A Poutpourri of Chomskyan Science
A Poutpourri of Chomskyan Science
A Poutpourri of Chomskyan Science
Christina Behme
[email protected]
May 2014
1. Introduction
The Science of Language, published in the sixth decade of Noam Chomskys linguistic
career, should have been an impressive summary of the achievements of one of the greatest
intellectuals of our time. It is not. Chomskys scholarship has arguably been slowly
deteriorating over decades, and this volume is altogether representative of the problem. I
shall argue in this review article that uncritical acceptance of Chomskys work despite its
steadily declining quality has been doing the field considerable damage.
One goal of this article is to engage in what Chomsky advocates as consciousness raising
(119) and to encourage readers to apply to Chomskys work the same standards that are
applied throughout science. The Science of Language has been reviewed elsewhere (e.g.
Pullum, 2012; Bishop, 2012; Behme, 2013a; Lieberman, 2013), so readers seeking a more
conventional review are already well served. This review article offers only a brief survey
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of the book as a whole, before focusing on certain key passages in order to discuss serious
shortcomings of Chomskys recent scholarship. I shall show that his recent work fails to
meet serious scientific standards because he rejects scientific procedure, inflates the value
of his own work, and distorts the work of others, and that the poor quality of The Science of
Language is no isolated misstep but characteristic of many of his recent (and some not so
recent) publications.1
The Science of Language contains twenty-five interviews. Part I introduces the reader to
Chomskys thought on the design and function of human language, language evolution,
commentaries, and a glossary. Given that the volume aims (at least in part) at illuminating
[Chomskys linguistics for] newcomers (Pietroski, back cover), the interview format
and the frequent focus on philosophical and political issues might seem appropriate.
However, as noted by another reviewer, there seemed no coherent structure The style is
so discursive that its impossible to prcis. [Chomskys] rhetorical approach seemed the
antithesis of a scientific argument (Bishop, 2012). Indeed, searching for the promised
cutting-edge theorizing (Stainton, back cover) proves futile, and any hopes for
1
This review article gives a negative evaluation of Chomskys work that goes beyond The Science of
Language. However, it is not an attempt to evaluate the entire body of his work, nor to diminish the
importance of the technical contributions he made in publications like Syntactic Structures, Aspects of the
Theory of Syntax, The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, etc. Many issues only briefly mentioned here
are discussed in detail at http://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/001592.
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philosophical engagement with long-standing criticism of the Chomskyan paradigm are in
vain. Further, it is difficult, (especially for newcomers), to follow the presentation, because
terms are not clearly defined, the conversation meanders through multitudes of obscure,
are often drawn from meagre premisses. The only attempt in the entire volume at a
syntactic analysis (for the sentence Harry saw a house) is a sketch outlined by McGilvray
follows. Chomsky dogmatically defends a view that is visibly out of touch with recent
language acquisition, and language evolution. He fails to provide novel (or at times, any)
he proclaims as irrefutable truth what is hotly contested outside the Chomskyan camp.
Most of the arguments provided are sketchy repetitions of controversial arguments that
Chomsky put forward years or even decades ago. There is virtually no reference to work by
Chomskyans that had not been already discussed in recently published volumes, such as
Cartesian Linguistics2 (3rd edition, 2009), Of Minds and Language (2009), Noam Chomsky
on Cognition and Language (2009), and Chomsky Notebook3 (2010). At times Chomskys
2
Naturally, one would not expect novel research in Cartesian Linguistics (2009). Yet it advertises a new and
specifically written introduction by James McGilvray, contextualizing the work for the twenty-first century
(back cover), and contains a letter by Chomsky commenting on computational work.
3
This volume was originally published as Chomsky (2007) in French.
3
replies to McGilvrays questions are almost identical to passages from such earlier works4.
This turns the current volume into a meta-interview: pieces of earlier interviews are
Apart from the poor quality of argumentation, The Science of Language displays numerous
pagination is allowed to accumulate from p.16 (the relevant footnote refers to p. 17) to p.
141 (the relevant footnote refers to p. 123), and work criticized by Chomsky is not cited
properly in the text (e.g., that guy (57); a very good English philosopher (30)), and not
listed in the reference section (Lassiter, 2008; Papineau, 2008). While ultimately Chomsky
is responsible for his remarks, a share of criticism must also be attributed to the interviewer
James McGilvray, and to the editors at the distinguished academic publisher. Why did they
The problems listed above would be serious flaws in any academic work. But The Science
of Language is no isolated instance of poor scholarship and substandard editing. The public
has been exposed in short succession to five books with Chomskys name on the cover, all
(Paul Pietroski, Howard Lasnik, Robert Freidin, Robert Stainton). Despite these failings,
the books have elicited the highest praise in reviews published in reputable venues:
representations of Chomsky's oeuvre ... The volume opens with two majestic essays by
4
None of these earlier works reported original research either. There is some discussion of biological and
psychological work in Of Minds and Language. But discussion of novel linguistic findings has been absent
from Chomskys publications for a long time.
4
Chomsky himself (Mukherji, 2009, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews); [Of Minds and
Language] is a book remarkably rich in ideas (Kljajevic, 2009, Linguist List); the papers
[in Of Minds and Language] are uniformly thoughtful and provide an excellent guide to
some of the best thinking on biolinguistic themes (Drummond & Hornstein, 2011,
Biolinguistics). Negative evaluations (Pullum, 2012; Postal, 2012; Behme, 2013b) have
elicited open hostility. All this suggests, especially to non-linguists, that work which fails to
meet even minimal standards for scientific publications is held in high esteem by
professional linguists.5
3. Supplemental Information
One could expand on all the points made above. I restrict myself to two that are of
evolution, and (ii) Chomskys distortion of the work of others. These topics were selected
because Chomskys views about language evolution reveal the full extent of the double
standards evident throughout. He ridicules the work of an entire field, without ever citing
the views he considers problematic. His own view is put forward authoritatively as the only
rational option. This creates the impression that he is popularizing tidbits of a massive body
of scientific work he has conducted. Yet, no supporting evidence is cited, and none of his
speculations are based on work he has completed himself. The tendency to distort and
denigrate the work of others is not confined to language evolution and warrants additional
5
3.1. Speculations about Language Evolution
For decades Chomsky has been claiming that communication is not an important function
of language because language is badly suited for this purpose. This highly controversial
proposal plays a crucial role supporting the equally controversial suggestion that language
evolution occurred basically overnight when one mutation slightly rewired the brain and
installed Merge. Given its central importance, one would expect the proposal to be well
Chomsky provides no evidence supporting these claims and at least some readers may have
specify a function of language in the way biologists do when they look at other organs of
the body. Instead, Chomsky states his only identifiable proposal was not serious.
