SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123555. January 22, 1999]

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

May the lessee which instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an action for forcible entry with damages against its lessor file a
separate suit with the Regional Trial Court against the same lessor for moral and exemplary damages plus actual and compensatory
damages based on the same forcible entry?
On grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping, petitioner invokes established jurisprudence that a party cannot by varying the form
of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case evade the principle that the same cause of action shall not be
litigated twice between the same parties or their privies.[1] Petitioner therefore prays for reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 27 May 1995, as well as its Resolution dated 17 January 1996 denying reconsideration, which upheld the denial by the Regional
Trial Court of petitioner's motion to dismiss private respondent's damage suit.

The antecedents: On 27 May 1991 petitioner leased to private respondent Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a
commercial building thereon located at Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of nine (9) years and three (3) months, i.e.,
from 2 January 1989 to 30 April 1998, with a monthly rental of approximately P600,000.00. The contract contained, among others, the
following pertinent terms and conditions:

EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS
25. LESSEE hereby agrees that all the provisions contained in this Contract shall be deemed as conditions, as well as covenants,
and that this Contract shall be automatically terminated and cancelled without resorting to court action should LESSEE violate
any or all said conditions, including the payment of Rent, CUSA and other charges indicated in the FLP when due within the
time herein stipulated and in any such cases, LESSEE hereby irrevocably appoints LESSOR, its authorized agents, employees
and/or representatives as his duly authorized attorney-in-fact, even after the termination, expiration or cancellation
of this Contract, with full power and authority to open, enter, repossess, secure, enclose, fence and otherwise take full and complete
physical possession and control of the leased premises and its contents without resorting to court action and/or to summarily
disconnect electrical and/or water services thereof, and that LESSEE hereby irrevocably empowers LESSOR, his authorized agents,
employees and/or representatives to take inventory and possession of whatever equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise,
appliances, etc., found therein belonging to LESSEE, consignors and/or to any other persons and to place the same in LESSORs
warehouse or any other place at LESSORs discretion for safekeeping; charging LESSEE the corresponding storage fees therefor; that
in case LESSEE fails to claim said equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, appliances, etc. from storage and
simultaneously liquidate any liability with LESSOR within seven (7) days from date of said transfer to LESSORs warehouse,
LESSOR is likewise hereby expressly authorized and empowered by LESSEE to dispose of said property/properties in a public
sale through a Notary Public of LESSORs choice and to apply the proceeds thereof to whatever liability and/or indebtedness
LESSEE may have to LESSOR plus reasonable expenses for the same, including storage fees, and the balance, if any, shall be turned
over to LESSEE; that LESSEE hereby expressly agrees that any or all acts performed by LESSOR, his authorized agents, employees
and/or representatives under the provisions of this Section may not be the subject of any petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Mandatory Injunction in court, and that LESSOR and/or his authorized agents, employees, and/or representatives shall be free from
any civil and/or criminal liability or responsibility whatsoever therefor.

TERMINATION OF LEASE
26. Upon the automatic termination of this lease contract, as the case may be, LESSEE shall immediately vacate and redeliver
physical possession of the leased premises, including the keys appertaining thereto, to LESSOR in good, clean and sanitary
condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, devoid of all occupants, equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, etc., belonging to
LESSEE or to any other person except those belonging to LESSOR; that should LESSEE fail to comply with this provision, LESSOR is
hereby given the same rights and power to proceed against LESSEE as expressly granted in the immediately preceding section.

Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by petitioner. As of 19 October 1992 the arrearages amounted
to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of rentals constituted breach of their contract; thus, pursuant to the express authority
granted petitioner under the above-quoted Secs. 25 and 26 of the lease agreement, petitioner on 31 October 1992 repossessed the
leased premises, inventoried the movable properties found within and owned by private respondent and scheduled public auction for
the sale of the movables on 19 August 1993 with notice to private respondent.

On 26 November 1992 private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner for
forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.[2] The case was raffled
to Branch 40 presided over by Judge Guillermo L. Loja Jr. who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from selling
private respondents properties at a public auction.

On 9 December 1992 Judge Loja inhibited himself from trying the case and directed its transfer to Branch 34 presided over by Judge
Joselito SD Generoso. Soon after, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the inhibition of Judge Generoso and the immediate reraffle of
the case arguing that the summary transfer of the case to Judge Generoso was irregular as it was not done by raffle.

