). Again, the fact that the Magna Moralia
sistently, clearly and repeatedly (1184 a 29-38, b 33-39 w
1204 a 26-29, 1185 a 25-26, 36-39, 1208 b 3-6) mainta
unified conception of evdatLovta as consisting, without discrim
tion, of the exercise of both the moral and the intellectual vir
cannot but throw important new light on the related theories
the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics.6
In all these ways then, as well perhaps as others,7 the Magna
Moralia is a very important document for scholars and philoso-
phers interested in understanding Aristotle's moral philosophy-
if it is, in fact, Aristotle's work. In this paper I will try to
I think something similar should be said about the Mag. Mor.'s well-
known emphasis on dpalt fvctiKal and q5VOLKi dper' as necessary presup-
position for the acquisition of moral virtue (1198 a 8-9). I believe
careful reflection will show that the Eth. Nic.'s theory of virtue is in-
compatible with this thesis. The notion of fvacKriK dper7j appears in the
Eth. Nic. only in books 6 & 7, which are also Eudemian books, and even
there (1144 b 1 ff.) Aristotle does not make it, or b6pali fvO-lKa, a
necessary presupposition of (complete) moral virtue.
Dirlmeier (commentary on Eth. Eud., pp. 366-67, 492-93, 497-98) re-
vives the view of Spengel (fber die unter dem Namen des A. erhaltenen
ethischen Schriften, 499-503) and von Arnim (Sitzungsberichte d. Wien.
Akad. 202 (2), p. 96, and Rhein. Museum, 76 (1927), 114-15, that the
present concluding chapters of the Eth. Eud., 8.1-3) in fact have been
misplaced in our MSS. from the end of book 6, and that therefore Eth.
Eud., like Mag. Mor., concluded with the treatment of friendship. His
and their chief argument is that the corresponding chapters of Mag.
Mor. (2.7.1206 a 36-10) do precede the treatment of friendship.
Dirlmeier's motive for wanting to make this adjustment is apparently
to underscore the truth that Eth. Eud. 8.3 is not to be interpreted as
the counterpiece to Eth. Nic. 10. 6-8, with its intellectualist revision of
the definition of evSatLovia. This motive I applaud; though the truth
in question is not made doubtful by reading these chapters where they
stand. But so far as I can see they cannot have preceded book 7, since
at 8.3.1249 a 17-18 Aristotle refers back to the argument of book 7.2.
1235 b 30 ff.-an argument, indeed, found nowhere else in the Corpus.
Dirlmeier's invention (op. cit. p. 497-98) of a passage for Eth. Eud.
6 in which the same thing was said is gratuitous at best.
330 JOHN B. COOPER.
show, mostly by considering the philosophical content

work, that the Magna Moralia can only be plausibly inte
as, in substance at any rate, the work of Aristotle, represe
an earlier stage in the development of his moral philosophy
either the Eudemian or the Nicomachean Ethics. In this
with Dirlmeier. But as I am not persuaded by his treatm
the more narrowly philological grounds on which schola
tended to reject the treatise, I first indicate what I tak
the main inadequacies of Dirlmeier's views on the d
method of composition of the work. But though Dirlme
not, in my judgment, adequately meet the philological g
of objection to the treatise, these objections can be very
disarmed, and I will suggest a way in which this can b
My hope is that once it is seen clearly that the state of our
does not require, or even strongly suggest, the inferen
someone other than Aristotle is the author of the Magna M
the arguments from its content which I advance in se
will then be admitted to weigh the balance strongly in f
its Aristotelian origin.
A large part of Dirlmeier's commentary (which, with its intro-

duction, runs to three hundred and eighty-odd pages) is devoted
to rebutting the charges that have been made against the Magna
Moralia's authenticity. The grounds of objection have chiefly
fallen into four groups. (1) Matters of language and style in
which the Magna Moralia seems to diverge sharply from the
admittedly genuine works; (2) a few personal and other refer-
ences allegedly pointing toward a post-Aristotelian date; (3)
supposed Stoic influences in terminology and doctrine; (4) a
general impression, very strong in a few relatively isolated pas-
sages, that the author of the Magna Moralia wrote with the
Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics open before him, excerpting,
condensing and abbreviating so as to produce a kind of hand-
book of Aristotelian moral theory.8 Dirlmeier, following von
8I omit mention of Jaeger's claim ("Ein Theophrastzitat in der

Gr. Ethik," Hermes 64, (1929), 274-78) that the Mag. Mor. cites
Theophrastus at 1198 b 9-20. This claim was always suppositious, and
Dirlmeier disposes of it effectively (pp. 354-56).
Arnim, shows, I think, that the passages which have

thought to betray Stoic influence do not do so.9 What he
on the other heads, however, is open to serious objection
several ways.
To begin with, the view he adopts about the Magna Mor
peculiarities of language and style is strained and dubious
self and hardly consistent with his treatment of some o
personal references." Dirlmeier recognizes, as he must, tha
Magna Moralia was not written down in its present form
Aristotle. His strategy, however, is to reduce the influenc
Aristotle's "editor" 'l to the minimum, viz., to "exter
of language.12 Stylistic peculiarities he hopes to account f
another way. The treatise has always struck readers as ped
and schoolmasterly, consisting as it does of discussions fo
most part simply strung together, without much attemp
large-scale composition, and with frequent personal and qu
dramatic touches, such as references to the author in the
person singular, use of second person singular where Aris
more normally uses impersonal Tn, introduction of object
by personifying the counterargument or by a subjectless
says," and such practices as beginning an explanation or de
of a thesis by 8& rzt; ("And why so? Because . . ."). Th
and other such, peculiarities Dirlmeier seeks to explain partly
the idea that the Magna Moralia is an early work, compose
the young logician Aristotle in the style of the Topics,13
'See, for example, pp. 439; 202-5, 257-58, 349-50; 268-69; 291
that everything he says is correct, or that more might not be s
Dirlmeier is also right (pp. 118-19, 423) to reject Tennemann's ob
tions to the Mag. Mor.'s "moralistic" conception of god at 1207 a
10 Diring has also noticed this incongruence (Gnomon 33, pp.
557).
11 So Dirlmeier, without adequate discussion, characterizes the i
loper. See below, pp. 7 if.
1It should be acknowledged that Praechter (Die Philosophie
Altertums, ed. 12, p. 370 n. 1) and Theiler (Hermes 69[1934], 353
anticipated Dirlmeier in arguing for the independent Aristotelian o
of the content of the Mag. Mor., while allowing the actual writin
have been done by someone else.
18 This he thinks accounts for the serial ordering of argument
some of the dryness of exposition. I find his arguments from the
posed affinity of Mag. Mor. to Topics (itself much overstated) extre
dubious: see below p. 336.
332 JOHN M. COOPER.
partly by the unfalsifiable but rather disparate hypothe

