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EN BANC
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN G.R. No. 211362

JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine
Military Academy, represented by Present:
his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who
also acts on his own behalf, and SERENO, CJ,
BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, CARPIO,
Petitioners, VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,*
PERALTA,
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE BERSAMIN,
PHILIPPINE MILITARY DEL CASTILLO,
ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR VILLARAMA, JR.,
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF PEREZ,
THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and MENDOZA,
the CADET REVIEW AND REYES,
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), PERLAS-BERNABE,
Respondents. LEONEN, and
x----------------------------------------------x JARDELEZA,** JJ
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of
CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN Promulgated:
JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her own
behalf,
Petitioner-Intervenor. Februarv 24, 2015
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal

commitment to uphold what is morally and ethically righteous at the most
critical and trying times, and at the most challenging circumstances. When
a cadet must face a dilemma between what is true and right as against his
security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is
his honor and those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable
character does not think twice and chooses the fore. This is the essence of
.. On leave .
t7
No part.
Decision -2- G.R. No. 211362
and the Spirit of the Honor Code it is championing truth and

righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of ones basic rights and
privileges.1
The Procedural Antecedents
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for
himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia
(Cadet 1CL Cudia), and Berteni Catalua Causing filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for extremely urgent
temporary restraining order (TRO).2
In a Resolution dated March 17, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for
TRO and, instead, required respondents to file their comment on the
petition.3
On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf
of her son Cadet 1CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave to intervene, attaching
thereto the petition-in-intervention.4 Per Resolution dated March 31, 2014,
the Court granted the motion and resolved to await respondents comment
on the petition.5
A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014,

recommending the admission of the petition-in-intervention and adopting it
as an integral part of their petition.6 On May 20, 2014, petitioner-intervenor
filed a manifestation with motion for leave to admit the Final Investigation
Report of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7
The Report8 was relative to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by the
spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for themselves and in
behalf of their son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC) members and
Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet 1CL
Cudias rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.
Subsequently, on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a motion for leave to adopt
1
The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 7 (Rollo, p. 156).
2
Rollo, pp. 3-31.
3
Id. at 48.
4
Id. at 49-117.
5
Id. at 204.
6
Id. at 209-213.
7
Id. at 222-235.
8
Id. at 236-266.
9
Maj. Gracilla is the Intelligence and Operations Officer of the PMA. Allegedly, on February 25,
2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia saw a recording device taped at the wall and covered by a blanket in an adjacent
room where he was staying at while in the PMA Holding Center (Rollo, pp. 257-258, 261-262, 477).
the submission of the CHR Report.10 The manifestation was granted and the
motion was noted by the Court in its Resolution dated July 7, 2014.
After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed

their Consolidated Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a motion, petitioner-
intervenor filed a Reply, which was later adopted by petitioners.13 Submitted
as Annex A of the Reply was a copy of the CHR Resolution dated May
22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted
the same on August 11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to

submit the case for early resolution,15 which the Court noted in a Resolution
dated August 11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.16
The Facts
Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the
PMA, the countrys premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del
Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the A Company and was the Deputy
Baron of his class. As claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor
(hereinafter collectively called petitioners, unless otherwise indicated), he
was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the
Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned
as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air
Force 1CL cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research
(OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI
Room. Per published schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the
4th period class in OR432 was from 1:30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while
the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th
period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1CL Cudia
because he was [l]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x.17
10
Rollo, pp. 273-277.
11
Id. at 204-213, 217-221, 267-272.
12
Id. at 282-337.
13
Id. at 383-452, 522-525.
14
Id. at 453-497.
15
Id. at 509-519.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 32, 150, 366.
Cadets 1CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela
Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.18
On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical

Officers. They were logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical
Officers (CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days later,
Cadet 1CL Cudia received his DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL

Cudia reasoned out that: I came directly from OR432 Class. We were
dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir.19
On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj.

Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1CL Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11
demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet 1CL Cudia clarified with
Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of the
punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who
responded that she never dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss
the class 10-15 minutes earlier than scheduled. When he expressed his
intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the punishment, he was
advised to put the request in writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1CL
Cudia addressed his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to
Maj. Benjamin L. Leander, Senior Tactical Officer (STO), asserting:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th

period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412,
started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next
class without any intention of being late Sir.20
A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his

comments on the request of Cadet 1CL Cudia and to indicate if there were
other cadets belonging to the same section who were also late.
On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj.

Leander pointing out that, based on his investigation, the 4th period class was
not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty imposed.
Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1CL Cudia came to know of the denial of his
request only on January 24, 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.
18
Id. at 338.
19
Id. at 150.
20
Id. at 34, 139.
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia was
informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for violation of the
Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal,
stating that his 4th period class ended at 1500H that made him late in the
succeeding class.22
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol

(Cadet 1CL Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet
1CL Cudia learned that it was based on Maj. Hindangs conversations with
their instructors and classmates as well as his statement in the request for
reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He then verbally applied for and was
granted an extension of time to answer the charge against him because Dr.
Costales, who could shed light on the matter, was on emergency leave.
On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet 1CL
Cudia, conveying:
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a
report dated november. When maj hindang ask me, no time referens.
(04:25:11 P.M.)
All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last
december. Whc i told, i wud presume they wil finish early bec its grp
work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23
The next day, Cadets 1CL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr.
Costales, who reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang were not in the same
time reference when the latter asked her.
Later, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the

Honor Report. He averred:
Sir,
We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class.

When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and
submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and Cadet 1cl
Arcangel asked for some query with regards (sic) to the deductions of our
21
The Honor Committee is a body of cadets who are entrusted by the Cadet Corps to preserve the
sanctity of the Honor Code and conduct the procedural aspect of the Honor System. It is composed of
representatives from the first, the second and the third classes in each company, the Chairman, the Vice-
Chairman, and the Cadet First Captain, who is an Ex-Officio member (The Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook, Series 2011, p. 29 [Rollo, p. 167]).
22
Rollo, pp. 35, 63, 120-121, 140, 247, 285.
23
Id. at 136.
previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered our question. She then told
me that she will give the copy of our section grade, so I waited at the
hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then she came out of the room and
gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I
immediately went to our 5th period class which is ENG412.
With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:
1. How could this be lying?

2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up to
that honor report)?
3. What are his assumptions?
I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be

reopened and carefully reviewed for I did not violate the honor
code/system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I intend to deceive?
Did I intend to take undue advantage?) and for the following reasons:
1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized
given the fact that no face-to-face personal conversation with Ms.
Costales was conducted to clarify what and when exactly was the
issue at hand.
2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation.
3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for
reconsideration of meted punishment) further supports my
explanation in my delinquency report.
4. My understanding of the duration of the CLASS covers not just
a lecture in a typical classroom instruction but includes every
transaction and communication a teacher does with her students,
especially that in our case some cadets asked for queries, and I am
given instruction by which (sic) were directly related to our
CLASS. Her transaction and communication with our other
classmates may have already ended but ours extended for a little
bit.
I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under

my instruction to wait, and the other cadets still have business with
me, it is reasonable enough for him to say that Our class was
dismissed a bit late (dealing with matter of seconds or a minute
particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)
And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended

on time (1500H).
(signed)
M. COSTALES
w/ attached certification
5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and

did not attempt to conceal anything that happened or I did.
6. Furthermore, CPT DULAWAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk
Company[,] and I had a conversation with regards (sic) to the same
matter for which he can give important points of my case.
7. Cadet 1cl DIAZ D Co can also stand as a witness that I waited

for Ms. Costales.24
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a

preliminary investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet 1CL
Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the investigating team and
was composed of Cadet 1CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1CL
Mogol, 1CL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL
Poncardas as members.25 Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary
Investigation Report recommending that the case be formalized.
The formal investigation against Cadet 1CL Cudia then ensued. The
Presiding Officer was Cadet 1CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine (9)
voting members were Cadets 1CL Jairus O. Fantin, 1CL Bryan Sonny S.
Arlegui, 1CL Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1CL Jeanelyn P. Cabrido, 1CL Shu-
Aydan G. Ayada, 1CL Dalton John G. Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Cario, Jr.,
2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as
recorders tasked to document the entire proceedings were 4CL Jennifer A.
Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus II.27 Those who observed the
trial were Cadets 1CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino,
Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL
Umaguing.28
The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and
lasted until early morning the next day. Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed of
the charge against him, as to which he pleaded Not Guilty. Among those
who testified were Cadet 1CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1CL
Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the hearing held on January
21, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia again appeared and was called to the witness
stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under
oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting
members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The
members cast their votes through secret balloting and submitted their
accomplished ballot sheets together with their written justification. The
result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Dalton John G. Lagura
(Cadet 1CL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order of HC
Chairman Cadet 1CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting members
24
Id. at 35-36, 140-141.
25
In the CHRs Final Investigation Report, those who acted as members of the preliminary
investigation team were Cadet 1CL Hasigan, 1CL Raguindin, 1CL Dag-uman, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua,
3CL Espejo, and Cdt Laturnas (Rollo, p. 253).
26
Rollo, p. 458. However, in the CHRs Final Investigation Report as well as the Final Investigation
Report of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, Cadet 1CL Bianchiheimer L. Edra was named as one
of the voting members instead of Cadet 1CL Jeanelyn P. Cabrido or Cadet 1CL Shu-Aydan G. Ayada
(Rollo, pp. 254, 339).
27
Rollo, pp. 254, 458.
28
Id. at 242, 470-471.
went inside a chamber adjoining the court room for further deliberation.
After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer announced
the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring
hours, was then informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of
violating the Honor Code. He was immediately placed in the PMA Holding
Center until the resolution of his appeal.
On January 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia filed a written appeal

addressed to the HC Chairman, the full text of which stated:
WRITTEN APPEAL
14 NOVEMBER 2013
This is when I was reported for Late for two (2) minutes in
Eng412 class, my explanation on this delinquency report when I received
it, is that Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly
from 4th period class... etc. Knowing the fact that in my delinquency
report, it is stated that ENG412 classes started 1500H and I am late for
two minutes, it is logical enough for I (sic) to interpret it as I came 1502H
during that class. This is the explanation that came into my mind that
time. (I just cannot recall the exact words I used in explaining that
delinquency report, but what I want to say is that I have no intention to be
late). In my statements, I convey my message as since I was not the only
one left in that class, and the instructor is with us, I used the term
CLASS, I used the word DISMISSED because I was under instruction
(to wait for her to give the section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales.
The other cadets (1CL MIRANDA, 1CL ARCANGEL) still have queries
and business with her that made me decide to use the word CLASS,
while the others who dont have queries and business with her (ex: 1CL
NARCISO and 1CL DIAZ) were also around.
Note:
The four named cadets were also reported late.
Reference: Para 171.0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal

Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)
It is stated in this reference that Cadets shall not linger in the

place of instruction after the section has been dismissed. EXCEPT when
told or allowed to do so by the instructor or by any competent authority
for official purposes.
The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two

bells rang (indicating the end of class hour, 1500H). I waited for her for
about 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made me to decide to
write a little bit late in my explanation. Truly, the class ENDED 1500H
but due to official purpose (instruction by Ms. Costales to wait) and the
conflict in academic schedule (to which I am not in control of the
circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H and 5th PD class 1500H-
1600H), and since Ms. Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I
used the word CLASS.
19 December 2013
I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11

Demerits and 13 Touring hours. Not because I dont want to serve
punishment, but because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction,
and believing that my reason is justifiable and valid, that is why I
approached our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify and ask
why it was awarded that day.
In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my

instructor and he even added that they have a protocol to dismiss the class,
15 minutes or 10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:
Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th
class without any intention of being late Sir.
These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my

delinquency report, in here, I specified the conflict in the schedule and
again, I have no intention to be late. After explaining it further with these
statements, my tactical officer said that since I was reported in a written
form, I should make an appeal in a written form. Thinking that he already
understood what I want to say, I immediately made an appeal that day
stating the words that I used in having conversation with him.29
Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24,

2014, wherein Dr. Costales attested:
1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with

Cadet CUDIA in making query about their latest grades in OR432
and/or results of UE1 outside the ACADS office. The following facts
may explain their queries on 14 November 2013:
a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.

b. That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are
informed during Thursday, either in class or posted grades in the
bulletin board (grades released was [sic] based on the previous
LEs: latest LE before UE was Decision Trees).
c. That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded due to
(sic) other cadets have not taken the UE. Cadets were allowed to
verify scores but not to look at the papers.
d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed Cadet
NARCISO and ARCANGEL verified grades. The two cadets said
that they verified something with me after the OR432 class and
they were with Cadet CUDIA. That the statements of the three (3)
cadets are all the same and consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.
29
Id. at 32-33, 137-138.
Decision - 10 - G.R. No. 211362
2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the
specific time that I dismissed the class. To this date, I [cannot] really
recall an account that is more than two (2) months earlier. According
to my records, there was a lecture followed by an LE during (sic) on
14 November 2013. To determine the time of my dismissal, maybe it
can be verified with the other members of class I was handling on that
said date.30
Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day,
January 24, as it found no reason to conduct a re-trial based on the
arguments and evidence presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim that the
written appeal was not acted upon until the filing of the petition-in-
intervention.32
From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the

Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted an informal review to check
the findings of the HC. During the course of the investigation, Prof. Berong
was said to have confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge of the HC that
classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or 1505H), and that Cadet 1CL
Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412, verified before the
Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and STO that the class started not
earlier than scheduled.
Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the

Formal Investigation Report to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for review.
The next day, the SJA found the report to be legally in order.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the

Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and recommended to Vice
Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation from the
PMA of Cadet 1CL Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code
(Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same
date, Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing
Cadet 1CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances
effective February 10, 2014 pending approval of his separation by the AFP-
GHQ, barring him from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and
not permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the PMA.33
Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation

to dismiss Cadet 1CL Cudia.
30
Id. at 37, 142, 149.
31
Id. at 340.
32
Id at. 68.
33
Id. at 143, 172, 199.
Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 211362
On February 13, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted a letter to the

Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting for reinstatement by the
PMA of his status as a cadet.34
Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee), the sister of Cadet

1CL Cudia, posted his plight in her Facebook account. The day after, the
Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen.
Lopez), the new PMA Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1 voting of
the HC,35 copies of which were furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and
other concerned military officials. Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was
directed to review Cadet 1CL Cudias case. The latter, in turn, referred the
matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).
On February 19, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia made his personal appeal
letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a
reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of Annavee demanding the
intervention of the military leadership.
Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was
issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cadet 1CL Cudia by not talking
to him and by separating him from all activities/functions of the cadets. It is
said that any violation shall be a Class 1 offense entailing 45 demerits, 90
hours touring, and 90 hours confinement. Cadet 1CL Cudia was not given a
copy of the order and learned about it only from the media.36 According to
an alleged news report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette Flores
(Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to ostracize Cadet 1CL Cudia. Among
his offenses were: breach of confidentiality by putting documents in the
social media, violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to resign,
and smearing the name of the PMA.37
On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for
additional time, until March 4, 2014, to file an appeal on the ground that his
intended witnesses were in on-the-job training (OJT).38 As additional
evidence to support his appeal, he also requested for copies of the Minutes
of the HC proceedings, relevant documents pertaining to the case, and video
footages and recordings of the HC hearings.
The next day, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family engaged the services
of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) in Baguio City.
34
Id. at 143-144.
35
Id. at 145-146, 202-203.
36
Id.at 11, 70.
37
Id. at 40.
38
Id. at 132.
Decision - 12 - G.R. No. 211362
The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a)
letter of appeal of the Spouses Cudia dated February 18, 2014; (b) directive
from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case; and (c) guidance from Maj.
Gen. Lopez.
On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr.

(Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB Chairman, informed Cadet 1CL Cudia
that, pending approval of the latters request for extension, the CRAB would
continue to review the case and submit its recommendations based on
whatever evidence and testimonies received, and that it could not favorably
consider his request for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and
video footages and recordings of the HC hearings since it was neither the
appropriate nor the authorized body to take action thereon.39 Subsequently,
upon verbal advice, Cadet 1CL Cudia wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez
reiterating his request.40
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the
CHR-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC
members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of
Cadet 1CL Cudia, particularly his rights to due process, education, and
privacy of communication.41
On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for
additional time, until March 19, 2014, to file his appeal and submit evidence.
PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T.
Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for immediate directive to the PMA to
expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudias requests.42
Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa

Class, the following events transpired:
On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief

Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other hand, the CRAB
submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of Cadet 1CL
Cudia.44
On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez
stating the denial of Cadet 1CL Cudias requests for extension of time to file
an Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time already given, and to be
39
Id. at 179.
40
Id. at 133-135.
41
Id at. 462.
42
Id. at 181-182.
43
Id. at 183-185.
44
Id. at 340.
Decision - 13 - G.R. No. 211362
furnished with a copy of relevant documents because of confidentiality and

presumption of regularity of the HC proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia,
through PAO, then filed an Appeal Memorandum46 before the CRAB.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President

Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47 On the same
day, Special Orders No. 48 was issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-
Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and
PMA senior officers to conduct a deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet
1CL Cudias Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry was not just
to find out whether the appeal has merit or may be considered but also to
investigate possible involvement of other cadets and members of the
command related to the incident and to establish specific violation of policy
or regulations that had been violated by other cadets and members of the
HC.49
On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney
had a dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary
findings, which recommended the following:
a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8
Guilty 1 Not guilty vote;
b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt
Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor
Committee;
c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudias rights and entitlements as a full-
fledge graduating cadet and allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16
March 2014;
d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of
Cudias Case.50
On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting
with Pres. Aquino and Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary
Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended that they put in writing
45
Id. at 152.
46
Id. at 118-131.
47
Id. at 186.
48
The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body were BGen.
Andre M. Costales and Capt. Allan Ferdinand V. Cusi, respectively. The members were Col. Archimedes
V. Viaje, Col. Monico S. Batle, Maj. Ma. Victoria Asther R. Excelise, Maj. Raul V. Verceles, Maj. Xerxes
A. Trinidad, Maj. Charles V. Calucag (Secretary), Maj. Lope A. Domingo, Jr., Maj. Agnes Lynette A.
Flores, Cpt. Charity G. Fuentespina, Cpt. Dhylyne Enchon B. Espejo (Legal Officer Adviser), Cpt. Almira
C. Jabagat, and 2Lt. Marlon B. Nido.
49
Rollo, p. 359.
50
Id. at 191.
Decision - 14 - G.R. No. 211362
their appeal, requests, and other concerns. According to respondents, the

parties agreed that Cadet 1CL Cudia would not join the graduation but it was
without prejudice to the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the AFP
Chief of Staff. The President then tasked Gen. Bautista to handle the
reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the
group conducting the review.
Four days after Siklab Diwa Class graduation day, petitioner Renato
S. Cudia received a letter dated March 11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP
Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for the AFP
Chief of Staff, affirming the CRABs denial of Cadet 1CL Cudias appeal. It
held:
After review, The Judge Advocate General, AFP finds that the
action of the PMA CRAB in denying the appeal for reinvestigation is
legally in order. There was enough evidence to sustain the finding of guilt
and the proprietary (sic) of the punishment imposed. Also, your son was
afforded sufficient time to file his appeal from the date he was informed of
the final verdict on January 21, 2014, when the decision of the Honor
Committee was read to him in person, until the time the PMA CRAB
conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son
at the Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained subject to the
Academys policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no violation of
his right to due process considering that the procedure undertaken by the
Honor Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with existing policy.
Thus, the previous finding and recommendation of the Honor Committee
finding your son, subject Cadet guilty of Lying and recommending his
separation from the Academy is sustained.
In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your

appeal for lack of merit.51
Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final

Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1CL Cudias
appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special investigation board
tasked to probe the case submitted its final report to the President.53 Pursuant
to the administrative appeals process, the DND issued a Memorandum dated
May 23, 2014, directing the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the
complete records of the case for purposes of DND review and
recommendation for disposition by the President.54
Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution

with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029, concluding and
recommending as follows:
51
Id. at 200-201.
52
Id. at 338-358.
53
Id. at 289.
54
Id. at 360.
Decision - 15 - G.R. No. 211362
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission

on Human Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of
the PMA Honor Committee and certain PMA officials, specifically for
violations of the rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity,
due process, education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good life.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office

RESOLVED to indorse to competent authorities for their immediate
appropriate action on the following recommendations:
1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the 9-Guilty, 0-Not
Guilty verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being null and
void; to uphold and respect the 8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty voting result
and make an official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in favor of
Cadet Cudia;
2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands
rest the ends of justice and fate of Cadet Cudia, to:
2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the

Philippine Military Academy;
2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the degree
of Bachelors of Science; and
2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript of his
academic records for his BS degree, without conditions therein as
to his status as a PMA cadet.
3. The Public Attorneys Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia

in pursuing administrative, criminal and civil suits against the officers
and members of the Honor Committee named hereunder, for violation
of the Honor Code and System and the Procedure in Formal
Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the ballot,
tampering the true result of the voting, perjury, intentional omission in
the Minutes of substantive part of the formal trial proceedings which
are prejudicial to the interest of justice and Cadet Cudias fundamental
rights to dignity, non-discrimination and due process, which led to the
infringement of his right to education and even transgressing his right
to a good life.
3.1 Cdt 1CL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.2 Cdt 1CL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ
3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARIO, JR.
3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKO ANGELO C. TARAYAO
3.6 Cdt 1CL JEANELYN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.7 Cdt 1CL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.8 Cdt 1CL JAIRUS O. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.9 Cdt 1CL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.10 Cdt 1CL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.11 Cdt 1CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the
AFP
3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)
3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (recorder)
Decision - 16 - G.R. No. 211362
4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent
authorities should investigate and file appropriate charges against Maj.
VLADIMIR P. GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of
Cadet Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the
protection of the right to privacy of Cudia who was then billeted at the
PMA Holding Center;
5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent authorities
should investigate Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG for his
failure and ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a competent
Tactical Officer and a good father of his cadets, in this case, to Cadet
Cudia; for failure to respect exhaustion of administrative remedies;
6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Philppines, the PMA Superintendent, to immediately
cause the comprehensive review of all rules of procedures, regulations,
policies, including the so-called practices in the implementation of the
Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt new policies, rules of procedures
and relevant regulations which are human-rights based and consistent
with the Constitution and other applicable laws;
7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law

defining and penalizing ostracism and discrimination, which is
apparently being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in this
jurisdiction;
8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as priority,

the passage of an anti-ostracism and/or anti-discrimination law; and
9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to ensure
respect and protection of the rights of those who testified for the cause
of justice and truth as well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the

competent authorities on the foregoing CHR recommendations.
Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by

substituted service to the complainants (the spouses Renato and Filipina
Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the respondents. Also, to the
PMA Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National
Defense, His Excellency The President of the Philippines, The Public
Attorneys Office.
SO RESOLVED.55
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of
the AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The letter, which was addressed to
the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
stated in whole:
55
Id. at 495-497. (Emphasis in the original)
Decision - 17 - G.R. No. 211362
This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014

and 26 March 2014 appealing for a reconsideration of the decision of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of
your son, Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.
After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the
decision of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this Office
has found no substantial basis to disturb the findings of the AFP and the
PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is no competent
evidence to support the claim that the decision of the Honor Committee
members was initially at 8 Guilty votes and 1 Not Guilty vote. The
lone affidavit of an officer, based on his purported conversation with one
Honor Committee member, lacks personal knowledge on the deliberations
of the said Committee and is hearsay at best.
Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on

Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis that Cadet Cudias due process
rights were violated. Apart from being explicitly preliminary in nature,
such recommendations are anchored on a finding that there was an 8-1
vote which, as discussed above, is not supported by competent evidence.
In the evaluation of Cadet Cudias case, this Office has been

guided by the precept that military law is regarded to be in a class of its
own, applicable only to military personnel because the military
constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate
from that of civilians (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August
2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office regarded the findings of
the AFP Chief, particularly his conclusion that there was nothing irregular
in the proceedings that ensued, as carrying great weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained

the findings of the AFP Chief and the PMA CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR

COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE
ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS
56
Id. at 499-500.
Decision - 18 - G.R. No. 211362
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case,

Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was deprived of his right to have
access to evidence which would have proven his defense, would have
totally belied the charge against him, and more importantly, would
have shown the irregularity in the Honor Committees hearing and
rendition of decision
B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the
decisions arrived at by the Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy have afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin
Jeff Cudia nothing but a sham trial
D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy violated their own rules and principles as
embodied in the Honor Code
E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the
Philippine Military Academy, in deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff
Cudias case, grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so
as to defy the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the unquestionable
fact that the former should yield to the latter.
II
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR

COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING
THAT CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED,
THEREBY VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE
III
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING

INVESTIGATION INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT
AND PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT
MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition,

respondents presented the issues below:
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
I.
THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE

INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA
57
Id. at 79-81.
Decision - 19 - G.R. No. 211362
CLASS OF 2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE

COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS ALREADY BEEN RENDERED
MOOT.
II.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY

FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.
III.
MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO

GRANT THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.
IV.
IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING

THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON CADET CUDIAS
APPEAL.
V.
WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST

EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY
OR PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE
MILITARY MATTERS.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
VI.
CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY

RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS
ENTRY INTO THE PMA.
VII.
THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH

AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND
PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE
PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.
VIII.
CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE

PROCESS.
The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate

cadets despite the absence of statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal

of a guilty cadet.
Decision - 20 - G.R. No. 211362
Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by

providing untruthful statements in the explanation for his tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the
findings of the Honor Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were
properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.
The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor

Committee, by incorporating executive session/chambering, was
adopted to further strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor
Committee.
Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any pressure

from the other voting members of the Honor Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.
The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding

on the Honorable Court, and are, at best, recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he

was dismissed from the PMA.58
The Ruling of the Court
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Propriety of a petition for mandamus
Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying

that Cadet 1CL Cudia be included in the list of graduating cadets and for
him to take part in the commencement exercises was already rendered moot
and academic when the graduation ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa
Class took place on March 16, 2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is
improper since it does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary
duty. Invoking Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus petition could not be
availed of to compel an academic institution to allow a student to continue
studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not a right. In this case,
there is a clear failure on petitioners part to establish that the PMA has the
ministerial duty to include Cadet 1CL Cudia in the list, much less award him
with academic honors and commission him to the Philippine Navy. Similar
to the case of University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 it is
58
Id. at 290-292.
59
160-A Phil. 929 (1975).
60
G.R. No. 100588, March 7, 1994, 230 SCRA 761.
Decision - 21 - G.R. No. 211362
submitted that the PMA may rightfully exercise its discretionary power on
who may be admitted to study pursuant to its academic freedom.
In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet

1CL Cudia to participate in the PMA 2014 commencement exercises could
no longer be had, the Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed for. They
add that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to act in a
particular manner when there is a violation of a constitutional right, and that
the certiorari aspect of the petition must still be considered because it is
within the province of the Court to determine whether a branch of the
government or any of its officials has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
thereof.
We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition

for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a

ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be performed
"[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the
tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have
no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is
opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide
how or when to perform the duty.61
In this case, petitioners pray for, among others:
Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of the Court to issue
a Writ of Mandamus to:
1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of

Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, including inclusion in the
yearbook;
61
Buena v. Benito, G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014.
Decision - 22 - G.R. No. 211362
2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the

commencement exercises if he completed all the requirements for his
baccalaureate degree;
3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he
deserves, and the commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign;
4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its
records of the proceedings taken against Cadet Cudia, including the
video footage and audio recordings of the deliberations and voting, for
the purpose of allowing the CRAB to conduct intelligent review of the
case of Cadet Cudia;
5. direct the PMAs CRAB to conduct a review de novo of all the records
without requiring Cadet Cudia to submit new evidence if it was
physically impossible to do so;
6. direct the PMAs CRAB to take into account the certification signed
by Dr. Costales, the new evidence consisting of the affidavit of a
military officer declaring under oath that the cadet who voted not
guilty revealed to this officer that this cadet was coerced into
changing his vote, and other new evidence if there is any;
7. direct the PMAs CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel
who is allowed to participate actively in the proceedings as well as in
the cross-examinations during the exercise of the right to confront
witnesses against him; and
8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the

CRAB to allow Cadet Cudia a representation of a counsel.62
Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:
A. x x x
B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:

a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold the
8 Guilty - 1 Not Guilty vote;
b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce
Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before
the Honor Committee;
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudias rights and entitlements as a
full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma and awards.63
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1CL Cudia in the
list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part
in the commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic
when the graduation ceremonies pushed through on March 16, 2014 without
including Cadet 1CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.
62
Rollo, p. 27.
63
Id. at 110-111, 446-447.
Decision - 23 - G.R. No. 211362
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1CL
Cudias rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including
his diploma, awards, and commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the
same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the basis of academic
freedom, which We shall discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at
this point that these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the
right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court to
decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and
commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part
of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words of
Garcia:
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued.
Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology,
what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather
than a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy
the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be

availed against an official or government agency whose duty requires the
exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to issue, petitioners should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an
imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be
mandated.67
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought
by petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the
absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition
does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or
review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.68
The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must

proceed since, as argued by petitioners, the Court is empowered to settle via
petition for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondents in dismissing Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA.
64
University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21,
1993, 227 SCRA 342, 356.
65
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 59, at 942.
66
University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, supra note 64, at 361-362.
67
See Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., G.R. No. 103142, November 8, 1993,
227 SCRA 591, 597.
68
University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 771.
Decision - 24 - G.R. No. 211362
Factual nature of the issues
According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually

require the Court to make findings of fact because it sets forth several factual
disputes which include, among others: the tardiness of Cadet 1CL Cudia in
his ENG412 class and his explanation thereto, the circumstances that
transpired in the investigation of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings
before the HC, and the allegation that Cadet 1CL Lagura was forced to
change his vote during the executive session/chambering.
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents

legal issues. Rather than determining which between the two conflicting
versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly centers on the application,
appreciation, and interpretation of a persons rights to due process, to
education, and to property; the interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and
Honor System; and the conclusion on whether Cadet 1CL Cudias
explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant case involves questions of
fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed
questions of fact and law.
Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination
of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law
and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of
fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether
or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.69
The petition does not exclusively present factual matters for the Court
to decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of more importance is
the determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due process, to
education, and to property in the context of the Honor Code and the Honor
System, and, if in the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof. Notably, even
respondents themselves raise substantive grounds that We have to resolve. In
support of their contention that the Court must exercise careful restraint and
should refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military
matters, they argue that Cadet 1CL Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily
relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of his entry into the PMA, and
that the Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing the imposition of
disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the
peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues, aside from being purely legal
69
Morales v. The Board of Regents of the UP, 487 Phil. 449, 464 (2004).
Decision - 25 - G.R. No. 211362
questions, are of first impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make
a categorical ruling.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the
petition pending President Aquinos resolution of Cadet 1CL Cudia appeal.
They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full administrative
process. While Cadet 1CL Cudia underwent the review procedures of his
guilty verdict at the Academy level the determination by the SJA of
whether the HC acted according to the established procedures of the Honor
System, the assessment by the Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and
legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the evaluation of the PMA
Superintendent to warrant the administrative separation of the guilty cadet,
and the appellate review proceedings before the CRAB he still appealed to
the President, who has the utmost latitude in making decisions affecting the
military. It is contended that the Presidents power over the persons and
actions of the members of the armed forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.)
Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act"). As such, the President
could still overturn the decision of the PMA. In respondents view, the filing
of this petition while the case is pending resolution of the President is an
irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For them, comity dictates
that courts of justice should shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that

President Aquino effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1CL Cudia. They
70
530 Phil. 398 (2006).
71
SEC. 31. The President is authorized to appoint to the Military Academy annually, subject to such
physical and examinations as he may prescribe, the number of examinations, cadets necessary to maintain
the Cadet Corps at a strength of not to exceed three hundred and fifty. Cadets shall be selected from among
qualified candidates as hereinafter provided. Candidates for admission shall be single, in good physical
condition, not less than seventeen nor more twenty-two years of age, and shall be nominated by the
Members of the National Assembly, each of whom may nominate any number of candidates. The President
shall appoint from among those who pass the physical and mental examinations with the highest ratings the
number or numbers necessary to fill the existing vacancies: Provided, That a quota of three members of the
Cadet Corps shall be allotted to each Assembly district: Provided, further, That in case no candidates from
a given Assembly district attain the required minimum ratings, a second examination shall be given during
the same year to nominees from that district. If on the second examination no candidate shall attain the
required minimum rating, the vacancies in the district quota shall be filled by the President from successful
candidates at large.
The pay and allowances of students at the Military Academy shall be fixed by the President.
Any student who shall, after entrance to the Academy and before completion of the prescribed course
of training, be found to be physically unfit for military duty by reason of injury or disease incident to the
service, shall be retired with the rank of cadet and shall be entitled to the retired pay and allowances of a
third lieutenant of the Regular Force.
Upon satisfactory completion of the course of instruction at the Military Academy candidates shall be
commissioned third lieutenants in the Regular or Reserve Forces with relative rank in the order of final
general standing' as determined by the Faculty Board and Commandant of the Academy, and approved by
the Chief of Staff.
Decision - 26 - G.R. No. 211362
claim that his family exerted insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration

of the HC recommendation from the AFP officials and the President, but
was in vain. The circumstances prior to, during, and after the PMA 2014
graduation rites, which was attended by President Aquino after he talked to
Cadet 1CL Cudias family the night before, foreclose the possibility that the
challenged findings would still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist
that the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute based
on the Corsiga v. Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.
We rule for petitioners.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or

threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been
exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should
not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first
been resorted to and the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon
the matter complained of, have been given the appropriate opportunity to act
and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum.74 In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United States,75 which was cited by
respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving a
decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies
within the military before appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed
both to preserve the balance between military and civilian authorities and to
conserve judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a

party may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is
present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;

2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.76
72
439 Phil. 875 (2002).
73
491 Phil. 520 (2005).
74
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, 485 Phil. 446, 454-455 (2004).
75
420 F. Supp. 698 (1976).
76
Supra note 61.
Decision - 27 - G.R. No. 211362
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of

Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due
course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Yet more significant is the fact that during the pendency of this case,
particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President finally issued its
ruling, which sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence,
the occurrence of this supervening event bars any objection to the petition
based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Courts interference within military affairs
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v.

Councilman78 to support their contention that judicial intervention would
pose substantial threat to military discipline and that there should be a
deferential review of military statutes and regulations since political
branches have particular expertise and competence in assessing military
needs. Likewise, in Orloff v. Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was
allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme Court that the military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian. According to respondents, the U.S. courts respect to the military
recognizes that constitutional rights may apply differently in the military
context than in civilian society as a whole. Such military deference is
exercised either by refusing to apply due process and equal protection
doctrines in military cases or applying them but with leniency.
In respondents view, although Philippine courts have the power of

judicial review in cases attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the widest
latitude of deference to military affairs. Such respect is exercised by the
court where the issues to be resolved entail a substantial consideration of
legitimate governmental interest. They suppose that allowing Cadet 1CL
Cudias case to prosper will set an institutionally dangerous precedent,
opening a Pandoras box of other challenges against the specialized system
of discipline of the PMA. They state that with the PMAs mandate to train
cadets for permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and
procedure necessarily must impose a different standard of conduct compared
with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the
States check-and-balance machinery, specifically mandated by Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no branch of the government or any
77
801 F.2d 462 (1986).
78
420 U.S. 738 (1975).
79
345 U.S. 83 (1953).
80
417 U.S. 733 (1974).
Decision - 28 - G.R. No. 211362
of its officials acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert that
judicial non-interference in military affairs is not deemed as absolute even in
the U.S. They cite Schlesinger and Parker, which were invoked by
respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals on
account of issues posed concerning due process and violations of
constitutional rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this Court,
petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised the judicial power to determine
whether the AFP and the members of the court martial acted with grave
abuse of discretion in their military investigation.
Petitioners contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the

government, not the courts, with superintendence and control over the
military because the courts generally lack the competence and expertise
necessary to evaluate military decisions and they are ill-equipped to
determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon
military authority might have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We
rule that the facts as well as the legal issues in the U.S. cases cited by
respondents are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia. Instead,
what applies is the 1975 U.S. case of Andrews v. Knowlton,85 which
similarly involved cadets who were separated from the United States
Military Academy due to Honor Code violations. Following Wasson v.
Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v. Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed the power
of the district courts to review procedures used at the service academies in
the separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen. While it recognized
the constitutional permissibility of the military to set and enforce
uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics, it said that the courts
have expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial access for
review of military determinations. Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was
opined that it has been well settled that federal courts have jurisdiction
"where there is a substantial claim that prescribed military procedures
violates one's constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S. Congress eventually
81
346 U.S. 137 (1953).
82
355 U.S. 579 (1958).
83
G.R. No. 92606, July 26, 1991, 199 SCRA 663.
84
See Major Richard D. Rosen, Thinking About Due Process, the Army Lawyer, March, 1988 (1988
Army Law. 3), citing U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cls. 13-15; art. II, 2, cl. 1; Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65
(1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1973);
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953); and Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 181, 187 (1962).
85
509 F.2d 898 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari (423 U.S. 873, 96 S.
Ct. 142, 46 L. Ed. 2d 105, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2844 [1975]).
86
382 F.2d 807 (1967).
87
470 F.2d 201 (1972).
88
534 F. Supp. 590 (1982).
Decision - 29 - G.R. No. 211362
made major revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by

expressly providing, among others, for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme
Court of decisions by the militarys highest appellate authority.89
Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still

formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating that the
duty of the courts of justice includes not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.90 Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.91
The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of

the Due Process Clause, be considered a governmental activity. As ruled in
Andrews:
The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation
process at the Academy has been sufficiently formalized, and is
sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that committee's activities
within the definition of governmental activity for the purposes of our
review. While the Academy has long had the informal practice of referring
all alleged violations to the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship
between that committee and the separation process has to a degree been
formalized. x x x
Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or

informal, the Honor Committee under its own procedures provides that a
single "not guilty" vote by a member ends the matter, while a "guilty"
finding confronts a cadet with the hard choice of either resigning or
electing to go before a Board of Officers. An adverse finding there results
not only in formal separation from the Academy but also in a damaging
record that will follow the cadet through life. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a grand jury, is clearly
part of the process whereby a cadet can ultimately be adjudged to have
violated the Cadet Honor Code and be separated from the Academy.
Therefore, the effect of the committee's procedures and determinations on
the separation process is sufficiently intertwined with the formal
89
36 Cap. U.L. Rev. 635, citing DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1-6(C) (6th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006).
90
Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014, citing Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014.
91
Morales v. The Board of Regents of the UP, supra note 69.
Decision - 30 - G.R. No. 211362
governmental activity which may follow as to bring it properly under

judicial review.92
No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present
Constitution declares it as a matter of principle that civilian authority is, at
all times, supreme over the military.93 Consistent with the republican system
of checks and balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by
necessary implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining,
in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive
action.94
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Cadets relinquishment of certain civil liberties
Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is