The motion was granted and the case went to Branch 36 presided over by Judge Francisco D. Villanueva. Thereafter, on 22 December
1992, at the continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a writ preliminary mandatory injunction, the parties agreed, among others,
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on the following: (a) private respondent would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in the name of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, the amount of P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back rentals; (b) petitioner would
defer the sale of the personal properties of the Westin Seafood Market, Inc., until a final settlement of the case had been arrived at; (c)
petitioner shall allow private respondent to retrieve all the perishable goods from inside the leased premises like frozen meat,
vegetables and fish, all properly receipted for; (d) petitioner shall allow three (3) maintenance personnel of private respondent to enter
the premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the restaurant equipment; and (e) the parties shall negotiate for the restoration of
the premises to private respondent, and if no settlement be arrived at on or before January 8, 1993, the hearing on the merits of the
case shall proceed and the disposition of the amount deposited representing the rental arrearages shall be left to the discretion of the
court.

This agreement was incorporated in the order of the court dated 22 December 1992 [3] which in effect terminated for all intents and
purposes the incident on the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction.

Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the designated bank the amount representing its back
rentals. Instead, with the forcible entry case still pending with the MeTC, private respondent instituted on 9 June 1993 another action for
damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 101 presided over by Judge
Pedro T. Santiago.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping. On 2 July 1993, instead of
ruling on the motion, Judge Santiago issued an order archiving the case pending the outcome of the forcible entry case being heard at
the MeTC for the reason that "the damages is (sic) principally anchored on whether or not the defendants (petitioner herein) have
committed forcible entry."[5] On 2 August 1993 petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order and reiterated its motion to dismiss the
suit for damages.

Before petitioner's motion to dismiss could be resolved, private respondent filed with the RTC on 18 August 1993 an amended
complaint for damages. On 14 September 1993 it also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Motion for the Grant of a Preliminary Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. On the very same day, Judge
Santiago issued an order (a) denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b) admitting private respondent's amended complaint, and (c)
granting private respondent's application for a temporary restraining order against petitioner.

Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition on the ground that Judge Santiago
acted in excess of his jurisdiction and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended
complaint of private respondent and issuing a restraining order against petitioner; in allowing private respondent to engage in forum
shopping; and, taking cognizance of the action for damages despite lack of jurisdiction. [6]

But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to the failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of Judge Santiago's
order of 14 September 1993 which, it explained, was a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It also
found that the elements of litis pendencia were lacking to justify the dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC because despite
the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC the only damages recoverable thereat were those caused by the loss of the use
and occupation of the property and not the kind of damages being claimed before the RTC which had no direct relation to loss
of material possession. It clarified that since the damages prayed for in the amended complaint with the RTC were those caused by the
alleged high-handed manner with which petitioner reacquired possession of the leased premises and the sale of private respondents
movables found therein, the RTC and not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action of damages. [7]

Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court alleging that it erred in (a) finding that petitioner failed to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a prior motion for
reconsideration with the RTC; (b) ruling that the trial judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the action
for damages and injunction despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC; and, (c) ruling that private respondent did
not commit forum shopping since the causes of action before the RTC and MeTC were not identical with each other.

There is merit in the petition. While generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give
the lower court an opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it [8] this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without
considering the circumstances of the case. [9] The filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorariis
not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of law,[10] or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void,[11] or the
questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.

In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner raised the ground that another action for forcible entry was
pending at the MeTC between the same parties involving the same matter and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the
same issue was elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under the prevailing circumstance, any motion
for reconsideration of the trial court would have been a pointless exercise. [12]

We now turn to the issue of whether an action for damages filed with the Regional Trial Court by the lessee against the lessor
should be dismissed on the ground of pendency of another action for forcible entry and damages earlier filed by the same
lessee against the same lessor before the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an
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action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, together with
damages and costs. The mandate under this rule is categorical: that all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed
before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages
and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed
separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.

This is consistent with the principle laid down in Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which states that the pendency of
another action between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for dismissal of an action. Res adjudicata requires that there
must be between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action the following elements: (a) identity of parties or at least such
as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration.[13]

It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party may not institute more than one
suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or others.
"Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by which a party violates a right of another.[14] These
premises obtaining, there is no question at all that private respondent's cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for
damages is the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs
arise. Simply stated, the restoration of possession and demand for actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand
for damages with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by petitioner into the leased premises.

A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not
only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but
also that the claim for damages - moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory - constitutes splitting a single cause of
action. Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations

2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor,
Seafood Market (hereinafter Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao,
Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998.