the Magna Molrcia, unlike the other treatises, preserves
totle's actual classroom style.
By emphasizing its affinities to the Topics (and other
logical works) Dirlmeier commits himself to a date for the
perhaps as early as the early 350's and certainly not late
about 350.14 But this is hardly compatible with the refe
(1197 b 22) to Mentor, the man who betrayed Aristotle's
Hermeias to the Persian king; this, as Dirlmeier recogn
passing (see his comment ad loc.) could not have been w
before about 342 at the earliest. And similarly the p
(1205 a 23) referring to Neleus, son of the exemplary Co
can hardly have been written before about 340 and perhaps
from considerably later.15 Dirlmeier also runs into diffi
over the reference (2.15.1212 b 23 if.) to, and implied defen
the doctrine of god as self-thinker. For since he accepts
date for Metaphysics A he must, most implausibly, im
the reference not to be to Aristotle's own argument in A bu
an otherwise entirely unknown Academic pre-cursor.16
Metaphysics reference will cause no difficulty if, as I am in
to believe in any case, (the main body of) A is an early w
But the other two passages pose considerable obstacl
Dirlmeier's defense of the Magma Moralia: at the very
if the treatise was composed before about 350 then some
explanation must be provided for the occurrence of the ref
to Mentor and Neleus. But Dirlmeier seems not to have even
noticed the discrepancy.
Thus Dirlmeier's treatment of the stylistic peculiarities of
the treatise is both unconvincing in itself and at variance with
his way of handling the references to Mentor and Neleus. H
1 For this dating of the Topics see During, Aristotle's Protrepticus

(G-iteborg, 1961), p. 287.
15 On Mentor and Neleus see Diiring, Gnomon 33, p. 552, as well as
Dirlmeier ad loc. (Dirlmeier accepts Wilamowitz's correction of the
manuscripts at 1205 a 23: see Wilamowitz, "Neleus von Skepsis,"
Hermes 62 [1927], 371.)
"6 Cf. Merlan, loc. cit. and During op. cit. pp. 550-51.
17In fact if Mag. Mor. is authentic and an early work, the appear-
ance of the reference to Metaph. A becomes a very strong additional
argument in favor of an early date for A.
THE " MAGNA MORALIA" AND ARISTOTLE. 333
is no more convincing in what he says about the lin

oddities of the work. As noted above, Dirlmeier maintai
the "editor" who prepared Aristotle's manuscript for p
tion limited himself to providing some of the "extern
language in which to clothe Aristotle's thoughts (p. 14
one place, indeed, Dirlmeier goes to the extreme of cla
that the "editor" betrays his presence only in his preferenc
Vrep with genitive where Aristotle would write rept (p
In fact, however, on Dirlmeier's own account elsewher
Aristotelian language is much more prevalent than that
treatise. Thus the use of To o'Aov as adverb (meaning "i
eral," "on the whole ") is, at least given its frequency
work, certainly un-Aristotelian (cf. Dirlmeier's comme
156). There is also the remarkable fact, noted by Dirlme
p. 158, that Ionic forms of ol8a are not merely frequent
Magna Moralia, but the only ones used at all. And othe
striking usages might be cited as well.
When the number and pervasiveness of these linguisti
liarities is taken properly into account, I think Dirl
hypothesis of an " editor" who published Aristotle's own
notes with a few light alterations of language is untenab
very mention of an editor who not only touches and patche
and there, but regularly supplies some of the prepositio
adverbs is really quite suspect. No other work of Aristo
of which, one supposes, were at least lightly edited, sho
such features. How did it happen that the supposed ori
Aristotelian manuscript of the Magna Moralia, and it a
underwent such treatment? Dirlmeier attempts no answ
no plausible one suggests itself.
The very least that one must infer from these facts abou
language in which the treatise is written is that if it co
Aristotle's own notes put out by someone else, this man
mere editor. He must have worked from an original text
was very incomplete, since he found it necessary to write a
places V7r'p where Aristotle, if he had written up the
materials, would have written 7rept, and his own idiom
also, as I have noted, in other ways throughout the wor
if the materials were incomplete enough to require the "
to compose many of the actual sentences in his own words,
334 JOHN M. COOPER.
must have been plenty of opportunity, and perhaps in some

actual need, for him to fill out the argument here and there
by adding examples and in other ways. Once you adm
Dirlmeier reluctantly does, and as one must, that the wor
actually written out in someone else's words than Arist
you must expect to find some substantive intrusions in the t
so that Dirlmeier's insistence on the total authenticity
work's contents would in any case have to be tempered. (S
simplest hypothesis, I should think, by which Dirlmeier
reconcile his early date for the Magna Moralia with refe
in the text to Neleus and Mentor would be to suppose that
were added later by the " editor".)18 If, then, our text
ginated in a manuscript of Aristotle's own, we must reckon
the strong probability that this manuscript was very in
plete and has been considerably filled out by whoever pre
it for publication.
It is of course possible for all we are likely ever to know, t
this is how our text came into being. But there is a sim
and more natural way, on the hypothesis of the substan
authenticity of the Magna Moralia's contents, of accountin
all the genuinely un-Aristotelian aspects of style and lan
found in the treatise, without indulging in conjectures
an Aristotelian manuscript whose condition might have s
to call for just the sort of expansion we seem to find in
Magna Moralia. This is by the supposition that the M
Moralia is a student's published notes of a course of Arist
not based on any Aristotelian manuscript but on what h
tually heard Aristotle say. Editing, if any, would be of h
old notes, not Aristotle's. In setting down his notes origi
he would naturally have written partly in his own idiom
style; in preparing them for publication, or for his own
use in lectures, he could easily have added the examp
Neleus and Mentor, and perhaps filled out the notes in
ways. In this way all the linguistic facts could be plausib
18 This is a better guess than Diuring's supposition (op. cit. p