not the same as that of a civilian because the formers rights have already
been recalibrated to best serve the military purpose and necessity. They
claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De Villa95
recognized that, to a certain degree, individual rights of persons in the
military service may be curtailed by the rules of military discipline in order
to ensure its effectiveness in fulfilling the duties required to be discharged
under the law. Respondents remind that, as a military student aspiring to a
commissioned post in the military service, Cadet 1CL Cudia voluntarily
gave up certain civil and political rights which the rest of the civilian
population enjoys. The deliberate surrender of certain freedoms on his part is
embodied in the cadets Honor Code Handbook. It is noted that at the
beginning of their academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1CL Cudia, along with
the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by the Honor
Code and the Honor System.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights,

including the right to due process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the
provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,96 Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of
Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System,
92
Supra note 85, at 20-22.
93
CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. II Sec. 3.
94
Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, citing Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, 73-74 (1939).
95
250 Phil. 270 (1988).
96
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and
the integrity of the national territory.
97
Dated December 17, 1938, otherwise known as the "Manual for Courts-Martial, Armed Forces of
the Philippines."
98
Dated January 28, 1985 (Amending Chapter XXIV Section 105 thru 109).
Decision - 31 - G.R. No. 211362
military professionalism, and, in general, military culture. They maintain

that the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly and in bad faith misapplied
the Honor Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet 1CL Cudias case
considering that these should not be implemented at the expense of human
rights, due process, and fair play. Further, under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, they can never overpower or defy the 1987
Constitution since the former should yield to the latter. Petitioners stress that
the statement that a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights
and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented simply
pertains to what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men
or women of integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain vices and the
right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the context of
disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to
due process but, at most, refers to the cadets rights to privacy and to remain
silent.
We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to

subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational
institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a student at a
civilian public school.99 In fact, the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook of the PMA expresses that, [as] a training environment, the
Cadet Corps is a society which has its own norms. Each member binds
himself to what is good for him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be part
of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties
for the good of the group.100
It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian,

which were adopted by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from the
military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private
interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceedings
conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must.101 For that
reason, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the due
process clause must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe
sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction which he or
99
See Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87.
100
101
Andrews v. Knowlton, supra note 85. See also Roberts v. Knowlton, 377 F. Supp. 1381 (1974);
Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710 (1975); Tully v. Orr, Secretary of the Air Force, 608 F. Supp.
1222 (1985); Cody v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1031 (1983); Crowley v. United States Merchant Marine
Academy, 985 F. Supp. 292 (1997); and Lebrun v. England, 212 F. Supp. 2d 5 (2002).
102
Lightsey v. King, 567 F. Supp. 645 (1983).
Decision - 32 - G.R. No. 211362
she has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of probably
being forever denied that career.103
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not
specifically pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military academy
due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the petition that sought
to annul the directive from then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which
enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress without her consent.
We ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their
defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other hand, in
Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction imposed on petitioner since
the conditions for his house arrest (particularly, that he may not issue any
press statements or give any press conference during the period of his
detention) are justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these
two cases, the constitutional rights to information, transparency in matters of
public concern, and to free speech not to due process clause were
restricted to better serve the greater military purpose.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by

the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a
cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code violation is not among
those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the
Honor Code and the Honor System do not state that a guilty cadet is
automatically terminated or dismissed from service. To them, the Honor
Code and Honor System are gentlemans agreement that cannot take
precedence over public interest in the defense of the nation and in view of
the taxpayers money spent for each cadet. Petitioners contend that, based on
the Civil Code, all written or verbal agreements are null and void if they
violate the law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and public safety.
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose

disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the
peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without express provision of a law, the
PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets since
it is deemed reasonably written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said
law grants to the President the authority of terminating a cadets
appointment, such power may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who
may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
103
See Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (1972).
Decision - 33 - G.R. No. 211362
Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the

PMA has the inherent right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and
regulations that it may deem necessary for the maintenance of school
discipline, which is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military educational institution of
the AFP in accordance with Section 30,105 Article III of C.A. No. 1 and
Sections 58 and 59,106 Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987), the PMA is an institution that enjoys
academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,108 it
was held that concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill
and impose discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with Isabelo, Jr. v.
Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109 and Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong,110 the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to
expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor expected from its
students who are to form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail

the Honor Code as basis of the HCs decision to recommend his dismissal
from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA for
four years, he knew or should have been fully aware of the standards of
discipline imposed on all cadets and the corresponding penalty for failing to
abide by these standards.
104
Section 3. (2) They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for
human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach
the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological
knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
105
Sec. 30. There shall be established a military training school to be named the Philippine Military
Academy, for the training of selected candidates for permanent commission in the Regular Force. The
student body in the Military Academy shall be known as the Cadet Corps of the Army of the Philippines.
106
SECTION 58. Organization.(1) The Philippine Military Academy is the primary training and
educational institution of the AFP. It shall be the primary source of regular officers of the Standing Force.
(2) The Academy shall be organized as prescribed by the Secretary of National Defense, upon
recommendation of the Chief of Staff, AFP.
(3) The student body of the Academy shall be known as the Cadet Corps of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (CCAFP) and shall have such strength as the Secretary of National Defense shall determine
upon the recommendation of the Chief of Staff, and within the strength limited by the annual Appropriation
Act.
(4) There shall be an Academic Board organized by the Chief of Staff, which shall be composed of not
more than fifteen (15) members selected from the officers of the Academy upon recommendation of the
Superintendent. The Board shall, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Chief of
Staff, have the power to confer baccalaureate degrees upon the cadets who satisfactorily complete the
approved course of study.
SECTION 59. Functions.The Academy shall prepare the candidates for commission in the regular
force of the AFP and shall instruct, train and develop cadets so that each graduate shall possess the
character, the broad and basic military skills and the education essential to the successful pursuit of a
progressive military career.
107
Section 5. (2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
108
401 Phil. 431 (2000).
109
Supra note 67.
110
G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993, 222 SCRA 644.
Decision - 34 - G.R. No. 211362
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in Isabelo, Jr. and

Ateneo, academic freedom is not absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant
disregard of the right to due process and the 1987 Constitution. Although
schools have the prerogative to choose what to teach, how to teach, and who
to teach, the same does not go so far as to deprive a student of the right to
graduate when there is clear evidence that he is entitled to the same since, in
such a case, the right to graduate becomes a vested right which takes
precedence over the limited and restricted right of the educational institution.
While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of

respondents are more in line with the facts of this case.
We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in

nature. Once admitted, a students enrolment is not only semestral in
duration but for the entire period he or she is expected to complete it.111 An
institution of learning has an obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is
imbued with public interest because of the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions.113
The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. [It]

has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind
it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school
undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to
pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students
agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its
rules and regulations.114
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of

universities and institutions of higher learning,115 has been enshrined in our
111
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, supra note 74, at 459, citing Non v.
Dames II, 264 Phil. 98, 121 (1990). See also Phil. School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 729, 733 and Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal,
Inc., supra note 67, at 596.
112
Magtibay v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-28971, January 28, 1983, 120 SCRA 370, 374; Licup v.
University of San Carlos (USC), G.R. No. 85839, October 19, 1989, 178 SCRA 637; Non v. Dames II,
supra at 123; San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 414, 427 (1991); University of San
Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 775; and Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology, supra note 74, at 461.
113
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, supra note 74, at 459, citing Non v.
Dames II, supra note 111, at 120. See also Phil. School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 111, at 733, and Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., supra note 67, at 596.
114
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, supra note 74, at 459-460, citing Phil.
School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals, supra note 111, at 733; and University of San
Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 775.
115
University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 287, 306 (1999).
Decision - 35 - G.R. No. 211362
Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court espoused the
concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,117 which enumerated the four essential
freedoms of a university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4)
who may be admitted to study.118 An educational institution has the power to
adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its
government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of the college.119 It can decide
for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from
outside coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public
welfare which would call for some restraint.120 Indeed, academic freedom
has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that
assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling
precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the
Civil Code, that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.121
The schools power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed

in their academic freedom and that the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.122 As a Bohemian
proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water."
Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power
assure its right to survive and continue operating.123 In this regard, the Court
has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions,
which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate
116
De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 330, 361 (2007), citing Ateneo de
Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 660. See also University of the Phils. Board of Regents
v. Court of Appeals, supra.
117
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
118
See also the subsequent cases of Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 660;
Mirriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 108, at 456; Regino v. Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology, supra note 74, at 464; and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 116, at 359.
119
Guzman v. National University, 226 Phil. 596, 603-604 (1986).
120
See Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 59, at
943; Tangonan v. Pao, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, 257; Alcuaz v. Philippine
School of Business Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 23 (1988); University of the Philippines Board of Regents v.
Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 360; Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 108, at 455-456; Morales v. The Board of Regents of the UP, 487 Phil. 449,
474 (2004); De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 116, at 359; Parents-Teachers
Association (PTA) of St. Mathew Christian Academy v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No.
176518, March 2, 2010, 614 SCRA 41, 54; and Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Paraaque City, Inc.,
G.R. No. 183572, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA.
121
Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., supra note 67, at 595-596
122
De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 116, at 363, citing Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 663-664.
123
University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21,
1993, 227 SCRA 342, 360.
Decision - 36 - G.R. No. 211362
disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals,125 this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent

in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot
function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational

institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of
an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational
environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally
necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student

discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning.
By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the
right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to
teach."
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop
discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism,

foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of
national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights
and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop
moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative
thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote
vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the
school to carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop
into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline

more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the
freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right
to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose
lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation
privileges.126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even

after graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto. In University
of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,127 We upheld the
universitys withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a student
who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation.
Thus:
124
Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran, G.R. No. 169391, October 10, 2012, 683 SCRA 358, 372.
125
Supra note 108.
126
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 108, at 456-457.
127
Supra note 115.
Decision - 37 - G.R. No. 211362
Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic

freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is
nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise
provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed
out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly
extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher learning
can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also
determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its
graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction

was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or
withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a
university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the
Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a
student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private
respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the
graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many
investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she
should not have been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of

higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote
again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest

governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power to
confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. It
follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the
Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due
process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student's
rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers
that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved.
Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university's highest
academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through
fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's
concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take
measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue
their education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to
pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right
to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.128
128
University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, supra note 115, at 306-308.
(Citations omitted)
Decision - 38 - G.R. No. 211362
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to

develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values,
ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the
total man.129 Essentially, education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one
which inculcates duty and reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to
education," students have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid
down by the school.131 Every citizen has a right to select a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements.132
The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational

institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom
in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor
Code and the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral
principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the
guiding spirit behind each cadets action. It is the cadets responsibility to
maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout a cadets stay in the
PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members of
the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called Long Gray
Line.
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets
character development. It defines the desirable values they must possess to
remain part of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so essential in a
military organization; and it makes them professional military soldiers.133 As
it is for character building, it should not only be kept within the society of
cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it
outside as an officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.134
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means
of achieving the cadets character development and as ways by which the
Academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in conduct.135 Upon
the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also an
institutional goal, ensuring that graduates have strong character,
unimpeachable integrity, and moral standards of the highest order.136 To
129
De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 116, at 362, citing Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 664..
130
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 664.
131
Id.
132
CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XIV Sec. 5 (3).
133
134
Id.
135
See Ringgold v. United States, supra note 75 and John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System A
Due Process Hybrid, 118 Mil. L. Rev. 187 198).
136
See John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System A Due Process Hybrid, id.
Decision - 39 - G.R. No. 211362
emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is characterized as