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McGilvray fails to ask for a serious proposal and allows Chomsky to continue his musings:
Its perfectly true that language is used for communication. But everything you do is used
for communication - your hairstyle, your mannerisms, your walk, and so on and so forth. So
sure, language is also used for communication (Chomsky, p. 12). Again, no research is
Chomsky is unaware of fellow humans who do not do everything for communication. His
speculations continue:
Finally Chomsky asserts: Every animal down to ants has a communication system (p. 12,
Chomskys categorical claim requires that there are no animals without communication
systems. What and to whom would an endoparasite like Taenia saginata communicate, one
wonders. Why would solitary sessile creatures like Corella willmeriana have a need to
entails that these species communicate. But, if we invoke Chomskys own standards: if by
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communication you mean any form of interaction, ok, [there is] communication.
However, if you want the notion of communication to mean something, lets say conveying
information (p. 12), then it is dubious that these or many other animals communicate with
Turning to language evolution, two tendencies emerge. First, Chomsky expresses contempt
for and repeatedly ridicules the work of others. Second, his own accounts reveal an
As discussed in the review reproduced above, Chomsky does not critique actual work on
language evolution. Instead, he has invented an allegedly common account that bears no
resemblance to any known theory. Researchers I contacted to inquire about it were insulted
that anyone would imply they might defend such a theory. The comments ranged from a
not suitable for citation. Given the variety of existing theories and the willingness of
researchers to clarify their views and engage with targeted criticism, detailed discussion
doing this Chomsky is satisfied with creating and dismissing a strawman argument.
Next, Chomsky alleges that current evolutionary theorizing is too narrowly focused on
natural selection: a pure form of selectionism that no serious biologist could pay
attention to, but which is [a form of] popular biology - Its like a sixth grade version of
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the theory of evolution. It cant possibly be right (p. 67). Chomsky links this view to
Skinner and Quine but gives no example of evolutionary biologists holding it. He goes on
to argue that natural selection could not have played a role in language evolution:
Chomsky provides no evidence establishing that every New Guinean native has exactly the
same concept RIVER as he does and it is unclear what this argument establishes. It is
possible that the concepts we currently have may not have provided a selectional advantage
for our distant ancestors. Whether or not they had the same concepts as we is a matter of
speculation. Chomsky provides no evidence that they did and it is difficult to imagine what
such evidence could possibly consist of. Assuming for arguments sake that they did have
the same concepts, it would appear that the argument mainly threatens Chomskys
advantage and if the concepts are also not reliably related to external objects, then one has
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to ask why are these concepts and not different ones allegedly encoded in our genome?
Why are they invariant for all humans and do not differ like, say, eye-colour or body-height
(which are also both: genetically determined and not linked to survival)? These questions
seem not to arise for Chomsky and he assumes his argument has established natural
selection is mostly irrelevant for language evolution. This leads him to ridicule the
proposals of others:
Chomsky does not reveal who overwhelmingly assumes prolonged gradual linguistic
evolution, or what the most basic facts are, and he provides no reference to specific
accounts that dont make any sense. The continuation of his attacks - We know almost
nothing about the evolution of language, which is why people fill libraries with speculation
about it (p. 51) - is also not supported by any evidence such as citation of problematic
speculations. The same holds true for: You cant just tell stories about something; you
have to show that those stories have some substance. Thats why so much talk about
evolution is basically uninteresting; its just stories (p. 128). Since Chomsky does not even
provide a name of anyone who propagates just stories, it is impossible to evaluate whether
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There are libraries of material on the evolution of human language
and some scattered technical papers on the evolution of bee
communication, which mostly point out that its too hard to study,
although its vastly easier to study than evolution of human
language. This is just irrational So sure, study it [language
evolution, CB] to the extent you can, but sensibly - knowing when
youre talking and producing serious science and when youre
gesturing rhetorically to a general public who you're misleading.
Those are important distinctions, and I think if we make those
distinctions, a lot of this literature pretty much disappears.
(Chomsky, 2012, p. 105, emphasis added)
Chomskys premise that the study of language evolution is vastly more difficult than the
study of bee-communication does not support the conclusion that it is irrational to study the
former. If the resulting insights are more valuable, it is sensible to spend more resources on
that task. By analogy, not knowing how to cure cancer in less complex organisms does not
Obviously, serious scientific work should be free of rhetorical gesturing. But Chomsky
does not provide a single example of such gesturing and never identifies the researchers
who are producing the mass of allegedly worthless literature. Only in one case, Chomsky
One looks in vain for citation of any non-rational argument that Dawkins has offered, much
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reader is apparently supposed to walk away from this passage convinced that one of the
major evolutionary theorists of the past century has provided not merely incorrect
arguments, but arguments which are not a contribution to scientific rationality - on the
Given his harsh criticism of the work of others, one would expect that Chomskys own
contribution is done seriously and without pretense, and that his arguments are carefully
crafted and supported by solid evidence. But this is not the case. He cites no own research
and his familiarity with the work of others seems superficial at best. He argues that,
obviously, we have to dismiss gradual language evolution because other animals have
adaptations similar to those of humans and it is not clear that any of the language related
changes in our anatomy evolved for language. A typical argument is provided here:
There might be some adaptations for language, but not very much.
Take, say, the bones of the middle ear. They happen to be
beautifully designed for interpreting language, but apparently they
got to the ear from the reptilian jaw by some mechanical process of
skull expansion that happened, say, 60 million years ago. So that is
something that just happened. The articulatory-motor apparatus is
somewhat different from other primates, but most of the properties
of the articulatory system are found elsewhere, and if monkeys or
apes had the human capacity for language, they could have used
whatever sensory-motor systems they have for externalization,
much as native human signers do. Furthermore, it seems to have
been available for hominids in our line for hundreds of thousands of
years before it was used for language. So it doesnt seem as if there
were any particular innovations there. (Chomsky, 2012, pp. 25-6,
emphasis added)
First, Chomsky has not completed the research he discusses here. By omitting references he
shows disrespect for the researchers and prevents the reader from accessing this work.
Second, scientists do not claim that apparently something happened, say 60 million years
ago, but, rather, give specific time frames for specific events. Third, this superficial survey
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of very few factors that need to be considered for the evolution of the multitude of
conclusion that there were not any particular innovations for language. Rather, for
explanation and everything else just happened to be in place, presumably, for hundreds of
thousands of years.