that Theophrastus (or someone) added them on the occasion o
reading Aristotle's notes to a beginning ethics class in the Ly
Does During then suppose also that Theophrastus (or whoever)
identical with Dirlmeier's "editor ?"
THE " MAGNA MORALIA " AND ARISTOTLE. 335
counted for and such facts as the appearance of the referenc

Mentor and Neleus easily accommodated. I need not claim
this hypothesis does correctly explain the genesis of our
Moralia; it is enough to point out that, in advance of a st
the treatise's contents, this possibility stands completely
and is in itself no less believable than the generally cur
hypothesis of a post-Aristotelian author who worked prim
from Aristotelian sources known to us independently o
version.
II
But is the substance of the treatise Aristotle's own work,

rather than a pastiche of the other Ethics? Dirlmeier here does
what one must do, namely read right through the work testing
each section to see how it compares with the corresponding pas-
sages, if any, in the other treatises. I think there is no doubt
that he proves the insufficiency of the standard view, that the
Magna Moralia has its origin in a condensation and distillation
of the Eudemian Ethics or of the Eudemiarn and Nicomachean
both. There are in fact only two fairly brief passages where in
organization and argument the Magna Moralia "follows" the
Nicomachean in preference to the Eudemian.l9 Elsewhere the
affinities are all to the Eudemian. But I agree with Dirlmeier
that no one who reads the Magna Moralia carefully and sen-
sitively, noticing and understanding the points of divergence in
form, organization, and argument, can believe that it derives
directly from the written text of either or both of the other
Ethics. Dirlmeier is not, however, always careful enough to
distinguish this kind of independence, which he amply estab-
lishes, from that kind of independence he wishes to prove: that
of a work composed without knowledge of the others, and by
the same author. For, even if the Magna Moralia is thus textual-
19 1.5.1185 b 13-9. 1187 a 4 (corresponding roughly to EtK. Nic. 2),

and 2.13-14 (1212 a 28-b 23) (on the sense in which the good man loves
himself, corresponding to Eth. Nic. 9.8). How comes it that Mag. Mor.,
the earliest ethics, deals with these matters in a way which in the
end (Eth. Nic.) Aristotle finds on the whole satisfactory, while yet
during the interim (Eth. Eud.) he sees fit to alter his treatment quite
considerably? Dirlmeier doesn't even face the question squarely. See
below, p. 347 f.
336' JOHN M. COOPER.
ly independent, it might still have been composed as a handb

of Aristotelian moral philosophy by someone other than
totle: the author might have learned his philosophy from
ing (or hearing) the Eudemian Ethics, and then compose
handbook without consulting the texts as he went a
Dirlmeier repeatedly emphasizes that Aristotle himself
the Nicomachean Ethics without working directly from the
of the Eudemian: why should not a second party have d
the same in the Magna Moralia?
To prove its Aristotelian authorship Dirlmeier relies p
cipally on matters of form and language. In the first p
there is the alleged affinity, already mentioned, to the T
and other logical works: he calls the Magna Moralia "
logice demonstrata" (p. 175), and says it is composed
topico (p. 205), "with the logical interest" predominatin
seems to me highly questionable whether anything muc
be made of these claims. The Topics consists for the mos
of somewhat disjoint analyses of modes of argument, b
its interest is predominantly in the form of valid and in
arguments of a very wide range of types. The interest is
study of the arguments themselves, and not so much in
large-scale theory of arguments; hence, the disjointedness, se
order, etc. In the Magna Moralia the predominant interes
any case in the content of the arguments, such interest in f
as there is being simply that of the self-respecting philos
concerned for the validity of his reasoning.20 So the disjo
ness here certainly does not have the same causes. Nor d
Dirlmeier cite any reason to expect a man in turning from w
on a handbook on dialectical argumentation to lecturing
composing a book on ethics, to treat this new and different
ject matter in a somewhat similar handbook style. Hence
20 It is, in any case, rather the Eth. Eud. than the Mag. Mor. wh
betrays in its mode of exposition Aristotle the young logician:
emphasis on v7roe'reLs and deduction which marks that work (cf.
Allan "Quasi-mathematical method in the Eudemian Ethics," in Aris-
tote et les problemes de methode, ed. S. Mansion, Louvain, 1961) is
surely to be interpreted as the application of the Posterior Analytics'
Theory of scientific reasoning to the subject matter of ethics-as the
De Caelo is its application to cosmology.
affinities as there may be to the Topics provide no stro

ment in favor of Aristotelian authorship.
On the other hand, Dirlmeier also emphasizes many m
of linguistic usage, and small matters of style, of whi
link the Magna Moralia to the logical works, some to P
the Academy. These observations, spread through his c
tary, are varyingly impressive; 21 but my own sense
cumulatively they are not sufficient to settle the que
authorship. The author, if not Aristotle, might hims
spent time at the Academy, perhaps while Aristotle was
ber, thus picking up mannerisms, distinctions, etc., lin
to the Academy in general and to the Aristotle of the
in particular.
Thus, while one must attach some weight to considerations of
language and style, further arguments are clearly needed. Such
arguments can only be founded on the philosophical content of
the work. Dirlmeier does on occasion take note of philosophical
divergences which can plausibly be explained on the theory that
the Magna Moralia presents less mature Aristotelian doctrine,22
but he seems to shy away from such judgments (perhaps on the
ground that they are too "subjective "). Certainly judgments
of this kind are frequently inconclusive; but often, also, they
are not. I think there are many passages of the Magna Moralia
of which "immaturity" of doctrine is an extremely plausible
explanation 23-and a much more plausible one than the alter-
21 Among the most interesting are the formulary resemblances be-