"correctional and educational in nature rather than being legalistic and
punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be prepared to accept full
responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the
service above self-interest or loyalty to friends or associates."137
Procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case
Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more

appropriate in determining the minimum standards for the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. Similarly, with the
guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that Cadet 1CL Cudia was accorded
due process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the
PMA fell short in observing the important safeguards laid down in Ang
Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which set the minimum
standards to satisfy the demands of procedural due process in the imposition
of disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman did not entirely do away with
the due process requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court merely
stated that the minimum requirements in the Guzman case are more apropos.
Respondents rightly argued.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue

as it held that although both Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the
requirements of due process, the latter case is more apropos since it
specifically deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman
is the authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases was
reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of Go v. Colegio De San
Juan De Letran.142
In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which
must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process, to wit:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
137
See Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87.
138
Supra note 119.
139
69 Phil. 635 (1940).
140
Supra note 111.
141
Supra note 110, at 656.
142
Decision - 40 - G.R. No. 211362
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary

cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice;144 that the
proceedings may be summary;145 that cross-examination is not an essential
part of the investigation or hearing;146 and that the required proof in a
student disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.147
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of

fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.148 As held in De La Salle
University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right
to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in
administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,

essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy
and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be
based. To be heard does not only mean presentation of testimonial
evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings and where
143
Guzman v. National University, supra note 119, at 603-604. See also Alcuaz v. Philippine School
of Business Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 21 (1988) and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 116, at 357.
144
Guzman v. National University, supra note 119, at 603; Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business
Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 21 (1988); and Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at
658-659.
145
Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 21 (1988); Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 124, at 658;
and Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran, supra note 124, at 375.
146
Administration, 244 Phil. 8, 21 (1988); Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra note 110, at 658;
and University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, supra note 115.
147
See University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21,
1993, 227 SCRA 342, 359 and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 330, 361 (2007).
148
John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System A Due Process Hybrid, supra note 135.
149
Supra note 116.
Decision - 41 - G.R. No. 211362
the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no

denial of due process.150
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative

proceeding conducted to investigate a cadets honor violation need not be
clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that
The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and
assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal precedents in
cases involving Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor
Code dare not look into these precedents for loopholes to justify
questionable acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own
advantage.
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize
Honor in a substantive way. Technical and procedural misgivings of the
legal systems may avert the true essence of imparting the Spirit of the
Code for the reason that it can be used to make unlawful attempt to get
into the truth of matters especially when a cadet can be compelled to
surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System
to be implemented. By virtue of being a cadet, a member of the CCAFP
becomes a subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadets actions are
bound by the existing norms that are logically applied through the Code
and System in order to realize the Academys mission to produce leaders
of character men of integrity and honor.151
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:
2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the states Justice
System but it does not demean its Spirit by reducing the Code to a
systematic list of externally observed rules. Where misinterpretations
and loopholes arise through legalism and its technicalities, the objective
of building the character of the cadets becomes futile. While, generally,
Public Law penalizes only the faulty acts, the Honor System tries to
examine both the action and the intention.152
Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards

undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy. It
has been said that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its
primary business is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion
arise, and that over-proceduralizing military determinations necessarily
gives soldiers less time to accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet
investigations and complex due process hearing could sacrifice simplicity,
practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last for several days or
150
De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. 357-358. (Citations omitted). See also
University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, supra note 115, at 304-305.
151
The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, pp. 6-7 (Rollo, p. 156).
152
Id. at 21 (Id.).
153
Richard D. Rosen, Thinking About Due Process, Army Law. 3 (March, 1988).
Decision - 42 - G.R. No. 211362
weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with legal and procedural
points, and legal motions and evidentiary objections that are irrelevant and
inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and confuse the dismissal proceedings
and make them unmanageable. Excessive delays cannot be tolerated since it
is unfair to the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and,
generally, to the Armed Forces. A good balance should, therefore, be struck
to achieve fairness, thoroughness, and efficiency.154
Considering that the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia is one of first

impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the
particular issue of a dismissed cadets right to due process, it is necessary for
Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for some guidance. Notably, our armed
forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S. military code
produced a salutary effect in the military justice system of the Philippines.155
Hence, pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code and practices
have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that due
process is a flexible concept, requiring consideration in each case of a
variety of circumstances and calling for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.156 Hagopian opined:
In approaching the question of what process is due before

governmental action adversely affecting private interests may properly be
taken, it must be recognized that due process is not a rigid formula or
simple rule of thumb to be applied undeviatingly to any given set of facts.
On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which depends upon the balancing
of various factors, including the nature of the private right or interest
that is threatened, the extent to which the proceeding is adversarial in
character, the severity and consequences of any action that might be
taken, the burden that would be imposed by requiring use of all or
part of the full panoply of trial-type procedures, and the existence of
other overriding interests, such as the necessity for prompt action in
the conduct of crucial military operations. The full context must
therefore be considered in each case.157 (Emphasis supplied)
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum

standards of due process required in the dismissal of a cadet. Thus:
[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may

not proceed arbitrarily but must observe due process of law. x x x
Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent in the concept of due
154
See John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System A Due Process Hybrid, supra note 135.
155
Claro C. Gloria, Philippine Military Law, p. 9 (1973), Capitol Publishing House, Inc. Q.C.
156
See Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87; Wimmer v. Lehman, 705 F.2d 1402 (1983); Cody v.
Scott, supra note 101; and Lebrun v. England, supra note 101.
157
Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87.
Decision - 43 - G.R. No. 211362
process of law precludes the dogmatic application of specific rules

developed in one context to entirely distinct forms of government action.
"For, though 'due process of law' generally implies and includes actor,
reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial
according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is
not universally true." x x x Thus, to determine in any given case what
procedures due process requires, the court must carefully determine and
balance the nature of the private interest affected and of the government
interest involved, taking account of history and the precise circumstances
surrounding the case at hand.
While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the
subject matter before it may validly affect private interests, in particularly
vital and sensitive areas of government concern such as national security
and military affairs, the private interest must yield to a greater degree to
the governmental. x x x Few decisions properly rest so exclusively within
the discretion of the appropriate government officials than the selection,
training, discipline and dismissal of the future officers of the military and
Merchant Marine. Instilling and maintaining discipline and morale in these
young men who will be required to bear weighty responsibility in the face
of adversity -- at times extreme -- is a matter of substantial national
importance scarcely within the competence of the judiciary. And it cannot
be doubted that because of these factors historically the military has been
permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary procedures than the
civilian authorities.
We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the

dismissal of a Cadet from the Merchant Marine Academy that he be given
a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges against him and
permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance of the parties x x x the
rudiments of a fair hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet must be
apprised of the specific charges against him. He must be given an
adequate opportunity to present his defense both from the point of
view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. We do not
suggest, however, that the Cadet must be given this opportunity both when
demerits are awarded and when dismissal is considered. The hearing may
be procedurally informal and need not be adversarial.158 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian
are equally controlling in cases where cadets were separated from the
military academy for violation of the Honor Code. Following the two
previous cases, it was ruled that in order to be proper and immune from
constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated
from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific
charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or
her defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and
other evidence.159 Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far from
what We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v.
158
Wasson v. Trowbridge, supra note 86, at 811-812.
159
Andrews v. Knowlton, supra note 85. See also Kolesa v. Lehman, supra note 88; Crowley v.
United States Merchant Marine Academy, supra note 101; and Lebrun v. England, supra note 101.
Decision - 44 - G.R. No. 211362
Philippine School of Business Administration160 and De La Salle University,

Inc. v. Court of Appeals.161
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudias Honor Code

violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the
PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then
given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed
about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The
preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and
submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team
submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations.
When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given
the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the
witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the
Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at
the Academy level from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of
the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the
CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the
CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal
to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and

expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their
respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative tribunals are
ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court, unless such findings
are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
where the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable
errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, We find no
reason to deviate from the general rule. The grounds therefor are discussed
below seriatim:
As to the right to be represented by a counsel
160
161
162
Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration, supra note 120, at 24.
Decision - 45 - G.R. No. 211362
For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1CL

Cudia the right to be represented by a counsel who could actively participate
in the proceedings like in the cross-examination of the witnesses against him
before the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is because while the CRAB
allowed him to be represented by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made
an observer without any right to intervene and demand respect of Cadet 1CL
Cudias rights.163 According to them, he was not sufficiently given the
opportunity to seek a counsel and was not even asked if he would like to
have one. He was only properly represented when it was already nearing
graduation day after his family sought the assistance of the PAO. Petitioners
assert that Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has the right
to answer the charges against him or her with the assistance of counsel, if
desired.
On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera

v. The Auditor General165 in asserting that the right to a counsel is not
imperative in administrative investigations or non-criminal proceedings.
Also, based on Cadet 1CL Cudias academic standing, he is said to be
obviously not untutored to fully understand his rights and express himself.
Moreover, the confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his
right to be represented by a counsel. In any event, respondents claim that
Cadet 1CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsels advice in
preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim that Cadet 1CL Cudia is guaranteed the

right to have his counsel not just in assisting him in the preparation for the
investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in participating fully
in said hearings. The Court disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987

Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to
be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not
indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,166 the
Court held that a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel
because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.
163
Rollo, p. 18.
164
346 Phil. 807 (1997).
165
247 Phil. 1 (1988).
166
414 Phil. 590, 599 (2001); See also Philcomsat Holdings Corporation v. Senate of the Republic of
the Philippines, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 611.
Decision - 46 - G.R. No. 211362
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a

function of all of the other aspects of the hearing. Where the proceeding is
non-criminal in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not
adversarial and the government does not proceed through counsel, where
the individual concerned is mature and educated, where his knowledge of
the events x x x should enable him to develop the facts adequately through
available sources, and where the other aspects of the hearing taken as a
whole are fair, due process does not require representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to

representation by counsel, as a function of due process, in military academy
disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is principally motivated by the policy
of "treading lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the
power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs
within the broad confines of constitutional due process" and the courts'
views that disciplinary proceedings are not judicial in nature and should be
kept informal, and that literate and educated cadets should be able to defend
themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was ruled that the importance of informality
in the proceeding militates against a requirement that the cadet be accorded
the right to representation by counsel before the Academic Board and that
unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the training and education needed to
understand his rights and express himself, the cadet should be capable of
doing so.170 In the subsequent case of Wimmer v. Lehman,171 the issue was
not access to counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of oneself,
examine and cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and argue the case
during the hearing. Disposing of the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the argument that an individual of a
midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected because he is expected to be
able to care for himself and others, often under difficult circumstances, and
who has full awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's advice, was
deprived of due process by being required to present his defense in person at
an investigatory hearing.
In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that
Cadet 1CL Cudia was given the option or was able to seek legal advice prior
to and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that he was assisted by a
counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB reviewed and
167
Wasson v. Trowbridge, supra note 86 at 812. See also Kolesa v. Lehman, supra note 88, and
Wimmer v. Lehman, supra note 156.
168
See Wasson v. Trowbridge, supra note 86; Andrews v. Knowlton, supra note 85; Birdwell v.
Schlesinger, supra note 101; Kolesa v. Lehman, supra note 88; Wimmer v. Lehman, supra note 156; Cody
v. Scott, supra note 101; Rustad v. United States Air Force, 718 F.2d 348 (1983); Tully v. Orr, Secretary of
the Air Force, supra note 101; and Crowley v. United States Merchant Marine Academy, supra note 101.
169
Crowley v. United States Merchant Marine Academy, sjupra note 101.
170
470 F.2d 201 (1972). See also Cody v. Scott, supra note 101.
171
Supra note 156.
Decision - 47 - G.R. No. 211362
reinvestigated the case. The requirement of due process is already satisfied

since, at the very least, the counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of the
Appeal Memorandum and even acted as an observer who had no right to
actively participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the cross-
examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts that the offense
committed by Cadet 1CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the hearings
before the HC and the CRAB were investigative and not adversarial; and
that Cadet 1CL Cudias excellent academic standing puts him in the best
position to look after his own vested interest in the Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings
Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11,
2014 letter Cadet 1CL Cudias request for documents, footages, and
recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence negating the
regularity of the HC trial and supporting his defense have been surely
overlooked by the CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for them, the answers
on whether Cadet 1CL Cudia was deprived of due process and whether he
lied could easily be unearthed from the video and other records of the HC
investigation. Respondents did not deny their existence but they refused to
present them for the parties and the Court to peruse. In particular, they note
that the Minutes of the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal
Investigation Report dated January 20, 2014 were considered by the CRAB
but were not furnished to petitioners and the Court; hence, there is no way to
confirm the truth of the alleged statements therein. In their view, failure to
furnish these documents could only mean that it would be adverse if
produced pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.172
For lack of legal basis on PMAs claim of confidentiality of records,

petitioners contend that it is the ministerial duty of the HC to submit to the
CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the case, all its records of the
proceedings, including video footages of the deliberations and voting. They
likewise argue that PMAs refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet
1CL Cudia under the guise of confidentiality reveals another misapplication
of the Honor Code, which merely provides: A cadet who becomes part of
any investigation is subject to the existing regulations pertaining to rules of
confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to the creed of secrecy. Nothing
shall be disclosed without proper guidance from those with authority (IV.
The Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet Observer). This provision,
they say, does not deprive Cadet 1CL Cudia of his right to obtain copies and
examine relevant documents pertaining to his case.
172
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(e)That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
xxxx
Decision - 48 - G.R. No. 211362
Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages,

and recordings relevant to the HC hearings are favorable to Cadet 1CL
Cudias cause, and, consequently, to rule that respondents refusal to
produce and have them examined is tantamount to the denial of his right to
procedural due process. They are mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any

documents, witness testimony, or oral or written presentation of facts
submitted at the hearing that would support Cadet 1CL Cudias defense. The
Court may require that an administrative record be supplemented, but only
"where there is a 'strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior' on the
part of the agency,"173 both of which are not present here. Petitioners have
not specifically indicated the nature of the concealed evidence, if any, and
the reason for withholding it. What they did was simply supposing that
Cadet 1CL Cudias guilty verdict would be overturned with the production
and examination of such documents, footages, and recordings. As will be
further shown in the discussions below, the requested matters, even if
denied, would not relieve Cadet 1CL Cudias predicament. If at all, such
denial was a harmless procedural error since he was not seriously prejudiced
thereby.
As to the ostracism in the PMA
To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and