Another revealing aspect of Chomskys dealings with the language evolution literature is
that he accepts without hesitation those proposals that support his own speculations. For
example, it is crucial for his hypothesis that all modern day humans descend from one
small breeding group in Africa that only dispersed after the alleged Merge-mutation
occurred. He takes as established fact that [w]e know by now that human language does
not postdate about sixty thousand years agowhen the trek from Africa started (p. 13,
emphasis added). Chomsky neglects to mention that one hypothesis (e.g., Frayer et al.,
language evolutionists consider MOH unlikely (for discussion see Lieberman, 1998). But,
as the history of plate tectonic theory (Wegener, 1929) shows, at times theories initially
opposed by the mainstream turn out to be correct. Given that it is necessary for Chomskys
arguments that MOH is false one would expect he would either provide novel arguments,
refuting MOH or, at least, cite specific research providing very strong supporting evidence
for the mainstream out of Africa hypothesis. He does neither. Instead, he accepts
rhetorically to a general public who [theyre] misleading (p. 105), take a highly irrational
approach to inquiry (p. 20), and provide no justification for any of [their theories] (p.
13
15). Seemingly, what makes the out of Africa hypothesis acceptable is neither the
reputation of its proponents nor compelling evidence but the fact that it offers support for
Chomskys speculations.
Further, given how important the precise dating of the trek from Africa and the sudden
leap are, it is surprising that Chomsky offers a fairly wide variety of dates for these events:
maybe sixty thousand years ago, language was there, in its modern form (p. 13), effects
of having a complex symbolic system are barely there before 60,000-100,000 years ago (p.
13), this massive cultural revolution, which is quite striking, probably about sixty or
seventy thousand years ago (p. 17), groups that got separated about fifty thousand years
ago (p. 27), a great leap forward in human evolution in a period of roughly 50,000-
100,000 years ago (p. 70), it couldnt have happened later than about fifty thousand years
ago (p. 71). Chomsky cites no work by other researchers and could have easily been more
consistent. The inconsistency regarding such an important detail shows that neither he nor
his editor cared to avoid the impression of sloppiness. Finally, Chomsky also claims: You
can argue fifty thousand years more or less, but that doesnt matter (p. 51). Given the dates
Chomsky offers this implies the language mutation could have happened as early as
150,000 years ago or as late as yesterday. One might think more precise timing does matter.
unsophisticated level and do not meet any criteria of scientific theorizing. I reproduce here
some small genetic change led to the rewiring of the brain that
made this human capacity available Well, mutations take place in
a person, not in a group. We know, incidentally, that this was a very
small breeding group - some little group of hominids in some corner
of Africa, apparently. Somewhere in that group, some small
mutation took place, leading to the great leap forward. It had to
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have happened in a single person. Something happened in a person
that that person transmitted to its offspring. And apparently in a
very short time, it [that modification] dominated the group; so it
must have had some selectional advantage. But it could have been a
very short time in a small [breeding] group. Well, what was it? The
simplest assumption - we have no reason to doubt it - is that what
happened is that we got Merge. You got an operation that enables
you to take mental objects [or concepts of some sort], already
constructed, and make bigger mental objects out of them. That's
Merge. As soon as you have that, you have an infinite variety of
hierarchically structured expressions [and thoughts] available to
you. (Chomsky, 2012, pp. 13-14)
This account has the hallmarks of (very superficial) backward engineering. Chomsky is
Merge must have evolved, and this must have happened in one mutation, and this mutation
descendants took over the breeding group and the world. Chomsky presents no evidence for
his JSS. Furthermore, he neglects to mention that the great leap forward hypothesis has
been challenged (e.g., McBrearty & Brooks, 2000). It is a matter of ongoing scientific
debate, whether the great leap forward occurred in all human groups. Independently, it is
not entirely clear that a detectable change in technology is a reliable indicator for an
comparing the archeological record of human technology of the 17th and 20th century a
scientist of the 44th century might conclude that our species underwent a dramatic increase
in intelligence during this time period. But we have little reason to believe that such an
increase took place. Hence, Chomsky needs to establish not only that the great leap took
place but also that it would provide proof that language evolved at exactly the same time.
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He does neither. For readers unconvinced by the previous JSS, Chomsky offers a slightly
modified version:
One is told that, allegedly, our very distant ancestors had concepts that are virtually
identical to our own because every living human being has basically the same ones.
Concepts that remain the same over millennia, regardless of being used only in internal
thought or in communication with other members of the species or not at all are more
reminiscent of immutable Platonic forms or the craftsman-stamp of the Cartesian God than
language in frogs indeed doesnt tell us anything and, given that The Science of Language
is populated with remarks about pigeons, insects, nematodes and bacteria, one wonders if
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these groups are included in any other animal. For anyone with biological training, it is
impossible to take this account seriously, and even non-biologists ought to wonder about
its plausibility.
One final passage demonstrates how little empirical foundation there is to Chomskys
evolutionary theorizing:
Here Chomsky claims that even though there are many (unidentified) theories, everyone
believes that the mapping from the narrow syntax to the semantic interface is uniform for
every language. Not a single citation supports this sweeping claim. Further, how something
that is a mess could be the optimal solution to anything would have required detailed
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169-175), natural selection, and third factor reveal that he is also confused about the
intricacy of biological processes. In sum, while Chomsky requests that theorizing about
language evolution has to be done seriously and without pretense (p. 105) one sees that
Last not least, readers not familiar with language evolution research may conclude that all
work in this field is on the same level as Chomskys or even inferior. This is an entirely
wrong impression. Given the complexity of the subject matter and the lack of direct
behavior. But any serious proposal is supported by detailed hypotheses that are based on
careful analysis of available evidence (e.g., Deacon, 1997; Lieberman, 2006; Tomasello,
2008; Botha & Knight, 2009; Bickerton, 2009; Hurford, 2011; Arbib, 2012). The line
drawn, and in debates between opposing views the focus is on facts and evidence (e.g.,
contributions to Christiansen & Kirby 2003; Tallerman, 2005; Sampson, Gil & Trudgill,
2009; Tallerman & Gibson, 2012). It goes without saying that careful scientific analysis
and serious engagement with alternative views requires more writing than dismissals based
on allegations of irrationality. Hence, it is a lot less surprising than Chomsky implies, that
from the volume of this literature alone that the field has a highly irrational approach to
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3.2. Distorting the work of others
One of the most troubling aspects of The Science of Language is that Chomsky and
McGilvray repeatedly distort the work of others even though it has to be assumed that they
are aware that the accounts they give are incorrect. I defend this serious allegation by
Dan Lassiter published in 2008 (when he was a doctoral student at NYU) a paper in Mind
607). If Chomsky thought that this project was unsuccessful, he should have provided
factual criticism. Instead, he accuses Lassiter (whom he only calls this guy) of defending
a crazy theory of Michael Dummett. As discussed in the review, on the contrary, Lassiter
does not defend but attacks Dummett. Anyone who had read the paper would have hardly
missed that.