tween doctrines in Mag. Mor. (and Eth. Eud.) and the Academic
Definitiones: cf. pp. 104, 215, etc.; noteworthy, too, is the Mag. Mor.'s
listing (1185 b 5-6) of lyXivota, el,uieca and ,uv7u-q as intellectual vir-
tues: as Dirlmeier rightly observes (p. 207) these are repeatedly
referred to as virtues by Plato, but are not listed in Eth. Eud. 5 (=
Eth. Nic. 6), while again they turn up in the Definitiones.
2a Most notably with respect to the shifting uncertainty of the Mag.
Mor. as to whether the intellectual virtues, to which however, it never
refuses to grant the title of "virtue," are grounds of praise: pp. 208-9,
345-46, 352-53.
23 I list just a few of the most important of these: 1184 a 8-14
(definition of reXetov, which, as the context [a 3-38] shows, covers what
in Eth. Nic. is divided between re'Xeto and avrapKes) ; 1188 b 18-24
(what are called in Eth. Nic. 3.1 UcLKral rpatets-the conception though
not the name is prominent also in Eth. Eud., cf. 1225 a 1-33-are, with-
338 JOHN M. COOPER.
native, that someone whose knowledge of Aristotle's teac

was drawn from the Eudemian and/or Nicomachean Eth
wittingly or unwittingly, made alterations of the kind w
in Magna Moralia. Indeed, in two cases I think it can be
tically demonstrated that this explanation is correct. Wh
adds the fact that the author himself claims to be Aristo
referring to the Analytics' doctrine of the syllogism as h
(1201 b 25), I think the matter is settled.
The two passages I think are decisive are 1.1.1182 b 6-
b 8, the critique of an abstract or universal Good, and 1.
justice.
All three of the ethical treatises insist that ethics, as a prac-
tical and not a merely theoretical inquiry, ought to concern it-
self only with concrete questions about the good of human beings,
and not at all with whatever more universal or abstract goods
there may be. In the Nicomachean Ethics (1.6) the sole object
of attack and rejection is the Platonic Form of the Good, against
which Aristotle argues both that there isn't any such thing and
that if there were ethics should take no account of it. In the
Eudemian Ethics (1.8) the chief focus of the discussion is again
on the Platonic theory, and these same two points are again
made (1217 b 16-23, 25-1218 a 32, as against 1217 b 23-25,
1218 a 33-38), but there is in addition a brief section (1218 a
38-b 6) dealing separately with the claims for attention of some-
thing called rO KOLOV ayaao'v, "the common good." We are
evidently (cf. 1218 a 8-15, Mag. Mor. 1182 b 12-14) to under-
stand this as what all good things are supposed to have in com-
mon, regarded now not as something separated apart from those
good things (as a Platonic Form would be) but had or possessed
in common by each of them equally: in short, good regarded as
a proper universal instead of as a Form. In the Magna Moralia,
interest in the "common good" (introduced as rT KOLVOV iv
arantv vradpXov aya6ov, 1182 b 11-12) expands to such an extent
out comment, treated as dKcouoLa) ; 1193 b 10-18 ("legal justice" is

not rpOs &repoV, which contradicts Eth. Eud. 4 [Eth. Nic. 5] 1129 b
25-27; but the later version has, by deeper reflection, discovered a
different and important way in which "legal justice" is 7rpbs TrepoP);
1208 b 36-1209 a 36 (the theory of the three esgS of friendship is de-
veloped in the course of treating an daropla and not simply announced
as in Eth. Nic., 1155 b 18-19, and in effect, in Eth. Eud., 1236 a 16).
that it dominates the discussion (1182 b 10-1183 a 24),

the Platonic theory is relegated to a relatively brief final s
(1183 a 24-b 8); and though the main arguments are sign
ly different from those in the Eudemian and Nicom
Ethics, it is only against the common good, and not agai
Form, that the author makes any of the points made
other treatises (cf. 1183 a 7-23 with Eth. Eud. 1217 b 3
Eth. Nic. 1096 a 29-34).
This altered main interest of the Magna Moralia is cer
not easily explained as the work of a post-Aristotelian
among other reasons, Aristotle's mature theory makes th
that "good" is said in all the categories grounds for tr
it as a word not of one but of many senses. On this vie
cannot be anything which all good things as such have
mon, so that the idea of a KOLVOV ayaeov must be rega
empty. On this the Eudemian (1217 b 25-35) and th
machean Ethics (1096 a 23-29) agree.24 This is w
Nicomachean does not even mention a KoLov aya)o'v, oth
the Platonic Form, and why the Eudemian treats it
passing and as subsidiary to the Form. Why then does
posed post-Aristotelian writer take such a strong and in
dent interest in the unhypostatized KOrVOV ayao'v? One
of course, invent a controversy among Aristotle's succes
this point for the Magna Moralia to be engaged in, but f
there is no warrant. In fact close study of the texts sho
special interest in a non-Platonic Kvo'v ayaOdv marks a s
Aristotle's own thinking, a stage earlier than that
Eudemian Ethics. It follows that the Magna Moralia,
betrays this interest, reports Aristotle's argumentation
earlier time.
It is well known that in his essay On Ideas Aristotle re
the Platonists' argument "from the sciences" (Metap
990 b 12) by pointing out that even if this argument proves
24 Even if adya6v is treated as a 7rpbs Ev Xey6o/evov (cf. G. E.