evidence because Special Order No. 1 issued on February 21, 2014, which
directed the ostracism of Cadet 1CL Cudia, left him without any opportunity
to secure statements of his own witnesses. He could not have access to or
approach the cadets who were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1
voting result. It is argued that the Order directing Cadet 1CL Cudias
ostracism is of doubtful legal validity because the Honor Code
unequivocally announced: x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing the cruel
method of ostracizing Honor Code violators, PMA will not have to resort to
other humiliating means and shall only have the option to make known
among its alumni the names of those who have not sincerely felt remorse for
violating the Honor Code.
On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the
petition-in-intervention attached a full text copy of the alleged Special Order
No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance to PMA is improper and
misplaced because of petitioners admission that ostracism has been
absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned activity consistent with the
trend in International Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included in its
curriculum. Assuming that said Order was issued, respondents contend that
173
See Stainback v. Secretary of the Navy, 520 F. Supp. 2d 181 (2007).
Decision - 49 - G.R. No. 211362
it purely originated from the cadets themselves, the sole purpose of which
was to give a strong voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring that they did not
tolerate Cadet 1CL Cudias honor violation and breach of confidentiality of
the HC proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and

unlikely that Cadet 1CL Cudia was ostracized by his fellow cadets. They
manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he was already transferred to the
Holding Center. The practice of billeting an accused cadet at the Holding
Center is provided for in the Honor Code Handbook. Although within the
PMA compound, the Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have
any business to conduct therein. The cadets could not also ostracize him
during mess times since Cadet 1CL Cudia opted to take his meals at the
Holding Center. The circumstances obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was
issued clearly foreclose the possibility that he was ostracized in common
areas accessible to other cadets. He remained in the Holding Center until
March 16, 2014 when he voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary to his claim,
guests were also free to visit him in the Holding Center.
However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1CL Cudia suffered from

ostracism in the PMA. The practice was somehow recognized by
respondents in their Consolidated Comment and by PMA Spokesperson Maj.
Flores in a news report. The CHR likewise confirmed the same in its
Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For them, it does not matter where the
ostracism order originated from because the PMA appeared to sanction it
even if it came from the cadets themselves. There was a tacit approval of an
illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for ostracism would have been
charged by the PMA officials. Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1CL Cudia
did not choose to take his meals at the Holding Center as he was not allowed
to leave the place. Petitioners opine that placing the accused cadet in the
Holding Center is inconsistent with his or her presumed innocence and
certainly gives the implication of ostracism.
We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-in-

intervention attached a full text copy or even a pertinent portion of the
alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the ostracism of Cadet 1CL
Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence and contents are of doubtful veracity.
Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never be granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an

admission of Cadet 1CL Mogol during the CHR hearing that, upon
consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy
Board, they issued an ostracism order against Cadet 1CL Cudia.174 While
174
Rollo, p. 466.
Decision - 50 - G.R. No. 211362
not something new in a military academy,175 ostracisms continued existence

in the modern times should no longer be countenanced. There are those who
argue that the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss of private
interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may render
illusory the possibility of vindication by the reviewing body once found
guilty by the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism practically denies
the accused cadets protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his
or her behalf and to be presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a
proper proceeding.
As to Cadet 1CL Cudias stay in the Holding Center, the Court

upholds the same. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook provides
that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor
Code and has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the
disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and
shall be billeted at the HTG Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the
purpose of Boarders Ward is to quarter those cadets who are undergoing
separation actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered
therein until final disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the
segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary
authority of Academy officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with
respect to decisions made by Army authorities, 'orderly government requires
us to tread lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the
power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs
within the broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v.
Schlesinger,178 the administrative segregation was held to be a reasonable
175
In his article The USMA Honor System A Due Process Hybrid (118 Mil. L. Rev. 187), Major
John H. Beasley wrote on the experience of a cadet in the U.S. military academy, thus:
[A] cadet found not guilty by the board of officers or superintendent was returned to the
Corps, but was usually "cut" or "silenced," meaning that he was treated as if he did not
exist. The "silenced" cadet lived in a separate room, ate alone at a table in the Cadet
mess, was not spoken to by any other cadet except for official purposes, and was
otherwise completely ignored. The "silence" was not something new, but had originated
long before the formalization of the Honor Committee in the early 1920's. The Academy
and even some honor committees attempted to do away with the "silence," but all
attempts were unsuccessful. The 1928 honor chairman was quite blunt in his statement to
the Corps that "This action [the silence] established a wrongful precedent. This, in a few
words, means that you have no right to "silence." There is no such thing as "silence."
Forget about it." Just how vigorously the Academy attempted to do away with the
"silence" is a matter of speculation. The cadets were told by Academy officials that they
had no authority to punish, yet the practice of the "silence" continued.
Most "silenced" cadets could not endure the punishment and resigned after a short period.
A cadet who was silenced in 1971, however, remained at the Academy until his
graduation and commissioning in 1973. This much-celebrated case of Cadet Pelosi stirred
public demand for an end to the "silence." During this controversy, the official Academy
position was in support of the "silence," an unusual stand considering the completely
unsanctioned nature of the punishment. Nonetheless, the Corps itself voted to end the
punishment of the "silence" in 1973 and the issue was finally laid to rest.
176
See John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System A Due Process Hybrid, 118 Mil. L. Rev. 187,
(1987).
177
178
Supra note 101.
Decision - 51 - G.R. No. 211362
exercise of military discipline and could not be considered an invasion of the

rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.
Late and vague decisions
It is claimed that Cadet 1CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the
charge against him and the decisions arrived at by the HC, the CRAB, and
the PMA. No written decision was furnished to him, and if any, the
information was unjustly belated and the justifications for the decisions were
vague. He had to constantly seek clarification and queries just to be apprised
of what he was confronted with.
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the guilty verdict,

Cadet 1CL Cudia immediately inquired as to the grounds therefor, but Cadet
1CL Mogol answered that it is confidential since he would still appeal the
same. By March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1CL Cudia that
the CRAB already forwarded their recommendation for his dismissal to the
General Headquarters sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he
received no decision/recommendation on his case, verbally or in writing.
The PMA commencement exercises pushed through with no written decision
from the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from the Office of the
Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the Cudia
family received the same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in
laying down with specificity the factual and legal bases used by the CRAB
and even by the Office of the Adjutant General. There remains no proof that
the CRAB and the PMA considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1CL
Cudia, it being uncertain as to what evidence was weighed by the CRAB,
whether the same is substantial, and whether the new evidence submitted by
him was ever taken into account.
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMAs practice of

orally declaring the HC finding, not putting it in a written document so as to
protect the integrity of the erring cadet and guard the confidentiality of the
HC proceedings pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they aver that a
copy of the report of the CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not furnished to
Cadet 1CL Cudia because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence,
were the ones who were given a copy thereof.
Petitioners contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a

constitutional mandate stating that [no] decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based,179 such provision does not apply in Cadet 1CL Cudias
case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews require a specific form and content of a
179
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 14.
Decision - 52 - G.R. No. 211362
decision issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and Honor

System Handbook also has no written rule on the matter. Even if the
provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a point-by-point
consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are
necessary.180 What counts is that, albeit furnished to him late, Cadet 1CL
Cudia was informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the reviewing body,
assuring that it went through the processes of legal reasoning. He was not
left in the dark as to how it was reached and he knows exactly the reasons
why he lost, and is able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.
As to the blind adoption of the HC findings
Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A.

No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the power to
appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no
authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a
cadet. It also does not empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the
HC as a basis for recommending the cadets dismissal. In the case of Cadet
1CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HCs finding of
guilt in terminating his military service.
Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de

novo of all records without requiring Cadet 1CL Cudia to submit new
evidence if it is physically impossible for him to do so. In their minds,
respondents cannot claim that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed
the HC recommendation and heard Cadet 1CL Cudias side. As clearly
stated in the letter from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General, [in] its
report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained the findings and
recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal
filed by the subject Cadet. However, the Final Investigation Report of the
CRAB was dated March 23, 2014. While such report states that a report was
submitted to the AFP General Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it
was only on March 12, 2014 that it was designated as a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do the same
things twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded suspicion that the CRAB
never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out
with its report, and the Final Investigation Report was drafted merely as an
afterthought when the lack of written decision was pointed out by petitioners
so as to remedy the apparent lack of due process during the CRAB
investigation and review.
180
Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN
Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, Against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M.
Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals, A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-
CA-J, January 31, 2012, 664 SCRA 465, 469.
Decision - 53 - G.R. No. 211362
Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper

assessment of the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict
against Cadet 1CL Cudia. They assert that the higher authorities of the
PMA did not merely rely on the findings of the HC, noting that there was
also a separate investigation conducted by the HTG from January 25 to
February 7, 2014. Likewise, contrary to the contention of petitioners that the
CRAB continued with the review of the case despite the absence of
necessary documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of the case and
even conducted another investigation by constituting the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body. For respondents, petitioners failed to discharge
the burden of proof in showing bad faith on the part of the PMA. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary and considering further that petitioners
allegations are merely self-serving and baseless, good faith on the part of the
PMAs higher authorities is presumed and should, therefore, prevail.
We agree with respondents.
The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a

limited role of investigating and determining whether or not the alleged
offender has actually violated the Honor Code.181 It is given the
responsibility of administering the Honor Code and, in case of breach, its
task is entirely investigative, examining in the first instance a suspected
violation. As a means of encouraging self-discipline, without ceding to it
any authority to make final adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the
function of identifying suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners
assertion, the HC does not have the authority to order the separation of a
cadet from the Academy. The results of its proceedings are purely
recommendatory and have no binding effect. The HC determination is
somewhat like an indictment, an allegation, which, in Cadet 1CL Cudias
case, the PMA-CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was even
opined that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the Honor
Committee level because it is only a "charging body whose decisions had no
effect other than to initiate de novo proceedings before a Board of
Officers."184
Granting, for arguments sake, that the HC is covered by the due

process clause and that irregularities in its proceedings were in fact
committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners. It is not required that
procedural due process be afforded at every stage of developing disciplinary
action. What is required is that an adequate hearing be held before the final
act of dismissing a cadet from the military academy.185 In the case of Cadet
181
182
See Ringgold v. United States, supra note 75.
183
See Roberts v. Knowlton, supra note 101.
184
See Ringgold v. United States, supra note 75, citing Andrews v. Knowlton, supra note 85.
185
See Birdwell v. Schlesinger, supra note 101, citing Andrews v. Knowlton, supra note 85.
Decision - 54 - G.R. No. 211362
1CL Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets, and the
PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A separate investigation
was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ
to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body composed of the CRAB members
and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate
investigation of the case. The Board/Body actually held hearings on March
12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners find it
unusual that the CRAB would do the same things twice and suspect that it
never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out
with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture that deserves scant
consideration.
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial
According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham.

The people behind Cadet 1CL Cudias charge, investigation, and conviction
were actually the ones who had the intent to deceive and who took
advantage of the situation. Cadet 1CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC
member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1CL Cudia in the Navy cadet
1CL, was part of the team which conducted the preliminary investigation.
Also, Cadet 1CL Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously charged Cadet 1CL
Cudia with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly, conniving
with and tutoring his fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving solutions to
a retake exam) but the charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he
was a non-voting member, he was in a position of influence and authority.
Thus, it would be a futile exercise for Cadet 1CL Cudia to resort to the
procedure for the removal of HC members.186
Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was

given to Cadet 1CL Cudia, his family, or his PAO counsel. During one of
her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was advised to
convince his son to resign and immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen.
Costales, who later became the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to
Annavee: Your brother, he lied! The CRAB conferences were merely
used to formalize his dismissal and the PMA never really intended to hear
his side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMAs clear resolve to
dismiss him no matter what.
For their part, respondents contend that the CHRs allegation that Maj.
Hindang acted in obvious bad faith and that he failed to discharge his duty to
186
Any cadet who loses confidence from any Honor Committee member may address the matter to
the Honor Committee Chairman. The Chairman then calls for a deliberation of the case and submits the
said representative to a loss of confidence vote of at least 2/3 of the Honor Committee representative seated
en banc (See The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 34 [Rollo, p. 170]).
Decision - 55 - G.R. No. 211362
be a good father of cadets when he paved the road to [Cadet 1CL Cudias]
sham trial by the Honor Committee is an unfounded accusation. They note
that when Maj. Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1CL Cudia, he revoked
the penalty awarded because of his explanation. However, all revocations of
awarded penalties are subject to the review of the STO. Therefore, it was at
the instance of Maj. Leander and the established procedure followed at the
PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to investigate the circumstances
surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudias tardiness. Respondents add that bad faith
cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to the actions
taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1CL Narciso and
Arcangel who also arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other cadets,
Cadet 1CL Cudia did not admit his being late and effectively evaded
responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales.
As to the CHRs finding that Cadet 1CL Mogol was likewise in bad
faith and determined to destroy [Cadet 1CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own
because the former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in
November 2013, respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is
groundless as there is failure to note that Cadet 1CL Mogol was a non-voting
member of the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible
honor violation since he is the HC Chairman and nothing less is expected of
him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives of the HC are elected
from each company, while the HC Chairman is elected by secret ballot from
the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1CL Cudia believed
that there was bias against him, he should have resorted to the procedure for
the removal of HC members provided for in the Honor Code Handbook.
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the

part of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1CL Cudia from graduating because the
Academy does not stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the
contrary, in view of his academic standing, the separation militates against
PMAs mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.
The Court differs with petitioners.
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some

showing of actual bias, petitioners allegations do not hold water. The mere
imputation of ill-motive without proof is speculative at best. Kolesa teaches
us that to sustain the challenge, specific evidence must be presented to
overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators;

and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring investigative and
adjudicative powers on the same individual poses such a risk of actual bias
Decision - 56 - G.R. No. 211362
or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due

process is to be implemented.187
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are
to be awarded, he is not an adversary of the cadet but an educator who
shares an identity of interest with the cadet, whom he counsels from time to
time as a future leader.188 When the occasion calls for it, cadets may be
questioned as to the accuracy or completeness of a submitted work. A
particular point or issue may be clarified. In this case, the question asked of
Cadet 1CL Cudia concerning his being late in class is proper, since there is
evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have occurred and there
is reasonable cause to believe that he was involved in the breach of
regulations.189
For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely
on the non-toleration clause of the Honor Code, i.e., We do not tolerate
those who violate the Code. Cadets are reminded that they are charged with
a tremendous duty far more superior to their personal feeling or
friendship.190 They must learn to help others by guiding them to accept the
truth and do what is right, rather than tolerating actions against truth and
justice.191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be characteristically honorable;
they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action of their
peers, seniors, or subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1CL Mogol exactly
did, although he was later proven to have erred in his accusation. Note that
even the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes that
interpretation of ones honor is generally subjective.193
Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1CL