2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff established and now operates
thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual, continuous, and peaceful physical
possession of the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992.
xxxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to
the exclusion of all others, including defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain
possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior number of men and arms amounts
to the taking of the law into their own hands.

3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving
it of possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation should be condemned and declared illegal for being
contrary to public order and policy.

3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises
and restore possession thereof, together with its contents, to plaintiff.
xxxx
4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void,
defendant should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the afore described damages which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.

The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases
for the relief prayed for, to wit:

4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up
to April 30, 1998 over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at
the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as
Annex A.

5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject Premises, and established thereon the now famous
Seafood Market Restaurant.
xxxx

7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the benefit of any writ of possession or any lawful court
order and with the aid of approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the supervision of defendant
Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises through force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute force and in
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a thunderboltish manner and against plaintiffs will, unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the
subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural possession of the subject premises. The
illegal, high-handed manner and gestapo like take-over by defendants of subject premises is more particularly described as
follows: x x x

8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures
and equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute an
unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of property against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell
at public auction and without the consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and
at prices way below the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex B the letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993
addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the
plaintiff presently in defendants possession.
xxxx

12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring
the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff
has filed the present suit for the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x

Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the
leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by
the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses
suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the
use of the premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorney's fees and costs of suit.

On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and
exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages ofP20,000,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00
representing unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the
leased premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the
MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.

The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these sprung from the main incident being
heard before the MeTC. Jurisprudence is unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong is committed - like the unlawful taking or
detention of the property of another - there is but one single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been
violated, and all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint as constituting one single cause of action.[15] In a forcible entry
case, the real issue is the physical possession of the real property. The question of damages is merely secondary or incidental, so
much so that the amount thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking
possession of a piece of land by means of force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict
or wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of possession and recovery of damages arising
from the loss of possession, but only to one action. For obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and
independent actions, one for recovery of possession only, and the other, for the recovery of damages. That would inevitably lead to
what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action. [16] In David v. de la Cruz[17] we observed -

Herein tenants have but one cause of action against their landlord, their illegal ejectment or removal from their landholdings, which
cause of action however entitles them to two (2) claims or remedies - for reinstatement and damages. As both claims arise from the
same cause of action, they should be alleged in a single complaint.

A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be recovered in one case and the rest, in
another.[18] In Bachrach v. Icarangal[19] we explained that the rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of the controversy and to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo debet bis vexari
pro una et eadem causa.

What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule is that all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint,
it goes without saying that those not therein included cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints for they are barred forever.[20] If a
suit is brought for a part of a claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the
residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second form of action is not identical with the first or different grounds for relief are set for
the second suit. This principle not only embraces what was actually determined, but also extends to every matter which the parties
might have litigated in the case.[21] This is why the legal basis upon which private respondent anchored its second claim for damages,
i.e., Art. 1659 in relation to Art. 1654 of the Civil Code, [22] not otherwise raised and cited by private respondent in the forcible entry case,
cannot be used as justification for the second suit for damages. We note, not without some degree of displeasure, that by filing a
second suit for damages, private respondent was not only able to press a claim for moral and exemplary damages which by its failure
to allege the same in its suit before the MeTC foreclosed its right to sue on it, but it was also able to obtain from the RTC, by way
of another temporary restraining order, a second reprieve from an impending public auction sale of its movables which it could not
anymore secure from the MeTC before which the matter of the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction was already closed.

The foregoing discussions provide sufficient basis to petitioner's charge that private respondent and its counsel in the trial courts
committed forum shopping. In Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission[23] we ruled -

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There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies x x x with respect to suits filed in the courts x x x in connection with litigations
commenced in the court x x x in anticipation of an unfavorable x x x ruling and a favorable case where the court in which the second
suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.

This Court likewise elucidated in New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission [24] that there is forum shopping
when the actions involve the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances. The reason behind the proscription of
forum shopping is obvious. This unnecessarily burdens our courts with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the manpower and
financial resources of the judiciary and trifles with and mocks our judicial processes, thereby adversely affecting the efficient
administration of justice. This condemnable conduct has prompted the Court to issue circulars [25]ordering among others that a violation
thereof shall be cause for the dismissal of the case or cases without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or
party concerned.