"Logic and metaphysics in some earlier works of Aristotle," A
and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. Diiring-Owen, Git
1959, pp. 163-90, esp. p. 180) it remains true that the word h
senses, with no common definition covering all its instances.
the later reservations of the Eth. Nic. (1096 b 26-31) do not
this point.
340 JOHN M. COOPER.
are things besides particulars, it does not prove there are Fo

for "there are besides particulars the things they have in
mon (ra KOLvd), which we maintain are the objects o
sciences." 25 This theory of KOLvd, as an alternative to P
hypostatization, appears also in the logical works; 26 an
plainly about KoLvd in this Aristotelian sense that the
Moralia is speaking when it says: [repov yap ris SEc'as rovro 8o
av tvaL. r} pJV loEa XpLTo KaC aVro xat' avr, TO 86 KOtLOV ev a
vrdpXEc (1182 b 12-14). So the suggestion that political s
must in the first instance get to know ro KOLVOV ayaaov am
to the claim both that there is a KOLVOV in this Aristotelian s
in the case of "good," and that political science must stud
In the Nicomachean and Eudemian, Ethics the correspon
suggestion about the Form is disposed of in two stages: as
above, Aristotle argues first that there is no such object of s
and secondly that even if there were it would not help the p
ical scientist, or any other specialist, to know about it.2
Magna Moralia, however, argues only that political scien
must not concern themselves with the KOLVOV ayaOov (nor
the Platonic Form), without denying the existence o
KOLVOV ayao'v, whether "separated" or not. In fact, the
Moralia has no qualms about actually stating the common def
tion of "good" (1182 b 20-21); whereas the argument of
two Ethics clearly implies that there is no such definition
na Moralia is content to deny to political science any need
concerned with it, while yet affirming its existence. The
cipal argument of the Eudemian and Nicomachean Et
26 Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Metaph. 79.17-19, citing the Ilept

(cf. 79.5): earL 'yap 7rapa r&a KaO' eKa'ra Ta KOLva, ,v f, paILev Ka
eirtaTriLas elvat.
26 E.g., Topics 178 b 36 ff., as a solution to the Third Man; cf.
Metaph. B. 6 1003 a 8-12, Z. 13.1039 a 1-3.
2 Eth. Eud. states this program explicitly (1217 b 19-25), and Eth.
Nic. plainly follows it implicitly (1096 a 17-b 31 on existence, b 31-1097
a 14 on usefulness). At 1218 a 37-b 1 Eth. Eud. apparently means to
affirm the corresponding two points about a nonseparated KopVOV (so also
D. J. Allan interprets: "Aristotle's Criticism of Platonic Doctrine con-
cerning Goodness and the Good," Proc. of the Arist. Soc. 64 [1963-64],
227): in any case it certainly follows from what is argued at 1217 b
22-35 (cf. wa"Trep oiv ov36 Tor ov Lev T eoL rept Ta elprlfleva, orTWS o5&r Tb
ayaOov, b 33-34) that there is no KOLvbv aya06v.
against its existence, that because "good" is said in all

categories it must have so many different senses, is not
adumbrated anywhere in the Magna Moralia. It is true
the claim is made (1183 a 9-10) that "good" is said in al
categories, but this thesis is put to a quite different use.
argument here (1183 a 7-23)28 is that even in a single categ
like that of time, what is good is not the subject of a sin
science; rather the doctor knows when is a good time for
operation, and the pilot when is a good time to sail,
so on. If then in each category one finds not one but man
sciences dealing with good, so much the less will one expec
find a single science dealing with what is good in all the ca
gories at once. This is a straightforward argument a fort
and does not depend on or involve the theory that good i
7roAXaXo Xe?y6oLevov.
The argument of this section of the Magna Moralia there
has the following features. (1) It concentrates specially on
proposition that political science should have in view in its
sonings the realization of the "common" good, an unhypo
tatized universale in rebus. (2) It does not deny, but affir
the existence of such a "common" good. (3) It is fami
with the doctrine of categories, and holds that there are it
in all of them which are good, but does not argue on this
that " good" is ambiguous and that there is no goodness c
mon to all good things. It would seem that we have here
record of a stage of Aristotle's thinking about "good" wh
antedates both that preserved in the Eudemian and that of
Nicomachean Ethics. At this time he himself accepted the
28 It corresponds to Eth. Eud. 1217 b 35-1218 a 1 (not to b 25

and Eth. Nic. 1096 a 29-34 (not to a 23-29). Dirlmeier's failure to
see that two separate arguments are given in Eth. Eud. and Eth. Nie.
leads him wildly off in his analysis of Mag. Mor. 1183 a 7-23: see pp.
176-77. The same failure, in the case of Eth. Eud., has led Allan (op.
cit. pp. 284-86, cf. esp. his way of running together the two arguments
in his summary on p. 285) to misunderstand the clear meaning of 1217
b 33-35, which states as the conclusion of a completed, independent argu-
ment that there is no unified science of goodness because there is
nothing common to all good things as such. (On this Owen is right,
"Logic and Metaphysics in some Earlier Works of Aristotle," Owen-
Diiring op. cit. pp. 165-66).
342 JOHN M. COOPER.
istence of a KOLwov ayaGo'v alongside the other xotva whose ex

tence he proposed as an alternative to Forms. This is why
deals more fully with the suggestion that politics must stu
this than with the corresponding suggestion about the Plato
Form. The former was for him a live question, while the lat
was not. Later, when he came to think that because there
good things in all the categories good must be a iroAXAaX
Xeyo,uevov, so that there is no such KOLVOV, the question ceased
be a live one. He then naturally recast his treatment of th
" abstract good " so as to make it a historical, anti-Platonic d
cussion such as we find in the Eudemian and Nicomachean
Ethics. Certainly no follower of Aristotle's, whether wittin
or unwittingly, can have produced our text out of the mor
orthodox arguments of the other works.
These considerations show conclusively, I think, that at le
the part of the first book just analyzed goes back to some Ar
totelian text or discussion earlier than either Eudemian or
Nicomachean Ethics. Examination of the Magna Moralia's
treatment of justice will show that this is no isolated case. This
can be done relatively briefly, since two of the points that need
to be taken account of have been mentioned already.29
Magna Moralia 1.33, like the Eudemian-Nicomachean ac-
count of justice, begins with a distinction between two senses
of rTO GKaiov. First, there is the sense of the word in which, be-
cause the law of the city enjoins the performance of virtuous
acts of all kinds, and anything enjoined by the law can be called
8'Katov, " just" acts would include acts of virtue of whatever
kind, brave, temperate, pious and the rest. (Commentators of
the Nicomachean Ethics call this "justice" in the universal
sense.) Secondly, and more narrowly, there is a sense of the
word in which only fair dealing counts as just action, and it is
naturally with justice in the second sense of the word that both
discussions are primarily concerned. The Magna Moralia, how-
ever, draws the distinction in an importantly different way from
the Eudemian-Nicomachean account. The Magna Moralia,
noting that fairness and unfairness consist in attitudes one has
to other people and their good, contrasts the narrower with
the broader sense of justice as respectively relational and non-
2o Above, p. 328 and note 23.
THE "MAGNA MORALIA" AND ARISTOTLE. 343
relational: the temperate man, who will of course also b