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Chomsky could have missed this explicit point only if he did not read the entire paper.
Criticizing work he has not read would be irresponsible. However, the situation is worse.
McGilvray replies to Chomskys enraged comment about some guy defending Dummetts
crazy theory:
Even though Lohndal & Narita (2009) is found in the bibliography (from which Lassiter
(2008) is missing), McGilvray claims he does not know if it will be published. Further,
these authors acknowledge that they are indebted to Noam Chomsky, Jim McGilvray, and
Paul Pietroski for valuable comments and advise (sic) on this piece (Lohndal & Narita,
2009, p. 231). Given that this paper deals virtually exclusively with Lassiters arguments,
Chomsky and McGilvray could not have provided valuable comments, had they not been
familiar with the relevant details of Lassiter (2008) long before The Science of Language
went in press.
Lohndal and Narita allege that Lassiters arguments are flawed and based on a serious
attempts with little hope of scientific achievement (Lohndal & Narita, 2009, p. 321). At
one point the authors acknowledge that Lassiter holds that the philosophically dominant
tradition of semantic externalism (led by people like Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, Michael
Dummett, and David Lewis) can [not provide] a linguistic theory that incorporates
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(Ibid., p. 322). However, they also frequently conflate Lassiters view with externalism
(e.g., his alleged theory is just another instantiation of externalism, p. 323; He fails to
In 2010 Lassiter published a reply to Lohndal & Narita (2009) defending his account and
(Lassiter 2008: 611-617) (Lassiter, 2010, p. 138). The further details of the dispute are
irrelevant here. Striking is that at the time of publication of The Science of Language
Lassiters original paper and his reply to Lohndal & Narita (2009) had been available to
Chomsky. In both, Lassiter states clearly and unambiguously that he objects to Dummett-
style externalism. One cannot plausibly assume that Chomsky was unable to understand
This would be a reprehensible act no matter who commits it. But given the status and
Also relevant here are the grounds on which Chomsky defends semantic internalism:
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This argument is supposed to show that children could not have learned the concept
study the conditions under which children impute intentionality to objects. But Chomsky
does not cite any such work. Instead, he derives his data from a fairytale. It is of course not
surprising that his grandchildren could not have learned from experience with the actual
world that donkeys turning into rocks and back into donkeys retain their psychic continuity.
But this hardly establishes that they must have an innate concept of the nature suggested.
Further, Chomsky claims based on the same case study that for other cultures the
basic properties [of concepts] are just identical (p. 27, original emphasis). Throwing in the
additional example of river, Chomsky claims that all infants in all cultures recognize
continuity of objects that change their appearance: these things are there. They show up
in every language; whether they are there independently of language, we have no way of
knowing. We dont have any way of studying them (Ibid., emphasis added). Without
providing any evidence he claims that every human being shares the continuity of identity
concept and that we cannot study these matters. Chomsky provides exclusively arguments
of the donkey-tale quality to support his own view; yet, he calls the views of others crazy.
Chomsky advocates superior ethical standards, writing that we need consciousness raising:
get people to recognize that theres nothing natural about domestic abuse, for example (pp.
119-20). There is also nothing natural about distorting the view of ones opponent to
and about creating the impression of having conducted a massive amount of research
without providing any citation of specific results from this research. The failure of
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Chomskys writings to conform to serious standards of scientific and academic practice
contrasts strikingly with his preaching about ethical standards and consciousness raising.
misunderstanding, or willful distortion. Consulting the relevant literature can eliminate the
first and likely the second of these reasons. In the case discussed below neither Chomsky
nor McGilvray have the questionable excuse of being unaware of this literature.
In July 2009 it has been brought to their attention that the letter from which McGilvray
(Behme, 2009). The authors were provided with several papers by Elman showing clearly
that his work had been misrepresented. In The Science of Language McGilvray cites these
papers in a footnote, which must be taken as indication that he has read them. Nevertheless,
he claims in that footnote Chomsky was wrong to think that the view is expressed in a
single paper (p. 226) and continues to support the incorrect conclusions Chomsky draws
Anyone who has read the papers knows that the view is not expressed in them. Elman has
not claimed that his method works just as well on [nesting and] crossing dependencies
(Chomsky, p. 226). Instead, the papers cited explicitly report differences in performance:
given the prediction task, the network is more successful at right-branching structures
than center-embedded ones6 (Weckerly & Elman, 1992, p. 414, see also below). One
6
It should be noted that Chomsky and Elman use terminology differently. Elman draws a distinction between
(i) left/right branching and (ii) center embedding. Chomsky calls both nested dependencies: The examples
23
important fining of this work was that it showed that the networks performance parallels
that of human listeners (Ibid., p. 418). It is not relevant here whether this conclusion is
Further, Chomsky claims, [Elmans] program works up to depth two but fails totally on
Elman does not say that his program fails totally at level three but that representations
degrade. Further, he specifically states that at that level are differences for sentences
involving different types of recursive structures. One could, of course, question these
findings and/or the conclusions Elman draws from his work. But neither Chomsky nor
I've seen of what they call center embedding are nested dependencies, usually self-embedded. These are
the terms from the literature in mathematical linguistics. If they want to refer to nesting as right-branching
dependency, thats OK, though pointless terminological confusion (Chomsky, p.c., 5th August 2009).
Chomsky further claimed: Their [Elman et al., CB] results are negative because they do not distinguish these
from the very rare and marginal crossing dependencies. The Dutch cases are the ones I was referring to. They
are very marginal, and are understood involve special rules and properties, hence do not belong in this
discussion apart from footnotes, at least if it is intended to be a contribution to science (Ibid.). This
supercilious dismissal is problematic for at least two reasons. First, Elman never made claims regarding
crossing dependencies. Given that it has been known for a long time that human speakers have more
difficulties processing center embeddings than right branching structures (e.g., (Blaubergs & Braine, 1974;
Blumenthal, 1966; Blumenthal & Boakes, 1967; Cairns, 1970; Fodor & Garrett, 1967; Larkin & Burns, 1977;
Marks, 1968; Miller & Isard, 1964; Schlesinger, 1968 cited by Weckerly&Elman, 1992) he drew an explicit
distinction between these types of structures which Chomsky lumps under the term nested dependencies.