The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by private respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City contained
no certification of non-forum shopping. When petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among others the ground of forum
shopping it pointed out the absence of the required certification. The amended complaint, as well as the second and third amended
complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably stating that there was no other action pending between the parties involving the
same causes of action although there was actually a forcible entry case pending before the MTC of Quezon City. By its admission of a
pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private respondent was indulging in forum shopping. While private respondent
conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it had likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the same forcible entry, the fact
remains that it precisely did so, which stratagem was being duplicated in the second case.This is a compelling reason to dismiss the
second case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 September 1995 and the Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 24 September 1993 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-93-16409, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development Corporation,
et al.," and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City to proceed with the proper disposition of Civil Case No. 6589, "Westin Seafood
Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development Corporation, et al.," with dispatch considering the summary nature of the case. Treble costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

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 SECOND DIVISION

CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its G.R. No. 170916

President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN M.
BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO, Present:
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., April 27, 2007
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284, to
wit: Order[1] dated August 26, 2005 which dismissed petitioners complaint for damages on the ground of prematurity, and
Order[2] dated January 2, 2006 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In issue is one of law whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for damages arising after the act of
dispossession had occurred.

CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public
land in Barangay Bulanon, SagayCity, Negros Occidental even before the notarized separate Fishpond Lease Agreement Nos.
5674,[3] 5694[4] and 5695[5] in their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of
twenty-five (25) years or until December 31, 2024.

On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and once
inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners fishponds, and harvested
several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.

On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible
Entry With Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 1331,[6] 1332[7] and
1333,[8] against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent.

In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No, 04-12284, alleging,inter alia,

V
That prior to the issuance of the fishpond lease agreement in favor of the plaintiffs, they had already been in open and continuous
possession of the same parcel of land;

VI
As lessee and in possession of the above[-]described fishpond, plaintiffs have continuously occupied, cultivated and developed the said
fishpond and since then, had been regularly harvesting milkfish, shrimps, mud crabs and other produce of the fishponds;

VII
That the yearly income of the fishpond of the plaintiff corporation is at least P300,000.00 more or less, while the yearly income of the
fishpond of plaintiff Herman Benedicto, Sr. is at least P100,000.00 more or less, and the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff
Alberto Benedicto is at least P100,000.00 more or less;

VIII
That sometime last November 18, 2000 or thereabout, defendant Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed men and with the help of the
blue guards from the Negros Veterans Security Agency forcibly and unlawfully entered the fishponds of the plaintiffs and once inside
barricaded the entrance of the fishpond and set up barb wire fence along the road going to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish
and carted away several tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs;

IX
That on succeeding days, defendants men continued their forage on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and taking away the
remaining full grown milkfish, fry and fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds. NOT ONLY THAT, even the chapel built by
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plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the materials taken away by defendants men.Religious icons were also
stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons;

XIII
That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction of defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men on the fishpond leased and
possessed by the plaintiffs is without any authority of law and in violation of Article 539 of the New Civil Code which states:

Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or
restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and rules of the Court.[9] (Underscoring supplied) and praying for the
following reliefs:

1) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the sum of at least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and
Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at least P300,000.00 each by way ofactual damages and such other amounts as proved during the trial;

2) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each as moral damages;

3) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages;

4) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs with all such
sums paid to their counsel by way of appearance fees. [10](Underscoring supplied)

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] petitioners complaint for damages on three

grounds litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping.

By the assailed Order[12] of August 26, 2005, Branch 43 of the Bacolod RTC dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground
of prematurity, it holding that a complaint for damages may only be maintained after a final determination on the forcible entry cases
has been made.

Hence, the present petition for review.

The only issue is whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can independently institute
and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the
premises.

Petitioners meet the issue in the affirmative. Respondents assert otherwise.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the
defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either
party and award costs as justice requires. (Emphasis supplied)

The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to rents or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises or fair rental value of the property and attorneys fees and costs. [13]

The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas[14] reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of damages that may be recovered in an
action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property:

Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of
the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages
which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the
use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of
material possession. x x x[15] (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied; citations omitted)

Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.[16]

In asserting the negative of the issue, respondent cites the 1999 case of Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.[17] In this case, Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. (Progressive), as lessor, repossessed the leased premises from
the lessee allegedly pursuant to their contract of lease whereby it was authorized to do so if the lessee failed to pay monthly
rentals. The lessee filed a case for forcible entry with damages against Progressive before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
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ofQuezon City. During the pendency of the case, the lessee filed an action for damages before the RTC, drawing Progressive to file a
motion to dismiss based on litis pendentia.The RTC denied the motion.

On appeal by Progressive, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC order denying the motion to dismiss.