in the broad sense, need stand in no particular relation to ot
in doing (at least some of) his temperate actions (1193 b
17). But the Eudemian-Nicomachean account makes it a
cipal part of its theory that in both senses justice is a rel
notion: 3 insofar as a temperate man can be regarded al
just (in the universal sense) he must think of his act
conforming to the law and therefore as contributions t
general good which it is the aim of the law to promote
contradiction here is quite explicit. Universal justice aperq LYE
TrXda, 4AX' ovx a7rXws aXXa 7rpos crTpov (Eth. Nic.--Eth. Eu
b 26-7); aMcA a rO Katcov TO 7r Epovs lXXoeo a ro EV lprflLVO KavT
&KatOv Wa-rv (Mag. Mor. 1193 b 15-16). It is surely incr
that anyone writing a compendium of Aristotelian ethic
knew the other treatment should thus boldly contradict his
source.83
But on the assumption of authenticity it is not difficult to

account for this divergence. It is plain that the Magna Moralia
takes a much too simple view of the relation of universal, or
legal, justice to the particular virtues enjoined by it-and that
the Eudemian-Nicomachean account shows deeper insight and
more sophistication. The author of the Magna Moralia simply
equates acts of (universal) justice with acts of temperance,
courage and so on, as the case may be, and hence, naturally
enough, infers that acts of (universal) justice have no necessary
relation to other persons. But this is wrong, and in the other dis-
cussion Aristotle takes some pains (1129 b 25-1130 a 8) to ex-
0 It is this fact that, Aristotle implies (1130 b 1-2), makes the

double usage of the word at once intelligible and difficult to see through
(1129 a 26-28).
81 The contradiction consists in the affirmation and denial that rb Kar&
o,6Lov lIKatov is rpbs trepov, something that consists in a relation to
others. It is plain that rpbs 9repov bears this same sense in both state-
ments. The fact that KaO' eav6ro ("by himself," "solitary," Mag. Mor.
1193 b 13, 15) contrasts with 7rpbs &repov differently than Ka'f alr6v
("in himself," "for his own advantage," Eth. Nic. 1129 b 33), a&7rwXw
(1129 b 26) or 7rpbs avT6v (1130 a, 6, 7) do (P. Trude, Der Begriff
der Gerechtigkeit in der aristotelischen Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie,
Berlin, 1955, pp. 59-62, cited with approval by Dirlmeier, p. 313), does
not imply that 7rpbs erepov has a different sense there. Provided the
sense is the same the contradiction remains.
344 JOHN M. COOPER.
plain why: as already noted, an act of (say) temperance i

also an act of (universal) justice if done as owed to some
else (perhaps the community as a whole, or the ruler, or
fellow citizen, Aristotle suggests [1129 b 14-19, 1130
Aristotle seems to have in mind two different ways in w
virtuous act might be regarded as a contribution to som
else's good. First, some acts of courage are undertaken i
fense of the life and property, not of the agent himself, bu
others, and a corresponding point might be made for temper
good temper and other virtues.32 Now on this ground one
only argue that a person displays justice in the universal
when exercising some virtue to the material benefit of some
person besides himself-by bravery in battle, or leaving so
else's wife unseduced, and so on. But one could not main
that private acts of bravery (defending merely oneself) or
perance (not overeating), etc., showed (universal) just
Secondly, however, Aristotle seems also to have in mind
in which all virtuous acts, whether publicly or merely privat
beneficial in the way just noted, can be thought of as 7rpos Er
For in a well-organized city, according to Aristotle, the
aim to advance the happiness of all the citizens in comm
(1129 b 14-19), so that, since happiness consists partly in m
ly virtuous action, the law "bids us to live according to ea
the virtues and forbids us each of the vices" (1130 b 23-
Hence one may regard one's virtuous disposition and its exerc
whether private or public, as a contribution to the well-b
of the city just in themselves: it is in the exercise of one'
virtue, whatever the circumstances, that one makes one's
damental contribution to the communal good.
Now in making this second point Aristotle marks an e
tial advance on the theory of the Magna Moralia. For even
Magna Moralia's solitary temperate man can, from this po
view, also be acting for social ends and so be acting -rpos ~rE
he need only regard his own temperance as just in itself
of the communal good. It would thus seem that the Eude
Nicomachean account shows the fruit of deeper reflection, w
enabled Aristotle to correct the earlier, over-hasty classificat
82 This seems to be the point Aristotle relies on at 1129 b 31-113