Raguindin and Mogol as well as Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to grind
against Cadet 1CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no matter what, the
latters downfall, their nefarious conduct would still be insignificant. This is
so since the HC (both the preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB,
and the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence,
the claim that the proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a farce
because the three personalities participated therein is tantamount to implying
the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the competence, independence, and
integrity of the other members who constituted the majority. Again, in the
absence of specifics and substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give
credence to this baseless insinuation.
187
Kolesa v. Lehman, supra note 88 at 594.
188
See Hagopian v. Knowlton, supra note 87, at 210, citing Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403
(1970).
189
See The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 12-13 (Rollo, p. 159).
190
191
Id. at 20 (Id. at 163).
192
Id.
193
Id. at 7 (Id. at 156).
Decision - 57 - G.R. No. 211362
As to the HC executive session/chambering
Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in

the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia because two voting rounds took place. After
the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1CL Mogol ordered the voting
members to go to a room without the cadet recorders. Therein, the lone
dissenter, Cadet 1CL Lagura, was asked to explain his not guilty vote.
Pressured to change his vote, he was made to cast a new one finding Cadet
1CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was discarded and replaced. There was
no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was mentioned in the
HC formal report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6,

2014 was submitted by petitioners since he purportedly recalled Cadet 1CL
Lagura telling him that he was pressured to change his not guilty vote after
the voting members were chambered. In the sworn statement, Commander
Tabuada said:
1. That after CDT 1CL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I
[cannot] remember exactly the date but sometime in the morning of
23rd or 24th of January 2014, I was in my office filling up forms for the
renewal of my passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had
business with my staff;
2. When he was about to leave I called him. Lags, halika muna dito,
and he approached me and I let him sit down on the chair in front of
my table. I told and asked him, Talagang nadali si Cudia ah... ano
ba ang nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka. He replied,
Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa kanya sir, and I asked him,
Oh, bakit naging guilty di ba pag may isang nag NOT GUILTY,
abswelto na? He replied Chinamber ako sir, bale pinapa-justify
kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya
binago ko, sir. So, I told him, Sayang sya, matalino at mabait pa
naman and he replied oo nga sir. After that conversation, I let him
go.194
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it

committed voting manipulation since, under the rules, it is required to have a
unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing
in the procedure that permits the HC Chairman to order the chambering of
a member who voted contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to
reconsider in order to reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order
from the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning the HC procedure or
approving any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1.
The HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their own rules and principles as
194
Rollo, pp. 45, 147, 151.
Decision - 58 - G.R. No. 211362
embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from the established
procedures, the second deliberation should be considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote

involves a substantive right which cannot be unceremoniously changed
without a corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook. In their view, chambering totally defeats the purpose
of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly destroys the very essence and
philosophy behind the provisions of the Honor System, which is to ensure
that the voting member is free to vote what is in his or her heart and mind
and that no one can pressure or persuade another to change his or her vote.
They suggest that if one voting member acquits an accused cadet who is
obviously guilty of the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from the
HC through the vote of non-confidence as provided for in the Honor
Code.195
Anent the above arguments, respondents contend that a distinction

must be made between the concepts of the Honor Code and the Honor
System. According to them, the former sets the standard for a cadets
minimum ethical and moral behavior and does not change, while the latter is
a set of rules for the conduct of the observance and implementation of the
Honor Code and may undergo necessary adjustments as may be warranted
by the incumbent members of the HC in order to be more responsive to the
moral training and character development of the cadets. The HC may
provide guidelines when the Honor System can be used to supplement
regulations. This being so, the voting process is continuously subject to
change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict

automatically acquits a cadet from the charge of Honor violation. The voting
members only write either guilty or not guilty in the voting sheets
without stating their name or their justification. However, this situation drew
criticisms since there were instances where a reported cadet already admitted
his honor violation but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a sympathetic
voting member.
In the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice

that should the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would automatically
sanction a jury type of discussion called executive session or
chambering, which is intended to elicit the explanation and insights of the
voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny of the minority or lone dissenter
195
The Honor Committee may withdraw its confidence from any Honor Committee member and
officer by: (1) at least 2/3 vote of all its members; (2) voluntary resignation of the member; or (3) turned
back/discharged disposition. (See The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, Series 2011, p. 34 [Rollo,
p. 170]).
Decision - 59 - G.R. No. 211362
from prevailing over the manifest proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice
has been adopted and widely accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa Class of
2014 since their first year in the Academy. The allegations of conspiracy and
sham trial are, therefore, negated by the fact that such practice was in place
and applied to all cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of Cadet
1CL Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests

solely on the personal conviction of the dissenter/s, without any compulsion
from the other voting members. There can also be no pressuring to change
ones vote to speak of since a vote may only be considered as final when the
Presiding Officer has affixed his signature.
To debunk Commander Tabuadas statements, respondents raise the

argument that the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet
1CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral testimony made under oath, he
submitted to the Board/Body an affidavit explaining that:
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of

Naval Warfare to ask permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy
duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside the
Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was
about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head
Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him
and he said: Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?
At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the
Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: Wag kang mag-alala, atin,
atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. Then I answered: Ako
yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi na
pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita
[yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto
nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung
boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. He replied: Sayang si Cudia
ano? And I said: Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at
matalino.196
Cadet 1CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit

executed on March 12, 2014, which he submitted before the CHR wherein
he attested to the following:
3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for
Honor Code violation committed by Cadet Cudia, for lying. As a voting
member, we are the one who assess or investigate the case whether the
reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not.
196
Rollo, pp. 326-327, 342.
Decision - 60 - G.R. No. 211362
4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted NOT GUILTY

among the nine (9) voting members of the Honor Committee in the case of
Cdt Cudia for Lying.
5. I initially voted NOT GUILTY for the reason that after the
proceedings and before the presiding Officer told the members to vote, I
was confused of the case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered some facts from
the investigation to make my decision but for me it is not yet enough to
give my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote NOT
GUILTY with a reservation in my mind that we will still be discussing
our verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote
if I may be enlightened with the others justifications.
6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that
the vote is 8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty. By way of practice and as I
predicted, we were told to go inside the anteroom for executive meeting
and to discuss our respective justifications. I have been a member for two
(2) years and the voting committee will always go for executive meeting
whenever it will meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.
7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that
enlightened my confusions that time. I gave a thumbs-up sign and asked
for another sheet of voting paper. I then changed my vote from NOT
GUILTY to GUILTY and the voting members of the Honor Committee
came up with the final vote of nine (9) votes for guilty and zero (0) votes
for not guilty.
9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict
was GUILTY of LYING. After that, all persons inside the courtroom went
back to barracks.
10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt

Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and said: Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng
boto? I answered: Nasa process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo.
They also asked who were inside the Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt
Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt
Jocson talked to me.
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the

Department of Naval Warfare to asked (sic) permission if it is possible not
to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball
game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was
about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head
Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him
and he said: Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?
At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the
Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: Wag kang mag-alala,
atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. Then I answered:
Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi na
pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita
[yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto
nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung
boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. He replied: Sayang si Cudia
Decision - 61 - G.R. No. 211362
ano? And I said: Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at

matalino.197
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet
1CL Lagura, as the lone dissenter, was made to explain in the presence of
other HC members, who were in disagreement with him, gives a semblance
of intimidation, force, or pressure. For them, the records of the HC
proceedings, which were not presented assuming they actually exist, could
have been the best way to ensure that he was free to express his views, reject
the opinion of the majority, and stick to his decision. Also, it was pointed
out that Cadet 1CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in his affidavit why he
initially found Cadet 1CL Cudia not guilty and what made him change his
mind. His use of general statements like he was confused of the case and
saw things that enlightened my confusions could hardly suffice to
establish why he changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission of
Cadet 1CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that he was the only one
who was given another ballot sheet while in the chamber and that he
accomplished it in the barracks which he only submitted the following day.
However, as the CHR found, the announcement of the 9-0 vote was done
immediately after the HC came out from the chamber and before Cadet 1CL
Lagura submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.
We rule for respondents.
As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code

tersely provides:
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding

member of the Board will call for the members to vote whether the
accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of
GUILTY decides that a cadet is found guilty of violating the Honor
Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC

practice of conducting executive session or chambering is not at all
prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the voting procedures in actual cases
taking into account the exigency of the times. What is important is that, in
the end, there must be a unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty
of violating the Honor Code.
197
Rollo, pp. 361-362.
198
Decision - 62 - G.R. No. 211362
Granting, for arguments sake, that the HC violated its written

procedure,199 We still rule that there is nothing inherently wrong with the
practice of chambering considering that the presence of intimidation or
force cannot automatically be inferred therefrom. The essence of secret
balloting and the freedom to vote based on what is in the heart and mind of
the voting member is not necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final
voting was conducted. As explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol before the CRAB:
13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and
insights regarding the case at hand. The other members, on the other
hand, would be given the chance to explain their votes as well as their
insights to the dissenting voter. The decision to change the vote of the
dissenting voter rests solely on his personal conviction. Thus, if he [or
she] opted not to change his/her vote despite the discussion, his [or
her] vote is accorded respect by the Honor Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere

allegation is definitely not evidence. It must be substantiated and proved
because a person is presumed to be innocent of a crime or wrong and that
official duty has been regularly performed.201
The oral and written statements of Cadet 1CL Lagura should settle the
issue. Before the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he
consistently denied that he was pressured by the other voting members of the
HC. His representation must be accepted as it is regardless of whether he has
satisfactorily elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the one who
was chambered, he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt,
We have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1CL Lagura observed the Honor
Code, which clearly states that every cadet must be his or her own Final
Authority in honor; that he or she should not let other cadets dictate on him
or her their sense of honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any person
can have confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will be fair
199
During the CHR hearing, the Procedure During Formal Investigation, which was said to be a
supplement to the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook, was presented and considered. It provides as
follows:
DELIBERATION
Here, the Committee engages in an open and thorough discussion of the merits and
demerits of the case. The presiding officer then aligns the different circumstances,
mitigating and aggravating and once again present the evidences to the voting members
for examination. After which, the Presiding Officer will ask the Voting Members if all of
them are ready satisfied and are ready to vote. Just one member (not) ready to vote will
postpone the voting and continue the deliberation until all doubts are cleared.
Further,
Voting is done by secret ballots. After deliberation, the blank ballot sheets are
distributed to each of the voting members who then signify his vote by writing Guilty or
Not Guilty and justify why he write the said vote. The Presiding Officer counts the
ballots and announces the result to the Committee. (Rollo, pp. 485-486)
200
Rollo, pp. 344-345.
201
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (a) and (m).
202
Decision - 63 - G.R. No. 211362
and just in dealing with him; that his actions, words and ways are sincere
and true.203
As to the other alleged irregularities committed such as not putting

on record the initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Laguras bringing of his
ballot sheet to and accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no longer
dwell on the same for being harmless procedural errors that do not
materially affect the validity of the HC proceedings.
Cadet 1CL Cudias alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1CL Cudia did not lie. According to them,
there is no clear time reference as to when was the actual dismissal or what
was the exact time of dismissal whether it should be the dismissal inside
the room or the dismissal after the section grade was given by Dr. Costales
in the minds of Cadet 1CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators
and voting members. They claim that during long examinations, the time of
dismissal was usually five minutes before the class was set to end and the
protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was not observed. When
Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory language that Cadet 1CL Cudia perverted
the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not state what
was the true time of dismissal. He did not mention whether the truth he was
relying on was 5 or 15 minutes before the scheduled end of class.
It is also averred that Cadet 1CL Cudias only business was to ask Dr.
Costales a query such that his business was already finished as soon as she
gave an answer. However, a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales,
which is, Cadet 1CL Cudia must stay and wait for the section grade. At that
point in time, he was no longer in control of the circumstances. Petitioners
claim that Dr. Costales never categorically stated that Cadet 1CL Cudia was
lying. She recognized the confusion. Her text messages to him clarified his
alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted during its investigation that she could
not exactly recall what happened in her class on November 14, 2013.
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated

that ENG412 class started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet 1CL Cudia was
obviously not late. If, as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he was late
two (2) minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived
3:02 p.m. Respondents, however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m.
Thus, Cadet 1CL Cudia was not late.
203
Id. at 5 (Id. at 155).
Decision - 64 - G.R. No. 211362
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were

of the view that what appears to have caused confusion in the minds of
respondents is just a matter of semantics; that the entire incident was a
product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is malicious for them to insinuate that
Cadet 1CL Cudia purposely used incorrect language to hide the truth. Citing
Merriam Websters Dictionary, petitioners argue that dismiss means to
permit or cause to leave, while class refers to a body of students meeting
regularly to study the same subject. According to them, these two words do
not have definite and precise meanings but are generic terms. Other than the
words class and dismiss used by Cadet 1CL Cudia, which may actually
be used in their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about what he said.
Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong or not correct, but it is not false
or not true.
For petitioners, Cadet 1CL Cudias explanations are evidently truthful

and with no intent to deceive or mislead. He did not manipulate any fact and
was truthful of his explanation. His statements were clear and unambiguous
but were given a narrow-minded interpretation. Even the Honor Code
acknowledges that [e]xperience demonstrates that human communication
is imperfect at best, and some actions are often misinterpreted.
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1CL Cudias transcript of

records reflects not only his outstanding academic performance but proves
his good conduct during his four-year stay in the Academy. He has above-
average grades in Conduct, with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct I
to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore, far from the truth.
On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that