Progressive brought the case to this Court. Citing Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, this Court reversed the lower courts ruling, it
holding that all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the
plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs therefrom. In other words, this Court held that no claim for
damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration of
possession.[18] (Underscoring supplied)

In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the therein two complaints, thus:

A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not
only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but
also that the claim for damages moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory constitutes splitting a single cause of
action. Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.

The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations

2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor,
Seafood Market (hereinafter Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA
corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998.

2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff established and now operates
thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual, continuous, and peaceful physical
possession of the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992.

3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to
the exclusion of all others, including defendants herein.

3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain
possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior number of men and arms amounts
to the taking of the law into their own hands.

3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving it
of possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation should be condemned and declared illegal for being
contrary to public order and policy.

3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises
and restore possession thereof, together with its contents to plaintiff.

4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void,
defendant should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.

The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases
for the relief prayed for, to wit:

4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up
to April 30, 1998 over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at
the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao,Quezon City. A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as
Annex A.

5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject Premises, and established thereon the now famous
Seafood Market Restaurant.

7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the benefit of any writ of possession or any lawful court order and
with the aid of approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the supervision of defendant Tejam, forcibly
entered the subject premises through force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute force and in a thunderboltish manner
and against plaintiffs will, unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff
of its actual, physical and natural possession of the subject premises. The illegal high-handed manner of gestapo like take-over by
defendants of subject premises is more particularly described as follows: x x x x

8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures
and equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute
an unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of property against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to
sell at public auction and without the consent, of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff
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and at prices way below the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex B the letter from defendants dated August 6,
1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties
of the plaintiff presently in defendants possession.

12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring
the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff
has filed the present suit for the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x[19] (Emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)

Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in Progressive, observed:

Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the
leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs(denominated by private respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by
the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee, (b) the claim foractual damages due to the losses
suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the
use of the premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorneys fees and costs of suit.

On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and
exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00
representing unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorneys fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the
leased premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible entry case before
the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot berelitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.

The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these sprung from the main incident being
heard before the MeTC. x x x[20] (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their
claim for damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with respondents alleged harvesting
and carting away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds,ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by
petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of
dispossession had occurred.

Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for
damages.[21]

Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use
and occupation of the premises and attorneys fees.[22]

Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or
where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.[23]

Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by
the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated August 26, 2005 and January 2, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, in
Civil Case No. 04-12284 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, is directed to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 04-12284 to its docket and to conduct
proceedings thereon with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

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 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16797 February 27, 1963

RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SOCORRO A. RAMOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Gelasio L. Dimaano for plaintiffs-appellees.

Vicente K. Aranda for defendants-appellants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal on points of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-4232.

The record is to the effect that on 24 November 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea Soriano de Dizon
sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date, eleven (11) parcels of land situated in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, and
covered by their corresponding certificates of title, for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid P5,000.00 down, P2,500.00
in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the Philippine National Bank, and agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within
ninety (90) days. To secure the said balance, the vendee Socorro A. Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven parcels in
favor of the vendors. By way of additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her children, Enrique, Antonio, Milagros,
and Lourdes, and as judicial guardian of her minor child Angelita Ramos, executed another mortgage on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta
Estate.

Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage, this action for foreclosure of the mortgage
was filed by the vendors-mortgagees in the court below, on 29 April 1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that
the plaintiffs previously had filed action against her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on 24 February 1959 for the recovery of
P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that at the time this first suit was filed, the
mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable; that plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single cause of action, and
under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a defense that could be ple aded in
abatement of the second suit. Upon opposition by the plaintiffs, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss;
but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special defense in her answer. After trial, on 16 December 1959, the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City rendered judgment against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12% interest from 24
February 1959 until payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit; and further decreed the foreclosure
sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within ninety (90) days.

Socorro Ramos appealed directly to this Court, and here insists that the action should be dismissed on account of the alleged splitting
of appellee's cause of action, and that the obligation not having fixed a period, although one was intended, the court below should have
set first a date of maturity before ordering payment or foreclosure.

We find no merit in the appeal.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila shows that it was based on
appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in
the present action was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was,
therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage was constituted on lands situated in Quezon City, the
appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not
apply.

On the second assignment of error: the stipulation in the mortgage contract that the obligation for P96,000.00 was to be

without interest, payable within ninety (90) days from this date, provided that in case of default it shall bear interest at the rate
of 12% per annum,

clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated twelve per cent in case of default being nothing more than a penalty, designed to induce
the debtor to pay on or before the expiration of the ninety (90) days. Hence, there was no call upon the court to set another due date.

Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

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