Second, work by Christiansen (1994) on crossing dependencies showed that these are processed similarly to
center embeddings. This might be surprising given that the latter are so rare in human language. Discussing
the implications of this work in detail would of course be desirable. But the blanket dismissal of a caricature
of Elmans work does not contribute to a better understanding of how humans process language.
24
misinterpretation. In addition, explicitly referring to the added references may well create
the entirely wrong impression that Chomskys interpretation is based on Elmans work.
Such deception violates generally accepted scientific conduct. It also makes one wonder
about the sincerity of Chomskys writings about morality: If you regard yourself as a
moral agent youre trying to think about your actions, or plans, or ideas that might make
human life better (p. 101). Any moral agent has an obligation to think about the
It has been suggested repeatedly that I took things out of context, selected only examples
that supported my conclusion, and ignored those that would undermine it. I have two
replies to this allegation. First, the examples I discussed in the review should not have
appeared in any published academic volume called The Science of Language, far less in
one by the celebrated intellectual leader of linguistics. Second, these examples are no
exceptions in an otherwise flawless volume but representative of the quality of the work.
Science of Language contains numerous allegations that researchers outside the Chomskyan
framework are irrational (e.g., Its a highly irrational approach to inquiry (p. 20),
25
thats not a contribution to scientific rationality (p. 105), a tribute to human
irrationality (p. 116), Thats just irrational (p. 123)) but none of these criticisms are
based on analysis of specific work. Instead, denigration of the work of mostly unnamed
If you look at the articles in the technical journals, such as, say,
Science or Nature, most of them are pretty descriptive; they pick
around the edges of a topic, or something like that. And if you get
outside the hard-core natural sciences, the idea that you should
actually construct artificial situations in an effort to understand the
world - well, that is considered either exotic or crazy. Take
linguistics. If you want to get a grant, what you say is I want to do
corpus linguistics - collect a huge mass of data and throw a
computer at it, and maybe something will happen. That was given
up in the hard sciences centuries ago. Galileo had no doubt about
the need for focus and idealization when constructing a theory.
(Chomsky, p. 19)
This description stands in stark contrast to how work in biology, the science in which
Chomsky locates linguistics, is usually described. Scientists and funding agencies are aware
that data collection cannot be divorced from theory construction: Of necessity, both the
interpretation of experimental data and the design of new experiments depend on extensive
and sophisticated theoretical analysis of the possible relationships that can be brought into
consistency (or inconsistency) with the data at hand (Fox-Keller, 2002, p. 236). It is, of
course, possible that some work might be of questionable value, and in some cases projects
might get funded because they are data oriented. But Chomsky condemns a whole field
In addition to unsupported accusations, Chomsky repeatedly makes assertions that are not
mutually consistent. At times, the members of such incoherent sets are contained in a single
answer:
26
If somebody can tell me what a general learning mechanism is, we
can discuss the question. But if you cant tell me what it is, then
theres nothing to discuss. So lets wait for a proposal. Hilary
Putnam, for example, has argued for years that you can account for
cognitive growth, language growth and so on, by general learning
mechanisms. Fine, lets see one.
Actually, there is some work on this which is not uninteresting.
Charles Yang's (2004) work in which he tries to combine a rather
sensible and sophisticated general learning mechanism with the
principles of Universal Grammar, meaning either the first or the
third factor - we don't really know, but something other than
experience - and tries to show how by integrating those two
concepts you can account for some interesting aspects of language
growth and development. I think thats perfectly sensible.
Here Chomsky asserts simultaneously (i) that he is unaware of any sensible account of
general learning mechanisms and (ii) that Yangs work concerns a sensible and
different definitions of learning mechanisms in mind when he talked about Putnams and
Yangs work. But he specifies any relevant difference and, McGilvray, a professional
philosopher, did not ask for clarification but accepted an incoherent set of assertions.
It seems the only criterion Chomsky applies consistently is claiming work that is done in
his framework is superior, scientific, and rational while any other work is inferior,
27
any other proposal, you evaluate it in terms of its theoretical
achievements and empirical consequences. It happens to be quite
easy in this case, because theyre almost nonexistent. (Chomsky,
2012, p. 67)
Again, it is remarkable McGilvray accepts this argument without any questioning. What
are these few things? How does the complexity of connections between actual neurons
differ from that of the models Chomsky never identifies? Why is abstracting away from
physical reality problematic when done by connectionists but a hallmark of good science
when done by Chomsky? Recall that he advocates: abstracting away from the whole
mass of data that interests the linguist who wants to work on a particular language (p. 84).
This abstracting had been justified by Chomsky because Galileo had no doubt about the
need for focus and idealization when constructing a theory (p. 19). So one is implicitly
told to accept, without any evidence, that Chomsky can know that his abstractions aim in
Finally, one finds: But, like any other proposal, you evaluate it in terms of its theoretical
achievements and empirical consequences. It happens to be quite easy in this case, because
theyre almost nonexistent. Chomsky never reveals what the proposal is. Connectionism is
a complex field that cannot be reduced to one proposal. Claiming that an entire field lacks
challenges Postals judgment of a passage from Chomsky (2002) as the most irresponsible
2009; for details see Postal, 2004, chapter 11). And this entirely unsupported claim is not
28
5. Chomskys contributions
linguistics, before launching into such harsh criticism of one work. Given the extensive
literature celebrating Chomskys work (e.g., Leiber, 1975; DAgostino, 1986; Salkie, 1990;
Barsky, 1997; Smith, 1999; McGilvray, 2005; Sperlich, 2006; Collins, 2008) this seemed
an odd request. But, given the severe criticism that emerged especially after the publication
of the minimalist program (e.g., Pullum, 1996; Johnson & Lappin, 1997; Culicover, 1999;
Lappin et al., 2000; Levine & Postal, 2004; Postal, 2004, 2012a,b, 2014; Seuren, 2004;
than Chomsky, and, certainly one would expect him to make a strong case for the value of
his work. When McGilvray asked him about his intellectual contributions Chomsky
JM: Noam, let me ask about what you take to be your most
important contributions. Do you want to say anything about that?
NC: Well, I think that the idea of studying language in all its variety
as a biological object ought to become a part of future science - and
the recognition that something very similar has to be true of every
other aspect of human capacity. The idea that - there was talk of this
in Aspects, but I didnt really spell it out - the belief ...