Cadet 1CL Cudia was obviously quibbling, which, in the military parlance,
is tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth. He lied by
making untruthful statements in his written explanation. Respondents want
Us to consider the following:
First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal
investigation, Dr. Costales testified that a class is dismissed as long as the
instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson
examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed from the time they have answered
their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his Request for
Reconsideration of Meted Punishment, We had an LE that day (14
November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood
up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales.
xxx Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia submitted his papers, he was already
considered dismissed. Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended
at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H) or a bit late.
Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to

his tardiness. After submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave and
Decision - 65 - G.R. No. 211362
attend his next class. However, he initiated a conversation with Dr.

Costales regarding their grades. He was not under instruction by Dr.
Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.
Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding

Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales clarified her statements in her
written explanation. She explained that the instruction to wait is a
response to Cadet Cudias request and that it was not her initiated
instruction. Clearly, there was no directive from Dr. Costales for Cadet
Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the contrary, it was them who
wanted to meet with the instructor.
Third, contrary to Cadet Cudias explanation, his subsequent class,

ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In the
informal review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the HC,
Professor Berong confirmed that her English class started as scheduled
(3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed,
the acting class marcher of ENG412 also testified that their class started as
scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1CL Cudia
had no intention to mislead or deceive but merely used wrong and unfitting
words in his explanations. For them, considering his academic standing, it is
highly improbable that he used incorrect language to justify his mistake.
Respondents arguments are tenable.
The issue of whether Cadet 1CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of

fact. Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts,
cannot pass upon factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and
weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. Moreover,
We reiterate the long standing rule that factual findings of administrative
tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this
case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence that the
findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported
by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the procedure
which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were committed;
or that a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest. With respect to the core issue of whether lying is present in this
case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding
that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.
204
Rollo, pp. 315-316.
Decision - 66 - G.R. No. 211362
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed

Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) states: We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat,
steal, nor tolerate among us those who do.
The First Tenet of the Honor Code is We do not lie. Cadets violate
the Honor Code by lying if they make an oral or written statement which is
contrary to what is true or use doubtful information with the intent to
deceive or mislead.205 It is expected that every cadets word is accepted
without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is true without qualification; and
that the cadets must answer directly, completely and truthfully even though
the answer may result in punitive action under the CCPB and CCAFPR.206
To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013,

Cadet 1CL Cudia justified that: I came directly from OR432 Class. We
were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir. Subsequently, in his
Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander, he
reasoned out as follows:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th

class without any intention of being late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1CL Cudia
committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has

been defined in one U.S. case as follows:
A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by
cleverly wording what he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial
truth. When he knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead, he
is quibbling. Because it is an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of
lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead
of directly and completely telling the cause of his being late in the ENG412
class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts,
thereby, telling a half-truth.
205
206
Id. at 9, 12 (Id. at 157, 159).
207
Rollo, pp. 34, 139.
208
Birdwell v. Schlesinger, supra note 101, at 714.
Decision - 67 - G.R. No. 211362
The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have

committed an honor violation are:
1. The act and/or omission, and

2. The intent pertinent to it.
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but
intent to commit or omit the act itself.209
The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally

are:
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the

honorable thing.210
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but

must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore, can only be proved
by unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.211 In this
case, Cadet 1CL Cudias intent to deceive is manifested from the very act of
capitalizing on the use of the words dismiss and class. The truth of the
matter is that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of an
educational institution, does not correspond to what Cadet 1CL Cudia is
trying to make it appear. In that sense, the words are not generic and have
definite and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1CL Cudia, Miranda,

Arcangel, and Narciso already constitute a class. The Court cannot agree
that such term includes every transaction and communication a teacher
does with her students. Clearly, it does not take too much intelligence to
conclude that Cadet 1CL Cudia should have been accurate by pinpointing
who were with him when he was late in the next class. His deceptive
explanation is made more obvious when compared with what Cadets 1CL
Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which was: We
approached our instructor after our class.212
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November

14, 2013 was five or fifteen minutes ahead of the scheduled end of class.
209
210
Id. at 22 (Id. at 164).
211
Feeder Intl. Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 1143, 1152-1153 (1991).
212
Rollo, p. 472.
Decision - 68 - G.R. No. 211362
Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for Cadet
1CL Cudia, consistently admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR that he was already dismissed when
he passed his LE paper.213 During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also
declared that she merely responded to his request to see the results of the
UE1 and that she had reservations on the phrases under my instruction
and dismissed a bit late used in his letter of explanation to the HC. In
addition, Dr. Costales manifested her view before the CHR that the act of
Cadet 1CL Cudia of inquiring about his grade outside their classroom after
he submitted his LE paper is not part of the class time because the
consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a new business was initiated
by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1CL Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the
section grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a
responsible cadet who is fully aware of the time constraint has the last say,
that is, to politely decline the invitation and immediately go to the next class.
This was not done by Cadet 1CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that he
already lost control over the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1CL Cudia cunningly chose words

which led to confusion in the minds of respondents and eventually
commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter of semantics and a
product of plain and simple inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts and
presentation of untruthful explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1CL Cudia. While
his Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding
academic performance but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during
his four-year stay in the PMA,215 it does not necessarily follow that he is
innocent of the offense charged. It is enough to say that evidence that one
did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time.216 While the
TOR may be received to prove his identity or habit as an exceptional PMA
student, it does not show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet
accused of committing a specific Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
213
Id. at 353, 356, 465.
214
Id. at 465.
215
Cadet 1CL Cudia obtained the following final grades in his subjects on Conduct: Conduct I - 97;
Conduct II - 97; Conduct III - 100; Conduct IV - 100; Conduct V - 100; Conduct VI - 100; Conduct VII -
100; Conduct VIII - 99; Conduct IX - 100; Conduct X - 99; and Conduct XI - 96 (Rollo, pp. 197-199).
216
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 34.
Decision - 69 - G.R. No. 211362
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants

separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps
Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the
Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which merits a
recommendation for a cadets dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The
same is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook.
Cadet 1CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that the Honor Code does
not accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no difference
between a little lie and a huge falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the
Honor Code has always been considered as an absolute yardstick against
which cadets have measured themselves ever since the PMA began and that
the Honor Code and System seek to assure that only those who are able to
meet the high standards of integrity and honor are produced by the PMA. As
held in Andrews, it is constitutionally permissible for the military to set and
enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics. Thus, in
violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate
from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet

breached the Honor Code, the offense warrants his or her dismissal since
such a policy may be the only means to maintain and uphold the spirit of
integrity in the military.217 They maintain though that in Cadet 1CL Cudias
case there is no need to distinguish between a little lie and a huge
falsehood since he did not lie at all. Absent any intent to deceive and to
take undue advantage, the penalty imposed on him is considered as unjust
and cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the penalty of
dismissal is not commensurate to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with
honors and what he allegedly committed does not amount to an academic
deficiency or an intentional and flagrant violation of the PMA non-academic
rules and regulations. Citing Non, petitioners argue that the penalty imposed
must be proportionate to the offense. Further, Isabelo, Jr. is squarely
applicable to the facts of the case. Cadet 1CL Cudia was deprived of his
right to education, the only means by which he may have a secure life and
future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied
and his acceptance that violation of the Honor Code warrants the ultimate
penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to
resolve. Indeed, the sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet 1CL Cudia, by
contract, risked this when he entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in
Andrews219 wherein it was held that, while the penalty is severe, it is
nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of
due process. It quoted the disposition of the district court, thus:
217
Rollo, p. 424.
218
See Cody v. Scott, supra note 101, at 1035.
219
Cited in the subsequent case of Ringgold v. United States, supra note 175, at 703.
Decision - 70 - G.R. No. 211362
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a
finding that he has violated the Honor Code is known to all cadets even
prior to the beginning of their careers there. The finding of a Code
violation by hypothesis includes a finding of scienter on the part of the
offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and tragic consequence
of a cadet's transgression, it is not an unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but
rather a reasonable albeit severe method of preventing men who have
suffered ethical lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of
admonitions or lesser penalties for single violations might be more
compassionate -- or even more effective in achieving the intended result --
is quite immaterial to the question of whether the harsher penalty violates
due process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHRs
recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a constitutional body mandated by
the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights, and to conduct investigative monitoring
of economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of
society. Further, it was contended that the results of CHRs investigation and
recommendations are so persuasive that this Court, on several occasions like
in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural Resources221 and Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,222 gave its findings serious
consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the Court to hear what an
independent and unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on

Human Rights223 ruled that the CHR is merely a recommendatory body that
is not empowered to arrive at a conclusive determination of any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely
recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that
the CHRs constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.224 As
held in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of
subsequent cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of
220
Andrews v. Knowlton, supra note 85, at 908, citing White v. Knowlton, 361 F. Supp. 445, 449.
221
400 Phil. 904 (2000).
222
G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32.
223
G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994, 229 SCRA 117.
224
CONSTITUTION, Art. XIII, Sec. 18 (1).
225
G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483.
226
Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. The Phil. Cement Manufacturers Corp., 478 Phil. 85 (2004); and
Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1972, 208
SCRA 125.
Decision - 71 - G.R. No. 211362
justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to adjudicate claims

on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to investigate
is not the same as adjudication:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of

adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
xxxx
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these
terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,

inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of investigate is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official
probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation,
of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o

follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track;
to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find
out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x x an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to

adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the
parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment
on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide
or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to
award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x x."
J
Decision - 72 - G.R. No. 211362
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of

judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a judicial
226
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment. "
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages
in accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The
dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him
of a future. Cliche though it may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the
"be-all and end-all" of his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may
still continue to pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without
suffering the stigma attached to his or her dismissal. For one, as suggested
by respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the
enlistment and reenlistment in the APP Regular Force, provides under
Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall be given to, among others, the ex-
PMA or PAFFFS cadets. 227 If the positions open does not appeal to his
interest for being way below the rank he could have achieved as a PMA
graduate, Cadet 1CL Cudia could still practice other equally noble
profession or calling that is best suited to his credentials, competence, and
potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that choice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet

First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
226
Carino v. Commission on Human Rights, supra note 222, at 495-496.
227
Rollo, pp. 367-375.
Decision - 73 - G.R. No. 211362
,
ANTONIO T. CAR LASCO,JR.
Associate Justice
~~4~ On leave
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
.,-
~~
. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
::--
J REZ
Associate Just,.-;- -
JOSE CAT~NDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Asij:;eLJ:1tice Associate Justice
'
4~
IACJ,
ESTELA l\f. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
No Part
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
,
. ,, ..
Decision - 74 - G.R. No. 211362
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
fKUcCOPY
~
ENRIQUV'A ES4;;UERRA~V10AI.
Clerk of Court
OCC-En Banc
Suoreme Court

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FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN G.R. No. 211362

The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal

and the Spirit of the Honor Code it is championing truth and

The Procedural Antecedents

A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014,

After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed

Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to

On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical

In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL

On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj.

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th

A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his

On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj.

Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol

Later, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the

We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class.

With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:

1. How could this be lying?

I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be

I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under

And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended

5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and

7. Cadet 1cl DIAZ D Co can also stand as a witness that I waited

On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a

On January 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia filed a written appeal

Reference: Para 171.0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal

It is stated in this reference that Cadets shall not linger in the

The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two

I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11

In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my

These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my

Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24,

1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with

a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.

From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the

Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the

On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the

Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation

On February 13, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia submitted a letter to the

Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee), the sister of Cadet

On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr.

Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa

On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief

furnished with a copy of relevant documents because of confidentiality and

On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President

their appeal, requests, and other concerns. According to respondents, the

In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your

Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final

Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office

2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the

3. The Public Attorneys Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia

6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed

7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law