8: see esp. b 33-35.
of justice in the broader sense as not consisting in a r

to others. Certainly the facts can very easily be accom
in this way, while, as noted above, they can hardly be
at all with the hypothesis of a post-Aristotelian author
with the orthodox doctrine.
This theory of the origin of the Magna Moralia's discussion
of justice is also suggested by other facts. Thus the Magna
Moralia gives an account of "particular" justice, justice in the
sense of fair dealing, which from the point of view of the
Nicomachean Ethics, is both restricted in scope and very poorly
articulated. The restricted scope comes out already in the defini-
tion of the just man as the man who wants to have what is
equal-neither getting more by acting unjustly nor getting less
by being unjustly treated (1193 b 25-30), than his share.30
Obviously in this conception justice and injustice only show
themselves in situations where a man is actually competing with
others for some good thing: the just man limits his competitive-
ness and desire for gain in ways in which the unjust man does
not. Justice, in effect, is fairness in making or accepting dis-
tributions between oneself and others (1193 b 20-23); the more
general case of parent or arbitrator or judge distributing goods
where he is not party to the distribution is not taken account
of in the definition at all.34 In fact, justice on this definition
seems perfectly to exemplify the Magna Moralia's general thesis
about the moral virtues (1186 a 33, b 33-34, 1190 b 7, etc.),
that they are /AErOOT-qrE T'rv 7raO0v. Justice turns out to be es-
sentially the proper control of one's competitive instinct for
gain: the just man has neither too much, nor too little, but
the right amount of this 7ra9os. Now not only does this view
make justice the exact counterpart of the other moral virtues
(without the disruptions caused in the theory of the mean by
Aristotle's recognition in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics
83 Compare Eth. Bud. 2.3.1221 a 4: KIoep-os-flila--8iKaLOP and the

theory of two opposed vicious types (the KepsaXVos and the ScLcS)jas)
adumbrated at a 23-24. The limitation evident here was corrected by
the time the detailed treatment of book 4 was composed. Contrast Eth.
Nic. 2.7.1108 b 7-8.
84 Hence the situation of the judge or arbitrator, which rightly oc

cupies the center of the discussion in Eth. Eud. (Eth. Nic.), is only
alluded to briefly in Mag. Mor., in a kind of appendix (1196 a 34-b 3
346 JOHN M. COOPER.
of the anomalous character of justice [cf. 1133 b 32 ff.]

it is also a very natural first sketch for a Greek and a studen
Plato's Republic to have produced. The general equati
7rAcovc'ta (graspingness) with a&Klao would certainly predisp
any Greek to the sort of account the Magna Morlia gives
this predisposition would certainly be reinforced for Ari
if he is the author of that account, by the way in which
symachus in the Republic builds on this usage in his theo
what injustice is.
Here again, the Eudemian-Nicomachean treatment show
fruits of further reflection. In their theory the circums
of justice are generalized to include indifferently the assignm
of the right amount of goods (and evils), no matter wh
persons may be to whom the assignment is made (cf. 11
1-6). And because the case where a man is assigning good
himself is a special case, Aristotle rightly tends to avoid i
cussing instead the actions of judges and arbitrators.35 On
improved conception it is not essential to justice that a
act involve the renunciation of possible, but unjust, gai
one's own part. And, on the other side, the motives to in
could, in principle, be quite varied: not merely excessive
for gain, but also simple hatred and willful arbitrariness
now be accommodated. The essential thing is whether or
the right assignment of goods has been made-and the mo
leading someone to fail to make it are now a subsidiary quest
The Nicomachean Ethics, by defining the virtues as mea
passion and action (1106 b 16-17),36 perhaps intends to m
room for virtues like justice, which, so understood, is a v
of action only, with no peculiar range of emotion under its c
trol. In any case the official Nicomachean account of just
a mean (1133 b 29 ff.) mentions only actions and not pass
(It is interesting to notice, however, that even in this l
treatment the appeal of the Magna Moralia's more prim
8 This is the true source of what some commentators have found to

be objectionably legalistic in Aristotle's account. The judge looms so
large primarily because he represents the general case, where the facts
can be observed free from the confusions introduced by considering the
special case concentrated on by Plato and the earlier Aristotle.
s The Eth. Eud. is less explicit than Eth. Nic. in including actions
as well as passions, but cf. e.g., 2.3.1220 b 21-35, esp. 7rpCdeL (b 25).
scheme is not completely overcome. In one passage (1136 b

1137 a 4) Aristotle assimilates the judge who knowingly h
down an unjust decision to Thrasymachus' grasping man,
is motivated by excessive desire for gain: according to Aris
even if he does not profit materially from the transaction
judge at least gets an excess of some good-gratitude, per
or revenge! Here Aristotle plainly writes under the influen
the old, restricted conception of justice; on his own curr
theory he ought to feel no need at all to treat the judge
7rXEovfKrns, and it is certainly to be regretted that he di
take the opportunity here once and for all to break the o
between daKika and 7rAXoveeta.)
The upshot is that although Aristotle takes the essential
step in Eudemian Ethics 4 (=Nicomachean 5) toward ge
beyond the oversimple conception of justice as consisting
sentially in the limitation of one's competitive instinct for ga
he never freed himself entirely of this idea. He recognize
essential irrelevance of the identities of the parties to a distri
tion, but does not, apparently, have a clear grasp of the c
quences. Both the success and the failure support the thesi
the Magna Moralia's theory of justice is the work of a less ma
Aristotle.
I think that my examination of the philosophical conten
the Magna Moralia's theory of justice shows beyond reason
doubt that that theory was constructed by Aristotle hims
some time before the composition of the Eudemian Ethics
have shown the same for the Magna Moralia's critique of a
versal Good. Many other passages could be added, but I th
these are decisive.
The only significant doubts about this conclusion, so far as
I can see, are prompted by the two passages where, as I said
above,38 the Magna Moralia " follows" the Nicomachean Ethics
in fairly clear preference to the Eudemian-to which, however,
on my account, it is chronologically closer. Why Aristotle should
have revised, in the Eudemian Ethics, the treatment accorded
87 The same conclusion could be reached, I think, from a consideration

of the Magna Moralia's failure to distinguish distributive, corrective
and "reciprocal" justice and their spheres.
'8 P. 335 and note 19.
348 JOHN M. COOPER.
to these matters in the Magna Moralia, only to revert to

the Nicomachean, is certainly not easy to say. On the other h
one must not expect to explain everything: Aristotle can
had motives for doing what seems unfathomable to us. I do
not think the facts are entirely inconsistent with the supposition
of the priority of the Magna Moralia's version of these two pas-
sages; 39 but in any case, the anomaly, difficult as it is to explain,
must not be allowed to outweigh the arguments for authenticity
presented above.
I have defended both the substantial authenticity of the Mag-
na Moralia and its importance as a source for the study of Aris-
totle's moral philosophy. But I have also emphasized the un-
doubted, though not precisely determinable, influence of an
intermediary on the transmitted record of what Aristotle said.
One is not infrequently tempted to find this influence at work in
the exposition of the detail of Aristotle's arguments.40 This is
39 On the question of Mag. Mor. 1.5.1185 b 14-1187 a 4 see D. J. Allan,