[Wait; Ill start over. B. F.] Skinners observation is correct that the
logic of behaviorism and the logic of evolution are very similar -
that observation is correct. But I think his conclusion - and the
conclusion of others - is wrong. Namely, that that shows hat theyre
both correct. Rather, it shows that they're both incorrect, because
the logic of behaviorism doesnt work for growth and development,
and for the same reason, the notion of natural selection is only
going to work in a limited way for evolution. So there are other
29
factors. As I said in Aspects, theres certainly no possibility of
thinking that what a child knows is based on a general procedure
applied to experience, and theres also no reason to assume that the
genetic endowment is just the result of various different things that
happen to have happened in evolutionary history. There must be
further factors involved - the kind that Turing [in his work on
morphogenesis] was looking for, and others were and are looking
for. And the idea that maybe you can do something with that notion
is potentially important. It's now more or less agreed that you can
do something with that notion for, say, bacteria. If you can also do
something with it for the most recent - and by some dimension most
complex - outcomes of evolutionary history like language, that
would suggest that maybe it holds all the way through. (p. 76)
At first glance this passage seems to hint at a wide variety of research activity. But how
much of this research has been carried out by Chomsky? He was asked about his most
important contributions. Had a student in one of my classes given that answer I would have
failed her. Where is any reference to his technical innovations that have set and re-set
theoretical agendas for those who share his general perspective and provided a considerable
input, if only in the form of novel observations, for those who favour different frameworks?
vague and confused comments about evolution and biology. He only mentions one of his
many publication (Aspects) but not for its contributions to linguistics. Many in his intended
audience who are unfamiliar with aspects must go away from this passage thinking it was a
During his career Chomsky has undoubtedly talked a lot about language as biological
object but he has never done any research in biology and certainly has made no
contribution to work on, say, bacteria. Further, it is misleading to imply that Chomsky has
[Chomsky] has not specified a single physical property of any linguistic object (Postal,
30
2009, p. 113, original emphasis). The language centers in the brain (Broca area, Wernicke
area, etc.) and genes (FOXP2) involved in language processing were discovered prior to or
intellectual contribution to the idea that: theres also no reason to assume that the genetic
endowment is just the result of various different things that happen to have happened in
evolutionary history. He attributes this insight (that there must be further factors
genuinely Chomskyan contributions are some unspecified talk in Aspects that never got
spelled out and the refutation of Skinnerian behaviourism. These contributions date back
more than 45 years and are best described as contributions to psychology. This leaves
Chomsky, by his own account, without any important specifically linguistic contribution.
Even more startling than this admission is McGilvrays reaction. He does not remind
Chomsky that the reader would benefit from a detailed account of the contributions that
Chomsky has made in the 1950s, which resulted in a new-orientation of linguistics. Instead,
he suggests vaguely Chomskys work led to pretty radical progress [because] were
actually at the stage now where we can begin to ask for language the old question, Why
are things the way they are? (McGilvray, p. 77, emphasis added). Celebrating the arrival at
a stage where we can begin to ask an old question, as radical progress, would be unusual
under any circumstances. But, Chomsky already had announced that we were in a position
31
fundamental question of how experience and maturational processes
interrelate within the framework of innate limiting conditions to
yield the linguistic competence exhibited by a normal speaker of a
language (Chomsky, 1966, p. ix, emphasis added)
Here Chomsky spoke of success that had been achieved and advances that made it possible
to formulate precise questions. McGilvray, who has edited two subsequent editions of
Cartesian Linguistics, could not have been unaware of the fact that what he calls radical
discovery; critics of Chomskys work wrote years ago: [Chomskys] claims and promises
made during the early years of his academic activityhave over time largely proved to be
wrong or without real content and the promises unfulfilled (Levine & Postal, 2004, p.
203).
In the passage cited Chomsky seems to agree, and other answers confirm the impression
that early promises remain unfulfilled, and that lasting contributions to linguistics are
unidentifiable. When McGilvray asks about the strong minimalist thesis, currently the
Maybe its even true (p. 54). However, this is followed by 237 words of speculation
about interfaces, the Norman Conquest, mapping constraints, and new questions (but no
Its interesting that people have expectations for language that they
never have in biology. Ive been working on Universal Grammar
for all these years; can anyone tell you precisely how it works [-
how it develops into a specific language, not to mention how that
language that develops is used]? Its hopelessly complicated. Can
anyone tell you how an insect works? Theyve been working on a
project at MIT for thirty years on nematodes. You know the very
few [302] neurons; you know the wiring diagram. But how does the
animal work? We dont know that. (Chomsky, 2012, p. 54)
32
It was of course Chomsky, who substantially raised the expectations for linguistic work by
setting a very ambitious research agenda: The study of language form will ultimately find
its place in a broader framework that will incorporate considerations of meaning and use,
just as the study of grammar will ultimately find its place in a richer investigation of how
knowledge of language is acquired (Chomsky, 1972, p. 119). Four decades later, Chomsky
admits that how language develops and is used is hopelessly complicated. In other
words, his work has not advanced our understanding of the creative aspect of language use
[which he had made] a central concern of linguistics (Chomsky, 1966, p. 72). Nor has he
given by now a sharp and clear formulation of some of the central questions of psychology
and [brought] a mass of evidence to bear on them (Chomsky, 1968, p. 59) as promised
decades ago.
Instead of taking responsibility, Chomsky claims that no one can tell us how an insect
works. Linguists are not comparative zoologists, so what is known about insects seems
irrelevant to linguistics. Further, if Chomsky considers the biology of species only distantly
related to humans so important for linguistics, it is curious that he apparently does not care
about the fact that nematodes are not insects but roundworms. For biologists it is not
surprising that the work of his MIT colleagues (likely on the model organism
Caenorhabditis elegans) does not reveal how insects work. So this diversion not only
fails to establish that we should not expect any results from linguistic work, it also reveals
Chomskys disregard for, or ignorance of, basic facts of biology; a discipline he claims to
The idea that basically theres one organism, that the difference
between an elephant and a fly is just the rearrangement of the
33
timing of some fixed regulatory mechanisms. It looks more and
more like it. Theres deep conservation; you find the same thing in
bacteria that you find in humans. Theres even a theory now thats
taken seriously that theres a universal genome. Around the
Cambrian explosion, that one genome developed and every
organisms a modification of it. (Chomsky, 2012, p. 53, emphasis
added)
No argument is given that the difference between fly and elephant can be reduced
language faculty, whatever similarities they share with humans is irrelevant to linguistics.
Finally, Chomsky never provides details about a theory or reveals who takes it seriously.
The fact that some theory exists and is taken seriously by some people does not tell us much
about its credibility. For example Michael Behe proposed a theory of irreducible
complexity, which is taken seriously by many creationists. That does not make it a
respectable scientific theory. Any biologist who wants to be taken seriously would provide
detailed arguments in support of the widely rejected speculation that theres a universal
genome.
In some cases it is difficult to discern what could have been the motivation for Chomskys
answers. McGilvray had asked if we want to allow that proving useful is not a condition of
determine the general shape of the properties of creatures, it doesnt say that you cant build
submarines (p. 137). I leave it to others to speculate how the building of submarines might
Some of the research projects Chomsky envisions seem similarly bizarre: An interesting
topic that should be addressed some day is that our internal speech is very likely fragments
of re-internalized external speech, and the real inner speech is very likely inaccessible to
34
introspection (p. 12). Before even contemplating how this interesting topic could be
addressed, one wonders why evolution would have equipped us with such a completely
unnecessary epicycle. The obscure and contentless character of such remarks is typical of
9. Deep problems
Pesestsky (2013) claims that the scientific community is largely ignorant of work by
generative linguists. Given the problems I have discussed, one almost hopes he is partly
right, and not too many scientists have read Chomskys recent work. But, given that
Chomsky is the best-known linguist, one must assume that especially non-linguists would
read his books before they read any other work by linguists. Any scientist who has read The
Science of Language will notice its dubious quality and must wonder why such work is
apparently7 still held in the highest esteem by many generative linguists. And even if
readers of The Science of Language would not be discouraged from reading works by other
linguists, they would find barely any reference to recent linguistics work in the
bibliography.
7
I use the qualifier apparently because the lack of published criticism of Chomskys recent publications by
prominent generativists (e.g., Pesetsky, Nevins, Hornstein, Freidin) does not necessarily imply that they hold
his work in high esteem. However, given that the same generativists have expressed scathing criticism of
work by others, one cannot rule out that the appearance is correct. It would be up to those (and other)
generativists to make their position regarding the value of Chomskys recent work clear, especially to the
general public.
35
In his 2013 LSA keynote address Pesetsky had listed discoveries by generative
sytnacticians he considered so exceptional that, in a better world, they would receive front-
page attention:
It may be indeed regrettable that this work does not receive more attention from non-
linguists. But, one certainly would expect that such allegedly ground breaking work is
discussed in a volume titled The Science of Language. Yet, when McGilvray asked
specifically what the most important intellectual contributions are, Chomskys reply
contained no trace of the putatively important work of the linguists Pesetsky lists. None of
the authors is cited in reference section of the volume nor do their names appear in the
index. This absence could possibly be explained by such an abundance of important recent
work that Chomsky focused on a sample different from Pesetskys. However, the only
argument from the seventies that c-command didnt involve linearity, just hierarchy (p.
36
Given Chomskys undisputed status as leader of the generativist movement, no one would
be in a better position to educate the allegedly ignorant editors and reviewers of journals
like Science or Nature about this work. If Pesetsky considers it unacceptable that the
marvelous work of [his] colleagues and students languishes in even firmer obscurity than
before (Pesetsky, 2013, slide 109), he might ask Chomsky why reference to this work is
entirely absent from his discussion, one that no doubt aims at popularizing the
achievements of generative grammar. Why is the reader exposed to endless musings about
molds, nematodes, insects, frogs, chickens, dogs, baboons, to fairy tales about baby
donkeys, and to obscure third factor invocations relating human languages to snowflakes?
Why is Chomsky suggesting that we ought to be abstracting away from the whole mass of
data that interests the linguist who wants to work on a particular language (p. 84) instead
Pesetsky has expressed his frustration about the fact that papers by generative linguists in
high profile science journals are devoid of specifically linguistic content: None of these
papers, in their published form, contain any linguistic theory, any linguistic analysis or any
significant set of linguistic facts (Pesetsky, 2013, 105). It is easy to understand his
frustration. What is harder to understand is that he does not express similar frustration
about the fact that none of the recent books by Chomsky contain any linguistic theory, any
linguistic analysis or any significant set of linguistic facts. It is possible that the editors of
science journals insisted to remove linguistic content from publications. But it is hardly
37
possible to imagine an editor more sympathetic to Chomsky and the work done in
advertise linguistics to the general public and remedy the deep problem Pesetsky
identifies: Most educated people have never encountered linguistics, and have no idea
what it might even mean to examine a linguistic puzzle scientifically (Pesetsky, 2013,
slide 120). Yet, how could the interested reader get an idea about how exciting linguistics is
This eclectic collection of jargon might be informative for some generative linguists. But
how are most educated people who have never encountered any linguistics supposed to
comprehend this passage? Again, Pesetsky has excellent advice to offer: its hard work
figuring out a way to make your discovery understandable to someone who knows nothing.
Prepare for that! (Pesetsky, 2013, slide 120). It is regrettable that, apparently, this advice
Postscript
38
Since the first publication of this review several works have appeared, documenting in great
detail that Chomskys linguistic work has been deeply flawed for decades, that he made
knowingly false claims, and that he failed to respond to legitimate criticism (e.g., Postal,
2012b, 2014). These works establish that the problems discussed above are no isolated late
career incidences. Instead, several of Chomskys proposals across the decades from 1962-
2002 [have been] thorough instantiations of the concept play acting at linguistics
(Postal, 2012b, p.1). For example, in 1964 Chomsky proposed a universal grammar
principle later referred to as A-over-A principle. This principle was shown to be untenable
by Ross (1967/86), and Chomsky (1972) acknowledged in print that the problems raised by
Ross were legitimate. Postal documents that the A-over-A principle never had the status of
a legitimate universal grammar principle. Yet, for decades Chomsky used the A-over-A
especially non-linguistic audiences about the status of this purported universal principle.
The accusations made by Postal are severe: [Chomsky] was simply deliberately deceiving
had to know that he had not! (p. 8, original emphasis), [Chomsky] simply lied to his
nonlinguist interviewers Schenker and Mehta, and slightly less directly, to all of the many
readers of these interviews (p. 9), [Chomskys] failure to mention these issues of course
helped disguise the failures of his proposal (p. 10), [Chomsky] was deliberately falsifying
the scientific status of his theoretical claims (p. 11), an attempt to gull a partially
function (p. 16), , [Chomsky] gratuitously and falsely denigrate[d] the work of one of
39
[his] own students just to make [his] own seem more important (p. 31). Postal concludes
that from the point of Ross (1967 [1986]) on, talk of the A- over-A Principle was mostly
disgraceful, self-promotional pretense, scorning any element of genuine integrity (p. 32)
and emphasizes the truly ludicrous quality of the thirty year plus long series of invocations
Chomsky has a well-deserved reputation for responding to criticism of his work with fierce
counterattacks, often implying his critics are not able to understand his work: Lakoff
presents a very confused picture of the issues that have been under discussion [and is]
confused beyond repair (Chomsky, 1973). [Cooper] has, however, ... seriously confused
the issues (Chomsky & Katz, 1975, p. 71). McCawley has missed the point of my
remarks (Chomsky, 1980b, p. 47). The post-1979 shift that Pullum perceives is
(Chomsky, 1990, p. 147). Godfrey-Smith cites only the last phrase quoted, misreading it
as ... exactly the opposite of what the passage unambiguously states (Chomsky, 1995, p.