"Magna Moralia and Nicomachean Ethics," JHS 77, pt. 1 (1957),
7-11; Dirlmeier, Magna Moralia pp. 145-46; Allan, Gnomon 38, pp.
142-43; Dirlmeier, commentary on Eth. Eud., ed. 2, 143. As for Allan's
claim that the author of Mag. Mor. here cites the (Nicomachean) Ethics
by name (1185 b 15), and thereby shows himself not to be Aristotle: (1)
Dirlmeier shows that the reading EK Tr~ )8OLKCv would not normally mean,
and so probably does not mean, "from the Ethics." (I do not think
he succeeds in showing that it could not mean that.) (2) Dirlmeier's
(and in effect Stock's) own favored translation, "from the phenomena
(Erscheinungen) of moral character," "from the (observed) facts about
character," which is in itself possible enough, does not fit the context:
if these facts of character can be observed then they are not dfavj and
there is no need to consider what is observed to happen in matters
of bodily health as a visible indication of what happens in the forma-
tion of character. (3) I therefore agree with Spengel and others (most
recently Dfiring, Gnomon 33, p. 551) that we should emend to eK rwv
alo-Oyrfrv (" from observable facts "): I take Stobaeus' IK rcT alaOffaewv
(11.7, Wachs. p. 137, 25) to be very strong grounds for this alteration,
given the well-known fact that his text is plainly based at this point
ultimately on the Magna Moralia. If this is correct the question of
priority must be decided on internal grounds alone, if at all.
40 Likely cases which can be briefly indicated include 1187 a 35-b
4 (compare Eth. Eud. 1222 b 20-1223 a 8), 1188 b 25-26 (which seems
to betray a formal structure for the argument of chapters 12-16 like
that of Eth. Eud. 2.7-9, but without any other sign that this is so);
indeed to be expected. But I do not find any evidence

writer has, either deliberately or through oversight or in
altered any important element of Aristotle's teaching
lectures being reported. The proof of this is the degree to
convincing and good philosophical sense can be made o
the main drift of all the Magna Moralia's discussions,
with the fact that the sense which emerges requires t
plained not as derivative from, but as the ancestor of,
ture Aristotelian doctrine. This means that the Magna
can only be used with care in giving an account of the
and content of Aristotle's moral theory; but it can an
be used.
JOHN M. COOPER.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH.
also certain arguments which hardly make sense as they stand can be
presumed to be faulty reports, e. g., 1205 a 7-15.

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The Magna Moralia and Aristotle's Moral Philosophy

Author(s): John M. Cooper

It has been nearly fifteen years since Franz Dirlmeier

1Aristoteles: Magna Moralia, iibersetzt und kommentiert von Franz

phy, we have in this work an extremely valuable tool for tra

4 Thus Mag. Mor. 1.16 comes closer to recognizing the importance of

5 The other four problems discussed in Mag. Mor. 2.3.1199 a 14 ff.

the treatise is genuine then its account of justice both serv

show, mostly by considering the philosophical content

A large part of Dirlmeier's commentary (which, with its intro-

8I omit mention of Jaeger's claim ("Ein Theophrastzitat in der

Arnim, shows, I think, that the passages which have

partly by the unfalsifiable but rather disparate hypothe

1 For this dating of the Topics see During, Aristotle's Protrepticus

is no more convincing in what he says about the lin

must have been plenty of opportunity, and perhaps in some

18 This is a better guess than Diuring's supposition (op. cit. p

counted for and such facts as the appearance of the referenc

But is the substance of the treatise Aristotle's own work,

19 1.5.1185 b 13-9. 1187 a 4 (corresponding roughly to EtK. Nic. 2),

ly independent, it might still have been composed as a handb

affinities as there may be to the Topics provide no stro

21 Among the most interesting are the formulary resemblances be-

native, that someone whose knowledge of Aristotle's teac

out comment, treated as dKcouoLa) ; 1193 b 10-18 ("legal justice" is

that it dominates the discussion (1182 b 10-1183 a 24),

24 Even if adya6v is treated as a 7rpbs Ev Xey6o/evov (cf. G. E.

are things besides particulars, it does not prove there are Fo

26 Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Metaph. 79.17-19, citing the Ilept

against its existence, that because "good" is said in all

28 It corresponds to Eth. Eud. 1217 b 35-1218 a 1 (not to b 25

istence of a KOLwov ayaGo'v alongside the other xotva whose ex

2o Above, p. 328 and note 23.

relational: the temperate man, who will of course also b

But on the assumption of authenticity it is not difficult to

0 It is this fact that, Aristotle implies (1130 b 1-2), makes the

plain why: as already noted, an act of (say) temperance i

82 This seems to be the point Aristotle relies on at 1129 b 31-113

of justice in the broader sense as not consisting in a r

83 Compare Eth. Bud. 2.3.1221 a 4: KIoep-os-flila--8iKaLOP and the

84 Hence the situation of the judge or arbitrator, which rightly oc

of the anomalous character of justice [cf. 1133 b 32 ff.]

8 This is the true source of what some commentators have found to

scheme is not completely overcome. In one passage (1136 b

87 The same conclusion could be reached, I think, from a consideration

to these matters in the Magna Moralia, only to revert to

39 On the question of Mag. Mor. 1.5.1185 b 14-1187 a 4 see D. J. Allan,

indeed to be expected. But I do not find any evidence

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