2), [Putnams] argument might hold if one could make some sense of it; such an
argument would not however, be relevant here, even if it could be given in some coherent
form (Chomsky, 2000, p. 66), [Dennetts] report of informal discussion, several years
ago, on which his account is in part based, seems to me rather misleading, to say the least
(Chomsky, 2000, p. 200), [Deacon seemed to] reshape standard problems of science as
utter mysteries, placing them beyond any hope of understanding, while barring the
procedures of rational inquiry that have been taken for granted for hundreds of years
40
In addition, Chomsky has questioned the mental fitness of intellectual opponents:
2009, p. 342), Arguments of the sort that Matthews presents are unfortunately all too
common in the linguistic literature. They are based on assumptions that can only be
regarded as pathological (Chomsky, 1986, p. 149), and even compared them to criminals
that might be appropriate to some criminal (Chomsky, 1984, cited in Hill, 2007, p. 636). It
is curious that a man who tolerates as little disagreement with his position as Chomsky
were published in recent years. Has Chomsky mellowed in his attacks of opponents? There
In a recent response to Margaret Bodens (2006) work Chomsky wrote: virtually every
reference to me or to (unidentified) co-workers around the world, and to the areas in which
we work, is fanciful, sometimes even bringing to mind Paulis famous observation not
even wrong (Chomsky, 2007). He called her work an ugly insult to hundreds of serious
and productive researchers (Ibid) and suggested that [h]er conception of an argument,
repeatedly, is to quote someone who agrees with her judgments. QED. It doesnt matter
what the facts are (Ibid). Chomskys rebuttals of Boden rarely rise above invective and
reveal astounding hypocrisy. He claims repeatedly she fails to provide any evidence for her
claims, especially that she fails to name the targets of her criticism: participants in the vast
Chomskyan conspiracy -- vilified, but unnamed (Ibid.). Yet, his rebuttals contain several
41
references to (allegedly) hostile critics and colleagues without naming them: she dismisses
[Chomskys theory of minimalism, CB] as risible (on the basis of a quote from a hostile
critic). It cannot be risible, because it does not exist (Ibid). Here an unnamed hostile critic
is accused of gross incompetence. The reader has no means to verify Chomskys charge,
and can only wonder why this is not an ugly insult, especially since it has been uttered by
someone who claims that We apply to ourselves the same standards we apply to others
In the current context, it is irrelevant, whether Chomskys allegations against Boden (and
unnamed hostile critics/colleagues) are true. Of interest is that he reacted swiftly and
ferociously to criticism of his work. So, one has to ask why he has remained silent in face
of Postals repeated and very explicit criticisms (e.g., Postal 2004, 2009, 2012a,b). One
reason could be that Postals criticism was not severe enough to warrant a reply. Only a
cursory reading of the Boden rebuttal rules out this possibility. Consider:
Here Chomsky calls Bodens assertion that he was driven by political passion a serious
charge. There is no necessary connection between ones political passion and the quality of
ones scientific work. It only becomes a problem if one promotes scientific work of inferior
quality for political reasons. But Boden never claimed that Skinners behaviourism was
42
superior to Chomskys framework. So the serious charge is considerably less severe than
Postals charges listed above. In addition, Postal has claimed in print that Chomskys work
is a mixture of intellectual and scholarly corruption (Postal, 2009, 247) and stated
explicitly that he considers Chomskys framework incorrigibly flawed: my view is that not
only is there no such thing as bio-linguistics as this term is understood in the work
Chomsky has influenced, there cannot be such a thing (Ibid. p. 248, original emphasis).
Possibly, then, Chomsky never replied to Postal because he considers his allegations to be
entirely false, and unworthy of any attention. His refutation of Boden rules out this
The 1959 article has not even the remotest hint of any political
concern. Bodens evidence about a political agenda comes from a
more general article on psychology and ideology many years later
that dealt in part with Skinners Beyond Freedom and Dignity.
Since Skinners book had a very explicit political agenda, my
review, like every other one, saw it in political terms. The charge
that my linguistic work reflects a political agenda is repeated
throughout, on the basis of her usual source: quotes from a hostile
critic, backed by no evidence. Readers may judge for themselves
the intent of these fabrications. (Chomsky, 2007)
Again, it is not relevant whether Chomskys reply is factually correct. He holds that
Bodens claims are false, calls them fabrications, backed by no evidence. Yet, he replies
to her charges in print. Postals charges are backed by massive evidence, consisting mostly
of citations from Chomskys work. They are far more serious than any of Bodens charges.
Yet, Chomsky never replied in print. Undeniably, he has a right to remain silent. But this
43
silence leaves unimpeded the inference that he has not attempted a refutation [of Postal,
CB] because he cannot (Postal, 2009, p. 248). Leaving this inference unimpeded seems to
be a more severe problem for those promoting the Chomskyan framework than any
problems listed by Pesetsky (2013). And yet it continues to remain unaddressed by either
44
Acknowledgements:
I am greatly indebted to Avery Andrews, Michael Arbib, Derek Bickerton, Paul Bloom,
Rudie Botha, Ted Briscoe, Morten Christiansen, Patricia Churchland, Michael Corballis,
Peter Culicover, Stanley Dubinsky, Shimon Edelman, Jeff Elman, Dan Everett, Dan Flage,
Susan Fred Schmerling, Jim Hurford, Ray Jackendoff, David Johnson, Dan Lassiter, Robert
Levine, Philip Lieberman, Brian MacWhinney, Robert Martin, Frederick Newmeyer, David
Papineau, Paul Postal, Michael Studdert-Kennedy, Geoffrey Sampson, Pieter Seuren,
Maggie Tallerman, Michael Tomasello, and Virginia Valian for very helpful replies to my
inquiries and for commenting on earlier drafts. Further gratitude is owed to editor Robert
Borsley and two very patient reviewers of Journal of Linguistics. All remaining errors are
mine.
45
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